Although much of the work done was practical analysis, some researchers sought to explicitly expand and refine the concept of polarization. In their 1994 book on presidential communication and leadership, for instance, Smith and Smith devote an entire chapter to “The Politics of Division” in which they focus on George H.W. Bush’s presidency as a case study in both the successful and unsuccessful use of polarizing strategies to win elections and govern the country.
This chapter is particularly interesting for contemporary work for a variety of reasons: first, it details the use of polarization by a single president over three separate time periods (the 1988 presidential election, the governing period from 1988-1992, and the presidential election of 1992). Like the case of George C. Wallace, the analysis of a consistent orator allowed the researchers to control at least one variable in the rhetorical situation and to illustrate the success or failure of the strategy by the same orator under different circumstances. Second, Smith and Smith also provide a strong definition of polarizing rhetoric and clear theoretical descriptions of successful and unsuccessful polarizing strategies. Although their analysis of Bush’s rhetoric does not focus on specific speeches or textual formulations, they clearly illustrate broader frameworks and flag issues around which the Bush administration sought to polarize. They also describe important contextual information for each period. Indeed, much like those who studied Wallace, they indicate that situational factors are critical in determining the success or failure of polarizing rhetoric. Third, Smith and Smith illustrate the effects of rhetorical polarization over time, showing how public attitudes shifted based on Bush’s use of divisive imagery and frameworks over the course of his elections and presidencies. Finally, their research is interesting because it provides new insight into the dangers to speaker ethos when using polarizing tactics; indeed, they suggest that the more Bush used the strategy of polarization, the less effective it became.
Smith and Smith begin their chapter with a definition of polarizing rhetoric and a discussion of the factors that make such strategies effective or ineffective in a given communicative situation. They state that “polarization can be a deliberate strategy to build membership in an interpretive coalition. The politics of division is characterized by a rhetoric of polarization in which differences are stressed, similarities are downplayed, and derogatory language is developed to characterize the opposition.” This definition parallels earlier conceptions of polarizing strategies, and the use of derogatory language for the opposition is taken directly from Bowers and Ochs’ work. Importantly, they also follow King and Anderson’s assertion that such divisive strategies are actually designed to create solidarity, or as they put it, “convergence through divergence.”211 The strengthening of group identities is the primary immediate real-world goal of polarizing rhetoric, while the ultimate goal may vary.212
According to the authors, the successful application of polarizing strategies depends on six factors:
| 1. | “A speaker must invoke existing or latent prejudices among members of a community.” |
In agreement with earlier researchers, Smith and Smith indicate that polarization cannot arise out of thin air, but rather, that the strategy demands a precise situational assessment “to identify carefully the prejudices or divergences that already exist.”213 These differences of opinion are then functionalized by the orator to become the point of the wedge that drives audience members apart.
| 2. | The orator must be “identified exclusively with one group rather than another,” and “not as a fence-straddler.” |
This clarity of position is necessary for the divisive tactics to have effect; if the orator does not take a clear position in the presented dichotomy, it will have little effect on their public.
| 3. | It is important that the orator “identify with the dominant group.” |
This is because effective political leadership requires the activation of “communities that account for significant political resources.” If the president (or an orator in general) chooses to polarize around an issue that is not supported by the majority, they will likely face a backlash from a political constituency even more powerful than their own.
| 4. | Effective polarization requires the connection between the “bad group” and “one or more serious societal problems” to be “plausible.” |
More generally, the negative characteristics that the orator associates with the out-group must be plausible for audience members; otherwise, they will not accept the speaker’s dichotomous depiction of the world.
| 5. | The speaker’s “image must not be undercut by the strategy of division.” |
This factor is critical to maintaining a credible ethos, and it again speaks to the dangers of utilizing polarizing strategies. Indeed, because of this danger, Smith and Smith assert that instead of directly using such language, an orator should “have surrogates […] make the harsh polarizing charges.” This also underscores the necessity for multiple orators in a sustained campaign of polarization: because the use of polarization can damage speaker credibility, it is better to spread the messaging out among different orators to minimize the negative effects on any given individual orator. As Smith and Smith put it, it is better for a given president to put a bit of “rhetorical distance” between themselves and polarizing language.
| 6. | The in-group must be clearly associated with “higher societal values,” and as “a part of the uplifting moral climate of the nation.” |
As a counterpoint to the fourth factor, it is important for the president’s chosen in-group to be associated with positive values and moral rectitude. In this way, even if supporters feel that the polarizing strategy is inappropriate or unwarranted, “members can feel confident and superior” that their side is correct and just.214
Smith and Smith describe these six factors as essential features of successful polarizing rhetoric. And although the focus of their work was explicitly on presidential rhetoric, the majority of these features can be expanded to more general communicative situations. The lone exception is the third factor: while it is true that winning elections requires the activation of majority blocks of voters, it is easily conceivable that other contexts would not require a speaker to identify with the “dominant group” or the majority opinion. Indeed, in Bowers and Ochs’ original conception, polarizing rhetoric is a strategy utilized by those out of power (and out of the majority) to gain attention and to mobilize supporters to further action. A broader definition of polarizing rhetoric must take such situations into account as well.
Despite this limitation, Smith and Smith’s guidelines provide a roadmap for orators who want to successfully implement polarizing strategies: find appropriate issues around which to polarize, clearly identify oneself with one side (preferably the dominant opinion group), plausibly link the out-group with negative moral values while asserting the righteousness of the in-group, and ensure that a proper “distance” remains between the (primary) orator and the marginalizing strategies in order to protect the their ethos.
