Index
- abuse, of consumer data, 90–91
- ad blockers, 101, 105
- advertising
- ending the Google-Facebook advertising duopoly, 101–102
- predatory, 80–81
- See also targeted advertising
- algorithms, 16, 32
- Amazon
- Alexa, xiii, 2, 77
- as data-opoly, 32–33
- European action against, 33
- social concerns about, 42
- anonymity, unintended inferences and, 48
- anonymized data, 22
- antitrust
- enforcement against data-opolies, 33–35, 45
- historical concerns of, 42
- Apple
- apps selling user information obtained on Facebook, 14–15
- conflict with major powers, 124
- as data-opoly, 32
- European actions against, 33
- social concerns about products’ effect on children, 42–43
- artificial intelligence (AI)
- generation of behavioral profiles and, 16, 20
- personal data and, 2
- backlash, regulatory, and abuse of, xii–xiii
- Balkin, Jack, 26, 80, 83
- Basic Attention Tokens (BATs), 105–106
- Beacon Project, 114–115. See also government regulation
- behavioral profiles
- artificial intelligence–generated, 16, 20
- creation of, using personal data, 16
- benefits of data sharing, 10–11
- big data, convergence of privacy and cybersecurity and, 48, 51–52
- blockchain
- protecting product for content producers, 104–106, 108
- replacing need for restricting cross-border data flows, 116–117, 119
- supply chain data and, 117
- blockchain, use in marketing, 97–109
- blockchain applications, 98
- ending Google-Facebook advertising duopoly, 101–102
- ending marketing fraud and spam, 102–104, 106
- marketing impact of near-zero transaction costs, 99–100, 108
- remonetizing media consumption, 104–106
- results for companies and consumers, 106–107
- Borah, Abhishek, 53–66
- bots
- blockchain and blocking fake social media accounts by, 103, 108
- mitigating risk of, 23
- browsing history, monetization of, 14
- Burt, Andrew, 47–52
- California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), xii, 25
- Cambridge Analytica scandal, 25, 31–32, 49
- Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 21–24
- China
- Great Firewall of, 126
- Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and, 125, 126
- restrictions on data transfer, 112–113
- Citigroup, 60, 61
- CMOs (chief marketing officers)
- blockchain technology and, 107
- survey of, 97
- See also marketing
- Cochrane, Kevin, 89–96
- compensation for use of personal data, 22, 38, 72, 74
- competition
- effect of regulation on, 27
- monopoly power and, 43
- personal data collection and, 36
- competitive effects, data breaches and, 54, 55. See also data breaches
- consent
- asking consumers for privacy policy, 68
- informed, 3
- opt-in, 24, 28
- role in protecting privacy, 50, 52
- uninformed, 1–30
- consumer trust
- abuse of customer data and, xii–xiii
- building, xiii–xv
- as competitive advantage, xi–xvii
- data-opolies and loss of, 40
- as emotional evaluation, xv
- going beyond legally required minimum, xv
- measuring, xiii
- normative cybersecurity alliances and, 123
- transparent data practices and, 89–96
- cookies, 14, 91–92
- copyright protection, blockchain and, 104
- Costco, 58, 59
- costs
- of data-opolies on third parties, 40–41
- of data privacy, 7, 67
- of enforcing privacy regulation, 20
- overvaluing immediate and underweighting future, 5–6
- of restricting information flow, 20
- See also transaction costs
- cross-border data flows, 111–119
- policy restricting/regulating, 114–119
- customer communication
- consistency of, 93–94
- via privacy policies, 57, 65–66. See also privacy policies
- customer experience, privacy and, 71, 73
- customers, profit and prioritization of duty to, 84–85
- cyberattacks, 53, 121–122
- cybersecurity, 22
- privacy and, 47–52
- cybersecurity alliances
- companies forming, 121–129
- nations and, 125–127
- normative, 122, 123–124, 128
- operational, 122–123, 128
- reasons for firms not to join, 124–125, 129
- damages, liability, 26, 27
- data, aggregated vs. personal, 23
- data, deglobalization of, 112–113
- data breaches, xii, 50
- Anthem, 55
- Citigroup, 61
- data-opolies and implications of, 37–38
- Facebook, xiii
- harm to firm rivals due to spillover effects, 53, 54–55, 65
- help for firms because of competitive effects, 54, 55
- Marriott, 50
- number of customers affected and effects on firm rivals, 55–56
- Nvidia, 54–55
- privacy policy and lack of financial harm from, 54
- providing information on, 25, 28
- strategies to protect firms against, 56
- data brokers, xii, 15
