3.1.1.1. Close air support operations in Afghanistan: the code words

NATO military forces within the Afghan theater (2001–2014) would describe the combat operations there as “asymmetric”, in the sense that forces in the field were highly dissimilar. The coalition armed forces had access to resources (technologies, weapons and logistic capacities) that conferred them an objective advantage over Taliban forces. Even so, the physical characteristics of the ground, the presence of combat forces among civilian populations and the geographic dispersion of units posed real problems. Despite the means of communication deployed, they were confronted with difficulties in information gathering and reliability. Moreover, the tactical situation evolved according to nonlinear dynamics, shaped by unforeseen contingences that were therefore by definition difficult to anticipate.

It is under these circumstances that the French Air Force intervened to support special forces operating deep in the territory. These combat forces considered a situation as routine when the mission was carried out as planned (briefed) before departure and the activity breakdown followed the usual formal standards. It is worth noting that air or land forces missions in all theaters are always carefully prepared based on intelligence provided by a group of experts (among them intelligence officers). For example, the air force fighter crews brief their missions just before take-off. They describe all flight phases, security procedures and finish with what they call what-ifs. This last stage raises the question of what should be done (what procedures should be applied) in the case of a system operation problem during flight, such as an engine failure.

Despite rigorous preparation, combat forces may face situations that were not briefed or were briefed during the what-if stages, for example, but whose probability of occurrence was low. In Afghanistan, it was not possible to plan for everything, since ground targets were scattered and moving fast. These unexpected situations generated partial or total breakdown of plans of the air force crews and Special Forces on the ground, increasing the mission’s complexity. The task breakdown was then called into question and combat forces needed to rapidly make sense of the situation in order for coordination to evolve. Under these circumstances, common language played a key role.

Let us consider the example of close air support (CAS) missions undertaken daily within the Afghan theater for nearly 13 years (in particular by Mirage 2000D fighter-bomber aircraft). These tactical missions were launched when forces on the ground asked for air support, either because they were facing immediate danger or because they had identified a target to be destroyed. CAS involved three main actors. The first two were the fighter crew: the pilot, who concentrated on flying the aircraft, strictly speaking, and fired gun(s); and the navigator, who was in charge of medium- and long-term tasks (electronic threat monitoring, radio frequency tuning, preparation and weapon guidance). The last actor was the forward air controller (FAC). As a member of a Special Force unit deployed on the ground, his role was to accurately guide the bomber aircraft so that it could deliver weapons while avoiding fratricide firing risks and collateral damage.

When the fighter crew was above the target area, it got in contact with the FAC. He then provided the pilot with all available information on the objective, based on a standardized information card called CAS Card, which contains in particular an operation check-list named 9 line (Figure 3.1). The 9 line consists of several “lines” of instructions and data that indicate geographic coordinates, objective entry and exit point, timing, etc., as well as various procedures to implement for mission execution. Once in contact with the aircraft, the FAC provided a real-time description of the environment in order to gradually lead the pilot to visually and unambiguously identify the target. As stated in 9 line, the description should inform the crew of the number of targets to be eliminated, their nature, level of protection and evolution.

As illustrated by the Control the attack section in Figure 3.1, war fighters used a common language, published in NATO documentation, which they usually call code words. Push when ready, Continue and Abort were all code words easily understandable by the crew members and the FAC, which facilitated communication, while significantly reducing the risk of misinterpretation. As a pilot noted: “These code words are rich with meaning. They are the basis of a common language, no need for interpretation or reasoning. For example [in an air defense situation], with Investigate one has to identify. It is a fact known from the start that a particular interception is conducted in order to observe and identify. There is no ambiguity. Code words are a real philosophy of communication”.

In Afghanistan, with one code word war fighters could concisely and rapidly exchange a significant amount of information. Everyone knew and had assimilated the code words. They contributed significantly to reducing comprehension problems, such as the risk of communication overload, for crews and controllers on the ground.

