In March 1992, Sam Walton passed away after a two-year battle with bone cancer. Perhaps the most admired businessman of his era, he had founded Walmart Stores with the concept of discount stores in small towns. He brought the concept to the lofty stature of the biggest retailer in the United States, and then the world—ahead of the decades-long leaders, Sears and JCPenney—and in 1990, pushed ahead of an earlier great discount-store success, Kmart.
Walton's successors continued his legacy well. By the end of fiscal 1998, Walmart's sales of $137.6 billion made it one of the largest corporations in the world; by 2002 sales were $217.8 billion, and it had knocked ExxonMobil out of first place.
Yet a growing number of people were questioning how Walmart was using its gargantuan power—some seeing it becoming the antithesis of fair competition through questionable practices toward suppliers, competitors, employees, and communities themselves. Was Walmart becoming too big? Would its growth rate ever slow?
In 2001 Walmart knocked off ExxonMobil to become the world's biggest firm in revenues, with sales of $217.8 billion to ExxonMobil's $187.5 billion. General Motors's sales were $177.3 billion, and Ford, in fourth place, had sales of $162.4 billion.[1] Table 2.1 shows selected statistics of operating performance at the beginning and end of the decade 1992–2002. Walmart's former closest retail rivals had been left in the dust by 2002, as can be readily seen on the following page:
2002 | Revenues (billions) | % Change since 2001 |
Sears | $41.1 | 0.3 |
Target | 39.9 | 8.1 |
Kmart | 36.9 | 1.1 |
Penney | 32.0 | 0.5 |
Walmart | 217.8 | 13.8 |
Its nearest rival up to 1990, the one that dominated the retail environment in the early days of Walmart, was Kmart. But Kmart slid into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and subsequently a hedge fund merged it with Sears.
With the millennium approaching, and only a short step away from becoming the world's largest firm, Walmart turned to other growth opportunities. It bought Asda Group PLC, a large British supermarket chain, thereby expanding its international presence. In the United States, it not only accelerated building discount-grocery SuperCenters, but also expanded its smallish, (40,000-square-foot) Neighborhood Markets, designed to fill the gaps between convenience stores and Walmart's big SuperCenters. Walmart also bought a small savings bank in Oklahoma that could pave the way for bringing to banking its low prices for such services as check cashing, credit cards, and loans.
Overseas expansion created the most waves. European merchants and labor unions ran scared, but consumers stood to benefit enormously: "Its low-pricing policies and customer-friendly attitude is likely to change the face of British retailing and its reputation for high prices and surly service," one scribe wrote.[2]
Table 2.1. Walmart Selected Growth Statistics, 1993–2002
2002 | 1993 | |
|---|---|---|
Source: Walmart annual reports. | ||
Commentary: Here we see a fourfold increase in sales in these 10 years. Income had only a little more than a threefold increase, but was still impressive. Of particular interest is the decrease in number of U.S. Walmart stores in producing these increases, but the big growth was in Supercenters and Sam's Clubs, and the biggest of all was in international units, but then Walmart had barely entered the international arena in 1993. | ||
Net sales (millions) | $217,799 | $55,484 |
Net income (millions) | $6,671 | $1,995 |
Number of associates | 1,383,000 | 434,000 |
Number of U.S. Walmart stores | 1,647 | 1,848 |
Number of U.S. SuperCenters | 1,066 | 34 |
Number of U.S. Sam's Clubs | 500 | 256 |
International units | 1,170 | 10 |
The Walmart threat led two rival French retailers to merge in a $16-billion-dollar deal, though the combined company would still be far smaller than Walmart. The battle was perhaps fiercest in Germany, where Walmart had 95 stores. Competitors began staying open longer and improving customer courtesy. The biggest obstacle, however, was Germany's regulatory agency, which closely monitored whether prices were too low, while powerful trade unions worried that price wars would result in store closures and job losses.
