Chapter 3
The Texas Prison Hack
I don’t think there’s any one thing you can say to a youngster to make them change, other than to have value in themselves, you know, and never take the short road.
— William
 
 
Two young convicts, each doing extended time for murder, meet on a blazing day in the concrete yard of a Texas prison and discover they share a fascination with computers. They team up and become secret hackers right under the noses of watchful guards.
All that is in the past. These days, William Butler gets into his car at 5:30 every weekday morning and begins the commute to work through clogged Houston traffic. He considers himself a very lucky man even to be alive. He’s got a steady girlfriend; he drives a shiny new car. And, he adds, “I was recently rewarded with a $7,000 raise. Not bad.”
Like William, his friend Danny is also settled in life and holding down a steady job doing computer work. But neither will ever forget the long, slow years paying a hard price for their actions. Strangely, the time in prison equipped them with the skills they’re now making such good use of in “the free world.”

Inside: Discovering Computers

Prison is a shock to the newcomer. Arriving inmates are often dumped together until the unruly and violent can be sorted out — a severe challenge to those trying to live by the rules. Surrounded by people who might explode at any imagined challenge, even the meek have to hang tough and stand up for themselves. William devised his own set of rules:
I basically lived how you had to live in there. I’m just 5’10” and I was probably 255. But it wasn’t just about being big, it’s a mindset that I was not a weak person and I was nobody to be taken advantage of. I carried myself like that. Inside, if anybody perceives any weakness, then they take advantage of it. I didn’t lie, I didn’t chat about other people’s business, and don’t ask me about my business because I’ll tell you to get f___ed.
Danny and I both did time on tough units. You know what I’m saying — gladiator units, where you had to fight all the time. So we didn’t give a shit about guards or nobody. We would fight at the drop of a hat or do whatever we had to do.
Danny was already serving a 20-year sentence at the Wynne Unit, a prison in Huntsville, Texas, when William arrived. His initial prison job had nothing to do with computers.
They first sent me to a unit where you start you doing field work on the farms. You go hoeing up and down rows. They could use machines for that, but they don’t — it’s a form of punishment so you feel better about whatever job they give you later.
When Danny was transferred to the Wynne unit, he was grateful to be assigned clerical work in the Transportation Office. “I started to work on an Olivetti typewriter with a monitor and a couple of disk drives. It ran DOS and had a little memory. I messed around trying to learn how to use it.” (For me, that rang familiar bells: The first computer I ever used was an Olivetti teletype with a 110-baud acoustic-coupler modem.)
He found an old computer book lying around, an instruction manual for the early database program dBase III. “I figured out how to put the reports on dBase, while everybody else was still typing theirs.” He converted the office purchase orders to dBase and even started a program to track the prison’s shipments of farm products to other prisons around the state.
Eventually Danny made trustee status, which brought a work assignment involving a higher level of trust and what’s referred to as a “gate pass,” allowing him to work outside the secure perimeter of the prison. He was sent to a job in the dispatch office in a trailer outside the fence, preparing shipping orders for the delivery trucks transporting the food goods. But what really mattered was that it gave him “my first real access to computers.”
After a while, he was given a small room in the trailer and put in charge of hardware — assembling new machines and fixing broken ones. Here was a golden opportunity: learning how to build computers and fix them from hands-on experience. Some of the people he worked with would bring in computer books for him, which accelerated his learning curve.
Being in charge of hardware gave him access to “a shelf full of computer parts with nothing inventoried.” He soon grew reasonably skilled at assembling machines or adding components. Prison staff didn’t even inspect the systems to determine how he had configured them, so he could easily set up machines with unauthorized equipment.

Federal Prisons Are Different

That kind of careless disregard for what a prisoner is up to is unlikely in a federal prison. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons has a sensibly high level of paranoia about the subject. During my time inside, I had a “NO COMPUTER” assignment, which meant it was considered a security threat for me to have any computer access. Or even access to a phone, for that matter: A prosecutor once told a federal magistrate that if I was free to use a phone while in custody, I would be able to whistle into it and send instructions to an Air Force intercontinental missile. Absurd, but the judge had no reason not to believe it. I was held in solitary for eight months.
In the federal system at that time, prisoners were allowed computer access only under a strict set of guidelines. No inmate could use any computer that was attached to a modem, or that had a network card or other communication device. Operationally critical computers and systems containing sensitive information were clearly marked “Staff Use Only” so it would be immediately apparent if an inmate was using a computer that put security at risk. Computer hardware was strictly controlled by technology knowledgeable staff to prevent unauthorized use.

