Book IX.

CHAPTER I.

The Divisions of Inspired Divinity are omitted—Introduction only is made to three Deficients; namely, the Doctrine concerning the Legitimate Use of the Human Reason in Divine Subjects; the Doctrine concerning the Degrees of Unity in the Kingdom of God; and the Emanations of the Scriptures.

SEEING now, most excellent king, that my little bark, such as it is, has sailed round the whole circumference of the old and new world of sciences (with what success and fortune it is for posterity to decide), what remains but that having at length finished my course I should pay my vows? But there still remains Sacred or Inspired Divinity; whereof however if I proceed to treat I shall step out of the bark of human reason, and enter into the ship of the church; which is only able by the Divine compass rightly to direct its course. Neither will the stars of philosophy, which have hitherto so nobly shone upon us, any longer supply their light. So that on this subject also it will be as well to keep silence. I will accordingly omit the proper divisions thereof, contributing however a few remarks upon it, according to my slender ability, by way of paying my vows. And I am the more inclined to do this, because in the body of Theology I find no region or district entirely desert and uncultivated; such has been the diligence of man in sowing wheat or tares.

I will propose therefore three Appendices of Theology, which treat, not of the matter concerning which theology gives or shall give information, but only of the manner in which the information is imparted. I will not however, as in other like cases, either introduce examples or give precepts. That I will leave to theologians; for these, as I have said, are only in the place of vows.

The prerogative of God comprehends the whole man, extending to the reason as well as to the will; that man may deny himself entirely, and draw near unto God. Wherefore as we are bound to obey the divine law though we find a reluctation in our will, so are we to believe His word though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter and not to the author, which is no more than we would do to a suspected witness. But that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteousness was of such a nature that Sarah laughed at it, who therein was an image of natural reason. The more discordant therefore and incredible the Divine mystery is, the more honour is shown to God in believing it, and the nobler is the victory of faith. Nay, even sinners, the more they are oppressed in their conscience, trusting nevertheless to be saved through the mercy of God, the more do they honour Him; for all despair is a kind of reproach towards God. Howbeit, if we will truly consider it, it is more worthy to believe,than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man's mind suffers from sense, which is the reflection of things material, but in faith the spirit suffers from spirit, which is a worthier agent. Otherwise it is in the state of man glorified, for then faith shall cease, and we shall know even as we are known.

Wherefore we conclude that Sacred Theology ought to be derived from the word and oracles of God, and not from the light of nature, or the dictates of reason. For it is written, “The heavens declare the glory of God¹”, but it is nowhere written, “The heavens declare the will of God”; but of that it is said, “To the law and to the testimony; if men do not according to this word,” etc.². And this holds not only in those great mysteries which concern the Deity, the Creation, and the Redemption; but it pertains likewise to a more perfect interpretation of the moral law, “Love your enemies”; “do good to them that hate you”, and so on; “that ye may be the children of your father who is in heaven, that sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust ³”. To which words this applause may well be applied, “that they do not sound human⁴”; since it is a voice beyond the light of nature. Again, we see the heathen poets, especially when they discourse of the passions, often expostulate with laws and moral doctrines (which yet are far more easy and indulgent than the divine laws), as if they were contradictory and malignant to the liberty of nature; “What nature grants the envious laws deny⁵”. So said Dendamis the Indian to Alexander's messengers, “ That he had heard somewhat of the name of Pythagoras and some other wise men of Greece, and that he held them for excellent men; but that they had a fault, which was that they had too great reverence and veneration for a kind of phantom, which they called law and manners⁶”. Wherefore it must be confessed that a great part of the moral law is higher than the light of nature can aspire to. Nevertheless what is said, that man has by the light and law of nature some notions of virtue and vice, justice and injustice, good and evil, is most true. For we must observe that the light of nature is used in two several senses; the one, as far as it springs from sense, induction, reason, argument, according to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, as far as it flashes upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience; which is a spark and relic of his primitive and original purity. And in this latter sense chiefly does the soul partake of some light to behold and discern the perfection of the moral law, a light however not altogether clear, but such as suffices rather to reprove the vice in some measure, than to give full information of the duty. So then religion, whether considered with regard to morals or mysteries, depends on revelation from God.

The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things is manifold and very general. For it is not for nothing that the Apostle called religion, “Our reasonable service of God⁷”. If we review the types and ceremonies of the old law we see that they were full of reason and signification, differing widely from the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, which were like surds and non-significants, mostly without meaning, and not even suggestive of anything. But especially the Christian faith, as in all things, so in this is pre-eminent; holding the golden mean touching the use of reason and discussion (the child of reason) between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which embrace the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or confession; and the religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicts argument altogether; so that the one has the very face of vague and manifold error, the other of crafty and cautious imposture; whereas the holy Christian faith both admits and rejects the use of reason and disputation, but according to just limitations.