In addition to providing a list of features of successful polarizing strategies, Smith and Smith also provide reasons that such strategies often fail. Loosely aligned with the factors described, polarization can fail to help a speaker reach their ultimate goal if: 1) existing overlapping group identities are stronger than the dichotomous groups depicted by the speaker, 2) the speaker is not clearly and exclusively associated with one side of the issue, 3) the flag issues chosen are not relevant or acceptable to the public, 4) the speaker becomes personally associated with the strategy of polarization, “irreparably” undermining their reputation, 5) the “logical link” between the out-group and social problems fails to convince audience members, 6) the divisive strategy “activates the ‘bad’ groups to join protective coalitions and to establish their own dominance.”215
This final point speaks to the importance of prior calculation in the selection of flag issues and the identification of out-group members: if the out-group is so defined that a significant portion of the public feels attacked, it can lead to a backlash against the polarizing orator more powerful than their own chosen in-group. As will soon be illustrated, such a negative response can undermine or even derail a politician’s election campaign. On the other hand, if a speaker’s ultimate goal is not to win popular elections, such a backlash might even serve to reinforce the in-group/out-group dynamic, particularly when the polarizing orator clearly identifies with a minority opinion.216
Through their case study of the Bush election campaigns and administration, Smith and Smith demonstrate both successful and unsuccessful uses of polarizing communicative strategies, and they identify his presidential campaign of 1988 against Michael Dukakis as his singular most successful use of polarization. During the campaign, Bush hired experienced political strategists Roger Ailes and Lee Atwater to identify “‘hot button’ social issues [that] could change […] voters’ preferences from Dukakis to Bush.”217 They identified two flag issues around which the Bush campaign proceeded to polarize voters: the issue of prison furloughs in Dukakis’ home state of Massachusetts, and the Pledge of Allegiance. Each of these issues took advantage of preexisting divisions and prejudices in the American public, and the way that they were functionalized served to portray Dukakis as representing a minority position within the American electorate. The issue of allowing prisoners temporary furloughs—and the vivid imagery of the Willie Horton ad—exacerbated a divide along racial lines in the presidential race and injected the flag issue of crime prevention into the election. By consistently emphasizing frameworks of crime and punishment, and safety and security in his campaign speeches, Bush “successfully condensed race and crime into the symbol of Willie Horton, and voters began to perceive Dukakis as softer on crime than Bush and the majority of law-abiding Americans.”218
During the campaign, a now infamous advertisement was released that portrayed convict William “Willie” Horton (who had assaulted a couple and raped a woman while on a furlough from prison), as a product of Dukakis’ governorship in the state of Massachusetts. Although the Bush campaign did not directly produce the ad, and claimed to have no responsibility for its content, it was produced by a former colleague of Mr. Ailes. For his part, Mr. Atwater was quoted during the campaign as saying, “by the time we’re finished, they’re going to wonder whether Willie Horton is Dukakis’ running mate.”219 Still, the Bush campaign was able to publicly distance itself from the most inflammatory elements of the advertisement because it had not produced the clip itself. Thus, Bush and his subordinates could hint at, intimate, and imply the same racial frameworks while maintaining plausible deniability for their responsibility in dividing the nation. As Smith and Smith put it: “These lines of division were not new with the Bush forces; they merely tapped into latent fears and prejudices and brought them to an emotional peak that polarized and activated voters.”220
The second flag issue utilized by the Bush campaign in 1988 revolved around the Pledge of Allegiance. After Mr. Dukakis vetoed a bill as governor that would have required teachers to have their students say the pledge, Bush’s campaign team used the issue to attack his patriotism. Although the decision to veto the bill had been based on solid legal reasoning and the protection of free speech rights, Mr. Bush was able to use the issue to depict Mr. Dukakis as un-American. He explicitly chose to give a speech at the nation’s largest flag-making factory, and even invited delegates at the Republican convention to say the Pledge of Allegiance with him in unison. According to Smith and Smith, these “rhetorical choices invited Americans to associate the Bush campaign, and only the Bush campaign, with patriotism.”221 In summarizing the results of the election, they state that the
Bush campaign exploited latent divisions in America. It indirectly encouraged racial division, […] encouraged Americans to question Dukakis’ patriotism, […] pitted investors against spenders, […] [and] pulled all three together with the master division of liberal versus mainstream. Liberals were depicted as wasteful, lazy, criminal coddling, unpatriotic persons.222
After winning the presidency, Bush and his administration needed to govern the country and try to come together with a Democratic Congress to implement his chosen policies. But the divisive tactics of the campaign made such conciliation difficult: “The polarization of the campaign had alienated parts of the electorate and Congress, and had left the country in a temper of division rather than compromise.”223 This speaks to both the success and long-term effects of Bush’s use of polarizing rhetorical strategies. At the same time, it clearly illustrates a downside to utilizing polarizing strategies for those who seek to effectively govern: by dividing the American electorate, Bush also polarized a Congress that had a Democratic majority, which made it more difficult for him to implement his desired legislative agenda.
Although Smith and Smith detail a few instances of conciliatory and consensus building behavior at the beginning of his term, they also identify a series of flag issues around which President Bush sought to polarize voters during his presidency, including the nomination of Clarence Thomas for the Supreme Court, the issue of access to abortion, his relationship with Congress, and the First Gulf War. In each of these cases, Smith and Smith detail specific instances in which Bush used divisive language or tactics to mixed success. Indeed, although they state that he was able to “further the very deep divisions” on many of these issues, he rarely succeeded in his ultimate goal of passing legislation.
Thus, in each case, Bush successfully polarized his audiences, but this polarizing strategy failed to help him meet his real-world goals for a variety of reasons. With regard to Thomas’ nomination and confirmation as a Supreme Court judge, the divisive strategy “allowed President Bush to splinter his opponents’ coalition,” but it also drove feminist groups and newly elected female senators to form protective coalitions against the president.224 When taking a strong pro-life stance on abortion, Bush successfully polarized the American public, but “Bush identified with the minority rather than the majority stance, and the politics of division did not enhance his administrative success.”225
A similar problem confronted Bush in his relationship with Congress. Although he initially sounded conciliatory notes, his relationship with Democrats deteriorated rapidly. By 1990, Bush was criticizing Congress for inaction and seeking to divide public opinion away from congressional leaders. But here again, “Bush was using a partisan strategy from a minority position,” and showed “an overreliance on a polarizing strategy when bipartisan cooperation was needed.”226 Divisive communicative tactics surrounding the Iraq War proved successful but short lived, with Bush becoming increasingly personally identified with polarizing tactics. “In sum, the politics of division provided mixed success.”227
Smith and Smith end their case study with Bush’s unsuccessful reelection campaign in 1992, in which polarizing strategies proved to be his downfall. Although he sought to portray his opponent Bill Clinton as unpatriotic for not having served in Vietnam, and to divide “pro-war ‘real Americans’ from antiwar ‘unAmericans,’” this framework “proved to be a division that had outlasted its time.” Instead of moving Americans into the dichotomous camps Bush desired, the use of an outdated framework “was seen by many people as an inappropriate and desperate attempt by a failing president.”228 Other flag issues utilized by the Bush campaign also backfired, causing the president to take minority positions, activate opposing coalitions, and damage his ethos in the process. Just as the strategy of polarization had failed him during his administrative years, so too did it fail to win President Bush reelection.
