PREFACE TO THE NOVUM ORGANUM

BY ROBERT LESLIE ELLIS.¹

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THE Novum Organum was published in 1620. Certain prolegomena to the whole of the Instauratio were prefixed to it, namely a Proœmium beginning “Francis-cus de Verulamio sic cogitavit,” a dedication to King James, a general preface, and an account, entitled Distributio Operis, of the parts of which the Instauratio was to consist. Of these the Novum Organum is the second; the De Augmentis, which was not then published, occupying the place of the first. Accordingly in most editions of Bacon's works the prolegomena are prefixed, not to the Novum Organum, but to the De Augmentis; and this is doubtless their natural place. Nevertheless as Bacon's general design was not completed, it seems better to allow them to remain in their original position, especially as in the Proœmium Bacon explains why he publishes one portion of the Instauratio apart from the rest. “Decrevit,” he there says, speaking of himself, “prima quæque quæ perficere licuit in publicum edere. Neque hæc festinatio ambitiosa fuit, sed sollicita, ut si quid illi humanitus accideret, exstaret tamen designatio quædam ac destinatio rei quam animo complexus est,” etc.

After the Proœmium and the dedication we come to the Præfatio Generalis, in which Bacon speaks of the unprosperous state of knowledge and of the necessity of a new method; and then follows the Distributio Operis. The Instauratio is to be divided into six portions, of which the first is to contain a general survey of the present state of knowledge. In the second men are to be taught how to use their understanding aright in the investigation of Nature. In the third all the phenomena of the universe are to be stored up as in a treasure-house, as the materials on which the new method is to be employed. In the fourth examples are to be given of its operation and of the results to which it leads. The fifth is to contain what Bacon had accomplished in natural philosophy without the aid of his own method, but merely “ex eodem intellectûs usu quem alii in inquirendo et inveniendo adhibere consueverunt ”. It is therefore less important than the rest, and Bacon declares that he will not bind himself to the conclusions it contains. Moreover its value will altogether cease when the sixth part can be completed, wherein will be set forth the new philosophy—the result of the application of the new method to all the phenomena of the universe. But to complete this, the last part of the Instauratio, Bacon does not hope: he speaks of it as a thing “et supra vires et ultra spes nostras collocata.”

The greater part of the plan traced in the Distributio remained unfulfilled. Not to speak of the last division of the Instauratio, no part of Bacon's writings can properly be referred either to the fourth or fifth, except two prefaces which are found among the fragments published by Gruter.² To the fifth division however M. Bouillet ³ is disposed to refer several of Bacon's philosophical writings; as, for instance, the tracts entitled De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris, and Thema Cæli. But though they correspond with the description which Bacon gives of the contents of the fifth part of the Instauratio, there is no reason to suppose that they would have been comprised in it. They were written a considerable time before the publication of the Novum Organum; the Thema Cæli being clearly of the same date as the Descriptio Globi intellectualis, written in 1612 ⁴, and the De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris being probably written before Bacon had become acquainted with Galileo's theory of the tides. This theory was published in 1616; and it is reasonable to suppose that Bacon, who speaks of it in the Novum Organum, would have mentioned it in the De Fluxu, if the latter had not been written either before it was published, or but a short time afterwards ⁵. These tracts, and the others which M. Bouillet mentions, are clearly occasional writings not belonging to the circuit of the Instauratio.

To the fourth part have been referred the Historia Ventorum, the Historia Vitæ et Mortis, etc. This however is contrary to Bacon's description of them in the dedication to Prince Charles prefixed to the Historia Ventorum. They are there spoken of as the “primitiæ Historiæ nostræ naturalis.” Even the general title with which the Historia Ventorum and the titles of five other Historiæ were published, shows that they belong not to the fourth but to the third part of the Instauratio. It is as follows:—Historia Naturalis ad condendam Pkilosophiam, sive Phænomena Universi, quæ est Instaurationis Magnæ pars tertia. It is moreover manifest that as the fourth part was to contain applications to certain subjects of Bacon's method of induction, these treatises, in which the method is nowhere employed, cannot belong to it. M. Bouillet, though he justly dissents from Shaw's ⁶ arrangement, by whom they are referred to the fourth part, nevertheless commits an error of the same kind by introducing into this division of the Instauratio a fragment on Motion, published by Gruter with the title Filum Labyrinthi, sive Inquisitio legitima de Motu. This fragment, which is doubtless anterior to the Novum Organum, contains many thoughts and expressions which are found more perfectly developed either in the Novum Organum itself, or in the Distributio Operis. It is not to be supposed that Bacon, after thus expressing himself in the Distributio—“Neque enim hoc siverit Deus ut phantasiæ nos-træ somnium pro exemplari mundi edamus; sed potius benigne faveat ut apo-calypsim ac veram visionem vestigiorum et sigillorum Creatoris super creaturas scribamus ”—would have repeated this remarkable sentence with scarcely any alteration in another part of the Instauratio ⁷; nor that he would have repeated in a somewhat less finished form the whole substance of the hundred and twenty-fifth aphorism of the first book of the Novum Organum. Yet we must admit this improbable supposition, if we decide on giving to the Inquisitio legitima the place which M. Bouillet has assigned to it. The truth is, that many of Bacon's shorter tracts preserved by Gruter and others are merely, so to speak, experimental fragments, of which the substance is embodied in his more finished writings.

Of the fourth and fifth parts of the Instauratio nothing, as I have already remarked, has been preserved except the prefaces, if indeed any other portion of them ever existed. But of the third, though it is altogether incomplete, we have nevertheless large fragments. Two years after the publication of the Novum Organum Bacon published the Historia Naturalis ad condendam Philoso-phiam, which has been already mentioned. In this however only the Historia Ventorum is contained in extenso; and of the five other Historiæ of which Bacon speaks in the dedication, and of which he proposed to publish one every month, only two are now in existence, namely the Historia Vitæ et Mortis, published in 1623, and the Historia Densi et Rari which is contained in Rawley's Opuscula varia posthuma, published in 1658. Of the other three, namely the Historiæ Gravis et Levis, Sympathiæ et Anlipathiæ Rerum, and Sulphuris Mercurii et Salis, we have only the prefaces, which were published in the same volume as the Historia Ventorum.

These Historiæ, and the Sylva Sylvarum, published soon after Bacon's death by Rawley, are the only works which we are entitled to refer to the third part of the Instauratio. With respect to the former we have the authority of Bacon's own title page and dedication; and Rawley's dedication of the latter to King Charles shows that it is included under the general designation of Historia Na-turalis ad condendam Philosophiam ⁸.

Other tracts however, of more or less importance, have been placed in the third part of the Instauratio, as for instance a fragment, published by Rawley in 1658, entitled Historia et Inquisitio prima de Sono et Auditu et de Formâ Soni et latente processu Soni, sive Sylva Soni Auditus. But the substance of this fragment occurs also in the Sylva Sylvarum, and therefore it cannot have been Bacon's intention to publish both as portions of his Historia Naturalis. It is probable that the Historia de Sono et Auditu was originally written as a portion of the general scheme of natural history ⁹ which was to form the third part of the Instauratio; but it is certainly superseded by the Sylva Syluarum, and is therefore not entitled to the position which has generally been assigned to it. So, too, the Historiæ Naturalis ad condendam Philosophiam Præfatio destinata ¹⁰, published by Gruter, is clearly irreconcilable with the plan laid down in the dedication to Prince Charles of the Historia Naturalis. For Bacon's intention when he wrote the preface which Gruter has published was plainly to commence his Natural History by treating of density and rarity, and not of the natural history of the winds. Subsequently he changed his plan; and the first published portion of the third part of the Instauratio is, as we have seen, the Historia Ventorum. But this change of plan plainly shows that he had determined to cancel the fragment preserved by Gruter. Whenever what an author publishes or prepares for publication supersedes or contradicts unpublished and unfinished papers, these ought beyond all question to be set aside, and if published at all to be published apart from his other writings. Against some of the Other fragments included in the third part of the Instauratio there is no such direct evidence as there is against those of which we have been speaking; but it only gives rise to needless confusion to mix up with what we know it was Bacon's intention to publish as portions of his Historia Naturalis, loose fragments touching which we have no information whatever.