The use of human reason in matters of religion is of two sorts; the former in the explanation of the mystery, the latter in the inferences derived from it. With regard to the explanation of the mysteries, we see that God vouchsafes to descend to the weakness of our apprehension, by so expressing his mysteries that they may be most sensible to us; and by grafting his revelations upon the notions and conceptions of our reason; and by applying his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. But here we ought by no means to be wanting to ourselves; for as God uses the help of our reason to illuminate us, so should we likewise turn it every way, that we may be more capable of receiving and understanding His mysteries; provided only that the mind be enlarged, according to its capacity, to the grandeur of the mysteries, and not the mysteries contracted to the narrowness of the mind.

But with regard to inferences, we should know that there is allowed us a use of reason and argument (in regard to mysteries) secondary and respective, though not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion have been set in their true place, so as to be completely exempted from the examination of reason, it is then permitted us to derive and deduce inferences from them according to their analogy. In nature indeed this holds not. For both the principles themselves are examinable, though not by a syllogism, yet by induction; and besides, these same principles have no discordance with reason, so that the first and middle propositions are derived from the same fountain. It is otherwise in religion, where the first propositions are not only self-existent and self-supporting; but likewise unamenable to that reason which deduces consequent propositions. Nor yet does this hold in religion alone, but also in other sciences both of a greater and smaller nature; namely, wherein the primary propositions are arbitrary and not positive; for in these also there can be no use of absolute reason. For we see in games, as chess or the like, that the first rules and laws are merely positive, and at will; and that they must be received as they are, and not disputed; but how to play a skilful and winning game is scientific and rational. So in human laws there are many maxims, as they call them, which are mere Placets of Law, depending on authority rather than upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed. But what is most just, not absolutely but relatively (that is, according to these maxims), that is a matter of reason, and opens a wide field for disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason which has place in Divinity, which is grounded upon the Placets of God.

But as the use of the human reason in things divine is of two kinds, so likewise in the use there are two kinds of excess; the one when it inquires too curiously into the manner of the mystery; the other when the same authority is attached to inferences as to principles. For he may appear to be the disciple of Nicodemus who persists in asking, “How can a man be born when he is old⁸?” And he can be nowise considered the disciple of Paul who does not sometimes insert in his doctrines, “I, not the Lord”; or again, “According to my counsel⁹”; which style is generally suited to inferences. Wherefore it appears to me that it would be of especial use and benefit, if a temperate and careful treatise were instituted, which, as a kind of divine logic, should lay down proper precepts touching the use of human reason in theology. For it would act as an opiate, not only to lull to sleep the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith sometimes the schools labour, but also in some degree to assuage the fury of controversies, wherewith the church is troubled. Such a treatise I reckon among the things deficient; and call it Sophron, or The Legitimate Use of Human Reason in Divine Subjects.

It is of extreme importance to the peace of the Church, that the Christian covenant ordained by our Saviour be properly and clearly explained in those two heads, which appear somewhat discordant; whereof the one lays down, “He that is not with us is against us;” and the other, “He that is not against us is with us¹⁰.” From this it is evident that there are some articles, wherein if a man dissent he is placed beyond the pale of the covenant; but that there are others in which he may dissent, and yet remain within it. For the bonds of the Christian Communion are set down, “one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, etc.¹¹”, not one Ceremony, one Opinion. So we see the coat of our Saviour was without seam, but the garment of the church was of divers colours. The chaff should be separated from the corn in the ear, but the tares should not be pulled up from the corn in the field. Moses, when he saw the Egyptian fighting with the Israelite, did not say, “Why strive ye?” but drew his sword and slew the Egyptian¹². But when he saw the two Israelites fighting, though it were not possible for both to be in the right, yet he addresses them thus, “Ye are brethren, why strive ye?”

And therefore on these considerations it appears a thing of great use and importance, well to define what and of what latitude those points are, which disincorporate men from the Church of God, and excommunicate them from the communion of the faithful. And if any one think that this has already been done, let him think again and again, and say whether it has been done with sincerity and moderation. Meanwhile if a man talks of peace, he is very like to get the answer of Jehu to the message, (“Is it peace, Jehu?”) “What hast thou to do with peace? turn thee behind me¹³”; for it is not peace but party that most men care for. Nevertheless I have thought right to set down among the deficients a treatise on the degrees of Unity in the kingdom of God, being as a wholesome and profitable undertaking.