William Gets the Keys to the Castle

When William was transferred from the farm prison to the Wynne unit in Huntsville, he landed an enviable job in the kitchen. “I had the keys to the castle because I could trade food for other things.”
The kitchen had one computer, an ancient 286 machine with a cooling fan on the front but still good enough for him to make good progress with developing his computer skills. He was able to put some of the kitchen records, reports, and purchase order forms on the computer, which saved hours of adding columns of numbers and typing out paperwork.
After William discovered there was another prisoner who shared his interest in computers, Danny was able to help improve the quality of the computer setup in the commissary. He pulled components off the shelf in the Agriculture trailer and then recruited the aid of some friends with maintenance assignments, who could go anywhere in the prison.
They didn’t answer to anyone. So they sneaked computer parts into the kitchen for us — just put them into a cart and roll it down.
Then one Christmas Eve, a guard walked onto the unit with a box that basically had parts for a whole computer in it, and a hub and other stuff.
How did he convince a guard to break the rules so blatantly? “I just did what they call ‘worked my jelly’ on him — I just talked to him and befriended him.” William’s parents had purchased the computer items at his request, and the guard agreed to bring in the load of items as if they were Christmas presents.
To provide work space for his expanding computer installation, William appropriated a small storage room attached to the commissary. The room was unventilated but he was sure that wouldn’t be a problem, and it wasn’t: “I traded food to get an air conditioner, we knocked a hole in the wall and put the air conditioner unit in so we could breath and could work in comfort,” he explained.
“We built three PCs back there. We took old 286 cases and put Pentium boards in them. The hard drives wouldn’t fit, so we had to use toilet paper rolls for hard drive holders,” which, while an innovative solution, must have been funny to look at.
Why three computers? Danny would drop in sometimes, and they’d each have a computer to use. And a third guy later started “a law office” — charging inmates for researching their legal issues online and drawing up papers for filing appeals and the like.
Meanwhile, William’s skills in using a computer to organize the commissary’s paperwork came to the attention of the captain in charge of food service. He gave William an added assignment: When not busy with regular duties, he was to work on setting up computer files for the captain’s reports to the warden.
To carry out these additional responsibilities, William was allowed to work in the captain’s office, a sweet assignment for a prisoner. But after a time William began to chafe: Those computers in the commissary were by now loaded with music files, games, and videos. In the captain’s office, he had none of these pleasing diversions. Good old American innovation plus a healthy dose of gutsy fearlessness suggested a way of solving the problem.
I traded food from the kitchen to get network cable from maintenance. We had the maintenance clerk order us a 1,000-foot spool of Cat 5 [Ethernet] cable. We had the guards open up pipe chases and ran the cable. I just told them I was doing work for the Captain and they’d open the door.
In short order, he had hardwired an Ethernet connection linking up the three computers he now had in the commissary, with the computer in the captain’s office. When the captain wasn’t there, William had the pleasure of playing his computer games, listening to his music, and watching his videos.
But he was running a big risk. What if the captain came back unexpectedly and discovered him with music playing and a game on the screen, or a girlie movie? It would mean goodbye to the privileged position in the kitchen, the cushy duties in the captain’s office, and the access to the computer setup he had so painstakingly assembled.
Meanwhile, Danny had his own challenges. He was now working in the Agriculture Office surrounded by computers, with telephone jacks everywhere connecting to the outside world. He was like a kid with his nose pressed to the window of the candy store and no money in his pocket. All those temptations so nearby and no way to enjoy them.
One day an officer showed up in Danny’s tiny office. “[He] brought his machine in because he couldn’t get connected to the Internet. I didn’t really know how a modem worked, there was nobody teaching me anything. But I was able to help him set it up.” In the process of getting the machine online, the officer, on request, gave Danny his username and password; probably he didn’t see any problem about doing this, knowing that inmates weren’t allowed to use any computer with online access.
Danny realized what the guard was too dense or too technically illiterate to figure out: He had given Danny an e-ticket to the Internet. Secretly running a telephone line behind a rack of cabinets into his work area, Danny hooked it up to the internal modem in his computer. With the officer’s login and password that he had memorized, he was golden: He had Internet access.