3.1.1.2. Aerobatic performances of the French Air Forces Aerobatic Team and Patrouille de France: diagrams and body expressions

Coded and shared languages are also used by more atypical structures of the French Air Forces, such as the display teams. There are two specific squadrons: the Air Force Aerobatic Team (AFAT) and the Patrouille de France (PAF). Their main mission is to present their program during military and civil aviation meetings: it is qualified as “free integral” for the AFAT pilots, and consists of a sequence of free aerobatic figures (except for security rules, they are not subject to any other rules), while the PAF performs synchronized aerobatics in eight-plane formation (Figures 3.2(a) and (b)). It is worth noting that AFAT also participates in national and international competitions where for severral years it has won important prizes (world champion in particular).

Display team members coordinate in an extreme environment: the situation may very rapidly shift due to unstable weather conditions, for example; there is high uncertainty as to the extent that unexpected events can occur, such as a bird strike, a mechanical problem or a radio communication failure; finally, the flight programs presented involve significant levels of risk: there is physical risk, as pilots’ life and health may be endangered, but there is equally a more symbolic risk, as the teams’ prestige and reputation are at stake.

The pilots of display teams share a common language, just as those of the operational forces do. Beyond its verbal nature, this one is striking due to its pictorial and bodily dimensions. Members of the two teams first take advantage of schematization and drawing. For this purpose, the PAF uses a magnetic whiteboard and magnets in the shape of Alpha Jet (the fighter aircraft that PAF flies). They move the magnets on the whiteboard to symbolize the acrobatics, and write the technical elements required for the successful execution of the planned figures. AFAT members share a language that borrows from both the general aeronautics vocabulary and a code specific to aerobatics: the Aresti key (Figure 3.3). Published by the Fédération Aéronautique International (FAI), this code associates code words with simple diagrams that describe nine families of classical aerobatics figures. The diagrams consist of curved lines, straight lines and geometric elements representing the maneuvers to be performed by the pilot.

Complementary to this shared pictorial language, and for coordination purposes, display team members develop practices based on body communication, appealing to sensations. Before each flight, pilots mime the aerobatic figures to be performed (Figures 3.4(a) and (b)); they “experience” the figures with their bodies before performing them with their aircraft. Members of PAF call this mental and body imagery “the music”. During briefing meetings, pilots simulate together the flight program, in a rhythm imposed by the leader’s voice. Sitting on chairs, most of them with eyes shut, the pilots express their future flight maneuvers with their hands, fingers, legs and head. The actors’ gestures are always the same, perfectly automated. For the AFAT, the exercise is substantially similar, except that only one pilot mimes the flight while his or her teammates, often present, are observing him or her. Furthermore, the pilot is outdoors (on the tarmac) and performs the body movements while inside a square marked on the ground (representing 1 cubic kilometer volume, called the Box, in which his or her competition flight will evolve).

3.1.1.3. Shared languages: when faced with unexpected situations, automatisms improve comprehension and save time

In unexpected situations, teams’ and their members’ responsiveness and capacity to adapt prove to be crucial. When tension is high, everyone needs to work toward the overall coherence required to complete the mission within a very short time. To this end, the various types of language described above represent automated communication standards used by the actors. To the extent that they help save time, their role is crucial. More precisely, on one hand these languages facilitate communication between team members. Each code, either verbal, pictorial or bodily, is known by everybody and allows for rapid transmission of clear and straightforward messages. This significantly reduces interpretation errors. Actors understand each other without ambiguity. On the other hand, shared languages reduce the load of coordination and help free time for completing other less “routine” tasks that become a priority when unexpected situations occur.

Faced with the unexpected, actors take advantage of this time gain to reach agreement on the situation and on the adequate solutions for reaching objectives. There is a tendency to avoid code words and adopt more familiar language. A pilot shared with us: “In the combat theater, stress levels can be very high. In some situations survival instinct takes over. In such moments the important thing is to communicate, language doesn’t matter, even if everyone understands code language and we need to do our best to preserve it as long as possible.” Discussions may refer to the tactics to implement to deter the enemy (very low altitude flights, for example, also called show of force, were regularly used in Afghanistan) or the opportunity to fire weapons in a legitimate self-defense situation. A navigator remembers: “Last year I had a case when we decided not to fire weapons. […] We had the rules of engagement, what we could see below… The two of us discussed the opportunity to fire weapons. We agreed. And even if we didn’t, we would have discussed it longer. I think the decision would have been still a No, because generally when one doesn’t agree the decision is No”. Thus, natural language is adopted not because it is more effective than code languages, but because the war fighters are under such levels of tension and stress that they unconsciously activate deeply rooted patterns of action and communication. Through dialogue, they gradually move toward consensus on the processes to be implemented in order to coordinate when faced with the unexpected.