From what has been said it is manifest that what we possess of the third part of the Instauratio is merely a fragment—for the Sylva Sylvarum, a miscellaneous collection of observations gathered for the most part out of books, nowise completes Bacon's general design. In truth it is a design which cannot be completed, there being no limit to the number of the “Phænomena universi ” which are potentially if not actually cognisable; and it is to be observed that even if all the facts actually known at any instant could be collected and systematised (and even this is plainly impossible), yet still Bacon's aim would not be attained. For these facts alone would be insufficient as materials for the sixth part of the Instauratio, in which was to be contained all the knowledge of Nature man is capable of. Every day brings new facts to light not less entitled than those previously known to find a place in a complete description of the phenomena of the universe ¹¹. From many places in Bacon's writings it appears, as I have elsewhere remarked, that he had formed no adequate conception of the extent and variety of Nature. In a letter to R. P. Baranzan, who had apparently remarked by way of objection to Bacon's scheme of philosophy that a complete natural history would be a work of great extent and labour, Bacon observes that it would perhaps be sixfold as voluminous as that of Pliny. We have here therefore a sort of estimate of the limits which, in his judgment, the third part of the Instauratio would not exceed. What now exists of it is perhaps one twentieth in magnitude of this estimate.

Even the second part of the Instauratio, the Novum Organum itself, is incomplete. The second book concludes with the doctrine of prerogative instances, But in its twenty-first aphorism a number of subjects are mentioned of which this doctrine is the first, the last being the “Scala ascensoria et descensoria axiomatum.” Neither this, nor any of these subjects after the first, except the last but one, is anywhere discussed in Bacon's writings; and our knowledge of his method is therefore incomplete. Even the penultimate division of the Novum Organum which was published along with the first two books, and which treats “de parascevis ad inquisitionem,” has all the appearance of being a fragment, or at least of being less developed than Bacon had intended it to be.

The first part of the Instauratio is represented, not inadequately, by the De Augmentis, published about three years after the Distributio Operis and the Novum Organum. It is a translation with large additions of the Advancement of Learning, published in 1605; and if we regard the latter as a development of the ninth chapter of Valerius Terminus, which is an early fragment containing the germ of the whole of the Instauratio ¹², the De Augmentis will appear to belong naturally to the great work of which it now forms the first and only complete portion. In the preface prefixed to it by Rawley it is said that Bacon, finding “the part relating to the Partitions of the Sciences already executed, though less solidly than the dignity of the argument demanded, … thought the best thing he could do would be to go over again what he had written, and to bring it to the state of a satisfactory and completed work. And in this way he considers that he fulfils the promise which he has given respecting the first part of the Instauration.”¹³

From this general view of the different parts of the Instauratio, as described in the Distributio Operis, we proceed to consider more particularly the Novum Organum. Although it was left incomplete, it is nevertheless of all Bacon's works that upon which he bestowed the most pains. In the first book especially every word seems to have been carefully weighed; and it would be hard to omit or to change anything without injuring the meaning which Bacon intended to convey. His meaning is not always obvious, but it is always expressed with singular precision and felicity. His chaplain, Rawley, says that he had seen among his papers at least twelve yearly revisions of the Novum Organum ¹⁴. Assuming, which there is no reason to doubt, that this statement may be relied upon, it would seem to follow that the composition of the Novum Organum commenced in 1608. And this agrees tolerably well with the circumstance that the Cogitata et Visa was sent to Bodley in 1607, as we learn from the date of Bodley's reply to it. If we suppose that the tract published with this title by Gruter is the same as that which was sent to Bodley, a passage near the end acquires a significance which has not I think been remarked. In the Cogitata et Visa Bacon speaks of the considerations whereby he had been led to perceive the necessity of a reform in philosophy, and goes on to say that the question as to how his new method might be most fitly given to the world had been much in his thoughts. “Atque diu,” he proceeds, “et acriter rem cogitanti et perpendenti ante omnia visum est ei tabulas inveniendi, sive legitimæ inquisitionis formulas … in aliquibus subjectis proponi tanquam ad exemplum et operis descriptionem fere visibilem ¹⁵. … Visum est autem, nimis abruptum esse ut à tabulis ipsis docendi initium sumatur. Itaque idonea quædam præfari oportuisse, quod et jam se fecisse arbitratur.” It was Bacon's intention therefore when he wrote the Cogitata et Visa, and when apparently some years later ¹⁶ he communicated it to Bodley, to publish an example of the application of his method to some particular subject—an intention which remained unfulfilled until the publication of the Novum Organum. We may therefore conjecture that it was about this time that Bacon addressed himself to the great work of composing the Novum Organum ¹⁷; and this agrees with what Rawley says of its having been twelve years in hand. This view also explains why the whole substance of the Cogitata et Visa is reproduced in the first book of the Novum Organum; for this tract was designed to be an introduction to a particular example of the new method of induction, such as that which we find near the beginning of the second book. Bacon's purpose in writing it was therefore the same as that which he had in view in the first book of the Novum Organum,—namely to procure a favourable reception for an example and illustration of his method. What has been said may be in some measure confirmed by comparing the Cogitata et Visa with an earlier tract,—namely the Partis secundæ Delineatio et Argumentum. When he wrote this tract Bacon did not propose to set forth his method merely by means of an example; on the contrary, the three ministrations to the sense, to the memory, and to the reason, of which the last is the new method of induction, were to be set forth in order and didactically. Whereas in the Novum Organum Bacon remarks, “incipiendum est à fine ” (that is, the method of induction must be set forth before the method of collecting facts and that of arranging them so as best to assist the memory); and having said this, he goes on at once to his example,—namely, the investigation of the Form of heat. Thus it appears that after Bacon had not only decided on writing a great work on the reform of philosophy, but had also determined on dividing it into parts of which the second was to contain the exposition of his new method, he in some measure changed his plan, and resolved to set forth the essential and operative part of his system chiefly by means of an example. This change of plan appears to be marked by the Cogitata et Visa,—a circumstance which makes this tract one of the most interesting of the precursors of the Novum Organum.

That the Partis secundæ Delineatio is earlier than the Cogitata et Visa appears plainly from several considerations which M. Bouillet, who expresses a contrary opinion, seems to have overlooked. In the first place, whole sentences and even paragraphs of the Cogitata et Visa are reproduced with scarcely any alteration in the Novum Organum; whereas this is by no means the case with any passage of the Parlis secundæ Delineatio. But as it may be said that this difference arises from the different character of the two tracts, of which the one is simply a summary of a larger work, whereas the more developed style of the other resembles that of the Novum Organum, it may be well to compare them somewhat in detail.

In speaking of the prospects which the reform of philosophy was to open to mankind, Bacon thus expresses himself in the Novum Organum:—“Quinetiam prudentia civilis ad consilium vocanda est et adhibenda, quæ ex præscripto diffidit, et de rebus humanis in deterius conjicit ”. The corresponding sentence in the Cogitata et Visa is, “Consentaneum enim esse, prudentiam civilem in hâc parte adhibere, quæ ex præscripto diffidit et de humanis in deterius conjicit ”. Again, in the Partis secundæ Delineatio the same idea is thus expressed, “Si quis sobrius (ut sibi videri possit), et civilis prudentiæ diffiden-tiam ad hæc transferens, existimet hæc quæ dicimus votis similia videri,” etc. Here the somewhat obscure phrase “civilis prudentiæ diffidentiam ” is clearly the germ of that by which it is replaced in the other two passages, namely, “prudentia civilis quæ ex præscripto diffidit.” Again, in the Partis secundæ Delineatio Bacon affirms that ordinary induction “puerile quiddam est et precario concludit, periculo ab instantiâ contradictoriâ exposita ”: in the Cogitata et Visa, that the logicians have devised a form of induction “admodum simplicem et plane puerilem, quæ per enumerationem tantum procédât, atque propterea precario non necessario concludat ”. The clause “quas per enumerationem tantum procedat ”, which adds greatly to the distinctness of the whole sentence, is retained in the Distributio Opens, in which it is said that the induction of the logicians, “quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem, puerile quiddam est, precario concludit, et periculo ab instantiâ contradictoriâ exponitur”. To take another case: in the Partis secundæ Delineatio, Bacon, speaking of those who might object to his frequent mention of practical results as a thing unworthy of the dignity of philosophy, affirms that they hinder the accomplishment of their own wishes. “Quin etiam illis, quibus in contemplationis amorem effusis fre-quens apud nos operum mentio asperum quiddam atque ingratum et mechanicum sonat, monstrabimus quantum illi desideriis suis propriis adversentur, quum puritas contemplationum atque substructio et inventio operum prorsus eisdem rebus nitantur, ac simul perficiantur.” In the Cogitata et Visa, this sentence recurs in a modified and much neater form:—“Si quis autem sit cui in contemplationis amorem et venerationem effuso ista operum frequens et cum tanto honore mentio quiddam asperum et ingratum sonet, is pro certo sciât se propriis desideriis adversari; etenim in naturâ, opera non tantum vitæ beneficia, sed et veritatis pignora esse”. On comparing these two sentences, it is difficult to believe that Bacon would have omitted the antithesis with which the latter ends in order to introduce the somewhat cumbrous expressions which correspond to it in the former, especially as we find this antithesis reproduced, though with another context, in the Novum Organum. “Opera ipsa,” it is there said, “pluris facienda sunt quatenus sunt veritatis pignora quam propter vitæ commoda”¹⁸.

