Book VIII.

CHAPTER I.

The Division of Civil Knowledge into the Doctrine concerning Conversation, Negotiation, and Empire or State Government.

THERE is an old story, most excellent king, that many philosophers being met together in the presence of the ambassador of a foreign prince, each endeavouring to give a sample of his wisdom, that the ambassador might be able to make a report of the wonderful wisdom of Greece; one of them remained silent and propounded nothing; insomuch that the ambassador turning to him, said, “What have you to say for me to report?” To whom he answered, “Tell your king that you have found a man in Greece, who knew how to hold his tongue¹”. And in truth, in this synopsis of the arts I have forgotten to mention the art of silence, which (since it is commonly deficient) I will now teach by my own example. For since the course of the argument has now brought me down to that point, that I should presently handle the art of government; and since I am writing to so great a king who is such a master in that art, wherein he has been trained from his cradle; and since I cannot altogether forget what position I have held under your majesty; I thought that I should better approve myself by silence on such a matter before your majesty, than by speech. Cicero indeed makes mention not only of an art, but of a kind of eloquence in silence; for in one of his letters to Atticus, after relating a conversation between himself and another person on both sides of a subject, he writes, “Here I borrowed part of your eloquence, for I held my tongue²”. Pindar again (whose peculiar gift it was to surprise men's minds with some striking expression, as with a magic rod), utters some such saying as this, “Silence sometimes says more than speech³”. Wherefore in this part I have determined to be silent, or to be very brief, which is next thing to silence; but before I come to the arts of government, I must first make some observations touching the other parts of civil knowledge.

Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject, which of all others is most immersed in matter, and with most difficulty reduced to axioms. Nevertheless there are some circumstances to relieve this difficulty; for first, as Cato the Censor used to say of the Romans, “that they were like sheep, for that a man might better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you could but get some few of them to go right, the rest would follow⁴”; so in that respect the duty of moral philosophy is more difficult than that of policy. Secondly, moral philosophy propounds to itself to imbue and endow the mind with internal goodness; but civil knowledge requires only an external goodness, for that suffices for society. And therefore it often comes to pass that there be evil times in good governments; as in the sacred history we find it said more than once in speaking of good and pious kings, “Howbeit the people had not yet directed their heart aright to the Lord God of their Fathers⁵”; wherefore in this respect also the office of moral philosophy is more difficult. Thirdly, states as great engines are moved slowly and not without great efforts, whence they are not so soon put out of frame; for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so in states the good government of previous years prevents the errors of succeeding times from causing immediate ruin; but the resolutions and morality of particular persons are more suddenly subverted. And this makes moral knowledge more difficult, but civil knowledge more easy.

Civil knowledge has three parts, according to the three summary actions of Society; the knowledge of conversation, the knowledge of negotiation, and the knowledge of empire or government. For there are three kinds of good which men seek in society, comfort against solitude, assistance in business, and protection against injuries; and they are three wisdoms of divers natures, which are often separate; wisdom of behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.

The wisdom of conversation ought certainly not to be overmuch affected, but much less despised; for a wise management thereof has not only a grace and honour in itself, but an important influence in business and government. For as action in an orator, though an external quality, is held of such account as even to be preferred to those other parts which appear more important and internal; so in a man of business conversation and the management thereof, though employed on external objects, finds, if not the highest, yet at all events an eminent place. For look what an effect is produced by the countenance and the carriage of it. Well says the poet,

Nec vultu destrue verba tuo⁶.

