Disaster Governance—Dealing with an Earthquake
University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
Mental Health & Addictions, First Do No Harm Auckland, Northern Regional Sector, New Zealand
Abstract
Organizations operating in environments where natural disasters occur need to take account of governance issues when dealing with a crisis, particularly when the organization, staff, and its clients may all be affected. One organization, Pathways, which offers mental-health services, has reviewed its disaster governance during the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Feedback has been examined thematically in terms of strategic intention (including business continuity), human resources issues (including deployment of staff), organizational culture (including lived values), and strategic networking (including organizational politics and links with external organizations). Learnings from the earthquake include the need for responsive and visible leadership, effective information and communication systems, interagency collaboration, role clarity and boundaries, robust selection criteria, and enactment of the organizational values.
Keywords: Disaster governance, Strategic intention, Human resources, Strategic networking/interagency collaboration, Organization culture, Responsive and visible leadership, Role clarity and boundaries, Selection criteria.
The Earthquakes
New Zealand is situated in the Pacific Ring of Fire, which stretches to Asia, Alaska, and along the coasts of North and South America. This ring of volcanic and earthquake activity contains 75 percent of the world’s most active and dormant volcanoes and is the area where 90 percent of the world’s earthquakes occur (About Geography 2012).
On September 4, 2010, Christchurch (New Zealand’s second most populated city) experienced an earthquake (magnitude 7.1) that caused damage, but little loss of life. This was followed less than six months later on February 22, 2011, by a 6.4 magnitude quake that shook the city for 12 seconds and caused 181 deaths, thousands of injuries, and damage to tens of thousands of buildings. There have been approximately 20,000 aftershocks since the first quake. It is the second major earthquake that is the focus of this study and considered the main disaster.
There are many definitions of disaster, but the second earthquake fits many of the criteria for being one: it was an unexpected and uncontrollable dangerous event (Adshead, Canterbury, and Rose 1995; Fritz 1961 as cited in Scaffa, Gerardi, Herzberg, and McCall 2005), at the interface of natural, social, and human systems (The Red Cross 2001 as cited in Kapacu 2007), which exceeded the capacity of the local community to respond (Comfort, Ko, and Zogorecki 2004), and resulted in significant disruption to the community and social structure after the event (Tierney 2000 in Rodriguez et al. 2006), as well as causing “seemingly senseless deaths and injuries” (ibid., 170).
There is still significant disruption to business, many people have not been able to return to their homes, insurance claims are still being settled, infrastructure remains disrupted in some areas, and people remain exhausted with many retraumatized by the ongoing aftershocks. While many people are resilient and recover quickly (Gluckman 2011), mental-health effects often last longer than the physical manifestations after a disaster (Fisher 1998 cited in Scaffa et al. 2005).
A survey of Christchurch business owners showed the five key issues they were facing a year after the earthquake included the following: cash-flow, loss of markets or sales, mental tiredness, building/location, and insurance/legal issues. Only 55.6 percent were in a building that was okay or required only minor repairs. However, optimism levels have increased from 26.8 percent in mid-2011 to a year later when it was at 74 percent (Rebuild Christchurch 2012). Consumer confidence has improved significantly in recent months as the rebuild of Christchurch begins to take shape (NZ Herald 2013).
The Organization
Pathways is a nongovernmental organization and part of the Wise Group, which provides both residential and community mental-health support, crisis, and planned respite services across New Zealand to more than 1,000 people. The vision is to create mental-health and wellness opportunities to enable people to live their dreams and flourish.
The Effect of the Earthquake on Pathways
At the time of the earthquake, there were 50 staff in Christchurch providing services to 120 consumers through 2 residential complexes, 2 supportive landlord complexes, mobile support services, and planned respite care. None of the staff or consumers was killed or seriously injured, but many lost property, friends, or infrastructure services. The regional office was based on the fourth floor of an office building in the central business district of Christchurch, which was the area worst affected by the quake.
Pathways had updated its regional emergency disaster plan following the September 2010 earthquake. On the day of the earthquake, staff were in the mid of a busy day: visiting people in the community or providing support to clients in residential complexes, while others were at meetings or in the regional office. Staff in the office evacuated down the stairs, which seemed to be moving away from the walls and vacated the building, leaving personal belongings and work equipment behind. No one was able to re-enter this building for five weeks and then only to retrieve some equipment. Ceilings had collapsed, glass wall panels had fallen, and furniture was toppled and destroyed. This building was ultimately “red-stickered” for demolition.