These instances will probably be thought sufficient to justify us in concluding that the Partis secundæ Delineatio, in which no mention is made of the plan of setting forth the new method of induction by means of an example, is of earlier date than the Cogitata et Visa, in which this plan, actually employed in the Novum Organum, is spoken of as that which Bacon had decided on adopting. This question of priority is not without interest; for if the Partis secundæ Delineatio is anterior to the Cogitata et Visa, the general plan of the Instauratio must have been formed a considerable time before 1607, about which time Bacon probably commenced the composition of the Novunt Organum. If we could determine the date of Valerius Terminus, we should be able to assign limits within which the formation of this plan, so far as relates to the division of the work into six portions, may be supposed to lie. For the first book of Valerius Terminus was to include all that was to precede the exposition of the new method of induction, which was to be the subject of the second; that is, it was to comprehend, along with the first part of the Instauratio ¹⁹, the general reflexions and precepts which form the subject of the first book of the Novum Organum. Nor does it appear that Valerius Terminus was to contain anything corresponding to the last four parts of the Instauratio ²⁰; it was a work, as its title ²¹ shows, on the Interpretation of Nature; that is, it was to be a statement of Bacon's method, without professing either to give the collection of facts to which the method was to be applied, or the results thereby obtained. Unfortunately, there appears to be no evidence tending to enable us to assign the time at which (or not long after it) Valerius Terminus was written. That it is earlier than the Advancement of Learning seems to follow from the circumstance that Bacon, when he wrote it, designed to include in a single chapter the general survey of human knowledge which in the Advancement is developed into two books ²². Bacon has on all occasions condemned epitomes, and it is therefore altogether improbable that after writing the Advancement of Learning he would have endeavoured to compress its contents, or even those of the second book, within the limits proposed in Valerius Terminus. On the other hand, we may suppose that before writing the Advancement he had not seen how much he had to say on the subject to which it relates. We may conclude therefore, on these and other grounds, that Valerius Terminus was written some time before 1605; how much before cannot be known; but as by comparing the Partis secundæ Delineatio and the Cogitata et Visa with the Novum Organum we have seen reason to conclude that the general plan of the Instauratio was formed before Bacon had decided on propounding his method by means of an example, so by comparing the first-named of these three works with Valerius Terminus, we perceive that the idea of the work on the Interpretation of Nature, that is, on the new method of induction, was anterior in Bacon's mind to that of the Instauratio.

And this conclusion is confirmed by all we know of Bacon's early writings. In the earliest of all (if we assume that the Temporis Partus Masculus, published by Gruter ²³, is the same as the Temporis Partus Maximus mentioned by Bacon in his letter to Fulgenzio), the most prominent notion is that true science consists in the interpretation of Nature—a phrase by which Bacon always designates a just method of induction. But nothing is said either there or in any early fragment whereby we are led to suppose that Bacon then thought of producing a great work like the Instauratio. On the contrary, in the De Interpretatione Naturæ Proæmium he proposes to communicate his peculiar method and the results to which it was to lead, only to chosen followers; giving to the world merely an exoteric doctrine, namely the general views of science which afterwards formed the substance of the Cogitata et Visa and ultimately of the first book of the Novum Organum ²⁴.

From what has been said it follows that we should form an inadequate con-ception of the Novum Organum if we were to regard it merely as a portion of the Instauratio. For it contains the central ideas of Bacon's system, of which the whole of the Instauratio is only the developement. In his early youth Bacon formed the notion of a new method of induction, and from that time forth this notion determined the character of all his speculations. Later in life he laid the plan of a great work, within the limits of which the materials to which his method was to be applied and the results thereby to be obtained might be stored up, together with a statement of the method itself. But of this great plan the interpretation of Nature was, so to speak, the soul,—the formative and vivifying principle; not only because Bacon conceived that the new method only could lead to the attainment of the great ends which he had in view, but also because it was the possession of this method which had suggested to him the hopes which he entertained ²⁵. There seems some reason to believe that his confidence in his peculiar method of induction did not increase as he grew older; that is to say, he admits in the Novum Organum that the interpretation of Nature is not so much an artificial process as the way in which the mind would naturally work if the obstacles whereby it is hindered in the pursuit of truth were once set aside ²⁶. So that his precepts are, he says, not of absolute necessity: “necessitatem ei (arti interpretationis scilicet) ac si absque eâ nil agi possit, aut etiam perfec-tionem non attribuimus,”—an admission not altogether in the spirit of the earlier writings in which the art of interpretation is spoken of as a secret of too much value to be lightly revealed ²⁷.

If it be asked why Bacon determined on propounding his method by means of an example, the answer is to be sought for in the last paragraphs of the Cogitata el Visa. He seems to have thought that it would thus obtain a favourable reception, because its value would be to a certain extent made manifest by the example itself. Likewise he hoped in this way to avoid all occasion of dispute and controversy, and thought that an example would be enough to make his meaning understood by all who were capable of understanding it. “Fere enim se in eâ esse opinione,nempe (quod quispiam dixit) prudentibus hæc satis fore, imprudentibus autem ne plura quidem.”

His expectations have not been fulfilled, for very few of those who have spoken of Bacon have understood his method, or have even attempted to explain its distinguishing characteristics, namely the certainty of its results, and its power of reducing all men to one common level.

Another reason for the course which he followed may not improbably have been that he was more or less conscious that he could not demonstrate the validity, or at least the practicability, of that which he proposed. The fundamental principle in virtue of which alone a method of exclusions can necessarily lead to a positive result, namely that the subject matter to which it is applied consists of a finite number of elements, each of which the mind can recognise and distinguish from the rest, cannot, it is manifest, be for any particular case demonstrated à priori. Bacon's method in effect assumes that substances can always be resolved into an aggregation of a certain number of abstract qualities, and that their essence is adequately represented by the result of this analysis. Now this assumption or postulate cannot be made the subject of a direct demonstra-tion, and probably Bacon came gradually to perceive more or less the difficulties which it involves. But these difficulties are less obvious in special cases than when the question is considered generally, and on this account Bacon may have decided to give instead of a demonstration of his method an example of its use. He admits at the close of the example that the operation of the method is imperfect, saying that at first it could not but be so, and implying that its defects would be removed when the process of induction had been applied to rectify our notions of simple natures. He thus seems to be aware of the inherent defect of his method, namely that it gives no assistance in the formation of conceptions, and at the same time to hope that this would be corrected by some modification of the inductive process. But of what nature this modification is to be he has nowhere stated; and it is to be remarked that in his earliest writings the difficulty here recognised is not even mentioned. In Valerius Terminus nothing is said of the necessity of forming correct notions of simple natures,—the method of exclusions then doubtless appearing to contain all that is necessary for the investigation of Nature.

Bacon may also have been influenced by other considerations. We have seen that he was at first unwilling that his peculiar method should become generally known. In the De Interpretations Naturæ Proæmium he speaks of its being a thing not to be published, but to be communicated orally to certain persons ²⁸. In Valerius Terminus his doctrine was to be veiled in an abrupt and obscure style²⁹, such as, to use his own expression, would choose its reader,—that is, would remain unread except by worthy recipients of its hidden meaning. This affected obscurity appears also in the Temporis Partus Masculus. In this un-willingness openly to reveal his method Bacon coincided with the common feeling of his own and earlier times. In the middle ages no new discovery was freely published. All the secrets, real or pretended, of the alchemists were concealed in obscure and enigmatic language; and to mention a well-known instance, the anagram in which Roger Bacon is supposed to have recorded his knowledge of the art of making gunpowder is so obscure, that its meaning is even now more or less doubtful. In Bacon's own time one of the most remarkable discoveries of Galileo—that of the phases of Venus—was similarly hidden in an anagram, though the veil in this case was more easily seen through. This disposition to conceal scientific discoveries and methods is connected with the views which in the middle ages were formed of the nature of science. To know that which had previously been unknown was then regarded as the result not so much of greater industry or acuteness as of some fortunate accident, or of access to some hidden source of information: it was like finding a concealed treasure, of which the value would be decreased if others were allowed to share in it. Moreover the love of the marvellous inclined men to believe in the existence of wonderful secrets handed down by tradition from former ages, and any new discovery acquired something of the same mysterious interest by being kept back from the know-ledge of the vulgar. Other causes, which need not here be detailed, increased this kind of reserve; such as the dread of the imputation of unlawful knowledge, the facility which it gave to deception and imposture, and the like.