These shared languages help actors better comprehend messages and save time that can be dedicated to sense-making during unforeseen events. These results are made possible because, through training and operations, the acquisition of these languages by the team members reaches the level of automatism.

3.1.2.1. Multiplication of sources of information

An essential technical characteristic of text-chat is the multiplicity of sources of information available to users. On the Afghan theater, text-chat was configured to facilitate simultaneous creation and management of a multiplicity of dialogue spaces (chat-rooms). The users could thus conduct several conversations simultaneously, irrespective of the geographic and tactical location of their interlocutors. Within the same space, they participated in various dialogues, created collective dialogue spaces that facilitated group interaction and used private spaces to facilitate person-to-person exchanges (instant messaging). Most of the individual and collective dialogue spaces were secure, so users did not have to worry about espionage and piracy risks.

Naval Air Forces were familiar with the technical specificities of text-chat – during the operations in Afghanistan, each expert contributed on average to six dialogue spaces simultaneously – and they learned to exploit them. It is worth noting, for example, that users organized extended interest communities (navy, air and land forces) around the activities of most critical importance during offensive phases, namely meteorology, intelligence, logistics, air traffic control, oceanography and target designation. Each expert was actively involved in the dialogue with his or her community, while attentively following the neighboring conversations. Thus, users integrated in real time the new data and information exchanged in other spaces and which had a potential to affect their own planning.

Instant messaging, called whispering in the US Navy, has been used to conduct person-to-person dialogue. This additional activity allowed the user to search for information that was critical for the proper execution of a military operation, while avoiding overloading the collective conversation within the community. One expert got in contact with another by creating a dedicated personal space, obtained the requested information and then got back to the collective space to contribute to the conversation.

These text-chat uses facilitated the articulation of various communication practices (whispering and collective) starting from spaces organized as communities of interest, significantly improving coordination within and between teams of the coalition armies. This has been all the more true in the mission preparation phases. According to an intelligence officer: “Having a real-time dialogue with units of experts of the operational groups has simply allowed the tactical level to rapidly benefit from the analyses provided at our level”.

Before text-chat was implemented, the preferred communication technology was radio. The reception quality was not always guaranteed and users were frequently faced with difficulties in comprehending the oral messages (often due to limited vocabulary, accent problems, etc.). The act of radio communication could prove very time- and energy-consuming, reducing the drive to interact spontaneously and on a large scale. One of the text-chat contributions was to reduce noise during communication, allowing for text-based information exchange, which was more easily exploitable, particularly when the exchange involved multiple channels. An officer assigned to Task Force 50 (a US Navy combat group deployed at South of Afghanistan) noted: “Chat was awesome. Chat [was] like getting twenty new radios and being able to work them all at once”.

Thus, the very fact of using radio to transmit a piece of information or a directive came to have a particular meaning: it was a sign of a high-degree urgency or risk of unexpected event, when operators had no time to write and were forced to organize the mission through oral communication (“by voice”). Most of the time, users exploited text-chat and radio simultaneously. To the extent that each technology served well-defined objectives, it was not something that was forced on them, but something they had chosen.