To reduce costs, Walmart began buying globally, negotiating one price for stores worldwide. In so doing, it changed the organization to combine some domestic and international operations, including buying, new store planning, and marketing.[3]
With few prime sites in the United States remaining untapped for stores, Walmart continued an aggressive expansion worldwide, but some of its efforts were not very successful. For example, in Germany Walmart still had losses five years after buying two local chains to gain entry into the market. German consumers were very price sensitive, and Walmart failed to beat competitors who quickly undercut it and beefed up their private-label goods. Walmart's use of greeters was met with disdain by German shoppers. These experiences cast doubt on whether the Walmart model was suitable in every international market.
More than 80 percent of Walmart's international revenue came from Canada, Mexico, and the U.K. In China it struggled with a primitive supply chain. In Japan it faced a powerful but backward retail ecosystem. While Walmart has done well in Mexico, it faced stronger competitors in the huge markets of Brazil and Argentina. It made some mistakes along the way. It entered Hong Kong in 1994 and left two years later after bad decisions on merchandise selection and location. It entered Indonesia in 1996, but fled after a Jakarta store was looted and torched in the 1997–98 riots. In South Korea, its SuperCenters misread local tastes, and locations were too far outside city centers.
Walmart's impact on the world went beyond its store openings overseas. It imported many goods from low-wage countries such as China, thereby eliminating manufacturing jobs and depressing wage growth in the United States. But by selling goods for less, Walmart raised living standards and created 800,000 jobs worldwide, in addition to the labor needed for construction and distribution in these countries.[4]
Sam Walton cultivated a management style that emphasized individual initiative and autonomy over close supervision. He constantly reminded employees that they were vital to the success of the company, that they were essentially "running their own business," that they were "associates" or "partners" in the business, rather than simply employees.
In his employee-relations philosophy, Walton borrowed from James Cash Penney, founder of the JCPenney Company, and his formulation of the "Penney idea" in 1913. The Penney idea also stressed the desirability of constantly improving the human factor, of rewarding associates through participation in what the business produces, and of appraising every policy and action to see whether it squares with what is right and just.
Walton emphasized bottoms-up communication, thereby providing a free flow of ideas throughout the company. For example, the "people greeter" concept (described in the Information Box: Greeters) was implemented in 1983 as a result of a suggestion received from an employee in a store in Louisiana. This idea proved so successful that it has been adopted by Kmart, some department stores, and even shopping malls.
Another example of listening to employees' ideas came when an assistant manager in an Alabama store ordered too many Moon Pie marshmallow sandwiches. The store manager told him to use his imagination to sell the excess, so John Love came up with the idea of holding the first World Championship Moon Pie Eating Contest. It was held in the store's parking lot and became so successful that it became a yearly event, drawing spectators not only from the community but from all over Alabama as well as surrounding states.[5]
In 1972 Walmart instituted a profit-sharing plan that enabled associates to share in the company's yearly profits. As one celebrated example of the benefits of profit sharing, Shirley Cox worked as an office cashier earning $7.[6] an hour. When she retired after 24 years, her profit sharing amounted to $220,127.[7] In addition, associates could participate in a payroll stock-purchase plan with Walmart contributing part of the cost.
The Sam Walton philosophy was to create a friendly, "down-home," family atmosphere in his stores. He described it as a "whistle while you work philosophy," one that stressed the importance of having fun while working because you can work better if you enjoy yourself. He was concerned about losing this atmosphere: "The bigger Walmart gets, the more essential it is that we think small. Because that's exactly how we have become a huge corporation—by not acting like one."[8]
Another incentive spurred employees to reduce shrinkage (i.e., the loss of merchandise due to shoplifting, carelessness, and employee theft). Employees were given $200 each a year if shrinkage limits were met, and they became detectives watching shoppers and each other. In 1989, Walmart's shrinkage rate was 1 percent of sales, well below the industry average.[9]
A rather simple way to make employees feel part of the operation was regular sharing of statistics about the store's performance, including profits, purchases, sales, and markdowns. Many employees thought of Walmart as their own company.
Not the least of the open and people-oriented management practices was what Walton called MBWA, Management by Walking Around. Managers, from store level to headquarters, walked around the stores to stay familiar with what was going on, talk to the associates, and encourage associates to share their ideas and concerns. Such interactions brought a personal touch usually lacking in large firms.