The residential complexes were not badly damaged, but staff needed to reassure clients before they could check on their own families’ whereabouts. Mobile support staff ensured those they were visiting were safe and then tried to head home or to an identified response center, over roads that were in many cases destroyed or gridlocked. Telecommunication services remained mostly uninterrupted and power was restored fairly quickly. Other infrastructure was disrupted with no water available at any of the remaining Pathways’ service complexes.
Of critical importance was the pre- and postearthquake vulnerability of the clients and the need for continuity of business to ensure ongoing support and recovery. Vulnerable and already traumatized clients had just been retraumatized by the disaster. Gluckman (2011) notes that there are psychosocial effects for those going through an earthquake—both individual psychological effects impacting on how people feel and social effects impacting on how they relate to each other (p. 1). Staff were likely to be experiencing these impacts too.
Continuity of service during the crisis along with the need to provide support and human resources services to the staff affected were critical disaster governance issues for Pathways.
Disaster Governance
Governance can be defined as the process of steering, guiding, and correcting in an NGO (Wyatt 2004). It is the provision of overall vision, direction, purpose, and oversight to ensure an organization’s efficiency, effectiveness, and focus are maintained. Well-functioning governance structures identify the mission, articulate the strategy to achieve organizational goals, evaluate progress, oversee the financial affairs of the organization, support the organization’s long-term viability, promote organizational continuity and stability, and serve as a link to the organization’s constituencies (The Working Group on NGO Governance in Central & Eastern Europe 2011). However, as Tierney (2012) points out, disaster governance is an emerging concept closely related to risk and environmental governance, and it may require more collaborative governance focused on public purpose to reduce impacts and losses. Many leaders focus only on communications and public relations during a crisis, but it is essential for them not only to make sense of the issues, sell changes, remain agile and creative, make decisions, and take risks, but also to ensure appropriate governance issues are addressed. These include strategic business survival, leadership, resourcing, infrastructure, ethical, and safety issues.
During disasters, leaders may need to use a different frame through which to view governance and their own roles, to develop appropriate processes, and to provide a roadmap for decision making. The different lenses through which to view the governance issues of handling a disaster are considered in this case as being that of strategic design (for organization continuity), human resource management practices (to achieve organization strategy and goals) and organization culture (to link to organization mission and values), and strategic networking (dealing with organizational and interagency politics and building links to other stakeholders) (Wooten 2007).
Following Wooten’s (2007, 2008) four lenses, in terms of strategic design, leaders need to consider the impact on the business in the future and how it might continue to operate, how to allocate staff from other areas to assist in the disaster area, and how to continue to manage successfully in under-resourced areas. Through a human resources lens, there is a need to be aware of the organization’ social and human capital, consider the gap between the employees’ needs and the organization’s goals and assess the impact of potential labor shortages, while at the same time scanning the environment for further threats. Organization culture can be destroyed or enhanced by the way leaders deal with a crisis, so role modeling by leaders is key to the outcome, as the leaders may need to both walk the talk of organizational values and also challenge any cultural barriers during the crisis. In relation to strategic networking, the leaders need to develop networks both in and outside of the disaster area to assist with the crisis and ensure that those who volunteer for assistance are able to cope with the crisis, while taking note of key power brokers within and outside the organization who can facilitate the process.
While this particular type of disaster may not be one that will affect most organizations, the Institute for Crisis Management points out that between 2000 and 2009 there were 90,000 news reports of business crises in the United States alone. Learnings from this case study may apply to other situations in which a business crisis occurs and disaster governance needs to be implemented.
Data Collection
After the initial crisis of the earthquake, leaders and staff were interviewed and completed questionnaires to debrief and reflect on the disaster and to consider both how the organization had handled the crisis, what it did well in terms of disaster governance issues, and what it might have done differently or better. Responses were thematically analyzed.
Strategic Design
From a strategic design perspective, demonstrable leadership to enable continuity of business was a key driver. The then CEO and general manager of Pathways were aware of the disaster within five minutes of the quake occurring. Both had arrived in Christchurch the day after the February 2011 earthquake to accommodation arranged after the first earthquake in September 2010 and coordinated the disaster response for the next three weeks from within the city. From then on they were intermittently present there for a number of months.
In the immediate aftermath of hearing about the earthquake, the first issue was to establish the health and safety of all Christchurch staff and clients. They were contacted by phone to establish their well-being and immediate needs. Phone lists and the task of topping up credit on phones were allocated to each staff member in the head office. After the first earthquake, all clients had been provided with prepaid phones with support from Telecom NZ. In addition, e-texts could be sent by computer. This enabled 70 percent of staff and clients to be contacted by the end of day one.
