Chapter 36. Wanted: Your Money

JONATHAN WASHER

At first he seemed like a friendly businessman looking to fulfill customers' wants and needs through the various services and products he offered on different Web sites. But Blake Styles of Cape Coral, Florida, was quite the clever con artist. He seemed to have just what you needed (or could get what you wanted) for a reasonable price. He sold guns, scopes, binoculars and camera equipment online, and later branched out to offer professional services to CEOs and CFOs looking for employment and to corporations searching for executives — for a nominal fee. He found the employment services side of business picked up significantly when the economy took a turn for the worse. Blake used several different Web sites to entice his victims. He would keep one active until the complaints from swindled customers rolled in and the Internet hosting company banned him. When this happened, he simply moved on to a new hosting Web site and targeted new victims. His modus operandi did not change, only the names of his victims.

Blake advertised his items for sale on several Web sites as an individual. But he also used his company name to offer employment services to CEOs, CFOs and other executives. Blake's communication with each customer and subsequent victim was steady and seemingly professional. His method of correspondence was typically e-mail through free services, such as Yahoo! or Gmail, which required no verification of the user's identity.

Blake Styles ran Theodore and Styles, Inc., based in North Fort Myers, Florida, just outside Cape Coral. The business address was a nice piece of property, conveniently located in a busy strip mall on a main road past the Cape Coral city limits. The company's mailing address was assigned a suite number that turned out to be a mailbox rental service offering PO boxes and other shipping and receiving services to individuals. Theodore and Styles seemed to be doing quite well. Mail delivery was steady from people across the country. Blake also used other rental boxes to keep mail related to his Internet dealings away from his personal residence. Theodore and Styles even had a nice Web site that explained its services for executive searches and included a photo of the owner, Blake Styles, on the home page. The Web site also showed logos or seals of international companies — some Fortune 500 corporations — that were reportedly previous clients of Theodore and Styles. The Web site claimed to have helped the companies locate their CFOs and CEOs. There were no reliable letters of recommendation from these companies, only graphics on the site with statements from Blake Styles claiming they were previous clients.

Blake was clever in advertising his services on the Web site. He attempted to cater to larger corporations in search of VPs of finance, CFOs, CEOs and treasurers. To do this, he quoted current laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to stress the importance of using his executive search service to find qualified professionals. The victims had no idea that his representations weren't true. And sadly, if any of the victims had done the most basic research into Blake Styles or Theodore and Styles, they would have clearly seen him for the fraud he was.

United Online

Blake Styles was not selective when choosing the victims for his various scams; they ranged from retirees to skilled tradesman to professional executives. Blake orchestrated his scheme via the Internet, so he mostly dealt with victims outside Cape Coral and Lee County, Florida; they were spread across the United States and came from Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Texas, New York, Colorado, Indiana, Ohio, Georgia, Kentucky, Oregon, Montana, Florida and Wyoming. In many of these states, there were several victims who were scammed with multiple Web sites run by Blake that offered items for sale or auction, such as firearms, scopes, binoculars and camera equipment.

The least amount a victim lost to Blake was $275; the most was $4,500. Each was required to pay him for the merchandise or service with a money order, cashier's check, or personal check. Once Blake received the payment, each victim reported that communication from him began to trail off. The victims became incessantly persistent; they called and e-mailed him day and night to ask when they would receive their items or their money back. After many excuses from Blake, he stopped contacting the victims completely. He changed his telephone numbers and ignored the e-mails or changed his e-mail address. As anyone would expect, the victims became angry. And angry Internet customers tend to express their feelings online. They began to blog on various Web sites that they were victimized by Blake, and fortunately for them, they had a lot in common, because many of them bought the exact same item. At this point, I had already received one report about Theodore and Styles, undertaken a little investigative groundwork and communicated with two victims. This was enough for them to get my name out in the blogosphere as a point of contact for other victims. Within days, I received dozens of calls wanting to file complaints against Blake Styles for an Internet-based fraud.

The Reports Were Piling Up

It was another warm, moderately humid morning for the end of October, one day before Halloween in Fort Myers, Florida. I arrived at the office at 7:45 and got settled in my cubicle at the economic crimes unit (ECU) of the Lee County Sheriff's Office, turned on my computer, checked my e-mail and noticed another wave of new cases in my bin, assigned that morning by my lieutenant. At the time, there were only four full-time detectives and we were carrying more than 100 cases each, with no sign of it slowing down. My lieutenant tried to assign cases to each detective based on our investigative strengths. I was quite knowledgeable in most fields of fraud investigation and was studying to attain my Certified Fraud Examiner's (CFE) credential, so I was assigned a lot of the high-profile cases, as well as long-term investigations.

I began to go through my new assignments, and right away one grabbed my interest. It was an Internet case where the suspect, Blake Styles, had reportedly defrauded several victims who tried to purchase different firearms and scopes through a Web site. Each of the five victims had several things in common: They bought an item from Blake Styles, they sent him money in the form of a check or money order and they did not receive their merchandise. The victims became known to each other by filing complaints through the Web site's blog. The combined cash loss was in excess of $6,500. I made contact with each victim and requested they forward their correspondence with Blake Styles to my e-mail address. When I began to read them, I noticed a pattern. He acknowledged receiving the victim's funds, but had an excuse or reason beyond his control for not shipping the merchandise. Due to the fact that the sale and shipping of firearms required a federal firearms license (FFL), Blake would attempt to pass blame for the shipping delay to the FFL holder — usually a local pawnshop. Since I had five victims from one Web site, was it possible a crime didn't occur? Could there have been a simple problem with the shipping of the merchandise? Or was this the beginning of a larger scam with more victims yet to come forward?