Not surprisingly, unions have not fared well at Walmart. Walton argued that in his "family environment," associates had better wages, benefits, and bonuses than any union could get for them. In addition, he maintained that the bonuses and profit sharing were inducements far better than anything a union could negotiate. (Today, Walmart has come under criticism for some of its employee relations, especially health benefits and handling of overtime.)
The decentralized management style led to a team approach to decision making. A huge telecommunications system permitted headquarters to easily communicate with stores. In addition, home-office management teams, using company airplanes, visited stores to assess their operations and any problems and to coordinate needed merchandise transfers among stores. A master computer tracked the company's complex distribution system.
Adopting a strategy similar to that of the JCPenney Company over half a century before, Walmart for many years shunned big cities and kept to smaller towns where competition consisted only of local merchants and small outlets of a few chains, such as Woolworth, Gamble, and Penney.
These merchants typically offered only limited assortments of merchandise, had no Sunday or evening hours, and charged substantially higher prices than would be found in the more competitive big-city environments. Larger retailers, especially discount stores, had shunned small towns as not affording enough potential to support the sales volume needed for the low-price strategy. But Walmart found abundant potential with customers flocking from surrounding towns and rural areas for its variety of goods and prices. (In the process of captivating these consumers, Walmart wrecked havoc on the existing small-town merchants. See the Issue Box: Impact of Walmart on Small Towns for a discussion of the sociological impact of Walmart on small towns.) The company honed its skills in such markets isolated from aggressive competitors, and then flexed its muscles and moved confidently into the big cities, whose retailers were as fearful of Walmart as the thousands of small-town merchants had been.
Sam Walton was a stickler for holding down costs in order to offer customers the lowest prices. Cost control started with vendors, and Walmart gained the reputation of being hard to please, of constantly pressuring suppliers to give additional price breaks and advertising, and to provide prompt deliveries. In its efforts to buy goods at the lowest possible prices, Walmart attempted to bypass middlemen and sales reps and buy all goods direct from manufacturers. In so doing, a factory presumably would save money on sales commissions of 2 to 6 percent, and was expected to pass the savings on to Walmart. Understandably, this aroused a heated controversy from groups representing sales reps.
Walmart achieved great savings with its sophisticated distribution centers and its own fleet of trucks that enabled it to buy in bulk directly from suppliers. Most goods were processed through one of the company's distribution centers. For example, take the distribution center in Cullman, Alabama, situated on 28 acres with 1.2 million square feet. Some 1,042 employees loaded 150 outbound Walmart trailers a day and unloaded 180. On a heavy day, laser scanners routed 190,000 cases of goods on an 11-mile-long conveyor.[10]
Each warehouse used the latest in optical scanning devices, automated materials-handling equipment, bar coding, and computerized inventory. With a satellite network, messages could be quickly flashed between stores, distribution centers, and corporate headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas. Handheld computers assisted store employees in ordering merchandise. These advanced technologies cut distribution expenses to half those of most chains.
Walmart had previously been able to achieve great savings in advertising costs, compared to major competitors. While discount chains typically spent 2 to 3 percent of sales for advertising, Walmart held it to less than 1 percent of sales. Some of this difference reflected low media rates in its small-town markets. But advertising costs were also kept low in larger markets by using very little local advertising, relying instead on national TV institutional commercials showing prices being slashed and Walmart as a good and caring firm. See the Issue Box: Institutional Advertising? for a discussion.
Walmart's operating and administrative costs reflected a rigidly enforced, spartan operation. A lean headquarters organization and a minimum of staff assistants, compared with most other retailers, completed the cost-control philosophy and reflected Sam Walton's frugal thinking, which dated back to the company's earliest days.
Despite the good-citizen image that Walton sought to cultivate, Walmart provoked controversy almost from its beginnings. As it honed its skills and resources, and moved into more and more small towns, its impact on these local communities was profound. As we discussed in a previous box, many downtowns were devastated as local merchants could not compete with this giant newcomer opening on the outskirts of town. Still, most people thought Walmart brought more good than bad to their community— although some communities voted to keep Walmart out.