Then from a governance perspective, creating a structure to deal with the disaster was essential. Volunteers from staff around the country were sought to provide support to the Christchurch staff, who needed time to organize their families and homes. By the end of the day following the earthquake, 10 volunteers had been identified, were booked on flights, and had accommodation organized. All of them were accompanied by supplies of water, hand sanitizer, and other resources needed to supplement supplies in Christchurch.
Over the next 6 weeks, a total of 31 staff were sent to provide moral and practical support to the organization in Christchurch so that practical staffing levels could be maintained, staff could take leave to deal with anxiety/trauma responses, and practical issues such as accommodation and safety of their families. All of the staff from other regions brought boxes of bottled water and other supplies.
Managers in most other regions considered that they were able to cope with the cover of their own services and those of Christchurch during this period, without impeding client needs significantly. The Christchurch managers felt the most valuable outcome was that they were able to take in staff from the regions “quickly with the right people . . . able to step in.”
There was some impact on the regions’ ability to deliver services, but the managers had taken this into account when making selections. Some permanent staff took on extra shifts or worked in different parts of the service and they also utilized casual staff more fully.
In terms of access to clients, one landlord complex was within the police cordon that was established around the seriously damaged central business district. It required permits and entry via army and police roadblocks to enable services to be delivered to clients within the cordon. Leaders facilitated this as much as they were able to by ensuring that police and army were aware that they were providing health care to vulnerable clients.
The decision was made to consolidate the two residential services to one complex, and this was made possible by having some vacancies and enabling clients to share flats. There were no toilet facilities for days and in some cases for weeks. For many staff, the role became more basic in that they needed to assist clients with using plastic bags for human waste disposal and then burying these in gardens. Infection control was a key issue.
From a business continuity perspective, resources to enable the organization to continue functioning were also a significant requirement. The two leaders had taken a large amount of cash with them to enable them to purchase the necessary goods, as they expected that automated cash machines would not be working. Extra money was also transferred into the bank accounts of two senior staff to enable the purchase of resources. There was a continual need to provide other basics such as water, food, medication, sanitary supplies, chemical toilets, buckets, solar showers, radios, batteries, torches, and access to Red Cross emergency grants. Within two days, a pharmacist was making up blister packs of medication for clients.
Staff needed to be able to travel to see their clients, and with three company cars trapped inside the cordon, five rental vehicles needed to be hired on the day following the earthquake.
Strategic Design Feedback
In terms of keeping the organization functioning, staff valued out of town staff coming to assist. This provided them with practical support in times when they could not cope and moral support, in which the organization felt like a “family and present with us.”
Practical resources became crucial for on-going business and staff commented how they did not have to worry about the provisioning of items such as water, food, four-wheel drive vehicles, and chemical toilets, as they were available quickly. On the other hand, there was inevitably an oversupply of some goods, resulting in some resources continuing to be available should there be a future need.
The quick decision on a base for the mobile team gave stability to the team, as did the ability to have storage and resources available. More than three days of food and water in a survival kit became an obvious need.
The documented regional disaster plan (which had been updated six months prior) was not accessed or followed, but nevertheless the leaders felt that all elements of a sound disaster response could be followed. People do follow a common sense model on the ground.
Human Resources
Staffing requirements to maintain continuity of service was a key issue. Some Christchurch staff took annual leave to deal with the aftermath, and others left the city altogether. Some needed time off to sort out personal affairs or to deal with their emotions. Many of the clients went to stay with family or friends elsewhere, which eased the pressure on staff, but, on the other hand, time to do tasks increased and mobile staff found driving round the city difficult, as journeys that previously took 10 minutes could take an hour or more.
Staff from out of town were redeployed to Christchurch on a voluntary basis. They needed to be accommodated, have communication facilities, be orientated to the situation, be briefed on the role, and maintain touch with their families and regular work colleagues.
The most common criterion for managers to select staff to go to Christchurch was first their likely calming influence or ability to remain calm under stressful conditions. The next most important criteria were the knowledge of the organization, those who had the “whatever it takes” attitude and those with specific skills to offer (e.g., nursing). Further criteria included those who had assisted in the previous earthquake in September the year prior and the necessary makeup of the team to deliver the services required in a postearthquake situation.
In addition, the need for debriefing of the critical event was important. People needed time to connect with others, to talk about what had happened and their feelings. Employee Assistance Program services were available to all staff. Some of the out of town staff were experienced in dealing with posttraumatic stress and provided psychological first aid. Many other staff around the country were stressed or grieving due to what had happened and similar services needed to be provided to them. Shared morning teas in branches were held. TVs in staffrooms had to be turned off as staff became so distressed at the ongoing footage. All staff across the country participated in the 2-minute silence one week after the earthquake.