Since the Holy Scriptures are the principal sources of information in theology, we must especially look to their interpretation. And I am not now speaking of the authority of interpreting them, which rests in the consent of the church; but of the manner thereof; which is of two sorts; methodical and free. For this divine water, which excels so much that of Jacob's well, is drawn forth and employed much in the same manner as natural water is out of wells and fountains. For it is either first forced up into cisterns, whence it may be conveniently fetched and derived by pipes for use; or else it is poured into buckets and vessels to be used as it is wanted. The former method has in the end produced to us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity has been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of doctrines and positions have been derived and conveyed from thence to water every part. But in the free way of interpreting Scripture, there occur two excesses. The one presupposes such perfection in Scripture, that all philosophy likewise should be derived from its sources; as if all other philosophy were something profane and heathen. This distemper has principally grown up in the school of Paracelsus and some others; but the beginnings thereof came from the Rabbis and Cabalists¹⁴. But these men do not gain their object; and instead of giving honour to the Scriptures as they suppose they rather embase and pollute them. For to seek the materiate heaven and earth in the word of God, (whereof it is said, “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my word shall not pass away¹⁵”), is rashly to seek for temporary things amongst eternal; and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living among the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead among the living. The other method of interpretation which I set down as an excess, appears at the first glance sober and modest, yet in reality it both dishonours the Scriptures themselves, and is very injurious to the Church. This is (in a word), when the divinely-inspired Scriptures are explained in the same way as human writings. But we ought to remember that there are two things which are known to God the author of the Scriptures, but unknown to man; namely, the secrets of the heart, and the successions of time. And therefore as the dictates of Scripture are written to the hearts of men, and comprehend the vicissitudes of all ages; with an eternal and certain foreknowledge of all heresies, contradictions, and differing and changing estates of the Church, as well in general as of the individua 1 elect, they are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude and obvious sense of the place; or with respect to the occasion whereon the words were uttered; or in precise context with the words before or after; or in contemplation of the principal scope of the passage; but we must consider them to have in themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively also in clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrines, to water every part of the Church and the souls of the faithful. For it has been well observed that the answers of our Saviour to many of the questions which were propounded to Him do not appear to the point, but as it were impertinent thereto. The reason whereof is twofold; the one, that knowing the thoughts of his questioners not as we men do by their words, but immediately and of himself, he answered their thoughts and not their words; the other, that He did not speak only to the persons then present, but to us also now living, and to men of every age and nation to whom the Gospel was to be preached. And this also holds good in other passages of Scripture.

Having made then these prefatory remarks, I come to that treatise which I pronounce deficient. There are found indeed among theological writings too many books of controversies, a great mass of that theology which I have termed Positive, commonplaces, special tracts, cases of conscience, sermons and homilies, and many prolix commentaries upon the Scriptures. But what we want is a concise, sound, and judicious collection of annotations and observations on particular texts of Scripture; neither dilated into commonplaces, nor chasing after controversies, nor reduced into method of art, but entirely unconnected and natural. It is indeed a thing sometimes found in the more learned sermons, which for the most part do not last; but not yet introduced into books, which may be handed down to posterity. But certainly, as wines which flow gently from the first treading of the grape are sweeter than those which are squeezed out by the wine-press; because these last have some taste of the stones and skin of the grape; so those doctrines are very sweet and healthy, which flow from a gentle pressure of the Scriptures, and are not wrested to controversies or commonplaces. Such a treatise then I will denominate the Emanations of the Scriptures.

Now therefore have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world, as faithfully as I could; with a note and description of those parts which I find either not constantly occupied, or not well cultivated by the labour and industry of man. Wherein, if I have in any point receded from the opinion of the ancients, let it be understood that I have done so not from a desire of innovation or mere change, but of change for the better. For I could not be true and constant to myself or the argument I handle, if I had not determined to add as much as I could to the inventions of others; being however no less willing that my own inventions should be surpassed by posterity. But how fair I am in this matter may appear from this; that I have propounded my opinions everywhere naked and unarmed, without seeking to prejudice the liberty of men's judgments by disputes and confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am in good hope that if the first reading move a scruple or objection, the second reading will of itself make an answer. And in those things wherein it has been my lot to err, I am sure I have not prejudiced the truth by litigious arguments; which commonly have this effect, that they add authority to error, and diminish the authority of that which is well invented; for question is an honour to falsehood, but it is a repulse to honour. Meanwhile I am reminded of the sarcastic reply of Themistocles to the ambassador, who coming from a small town used great words, “Friend, (said he) your words require a city¹⁶”. And certainly it may be objected to me with truth, that my words require an age; a whole age perhaps to prove them, and many ages to perfect them. But yet as even the greatest things are owing to their beginnings, it will be enough for me to have sown a seed for posterity and the Immortal God; whose Majesty I humbly implore through His Son and our Saviour, that He will vouchsafe favourably to accept these and the like offerings of the human intellect, seasoned with religion as with salt, and sacrificed to His Glory.