The manner in which Bacon proposed at one time to perpetuate the knowledge of his method is also in accordance with the spirit of the middle ages. In the writings of the alchemists we meet continually with stories of secrets trans-mitted by their possessor to one or more disciples. Thus Artefius records the conversation wherein his master, Boemund, transmitted to him the first principles of all knowledge; and it is remarkable that in this and similar cases the disciple is called “mi fili ” by his instructor—a circumstance which shows from what source Bacon derived the phrase “ad fllios,” which appears in the titles of several of his early pieces. Even in the De Augmentis the highest and most effectual form of scientific teaching is called the “methodus ad filios ”³⁰.

When he wrote the Cogitata et Visa, Bacon seems to have perceived ³¹ how much of vanity and imposture had always been mixed up with this affectation of concealment and reserve. “Reperit autem”, he there says, “homines in rerum scientiâ quam sibi videntur adepti, interdum proferendâ interdum occultandâ, famæ et ostentationi servire; quin et eos potissimum qui minus solida proponunt, solere ea quæ afferunt obscurâ et ambiguâ luce venditare, ut facilius vanitati suæ velificare possint”. The matter which he has in hand, he goes on to say, is one which it were nowise fitting to defile by affectation or vain glory; but yet it cannot be forgotten that inveterate errors, like the delusions of madmen, are to be overcome by art and subtlety, and are always exasperated by violence and opposition. The result of this kind of dilemma is that the method is to be propounded in an example,—a decision in which it is probable that he was still more or less influenced by the example of those whom he here condemns.

Thus much of the connection between the plan of the Novum Organum and that which Bacon laid down in the Cogitata et Visa. That there is no didactic exposition of his method in the whole of his writings has not been sufficiently remarked by those who have spoken of his philosophy; probably because what he himself regarded as a sort of exoteric doctrine, namely the views of science contained in the first book of the Novum Organum, have received much more attention than the method itself, which is nevertheless the cardinal point of his whole system. Bacon is to be regarded, not as the founder of a new philosophy, but as the discoverer of a new method; at least we must remember that this was his own view of himself and of his writings.

I proceed to give some account of the structure of the Novum Organum and of the parts into which it may be most conveniently divided.

After the preface, in which Bacon professes that it is not his intention to destroy the received philosophy, but rather that from henceforth there should be two coexisting and allied systems,—the one sufficient for the ordinary purposes of life, and such as would satisfy those who are content with probable opinions and commonly received notions; the other for the sons of science, who desire to attain to certainty and to an insight into the hidden things of Nature,—we come to the Novum Organum itself; which commences with some weighty sentences concerning the relation of Man to Nature. The first aphorism, perhaps the most often quoted sentence in the Novum Organum, occurs twice in the fragments published by Gruter; namely in the A phorismi et Consilia de Auxiliis Mentis, and again in a less perfect form in the De Interpretatione Naturæ Sententiæ XII., both which fragments are included [by M. Bouillet] ³² under the title Temporis Partus Mas-culus, though they are clearly of different dates. The wording of the aphorism in the former is almost precisely the same as in the Novum Organum. In all three places man is styled “naturæ minister et interpres”. He is naturæ interpres, because in every object which is presented to him there are two things to be considered, or rather two aspects of the same thing,—one the phenomenon which Nature presents to the senses—the other the inward mechanism and action, of which the phenomenon in question is not only the result but also the outward sign. To pass therefore from the phenomenon to its hidden cause is to interpret the signs which enable us to become acquainted with the operations of Nature. Again, he is the minister naturæ, because in all his works he can only arrange the things with which he deals in the order and form which Nature requires. All the rest comes from her only; the conditions she requires having been fulfilled, she produces new phenomenon according to the laws of her own action. Thus the two words minister and interpres refer respectively to works and contemplation— to power and knowledge—the substance of Bacon's theory of both being compressed into a single phrase. The third and fourth aphorisms are developments of the first; the second relating not to the theory of knowledge, but to the necessity of providing helps for the understanding.

Then follow (5–10) reflections on the sterility of the existing sciences, and (11–17) remarks on the inutility of logic. In (14.) Bacon asserts that everything must depend on a just method of induction. From (18) to (37) he contrasts the only two ways in which knowledge can be sought for; namely anticipations of Nature and the interpretation of Nature. In the former method men pass at once from particulars to the highest generalities, and thence deduce all intermediate propositions; in the latter they rise by gradual induction and successively, from particulars to axioms of the lowest generality, then to intermediate axioms, and so ultimately to the highest. And this is the true way, but as yet untried.

Then from (38) to (68) Bacon developes the doctrine of idols. It is to be re-marked that he uses the word idolon in antithesis to idea, the first place where it occurs being the twenty-third aphorism. “Non levé quiddam interest”, it is there said, “inter humanæ mentis idola et divinæ mentis ideas”. He nowhere refers to the common meaning of the word, namely the image of a false god. Idols are with him “placita quædam inania”, or more generally, the false notions which have taken possession of men's minds. The doctrine of idols stands [he says] in the same relation to the interpretation of Nature, as the doctrine of fallacies to ordinary logic.

Of idols Bacon enumerates four kinds,—the idols of the tribe, of the cave, of the market-place, and of the theatre; and it has been supposed that this classification is borrowed from Roger Bacon, who in the beginning of the Opus Majus speaks of four hindrances whereby men are kept back from the attainment of true knowledge. But this supposition is for several reasons improbable. The Opus Majus was not printed until the eighteenth century, and it is unlikely that Francis Bacon would have taken the trouble of reading it, or any part of it, in manuscript ³³. In the first place there is no evidence in any part of his works of this kind of research, and in the second he had no high opinion of his namesake, of whom he has spoken with far less respect than he deserves. The only work of Roger Bacon's which there is any good reason for believing that he was acquainted with is a tract on the art of prolonging life, which was published at Paris in 1542, and of which an English translation appeared in 1617. The general resemblance between the spirit in which the two Bacons speak of science and of its improvement is, notwithstanding what has sometimes been said, but slight. Both no doubt complain that sufficient attention has not been paid to observation and experiment, but that is all; and these complaints may be found in the writings of many other men, especially in the time of Francis Bacon. Nothing is more clear than that the essential doctrines of his philosophy—among which that of idols is to be reckoned—are, so far as he was aware, altogether his own. There is moreover but little analogy between his idols and his namesake's hindrances to knowledge. The principle of classification is altogether different, and the notion of a real connection between the two was probably suggested simply by there being the same number of idols as of hindrances³⁴. It is therefore well to remark that in the early form of the doctrine of idols there were only three. In the Partis secundæ Delineatio the idols wherewith the mind is beset are said to be of three kinds: they either are inherent and innate or adscititious; and if the latter, arise either from received opinions in philosophy or from wrong principles of demonstration. This classification occurs also in Valerius Terminus ³⁵.

The first of these three classes corresponds to the first and second of those spoken of in the Novum Organum. The idols of the tribe are those which belong, as Aristotle might have said, to the human mind as it is human,—the erroneous tendencies common more or less to all mankind. The idols of the cave arise from each man's mental constitution: the metaphor being suggested by a passage in the [opening of the seventh book of Plato's Republic ³⁶.] Both classes of extraneous idols mentioned in the Partis secundæ Delineatio are included in the idola theatri, and the idola fori correspond to nothing in the earlier classification ³⁷. They also are extraneous idols, but result neither from received opinions nor erroneous forms of demonstration, but from the influence which words of necessity exert. They are called idols of the market-place because they are caused by the daily intercourse of common life. “Verba,” remarks Bacon, “ex captu vulgi imponuntur.”

It is only when we compare the later with the earlier form of the doctrine of idols that we perceive the principle of classification which Bacon was guided by, namely the division of idols according as they come from the mind itself or from without ³⁸. In the Novum Organum two belong to the former class and two to the latter, so that the members of the classification are better balanced ³⁹ than in the previous arrangement: in both perhaps we perceive a trace of the dichotomizing principle of Ramus, one of the seeming novelties which he succeeded in making popular ⁴⁰.

After enumerating the four kinds of idols, Bacon gives instances of each (45–67); and speaking in (62) of idols of the theatre, introduces a triple classification of false philosophies, to which he seems to have attached much importance, as we find it referred to in many parts of his writings. False philosophy is sophistical, empirical, or superstitious; sophistical, when it consists of dialectic subtleties built upon no better foundation than common notions and every-day observation; empirical, when it is educed out of a few experiments, however accurately examined; and superstitious, when theological traditions are made its basis. In the Cogitata et Visa he compares the rational philosophers (that is, those whose system is sophistical,—the name implying that they trust too much to reason and despise observation) to spiders whose webs are spun out of their own bodies, and the empirics to the ant which simply lays up its store and uses it. Whereas the true way is that of the bee, which gathers its materials from the flowers of the field and of the garden, and then, ex propriâ facultate, elaborates and transforms them ⁴¹. The third kind of false philosophy is not here mentioned. In the Novum Organum Bacon perhaps intended particulaly to refer to the Mosaical philosophy of Fludd, who is one of the most learned of the Cabalistic writers⁴².