The buying power of Walmart invited allegations that it was crossing the line of unfair competition. Suppliers felt the power of Walmart and the price and service demands that it imposed on those wishing to do business with it. For many suppliers, losing Walmart's business was life threatening; they had to meet its dictates, or else.
Walmart led the retail industry in "partnering" with its vendors. If this were truly a two-way relationship it would have been of mutual benefit and an example of a symbiotic relationship in which both parties gain from the success of each other. However, Walmart's "partnering" more often meant that vendors had to assume most of the inventory management costs associated with their products in Walmart stores; it compelled them to guarantee fast replenishment, often saddling them with huge costs, so that the stores could maintain lean stocks. "If you can't do it, we'll find another vendor."
In 1998, Walmart entered grocery retailing, and in only four years, by 2002, became the nation's largest grocer with over $53 billion in grocery sales. Its nonunionized workforce and legendary efficiency enabled it to drive prices down in all markets it entered—good for customers, but deadly for rivals. In the decade of the 1990s, twenty-nine grocery chains sought bankruptcy-court protection, with Walmart the catalyst in twenty-five of these cases.[11]
In recent years, Walmart found toys to be a big traffic generator, especially at the important Christmas season, and expanded its emphasis on toys until it bested Toys "R" Us to become the biggest toy retailer.
During Christmas 2003, Walmart moved to increase its market share even more. It drastically reduced prices on many of the hottest toys in late September, long before the peak selling season. This essentially denied its smaller competitors a profitable Christmas season as they were forced to match these low prices or lose most of their customers. As a result, two major toy chains, famed FAO Schwarz, along with its Zany Brainy and Right Start stores, and KB Toys filed for bankruptcy protection, unable to profitably match Walmart's prices. Walmart could afford to sell these popular toys at a loss to generate traffic for its other merchandise. But its smaller competitors could not. Toys "R" Us, the nation's second-largest toy chain behind Walmart, also suffered.[12]
Despite Walmart's profit sharing and bonuses, scattered allegations surfaced about dictatorial employee relations and refusal to pay earned overtime. Walmart pruned employee health benefits by requiring a six-months wait for hourly workers to be eligible for benefits, while deductibles ranged up to $1,000, triple the industry norm. It refused to pay for flu shots, eye exams, child vaccinations, and numerous other treatments normally covered by other employers, nor would it usually pay for treatment of pre-existing conditions in the first year of coverage. As a result, Walmart spent 40 percent less per employee for health care than the national average. To Walmart's credit, some saw its approach to health care as a positive influence at a time when health care costs were soaring.[13]
Walmart also became the target of lawsuits accusing it of bias toward women and not paying employees for all the hours they worked. The company vigorously fought such court actions, and as we saw in the box on institutional advertising, had in early 2005 begun a massive media blitz to defend itself. Joseph Sellers, an attorney in a gender-discrimination suit, observed, "It is hard to reconcile Walmart's claim that it is serving everybody when it systematically underpaid and under-promoted its 1.6 million women employees for over a decade."[14]
In late 2003, Walmart faced serious allegations of subcontracting its daily cleaning chores in many stores to firms that employed illegal immigrants at low wages with no overtime or benefits, and without collecting payroll taxes. These illegalities purportedly saved the company millions. In a company so tightly controlled, some wondered how company executives could have been oblivious.[15]
Going into 2004, Walmart faced increasing criticisms and lawsuits. These had been granted class-action status in Massachusetts, California, Indiana, and Minnesota, and 35 similar lawsuits were pending. Allegations were that Walmart understaffed its stores, banned overtime, and consequently required workers to continue to work after their shifts, as well as during rest and meal breaks, without compensation. Walmart denied that it required workers to work without pay.
The Los Angeles City Council was trying to prevent Walmart from opening its Super-Centers in the city. Similar bans on these giant stores had been approved in the San Francisco Bay area, as well as communities from Atlanta to Albuquerque. City leaders feared that such stores would drive down local wages as rival businesses struggled to survive; wipe out more jobs than they created; and leave more people without health insurance, thereby putting additional burden on overtaxed public hospitals and clinics.