Smith and Smith draw a few relevant conclusions from their analysis. They determine that the polarizing strategy of the 1988 election worked primarily because the Bush campaign was able to divide along “economic and racial, rather than primarily partisan or ideological lines.” This led to a coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats assembled “on the basis of their shared dislikes,” rather than around a strong positive identity.229 Critically, Bush was also able to keep his rhetorical distance from the more inflammatory and racially provocative elements of the campaign while still profiting from their effect. After the 1988 election, however, Bush found significantly less success with his use of polarizing tactics for two main reasons. First, the issues he chose to polarize around were either irrelevant, outdated, or “were salient only to a small number of Americans insufficient to form the majority coalition.”230 Second, Bush’s ethos became too associated with polarization, which undermined his oratorical authority and credibility. By becoming associated with a negatively charged, divisive rhetorical strategy, Bush alienated many even within his own party. As indicated earlier, there “is always a danger in a divisive or polarization strategy: in the process of mobilizing and activating your group, you may be more effective in alienating and mobilizing communities on the opposite side of an issue.”231
From a theoretical perspective, Smith and Smith also offer more general comments on polarization: it is a strategy designed to “realign communities, to build coalitions, and to produce desired behavioral changes,” which “functions to change sympathizers into supporters, to build strength in one’s own group, and to expand one’s coalition on the basis of shared disbeliefs.” Although they do not explicitly cite earlier works on polarization, this definition aligns well with those that came before it; polarization creates solidarity within an (ascendant) in-group by generating an image of a shared negative out-group. Like their predecessors, Smith and Smith also agree that contextual factors are critical to the ability of such a strategy to help an orator meet their ultimate, real-world goals, “the skillful use of the politics of division requires an astute knowledge of the audiences to which it is being addressed, and an appreciation of the dangers inherent in dividing a population.”232
2.2.5 George W. Bush: No Shades of Gray
In 2004, Coe et al. published an analysis of President George W. Bush’s use of polarizing rhetorical tactics following the tragedy of September 11 and the build up to the Iraq War. Although Bush did not seek to polarize the country along partisan lines, he clearly sought to generate solidarity among the American public and to project a negative other as a danger to American values and society. In his own famous words: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”233 While the work of Coe et al. deals with the individual mechanisms of the strategy (detailing specific textual features, situational circumstances, and individual orator calculations), it also analyzed network-level elements of polarizing rhetoric, particularly the way that the interactions of multiple orator complexes can combine to drive broader social polarization. This work is also important because it directly addresses the process-oriented nature of polarization by breaking down the use of polarizing strategies into two phases, each of which has its own functions and time-sensitive elements.
Coe et al. focus their attention on elements of binary discourse in a series of fifteen nationally covered speeches by President George W. Bush between his inauguration and a speech given in March 2003, and show how these elements were paralleled in the editorial press coverage of the time. Although they reference work on polarization by King and Anderson and by Raum and Measell, they use the term “binary discourse” to describe texts that depict dichotomous situations, emphasize in-group and out-group dynamics, and pit one side against the other.234 According to their model, binary discourse has three main attributes:
| 1. | “Binary discourse requires a central organizing object that provides a foundational meaning to the surrounding language.” |
In other words, binary discourse requires a flag issue, which can be a “behavior,” an “idea,” or an “event.” Paralleling previous work, the authors also insist that the central organizing object “must resonate with the audience at whom communications are directed […] The audience must have strong beliefs and an interpretation perceived as widely shared about the object.”235 In the case of George W. Bush, the September 11 attacks were the central organizing object of his polarizing rhetoric.
| 2. | “Binary discourse occurs in two phases over time: the establishment phase and the extension phase.” |
During the establishment phase, “a speaker does two things”: he “initiates or substantially increases the usage of binaries, and […] employs the binaries in a rhetorically notable manner.”236 This phase establishes the two sides of the dichotomous framework within the public discourse and uses memorable textual formulations to increase “cultural circulation.” The extension phase seeks to further the effect of the initial polarizing formulation over time and space, and consists of repeatedly emphasizing the binary framework, or highlighting the positive or negative aspects of one side or the other in order to “evoke the full binary,” in the minds of the public. By clearly identifying both phases, the authors are able to show how the process of polarization was driven over time and reflected in both the president’s own speeches and in media coverage of the speeches.
| 3. | Finally, “a binary discourse utilizes multiple binary constructions.”237 |
By selecting a series of different dichotomies with which to polarize their audience, orators gain the flexibility to select the most effective framework in a given speaking situation, or even to use multiple binaries together to increase the polarizing effect. In the case of George W. Bush, Coe et al. identify the binaries of “good/evil” and “security/peril” as central to his polarizing strategy. This third characteristic of “binary discourse” also parallels earlier research on polarizing rhetoric; Smith and Smith in particular identify a series of polarizing frameworks used by the first Bush administration.
One of the primary effects of binary discourse is the amount of attention it draws to both the orator and the issue around which they have chosen to polarize. And polarizing language is particularly effective at gaining media attention because it fits with journalists’ needs to write a compelling story. As Coe et. al describe it, such rhetoric is strategically useful precisely because it is designed to garner as much media attention as possible, leading to an amplification of the orator’s original performance (and binary frameworks) to broader segments of society. Because “binary oppositions inherently suggest competition between two forces,” they make it easy for journalists to construct a narrative. The use of provocative language and imagery to activate audience members also makes it more likely that journalists will directly quote such passages and integrate the same binary construction into their reports of the original performance. And because polarized descriptions always include a moral element (good/bad), they generate “resonance with the mass public and a sustaining news value.”238 Thus, the successful use of polarizing strategies will lead media outlets, and newspaper editorials in particular, to repeat the polarizing frameworks generated by the orator, leading to an amplification of the orator’s own views and extending the divisive effect through time.
Appropriately, Coe et al. do not limit their analysis of binary formulations to President Bush’s national addresses. They also directly compare editorial articles from twenty major newspapers in the days following each speech in order to gauge the repetition of the binary structures in the media. Importantly, they illustrate that the media coverage of Bush’s speeches “followed the president’s use of these binaries, often repeating his words.”239 The researchers were also able to clearly identify both an establishment phase and an extension phase of the president’s polarizing rhetoric, showing that the three speeches following the September 11th attacks contained a particularly high percentage of binary formulations, while he continued to refer to the binaries long after the events of September 11th but at a significantly reduced rate.
Not only does the extension phase serve to deepen the divide and maintain established dichotomies, it can also be used to influence the polarized audience in ways controlled by the orator. As Coe et al. put it: “The results strongly suggest that the president strategically emphasized a particular side of the security/peril binary to fit a specific administration policy goal.” The recognition that, once established, polarized binaries can be functionalized over time to meet diverse needs of an orator is an important one. This indicates that the generation (or amplification) of a polarized state can serve to steer an audience long after the initial establishment of dichotomous frameworks. The fact that the selective use of binaries continued to be repeated in newspaper editorials only increased their efficacy and spread throughout American society.
For our purposes here, there are two relevant conclusions to be drawn from this case study. First, it clearly demonstrates different phases in the process of polarization. In the establishment phase, the consistent and repeated use of binary descriptions in provocative and memorable ways imprints the chosen dichotomy in the minds of direct listeners. The extension phase then sustains the binary framework by “periodically employing the binaries […] and by consistently emphasizing the respective sides.”240 Although the repetition of polarizing texts leads to diminishing effectiveness, the emphasis of one side of an established binary can effectively evoke the polarized reaction in audience members. Second, Coe et al. show that “binary discourse seems ideally suited for a political culture dominated by mass media.” The establishment phase of the process provides journalists with powerful, ready-made quotes and sound bites about the chosen flag issue, while the extension phase “prolongs the story,” giving media outlets more material “until the next compelling narrative arrives.” Thus, a politician or prominent public figure “can have a high confidence that the press will echo a binary discourse.”241 As stated previously, this media coverage amplifies an orator’s message and spreads its polarizing effect to a much wider audience. And because an orator can (to a certain extent) strategically control this coverage by emphasizing certain aspects of a constructed dichotomy, they can (to a certain extent) steer public opinion in one direction or the other.