Practices associated with the multiplication of sources of information were beneficial not only in the operation preparation phase, but also in their tactical execution. NATO Special Forces have developed communication practices for combat conducted deep in the territory. The situation differed in terms of bandwidth capacity, which was very low on the ground. War fighters found a way to bypass these limitations by connecting their laptops through the satellite connection for voice and text data transmission. Due to this “bricolage” [CIB 93], they could receive and send messages that were less elaborate than those exchanged within the professional communities in the preparation phases, but were accurate enough to allow for direct dialogue with the headquarters. The special units deployed in the Afghan villages developed interesting practices starting from this improvised text-chat. As they were positioned in proximity to the attack area, they first received a vocal message through the satellite radio requesting them to connect to their laptops. A precise order was sent asking them to go near a village where wanted individuals were hiding. The commando team confirmed good receipt of the order, and then opened a dialogue space with headquarters to discuss tactical details and ways to execute the mission. Complementary to this information, war fighters got used to opening other spaces that allowed them to collect tactical data from various sources. For example, the reconnaissance drones flying above these areas were displaying data from the ground (images, geographic coordinates, etc.) concerning the real-time evolution of the situation. The information essential to the offensive was very rapidly collected without the risk of misinterpretation. Once the mission was completed, a status report (number of prisoners, weapons found and intelligence gathered) was sent to headquarters, which then asked for details, if needed. The use of text-chat enacted by the Special Forces has significantly shortened the decision-making process. The capacity to follow the troops’ evolution in quasi-real time and to have access to continuously updated information has increased the responsiveness of headquarters, through reassignment of missions to those who were able to best respond to the needs on the ground.

3.1.2.2. Permanence of the flow of communication and persistence of information

In Afghanistan, text-chat was configured to allow for the reception and transmission of messages 24 hours a day. The permanence of the flow of communication was essential in the theater of operations, as missions had to be planned and executed anytime, by day or night. War fighters thus considered text-chat as one of the most reliable tools for command and execution: when the deployed units got so deep that they could not be reached by voice or when bandwidth capacities were not sufficient, text-chat became the only means of communication permanently available.

Little by little, the users took ownership of the capacity of permanence of technology and developed adapted communication practices: operators were still expecting to find an interlocutor to start a dialogue with. This expectation being shared by everyone, war fighters spent more and more time in front of their screens – up to 7 hours a day on average in the case of certain officers in charge of operating American aircraft carriers and destroyers during the first months of the war in Afghanistan. They were thus making sure they would never miss information that was important for the evolution of tactical plans. This behavior has led to a significant increase in the speed of mission planning and execution. As users exploited the permanence attached to text-chat more, their exchanges became more intense and strategic, and the incentive to stay in front of the screen grew stronger.

As an illustration, Task Force 50 implemented a planning and execution platform for Navy and Navy Air Force operations, named the Knowledge Wall. This platform provided access to various ICTs such as e-mail, Internet portal and evolutive databases. The additional information and knowledge thus collected have allowed an unprecedented level of precision to be reached in the analysis and processing of information for decision purposes. An air defense liaison officer aboard the USS Princeton noted: “The power of the system [Knowledge Wall] was in harnessing information from multiple sources, fusing it into a consistent, user-friendly format, and instantaneously disseminating that information back to war fighters and decision-makers”.

The Knowledge Wall and the radio constituted a portfolio of information and communication tools based on which the Special Forces developed communication practices that were adapted to the situations they faced. Mediated interactions effectively replaced face-to-face interactions, partly because individuals knew each other and shared standard action patterns, and because the time allocated to decision-making was very brief and they were not able to meet whenever they needed to. Face-to-face meetings continued to have an important role during more routine phases, such as mission debriefing, when actors could afford to take the time to comment and debate on their actions.

This articulation of technologies and uses has generated a debate about the problems of information overload. In effect, during real-time dialogues and information reception, the users had to pay continuous attention to be able to follow the evolution of the situation and to make sure they did not miss essential data. They then had difficulties determining when to stop collecting information and start focusing exclusively on mission execution. Furthermore, the multiplication of dialogue spaces tended to generate a surge in the volume of information to be urgently processed. There were times when users were flooded with information and had difficulties making a priority-based selection. Experimental researches conducted in the United States have revealed the difficulties in managing information flow [SCO 06] in the theater of operations. They have notably shown that in unexpected situations, where urgency and stress reach high levels, text-chat users tended to focus exclusively on the system interface. They were completely focused on processing demands and following dialogues, even as the instructor was trying to remind them of their main mission. Users learned with experience, however, how to take ownership of technologies and succeeded in giving them meaning in their specific work environment.

In this case, the American Navy forces have requested that text-chat be configured to show a guiding thread of conversations conducted in various dialogue spaces. A time-marking system has then been developed, giving authorized personnel access to a real history of conversations. As one user said: “The chat is better because it gives history, and you can watch things unfold in near-real time”. Special Forces also added a search engine to the system, and this allowed them to rapidly find, among multiple open or stored dialogue spaces, the fragments of conversations that helped them in dealing with such and such problem.