In (69) Bacon speaks of faulty demonstrations as the defences and bulwarks of idols, and divides the common process for the establishment of axioms and conclusions into four parts, each of which is defective. He here describes in general terms the new method of induction. In the next aphorism, which concludes this part of his object, he condemns the way in which experimental researches have commonly been carried on.

The doctrine of idols seems, when the Novum Organum was published, to have been esteemed one of its most important portions. Mersenne at least, the earliest critic on Bacon's writings, his Certitude des Sciences having been published in 1625 ⁴³, speaks of the four idols, or rather of Bacon's remarks upon them, as the four buttresses of his philosophy. In Bacon's own opinion this doctrine was of much importance. Thus in the De Interpretations Naturæ Senientiæ Duodecim he says, in the abrupt style of his earlier philosophical writings, “Qui primum et ante alia omnia animi motus humani penitus non explorant, ibique seietiæ matus et errorum sedes accuratissime descriptas non habuerit, is omnia larvata et veluti incantata reperiet; fascinum ni solvent interpretari non potent “⁴⁴.

From (71) to (78) he speaks of the signs and, tokens whereby the defects and worthlessness of the received sciences are made manifest. The origin of these sciences, the scanty fruits they have borne, the little progress they have made, all testify against them; as likewise the confessions of the authors who have treated of them, and even the general consent with which they have been received. “Pessimum,” says Bacon, “omnium est augurium, quod ex consensu capitur in rebus intellectualibus ” ⁴⁵.

From (78) to (92) Bacon speaks of the causes of the errors which have hind-ered the progress of science; intending thereby to show that there is no reason to doubt the value of the reform which he is about to propose, because though in itself seemingly plain and obvious it has nevertheless remained so long unthought of. On the contrary, there is, he affirms, good reason for being surprised that even now any one should have thought of it.

The first of these causes is the comparative shortness of the periods which, out of the twenty-five centuries which intervene between Thales and Bacon's own time, have been really favourable to the progress of science. The second, that even during the more favourable times natural philosophy, the great mother of the sciences, has been for the most part neglected; men having of late chiefly busied themselves with theology, and among the Greeks and Romans with moral philosophy, “quæ ethnicis vice theologiæ erat”. Moreover, even when men occupied themselves the most with natural philosophy (Bacon refers to the age of the early Greek physicists), much time was wasted through controversies and vain glory. . Again, even those who have bestowed pains upon natural philosophy have seldom, especially in these latter times, given themselves wholly up to it. Thus, natural philosophy having been neglected and the sciences thereby severed from their root, it is no wonder that their growth has been stopped.

Another cause of their scanty progress, is that their true end, the benefit and relief of man's estate, has not been had in remembrance. This error Bacon speaks of in the Advancement as the greatest of all, coupling however therewith the relief of man's estate the glory of the Creator. Again, the right path for the advancement of knowledge has not only been neglected but blocked up, men having come not only to neglect experience but also to despise it. Also the reverence for antiquity has hindered progress; and here Bacon repeats the remark he had made in the Advancement, that antiquity was the world's youth, and the latter times its age ⁴⁶.

Again, the progress of science has been hindered by too much respect for what has been already accomplished. And this has been increased by the appearance of completeness which systematic writers on science have given to their works, and also by the vain and boastful promises of some who have pretended to reform philosophy. Another reason why more has not been accomplished, is that so little has been attempted.

To these hindrances Bacon adds three others,—superstitious bigotry, the constitution of schools, universities, and colleges, and the lack of encouragement; and then concludes this part of the subject with that which he affirms to have been the greatest obstacle of all, namely despair of the possibility of progress. To remove this, he goes on to state the grounds of hope for the future,—a discussion which extends from (93) to (115).

“Principium autem,” he begins, “sumendum a Deo ”; that is to say, the excellence of the end proposed is in itself an indication that the matter in hand is from God, nor is the prophecy of Daniel concerning the latter times to be omitted, namely that many shall go to and fro and knowledge shall be increased. Again, the errors committed in time past are a reason for hoping better things in the time to come. He therefore sets forth these errors at some length (95–107). This enumeration begins with the passage already mentioned [as occurring in the Co-gitata et Visa], in which the true method is spoken of as intermediate to those of the dogmatici or rationales, and of the empirici. There will be, he concludes, good ground for hope when the experimental and reasoning faculties are more intimately united than they have ever yet been. So likewise when natural philosophy ceases to be alloyed with matter extraneous to it, and when any one can be found content to begin at the beginning and, putting aside all popularly received notions and opinions, to apply himself afresh to experiences and particulars. And here Bacon introduces an illustration which he has also employed elsewhere, com-paring the regeneration of the sciences to the exploits of Alexander, which were at first esteemed portentous and more than human, and yet afterwards it was Livy's judgment that he had done no more than despise a vain show of difficulty. Bacon then resumes his enumeration of the improvements which are to be made, each of which will be a ground of hope. The first is a better natural history than has yet been composed; and it is to be observed that a natural history which is designed to contain the materials for the instauration of philosophy differs essentially from a natural history which has no such ulterior end: the chief difference is, that an ordinary natural history does not contain the experimental results furnished by the arts. In the second place, among these results themselves there is a great lack of experimenta lucifera, that is of experiments which, though not practically useful, yet serve to give light for the discovery of causes and axioms: hitherto men have busied themselves for the most part with expérimenta fructifera, that is experiments of use and profit. Thirdly, experimental researches must be conducted orderly and according to rule and law, and not as hitherto in a desultory and irregular manner. Again, when the materials required have been collected, the mind will not be able to deal with them without assistance and memoriter: all discoveries ought to be based upon written records— “nulla nisi de scripto inventio probanda est”. This is what Bacon calls experientia literata ⁴⁷, his meaning apparently being that out of the storehouse of natural history all the facts connected with any proposed subject of investigation should be extracted and reduced to writing before anything else is done. Furthermore, all these facts must not only be reduced to writing, but arranged tabularly. In dealing with facts thus collected and arranged, we are to regard them chiefly as the materials for the construction of axioms, our path leading us upwards from particulars to axioms, and then downwards from axioms to works; and the ascent from particulars to axioms must be gradual, that is axioms of a less degree of generality must always be established before axioms of a higher. Again a new form of induction is to be introduced; for induction by simple enumeration is childish and precarious. But true induction analyses nature by rejections and exclusions, and concludes affirmatively after a sufficient number of negatives. And our greatest hope rests upon this way of induction. Also the axioms thus established are to be examined whether they are of wider generality than the particulars employed in their construction, and if so, to be verified by comparing them with other facts, “per novorum particularium designationem ⁴⁸, quasi fide-jussione quâdam”. Lastly, the sciences must be kept in connection with natural philosophy.

Bacon then goes on (108–114) to state divers grounds of hope derived from other sources than those of which he has been speaking, namely, the errors hitherto committed. The first is that without any method of invention men have made certain notable discoveries; how many more, then, and greater, by the method now to be proposed. Again, of discoveries already made, there are many which before they were made would never have been conceived of as possible, which is a reason for thinking that many other things still remain to be found out of a nature wholly unlike any hitherto known. In the course of ages these too would doubtless some time or other come to light; but by a regular method of discovery they will be made known far more certainly and in far less time,—propere et subito et simul. Bacon mentions particularly, as discoveries not likely to have been thought of beforehand, gun-powder, silk, and the mariner's compass; remarking that if the conditions to be fulfilled had been stated, men would have sought for something far more akin than the reality to things previously known in the case of gun-powder, if its effects only had been described, they would have thought of some modification of the battering-ram or the catapult, and not of an expansive vapour; and so in the other cases. He also mentions the art of printing as an invention perfectly simple when once made, and which nevertheless was only made after a long course of ages. Again, we may gain hope from seeing what an infinity of pains and labour men have bestowed on far less matters than that now in hand, of which if only a portion were given to the advancement of sound and real knowledge, all difficulties might be overcome. This remark Bacon makes with reference to his natural and experimental history, which he admits will be a great and royal work, and of much labour and cost. But the number of particulars to be observed ought not to deter us; on the contrary, if we consider how much smaller it is than that of the figments of the understanding, we shall find even in this grounds for hope. To these figments, commenta ingenii, the phænomena of Nature and the arts are but a mere handful. Some hope too, Bacon thinks, may be derived from his own example; for if, though of weak health, and greatly hindered by other occupations, and moreover in this matter altogether “protopirus ” and following no man's track nor even communicating these things with any, he has been able somewhat to advance therein, how much may not be hoped for from the conjoined and successive labours of men at leisure from all other business? Lastly, though the breeze of hope from that new world were fainter than it is, still it were worth while to follow the adventure, seeing how great a reward success would bring.

