8

Security and Nuclear Issues After the Second World War

The use of nuclear technology for warfare was unknown to the world before the Second World War. With the use of hydrogen bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during this war, the devastating effects of nuclear weapons came to light. It became evident that nuclear weapons had far more destructive powers than conventional weapons, and a nation’s ability to produce nuclear weapons would give it an advantage over others in terms of national security and international importance. The United States was the first nation to acquire and use nuclear weapons, but was soon followed by the Soviet Union that produced its own nuclear device in 1949. Soon a race for acquiring nuclear weapons started around the world and it posed a serious challenge to the maintenance of international peace and security after the Second World War. With two superpowers possessing nuclear weapons, the Cold War became intense and international security was in real danger. The dreadful event of a nuclear war between the two superpowers during the Cold War continuously threatened the goal of a peaceful world that the United Nations (UN), and other world leaders had envisioned. The world was facing an unprecedented security crisis with the advent of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons (these are together referred to as ‘weapons of mass destruction’ or WMDs) and the consequential politics surrounding the WMDs. The post–Second World War international order was new to such politics, and efforts started soon to deal with this new threat to global security and peace. Among the WMDs, nuclear weapons initially constituted the most dangerous threat to the world. As a consequence, Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (NPR) was one of the first attempts to make the world free of WMDs after the Second World War.

After the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies, when the awesome and destructive power of nuclear weapons became apparent, some nations were keen on pursuing policies that would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. After the Second World War was over, in 1946, the United States advocated the Baruch Plan (designed by the American atomic scientist Bernard Baruch) that called for international control over all nuclear weapons. But the Soviet Union, still in pursue of its first nuclear bomb, as also due to the apprehension of West Bloc’s supremacy in nuclear politics, rejected this plan. In 1953, the US President Eisenhower proposed an ‘atoms for peace’ plan to the UN General Assembly. This proposal reflected the ideals of the earlier Baruch Plan. In 1957, following the Eisenhower proposal of 1953, the Atoms for Peace Treaty (APT) came into force. The Soviet Union, already a nuclear power, agreed to sign the APT. The APT also created, in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that was given the task of monitoring the use of nuclear energy. The IAEA, an autonomous body affiliated to the UN, was later assigned the work of ensuring that nuclear materials used for energy production are not diverted towards military activities. The Baruch Plan, the APT and the creation of the IAEA marked the beginning of what is today called the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (NPR).

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed in 1963 in Moscow banning all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space. While the United States, Soviet Union and Britain signed the Treaty, France and China did not, reducing greatly the effectiveness of the PTBT. But the quest for complete global disarmament continued under the NPR, and the two superpowers were involved in these efforts. After the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964, the Soviet Union and the United States began to favour stringent nonproliferation norms. American president Lyndon Johnson and Soviet leader Nikita Kruschev, along with other world leaders (prominent among them was Frank Eiken, the Foreign Minister of Ireland), started working on a treaty that could prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. Finally, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was mooted. The treaty was opened for signature in 1968, although it entered into force in March 1970. Ireland and Finland were the first countries to sign this treaty. Till date, 189 countries have signed it, while India, Pakistan and Israel have declined to sign. North Korea signed the treaty, but withdrew from it in 2003. The NPT is a multilateral treaty mutually agreed upon by the ratifying countries. Initially, it was conceived for a period of twenty-five years with the provision for review every five years. But the signing states decided by consensus to extend the NPT indefinitely and without any conditions at the Fifth Review Conference of the NPT in 1995 in New York City.

The NPT has three major thrust areas, sometimes described by scholars as the three ‘pillars’ of the treaty. They are: (1) nonproliferation; (2) disarmament and (3) the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Provisions have been enumerated in the treaty to achieve these three objectives. When the treaty came into force in 1970, there were five declared nuclear-weapon-possessing countries in the world—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, China and France. These five states were described as the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) by the treaty. The remaining signatories to the treaty were refereed to as non-nuclear-weapon states. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has become the sole successor of the Soviet Union as a NWS.