Online in Safety

For Danny, achieving an Internet connection opened up a whole new world on his monitor. But just as for William, he ran a huge risk every time he went online.
I was able to dial out, pick up information about computers and all, and ask questions. I was signing on for the officer but the whole time I was afraid it might come to light. I tried to be careful not to stay on so long that I tied up the lines.
A clever workaround suggested itself. Danny installed a “splitter” on the phone line going to the fax machine. But it wasn’t long before the Ag unit began to hear complaints from other prisons wanting to know why their fax line was busy so much of the time. Danny realized he’d have to get a dedicated line if he wanted to cruise the Net at leisure and in safety. A little scouting provided the answer: He discovered two telephone jacks that were live but not in use. Apparently none of the staff remembered they even existed. He reconnected the wire from his modem, plugging it into one of the jacks. Now he had his own outside line. Another problem solved.
In a corner of his tiny room, under a pile of boxes, he set up a computer as a server — in effect, an electronic storage device for all the great stuff he planned to download, so the music files and computer hacking instructions and all the rest wouldn’t be on his own computer, just in case anybody looked.
Things were shaping up, but Danny was plagued by one other difficulty, a considerably bigger one. He had no way of knowing what would happen if he and the officer tried to use the officer’s Internet account at the same time. If Danny was already connected, would the officer get an error message saying that he couldn’t get online because his account was already in use? The man might have been a dense redneck, but surely at that point he would remember giving Danny his sign-on information and begin to wonder. At the time, Danny couldn’t think of a solution; the problem gnawed at him.
Still, he was proud of what he’d accomplished given the circumstances. It had taken an enormous amount of work. “I had built up a good foundation — running servers, downloading anything I could get off the web, running ‘GetRight’ [software] that would keep a download going twenty-four hours. Games, videos, hacking information, learning how networks are set up, vulnerabilities, how to find open ports.”
William understood how Danny’s setup in the Agriculture Department had been possible. “He was basically the network administrator because the free-world guy [the civilian employee] they had working there was a buffoon.” The inmates were being assigned jobs that the employee was supposed to be doing but didn’t know how, things like “the C++ and Visual Basic programming,” nor did they have the smarts necessary to properly administer the network.
Another challenge also troubled Danny: His computer faced an aisle, so anybody could see what he was doing. Since the Agriculture Office was locked up after working hours, he could only go online during the day, watching for moments when everyone else in the office seemed to be too busy with their own work to take any interest in what he was up to. Picking up a clever trick that would allow him to take control of another computer, he connected his machine to the one used by a civilian employee who worked opposite him. When the man wasn’t there and it looked like maybe no one would be drifting into the back room for a while, Danny would commandeer the other computer, put it online, and set it to download some game or music he wanted to the server in the corner.
One day when he was in the middle of getting online for a download, somebody showed up unexpectedly in Danny’s work area: a female guard — always much more hard-nosed and by-the-rules than the men, Danny and William agree. Before he could release his control of the other machine, the guard’s eyes widened: She had noticed the cursor moving! Danny managed to quit his operation. The guard blinked, probably figuring she must have imagined it, and walked out.