And here (115), Bacon says, concludes the pulliug-down part, pars destruens, of the Instauration. It consists of three confutations; namely, of the natural working of the mind, of received methods of demonstration, and of received theories or philosophies. In this division we perceive the influence of the first form of the doctrine of Idols. As the Novum Organum now stands, the pars destruens cannot be divided into three portions, each containing one of the confutations just mentioned. Thus, for instance, the doctrine of Idols, which undoubtedly forms a distinct section of the whole work, relates to all three. Errors natural to the mind, errors of demonstration, errors of theory, are all therein treated of; and Bacon then goes on to another part of the subject, in which, though from a different point of view, they are all again considered. The sort of cross division here introduced is explained by a passage in the Partis secunda Delineatio, in which the doctrine of Idols is introduced by the remark, “Pars destruens triplex est secundum triplicem naturam idolorum quæ mentem obsident”. And then, after dividing idols into the three classes already mentioned, he proceeds thus:— “Itaque pars ista quam destruentem appellamus tribus redargutionibus absol-vitur, redargutione philosophiarum, redargutione demonstrationum, et redar-gutione rationis humanæ nativæ”. When the doctrine of Idols was thrown into its present form it ceased to afford a convenient basis for the pars destruens; and accordingly the substance of the three redargutiones is in the Novum Orgamim less systematically set forth than Bacon purposed that it should be when he wrote the Partis secundæ Delineatio ⁴⁹. It is to be remarked that Redargutio Philoso-phiarum is the title of one of the chapters in the third and last of the tracts published by Gruter with the title Temporis Partus Masculus ⁵⁰, and that it is also the title of a tract published [by Stephens in 1734, and reprinted] by Mallet [in 1760 ⁵¹], and evidently of a later date than the other of the same name.

From (116) to (128) Bacon endeavours to obviate objections and unfavourable opinions of his design. In the first place he plainly declares that he is no founder of a sect or school,—therein differing from the ancient Greeks, and from certain new men, namely Telesius, Patricius, and Severinus. Abstract opinions on nature and first principles are in his judgment of no great moment. Nor again does he promise to mankind the power of accomplishing any particular or special works —for with him works are not derived from works nor experiments from experiments, but causes and axioms are derived from both, and from these new works and experiments are ultimately deduced; and at present the natural history of which he is in possession is not sufficient for the purposes of legitimate interpretation, (hat is, for the establishment of axioms. Again, that his Natural History and Tables of Invention are not free from errors, which at first they cannot be, is not a matter of much importance. These errors, if not too numerous, will readily be corrected when causes and axioms have been discovered, just as errors in a manuscript or printed book are easily corrected by the meaning of the passage in which they occur. Again, it may be said that the Natural History contains many commonplace things; also many things mean and sordid; and lastly many things too subtle to be of any use. To this a threefold answer is to be given. In the first place, rare and notable things cannot be understood, much less new things brought to light, unless the causes of common things and their causes' causes be duly examined and searched out. Secondly, whatever is worthy of existence is also worthy to be known; for knowledge represents and is the image of existence. Lastly, things apparently useless are in truth of the greatest use. No one will deny that light is useful, though it is not tangible or material. And the accurate knowledge of simple natures is as light, and gives access to all the secrets on which works depend, though in itself it is of no great use.

Again it may bo thought a hard saying that all sciences and authors are at once to be set aside together. But in reality this is both a more modest censure and one that carries with it a greater show of reason than any partial condemnation. It implies only that the errors hitherto committed are fundamental, and that they have not been corrected because as yet they have not been sufficiently examined. It is no presumption if any man asserts that he can draw a circle more truly with a pair of compasses than another can without; and the new method puts men's understandings nearly on the same level, because everything is to be done by definite rules and demonstrations. Bacon anticipates also another objection, that he has not assigned to the sciences their true and highest aim; which is the contemplation of truth,—not works, however great or useful. He affirms that he values works more inasmuch as they are signs and evidences of truth than for their practical utility It may also, he continues, be alleged that the method of the ancients was in reality the same as ours, only that after they had constructed the edifice of the sciences they took away the scaffolding. But this is refuted both by what they themselves say of their method ⁵², and by what is seen of it in their writings. Again he affirms that he does not inculcate, as some might suppose, a ⁵³ [final suspension of judgment, as if the mind were incapable of knowing anything; that if he enjoins caution and suspense it is not as doubting the competency of the senses and understanding, but for their better information and guidance; that the method of induction which he proposes is applicable not only to what is called natural philosophy, as distinguished from logic, ethics, and politics, but to every department of knowledge; the aim being to obtain an insight into the nature of things by processes varied according to the conditions of the subject; and that in declaring that no great progress can be expected either in knowledge of truth or in power of operation by the methods of inquiry hitherto employed, he means no disrespect to the received arts and sciences, but fully recognises them as excellent in their proper place and use, and would have them honoured and cultivated accordingly.

These explanations,—together with some remarks (129), by way of encouragement to followers and fellow-labourers, on the dignity, importance, and grandeur of the end in view,—bring the preliminary considerations to a close, and clear the way for the exposition of the art of interpretation itself; which is commenced, but not completed, in the second book. What this art was, has been fully discussed in the general preface, and it is not necessary therefore to follow the subject further here. Only it is important to remark that whatever value Bacon may have attached to it, he certainly did not at this time profess to consider it either as a thing absolutely necessary, or even as the thing most necessary, for any real progress in science. In the concluding aphorism of the first book he distinctly warns the reader that the precepts which he is about to give, though he believes them to be very useful and sound, and likely to prove a great help, are not offered either as perfect in themselves or as so indispensable that nothing can be done without them. Three things only he represents as indispensable: 1st, ut “justam naturæ et experiential historiam præsto haberent homines atque in eâsedulo versarentur; ” 2nd, “ut receptas opiniones et notiones deponerent; ” 3rd, “ut mentem a generalissimis et proximis ab illis ad tempus cohiberent”. These three conditions being secured, the art of interpretation (being indeed the true and natural operation of the mind when freed from impediments) might, he thinks, suggest itself without a teacher: “fore ut etiam vi propriâ et genuinâ mentis, absque aliâ arte, in formam nostram interpretandi incidere possent; est enim interpretatio verum et naturale opus mentis, demptis iis quæ obstant ”: an admission which helps to account for the fact that during the five years which he afterwards devoted to the development of his philosophy, he applied himself almost exclusively to the natural history; leaving the exposition of his method of interpretation still incomplete. For it cannot be denied that, among the many things which remained to be done, the setting forward of the Natural History was, according to this view, the one which stood next in order of importance. In furtherance of the two other principal requisites, he had already done what he could. Every motive by which men could be encouraged to lay prejudices aside, and refrain from premature generalisations, and apply themselves to the sincere study of Nature, had already been laid before them. It remained to be seen whether his exhortations would bring other labourers into the field; but in the mean time the question lay between the completion of the Novum Organum, which was not indispensable, and the commencement of the collection of a Natural History, which was; and when he found that other labourers did not come forward to help, he naturally applied himself to the latter.]

¹ Mr. Ellis's preface to the Novum Organum was written when he was travelling abroad and had not his books of reference about him. He was at work upon it the night he was taken ill at Mentone, and was not afterwards able either to finish or to revise it. I have added a page or two at the end, by which the analysis of the first book is completed. Of the second book it was not necessary to say anything; the subject of it being Bacon's method, which has been fully discussed in the General Preface. A few bibliographical inaccuracies of little consequence in themselves l have corrected, either in notes or by the insertion of words within brackets. These were merely oversights, hardly avoidable in the first draft of a work written in such circumstances. But there are also a few opinions expressed incidentally in which I cannot altogether concur, though they have evidently been adopted deliberately. With regard to these (Mr. Ellis not being in a condition to enter into a discussion of them) I had no course but to explain the grounds of my dissent, and leave every man to decide for himself upon the questions at issue. To avoid inconvenient interruptions however, I have thrown my arguments into an appendix, and contented myself in the foot notes with marking the particular expressions which I hold to be questionable.—J. S.

² Francisci Baconi de Verulamio Scripta in naturali et universali Philosophia. Amst. 1653—J. S.

³ Œuvres Philosophiques de Bacon, publiées d'après les textes originaux, avec notice, sommaires et éclaircissemens, par M. N. Bouillet. Paris, 1834.—J. S.