Financial dilemmas were another issue. Staff were naturally concerned about costs of caring for other family members, additional petrol costs to get to work due to road closures, the cost of not being at work (some because child care facilities and schools were closed), and some were dealing with destruction of their property. The organization gave them an additional cash payment into their accounts.
Change management became a critical governance issue. Staff had to deal with changes in structures of teams, changes in venue, changes in their home circumstances, changes in client needs, and changes in service delivery.
Human Resources Feedback
From a human resources perspective, staff appreciated the practical, financial, and work-related support they received. Staff valued the practical support offered to them by the organization. This included phone calls, texts, credit on mobile phones, and relief payment. “$500 in the pocket to buy groceries—I had to queue for an hour, but I’ve never bought that many groceries in my life” said one.
In addition, the time off granted to attend personal affairs or simply to reflect on the momentous event was important. Just being able to go and sit under a tree for a while became an essential part of coping. Those who were able to continue with work felt significant pride in being able to do so. For those working on their own, the need to set expectations about how long this might endure was noted.
Regarding staff flown in to assist, those who had previously traveled to the Christchurch region were particularly well regarded due to familiarity with the situation and staff. People with the right level of respect and ability to step back were important. Practical skills that were valued included nursing, camping, and proactiveness. Some felt that not all staff that volunteered had the right level of respect and at times felt overtaken or that there were too many out of town staff.
Strategic human resources planning postdisaster is key as there were times when out of town staff were rostered into Christchurch only for a week resulting in “short changeovers” of staff. Rostering needs to be managed by one or two people to ensure that rosters are well managed. Issues related to child care, with schools and day care centers closed, need to be considered. It was difficult for some staff to be at work or focus on work, while these issues remained unresolved.
Orientation to the situation varied in quality and comprehensiveness, with 16 out of the 31 feeling they had received some orientation and had some idea of what to expect. The quality often depended on who provided the orientation at the time. The suggestion was that the national team needed to coordinate the orientation, ensure there was written documentation, and that a more structured process be used, so that all receive a standardized and consistent briefing.
Clarity of roles was raised as an issue and it is essential for clear communication about who is responsible for what in a postdisaster situation. This also impacts on the issue of rostering and coordination of resources including vehicles.
A better selection process for those who volunteered to assist is necessary. Skills that could be considered include proactivity, emotional intelligence, initiative, judgment, and decision making. There is also a need to have good logistics in bringing in out-of-towners to a disaster situation and to orientate these staff better to the situation.
The value of having up-to-date information about clients and staff via centralized information systems enabled better staff and client planning.
Organization Culture
Communication and role modeling of values by leaders was a key element of disaster governance. The values of the organization are as follows: caring, optimism, passion, innovation, integrity, fun, imagination, and courage. The spirit statement is “whatever it takes” and “think and act as one.” All of these needed to be reinforced in the way every activity was carried out.
Communication had to be transparent, open, and accurate. For the first 48 hours, the full communications team was dedicated to communication about the quake and its aftermath. Information needed to be factual, objective, and up to date. From then on, they focused on ensuring continuing information flow. This included details such as availability or locality of a community laundry, road closures, and welfare centers in Christchurch, as well as updates for all staff on the intranet and a resource bank with an “I can help” address for people to offer skills (such as plumbing) and support. A message board was established so that people could express their emotion and the organization could show it cared and was actively doing things to address the problems of staff. The chief executive (CE) and general manager (GM) also wrote regular reports back to the organization.
Communication was a key factor in the response and a coordinated and comprehensive communications strategy evolved to support all the regions. Early communication about the chain of command, health records of clients, and state of other staff and clients contributed to the positive postquake culture.
In line with the value of “caring,” when staff indicated that they never wished to go back to the fourth-floor office where they had been when the quake occurred, the decision was made to relocate even though this created significant financial liability in terms of the existing lease. A single-story building was located and within a month it was opened.
In addition, the immediate presence of calm and considered leadership and visible governance played a key role “they were right there and then, not a week, but the next day.” Having the CE and GM present created a sense of safety and leadership. Managers generally appreciated the immediate responses they were given to requests. They were able to interact with the leaders to “think and act as one.” Daily meetings and the ability of leaders from outside of Christchurch grounded stressed staff and clients.