Important Articles of the NPT

Experts consider the NPT a major arms control device since the Second World War. This necessitates a brief analysis of the important articles in the NPT in order to realize its essence. In Article I, the NWS pledge not to transfer nuclear explosive devices or the means to produce them to non-weapon states. Article II obligates the non-weapon states not to receive nuclear explosive devices or attempt at acquiring them. It also prohibits non-weapon states from receiving any kind of assistance for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Article III requires all non-weapon states to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of the safeguards of the agency on all nuclear activities, and for accounting for all nuclear materials. Article IV, in its two sections, gives all signatories the ‘inalienable right’ to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It further provides:

All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

By Article VI of the NPT, all the signatories, particularly the NWS, pledge to work towards cessation of the nuclear arms race and universal nuclear disarmament. They also pledge to work for a ‘treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’. Article X contains the provision of withdrawal from the treaty. It allows each party to the treaty to withdraw from it with three months’ notice. The provisions contained in the NPT make it a legal document designed to encourage nations in making political commitment to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, it may be pointed out, the NPT is only a voluntary commitment without adequate mechanism for enforcement.

India, Pakistan and the NPT

As noted earlier, India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT despite the treaty being ratified by 189 other nations. What are the Indian and the Pakistani positions vis-à-vis the NPT? Although these two countries of South Asia share some common perceptions about the NPT, they had put forward separate arguments for their refusal to sign the NPT. Both are of the opinion that the NPT is inherently discriminatory as it had created imbalances in the possession, use and distribution of nuclear energy. Further, the treaty had placed the NWS in an advantageous position vis-à-vis non-weapon states. It also failed to address the security concerns of the non-weapon states of the developing world. Apart from these common grounds, India and Pakistan had taken different paths for their refusal to sign the NPT.

India had been opposing the NPT on several grounds. Indian views on NPT could be succinctly summarized as follows: (1) the treaty is discriminatory as it allows the NWS, the nuclear ‘haves’, to gain absolute control over nuclear energy. It is possible for them to use the provisions in the treaty to deprive the non-weapon states of the important nuclear technology; (2) the NPT provides little security cover to the non-weapon states. These countries feel militarily threatened, and are extremely wary that nuclear weapons could be used against them to gain political mileage; (3) there must be a comprehensive, genuine and non-discriminatory ban on all nuclear tests, in the spirit of Article VI of the NPT. But unfortunately, Article VI had been violated several times by the NWS. As a result, complete disarmament could not be achieved; (4) nuclear issues in South Asia are not strictly regional in nature; they may have extra-regional effects. So, such issues there must not be addressed separately. Before denuclearization of South Asia, a global nuclear disarmament is absolutely necessary; (5) India would only recognize an impartial nonproliferation regime supported by a universal nuclear disarmament.

The Pakistani leadership had, time and again, made it clear that Pakistan would not sign the NPT unilaterally unless India was made to sign it. In fact, they think that India should be pressurized to sign the NPT jointly with Pakistan. Like India, Pakistan views the treaty as a biased one. Unlike India, Pakistan contends that the nuclear issue in South Asia is a regional issue and could not be solved by singling out Pakistan as the sole proliferator. They view India as a major nuclear proliferator in South Asia, and believe that Pakistan’s acceptance of the NPT is very much dependent on India’s joining the NPR, because India is a security threat to Pakistan. The NPT, in their view, would not succeed in South Asia unless India is made to sign the treaty. This is why Pakistan linked its ratification of the treay to India’s signing it.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The PTBT and the NPT, signed during the Cold War, were not completely successful in achieving universal nuclear disarmament. Superpower rivalry and tension during this period hindered satisfactory progress in nuclear disarmament until 1991. Signatories to the PTBT held an amendment conference in 1991 to discuss a proposal to convert the PTBT into an instrument seeking to ban all nuclear-weapon tests everywhere—in the atmosphere, under water, in space and underground. With strong support from the UN, negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in January 1994. The Final Draft, agreed upon by 127 states, was presented to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 10 September 1996. The treaty was opened for signature on 24 September 1996 at the UN Headquarters.

