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Be a Strategic Asset

The boss doesn’t always know that he or she needs you. He or she may never even ask or think about asking for your help. That doesn’t mean you shouldn’t provide it as necessary.

If your boss has monumental decisions to make, he or she shouldn’t stand alone in that regard. The boss need not do it by herself or himself. Think of yourself as a strategic asset waiting to happen.

If you’re waiting to be asked, you’re not thinking beyond the moment for the boss, who could probably use your counsel more than he or she thinks. To provide effective counsel you need to be thinking and planning beyond the moment for the things that lie ahead, anticipated or not.

A good way to start is by making an honest appraisal of the business landscape today and what it’s likely to look like in the years to come. Understanding what corporate interests are at stake in regard to the decisions you make is key. Knowing your business purposes and the proposed actions for achieving them is also important. Determining the costs, the resources available, and the desired outcomes of those actions is fundamental.

Gubernare is a Latin word meaning “to steer or to control.” The term governance is the English derivative. You need to be helping the boss steer or govern what he or she should do, how to do it, and why it should be done.

You may have to work yourself into that strategic position. Sound, reasonable advice is the place to start. It may even take a crisis to get the ball rolling.

When Colin Powell became the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1989, I was loaded for bear. He had a sterling reputation as a general, and I set out to burnish that reputation. Regrettably for me, he wasn’t quite ready for the public exposure I was offering him.

As I sifted through piles of invitations he received to do one thing or another, I brought the best to the top of the heap. Then I advanced specific recommendations that he accept the very best. He wasn’t interested. He needed time to get his sea legs as chairman.

Rejection after rejection over the first three months began to wear on me. I found myself asking what I could do to alter his response. The answer came in mid-December.

He summoned me to his office on December 18, 1989, and said to me, “I need your help. I’m telling you something only a handful of people here in Washington, D.C., know. We’re going to invade Panama in two days to take down General Manuel Noriega and the Panama Defense Force.” He went on to say, “Obviously this is top secret, but begin planning for the public explanation I will have to make to our stakeholders.”

Back in my office I began the strategic thinking and planning I thought necessary. A press conference was going to be essential. Without knowing the absolute outcome of the operation, I prepared for several contingencies. He would probably do this in tandem with the secretary of defense, Dick Cheney. This would be a major moment for both of them. When the United States goes to war, it is big news.

Over the next two days I prepared a variety of things: an opening statement, probable questions from reporters, and proposed answers. Not knowing precisely the details of how the operation would unfold, I chose to be far-ranging on issues I expected to be raised.

He asked me to be back in the building by 11 p.m. on the nineteenth. I went home at the normal time, caught a two-hour nap, and returned to the Pentagon at 10:30 p.m. My best-laid secretive return came as a surprise to one of my assistants, who was working especially late to wrap things up before heading to Alabama for Christmas. I’m not sure who was more surprised, she or I.

Shortly after 11 p.m., I strolled down to the chairman’s empty outer office and knocked on his door. Silence. Did I have the wrong day? Quietly I opened the door and peeked in. The boss was stirring from his cat nap. See you in fifteen, he said.

Back I came at 11:20. We headed for the National Military Command Center in a highly secure and classified part of the Pentagon, where we joined the secretary of defense. Plenty of activity in motion: maps, timelines, radios ablaze, many operations and intelligence experts standing at the ready. The chairman took a seat next to Secretary Cheney at a designated command table. They were given the latest ops/intel brief by Lieutenant General Tom Kelly, the senior operations officer, and Rear Admiral Mike McConnell, the senior intelligence officer for the Joint Staff.

On the ground in Panama, there was a sense among the Panama Defense Force (PDF) that something was up. Tactical surprise is essential in combat. Since the PDF was stirring, there was a decision to move the scheduled 1 a.m. H-hour up by 15 minutes. At 0045 hours, Operation Just Cause commenced. A total of 25,000 American troops stationed in Panama, troops from various stateside locations, Delta Force, SEALs, Rangers, you name it, converged on key targets on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the Isthmus of Panama.

Night fighting is the most effective form of combat for American troops. The only thing missing when dawn broke was Noriega. He had made a hasty escape to avoid U.S. custody. Evidence of an imperfect world.

By and large, the early stages of Just Cause were successful but required explanation to our stakeholders. That included the public, Congress, American citizens living in Panama, our neighbors in that region, and the world community at large.

Time to go to work. The chairman and I went off into a corner to discuss the likely questions he would be asked in the press conference, how far he could go with his answers while maintaining operational security, and how to explain the AWOL Noriega.

Meanwhile, the secretary spoke to President Bush, who then went on television at 7:40 a.m., still on the twentieth, to explain why we had invaded Panama. Ample evidence of misdeeds by the PDF and missteps by their leader were presented as the rationale.

Cheney and Powell had a brief discussion to ensure they were in sync. At 8:30 a.m. they went together to the Pentagon briefing room to explain details of the operation and next steps. With briefing charts and maps in hand they handled every question adroitly.

For me it was an important event, for it helped solidify the relationship with my boss. He had done the heavy lifting with the prep and brief. Mine was a support role, but it had purpose and lent value to the press briefing.

There doesn’t have to be a crisis for the boss to turn to you for well-grounded, well-conceived advice. However, in my case, it helped reinforce the contribution I could make to prepare him for delivering strategic and tactical decisions to the publics to which we were responsible. That request for assistance by the boss doesn’t just happen, and when it does happen, it doesn’t guarantee there will be routine reliance on you.

Strategic management needs to take place on a regular basis. Strategic thinking and strategic planning need to be part of your professional portfolio. As Dwight Eisenhower once said, “Plans are nothing; planning is everything.” The value of the planning you do for what lies ahead is an asset your boss will come to rely on, to expect, and to count on as part of separating your organization from the competition. That’s a form of relevance you can and should claim in the life of your boss.