In line with the spirit statement of “whatever it takes,” no one quibbled about the work not being their job during the disaster and most people simply asked what they could do to help. Dealing with “stressed and fractious people” was not always easy and staff recognized the need to be gentle and understanding. Knowing that one could leave the area while others could not also left some leaders with the need to brief staff both remaining in the disaster zone and those returning to regions, on the difficulties of returning to day-to-day life.
Organization Culture Feedback
Leaders recognized that there was value in being on the ground and going through the experience with staff and how difficult it is to make decisions remotely. Leadership flexibility enabled staff to get on with it. “ I recall (leaders) saying yes to it, whatever it is you want, it’s all about yes. . .” This included leaders delaying competency assessments and the introduction of a new electronic health-record system, so that workers’ stress levels were not increased.
Staff would have liked more one-on-one discussions about how they were coping. A key time is 4–6 weeks after the earthquake, when adrenalin reduces and stress set in. Their first response is family and home, rather than work, and it is crucial for work organizations to recognize that this is their first response call.
On the other hand, communication at times was perceived as giving mixed messages, with an identified need for more written communication to support verbal messages, when people are under stress.
The nature of the duties varied, but volunteers mainly provided support to other staff, covered shifts, or took on additional support roles with clients. Many also had to cope with the fear that the aftershocks generated and four found the visual damage to the city had an impact. There is a need to ensure that staff who may experience vicarious traumatization are supported. About 59 percent of the out-of-town staff had postdisaster debriefing on return to their region. Others did not, but of those who did not, many felt that talking to friends, colleagues, and family was adequate.
For 8 people the most memorable experience was the opportunity to work with others and the team bond that formed, while for 7 others it was an opportunity to be in a support role to colleagues and the appreciation they received. There was strong acknowledgment of the leaders’ “whatever it takes” approach. Staff felt proud that the out of towners, for example, had invited them to come and take showers at their motels and if need be to spend some time there to get away from the stress of daily life. About 17 staff identified that postvolunteering they had received written appreciation or personal expression of thanks for their contribution.
About 60 percent of the managers felt the communication they received from leaders and the website information was useful, and the rest felt they would have appreciated a midcycle briefing to enable better understanding of needs. Staff found the website handy for offering their support. One found the amount of information provided was overwhelming.
In general, however, communication, problem solving, and organizational values being lived out were key positives during the disaster. The managers acknowledged that for the staff who had assisted in the Christchurch quake, this had been a significant learning and that they felt privileged to play a part.
The managers felt that the responsiveness of the organization and the speed of response was the most significant positive outcome. Managers also identified the need for the organization to reflect on the experience of people in Christchurch to be better prepared for governance issues during a disaster.
Strategic Networking
Strategic networking became essential to business continuity. Various network contacts made useful contributions to business continuity. Tiki Wine, contacted through one of Pathway’s staff, brought in a trailer with two large pods of clean water three days after the quake. This enabled water bottles to be refilled. Air New Zealand offered to fly in 12 laptop computers and data cards, as staff’s personal luggage and consistently permitted extra baggage to go on board free of charge. Supplier relationships with the rental company, Leaseplan, enabled hired vehicles to be upgraded to four-wheel drive vehicles at a favorable price, so that staff could navigate through congested and broken roads, some filled with liquefaction. Another employee had a contact with a cruise ship and they sent large boxes of linen that was distributed to people.
Powerful players intervened. The chief financial officer arrived in a van filled with chemical toilets, food, bottled water, a generator, toilet tents, cell-phone chargers, water filters, and purification tablets. A garage with supplies was set up to become the local store—named after the CE.
The local district health board ensured that all displaced services could share space and resources and could facilitate effective referral processes.
Regional managers offered to release staff who volunteered, putting extra pressure on their regions.
Strategic Networking Feedback
When the district health board implemented a new referral system, this was implemented quite rapidly and it was often difficult to cope with the new influx of clients. In addition, while the internal health-record system implementation was delayed by 6 weeks, staff still felt that this added to the numerous life and work changes they had to deal with. It was a challenging time to cope with further change.
There was some perceived resentment by a few Christchurch staff that staff from other regions had come in and “taken over” their roles or had questioned how they did things. In most cases, managers made sure their own services were sustainable, while recognizing the significant need within Christchurch. Managers were generous with key and senior people, which required additional work from them within their own regions.
In some regions, networks of not-for-profit providers banded together to identify how they could support those providers within the regions. Offers of staffing and practical supports were made. Little uptake was made of staffing offers, as it was identified that inducting new people into an organization’s systems and processes at a time of high pressure was “more trouble than it’s worth” by some Christchurch providers. Fear of loss of jobs and turf protection may have played some role in the lack of interagency collaboration.