The CTBT consists of a preamble, seventeen articles, two annexes and a Protocol. The Protocol describes verification procedures and contains two annexes. The preamble to the CTBT stresses the need for ‘continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally’ with the ultimate goal of their elimination and of ‘general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’. It recognizes that ‘the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions … constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects’.

Important Provisions in the CTBT

Article I of the CTBT outlines the ‘Basic Obligations’ of the treaty. Section 1 of the Article says: ‘Each state party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control’. Section 2 therein declares: ‘Each State party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion’.

Article II describes ‘the Organization’ of the CTBT to ensure the implementation of the treaty and provide a forum for consultation and cooperation.

Article III provides for ‘National Implementation Measures’ for the treaty. It requires each state party to take necessary measures to implement its obligations under the treaty, including the establishment of a National Authority for liaison with the organization and other state parties.

Article IV, along with the Protocol, establishes the ‘verification regime’ for the CTBT. Such a regime—consisting of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Centre (IDC), consultations and clarifications, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures—‘shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty’ on its entry into force.

Article VI of the CTBT provides for ‘Settlement of Disputes’ and elaborates the mechanisms by which disputes concerning the application or interpretation of the treaty may be settled. Subject to certain conditions, the International Court of Justice may be requested to give an advisory opinion.

Article VII refers to the ‘Amendment Procedures’ of the treaty. It says that each state party has the right to propose amendments to the treaty, the Protocol or the annexes to the Protocol at any time after the treaty’s entry into force. The proposed amendment requires the approval of a majority of states parties at an amendment conference with no party casting a negative vote.

Article VIII, which enumerates ‘Review of the Treaty’ provisions, stipulates that a conference to review the operation and effectiveness of the treaty would be held ten years after its entry into force, ‘unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties’. Such review would take into account ‘any new scientific and technological developments’. Further review conferences may be held with the same objective at intervals of ten years thereafter, or less, if the conference so decides in the preceding year.

Article IX declares that the treaty is of unlimited duration.

Article XIV of the CTBT remained the centre of controversy with its provisions for ‘Entry into Force’. It said that the treaty would enter into force 180 days after the forty-four state parties have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the UN, ‘but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature’. To enter into force, the CTBT must be ratified by the forty-four countries that, in 1996, possessed nuclear research or power reactors. If the treaty has not entered into force ‘three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature’, the Secretary-General of the UN, as Depositary of the Treaty, could, at the request of a majority of states that had ratified it, convene a conference to examine the situation and to ‘decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process’ in order to facilitate the treaty’s early entry into force.

Article XVI declares the UN Secretary-General s as the treaty’s Depositary.

Finally, Article XVII contains the provision that the texts in thetreaty are equally authentic, irrespective of their being in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian or Spanish.

CTBT: The Current Position

Article XIV of the CTBT, as mentioned earlier, states that in order to enter into force the treaty must be ratified by all forty-four countries that, in 1996, possessed nuclear research or power reactors. The status in 2010 is that forty-one of these forty-four countries have signed the treaty but only thirty-one have ratified it. Non-signatories include India, North Korea and Pakistan. The United States, which led the effort to conclude a CTBT and was the first to sign the treaty, remained, along with China, among those who had signed the treaty but not ratified it. The Bush (Jr) administration had actively resisted the CTBT’s logic. The treaty now has 180 signatories but has not entered into force because the United States and eight other CTBT-countries, including China, Egypt, India, Iran and Israel, have failed to ratify it. The United States has not yet ratified the CTBT, and a ratification seems unlikely, given the US Senate’s strong reservations about it. The Obama administration tried to secure consent from the Senate for ratification of the treaty, but was not successful. The Trump Administration has not moved much with it.