- data governance, 21–24
- data-harvesting practices
- Facebook and, 4
- restrictions on, 25, 29
- data islands, 112, 114, 118
- data-opolies, 31–46
- behavioral discrimination and, 39
- Cambridge Analytica scandal and, 31–32
- costs on third parties and, 40–41
- data policy violation and, 37–38
- Europe’s action against, 33–34
- flow of data through, 32–33
- global antitrust enforcement and, 45
- harm from, 35–44
- less innovation in markets dominated by, 41–42, 46
- limiting power of, 44–45
- loss of trust and, 40
- lower-quality products with less privacy and, 36
- political concerns, 43–44
- security risks and, 36–38, 46
- social and moral concerns, 42–43
- surveillance and security risks and, 36–38, 46
- U.S. antitrust and, 33–35
- wealth transfer to, 38–39, 46
- digital agency, 21. See also data governance
- digital isolationism, 126–127
- digital payments, 113
- digital peace, 123, 124
- digital protectionism, dangers of, 111–119
- data is deglobalizing, 112–113
- what policy makers should consider, 114–117, 118
- digital surveillance, xii, 76. See also surveillance economy
- Dobrygowski, Daniel, 121–129
- endowment effect, 7–8
- European Union
- actions against data-opolies, 33–35
- General Data Protection Regulation, xi, 24, 68, 92, 113
- Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, 125–126
- provisions to make data flows part of future trade pacts, 115–116
- experience, customer privacy and, 71, 73
- experiences, personalized, use of consumer data for targeted marketing, xii
- advertising duopoly with Google, 101–102, 106
- apps selling user information obtained on, 14–15
- Cambridge Analytica and, 25, 32, 49
- conflict with major powers, 124
- content control and, 78
- data breaches, xiii
- data collection and, 4
- as data-opoly, 32–33
- desire to disclose and, 12
- emotional contagion study, 43–44
- European actions against, 33–34
- “free” consumer products on, 35
- monetization of likes, 14
- political concerns about, 82–83
- Portal, xiii
- pushing content in feeds, 77
- social concerns about, 42, 43
- surveillance economy and, 18
- targeted advertising and exclusion of classes of people, 76
- as third-party data broker, 100
- use by Russia to interfere in 2016 U.S. presidential election, 32
- use of privacy defaults, 8
- facial recognition software, 2
- Fan, Ziyang, 111–119
- Federal Trade Commission, 34, 84
- federated ecosystem model for data sharing, 114–115, 118
- fiduciaries, information, 80–86
- firms
- bombarding consumers with messages not relevant to interests, 90–91
- formation of cybersecurity alliances by, 121–129
- incentivizing sharing of personal data, 92–94
- Fortune 500 firms with transparent privacy policies, 58–64
- company ranking methodology, 62–64
- fraud verification via blockchain, 102, 103–104, 108
- General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), xii, 24, 68, 92, 113
- Google, 8
- advertising duopoly with Facebook, 101–102, 106
- conflict with major powers, 124
- as data-opoly, 32–33
- EC shopping case, 33, 34, 42
- European action against, 33, 34, 42
- fined by European Commission, 33
- “free” consumer products on, 35
- revenue per active user via ads, 102
- social concerns about, 42, 43
- use by Russia to interfere in 2016 U.S. presidential election, 32
- government, covert surveillance and tapping into data-opoly’s personal data collection, 37
- government capture, of data-opolies, 37
- government regulation
- of digital surveillance, xii
- guidance for, 20–29
- of personal data collection, xv, xvi, 19–20
- strict liability for use of personal data, 26–27
- Gupta, Anil, 111–119
- identity theft, beliefs about risk of, 9
- India
- aggregation of global data by central bank, 115
- use of digital payments, 113
- information fiduciaries, 26, 80–86
- establishing, 83–84, 86
- privacy protections and, 81–82
- targeted advertising and, 80, 86
- informed consent, data privacy and, 3. See also consent
- innovation, data-opolies and less, 41–42
- internet, surveillance economy and, 2, 13–18
- Internet of Things, 2, 39, 98, 122, 128
- John, Leslie K., 1–30
- machine learning
- convergence of privacy and cybersecurity and, 48, 51–52
- personal data and, 2, 20
- marketing
- authenticity in, 94
- blockchain ending fraud in, 108
- personal data and targeted, xi, xii, 6
- See also blockchain, use in marketing
- market power
- data-opolies and increased, 39
- exploitation of personal data for, 33
- Martin, Kelly D., 53–66