Walmart fought back aggressively by taking the battle to the ballot box. A spokesman declared, "The reality is that this is not some huge grass-roots uprising. Most communities in the state do not believe the government should be restricting the shopping choices of their residents."[16]
On July 28, 2006, Walmart admitted defeat in Germany's giant but cutthroat retail market, and announced it would sell its 85 stores there to a German retailer, incurring a loss of $1 billion. After eight years of trying, Walmart said it had been unable to turn around the stores, which had lost money every year. This decision came two months after Walmart sold its 16 stores in South Korea to a local retailer, for $882 million. These actions amounted to a severe retreat from its aggressive global expansion, and a serious challenge to its image of power and efficiency. Strong unions, restrictive operating laws, poor choices of retail acquisitions, and difficulty in adjusting to German shopping customs contributed to the failure. But unrelenting price competition from local discounters made the situation worse. Despite these setbacks, Walmart maintained that it continued to thrive in many countries, particularly Mexico, Canada, Brazil, and Britain.
Still, Walmart's largest non-American operation, that in Britain, had been struggling of late, and its top local rival, Tesco, was thriving. Tesco is Britain's largest retailer, with a market share in groceries of 31 percent, nearly double the 16 percent held by Walmart, and it was planning to invade Walmart's home turf on the West Coast. As the U. S. market became saturated, Walmart had been looking at overseas markets for growth. But the Japanese unit had also suffered losses. India and China were also presenting challenges with restrictions on stores in India, and a state-run union in China was trying to force Walmart to allow unions in its 60 stores.
With its stock price trading in a narrow range over the last six years as investors saw scant growth ahead, and with the international market losing its luster, Walmart launched a major effort to remake itself in 2005. It shifted its image from "always low prices," to more on building an image as a "lifestyle" retailer offering trendy apparel and housewares. It planned to remodel 1,800 U.S. stores by mid-2007, adding faux-wood floors, wider aisles, and nicer restrooms, among other things. While the stores would still remain open during the remodeling, some analysts predicted that same-store sales would drop three to seven percent due to the disruption.
Even Walmart's attempts to expand its empire into the banking business encountered opposition from the banking industry, unions, consumer groups, and some lawmakers urging federal regulators to reject the bid. Rep. Tubbs Jones of Cleveland called Walmart "a poor corporate citizen . . . one of the most often sued companies in history," with claims of gender discrimination and wage and hour violations. Its employees' reliance on state federal medical programs and its violations of the Clean Water Act, "raise serious questions about the character of Walmart's management and business practices."[17]
In a late-breaking lawsuit, a state jury found that Walmart broke Pennsylvania labor laws by forcing employees to work through rest breaks and off the clock, a decision that plaintiffs' lawyers said would result in at least $62 million in damages. Walmart was facing a slew of similar suits around the country. It settled a Colorado case for $50 million, and was appealing a $172 million award handed down by a California jury.[18]
In an effort perhaps more aimed at improving public image than profitability, on October 6, 2006, Walmart launched a $4 drug program for 143 generics in 235 Florida pharmacies. The program was quickly expanded to 14 additional states on October 19, and Walmart filled more than 152,000 new prescriptions in four days. Rivals Target Stores and Publix Super Markets quickly matched the offer with their own $4 drug programs, and over the next few weeks, more supermarket chains, Kmart, and some independent pharmacies followed. Critics were quick to point out that most of these drugs were older medications that had been replaced with newer drugs, and represented only one percent of the total number of drugs available. The National Community Pharmacists Association representing 24,000 independent pharmacies, called this a public relations stunt, and just a marketing ploy to get more people to come into Walmart. Walmart said that it could offer the drugs more cheaply than its competitors because of efficiencies in the way it does business, and that the company was not selling them at a loss. It announced plans to expand both the number of states participating and the number of eligible drugs.[19]
For all the criticisms of Walmart, this decision to cut pharmacy prices was a significant benefit to consumers, and with competitors quickly following in reducing their prices, Walmart became a catalyst in crumbling sky-high pharmaceutical costs that the government had been unable to rein in.
Walmart can also be lauded for being a paragon of efficiency. Never was this more obvious than in its reaction when Katrina devastated New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. See the following Information Box about Walmart and Katrina.