On 24 September 2009, thirteen years after the CTBT opened for signature on the same day in 1996, representatives from 103 countries participated in an Entry into Force Conference in New York City to discuss issues pertaining to facilitation for ‘entry into force’ of the treaty and nonproliferation. The two-day conference began on the same day as the UN Security Council started deliberations on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issues at Heads of State level. Among the 103 countries that attended the conference were eighty-six ratifying, thirteen signatory and two non-signatory states (Saudi Arabia and Trinidad and Tobago). The Final Declaration of the conference called on the non-signatories and the non-ratifying nations to sign and ratify the CTBT in order to facilitate entry into force of the treaty. It contained a special appeal to those nations whose ratification was necessary for making the treaty a legally binding instrument. The simultaneous meeting of the Heads of State at the UN Security Council, chaired by the US President Barack Obama, also called upon all states ‘to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force at an early date’.

The Entry into Force Conference of the CTBT held in New York on 25 September 2009—this is the last till date—aroused hopes, as did the earlier ones, for the treaty to enter into force. However, an early ratification of the treaty would be extremely difficult, given the opposition of the CTBT by three of the forty-four countries that attended the 1996 Conference. India, Pakistan and North Korea have not yet signed the treaty, and until they sign and ratify it, it can never become a legally binding instrument. Moreover, important powers in today’s world, like the United States and China, have not ratified the treaty. Debates are going on in these countries over the issue of its ratification. The US Senate did not ratify the treaty earlier. It would not be an easy task for the Obama administration to persuade the Senate to ratify the treaty. Further, India and Pakistan are undecided about signing the CTBT. China too has not shown great enthusiasm in ratifying the treaty, although it signed it. Considering all these factors, it could be concluded that the future of the CTBT is uncertain, and like the PTBT and the NPT, it would not be an effective instrument for disarmament in the present world.

CTBT and India

India joined the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that began in Geneva in January 1994. The conference deliberated over a CTBT as part of the overall disarmament process. From the very beginning, India had been opposing the draft of the CTBT on several grounds. To begin with, it alleged that the draft did not address India’s security concerns. Nuclear activities were continuing unabated in India’s neighbourhood, but the text of the draft did not bother to address the issue of security concerns for countries like India. Further, India objected to the Entry into Force (Article XIVE) clause of the CTBT Draft saying that it would put unwanted obligations on India. The mandatory signature of the forty-four states for the CTBT to enter into force was not acceptable to India because it viewed the CTBT as another flawed instrument like the NPT. Since India had not signed the NPT earlier, it would contradict its position on nuclear issues if it agreed to sign the CTBT.

India also objected to the verification regime referred to in the draft. The CD deliberated on the procedures to penalize defaulters after the treaty came into force. But who would identify the defaulters? What kind of international monitoring system was necessary for legal action? India was concerned about these issues while objecting to the draft. Moreover, India did not like the close linkage between the NPT and the CTBT. The Preamble to the NPT made specific references to the completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and the linkage was discussed frequently ever since negotiations on the NPT started. Failure of the NPT signatory-states to fulfill the obligations outlined in Article VI of the treaty in fact increased the gap between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in terms of nuclear capability and security. The linkage between the NPT and the CTBT would only exacerbate this discrimination, argued India.

India further viewed the CTBT as only an instrument to cap the nuclear programmes of the developing countries, while it would have practically no control over the nuclear activities of developed nations with sophisticated technologies. India also had reservations about linking universal disarmament with proliferation issues. Since the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, all Indian leaders called for a total universal disarmament of all weapons. Excessive emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation only reveals an evil design to stop nuclear activities of developing nations, while the developed countries would continue to test weapons in sophisticated laboratories. Therefore, a CTBT would indulge in further discrimination between the NWS and non-weapon states. Considering all these factors, India vetoed the draft text of the CTBT on 20 August 1996, saying that the text did not serve the purpose of promoting the realization of universal disarmament goals. It refused to sign the treaty.

The FMCT and the MTCR

FMCT: An Unfinished Story

A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has not yet been materialized, although proposals in this direction had been mooted in 1993. In December 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on fissile material cut-off, calling for the negotiation of a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The resolution wanted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide assistance in examining verification arrangements. The CD agreed by consensus in March 1995 to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cut-off treaty based on that resolution. In May 1995, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the participants agreed to seek ‘the immediate commencement and early conclusion’ of cut-off negotiations. However, despite the widespread international backing for an FMCT, formal negotiations on cut-off have not yet commenced. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 again aroused the demand for an FMCT in the Western world, but deadlock persisted over the FMCT thereafter. As a consequence, the FMCT continue to remain a goal, not a reality.