For a man may destroy and betray the force of his words by his countenance; nay, and the effect of his deeds also, if we believe Cicero; who in recommending to his brother affability towards the provincials, said that it did not so much consist in affording them easy access, as in receiving them with a courteous and open countenance. “It is nothing to have your door open, if your countenance be shut⁷”. So we see Atticus before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war still depending, carefully and seriously advised Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture⁸. And if the government of the face and countenance alone be of such effect; much more is that of the speech and other carriage appertaining to conversation. Indeed all grace and dignity of behaviour may be summed up in the even balancing of our own dignity and that of others, as has been well expressed by Livy, (though not meant for this purpose) in that description which he gives of personal character. “Lest I should appear (says he) either arrogant or servile, whereof the one were to forget the liberty of others, the other to forget my own⁹”. On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much it may pass into a deformed and spurious affectation. “And then, what is more uncomely than to bring the manners of the stage into the business of life?” And even if it proceed not to that faulty extreme, yet too much time is consumed in these frivolous matters, and the mind is employed more than is right in the care of them. And therefore as in the universities preceptors use to advise young students from too much company-keeping, by saying, “Friends are the thieves of time”; so certainly the constant attention of the mind to the discretion of the behaviour is a great thief of more serious meditation. Again such as are accomplished in urbanity, and seem as formed by nature for that alone, generally find satisfaction enough therein, and seldom aspire to higher and more solid virtue; whereas those who are conscious of a defect in this point seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, there almost everything is becoming; but where that is not, it must be supplied by manners and behaviour. Again there is no greater nor more common impediment of action than an overcurious observance of external decency, and the attendant of decency, which is an anxious watching of Time and Season. For as Solomon well observes, “He that regards the winds does not sow, and he that regards the clouds does not reap¹⁰”; a man must make his opportunity as oft as find it. To conclude, this behaviour is as the garment of the mind, and ought to have the conditions of a garment. For first, it ought to be made in fashion; secondly it should not be too curious or costly; thirdly, it ought to be so framed as to best set forth any virtue of the mind, and supply and hide any deformity; lastly, and above all, it ought not be too strait, so as to confine the mind and interfere with its freedom in business and action. But this part of civil knowledge touching conversation has been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

CHAPTER II.

The Division of the Doctrine concerning Negotiation into the Doctrine concerning Scattered Occasions and the Doctrine concerning Advancement in Life.—Example of the Doctrine concerning Scattered Occasions from some of the Proverbs of Solomon.—Precepts concerning Advancement in Life.

THE Doctrine concerning Negotiation is divided into the Doctrine concerning Scattered Occasions, and the Doctrine concerning Advancement in Life; whereof the one comprises all variety of business, and is as it were the secretary for the whole department of life; the other merely selects and suggests such things as relate to the improvement of a man's own fortune, and may serve each man for a private notebook or register of his own affairs. But before I descend to the species, I will make some preparatory remarks touching the doctrine concerning negotiation in general. The science of negotiation has not hitherto been handled in proportion to the importance of the subject, to the great derogation of learning and the professors thereof. For from this root springs chiefly that evil, with which the learned have been branded; “That there is no great concurrence between learning and practical wisdom”. For if it be rightly observed, of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, the wisdom of behaviour is by learned men for the most part despised, as a thing servile, and moreover an enemy to meditation. For wisdom of government, it is true that as often as learned men are called to the helm, they acquit themselves well, but that happens to few. But for the wisdom of business (of which I am now speaking), wherein man's life is most conversant, there are no books at all written of it, except some few civil advertisements collected in one or two little volumes, which have no proportion to the magnitude of the subject. For if books were written of this as of the other, I doubt not but learned men with but little experience would far excel men of long experience without learning, and outshoot them (as they say) in their own bow.