2.3Polarization in Oratorical Networks
The research reviewed until now has largely focused on individual orators and orator complexes that have employed polarizing rhetorical strategies to help meet their real-world electoral goals. In the case of oratorical networks, however, the picture is more complex. In such situations, the strategy of polarization is used by a series of different orators and orator complexes, each with their own goals and motivations. The more extensive the network, the more unfeasible it becomes to centrally coordinate a messaging strategy.
Thus, one focus of “network-level” research on polarizing rhetoric has been to illustrate how polarizing strategies are implemented by multiple orators and nodes within a given network over time. Such research has shown that the effective use of polarizing strategies by oratorical networks can occur with a minimum of central coordination: while direct coordination may take place between certain individuals in the network, there are also numerous instances in which the appearance of message coordination arises organically and without explicit planning by the disparate orators involved. Instead, different nodes within the network take part in a self-reinforcing cycle that perpetuates and intensifies the polarizing effect on audiences. Similarly, the process of polarization can have a variety of effects on different social groups and audiences over time. While Coe. et al. briefly discuss the relationship between presidential speeches and mass media coverage, other research on polarization has examined the complexity involved in use of such strategies by broad social movements consisting of a wide array of disparate actors. In this sense, the cases to come more closely parallel the use of polarizing strategies within the tea party movement.
2.3.1 Polarization and Civility in the U.S. Senate
Angela M. McGowan’s recent work on the topic of polarizing rhetoric focused on the communication of a group of twenty female senators who sought to end the partisan impasse that caused the U.S. government shutdown of 2013. Interestingly, and perhaps counterintuitively, McGowan illustrates the ways in which polarizing strategies and processes can be used to build bipartisan coalitions and constitute new voting blocs that cross-party lines within legislative bodies. In this way, her research shows that polarizing rhetoric can be used to generate new social identities and to enhance solidarity between those who see themselves as a part of a rhetorically constituted in-group. While McGowan’s ultimate goal is to describe the broader phenomenon of how “the women in the 113th Senate coordinated a rhetorical strategy”, her account also illustrates how diverse politicians came together based on shared political goals to form an oratorical network to influence a diverse set of social audiences.242 By using polarizing strategies, the women of the network were able to establish a new positive in-group identity (those willing to compromise to end the shutdown), to expand their message of bipartisanship, to inject a dichotomous framework into the media narrative, and to motivate other members of Congress to join their cause.
McGowan’s research is also particularly relevant here because her analysis deals with an event central to the history of the tea party in American politics. The government shutdown of October, 2013, was, for the most part, instigated by the actions of tea party-affiliated representatives in both the House and the Senate, including Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX), who played a significant role in the crisis. Although McGowan does not devote much space to discussing Cruz’s role as a polarizing force in the Republican Party or his role in the government shutdown, she does make it clear that members of the tea party deepened partisan polarization in Congress.
McGowan begins her discussion of polarizing rhetoric by summarizing much of the same foundational research referenced here. She notes that the partisan polarization present in Congress has led to significant gridlock, claiming that “polarization can be a formula for inaction,” and that “partisan polarization is arguably the most problematic feature of modern American politics.”243 Despite these clearly negative effects of a polarized political state, McGowan insists that the strategy of polarization can be constructive: “polarizing discourse creates mutually exclusive groups, and constitutive rhetoric can work with polarizing rhetoric to create a group’s common identity.”244 In addition to incorporating King and Anderson’s ideas, her analysis also identifies the textual markers of polarizing language described by Raum and Measell and leans heavily on ideas of constitutive rhetoric from Burke and Maurice Charland (among others).245 As she describes it, the affirmative aspect of polarization creates a narrative reality in which the positive in-group is depicted as attractive and righteous. By “hailing” audience members with a compelling narrative, they are driven “to become consubstantial with the protagonist.”246
McGowan’s work details how group of independent senators utilized polarizing rhetorical strategies to create a novel narrative pitting a positive in-group (those who supported a bipartisan deal) against a novel, negative out-group (intransigent conservatives who did not support such a deal). McGowan identifies a shared identity narratively constructed by the network, which she names the “continuing resolution supporters (CRS)”.247 Although she demonstrates little evidence of any formal message coordination among the twenty women, there are clear parallels and common polarizing structures in their floor speeches and media interviews of the period. Indeed, her analysis suggests that the process of identification with the narratively constructed in-group caused the socially relevant grouping to form in the first place: “Positioning the self in relation to others is an important process of constitutive rhetoric, and during the shutdown, rhetors demonized the opposition while constituting a group.”248 Based on what was discussed in Chapter 1, the CRS could thus be described as a loose oratorical network consisting of at least twenty nodes—each representing a senator and her political communications team—that acted to influence their colleagues in the Senate, the journalistic news media, and the American public.
McGowan’s thorough analysis of this network shows that members consistently used affirmative and marginalizing strategies as well as textual structures to construct a positive in-group identity, a negative out-group of opponents to the continuing resolution, and a narrative that could appeal to the few persuadable members of Congress to join the “Sensible Center,” which explicitly included members of both political parties.249 Affirmative strategies appealed to god-terms such as the common good sought by the group, patriotism, American values, and the idea of bipartisanship. In this way,
CRS called the Sensible Center into being by emphasizing actions and outcomes that were important to both parties […] Within the boundaries of the narrative, some Republicans and most Democrats were constituted as the Sensible Center and the new identity erased political differences.
By consistently emphasizing bipartisanship as a positive virtue, members of the CRS also encouraged uncommitted Republicans to join them, “extend[ing] a hand to the other side of the aisle.”250 This persuasive component of the CRS strategy was supported by the marginalizing language with which the group described their tea party and Republican opponents. The negative out-group was described in devil-terms such as “irresponsible,” “villainous,” and alternately as hostage takers and as fussy children. In effect, “within their polarizing rhetoric, senators subdivided Republicans and attempted to reconstitute some Republicans’ identities as legislators.”251
The rhetorical strategy pursued by CRS was not limited to floor speeches within the halls of Congress. In television appearances, newspaper editorials, and press conferences, members of CRS consistently utilized polarizing strategies to construct a media narrative pitting their positive in-group against intransigent and damaging extremists within the Republican Party. Indeed, a critical component of the overall strategy to end the shutdown was to increase pressure on undecided members of the Senate over time by positively framing the Sensible Center’s efforts within the media narrative, and by driving negative coverage of their opponents. As McGowan illustrates well, members of CRS undertook a conscious and consistent public relations campaign to formulate and steer their polarizing narrative:
During the government shutdown, the Senate’s women presented a unified front to the press as they promoted their position […] Their public strategy attracted news coverage and […] the news media created a narrative that included villains and heroes.252
Indeed, some of the women appeared on news shows in groups of two and three to demonstrate their group solidarity.253 This provided visual evidence of their in-group, and it is also the clearest evidence McGowan provides of direct rhetorical coordination among CRS members.254 By influencing and (at least partially) steering the media narrative,
the women of the Senate helped the news media frame the government shutdown debate and thus offered a politically consequential narrative: […] a media frame that encouraged democratic decision-making and influenced how the public interpreted the narrative’s political issues, actors, and solutions.255
By clearly identifying polarizing textual elements, processes, and issues, McGowan details an instance in which the effective use of polarization helped meet real-world goals in the U.S. Senate. Beyond demonstrating that polarizing strategies are a viable field for modern rhetorical research, McGowan’s work also offers insights into a theory of oratorical networks and the analysis of the tea party to come. It is doubtful, for instance, that members of the CRS in-group explicitly coordinated their floor speeches and individual media appearances with one another throughout the group; McGowan certainly provides no evidence of such activities. But their common rhetorical narrative constituted a shared group identity that led the individual orators to act in a collective way, spontaneously generating a coherent social group and oratorical network over time.