The main objectives of the FMCT are: (1) to secure a comprehensive ban on any further production of fissile material for any nuclear explosives; (2) to bring all production facilities that are not subject to any international inspections under a strict verification and monitoring regime; (3) to make the world safer from nuclear weapons; and (4) to make it obligatory for the parties to the FMCT not to produce fissile material for any nuclear devices and give an undertaking to accept verification and monitoring regime.

All these objectives, except the third, have generated intense controversies and led to a deadlock over FMCT. While there is general agreement that the world must be made safer from nuclear weapons, there are controversies over the issue of a blanket ban on the production of fissile materials, and on inspection of production facilities. India, for instance, believes that all sovereign countries have an inalienable right to engage in research, and in production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Fissile materials used for civilian purposes must be differentiated from materials used for nuclear explosives. In fact, FMCT controversies begin with the ambiguous definition of a ‘fissile material’ for nuclear explosives, as well as the recycling facilities of these materials. The US position, for example, is that some uranium and plutonium fuels become wastes after single use and they must be disposed of. The Indian, French and Japanese positions, on the other hand, are that the spent fuel must be treated as a ‘resource’ and needs to be recycled. Until controversies over these important issues are resolved, the FMCT will continue to remain elusive as an instrument of disarmament.

MTCR: Another Step Towards Nonproliferation

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary association of sovereign states which share the goals of nonproliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering WMDs. The MTCR seeks to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. It was established in April 1987 by seven countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since then, the number of MTCR-member-countries has risen to thirty-four, all of which have equal standing within the regime. The current members of the MTCR are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States of America.

MTCR Guidelines

Guidelines issued by the MTCR define its purpose and provide the overall structure and rules to guide the member-countries and those wanting to adhere unilaterally to the guidelines. Further, The Equipment, Software and Technology Annexe (ESTA) is designed to assist in implementing export controls on MTCR Annexe items. The ESTA is divided into Category I and Category II items. It includes a broad range of equipments and technologies, both military and dualuse—used for military as well as industrial and commercial purposes—that are relevant to missile development, production and operation. Member-countries exercise restraint in the consideration of all transfers of items contained in the ESTA. All transfers are considered on a caseby-case basis. Category I items include complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missiles systems, target and reconnaissance drones) with capabilities exceeding a 300 km/500 kg range/payload threshold; production facilities for such systems; and, major sub-systems including rocket stages, re-entry vehicles, rocket engines, guidance systems and warhead mechanisms. Utmost restraint is applied in the case of Category I items.

Category II items include complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles systems, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicles (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) not covered in item I, capable of a maximum range equal to or greater than 300 kilometres. Also included are a wide range of equipments, materials and technologies, most of which have uses other than for missiles capable of delivering WMDs. Members of the MTCR enjoy greater flexibility in the treatment of Category II transfers, compared to category I transfers, although within the parameters of restraint. The MTCR guidelines declare that the regime is ‘not designed to impede national space programmes or international cooperation in such programmes as long as such programmes could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction’.

The MTCR has stipulated that partner-(member) countries should obtain the following undertakings before the transfer of a controlled item: (1) a statement from the user specifying the use and end use location of the proposed transfer, if necessary accompanied by documents explaining its business activities and organization; (2) an assurance explicitly stating that the proposed transfers will not be used for any activities related to the development or production of delivery systems for WMDs; and (3) wherever possible and if deemed necessary, an assurance that a post shipment inspection may be made by the exporter or the exporting government. All the partners have also agreed that their consent will be secured in a manner consistent with their national laws and practices, and prior to any retransfer to a third country of the equipments, materials or related technologies.