Key Disaster Governance Learnings
Strategic Design
Disaster governance requires some unusual roles from the CEO and board. Far more than PR is required in maintaining business continuity and client service, especially when clients are vulnerable. The practicalities of basic survival needs (medication, toilets, water, lighting, power, phones, cash, and transport) and posttrauma support interventions are of course important. But beyond this, leadership needs to demonstrate strength, resilience, and presence in the face of a disaster. This needs to be supplemented with centralized communication and information systems to enable deployment of appropriate resources and personnel. The organization realized that it had additional capacity in all but one region, and this suggests that the organization could cope with a more extreme disaster should this ever occur. The strong infrastructure, size, and strength within a mental-health and governance group, the Wise Group, facilitated its ability to respond. Because staff are deployed around the country, staff from other regions were able to be sent to Christchurch at short notice without significant compromise to service delivery. Many other service organizations that lost both buildings and technology struggled to cope, when staff were unable to be at work, but interestingly did not take up offers of assistance.
From a health and safety perspective, there is a need to move from a prescriptive emergency plan to one based on broad principles and guidelines, which are in line with the values and culture of the organization. Additional food and water has been added to emergency kits. The ongoing challenges Christchurch staff and clients face, with some homes still not being categorized for demolition or repair, ongoing aftershocks, and significant financial losses, mean that staff need continuing support almost 3 years after the disaster.
Business continuity insurance meant that resources could be used to purchase necessary resources and provide adequate financial reserves. In addition, the foresight of leaders to bring large amounts of cash (a learning from the first earthquake) facilitated business continuity.
Telecommunications was possible during the disaster and this made a difference to the ability to access immediate and ongoing information about the situation. It also offers the opportunity to curate, test, and train for mobile technology apps to enable better internal and interagency collaboration to meet challenges and deal with the complexity of disaster governance. Such apps could enable search, location, rescue, and management of resource allocation.
In this case, electricity supply was restored to the sites quickly and air transport was restored by the day following the earthquake, but strategic plans for the future need to consider how to handle a disaster where these major infrastructure resources are not available and these factors need to be mitigated.
Human Resources
The psychological aftermath is significant and there are ongoing tensions between different agendas (Gluckman 2011). People feel fatigued and traumatized by the ongoing battles with bureaucracy, insurers, and the Earthquake Commission. “There is a need for ongoing human and organizational resources” (ibid, p. 8). Employee Assistance Program sessions traditionally of three free sessions are probably inadequate to deal with the aftereffects of a significant disaster. The Wise Group was able to open its Women’s Wellness Centre in another location to families from Christchurch to give them a break for a week from the Christchurch scenario.
In this environment, it is also essential to ensure people with the right skills are selected to assist in the process of dealing with a disaster. Selection criteria include not only a “can do” attitude, but also the ability to communicate sensitively and clearly. The ability to offer practical support and not undermine current formal leadership roles is also key. Rostering processes need to be sensitive not only to those coming to help, but also to those whose jobs they are doing.
Orientation to role and situation and socialization into the disaster context needs to be standardized, coordinated, and documented, so that everyone gets the same briefing with regular updates to all.
It may be necessary to ensure that all who volunteer get access to formal debriefing, although some may choose to use their personal network to download their experiences of being in a disaster area.
Organization Culture
Leaders and managers living out organizational values together were significant. The leaders demonstrated this not only by being present for a lengthy period during the initial crisis, but also by ensuring that the “whatever it takes” and “think and act as one” values were visibly demonstrated through accessibility, responsiveness, and presence. This ensured effective decision making, moral, and practical support was available when it was needed and created a sense of stability and confidence in staff. The division between operations and governance is not feasible during a disaster.
While the communication strategy generally worked well, using both personal briefings by leaders, communication from head office, Internet feedback, and visible ongoing support, there is a need to streamline the communication, taking into account people’s psychological state at the time.
Communication issues appeared to arise during the time leaders were not on the ground in Christchurch after the first 6 week, suggesting that an ongoing active engagement by the CEO and GM is required for some extended period postdisaster.
Organization Politics
The organization did contact other providers during the disaster and offer support, but there was no response to this offer. Politics, patch protection, and the complexity of the situation may have played a role in this lack of interagency collaboration.