Another lesson to be drawn from McGowan’s work is how the in-group of CRS members explicitly sought to functionalize the journalistic media and, by extension, the wider American public to meet their real-world goals. In this way, the politicians utilized tactics described by Mannheim to influence their opponents in Congress: they activated other social stakeholders to exert direct and indirect pressure from multiple fronts to sway Republican politicians to support the continuing resolution.256 Similarly to Smith and Smith, McGowan shows how the narrative offered by CRS was directly reflected in media accounts of the time, and led to a shift in coverage of the events that was beneficial to those seeking a compromise and an end to the shutdown. The consistent and uniform nature of the polarizing account generated a plausible rhetorical narrative that only became more believable and more real over time.
Finally, one of the more heartening lessons to be taken from McGowan’s work is the idea that polarizing rhetorical strategies can be used constructively to overcome an otherwise polarized and gridlocked state. In essence, McGowan’s work shows how to fight (rhetorical) fire with (rhetorical) fire; to utilize the affirmative and identity-building nature of polarizing rhetoric to bridge partisan gaps. By consistently mixing conciliatory and welcoming messages with a compelling polarized narrative, the women of the CRS offered potential converts and undecided members of their target audiences a new acceptable identity—the Sensible Center. Eventually, enough senators were convinced (either through argument or external pressure) to join the in-group that the resolution’s supporters met their ultimate real-world goal.
This account illustrates a potential positive role for polarizing rhetorical strategies in public and political discourse.257 At the same time, a more cynical reading is that the use of polarizing strategies to combat existing polarization simply shifts the divided state around a new set of flag issues. In this reading, the twenty female senators that constituted the CRS were (for a brief period) simply more effective at polarizing Congress than their opponents. Instead of actually bridging any political gaps or generating any real conciliation between the parties, it could be argued that the CRS was merely skilled at using political wedge issues to pit their opponents against one another. Indeed, McGowan herself indicates that sowing division among their opponents was one of the core goals of CRS’s polarizing strategy. After temporarily shifting the votes of a small number of senators to get a compromise through, Congress remained severely polarized along partisan lines, and the coherent oratorical network surrounding the CRS in-group dissolved. While individual members of the group may still preach bipartisanship and polarize against extreme elements of the opposing party, the affirmative in-group identity created by the flag issues of the budget impasse and the government shutdown faded away.
Regardless of the normative issues involved in the utilization of polarizing rhetoric, McGowan makes a compelling case for its use as an effective coalition-building tool. She also clearly illustrates how polarizing narratives can generate new sociopolitical identities, and how those who identify with the in-group and seek to spread its narrative interact with other social groups (the journalistic media in particular) to increase its effect on their target audience. Similar strategies and structures will be seen in the coming discussion of polarization in the environmental movement.
2.3.2 Constitutive Polarizing Rhetoric in the Environmental Movement
Throughout the late twentieth century, the issue of use vs. conservation has been a central element of environmental politics in the United States, and the discourse surrounding environmental issues has seen its fair share of polarizing strategies on both sides of this dichotomous divide. There has also been a significant amount of research that has sought to document and analyze such rhetoric. As Judith Hendry notes in an essay titled “The Rhetoric of Polarization”: “Environmental conflict often takes place in the public arena. All parties in the conflict strive to bring their viewpoints to the public’s attention in a persuasive and compelling manner while undermining their opposition.”258 An interesting aspect of rhetoric in the environmental movement is the diverse number of groups and subgroups that have adopted parallel polarizing strategies, and the ways in which groups fighting on the same side of an issue might disagree with one another’s tactics. Work by both Hendry and Brant Short, for instance, has documented the use of extremely provocative rhetoric used by the radical environmental group Earth First!, and it’s even more extreme offshoot, the ELF.259 Other studies of the controversy over the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest have highlighted the ways in which both conservationists and land use activists have created competing polarizing narratives to influence public opinion in their favor.260
Short and Hendry both identify affirmative and marginalizing rhetorical strategies as well as dichotomous, hyperbolic, and provocative textual elements in Earth First!’s public communication. The conservationists established a positive in-group identity of “warriors” who were “planting their spears in the ground and taking a stand.”261 These “true believers” were acting to save the planet, and were called to confront the “enemy” both without and (importantly) within the environmental movement.262 Similarly, the negative out-groups of “the international timber, mining and beef industries” were marginalized using exaggerated devil-terms such as “bandits” and “villains,” and members were consistently ridiculed using derogatory language.263 At the same time, groups and individuals within the environmental movement itself were heavily criticize as well. Deemed ineffective and “corrupted by the system,” more moderate environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and The National Wildlife federation were labeled “soft” and “out of touch.”264 By offering this simplified and exaggerated narrative, Earth First! sought to activate those who identified themselves as environmentalists to choose their more confrontational version of the movement. Their provocative language sought to force members of the public (and others in the environmental movement) to choose sides in their constructed dichotomy.
The use of polarizing strategies by Earth First! closely parallels Bowers and Ochs’ original conception of the phenomenon: it was used by a small, agitative group to meet the sociopolitical goals of activation and attention generation, and even many who agreed with their position were associated with the out-group because of their (supposed) inaction and moderation.265 This situation also fits Lanigan’s description of internal social polarization arising from competing leadership claims. Short’s and Hendry’s studies are important because they illustrate how the rhetorical (and non-rhetorical) actions of an extremist subset of a movement can create division both inside and outside a political movement. As Short puts it: “The extreme, agitative rhetoric of one element within a social movement provides an internal dialectic that forces a counter response within the movement as well as outside the movement.”266
In the case of Earth First!, the extremely provocative and exaggerated nature of this group’s rhetoric led to division and fragmentation within the environmental movement as a whole, garnering significant criticism from more moderate environmental groups as well as generating outrage from those opposed to the movement.267 On the one hand, such communication generated internal group division, forcing nominal allies to spend resources denouncing each other and driving public supporters to choose between agitation and the “establishment.” It also provided opposing groups an opportunity to highlight extremist elements among environmentalists. In this vein, “many environmentalists have feared that the general public might link their specific groups to Earth First!, thereby harming the larger environmental movement.”268 Indeed, the rhetoric and actions of Earth First! generated significant negative press for the environmental movement as a whole and caused significant political blowback.