Neither is there any reason to fear that the matter of this knowledge should be so variable that it falls not under precept; for it is much less infinite than that science of government, which notwithstanding we see is excellently laboured and reduced. Of this kind of wisdom it seems some of the ancient Romans in the best times were professors: for Cicero reports that a little before his age senators who had most name and opinion for wisdom and practice in affairs (as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others) used to walk at certain hours in the Forum, where they might give audience to their fellow-citizens, who would consult with them not merely on subjects of law but on all sorts of business; as on the marriage of a daughter, the education of a son, the purchase of a farm, a contract, accusation, defence, and every other occasion incident to man's life¹. Whence it appears that there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal insight and experience of the affairs of the world; which is used i ndeed upon particular causes, but is gathered by general observation of causes of like nature. For so we see in that book which Cicero wrote to his brother, “on Canvassing for the Consulship”² (being the only book of particular business that I know written by the ancients), although it especially concerned an action then on foot, yet it contained many political axioms which prescribe not only a temporary but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But of this kind there is nothing any way comparable to those Aphorisms composed by Solomon the King, of whom the Scriptures testify, “that his heart was as the sands of the sea³”; for as the sands of the sea encompass all the coasts of the earth, so did his wisdom embrace all things human as well as divine. But in these Aphorisms, besides those of a theological character, there are not a few excellent civil precepts and cautions, springing from the inmost recesses of wisdom and extending to much variety of occasions. Wherefore seeing I set down this knowledge of scattered occasions (which is the first part of the knowledge touching negotiation) among the deficients, I will stay awhile upon it according to my custom, and offer to consideration an example of the same, taken from the Aphorisms or Proverbs of Solomon. Nor in my opinion can I be with reason blamed for seeking a politic meaning in one of the Sacred writers; for if those commentaries were extant which this same Solomon wrote touching the nature of things,.(wherein he treated of every vegetable, from the moss upon the wall to the cedar of Lebanon, and likewise of all animals)⁴, it would surely be lawful to interpret them in a natural sense; and therefore we may here use the same liberty in matters political.

An Example of a portion of the doctrine concerning scattered occasions, taken from some of the Proverbs of Solomon.

PROVERB.

(1.) A soft answer turneth away wrath⁵.

Explanation.

If the anger of a prince or a superior be kindled against you, and it is your turn to speak, Solomon gives two directions; first, “that an answer be made,” and secondly, “that it be soft”; the former contains three precepts. First, to beware of a sullen and obstinate silence, which either takes the fault entirely on yourself, as if you had no answer to make; or secretly impugns your superior of injustice, insinuating that his ears are not open to a defence, though a just one. Secondly, to beware of postponing the matter and demanding another time for defence; which either conveys the same impression as the preceding one, that your superior is carried away by too great an excitement of temper; or plainly intimates that having no answer ready you are meditating a false and artificial defence. Wherefore it will ever be the best course to bring forward something in excuse directly as the occasion arises. Thirdly, that an answer at all events be made; not a simple confession or submission, but with a mixture of defence and excuse; for a different course is unsafe, except with very generous and noble characters, which are extremely rare. It follows in the other precept, that the answer be soft, not harsh or rough.

PROVERB.

(2.) A wise servant shall have rule over a foolish son, and shall have part of the inheritance among the brethren⁶.

Explanation.

In all disordered and discordant families there is ever some servant or humble friend of great influence, who acts as arbiter and settles their disputes, and to whom on that account both the whole family and the master himself are subject. Such a man, if he is pursuing his own interests, foments and aggravates the family feuds; but if he is truly faithful and upright he deserves a great reward; even to be counted as one of the brothers, or at least to have the direction of the inheritance in trust.

PROVERB.

(3.) If a wise man contend with a fool, whether he rage or laugh, he shall find no rest⁷.

Explanation.

We are often advised to avoid an unequal contest, meaning that we should not contend with those that are too strong for us. But the advice here given by Solomon is no less useful, “Not to contend with one that is unworthy”; for herein the chances are altogether unequal; seeing it is no victory to conquer, and a great disgrace to be conquered. And it makes no difference in this kind of contest, whether we take it in jest, or in scorn and contempt; for, whichever way we turn, we must lose in dignity, and can no ways quit ourselves well of it. But the worst of all is if, as Solomon says, our adversary has somewhat of the fool in him, that is, if he be bold and presumptuous.

PROVERB.

(4.) Lend not thine ear to all words that are spoken, lest thou hear thy servant curse thee⁸.

Explanation.

It is scarcely credible what confusion is created in life by a useless curiosity about the things which concern us; that is, when we set to work to inquire into those secrets which when discovered produce uneasiness of mind, but are of no use to forward our designs. For first there ensues vexation and disquiet of mind, seeing all things human are full of treachery and ingratitude. And therefore if we could obtain a magic glass wherein we might view all the enmities and all the hostile designs that are at work against us, it were better for us to throw it down at once and break it to pieces; for these matters are but as the rustling of leaves, and have short duration. Secondly, this curiosity overcharges the mind with suspicions, a thing which ruins counsels, and renders them inconstant and perplexed, Thirdly, it often renders permanent those very evils which would otherwise blow over; for it is a dangerous thing to alarm the consciences of men; who, if they imagine themselves undetected, may come to a better mind; but if they perceive that they are discovered, they repel mischief with mischief. Rightly therefore was it considered great wisdom in Pompey that he burned all Sertorius's papers unperused either by himself or others⁹.