In the summer of 2004, many Walmart practices were getting critical scrutiny. Even Democratic congressmen running for reelection made anti-Walmart rhetoric part of their campaign speeches. Walmart's labor practices, health benefits, and even general business dealings were attacked. Such issues particularly appealed to labor unions, once the bedrock of Democratic support. Things got so bad that the board, headed by Rob Walton, son of Sam Walton, commissioned a "reputation" survey and found that Walmart was viewed as a demon by many former supporters. The board ordered CEO Lee Scott to correct this sorry situation.
Suddenly Mr. Scott stopped defending the company's practices, and started changing them. He encouraged a softer tone in dealing with complaints and lawsuits. He resurrected old commitments to the environment, going back to the formative days of Sam Walton. He prescribed ambitious initiatives for reducing waste, cutting energy consumption, and using renewable energy. "Green" labels on selected products would inform consumers of their environmental impact. The new CEO Mike Duke's objective was to call for "a new retail standard for the 21st Century." Walmart also began working closely with President Obama's health-care initiatives. But the image of Walmart as a good citizen and a compassionate firm was best seen in its taking the lead in reducing drug prices.[20]
Walmart is a success story of no small moment. It has certainly been good for consumers and for the country, and it is a symbol of one man's vision and leadership. Nonetheless, there are legitimate questions: In its quest to provide customers with the lowest prices, has it become guilty of predatory practices, crossing the line in coercing suppliers, and using its size to deliberately drive out less efficient competitors? Have its executives been guilty of going too far in hard-nosed cost-cutting? Has it practiced gender discrimination? Is it polluting the environment with abandoned old box stores?
Of late, questions are also being raised about whether Walmart can continue to grow. It already has over $300 billion in sales. The following Issue Box discusses Walmart's growth prospects and their impact.
Invitation for Your Own Analysis and Conclusions
Walmart is planning rather drastic and expensive changes domestically by upgrading stores, merchandise, and advertising to appeal to a more upscale market (more like Target, it seems). It is also limiting the depth of its assortments in some areas. Do you think these plans are overdue, a mistake at this time, or what? Defend your conclusions.
Can you identify additional learning insights that could be applicable to firms in other situations?
How might you attempt to compete with Walmart if you were:
a small hardware merchant?
a small men's clothing store?
a supermarket?
a toy store?
Do you think Walmart is vulnerable today to governmental intervention, andif so, in what way? If you do not think it is vulnerable, do you see any limitsto its growth?
When you shop at Walmart, do you usually find the employees far superior infriendliness and knowledge to those of other retailers? If not, what are yourconclusions regarding Walmart's employee-relations programs?
What weaknesses do you see Walmart as having either now or potentially?How can the company overcome them?
Can discounting go on forever? What are the limits to growth by price com-petition?
Discuss Walmart's business practices (especially in regard to unions, invadingsmall towns, and supplier relations) in terms of their ethical ramifications forthe industry and for society. Should students be encouraged to emulate thesepractices?
Do you think Walmart today is a benevolent and humane firm? Why or whynot? Is it completely ethical?
Do you think Walmart's Buy American program should be reestablished?Why or why not?
Be a devil's advocate. The decision is being made to phase out the hypermarts. Argue as persuasively as you can that Walmart is being too hasty and that the hypermart concept should be continued, if necessary with some changes.
You are an ambitious Walmart store manager. Describe how you might design your career path to achieve a high executive position. Be as creative as you can.
You are the principal adviser to David Glass, who replaced Sam Walton as chief executive. Even though Walmart has expanded aggressively overseas in recent years, he still thinks the greatest potential lies in foreign markets. He has charged you to develop a strategy to make greater inroads. What do you advise, and why? (Hint: you may need to do some research on Walmart's overseas presence at this time, and what specific problems it seems to be encountering in some countries.)
Debate the notion of Walmart aggressively seeking to enter small communities in places like rural New England, where many people oppose it. Should Walmart bow to the public pressure (which the company deems to be from a small minority of vehement agitators), or should it carry on with "right on its side"?
Can the great growth of Walmart continue indefinitely? Debate the pros and cons of this.