Solution

William still vividly remembers the day when the solution to both of their Internet access problems occurred to Danny. The kitchen crew was allowed to take their meals in the officer’s dining room after the officers had finished and cleared out. William would often sneak Danny in to eat the “much better food” in the dining room with him, and they could also talk privately there. “I can still remember the day I got him up there,” William related. “He said, ‘I know how we can do it, B.’ That’s what they called me — B, or Big B. And with it he explained to me what we were gonna do.”
What Danny envisioned was putting together two pieces of a puzzle; the telephone lines to the outside world, available to him in the Agriculture Department, and William’s computers in the kitchen. He proposed a way that would let the two of them use computers and get onto the Internet whenever they wanted, in freedom and safety.
We always sat in the back of the commissary playing games on the computers. And I thought, “If we could sit down here and play games, and nobody cares — the guards don’t care as long as we get our work done — then why can’t we access the Internet from right here?”
The Agriculture Office had computer equipment that was more up-to-date because, as Danny explained, other prisons around the state “razzed” to their server. His term “razzed” was a way of saying that computers at the other prisons were connecting by dial-up to the Agriculture Office server, which was configured to allow dial-up connections through Microsoft’s RAS (Remote Access Services).
A key make-or-break element confronted the guys: modems. “Getting hold of modems was a major deal,” William said. “They kept those pretty tight. But we were able to get our hands on a couple.” When they were ready to go online from the commissary, “What we would do was dial up on the inner-unit phone lines and razz into the Agriculture Department.”
Translation: From the commissary, the guys would enter a command instructing the computer modem to dial a phone call over an internal phone line. That call would be received by a modem in the farm shop, a modem connected to Danny’s server. That server was on a local network to all the other computers in the office, some of which had modems connected to external phone lines. With commissary and Ag Office computer networks talking to each other over the internal phone line, the next command would instruct one of those Ag Office computers to dial out to the Internet. Voilà! Instant access.
Well, not quite. The two hackers still needed an account with an Internet service provider. Initially, they used the login names and passwords of personnel who worked in the department, “when we knew they were gonna be out of town hunting or something like that,” says Danny. This information had been gleaned by installing on the other computers software called “BackOrifice,” a popular remote monitoring tool that gave them control of a remote computer as if they were sitting right in front of it.
Of course, using other people’s passwords was risky — with all sorts of ways you might get caught. It was William this time who came up with a solution. “I got my parents to pay for us to have Internet access with a local service company,” so it was no longer necessary to use other people’s sign-on information.
Eventually they kept the Internet connection through the Agriculture Office going 24/7. “We had two FTP servers running down there downloading movies and music and more hacking tools and all kinds of stuff like that,” says Danny. “I was getting games that hadn’t even been released yet.”

Nearly Caught

In their commissary headquarters, William hooked up sound cards and external speakers so they could play music or hear the soundtrack as they watched a downloaded movie. If a guard asked what they were doing, William told them, “I don’t ask your business, don’t ask mine.”
I told [the guards] all the time there’s some things in life that I can promise. Number one, I won’t have a pistol and I won’t shoot anybody in here. Number two, I will not do drugs and dilute my mind. Number three, I’m not gonna have a pimp and I’m not gonna be a pimp. Number four, I won’t mess with a female officer.
I couldn’t promise them that I wouldn’t fight. I never lied to ’em. And they respected my honesty and my forthrightness, and so they’d do things for me. You can get guards to do favors by conversation.
Conversation rules the nation. You talk women out of their panties, see what I’m saying, you talk men into doing what you want them to do for you.
But no matter how clever a talker a prisoner may be, no guard is going to allow an inmate free reign with computers and outside phone lines. So how did these two get away with their hacker escapades in plain view of the guards? William explained:
We were able to do a lot of the stuff we did because they looked at us like half wits. We’re in the seat of redneck-dom, so the bosses [guards] had no idea what we were doing. They couldn’t even fathom what we were capable of.
Another reason would have to be that these two inmates were doing computer work others had been paid to take care of. “Most of the people they had there that were supposed to be in the know about things like computers,” says William, “they just weren’t capable, so they had inmates doing it.”
This book is full of stories of the chaos and damage hackers can cause, but William and Danny were not bent on criminal mischief. They merely wanted to enhance their growing computer skills and keep themselves entertained — which under their circumstances is hardly difficult to understand. It’s important to William that people appreciate the distinction.
We never did abuse it or hurt anybody. We never did. I mean from my standpoint, I deemed it necessary to learn what I wanted to learn so I could go straight and be successful once I was released.
While the Texas prison officials remained in the dark about what was going on, they were fortunate that William and Danny had benign motives. Imagine what havoc the two might have caused; it would have been child’s play for these guys to develop a scheme for obtaining money or property from unsuspecting victims. The Internet had become their university and playground. Learning how to run scams against individuals or break in to corporate sites would have been a cinch; teenagers and preteens learn these methods every day from the hacker sites and elsewhere on the Web. And as prisoners, Danny and William had all the time in the world.
Maybe there’s a lesson here: Two convicted murderers, but that didn’t mean they were scum, rotten to the core. They were cheaters who hacked their way onto the Internet illegally, but that didn’t mean they were willing to victimize innocent people or naively insecure companies.