On the other hand, polarizing rhetoric by an extremist wing of a social movement can also have positive effects. As Hendry summarizes, such rhetoric from fringe elements of the environmental movement had at least three positive effects on the movement as a whole. First, “the media attention that activists receive […] draws public attention and increases awareness of environmental issues.” By using polarizing language and taking extreme actions, Earth First! forced the media to cover their activities and their public communications. By extension, this generated headlines and reports about environmental issues in general as journalists sought to provide context and inform the public about the actions of the extreme group. Second, their activities shifted the Overton window of public debate, making “mainstream groups working within the system seem ‘reasonable’ and ‘responsible’ by comparison.” In this way, polarization by Earth First! boosted the moderate reputation of the mainstream environmental movement; by contrasting themselves with fringe groups, organizations such as the Sierra Club were able to position themselves as a more rational and credible voice within the political discourse surrounding environmental issues. Finally, Earth First!’s rhetoric expanded the boundaries of public discourse “by articulating alternative views of reality that challenge[d] the largely unsustainable mainstream views.”269 By calling for the use of socially disruptive action, extremist elements within the environmental movement expanded the horizons of future possibility, making goals that once seemed impossible (such as a halt to old-growth logging) more real and present.
In related research on conflict surrounding forest use in the Pacific Northwest, both Jonathan I. Lange and Mark P. Moore studied the construction and contours of a polarized debate surrounding the flag issue of the endangered spotted owl. Both researchers discuss the communicative strategies of countervailing groups (environmentalists vs. the timber industry) and how each side acted as an independent oratorical network seeking to influence government policies by driving public and political discourse. While Moore focused his analysis on the construction of the northern spotted owl as a focal point of the polarized debate surrounding forest use, Lange used macroanalytical methods to map out the divergent and reciprocal “logic” of their competing campaigns. Although neither discussed the strategy of polarization explicitly, both provide important insights into the use of such strategies in complex, multi-party persuasive campaigns.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the spotted owl became the focal point of divergent polarizing narratives used by both the environmental movement and the timber industry. In his study of the debate, Moore utilized Burke’s concept of synecdoche to describe the owl as “a symbol that represents a part of a greater whole.”270 As related by Moore, the spotted owl became a divergent symbol for both sides of the conflict: “an ‘indicator’ species” for environmentalists and “an economic ‘scapegoat’” for those in the timber industry.271 To put it in now familiar terminology, the spotted owl became the central flag issue in the debate surrounding forest use in the Northwest; “overall, the owl synecdoche functions to establish a context for debate, provide an organizing principle for its orientation, and encapsulate the opposing worldviews, but it does not provide a group for resolution.”272 The divergent images of the spotted owl among competing groups created, “competing social realities” that were mutually exclusive and that drove and maintained the division between environmentalists and loggers. Although each side’s depiction of the owl and its role was clearly simplified and exaggerated, the owl became “a representation of the larger problem concerning economics and the environment.”273 The divergent views of reality “further reduce[d] the controversy to either/or terms: life or death for environmentalists; liberty or death for the timber industry.”274 The distorted images of the spotted owl as either an indicator of life or an economic scapegoat also became “symbolic political representations,” driving those who were not directly vested in the issue to take sides based on their prior political affiliations.275
Moore concludes that the use of such exaggerated and simplified synecdochic representations in social debates drives social division and makes it more difficult (or even impossible) for competing social groups to find resolution. As each group becomes more entrenched in its depiction of the issue, “the political discourse increases polarization and reinforces the incompatibility” of the opposing worldviews: “In this manner, an ideograph in divergent synecdochic forms generates irresolvable conflict.”276 This “false dilemma, generated by competing synecdoches, prevents discussion of the larger problem and negates conflict resolution.”277 By focusing group efforts on maintaining and controlling the public narrative surrounding the image, opposing groups lose sight of the real issues and potential negotiated solutions that could be found: “When the real issue is supplanted by the rhetorical trope, resolution is thwarted because, in a sense, the trope has created a ‘meta’ or contrived conflict of its own that not only distorts and obscures the issue, but replaces it as well.”278
Moore’s work emphasizes the role of flag issues as a central feature driving polarizing processes and preventing divergent social groups from reaching agreement. At their core, flag issues are symbols that represent core values and judgements held by the orator’s chosen in-group. As these symbols enter the public arena, they both define and obscure the core debate and take on a life of their own within social discourse. Because the flag issue often represents completely different things to each group, members of each have different and incompatible views of reality. The public discourse surrounding these issues becomes a public and political tug-of-war that ignores potential overlap and reconciliation, and that emphasizes the “true” version of reality as construed by one group or the other. As the debate widens, those not directly involved become drawn in by the provocative and dichotomous depiction offered by both sides; these uncommitted individuals then tend to pick a side based on prior biases and political affiliations. In the case of the tea party, central polarizing flag issues of federal bailouts, Obamacare, and immigration (among many others) served a similar function to the spotted owl seen in Moore’s work. As will be shown in Chapter 3, these issues became signifiers for core values that members of the tea party network felt were disrespected or betrayed by both the administration as well as more moderate Republicans. By focusing their rhetorical efforts on these issues, tea party orators were able to generate solidarity among those who identified with their depiction and to drive polarization by preventing the discussion of ways that policy disagreements could be resolved.
While Moore focused his research on the construction of irreconcilable conflict through the use of synecdoches, Lange sought to describe the way that conflicting persuasive campaigns by both environmentalists and the logging industry reacted and interacted with one another in the debate over the spotted owl. Lange’s work is important here because it indicates the ways in which competing persuasive campaigns interact with one another and society at large to generate a spontaneous “logic” that perpetuates a polarized state. And although Lange never explicitly mentions the term polarization, his analysis clearly illustrates all of the familiar markers of the rhetorical strategy, including both marginalization (“vilification”) and affirmation, as well as textual markers such as simplification to a dichotomy, exaggeration, and provocation. Perhaps most important for the analysis here is his conclusion that the interactions between the two oratorical networks spontaneously generated an ever-increasing polarization, or, as he puts it, “a ‘negative spiral’ of destructive strategies and tactics,” that were “achieved with little to no direct communication between environmental and counter-environmental groups.”279 Similarly to McGowan’s research, Lange shows how polarizing rhetorical strategies can organically emerge and spread through public discourse without the explicit coordination of orators within an oratorical network.