A Long-Term Plan

The preliminary investigation progressed slowly. I was dealing with multiple victims from different parts of the country and it was difficult to get their documentation in a timely manner. I needed the victims to forward a sworn statement, copies of payments made to Blake and/or his company and any correspondence they shared with Blake and each other when blogging about their thefts. It took nearly a month to receive the proper documents. I began to send out subpoenas for e-mail accounts, bank account information and other relevant records. A few months later, not to my surprise, I received yet another complaint against Blake Styles. This time he was using a different Web site to sell a high-priced camera lens. The victim sent Blake the funds via a post office box, but the customer did not receive the item. I made contact with the victim and requested his documentation to add to my case file. Now, with six victims and one suspect, was it possibly a coincidence? I didn't think so.

Throughout the next year and a half, I received numerous reports of theft by Blake Styles and his Internet companies. In total, I received 17 reports and had 21 victims on record, with an estimated financial loss of more than $25,000. It seemed obvious that Blake Styles was engaged in an organized Internet scam to defraud people of their money.

A review of the bank records showed that the checks the victims sent Blake were deposited into an account at a bank where I had a good contact. He was an ex-law enforcement officer who was now the fraud investigator at the suspect's bank. To speed up the case and see if a subpoena for surveillance photos of any transactions was necessary, I sent my contact copies of the deposits made by Blake. He said the bank might have a video of the transaction. I immediately requested that the state attorney's office issue a subpoena for the bank records of Blake's account and the surveillance video. After a review, it was clear I was looking at the culprit's bank records. I viewed the surveillance photos of a man making a deposit at a drive-up window and compared it to Blake's driver's license photo — it was a match.

It was also helpful that the suspect put his picture on his own Web site for us. The photograph he had displayed on his professional services Web site also matched the license and surveillance photo. This was key evidence for me in the case. One of the most difficult tasks in solving an Internet fraud is identifying the suspect because there is almost never a witness to the crime. Further review of the bank records confirmed Blake was the sole account holder and signer on each account he had with the bank.

I met with the clerk of the pawnshop that Blake mentioned in communications with customers — the one he claimed could not ship their firearms because there was a problem with the pawnshop's FFL. The clerk said Blake was a frequent customer and had purchased and sold items back to the shop dozens of times in the past several months. However, Blake had not made any arrangements with the shop to receive or ship firearms. The clerk provided a printout of the shop's transactions with Blake. There were a lot of firearms on the list, the same ones he was advertising for sale on several of his Web sites.

After obtaining a subpoena for Blake's mail, I met with a manager at the location where Blake received mail and checks from the victims. He immediately recognized Blake's name and confirmed he was a frequent customer and the sole recipient on the mailbox account. Blake provided his driver's license to open the account.

Additional records were subpoenaed from the Web sites he used to sell his products. Each site provided records with an Internet protocol (IP) address and history I was able to trace back to Blake. He was smart, up to a point. When I looked into the phone numbers he gave his victims, the telephone companies could only provide me with limited information. Blake had purchased throw-away trac-fones that did not have to be registered to an individual user. Because these phones and many other wireless companies offer prepaid services, it is often difficult for an investigator to identify the owner of a phone number. I made several attempts to contact Blake Styles, but he would not speak with me. He refused to answer the phone or return my calls, and his answering message usually said he was "traveling out of state."

Time Is Running Out

Fraud investigations take a lot of time. They also require patience and understanding from the victims regarding the amount of time needed to properly investigate them and bring them to a successful conclusion. As I type this, the Lee County Sheriff's Office ECU received yet another report against Blake from a victim in another state. He seems to use these schemes to make his living and, based on the information and facts obtained, he was positively identified as the individual who bilked more than a dozen individuals in excess of $25,000. Blake has been successful in eluding arrest by law enforcement thus far. Since he has been known to come back to Lee County periodically, he should worry every time he does and ask himself, "Is today the day I am going to jail?" The clock is ticking, and he is running out of time. With the dedication that we exert to identify, combat and prevent fraud, con artists and fraudsters cannot be elusive forever. Blake Styles will be arrested for his crimes; it's just a matter of time.

Note

Lessons Learned

There are many lessons to be learned from this case, both for investigators and victims. For investigators, the main lesson is to request additional assistance early in cases that require serious financial analysis. Due to my unit's heavy caseload, Blake's case was forced to sit dormant for more than a month because we lacked the analytical support. Today, we have more analysts in our unit than before and are attempting to hire more. This lesson was learned and corrected.

For the victims, this case points out many protective measures to be taken before purchasing products over the Internet. Customers should ask the following questions about a business or individual seller before buying anything online:

  • What is the physical location of the person/business?

  • How many people are employed?

  • Can I send payment via a secure Web site, like PayPal or VeriSign, or directly to the bank instead of by check, money order or wire?

  • Is the company registered with the Better Business Bureau?

  • Are there records on file with the secretary of state or county clerk?

One of the biggest downfalls victims tend to have when making a purchase on the Internet is to forget the saying, "If it sounds too good to be true, it usually is." When victims find something they have wanted for quite awhile, they let their guard down and violate common, good-sense business practices. Most fraudsters have been doing this for a while and know how to exploit people. The victims in this case didn't notice red flags before the transactions; it was only after they sent the money that they began having doubts. By that time, this suspect had already moved to a new target. The victims did not ask background questions, request references or ask for verification from the seller. Consumers who purchase products or services on the Internet should learn from these mistakes.

About the Author

Jonathan Washer, CFE, is a sergeant and supervisor of the Lee County Sheriff's Office, Economic Crimes Unit (ECU), in Fort Myers, Florida. He has been with the sheriff's office for nearly 15 years and was one of the founding members of the ECU. Despite being the supervisor, Sergeant Washer takes an active role in investigating cases of fraud and educating others on the prevention of fraud.

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