PROVERB.

(5.) Poverty comes as one that travelleth, and want as an armed man¹⁰.

Explanation.

It is elegantly described in this proverb, how the shipwreck of fortunes comes upon prodigals and those that are careless of their estates; for debt and diminution of capital come on at first slowly and step by step like a traveller, and are scarce perceived; but soon after want rushes in like an armed man, so strong and powerful as no longer to be resisted; for it was rightly said by the ancients, “that necessity was of all things the strongest¹¹”. Wherefore we must meet the traveller on his way, but against the armed man we must fortify.

PROVERB.

(6.) He that instructs a scorner gets to himself shame, and he that rebukes the wicked gets himself a blot¹².

Explanation.

This agrees with the command of our Saviour, “not to cast pearls before swine¹³”, but a difference is made between the actions of instruction and reproof; and also between the persons of the scorner and the wicked; and lastly, there is a difference in the return; for in the former case the labour is but lost, in the latter it is repaid with a stain and blot. For when a man informs and instructs a scorner, in the first place he loses his time; and secondly, the attempt is laughed at by others as a vain thing and labour misapplied; and lastly, the scorner himself despises the knowledge which he has received. But there is greater danger in the reproval of the wicked; for not only does a wicked man lend no ear to advice, but turns again on his reprover, whom being now made odious to him he either directly assails with abuse, or afterwards traduces to others.

PROVERB.

(7.) A wise son makes a glad father, but a foolish son is the heaviness of his mother¹⁴.

Explanation.

Here are distinguished the domestic comforts and tribulations of a father and mother respectively, touching their children. For a wise and prudent son is of most comfort to the father, who knows the value of virtue better than the mother, and accordingly has more joy in the virtuous inclination of his son; he may feel a satisfaction also in the course he has pursued, whereby he has brought up his son so well and implanted sound morality in him by precept and example. But the mother has most sorrow and discomfort at the ill fortune of her son, both because the affection of a mother is more gentle and tender, and because she is conscious perhaps that she has spoiled and corrupted him by her indulgence.

PROVERB.

(8.) The memory of the just is blessed, but the name of the wicked shall rot¹⁵.

Explanation.

A distinction is here made between the character of the good and the bad after death. For when the envy which carped at the reputation of the good in their lifetime is quenched, their name forthwith shoots up and flourishes, and their praises daily increase; but for the wicked, though their reputation through the favour of their friends and partizans last for a time,yet soon it turns into contempt, and in the end their fleeting glory changes into infamy and as it were a foul and noxious odour.

PROVERB.

(9.) He that troubles his own house shall inherit the wind¹⁶.

Explanation.

A very useful admonition, touching domestic discords and disturbances. For many from the separation of their wives, the disinheriting of their children, the frequent changes in their family, promise to themselves great things; as if they would thence obtain peace of mind and a better management of their affairs; but commonly their hopes vanish into the winds. For both those changes generally turn out ill, and such disturbers of their family often experience trouble and ingratitude from those whom to the neglect of others they select and adopt; nay further, they thus draw upon themselves ill reports and dishonourable rumours; for it is well said by Cicero, “Every man's reputation proceeds from those of his own household¹⁷”. And both these evils Solomon elegantly expresses by “the inheritance of the winds;” for both the disappointment of expectation and the raising of rumours are not unaptly compared to winds.

PROVERB.

(10.) Better is the end of a speech than the beginning thereof¹⁸.

Explanation.