These additional capacities to store and search information conferred persistence to dialogue spaces. Users have also developed asynchronous communication practices, which were not initially planned for. Persistence of information has been considered an additional material feature of the permanence of flows and multiplicity of sources. Taken together, these features reduce communication costs and improve the coordination of teams in command and tactical situations.

3.1.2.3. ICT uses: combined communication practices

The examination of text-chat uses enacted in the theater of operations confirms the existence of links between the technical features of the tool, in particular its programming modes, and the context within which it is used. Actors have developed communication practices by articulating the interactive features offered by text-chat (synchronous communication) with the integrative decision-support features (history of conversations and databases). The sociomaterial characteristics of permanence and persistence attached to the tool have allowed for the articulation of these practices. For its part, the multiplication of sources of information has facilitated access to a broader variety of internal (such as logistics, ammunition, friends’ and enemies’ positions) and external (such as weather conditions, topographic elements and physical characteristics of the ground) knowledge. Without the multiplication of these sources, it is unlikely that users would have been able to implement uses that allowed them to exploit the variety of information and knowledge needed to conduct operations. In particular, the permanence of the flows of communication and the persistence of information were revealed and afterward reinforced through individual and collective practices aimed at integrating communication (interactive process) and decision-support (integrative process) functions into the daily uses of text-chat.

The case also shows that uses, as sources of communication improvement, combine with each other. These “combinations of uses” refer to a logic of assembly of the social–material features attached to a technological tool. These features are not perfectly embodied in the design of technology, as there is no upstream possibility for the designer to envisage the diversity of future uses. Some of these are enacted in situ by users during their interaction with technology in concrete work situations, between routine and unexpected situations, for example when creating a search engine that allows for useful information to be found rapidly: thus, text-chat supports the transmission of explicit knowledge within expert teams and communities. It is also the case when individuals go further into the interactive properties of text-chat associated with the permanence of information channels and the multiplicity of sources, in order to improve communication and team coordination during the mission planning phases. Here, text-chat supports the transmission of experience and the sharing of more tacit knowledge among actors.

When unforeseen situations require the accomplishment of new tasks, technological uses and their combinations improve the dynamics of coordination. Field results are a good illustration, as they refer to the actors’ capacity to get involved in multiple opportunities for horizontal communication. Collective procedures for problem resolution are thus being reinforced. Decision structures are more decentralized and hierarchical authorities can concentrate on key decision-making phases. The new communication practices also have a tendency to modify the temporality of the relations among actors and to improve their awareness of the shared situation.

3.2.2.1. Learning from errors, by experimentation and from others

When asked “what are in your opinion the main objectives of briefing–debriefing?”, all the personnel interviewed answered: to facilitate learning and individual progress on one hand, and to permit collective improvement, on the other hand.

Pilots are systematically evaluated by their colleagues and/or hierarchy (in the case of trainee pilots) and can be disciplined in case of failure (bad decision, breach of flight security procedures, etc.). As a fighter pilot states: “The main interest of debriefing is to improve. Debriefing provides the opportunity to analyze what was done effectively or ineffectively and to find solutions to what was perhaps done less effectively during flight, through dispassionate analysis of what happened, so that solutions are readily available next time”. Each member of the navigating personnel agrees on this elementary function of debriefing and considers that error detection and correction are the best ways to progress and become successful.

While trainee pilots are particularly concerned, seniors are also interested in this process. They willingly admit that even the most experienced and talented pilots are no less exposed to error and may benefit from peers’ comments and remarks. Several interviewees noted that critical examination of the actions during flight was the very essence of debriefing. One of them explained: “Debriefing focuses essentially on finding out what happened during mission. Precisely. Why? Because during flight things go too fast. One needs to trace back, almost like a historian, what has really happened and then understand why it happened that way in order to learn and eventually progress”. This error detection and correction approach presupposes actors sharing a certain number of prerequisites, in particular: observing others’ errors is an opportunity for self-correction and the presence of other colleagues during debriefing not only guarantees all the errors are spotted, but also permits us to envisage a complete panel of solutions/corrections.