Close Call

The two neophyte hackers didn’t let the pleasurable distraction of Internet entertainment slow their learning, however. “I was able to get the books that I wanted from my family,” says William, who felt his escapades were a form of sorely needed hands-on training. “I wanted to understand the intricate workings of a TCP/IP network. I needed that kind of knowledge for when I got out.”
It was an education but it was fun, too — you know what I’m saying? It was fun because I’m an A-type personality — I like living on the edge. And it was a way to snub our nose at “the man.” Because they were clueless.
Besides the serious side and the fun side of their Internet use, Danny and William also got a few kicks from socializing. They started electronic friendships with some ladies, meeting them in online chat rooms and communicating by e-mail. With a few, they acknowledged they were in prison; with most, they neglected to mention the fact. No surprise there.
Living on the edge can be invigorating but always carries a dire risk. William and Danny could never stop looking over their shoulders.
“One time we got close to getting caught,” William remembered. “One of the officers we didn’t like because he was real paranoid. We didn’t like to be online while he was working.”
This particular guard called the commissary one day and found the line continually busy. “What made him freak out was that one of the other guys working in the kitchen had started a relationship with a nurse in the prison clinic.” The guard suspected that the prisoner, George, was tying up the line with an unauthorized call to his nurse fiancée. In reality, the phone line was tied up because William was using the Internet. The guard hurried to the commissary. “We could hear the key in the gate, so we knew somebody was coming. We shut everything down.”
When the guard arrived, William was entering reports on the computer as Danny innocently looked on. The guard demanded to know why the phone line had been busy for so long. William was ready for him and reeled off a story about needing to make a call to get information for the report he was working on.
We couldn’t have gotten an outside line from back there, and he knew it, but this guy was just super-paranoid. He thought that somehow we had helped George call his fiancée.
Whether he believed William’s story or not, without proof the guard couldn’t do anything. George later married the nurse; as far as William knows, he’s still in prison and still happily married.

Growing Up

How does a youngster like William — a kid from a stable home with caring, supportive parents — land in prison? “My growing up was excellent, man. I was a C student but very smart. Never played football and all that stuff, but never got into any trouble until I went off to college.”
Being raised Southern Baptist was not a positive experience for William. Today, he feels that mainstream religion can harm a young person’s self-esteem. “You know, teaching that you’re worthless from the get-go.” He attributes his poor choices in part to the fact that he had become convinced he couldn’t be successful. “You know, I had to gain my self-respect and self-esteem from somewhere and I gained it from people fearing me.”
A student of philosophy, William understood what Friedrich Nietzsche meant by a “metamorphosis of the spirit”:
I don’t know if you’ve ever read any Nietzsche, but he spoke of the camel, the lion, and the child. And I was really a camel — I did what I thought would make people happy to gain self-worth from people liking me, rather than me liking myself and carrying myself on my own merit.
Despite this, William made it through high school with an unblemished record. His troubles started after he enrolled in a junior college in the Houston area, then transferred to a school in Louisiana to study aviation. The instinct to please others turned into a need for respect.
I saw that I could make money selling Ecstasy and stuff. People feared me ’cause I was always armed and would always fight, and you know, just live life like an idiot. And then got myself in a situation of a drug deal gone bad.
He and his customer ended up rolling around, struggling for control. The other guy’s buddy showed up; it was two against one, and William knew he had to do something desperate or he would never walk away from there. He pulled out his gun and fired. And the man was dead.
How does a boy from a strong, stable family face this hard reality? How does he share the dreadful news?
One of the hardest things in my life to do was tell my mother that I did it. Yeah, it was very hard.
William had a lot of time to think about what landed him in prison. He doesn’t blame anyone but himself. “You know, it was just the choices I made because my self-esteem was wrecked. And it wasn’t nothing that my parents did because they brought me up the way that they thought they should.”
For Danny, everything went wrong in a single night.
I was just a stupid kid. The night of my eighteenth birthday, they gave me a big party. On the way home, a couple of the girls needed to use the restroom, so I pulled off at a restaurant.
When they came out, they had a couple of guys following them and harassing them. We piled out of the car and there was a big fight, and before everything was over, I ran over one of them.
And then I panicked and we drove off. I left the scene.
It was the Richard Nixon/Martha Stewart syndrome at work: not being willing to step up and take responsibility for his action. If Dan hadn’t driven off, the charge would most likely have been manslaughter. Leaving the scene compounded the mistake, and once he was tracked down and arrested, it was too late for anyone to believe it might have been accidental.