⁴ See the Preface to the Descriptio Globi inlellectualis.—J.S.

⁵ That the De Fluxu was written before the Thema Cæli is almost proved by the allusion to it in the following passage: “Verum hujusce rei demonstrationes et evidentias in anticipatione nostrâ de fluxu et refluxu maris plene tractavimus ”. I say almost proved, because Bacon in writing a piece which was designed to come after another which was not yet written, would sometimes refer to that other as if it were already done. But it is not likely that he should have done so here; for in any general scheme the Thema Cæli would have come before the De Fluxu. In a letter to Bacon, dated 14th April 1619, Tobie Matthew speaks of Galileo's having answered Bacon's discourse touching the flux and reflux of the sea: but he alludes apparently to a discourse of Galileo's on that subject which had never been printed.—J. S.

⁶ The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, etc.; methodised and made English from the Originals, by Peter Shaw, M.D., London, 1733.—J. S.

⁷ I doubt whether this argument can be safely relied upon. Among the works which were certainly meant to stand as part of the Instauratio several remarkable passages occur twice and more than twice. But there are other grounds for concluding that the Inquisitio de Motu was written soon after the Cogitata et Visa (1607). In the Com-mentarius solutus, a kind of diary which will be printed among the Occasional Works, I find the following entry under the date July 26. 1608:—“The finishing the 3 tables De Motu, De Calore et Frigore, De Sono.” After which follow (July 27.) several pages of notes for an Inquisitio legitima de Motu. It would seen that this Inquisitio was designed originally to be the example in which the new method was to be set forth (see last section of Cogitata et Visa), but that the Inquisitio de Calore et Frigore was afterwards preferred; probably as more manageable.—J. S.

⁸ “The whole body of the Natural History, either designed or written by the late Lord Viscount St. Albans, was dedicated to Your Majesty in the book De Ventis, about four years past, when Your Majesty was prince, so as there needed no new dedication of this work, but only in all humbleness to let Your Majesty know that it is yours ”.— Dedication to the King of the Sylva Sylvarum,

⁹ It was probably the table De Sono referred to in the Commentarius solutus, July 26 1608 (see note 7, above), and designed, like the tables De Motu and De Calore et Frigore, for an example of the new method.—J. 5.

¹⁰ See Bouillet, vol. ii. p. 264. The preface in question is the introduction to the Tabula Exporrectionis et Expansionis Matsriæ, a rudiment of the Historia Densi et Rari. It was published by Gruter, before the Historia Densi et Rari appeared, among the Impetus Philosophici: with the title, Phænomena Universi; sive Historia Naturalis ad condendam Philosophiam. Præfatio. M. Bouillet gives the preface only.

¹¹ This would be true, I think, of all new facts which were not obviously reconcilable with laws previously known. But is it not conceivable that so complete a knowledge might be attained of the laws of Nature, that it could not be increased or affected by the discovery of any new fact in Nature? If we had as complete a knowledge of other laws of Nature as we have of gravitation, for instance, new facts would still come to light, but with respect to the laws themselves they would all say the same thing, and therefore bring no new knowledge. Every new application of mechanical power contains some new fact more or less connected with gravitation; yet unless a machine can be made which shall produce results not only new (i.e. such as had never been produced before) but inexplicable by the received theory of gravitation, are we not entitled to say that we know all that can be known about gravitation?—J. S.

¹² I should rather say, the germ of all that part of the Instauratio which treated of the Interpretation of Nature. For I cannot find in the Valerius Terminus any traces of the first part, of which the Advancement of Learning was the germ. See Note A. at the end.—J. S.

¹³ My own reasons for thinking that the De Augmentis did not form part of the original design, together with the circumstances which, as I suppose, determined Bacon to enlarge that design so as to take it in, will be explained in the preface to the De Augmentis.—J. S.

¹⁴ “Ipse reperi in archivis Dominationis suæ autographa plus minus duodecim Organi novi, de anno in annum elaborati et ad incudem revocati; et singulis annis ulteriore limâ subinde politi et castigati.” In the preceding sentence, he calls it “multorum annorum et laboris improbi proles”.—Auctoris Vita, prefixed to the Opuscula varia posthuma, 1658. In the English life prefixed to the Resusctatio, which was published the year before, he says, “I myself have seen at the least twelve copies of the Instaura-tion; revised year by year, one after another; and every year altered and amended in the frame thereof ”. I doubt whether we can fairly infer from these expressions that these twelve several copies were made in twelve several years; but substantially they bear out the inference drawn from them.—J. S.

¹⁵ In the Commentarius solutus, under date July 26. 1608, I find the following memorandum:—“Seeing and trying whether the B. of Canterb. may not be affected in it, being single and glorious, and believing the sense”.

“Not desiring to draw in the Bp. Awnd. [Bishop Andrews, probably] being single, rich, sickly, and professor to some experiments: this after the table of motion or some other in part set in forwardness.”

Some other memoranda in the same place relate to the gaining of physicians, and learning from them experiments of surgery and physic; which explains the epithet “sickly ” in the above extract.—J. S.

¹⁶ Bodley's answer is dated Feb. 19. 1607; i.e. 1607–8; in which he says, “I must tell you, to be plain, that you have very much wronged yourself and the world, to smother such a treasure so long in your coffer ”. But I do not think we can infer from this that the Cogitata et Visa had been written “some years ” before. Bodley may only allude to his having kept such thoughts so long to himself.—J. S.

¹⁷ In the Commentarius solutus, under date July 26. 1608, I find the following memorandum:—“The finishing the Aphorisms, Clavis interpretationis, and then setting forth the book,” and in the same page, a little after, “Imparting my Cogitata et Visa, with choice, ut videbitur ”. The aphorisms here spoken of may have been the “Aphorismi et Consilia de auxiliis mentis et accensione luminis naturalis ”; a fragment containing the substance of the first, second, and third aphorisms of the first book of the Novum Organum, and the first, third, and sixteenth of the second. Clavis interpretationis was probably the name which was afterwards exchanged for Novum Organum. —J. S.

¹⁸ Nov. Org. i. 124. It is well to mention that some of the expressions in this aphorism which do not occur in the Cogitata et Visa will be found in the Partis secundæ Delineatio. But it will be observed that I am only comparing passages which occur in all three works. Of the greater general resemblance of the Cogitata et Visa to the Novum Organum there can he no question.

¹⁹ Query. See Note A. at the end, § 1.—J. S.

²⁰ Query. See Note A. at the end, § 2.—J. S.

²¹ “Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature; with the Annotations of Hermes Stella. A few fragments of the first book, viz.,” etc.

²² Query. See Note A. at the end, § 1.—J. S.

²³ Say rather, “the several tracts collected by M. Bouillet under the title Temporis Partus Masculus ”. See Note A. at the end, § 3.—J. S.

²⁴ See Note A. at the end, § 4.—J. S.

²⁵ I quite agree in this, but not quite on the same grounds. In Note A. at the end of this preface, the reader will find a statement, too long for a foot-note, of such points in the foregoing argument as I consider disputable. It was the more necessary to point them out, because the arrangement of the pieces in this edition, for which I am responsible, will otherwise create a difficulty; being in some respects inconsistent with the opinions here expressed.—J. S.

²⁶ Nov. Org. i. 130. “Est enim Interpretatio verum et naturale opus mentis, demptis iis quæ obstant ”. But compare the following passage in Valerius Terminus, c. 22: “that it is true that interpretation is the very natural and direct intention, action, and progression of the understanding, delivered from impediments. And that all anticipation is but a reflexion or declination by accident ”. So that if we may infer from the passage in the Novum Organum that his confidence had abated, we must suppose that when he wrote the Valerius Terminus it had not risen to its height. But for my own part I doubt whether his opinion on this point ever changed.—J. S.

²⁷ Not, I think, as a secret of too much value to be revealed, but as an argument too abstruse to be made popular. See Note B. at the end, where I have endeavoured to bring together all the evidence upon which the presumption in the text is founded, and to show that it proves either too much or too little.—J. S.

²⁸ See Note B. at the end, extract 4th, and the concluding remarks in which I have explained my own view of the kind of reserve which Bacon at this time meditated. -J. S.

²⁹ See the same note, extract 1st. I cannot think it was by “abruptness and obscurity ” that he proposed to effect the desired separation of readers either in Valerius Terminus or in the Temporis Partus Masculus.—J. S.