Sharing these prerequisites facilitates the implementation of a constructive process, through which one’s own practices improve due to others’ critiques and comments. This learning from error process is based on daily experimentation. As one of the display teams’ pilots states: “What we do is pure flight, and sensations are essential. In the case of a problem, you don’t search a database to find the answer! Theoretical knowledge is good… but it has no value unless it is put into practice”. The error correction approach, either for errors during flight or for those on the ground (for mechanics), is marked by the experiential nature of the knowledge it transmits. The display squadrons push this logic of experimentation to the extreme, bringing their bodies into it. As we have previously mentioned, pilots rehearse their flight before taking command of their aircraft. Keeping their eyes shut, they express with their hands and bodies the sequence of figures and aerobatic maneuvers they will present during the show. This “music” (for PAF) translates each of the technical gestures learned, criticized and learned once again during the debriefing sessions. It is also a moment of deep concentration that acts as a catalyst for emotions – such as stress – and permits the bodily and sensory preparation of the pilots for flight.

Debriefing also contributes to team progress. In effect, pilots and navigators insist that error detection/confrontation and the capacity to learn lessons at an individual level reflect on the group. Whether they are navigating personnel or not (for example, mechanics), the essential thing is that they participate in mission preparation and execution. A transport pilot explains: “The ultimate goal is to progress, get better. And I say get better in this impersonal manner because it concerns everyone, all the participants: controllers, pilots, navigators, crews, mechanics. All the actors involved in the mission have the same goal: progress. Debriefing should lead to individual or group learning so that next time the machine becomes even more successful. I use the term machine in the broad sense, as a complex system of all the individuals”. Each mission is an opportunity to learn and experiment. As they agree to work in a constructive criticism mode, all personnel members approach debriefing as a multilevel learning process that contributes to the progress of the person both as an individual and as a member of a team. A fighter pilot insists: “Debriefing permits us to once again prepare to perform as we should next time. It is part of a whole process. So debriefing as such… We shouldn’t take it out of context. We are working within this logic of success: we have to learn the lessons that will permit us to be successful, both as a group and as individuals. The lessons learnt during debriefing will strengthen both our global and individual knowledge. It is not an exercise in style, we are learning to be present at the right moment, when the day will come”.

According to the personnel interviewed, this shared view on error as an opportunity for individual and collective learning relies on a principle that was institutionalized within the French Air Force: error is not punished. Since 2006, it has been officially enforced by the French Air Force Chief of Staff: “We should agree to systematically account for our errors, to comment on and inform our peers about all the near-miss incidents on the ground or during flight, all those events that ‘nearly happened’. Our whole community should be able to take advantage, for learning purposes, of all our experiences, disagreeable as they may be” (source: French Ministry of Defense). Within this framework, pilots engage a posteriori in institutionalized learning practices, governed by the rules of transparency and error recognition.

3.2.2.2. Artifacts for confronting one’s errors and interacting with others

The analysis of data highlights the role played by technologies. For example, the use of flight reconstruction systems by fighter squadrons permits pilots to be systematically and objectively confronted with reality: watching the flight recording helps them accurately represent the mission unfolding and the eventual failures. Other squadrons, such as the display teams, have a cameraman at their disposal who films each of the flights and then makes them available to the pilots: “Once he gets off his aircraft, the pilot can watch the recording of the entire flight. During the flight, I [another pilot from the team] am next to the cameraman and all the comments and critiques that I make are recorded. When the pilot finishes his flight, he listens to these comments, while watching the film. He scrutinizes his performance, notices his errors, but he needs to be equally aware of what he did well. He needs to understand why he was successful with that figure or why he failed it. He needs to be aware of his state of mind during those moments”. The facts are clear, transparency is the rule and each participant needs to be ready to accept full responsibility for his (or her) errors.