Back in the Free World

William was a quarter of the way through a 30-year sentence, but he wasn’t having any success on his annual visits before the parole board. His talent for taking the initiative again came to the fore. He began writing letters to the parole board, one letter every two weeks, with copies addressed individually to each of the three board members. The letters detailed how constructive he was being: “What courses I was taking, the grades I was getting, the computer books I was reading, and so on,” showing them that “I’m not frivolous and I’m not wasting my time.”
He says, “One of the members told my mom, ‘I got more mail from him than my six kids combined.’” It worked: He kept it up for almost a year and on his next appearance before the board, they signed him out. Danny, on a shorter sentence, was released about the same time.
Since leaving prison, both William and Danny live fiercely determined to stay out of trouble, working computer-related jobs with skills gained during their years “inside.” While each took college-level tech courses in prison, both believe their hands-on experience, perilous though it was, gave them the advanced skills they now depend on for their living.
Danny earned 64 college credit hours in prison, and though he fell short of earning any professional certifications, now works with high-powered, critical applications including Access and SAP.
Before prison, William completed his freshman year in college and was a sophomore, with his parents supporting him. Once he got out, he was able to continue his education. “I applied for financial aid and got it and went to school. I got straight A’s and also worked in the school’s computer center.”
He now has two associate’s degrees — in liberal arts and network computer maintenance — both paid for by financial aid. Despite the two degrees, William didn’t have quite the luck of Danny in landing a computer job. So he took what he could find, accepting a position involving physical labor. Credit his determination and his employer’s open-minded attitude: As soon as the firm recognized his computer skills, he was pulled off the physical tasks and set to work at a job that makes better use of his technical qualifications. It’s routine business computing, not the network designing he’d rather be doing, but he satisfies that urge by spending time on weekends figuring out low-cost ways of networking the computer systems for two Houston-area churches, as a volunteer.
These two men stand as exceptions. In one of the most pressing and least-discussed challenges of contemporary American society, most felons released from prison face a near-impossible hurdle of finding work, especially any job that pays enough to support a family That’s not hard to understand: How many employers can be confident about the idea of hiring a murderer, an armed robber, a rapist? In many states they are ineligible for welfare, leaving few ways of supporting themselves while continuing the near-hopeless search for work. Their options are severely limited — and then we wonder why so many quickly return to prison, and assume it must be that they lack the will to live by the rules.
Today, William has some solid advice for young people and their parents:
I don’t think there’s any one thing you can say to a youngster to make them change, other than to have value in themselves, you know, and never take the short road, ’cause the long road always seems to be the most rewarding in the end. And you know, never sit stagnant because you don’t feel you’re worthy enough to do what you need to do.
Danny would no doubt also agree with these words of William’s:
I wouldn’t trade my life now for nothin’ on earth. I’ve come to believe that I can gain my way in life by my own merit and not take shortcuts. Over the years I learned that I could have people respect me on my own merit. That’s what I try to live by today.

INSIGHT

This story makes clear that many computer attacks can’t be protected against just by securing the perimeter. When the villain isn’t some teen hacker or computer-skilled thief but an insider — a disgruntled employee, a bitter former worker recently fired, or, as in this case, some other type of insiders like William and Danny.
Insiders often pose a greater threat than the attackers we read about in the newspapers. While the majority of security controls are focused on protecting the perimeter against the outside attacker, it’s the insider who has access to physical and electronic equipment, cabling, telephone closets, workstations, and network jacks. They also know who in the organization handles sensitive information and what computer systems the information is stored on, as well as how to bypass any checks put in place to reduce theft and fraud.
Another aspect of their story reminds me of the movie Shawshank Redemption. In it, a prisoner named Andy is a CPA. Some of the guards have him prepare their tax returns and he gives them advice on the best ways of structuring their finances to limit their tax liability. Andy’s abilities become widely known among the prison staff; leading to more book-keeping work at higher levels in the prison, until eventually he’s able to expose the Warden, who has been “cooking” the books. Not just in a prison but everywhere, we all need to be careful and discreet about whom we give sensitive information to.
In my own case, the United States Marshal Service created a high level of paranoia about my capabilities. They placed a warning in my file cautioning prison officials not to disclose any personal information to me — not even giving me their names, since they believed a wild rumor that I could tap into the government’s plethora of secret databases and erase the identity of anyone, even a Federal Marshal. I think they had watched “The Net” one too many times.