Is Walmart today in danger of losing its humanity?
How would you evaluate Walmart's latest move to $4 for certain generic prescriptions? Do you think it will be a significant factor in reining in health costs? Why or why not?
Have higher energy costs had a negative influence on Walmart's fortunes? Are Walmart's same-store sales comparing favorably with Target and Home Depot? Has the drastic renovation and upgrading of stores and merchandise been successful? Are there any ominous signs on the horizon? Have the management style and employee relations changed since what was described in the case? Are any stores unionized? Are the overseas efforts becoming more successful?
[1] "Sales Super 500," Forbes, April 15, 2002, p. 168.
[2] Ernest Beck, "The Walmart Is Coming! And Shopping for the British May Never Be the Same," Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1999, p. A23.
[3] Emily Nelson, "Walmart Revamps International Unit to Decrease Costs," Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1999, p. A6; David Woodruff and John Carreyrou, "French Retailers Create New Walmart Rival," Wall Street Journal, August 31, 1999, p. A14.
[4] Bruce Upbin, "Wall-to-Wall Walmart," Forbes, April 12, 2004, pp. 76–85.
[5] Don Longo, "Associate Involvement Spurs Gains," Discount Store News, December 18, 1989, p. 83.
[6] Chuck Bartels, Associated Press, as reported in "Walmart Hits Critics with Media Blitz," Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 14, 2005, pp. C1 and C5.
[7] Cited in Vance H. Trimble, Sam Walton: The Inside Story of America's Richest Man, New York: Dutton, 1990, p. 233.
[8] Ibid., pp. 104 and 105.
[9] Charles Berstein, "How to Win Employee and Customer Friends," Nation's Restaurant News, January 30, 1989, p. F3.
[10] John Huey, "America's Most Successful Merchant," Fortune, September 23, 1991, p. 54.
[11] Patricia Callahan and Ann Zimmerman, "Price War in Aisle 3," Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2003, pp. B1 and B16.
[12] Lisa Bannon, "An Icon's Last Christmas?" Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2003, pp. B1 and B2.
[13] Bernard Wysocki Jr. and Ann Zimmerman, "Walmart Cost-Cutting Finds a Big Target in HealthBenefits," Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2003, pp. A1 and A16.
[14] Bartels, p. C5.
[15] Dan K. Thomasson, "Underpriced and Overgrown," Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 15, 2003, p. B7.
[16] "Walmart Suit Gets Class-Action Status in Massachusetts," Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2004, p. A2;and Rene Sanches, "L.A. Isn't Buying Walmart's Sales Job," Washington Post, reported in Cleveland PlainDealer, February 4, 2004, p. C2.
[17] Compiled from such sources as: Stephen Koff, "Deny Walmart Bank Bid, FDIC Told," Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 11, 2006, p. C2; Cecilie Rohwedder, "No. 1 Retailer in Britain Uses "Clubcard' to Thwart Walmart," Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2006, pp. A1, A16; Ann Zimmerman and Emily Nelson, "With Profits Elusive, Walmart to Exit Germany," June 29–30, 2006, pp. A1, A6; Kris Hudson, "Walmart's Bid to Remake Itself Weighs on Sales," Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2006, pp. C1, C4.
[18] Maryclaire Dale, "Jurors Find Walmart Required Off-Clock Work," Associated Press, as reported inCleveland Plain Dealer, October 13, 2006, p. C2.
[19] Janet H. Cho, "$4 Walmart Drugs Reach Ohio," Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 27, 2006, pp. C1 and C3.
[20] Compiled from Ann Zimmerman, "Walmart's Image Moves from Demon to Darling," Wall Street Jour-nal, July 16, 2009, pp. B1, B4; Jeffrey Ball, "What 'Green' Labels Can Tell Us," Wall Street Journal, July16, 2008, B4; Olivera Perkins, "Union 'Vote' at Walmart Rebuffed," Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 23, 2003, p. C2.
[21] "Giant Slayer," Forbes, September 6, 2004, pp. 73–76.
[22] Geoffrey Colvin, "Walmart's Growth Will Slow Down—Eventually," Fortune, February 7, 2005, p. 48.