In this respect, technologies have to a certain extent revolutionized the briefing–debriefing procedures in as much as, before their introduction, some experienced pilots may have been inclined to underestimate the importance of their errors. A navigator from a transport squadron indicates: “In the past, it was very easy for a senior [pilot] to say that he had done this or that, that he was in the best position etc. And in the end, even though he may have had his doubts, the young trainee took the senior’s word as a reference, because he was the strongest, or at least he spoke the loudest. But the reconstruction system provided all those people with an opportunity to call themselves into question. And this is a good thing”. Allowing pilots and navigators to examine the objective flight data, flight reconstruction systems and films facilitate control and confront them with reality. As a fighter pilot explains, everyone, when confronted with his or her flight, needs to be able to precisely describe the problems he or she faced, to explain the reasons that led him or her to make the error and to derive from the incident the lessons for his or her next flight. The pilot states: “We all know, even those of us [who are] more experienced, that errors are nothing else but opportunities to learn. As far as I’m concerned, the moments that have most strongly marked my professional life were those when I made mistakes that I was sharply made aware of during debriefing, videotapes being there! I have not repeated those errors since then, and they marked me to the point where I still think about them”.

One of the French Air Forces display teams in 2012 implemented a camera device in the cockpit of its aircraft. It is usually directed toward the pilot’s legs and/or hands. The objective is to access how things are done in a situation. All the pilots are present during viewing so that they can observe technical errors, sources of problems (even incident/accident) during flight and good gesture and visual practices, which are sources of success. It is a group debriefing on one pilot’s performance. As one of the pilots explains: “When watching these internal films, we notice the way in which he [the colleague] flies. For example, the visual circuit is very important in aerobatics, and often pilots do not know where to look. There is a delay in the visual circuit, which leads to the wrong activation of their movements, in a hasty manner. Having one or two seconds advance over their visual circuit would be enough for them to see the objective coming and to activate with more liveliness. With the internal camera, one can understand why anticipation is wrongly operated”.

Video-based debriefing is deliberately directed toward team progression not only in technical terms, but also in collective terms. It is a matter of building synergy in the group, facilitating mutual learning through others’ practices. One of the pilots interviewed insists: “Criticism may sometimes be heavy during the debriefing of the internal video, but we need to know how to encourage ourselves. Everything must be done in a constructive spirit. If this is not the case, then it’s useless, the group is no good and the results are worthless”. It is a matter of sharing know-how and being willing to ensure the team evolves as a whole. The pilot adds: “The group relies on a somewhat particular type of equilibrium: there is a very individualistic spirit of competition, and each of us wants to be the best. Then there is a team spirit, which is essential to survival in the squadron, in the team. It is in this sense that the [internal] video plays its role. It shows one’s know-how and it helps communicate one’s ‘tricks’ and continue to progress as a group. The dissemination of practices, ways to succeed in performing such and such figure, the errors to avoid… all these are balanced during the video debriefing”.

3.2.2.3. Adopting a critical stance

The great majority of the interviewees think that debriefing sessions rely on and enhance personal qualities and attitudes. The most frequently named were modesty and calling oneself into question. Pilots and navigators define modesty as a capacity to admit one’s errors and assume full responsibility: “Being alone in the aircraft is one thing, debriefing in front of the other pilots, peers, even in front of the squadron when there are concerns related to flight security is something else. It means assuming responsibility in front of everyone. One has to take responsibility. We need to debrief in order to progress and it is also a means to remain modest in one’s work”. As a pilot of one of the display teams notes, modesty is certainly a personal predisposition, but it can also be acquired during debriefings: “They say that the first year is the toughest, because we are effectively ‘torn apart’: there is a lot of criticism, but it is constructive, as the aim is to become aware of our errors and to progress. All this may sometimes be too intense because obviously not all our flights are perfect, far from it!”.

Modesty is closely linked to calling oneself into question. A former leader of the PAF explains: “Debriefing is directly associated with self-analysis. It is crucial for a leader to be able to admit his errors and call himself into question. When I saw that for three flights in a row my inside right [first year in the Patrouille, evolving on the leader’s right side] did not manage to execute such and such figure, I said to myself that I was to blame too, simply because I served as a point of reference to him! What did this mean? I needed to permanently call myself into question. Being a leader doesn’t mean that you know everything. On the contrary, you discover quite a lot of things. Even when you have a certain background, real experience, you have to be able to analyze and call yourself into question”. Debriefing sessions imply that navigating personnel is able to admit errors and to assume responsibility so that he or she avoids repeating them during future flights.