The partners of the MTCR have also affirmed the principle that membership of the regime does not involve the right to obtain technology from another partner or any obligation to supply it. Members are expected to exercise appropriate accountability and restraint in their trade with fellow partners. Member-countries may also encourage all other countries to observe the MTCR guidelines on transfers of missiles and related technologies as a contribution to the building of a safer world. A third country may choose to adhere to the guidelines without being obliged to join the group, and a few have done so. MTCR and its members may get involved in conducting technical exchanges and broader dialogues on proliferation issues with non-member countries.

MTCR: The Balance Sheet

Since its establishment in 1987, the MTCR has been successful in helping to stop or slow down ballistic missile programmes of many countries. For instance, Argentina, Egypt and Iraq abandoned their joint Condor II ballistic missile programmes. Further, South Africa, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan either shelved or eliminated missile or space launch vehicle programmes. Poland and the Czech Republic destroyed their ballistic missiles, in part, to enhance their chances of joining the MTCR. At the annual meeting of the MTCR in Oslo in July 1992, the membercountries agreed to expand the scope of the regime to include nonproliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for all WMDs. Prohibited materials have been divided into two categories, which are outlined in the ESTA of the MTCR.

In October 1994, in order to achieve greater uniformity in the enforcement of the MTCR guidelines, the member-countries established a ‘no undercut’ policy, which meant that if one member denied the sale of some technology to another country, then all the members must adhere to that decision. In 2002, the MTCR was supplemented by the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, also known as the Hague Code of Conduct. The code calls for restraint and care in the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering WMDs. The ICOC, initiated by members of the MTCR, took the principles of the regime, expanded upon them and offered membership to all nations with less stringent restrictions. Now, 117 nations enforce export controls to curb the proliferation of UAVs.

The MTCR was also able to encourage some non-members to follow its guidelines. For instance, China has agreed to abide by the original guidelines and annexe of 1987. Some other countries like Israel, Romania and the Slovak Republic have agreed to abide by the MTCR without joining it. These countries have decided to maintain export controls consistent with the regime. The MTCR, however, has its limitations. It is alleged by the member-states that it failed to contain countries like Iran, North Korea, India and Pakistan in their bid to advance their missile programmes. These countries, with varying degrees of foreign assistance—some of which come from MTCR member-states—have developed and deployed medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometres and are in the process of building missiles with much greater ranges. These countries (not MTCR-members), as alleged by member-states, engaged in the transfer of missile technology in the global arms market. North Korea, for example, is suspected to be the primary source of ballistic missile proliferation in the world today. Iran has allegedly supplied missile production items to many Middle-East countries, Syria in particular. As the MTCR is a voluntary association, and the decision to export missile technology is the sole responsibility of each member-country, the regime has, in effect, limited control over transfers of controlled items. Monetary and political considerations often get precedence over associational norms in the MTCR.

WMDs and the Present World

WMDs constitute an unprecedented threat to international security and the human civilization. Efforts have been made since the Second World War to make the world free of WMDs. In 1972, a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, generally referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), was signed in London, Moscow and Washington DC to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. More than 165 states have signed and ratified it. Article 1 of the BWC declares:

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; and (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925, for the first time, banned the use of bacteriological elements in warfare. But it was not before 1969 that a comprehensive draft, prepared by Britain and aimed at complete elimination of biological weapons, was taken up for negotiation. The UN lent out its support, and the General Assembly passed a resolution in 1971 supporting the proposed BWC of 1972. The BWC that entered into force in March 1975 also pledged that each member-country shall destroy all existing stocks of biological weapons, and no member-country shall engage in the transfer of materials required for the production of such weapons. India, like many other countries, has signed and ratified the BWC and has destroyed all its stockpile of biological weapons.