Lange identifies a series of categories “in which advocates’ and counter-advocates’ rhetorical and communicative strategies mirror and match one another.” While such behavior is common between normal communicative partners seeking to directly influence one another, Lange notes that in this case, “this interaction is characterized by moves which […] are intended for just about anyone except the other party.”280 Lange repeatedly makes it clear that the environmental and counter-environmental movements had little to no direct communicative interaction with one another. Instead, both sides “waged extensive and intense information campaigns to gain the support of various groups and federal agencies, including the general public.”281 Like a framing tug-of-war, each oratorical network sought to push its version of the spotted owl narrative in interviews, press conferences, and other public forums. At the same time, individuals and groups on both sides were compelled to react to distortions by the other. In this way, “if one group vilifies the other, it is incumbent for the other to respond, refuting the charge and/or providing one’s own [...] Otherwise a fully unfavorable context, from their point of view, would prevail.”282 Although the actions of environmentalists and the timber industry were uncoordinated, the matching and mirroring dynamic created a spontaneous interactive logic: “a logic of duplication and antithesis […] more like a synchronous spiral of non-interaction, as messages are directed not to each other, but to the public and members of government and government agencies.”283
This indicates the degree to which polarizing campaigns seek to mobilize the wider public (and influential politicians) against their chosen opponent without directly engaging that opponent in dialogue or debate. In this case, both sides needed to have politicians and administrators on their side to effect (or stop) changes in forestry policies. To get this support, they needed the public to believe their version of events.284 As a result, both sides reinforced and sought to extend existing social divisions with their narratives, with each side hoping that a sufficient number of people (and ultimately, politicians) would agree with their version of the spotted owl debate and their chosen plan of action. And as Lange points out, even the benefits of legal action taken by both sides were “measured not only by the outcome of the issues in question, but by favorable or unfavorable publicity as well.”285 Like McGowan’s work and Smith and Smith’s research, this example again illustrates the importance of the media in broadcasting and amplifying the dichotomous frameworks offered by an oratorical network.
2.4Polarization as a Rhetorical Strategy
The research discussed in this chapter has focused on the phenomenon of polarization from the perspectives of both individual orators who have sought to divide their audiences and the wider American public for their own electoral gain, as well as more diffuse oratorical networks that have used polarizing strategies and frameworks to create new shared identities. Interestingly, and despite Bowers and Ochs’ original characterization of polarization as a strategy used by anti-establishment protest groups, a significant amount of research has focused on politicians already in power who have used polarizing rhetoric to help them maintain their positions. As has been illustrated here, the use of such strategies to meet these goals has shown mixed success.
At this point, it is helpful to provide a summary of what has been said so far and to crystallize the research results of the last forty years regarding the strategy of polarization. In particular, it is important here to delineate: 1) the functional effects of polarizing rhetorical strategies, 2) the specific structural elements that a polarizing text should have, 3) the situational conditions under which such a text can successfully polarize an audience, and 4) the oratorical calculations and considerations that an orator should make before utilizing polarization to try and meet their real-world goals. While the following summary will focus on the implementation of polarizing strategies by an independently acting orator, many of the theoretical lessons drawn here can also be directly applied to situations that involve oratorical networks and a more complex interplay between different orators and orator complexes.
2.4.1 Functional Effects
Polarizing rhetoric has a series of functional effects that an orator can use to help meet their real-world goals. As its name implies, and as traditional definitions of the term from other scholarly fields have shown, polarizing strategies serve to divide a given audience or broader segments of society into two mutually exclusive groups around an issue or topic chosen by the orator. While various researchers have provided different terminology to refer to an orator’s chosen polarizing topic, Bowers and Ochs’ original term flag issue still seems the most appropriate.286 The in-group and out-groups depicted by the orator represent the ends of a positive-negative continuum in a dichotomous framework, and those who come in contact with polarizing texts are driven to one side or the other, depending on their views of the orator and the flag issue.
As described by King and Anderson, the divisive effect of polarizing strategies can be broken down into two primary sub-strategies: affirmation and marginalization. On the one hand, polarizing rhetoric generates solidarity among audience members who identify with the orator or with the orator’s stance on the flag issue. The affirmative function of polarization emphasizes shared beliefs and characteristics in order to generate support for the orator, to establish and solidify the depicted in-group’s common social identity, and to rouse in-group members to action. As much of the research discussed here has indicated, polarizing rhetoric can serve to generate new social identities and powerful sociopolitical coalitions.287 The example of Nixon’s Silent Majority provides a particularly vivid illustration of the phenomenon. On the other hand, the marginalizing function of polarizing rhetoric seeks to undermine the ethos of those who hold an opposing position. Those who do not agree with the orator or their in-group, or who disagree with their methods, are swept together in a morally deficient out-group.288 By grouping those opposed to the orator or their position into one monolithic, negative out-group, an orator provides supporters with a negative external force for them to act against. As Smith and Smith note, this marginalizing effect may also generate solidarity among individuals labeled as out-group members.289
Another effect of polarizing rhetoric is to draw attention to the speaker and the issue around which they have chosen to establish a dichotomous framework. Even in situations in which division does not occur in an audience (failed polarization) or in which the created division fails to help an orator meet real-world goals (failed functionalization of polarization), the provocative and confrontational nature of polarizing rhetoric compels those who hear the orator’s message to sit up and pay attention. Indeed, research indicates that polarizing texts are specifically designed to generate an emotional and psychological response in listeners. This attention-getting function is particularly important for orators and oratorical networks whose voices would not normally be heard or would be discounted from public discourse. As Bowers and Ochs’ original definition of the term reflects—and as research on the environmental movement has shown—orator complexes and oratorical networks that sit outside the halls of power can use polarizing strategies simply to gain a voice at the discourse table. Relatedly, work by Coe et al. and McGowan have shown that polarizing textual structures and frameworks are particularly suited to repetition by media outlets, which increase the overall attention to an orator’s polarizing framework by broadcasting it to wider audiences.290
Polarization can be used to not only draw attention to a particular issue, but also to help define that issue in a way that is favorable to the speaker’s viewpoint. By expressing extreme viewpoints, or at least those that are not traditionally part of the public discourse, polarization can expand the range of possible worlds in political circles and the wider public. Such expansion can also lead to a shift in the Overton window of acceptable discourse, creating a new reality in which the overall discursive balance is shifted in the orator’s desired direction. A good example of this is seen in Coe. et al.: by consistently and forcefully asserting the binary of good vs. evil, President George W. Bush made it less and less socially acceptable to criticize his policies, as doing so came to be seen as unpatriotic and even treasonous.291
An important point made by all existing research is that the effects of polarization are felt both immediately and can be extended over time. While individual speeches and texts can be polarizing, the divisive, affirmative, and marginalizing effects of the process develop over time. While Coe et al. make the most effort to describe different “phases” of the process of polarization, others describe polarizing rhetorical strategies that have extended through political campaigns and throughout political careers. Following Coe et al., the establishment phase of polarizing rhetorical processes requires the intense initial use of binary couplets to imprint the orator’s chosen dichotomous framework in the minds of audience members. Over time, the frameworks and concrete descriptions of each side of the dichotomy can be extended through their occasional use together, or by emphasizing one side or the other according to orator needs.292 In the case of polarizing strategies across oratorical networks, it is important to describe how the process is initiated and extended over time by different actors to drive the functional effects of division, affirmation, and marginalization.293
2.4.2Textual Markers
At the textual level, existing research has identified a number of characteristics of polarizing rhetoric. Overall, polarizing texts integrate a combination of three elements: 1) the simplification of a given flag issue to a positive and negative dichotomy, 2) the exaggeration and amplification of the differences between individuals on either side of the dichotomy in order to spur in-group/out-group social identification, and 3) the provocation of an emotional-psychological response in audience members through the use of striking and morally charged language and imagery. Each of these textual elements drives a different aspect of the polarizing process. Simplification breaks down complex issues into an artificial either/or, pro/con framework that defines two diametrically opposed groups into which audience members are to be sorted, and which leaves no ground for a middle position. When nuance and details are discussed, it becomes clear to an audience that a broad range of positions are possible and acceptable, robbing the given text of its polarizing force. Following the research discussed here, common textual markers of simplifying polarizing rhetoric include we/they formulations, either/or assertions, and other dichotomous, binary copulas.