APPENDIX

[The following Notes on some old treatises on the art of writing in cipher are referred to by Mr. Ellis, at p. 527, note 16.—J. S.]

THE earliest writer, I believe, on ciphers, except Trithemius whom he quotes, is John Baptist Porta, whose work De occultis literarum notis was reprinted in Strasburg in 1606. The first edition was published when Porta was a young man. The species of ciphers which Bacon mentions are described in this work. What he calls the ciphra simplex is doubtless that in which each letter is replaced by another in accordance with a secret alphabet. (Porta, ii. c. 5.) The manner of modifying this by introducing non-significants and by other contrivances is described in the following chapter. The wheel cipher is described in chapters 7, 8, 9. It is that in which the ordinary alphabet and a secret one are written respectively on the rim of two concentric disks, so that each letter of the first corresponds in each position of the second (which is movable) to a letter of the secret alphabet. Thus in each position of the movable disk we have a distinct cipher, and in using the instrument this disk is made to turn through a given angle after each letter has been written. The ciphra clavis is described by Porta, book ii. 15, 16. It is a cipher of position; that is, one in which the difficulty is obtained not by replacing the ordinary alphabet by a new one, but by deranging the order in which the letters of a sentence or paragraph succeed each other. This is done according to a certain form of words or series of numbers which constitute the key. The cipher of words was given by Trithemius and in another form by Porta, ii. 19 (and in a different shape, v. 16). It is a cipher which is meant to escape suspicion. Each letter of the alphabet corresponds to a variety of words arranged in columns. Any word of the first column followed by any of the second, and that followed by any of the third, etc., will make, with the help of a non-significant word occasionally introduced, a perfectly complete sense; and by the time the last alphabet has been used a letter on some indifferent subject has been written. Only sixty alphabets are given by Porta, and therefore the secret communication can consist only of sixty letters. It is worth remarking that when Porta wrote it was usual to put the sign of the cross at the head of an ordinary epistle. The first of his alphabets corresponds not to a series of words but to two and twenty different modifications of the figure of a cross, and his second alphabet similarly corresponds to two and twenty different modifications of the introductory flourish. His sixtieth alphabet is of the same kind. We see here perhaps whence Bacon derived his idea of giving significance to seemingly accidental modifications of the characters of ordinary writing.

The idea of a biliteral alphabet, which Bacon seems to claim as his own, is employed, though in a different manner, by Porta. His method is in effect this. He reduces the alphabet to sixteen letters, and then takes the eight different arrangements aaa, aba, etc., to represent them; each arrangement representing two letters indifferently: the ambiguity arising from hence he seems to disregard. In this manner he reduces any given word or sentence to a succession of a's and b's. At this point his method, of which he has given several modifications, departs wholly from Bacons. Let us suppose the biliteral series to commence with aababb. A word of two syllables and beginning with A indicates that two a's commence the series; any monosyllable will serve to show that one b follows, another that it is succeeded by one a, and then any dissyllable will stand for bb. Thus Amo te mi fili or Amat qui non sapit will represent the biliteral arrangement aababb, and so on on a larger scale. Porta's method is therefore not, like Bacon's, a method scribendi omnia per omnia, but only omnia per multa. Still the analogy of the two methods is to be remarked; both aim at concealing that there is any but the obvious meaning, and both depend essentially on representing all letters by combinations of two only. See the De oc. Lit. Signis. v. c 3.

The Polygraphia of Trithemius (dedicated to Maximilian in 1508¹) consists of six books. The first four contain extensive tables constituting four different ciphrce verborum; the first and second of which are significant, and relate, the former to the second person of the Trinity, and the latter to the Blessed Virgin. The fifth and sixth books are of less importance. Trithemius, written in the cipher of the second book, becomes “Charitatem pudicissimæ Virginis Mariæ productricis coexistentis verbi, robustissimi commilitonis mei dilectissimi devotissime benedicamus; vivificatrix omnium,” etc.

Traictè des Chiffres, ou secrètes manières d'escrire, par Blaise de Vigenère, Bour-bonnois. (Paris, 1587.)

This work is described by the author as what he had saved of his work “Du Secrétaire,” written in Italy in 1567 and 68. The two first books were stolen at Turin in 1569. The third is the foundation of the present work. (v. f. 285. verso.) He says he had revealed nothing of its contents.