There was, however, ongoing collaboration with three other larger mental-health providers in the region and with the local district health board mental-health service staff to establish a more efficient referral process.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) outside the region also coordinated a support response, but there were few takers and other NGOs either did not or were unable to bring in staff from other regions. There was an opportunity for Pathways staff to provide broader based services during their client visits. This suggests that during a disaster the broader coordination of human resources is required and means that Pathways needs to be lobbying now to establish this broader base so that other organizations feel as supported as this organization did during a disaster. Some work on building collaborative responses across the sector in disaster situations would be in the public interest.
Conclusion
Governance is put under significant strain during a disaster. Disaster governance may mean that the CEO/board needs to be on the ground, enabling governance issues to evolve to meet the external and social requirements so that business continuity can be maintained. The ability of an organization to respond quickly, sensitively, and appropriately to the needs of clients, staff, and managers is key. Leadership and resources need to be deployed urgently, and there is an ongoing need for effective and accurate communication. Of particular importance, where vulnerable clients are at risk, is the access to accurate information regarding needs, medications, and contact details.
This organization within the Pacific Ring of Fire was well prepared for the disaster, particularly following the first earthquake six months prior, but one wonders how many other organizations in regions where natural disasters are prone to occur have the governance capability to enable similar response? One also needs to consider what might have happened had the disaster been national rather than regionally based? Governance planning needs to incorporate a strategic intention to maintain business continuity, to have visible and responsive leadership on the ground, to have clear selection criteria and role descriptions for stand-in staff, to clarify the boundaries between those staff and the incumbents, to have a standardized orientation process, to provide written instructions where possible for people under stress, to live out the values of the organization, to ensure robust debriefing processes are undertaken, to maintain leaders’ presence in the disaster zone for longer periods, and to create effective networks with any organization or individuals who may be able to assist with resources or processes.
This research provided the opportunity for staff and management to reflect on the events, to learn from what occurred, and to consider what they might do differently should another disaster event occur. People valued this process and some double-loop learning reflection process needs to be built into the postdisaster communication process.
Acknowledgments
To the management of the Wise Group that enabled this research to occur.
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Roduriguez, H., Wachetendorf, T., Kendra, J., and Trainor, J. 2006. “A Snapshot of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami: Societal Impacts and Consequences.” Disaster Prevention & Management 15, no. 1, pp. 163–77.
Rebuild Christchurch. 2012. http://www.rebuildchristchurch.co.nz/blog/2012/9/business-optimism-on-the-increase.htm
Scaffa, M.E., Gerardi,S., Herzberg, F., and McCall, M.A. 2005. “The Role of Occupational Therapy in Disaster Preparedness, Response and Recovery.” The American Journal of Occupational Therapy 60, no. 6, pp. 642–9.
Thompson Publishing Group. 2011. HR Guide to Business Continuity Planning. 3DE. Washington, DC: Thompson Publishing Group.
Tierney, K. 2012. “Disaster Governance: Social, Political & Economic Dimensions.” Annual Review of Environment & Resources 37, pp. 341–63.
The Working Group on NGO Governance in Central & Eastern Europe. October 2011. Fostering Effective NGO Governance. NGO Tips, pp. 1–5.
Wooten, L.P. 2007. “Leadership in a Crisis Situation.” The Human Factor 2, no. 1, pp. 76–80.
Wooten, L.P., and James, E.H. 2008. “Linking Crisis Management & Leadership Competencies: the Role of Human Resource Development.” Advances in Developing Human Resources 20, no. 10, pp. 1–28.
Wyatt, M. 2004. A Handbook of NGO Governance. Budapest, Hungary: European Centre for Not-for Profit Law.
Additional Reading
See crisis communications plan steps during disasters at:
Ready.gov (2012). Crisis Communications Plan I& IT Recovery Plan.
http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/continuity retrieved 1 May 2014.
Consider other types of disasters (natural or man-made that could affect the viability of your organization and impact on digital communication) at:
International Economic Development Council. Restore your economy.org
http://restoreyoureconomy.org/disaster-overview/types-of-disasters/ retrieved 1 May 2014.
Case Study Questions
1. In this case, the CEO became quite operational in the face of a disaster:
a. Why do you think this was necessary?
b. Could there have been other ways to handle the situation?
c. What does governance accountability mean in this case?
d. How does disaster governance differ from regular governance issues?
2. How was the mission of the organization safeguarded?
3. How was responsible resource management and mobilization exercised?
4. If NGOs need to be responsive to the communities they serve, how were organization and community interests integrated in this case?
5. How could public interest have been better served?
6. Should organizations have a disaster management plan that deals with all crises? If so, what does it need to include?
7. In terms of governance, how can organizations document learnings from an event like this so that the knowledge is captured?