Exaggeration (hyperbole) of the perceived differences between the two dichotomies serves to heighten the moral stakes of the generated conflict, to clearly establish the positive in-group in the minds of addressees, and to depict members of the out-group as having extreme and morally despicable views. By representing facts or events as greater or more important than they actually are, a speaker can highlight chosen positive and negative attributes. Specific textual markers of such exaggeration include the use of good/evil moral representation, reductio ad absurdum, and the description of both sides as monolithic entities engaged in a struggle for dominance. The more extreme the position an orator can plausibly attribute to their opponents, the more objectionable their positions become to those who identify with the in-group. In this way, exaggeration can also serve as a persuasive device for neutral audience members who know little about the chosen flag issue: the better a speaker can depict the negative position as too extreme, the more likely undecided recipients are to side with the positive in-group without thinking too much about the way the issue is framed. At the same time, exaggeration acts as a social cue for members of the audience who are informed about the issue. Even if they find it somewhat offensive, those who tend to agree with the speaker will accept the exaggeration as a legitimate embellishment, and their solidarity with the in-group will be strengthened. Those who identify with the out-group position often find the exaggeration excessively offensive and distorted, driving them further away from the speaker (and, by association, the in-group). Thus, exaggeration helps drive polarization by acting both as a persuasive device for addressees who haven’t already formed opinions about the issue at hand and by reinforcing group identities for those members of the audience who have already formed opinions.
Finally, provocative and confrontational textual elements seek to make it impossible for those who hear the orator’s message to remain neutral. The orator uses morally and emotionally charged language to trigger a psychological response in recipients, moving them to identify with one side of the dichotomous framework or the other. Provocative textual elements also help drive the attention-getting function of polarizing rhetoric. It is often difficult to ignore the loudest voice in a room, and the confrontational nature of polarizing rhetoric attracts attention for its bombast. By confronting the audience with incendiary or extreme language, the orator draws attention to their dichotomous depiction of the flag issue. Typical provocative textual elements found in polarizing rhetoric are the use of derogatory terminology to dehumanize and undermine the ethos of members of the out-group and the exhortation of in-group members to action to fight the perceived threat of the “other.”
By verbally attacking members of the out-group (even those in the immediate audience, as seen in Wallace’s campaign speeches), the orator creates a charged atmosphere, triggering psychological mechanisms that drive social group formation.294 As with exaggeration, the effect of provocative language on a given audience member is highly dependent on their initial opinions of the orator and of the flag issue. While those who identify with the in-group will feel emboldened and activated by provocative language, those who are identified as (or identify with) the out-group will become defensive and even less open to the orator.295 Those whose opinions aren’t yet solidified are compelled to make a decision upon being provoked: do they side with a provocative (and ostensibly stronger) position, or are they turned away by the extreme statements of the speaker? As Bowers and Ochs note, the provocative nature of polarizing rhetoric can even cause those who tend to agree with the speaker’s position to be turned off by their tactics.
It is important to emphasize that the separate textual elements of polarizing texts work in tandem to create polarizing effects: 1) simplification breaks down complex issues to a positive and negative dichotomy, 2) exaggeration heightens and highlights differences between the two sides of the dichotomy and to clearly establish the positive in-group and the negative out-group, and 3) provocation triggers emotional and psychological responses in audience members that forces them to react and drives them in opposing directions based on their preexisting opinions and group identities. Although these elements can be described separately, they are often combined together within a single paragraph, sentence, or (textual) image.296 And while all three of these constitutive textual elements must be present for the functional effects of polarization to occur, the form and the extent to which a given text incorporates each depends on the goals and intentions of the speaker as well as the concrete contextual situation in which they find themselves. Thus, each textual element can be measured along a spectrum: polarizing texts can be more or less simplified, exaggerated or provocative, depending on the needs of the speaker and the context of their communication. The extent to which each of these three elements must be present for a given text to polarize depends on the specific communicative context that a speaker finds themselves in and the overall makeup of their audience.
2.4.3 Contextual Factors
It is clear from existing research that certain contextual conditions must be met for polarizing strategies to be effective at generating the functional effects described previously. More specifically, the process of polarization depends heavily on preexisting audience opinions surrounding both the flag issue and the orator themselves. While some debate remains about the ability of orators to create division within an audience, all prior research agrees that an orator should seek to tap into latent, preexisting differences of opinion and social identities within their audience for their polarizing strategy to be successful.297 A thorough analysis of audience opinion composition is thus critical to the successful implementation of polarizing strategies. An orator is more likely to successfully functionalize polarizing strategies to meet real-world goals if they have considerable knowledge of the range of opinions present in their audiences, of the relative size (and/or sociopolitical strength) of opinion groups, and the issues around which (at least some) social polarization already exists.
A central requirement of successful polarization is that the chosen issue is seen as relevant. As Smith and Smith clearly illustrate, if audience members consider the flag issue irrelevant or out of date, they will reject the speaker’s claim to its importance and question the overall authority of the speaker themselves.298 Similarly, if audience members simply do not care enough about the issue to form an opinion, it will be difficult to activate the sociological division that polarization seeks to create (or exacerbate). In this sense, the constitution of the audience determines the range of potential topics that an orator can utilize to polarize their audience. The selection of an irrelevant flag issue will also tend to damage an orator’s overall image: audience members will react to the textual interplay of simplification, exaggeration, and provocation negatively and wonder why the orator is so vehement about something they do not deem important.299 At the same time, if the chosen flag issue is perceived as relevant by the audience, but the orator has not correctly taken preexisting attitudes, opinions, and social identities into account, then polarization may take place, but not in a way that can help the orator meet their ultimate, real-world goals.