The two authors whom he chiefly mentions are Trithemius and Porta; that is, modern authors; for there is a great deal said of the Cabala. The key ciphers of which Porta speaks he ascribes to a certain Belasio, who employed it as early as 1549: Porta's book not being published until 1563, “auquel il a inséré ce chiffre sans faire mention dont il le tenoit.” Porta's book, he goes on to say, was not en vente until 1568. The invention was ascribed to Belasio by the grand vicar of St. Peter at Rome, who had great skill in deciphering (f. 35. rect. and 37. verso).

At f. 199. Vigenère gives an account of ciphers in which letters are represented by combinations of other letters,—which Porta had already done, but which he varies in a number of ways.

f. 200. A table where the twenty-three letters of the alphabet, and four other characters, are represented by combinations of abc. D (e. gr.)=aaa, S—bac etc.)

f. 201. A smaller table where an alphabet of twenty-one letters is similarly represented.

f. 202. An alphabet of twenty letters represented by binary combinations of five letters, a=ED, etc.

f. 202. goes on to what Bacon speaks of, a cipher within a cipher. You write in a common cipher with an alphabet of eighteen letters; the cipher being such that the five vowels are used as nulls; then by the last cipher these five vowels are made significant, and give the hidden sense. He seems to speak of this as his own.

After mentioning a cipher described by Cardan, he goes on, f. 205, to Porta's ciphers by transposition, etc.

At f. 240. he shows how characters may be multiplied by different ways of writing them; which Porta had not done.

f. 241. An alphabet and &, each character written in four ways.

f. 241, verso, An application of these variations.

f. 242. He remarks that a great variety of uses may be made of this idea, and gives some.

f. 244. He goes on “De ce même retranchement et de la variété de figure, part une autre invention encore d'un chiffre carré à double entente, le plus exquis de tous ceux qui ayent esté decouvers jusqu'à icy,” &c. You write with twelve letters only, as in the subjoined table, in which however I have not followed his ways of diversifying.

In this table, Z, for instance, represents 1st M, and 2nd R or S; to distinguish whether R or S, he has recourse to a supplementary contrivance by nulls.

f. 242. v. He refers to table at 200., and says the three letters abc, (which there represent I) may be replaced by a single character; for this table represents in another column letters by dots. Thus T is.. … .; D …; or if we will we may put o's for dots; so that D=o o o and T=oo ooo o; and the spaces may be filled up by a slightly varied o. Thus D=ooooo, T=oooooooo, and thus the whole cipher will apparently consist of o's.

The transition from this to Bacon's cipher is so easy that the credit given to him must be reduced.

¹ Psalm xix. I.

² Isaiah, viii. 20.

³ St. Matt. v. 44, 45.

⁴ Virg. Æn. i. 328: Nec vox hominum sonat.

⁵ Ovid, Metam. x. 330:—

Et quod natura remittit, Invida jura negant.

⁶ Cf. Plut. in Alex. c. 65; and Strabo, i. xv. The name of the person of whom this story is told by Plutarch is Dandamis, but wherever Bacon has mentioned it, he spells it as in the text. Dandamis is also mentioned by Arrian, who, however, does not relate this anecdote. We find the same story in Strabo; but the name of the Indian is with him not Dandamis, but Mandanis. In the Temporis Partus Masculus, Bacon speaks of these remarks of Dandamis as one of the exceptions to his general assertion of the worthlessness of the speculations of the philosophers of antiquity.

⁷ Romans, xii. I.

⁸ St. John, iii. 4. 10.

⁹ I Corinth. vii. 10.

¹⁰ The two passages Bacon refers to are St. Luke, xi. 23. (or St. Matth. xii. 30.), and St. Luke, ix. 50. But the former he has not quoted accurately. The words of our version are, “He that is not with me is against me”; while the passage in the ninth chapter is, “He that is not against us is for us”.

¹¹ Ephes. iv. 5. Compare St. August. Ep. ad Casulan. de jejuniis priscorum. He has elsewhere said, “Desuper texta tunica, quid significat nisi unitatem?” See his Exp. in Evan. Joan. in c. 3. and other passages. Compare St. Jerome, Pro Libris adversus Jovin. Apolog., where the manu-coloured coat of Joseph is expressly mentioned, as well as the passage in the Psalms to which St. Augustine refers.

¹² Exod. ii. 12.

¹³ 2 Kings, ix. 19.

¹⁴ In support of this statement see Tennemann's History of Philosophy.

¹⁵ St. Mark, xiii. 31.

¹⁶ Lysander, not Themistocles. Cf. Plut. Lac. Apopthegmata.

¹ The edition of 1600 is that I use.