8. If a disaster like this were to happen in your organization, what governance issues would be likely to arise?
9. How can organizations best prepare for such emergencies in the future?
10. What political factors may have played a role in lack of interagency collaboration?
11. What political factors might impact on interagency collaboration in your organization in the face of a disaster?
12. Assuming the organization did not have access to digital technology, how might the response to the disaster differ?
Group Discussion
Instructions
Divide into groups of 4–8 and discuss:
You are the board of a manufacturing organization, with 10 sites across the country and during a board meeting, you receive a text message that there has been significant regional damage due to flash flooding, which has affected one major manufacturing site belonging to the company and where 500 staff are employed. Some staff and customers who were on site are missing, there has been widespread destruction to facilities and equipment, infrastructure has been damaged, and there is a prediction that there could be further flooding in the region. It is unclear to what extent worker’s homes have been damaged, but you are aware that many of them live in the area surrounding the manufacturing site and are therefore likely to have been impacted. This site is responsible for producing multimillion-dollar equipment for a major government project and at the time of the flood was slightly behind deadline on delivery. Other sites are currently working at capacity, but the flooded site is the biggest and responsible for 30 percent of the company’s profit. None of the other sites have identical machinery to produce the government equipment. The company’s mission is to be the customer-recognized leader in providing manufacturing solutions by producing high quality, competitively priced, short lead time, and reliably delivered products through an exceptional workforce trained, empowered to continuously improve and create shareholder value. The company has developed from a small manufacturing business to a multimillion-dollar enterprise, but it attempts to retain some family values including those of respect, leadership, innovation, and teamwork.
1. What would the board’s first priority be? Justify your answer.
2. What five immediate actions would be taken? Justify your answer.
3. How would you deal with the need to maintain business continuity?
4. How do you see the role of the board members in dealing with this disaster?
5. How would you live out the mission of the organization in this response?
6. How would you live out the values in your response?
7. Which stakeholders would it be important to engage in collaboration?
8. How would you create a collaborative process with other stakeholders in the region and nationwide?
9. What policies would you develop to ensure that organizational politics and power issues are being handled effectively?
10. What would you advise the government department waiting on output from the damaged plant?
11. What digital strategies would enable you to respond better to the disaster, assuming that power, Internet, and phones are available within two days of the flooding?
Authors Biographies
Colleen Rigby holds a PhD in psychology and is a senior fellow for Corporate and Executive Education, Waikato Management School, the University of Waikato, in Hamilton New Zealand, where she runs leadership clinics for MBA students and teaches on topics related to organizational behavior, such as high-performing teams, conflict, and negotiation. She also operates a private psychological practice, consulting to various organizations. Her background includes working in industry and commerce in human resource development and being a regional director for Ernst & Young in organizational management of change. Colleen has lectured in six countries and has presented papers at various international conferences in South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Her research interests include leadership, conflict, negotiation, ethics, communication, and innovative teams.
Lyndsay holds an MBA from the University of Waikato in New Zealand. She started out as an occupational therapist and then moved into management and leadership roles. She was previously the CE of Pathways Health Limited and currently holds the role of portfolio manager for Mental Health and Addictions at the organization First Do No Harm (Northern Regional Alliance) based in Auckland, New Zealand. Lyndsay was the general manager of Wise Group at the time the earthquake took place and has specific insight into what occurred and how disaster governance needed to be established quickly, particularly with a vulnerable client group. Lyndsay has specific interests in strategic planning, change management, leadership development, and stakeholder engagement in the field of mental-health organizations.
Key Terms Defined
Disaster governance: Steering an organization through a natural disaster so that the organization survives and stakeholders’ needs are met.
Strategic intention: Having a clear strategic direction in the aftermath of the disaster.
Human resources: Being able to allocate appropriate staff to the right place.
Strategic networking/interagency collaboration: Creating links to key stakeholders for the purposes of collaboration and shared resources.
Organization culture: The way the organization operationalizes its stated values.
Responsive and visible leadership: Leaders being available to employees and creating a sense of unity and caring in the aftermath of the disaster.
Role clarity and boundaries: Clearly defining who is responsible for what and where each role begins and ends.
Selection criteria: The factors that would enable specific people to be successful in a role in the wake of a disaster.
Organization values: What the organization purports to stand for.
Enactment of organization values: the leaders and others behave in ways that are congruent with the stated values.
Effective communication and information systems: ensuring that people involved in obtain the information they need when they need it, using whatever resources (including information technology systems) are available at the time of the crisis.