COUNTERMEASURES

Among the most significant security controls that can be effective in preventing and detecting insider abuse are these:
Accountability. Two common practices raise accountability issues: the use of so-called role-based accounts — accounts shared by multiple users; and the practice of sharing account information or passwords to permit access when an employee is out of the office or unavailable. Both create an environment of plausible deniability when things go seriously wrong.
Very simply, sharing account information should be discouraged if not altogether prohibited. This includes allowing one worker to use his/her workstation when this requires providing sign-on information.
Target-rich environment. In most businesses, an attacker who can find a way of getting into the work areas of the facility can easily find a way to gain access to systems. Few workers lock their computers when leaving their work area or use screensaver or start-up passwords. It only takes seconds for a malicious person to install stealth monitoring software on an unprotected workstation. In a bank, tellers always lock their cash drawer before walking away. Unfortunately, it’s rare to see this practice being used at other types of institutions.
Consider implementing a policy that requires the use of a screensaver password or other program to electronically lock the machine. Ensure that the IT department enforces this policy through configuration management.
Password management. My girlfriend was recently employed by a Fortune 50 company that uses a predictable pattern in assigning passwords for outside web-based intranet access: the user’s name followed by a random three-digit number. This password is set when the person is hired and cannot ever be changed by the employee. This makes it possible for any employee to write a simple script that can determine the password in no more than 1,000 tries — a matter of a few seconds.
Employee passwords, whether set by the company or selected by the employees, must not have a pattern that makes them easily predictable.
Physical access. Knowledgeable employees familiar with the company’s network can easily use their physical access to compromise systems when no one is around. At one point I was an employee of GTE of California, the telecommunications company. Having physical access to the building was like having the keys to the kingdom — everything was wide open. Anyone could walk up to a workstation in an employee’s cubicle or office and gain access to sensitive systems.
If employees would properly secure their desktops, workstations, laptops, and PDA devices, by using secure BIOS passwords and logging out, or locking their computer, the bad guy on the inside will need more time to accomplish his objectives.
Train employees to feel comfortable challenging people whose identity is uncertain, especially in sensitive areas. Use physical security controls like cameras and/or badge access systems to control entry, surveillance, and movement within the facility. Consider periodically auditing physical entry and exit logs to identify unusual patterns of behavior, especially when a security incident arises.
“Dead” cubicles and other access points. When an employee leaves the company or is transferred to a different position, leaving a cubicle empty, a malicious insider can connect via the live network jacks in the cubicle to probe the network while protecting his/her identity. Or worse, a workstation often remains behind in the cubicle, plugged into the network ready for anyone to use, including the malicious insider (and, as well, any unauthorized visitor who discovers the abandoned cubicle).
Other access points in places like conference rooms also offer easy access to the insider bent on doing damage.
Consider disabling all unused network jacks to prevent anonymous or unauthorized access. Ensure that any computer systems in vacant cubicles are secured against unauthorized access.
Exiting personnel. Any worker who has given notice of termination should be considered a potential risk. Such employees should be monitored for any access to confidential business information, especially copying or downloading a significant amount of data. With tiny USB flash drives now readily available that can hold a gigabyte or more of data, it can be a matter of minutes to load up large amounts of sensitive information and walk out the door with it.
It should be routine practice to put restrictions on an employee’s access prior to his/her being notified of a termination, demotion, or undesirable transfer. Also, consider monitoring the employee’s computer usage to determine any unauthorized or potentially harmful activities.
Installation of unauthorized hardware. The malicious insider can easily access another employee’s cubicle and install a hardware or software keystroke logger to capture passwords and other confidential information. Again, a flash drive makes stealing data easy. A security policy that prohibits any introduction of hardware devices without written permission, while justified in some circumstances, is admittedly difficult to police; benign employees will be inconvenienced, while the malicious have no incentive for paying attention to the rule.
In certain organizations that work with extremely sensitive information, removing or disabling the USB port on workstations may be a necessary control.