³⁰ Lib. vi. c. 2. I cannot think however that the merit of this method had anything to do with secresy. For the distinctive object of it is stated to be the “continuatio et ulterior progressus ” of knowledge; and its distinctive characteristic, the being “solito apertior ”. Its aim was to transfer knowledge into the mind of the disciple in the same form in which it grew in the teacher's mind, like a plant with its roots on, that it might continue to grow. Its other name is “traditio lampadis ”, alluding to the Greek torch-race; which was run, as I understand it, not between individuals, but between what we call sides. Each side had a lighted torch they were so arranged that each bearer, as he began to slacken, handed it to another who was fresh; and the side whose torch first reached the goal, still a-light, was the winner. The term “filii ”, therefore, alludes, I think, to the successive generations, not who should inherit the secret, but who should carry on the work. Compare the remarks in the Sapientia Veterum (Fab. xxvi. near the end), upon the torch-races in honour of Prometheus. “Atque continet in se moni-tum, idque prudentissimum, ut perfectio scientiarum a successione, non ab unius alicujus pernicitate aut facultate, expectetur.…. Atque optandum esset ut isti ludi in honorem Promethei, sive humanæ naturæ, instaurarentur, atque res certamen, et æmulati-onem, et bonam fortunam reciperet; neque ex unius cujuspiam face tremulâ atque agitatâ penderet.” To me, I must confess, the explanation above given of Bacon's motives for desiring a select audience seems irreconcilable both with the objects which he certainly had in view and with the spirit in which he appears to have pursued them. “Fit audience, though few,” he no doubt desired; and I can easily believe that he wished not only to find the fit, but also to exclude the unfit. But the question is, whether his motive in so selecting and so limiting his audience was unwillingness to part with his. treasure, or solicitude for the furtherance of his work. To decide this question I have brought together all the passages in which he speaks of the “singling and adopting ” of the “fit and legitimate reader ”. But the collection, with the remarks which it suggests, being too long for a foot-note, I hav placed them at the end of this preface. See Note B.—J. S.

³¹ See Note B., extract 7th. But observe that in the 1st, 3rd, and 4th, he shows himself quite as sensible of the vanity and imposture which such secrecy had been made to subserve.—J. S.

³² Not so included by Gruter. See note A. at the end, § 3.—J. S.

³³ I can hardly think that he would have omitted to look into a work like the Opus Majus, if he had had the opportunity. But it is very probable that no copy of it was procurable; possible that he did not even know of its existence. The manner in which he speaks of Roger Bacon in the Temporis Partus Masculus, as belonging to the “utile genus “of experimentalists, “qui de theoriis non admodum soliciti mechanicâ quâdam subtilitate return inventarum extensiones prehendunt ”, seems rather to imply that he knew of him at that time chiefly by his reputation for mechanical inventions.—J. S.

³⁴ That the two may be the more conveniently compared, I have quoted Roger Bacon's exposition of his “offendicula ”, in a note upon the 39th aphorism, in which the names of the four “Idols ” first occur. How slight the resemblance is between the two may be ascertained by a very simple test. If you are already acquainted with Francis Bacon's classification, try to assign each of the “offendicula ” to its proper class. If not, try by the help of Roger's classification to find out Francis's.—J. S.

³⁵ Not in Valerius Terminus. It occurs in the Distributio Operis, and may be traced though less distinctly in the Advancement and the De Augmentis. See Note C. at the end.—J. S.

³⁶ Mr. Ellis had written “in the of Aristotle ”. But the words of the De Augmentis (v. 4)., “de specu Platonis ”, prove that it was the passage in Plato which suggested the metaphor.—J. S.

³⁷ i.e. in the classification adopted in the Partis secundæ Delineatio; for they correspond exactly with the third kind of fallacies or false appearances mentioned in the Advancement, and with the idols of the palace in Valerius Terminus. And I think they were meant to be included among the “Inhærentia et Innata ” of the Delineatio. See Note C—J. S.

³⁸ Rather, I think, as they are separable or inseparable from our nature and condition in life. See Note C.—J. .S.

³⁹ Compare the Distributio Operis, where the classification is retained, with the Novum Organum, where it is not alluded to, and I think it will be seen that Bacon did not intend to balance the members in this way. See Note C. at the end.—J. S.

⁴⁰ Bacon alludes to Ramus in the Ve Augmentis vi. 2., “De unicâ methodo et dicho-tomiis perpetuis nil attinet dicere. Fuit enim nubecula quædam doctrinæ quæ cito transiit: res certe simul et scientiis damnosissima,” etc.

⁴¹ In the Advancement of Learning and the De Augmentis, the schoolmen in particular are compared to the spider: a passage which has been misunderstood by a distinguished writer, whose judgments seem not unfrequently to be as hastily formed as they are fluently expressed, and who conceives that Bacon intended to condemn the study of psychology.

In speaking of the field and the garden, Bacon refers repectively to observations of Nature and artificial experiment; an instance of the “curiosa félicitas ” of his metaphors.

⁴² Fludd's work, entitled Philosophia Moysaica, was published in 1638.

⁴³ In the Biographie Universelle (Mersenne) it is incorrectly said that this work was published in 1636, and an idle story is mentioned that it was in reality written, not by Mersenne, but by Lord Herbert of Cherbury,—a story sufficiently refuted by its scrupulous and submissive orthodoxy.

⁴⁴ So also in the Valerius Terminus, c. 17.: “That if any have had or shall have the power and resolution to fortify and inclose his mind against all anticipations, yet if he have not been or shall not be cautioned by the full understanding of the nature of the mind and spirit of man, and therein of the seats, pores, and passages both of knowledge and error, he hath not been, nor shall not be, possibly able to guide or keep on his course aright ”.—J. S.

⁴⁵ He however excepts matters political and religious.

⁴⁶ This remark is in itself not new; we read, for instance, in the book of Esdras, that the world has lost its youth, and that the times begin to wax old. Nor is it new in the application here made of it. Probably several writers in the age which preceded Bacon's had already made it, for in that age men were no longer willing to submit to the authority of antiquity, and still felt bound to justify their dissent. Two writers may at any rate be mentioned by whom the thought is as distinctly expressed as by Bacon, namely Giordano Bruno and Otto Casmann; the former in the Cena di Cenere, the latter in the preface to his Problemata Marina, which was published in 1596, and therefore a few years later than the Cena, with which however it is not likely that Casmann was acquainted. Few writers of celebrity comparable to Bruno's appear to have been so little read.

I have quoted both passages in a note on the corresponding passage in [the first book of] the De Augmentis: that in the Cena di Cenere was first noticed by Dr. Whewell. See his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, ii. 198.

⁴⁷ “Illâ vero in usum veniente, ab experientiâ factâ demum literatâ, melius speran-dum ”. In Montagu's edition literatâ is printed incorrectly with a capital letter; which makes it seem as if the experientia facta literata here spoken of were the same as the experientia quant vocamus literatam in Aph. 103. But they are, in fact, two different things; the one being opposed to experience which proceeds without any written record of its results; the other to vaga experienlia et se tantum sequens—experience which proceeds without any method in its inquiries. See my note oa Aph. 101.—J. S.

⁴⁸ I understand designatio here to mean discovery. The test of the truth of the axiom was to be the discovery by its light of new particulars. See Valerius Terminus, ch. xii., quoted in note on Aph. 106.—J. S.

⁴⁹ I think this apparent discrepancy may be better explained. It appears to me that the number of idols was originally three,—the Tribe, the Cave, and the Market-place; all belonging to the ratio humana nativa; fallacies innate or inherent in the human understanding,—to be guarded against, but not to be got rid of; and that a fourth was added afterwards, but of quite a different kind; consisting of fallacies which have no natural affinity to the understanding, but come from without and may be turned out again; impressions derived from the systems which men have been taught to accept as true, or from the methods of demonstration which they have been taught to rely upon as conclusive. These are the Idols of the Theatre, and the sole objects of the two Redargutiones which stand first in the Delineatio, and last in the Novum Organum. If this be true, the Redargutio rationis humanæ nativæ (or I should rather say, the part of the Novum Organum which belongs to it) extends from the 40th to the 60th aphorism; and the Redargutio Philosophiarum and Demonstrationum from the 61st to the 115th. For a fuller explanation and justification of this view, see Note C.—J. S.

⁵⁰ Say rather, “is the title prefixed by M. Bouillet to the second chapter of the fragment printed by Gruter with the heading Tradendi modus legitimus ”. I cannot find that M. Bouillet had any authority for giving it this title, more than the tenor of the chapter itself, which shows that it fits.—J. S.

⁵¹ A small portion of it was printed by Gruter at the end of the Partis secundæ Delineatio [and it seems to have been the beginning of the Pars secunda itself].

⁵² I have adopted here the correction introduced into the text of the present edition.

⁵³ Mr. Ellis had written thus far when the fever seized him. The remaining pages which complete the analysis of the first book, are mine.—J. S.