Since its entry into force, the BWC has been holding periodic review conferences. These conferences aimed at strengthening the convention through giving suggestions on issues like verification procedures, confidence-building measures, appointment of experts and other protocols to help the BWC keep pace with changing times. However, recent technological developments have posed a serious challenge to the convention. The biotech revolution, for instance, brought with it severe problems for the BWC. Biotechnology has made it possible to create ‘designer bugs’ that may be used as biological agents for military purposes. It is almost impossible to confront these designer bugs that could specifically target any particular racial, religious or ethnic group. Poor states which cannot afford to build costly nuclear weapons can take this comparatively cheaper route of biotechnology for the purpose of warfare. Therefore, a major arms control challenge of the present world is to combat newer forms of biological weapons that could be built following the biotech revolution.

Like biological weapons, chemical weapons too constitute a real threat to international security in the present world. These weapons are also considered as WMDs. They contain highly detrimental chemicals that can disable and kill people. Different chemicals are used in different chemical weapons to affect the nervous system, the respiratory system, the blood, the skin or other parts of the human body. After the holocaust of the First World War, that witnessed the use of mustard gas resulting in lung damage and skin eruptions, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banned the production and use of chemical weapons. But it is difficult to exercise effective control on such usage as these can be produced using methods similar to those for producing pharmaceuticals, pesticides, gases and other items required for civilian and medical purposes. It is also difficult to locate production sites producing chemical weapons, because these could be present under the guise of civilian chemical facilities, as also because they deny chemicals or equipments wanted by a suspected nation. Chemical weapons are cheaper to manufacture, and therefore possessed by several states, including the poor ones. Therefore, elimination of chemical weapons, along with other WMDs, is the greatest challenge of our times.

In order to meet this challenge, a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, popularly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was signed on 13 January 1993 in Paris and New York City. It became operational from April 1997. As of February 2018, 192 states, including the original 165 signatories, have become parties to the CWC. India too has signed and ratified the CWC and destroyed its whole stockpile of chemical weapons by April 2009. This convention is currently administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the UN Secretary-General is its depositary. As per the CWC stipulations, the OPCW must be informed of any plant having, or expecting, an annual produce of more than 200 tonnes of chemicals (chemicals falling under any of the three categories identified by the CWC) or thirty tonnes, if the chemical contains sulfur, phosphorous or fluorine. Over the years, the convention has made strict verification provisions and is in a position to sanction violators, including non-parties to the convention. The OPCW is mainly entrusted with the task of verification.

The international nonproliferation regime, with its various arms like the PTBT, NPT, CTBT, FMCT, MTCR, BWC and CWC, has been much active in fulfilling its dream of achieving a weapon-free world since the Second World War. In some cases, the regime has been successful in realizing its targets. The BWC and the CWC, for instance, have been working satisfactorily towards reducing the dangers of biological and chemical weapons from the world. Till 2009, most of the member-states of the UN have become parties to the BWC and the CWC, and have committed themselves to abide by the provisions in the two conventions. Some states, such as China, Libya and North Korea, have expressed reservations about the stipulations mentioned in the conventions. But that has not proved to be detrimental to the functioning and progress of the BWC and the CWC. Several states have already destroyed their stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, and more and more states are willing to do so under the guidance of these conventions.

But similar success cannot be attributed to other instruments of the nonproliferation regime like the NPT, CTBT, MTCR and FMCT. At least ten states important in terms of nuclear weapons have either not signed, or signed but not ratified, the CTBT. India, Pakistan and North Korea have signed neither the NPT nor the CTBT, rendering these two instruments almost ineffective. Six other countries—the United States, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, China and Egypt—have signed but not ratified the CTBT. While the future of the CTBT and the FMCT remain uncertain, the MTCR has also not evoked the confidence of major nations like India, China and Japan. Both the CTBT and the FMCT are still in their formative stages, and it would take more time and more acrimonious deliberations among countries to finally make them legally binding instruments. It is thus evident that the nonproliferation regime has not been totally successful in its mission. This is due to some flawed provisions in instruments like the NPT, the CTBT and the MTCR, and also due to differences in treatment among nations as contained in the provisions of these instruments. Unless these deficiencies are addressed, the NPT, the CTBT and the MTCR could not receive universal acceptance. While disarmament is the need of the hour and a weapon-free world the primary target of our times, non-discriminatory instruments of disarmament are also very important to secure a world free of lethal weapons.