Walk-around inspections should be conducted regularly. In particular, these inspections should verify that the machines have not had unauthorized wireless devices, hardware keystroke loggers, or modems attached, and that no software has been installed except as authorized. Security or IT personnel can check for unauthorized wireless access points in the immediate vicinity by using a PDA that supports 802.11, or even a laptop equipped with Microsoft XP and a wireless card. Microsoft XP has a built in zero-configuration utility that pops up a dialogue box when it detects a wireless access point in the immediate vicinity.
Circumventing processes. As employees learn about critical business processes within the organization, they’re in a good position to identify any weaknesses with the checks and balances used to detect fraud or theft. A dishonest worker is in a position to steal or cause other significant harm based on their knowledge of how the business operates. Insiders usually have unfettered access to offices, file cabinets, internal mailing systems, and have knowledge of the day-today business procedures.
Consider analyzing sensitive and critical business processes to identify any weaknesses so countermeasures can be implemented. In certain situations, developing separation of duties requirement in the process, where a sensitive operation performed by one person is checked independently by another, can reduce the security risk.
On-site visitor policies. Establish a security policy for outside visitors, including workers from other office locations. An effective security control is to require visitors to present State-issued identification prior to being allowed into the facility, and recording the information in a security log. If a security incident should arise, it may be possible to identify the perpetrator.
Software inventory and auditing. Maintain an inventory of all authorized software installed or licensed for each system and periodically audit these systems for compliance. This inventory process not only ensures legal compliance with software licensing regulations, but also may be used to identify any unauthorized software installations that could negatively affect security.
Unauthorized installation of malicious software like keystroke loggers, adware, or others type of spyware are hard to detect, depending on how clever the developers were at hiding the program within the operating system.
Consider using third-party commercial software to identify these malicious types of programs, such as the following:
• Spycop (available at www.spycop.com)
• PestPatrol (available at www.pestpatrol.com)
• Adware (available from www.lavasoftusa.com)
Audit systems for software integrity. Employees or malicious insiders could replace critical operating system files or applications that could be used by bypass security controls. In this story, the inmate hackers had changed the PC Anywhere application to run without displaying an icon in the system tray so they would not be detected. The prison officials in this story never realized that their every move was periodically being monitored while Danny and William virtually looked over their shoulders.
In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to conduct an integrity audit, and to use a third-party application that notifies the appropriate staff when any changes are made to system files and applications on the “watch list.”
Excessive privileges. In Windows-based environments, many end-users are logged into accounts with local administrator rights on their own machines. This practice, while more convenient, makes it very easy for a disgruntled insider to install a keystroke logger or networking monitoring (sniffer) on any systems where he has local administrator privileges. Remote attackers also may send malicious programs hidden within an email attachment that may be opened by the unsuspecting user. The threat posed by these attachments can be minimized by using the “least privilege” rule, which means that users and programs should run with the fewest privileges necessary to perform their required tasks.

THE BOTTOM LINE

In some situations, common sense dictates that elaborate security precautions are a waste of time. In a military school, for example, you would not expect the student body to be filled with people looking for every possible opportunity to cheat or challenge the rules. In an elementary school, you would not expect ten-year-olds to be more knowledgeable about computer security than the staff technology guru.
And in a prison, you would not expect that inmates, closely watched, living under a set of rigid rules, would find the means not just to work their way onto the Internet but then to spend hours at a time, day after day, enjoying music, movies, communications with the opposite sex, and learning more and more about computers.
The moral: If you are in charge of information security for any school, workgroup, company, or other entity — you have to assume that some malicious adversary, including someone inside your organization — is looking for that small crack in the wall, the weakest link of your security chain to break your network. Don’t assume that everyone is going to play by the rules. Do what is cost-effective to prevent potential intrusions, but don’t forget to keep looking out for what you missed. The bad guys are counting on you to be careless.
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