- media consumption, blockchain and remonetizing, 104–106
- micropayments, blockchain and, 98, 100, 102, 105, 106
- Microsoft, 23, 124
- monetization of personal data, 14, 90, 92, 95
- Moorman, Christine, 97–109
- Morey, Timothy, xi–xvii
- Morgan Stanley, 60, 61
- online content, blockchain and protection of, 104–106, 108
- online terms of use, consumer agreement to, 17
- operational cybersecurity alliances, 122–123, 128
- opt-in consent, 24, 28. See also consent
- opt-out choices, consumer sense of control and decision making and, 4–5, 8, 9–10, 17, 63–64
- opt-out policy, control over use and sharing of personal data, 56, 66
- Palmatier, Robert W., 53–66
- personalization
- consumer desire for, 91, 92, 95
- increased revenue from, 91
- personalized experiences, use of consumer data for targeted marketing, xii
- personally identifiable information (PII), 82
- phishing spam, 102, 106
- policy makers
- concern about data flows, 111–112
- issues to consider in regulating data flows, 114–117, 118
- predatory advertising, 80–81, 86
- privacy actives, xv, 68–69, 73
- comfort in sharing data, 69–70
- demographics of, 69
- firms’ engaging, 71, 73
- privacy policies and, 70
- sense of ability to protect own privacy, 70
- transparency gap and, 71–72
- privacy controls, impatience and failure to adopt, 6
- privacy defaults, 7–8
- privacy policies, 53–66
- data breach effects and, 53–56
- decision making and, 56–58, 65–66
- Fortune 500 companies with transparent, 58–64
- mitigating effects of data breaches and empowering customers, 56–57
- read by privacy actives, 70
- reasons to study, 57
- simplifying and shortening, 71–72, 74
- privacy protections
- data-opolies and, 36
- information fiduciaries and, 81–82
- privacy settings, editing, 93, 95
- privacy strategies, 68
- product safety regulations, 18–19, 26, 28
- quizzes, free online, 5, 15, 81. See also data breaches
- Redman, Thomas C., 67–74
- regional trade agreements, data flows and, 115–116, 118
- regulation. See government regulation
- risk-based approach to regulating data flows, 114, 118
- Russia
- Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and, 125, 126
- restrictions on data transfer, 112
- use of Facebook, Google, a nd Twitter to interfere in 2016 U.S. presidential election, 32
- search engines
- learning users’ preferences, 35
- use of personal data, 76–79
- security. See cybersecurity
- sharing consumer data, incentivizing, 92–94, 95
- Siemens, 123–124
- smart contracts, 98, 100. See also blockchain, use in marketing
- smartphones, location tracking on, 1–2
- social media
- blockchain and fraud on, 103, 108
- false boundaries, 11, 12–13
- heightening desire to disclose, 11–12
- spam emails, blockchain technology ending, 102–104, 106
- spillover effects, data breaches and, 53, 54–55, 65
- standards for storage, movement, and access to personal data, 22
- stock prices
- effect of data breaches on, 55, 56
- transparent privacy policy as buffer during data breaches, 58, 61
- Stucke, Maurice E., 31–46
- surveillance economy
- complexity of, 13–18
- internet as, 2
- targeted advertising
- consumer data use for personalized experiences and, xii
- information fiduciaries and, 80, 86
- personal data and, 6
- private data and, 75–76
- techlash, 3–4
- third parties
- data-opolies and costs on, 40–41
- manipulation of online news feeds by, 78
- third-party data, 22, 90, 91–92, 95
- third-party data sharing, 9, 14
- Toledo, Marc, 97–109
- transaction costs
- blockchain and, 99–100
- blockchain and near-zero, 108
- of negotiating with multiple parties, 23
- transparency gap, addressing, 71–72
- transparent data practices, consumer trust and, xiii–xiv, 89–96
- transparent privacy policies
- decision making about personal data and, 56–58, 65–66
- Fortune 500 firms with, 58–64
- trust. See consumer trust
- pushing content in feeds, 77
- use by Russia to interfere in 2016 U.S. presidential election, 32
- Uber, 8, 76
- unintended inferences, 48–49
- United Nations, competing cybersecurity-norm efforts, 126
- United States
- data-opolies and antitrust in, 33–35
- Group of Governmental Experts, 126
- Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and, 126
- value
- of consumer data, 19, 22
- of data privacy, 19, 67
- in exchange for customer data, xiv–xv
- of immediate and future costs and benefits, 5–6
- Venmo, 8, 12
- Verizon, 58, 59
- Yahoo data breach, 50. See also data breaches
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