This proverb reproves a very common error, not only of those who make an especial study of words, but even of the more wise and prudent; which is, that men are more careful of the entrances and commencement of their speeches than of the end, and study more diligently the prefaces and inducements than the conclusions and issues; whereas for the former, they ought not indeed to neglect them, but the latter as being of far greater importance they ought to have ready prepared and arranged at hand; considering within themselves and endeavouring as much as possible to anticipate what shall be the end of their speech, and how their business may be advanced and ripened thereby. Nor is this all; for it is not only proper to study perorations and conclusions of such speeches as relate to the business itself, but also to be prepared with some discourse which may be conveniently and gracefully thrown in at the close, although foreign to the matter in hand. Indeed I knew two great and wise councillors on whom the weight of business principally rested, with whom it was a constant care and especial art, whenever they conferred with their princes on matters of state, not to end their discourse with matters relating to the business itself, but always by way of divertisement to draw it away to some jest or some agreeable news, and so end by washing off (as the proverb has it) their salt water discourses with fresh¹⁹. Nor was this the least valuable of their arts.

PROVERB.

(11.) As dead flies do cause the best ointment to stink, so does a little folly him that is in reputation for wisdom and honour²⁰.

Explanation.

It is a very hard and unhappy condition (as the Proverb well remarks.) of men pre-eminent for virtue, that their errors, be they ever so trifling, are never excused. But as in the clearest diamond every little cloud or speck catches and displeases the eye, which in a less perfect stone would hardly be discerned; so in men of remarkable virtue the slightest faults are seen, talked of, and severely censured, which in ordinary men would either be entirely unobserved, or readily excused. Hence a little folly in a very wise man, a small offence in a very good man, a slight impropriety in a man of polite and elegant manners detracts greatly from their character and reputation; and therefore it would be no bad policy for eminent men to mingle some harmless absurdities with their actions; so that they may retain some liberty for themselves, and make small defects less distinguishable.

PROVERB.

(12.) Scornful men bring a city to destruction, but wise men turn away wrath²¹.

Explanation.

It may seem strange that Solomon in his description of men formed as it were by nature for the ruin and destruction of states, should have selected the character not of a proud and insolent, not of a tyrannical and cruel, not of a rash and violent, not of a wicked and impious, not of an unjust and oppressive, not of a seditious and turbulent, not of an incontinent and sensual, not finally of a foolish and incapable person, but the character of a scorner. And this selection is worthy of the wisdom of a king who well knew how states were overthrown or preserved; for there is hardly a greater danger to kingdoms and states than that councillors or senators and those who stand at the helm should be of a scornful disposition. For such men ever undervalue dangers, that they may appear bold councillors, and insult those who make a just estimate of them, as cowards. They sneer at seasonable delays and careful discussions in consultation and deliberation, as mere matter of oratory, full of weariness, and contributing nothing to the completion of business. As for reputation, with a view to which the counsels of princes ought to be specially framed, they despise it as the breath of the people, that will quickly be blown away. They make no more account of the power and authority of laws, than of cobwebs which ought not to be in the way of more important business. Counsels and precautions looking far into the future they despise as dreams and melancholy apprehensions. They scorn with gibes and jests men of real wisdom and experience, of great minds, and deep judgment. In short, they weaken all the foundations of civil government; a thing the more to be attended to, because the mischief is wrought, not openly, but by secret engines and intrigues; and the matter is not yet regarded by men with as much apprehension as it deserves.

PROVERB.

(13.) A prince who readily hearkens to lies, has all his servants wicked²².

Explanation.

When the prince is one who lends an easy and credulous ear without discernment to whisperers and informers, there breathes as it were from the king himself a pestilent air, which corrupts and infects all his servants. Some probe the fears and jealousies of the prince, and increase them with false tales; others excite in him passions of envy, especially against the most virtuous objects; others seek to wash away their own vileness and evil consciences by accusing others; others make way for the honours and wishes of their friends by traducing and calumniating their opponents; while others get up stage plots and a number of the like fables against their enemies. These are the machinations of servants who are of a more dishonest nature. But those also who are naturally of greater honesty and principle, when they find no safeguard in their innocence (the prince not being able to distinguish truth from falsehood), throw off their honesty, and catching the court breezes allow themselves to be carried where they blow. “For,” as Tacitus says of Claudius, “there is no safety with that prince, who has nothing in his mind, but what others put into it²³”. And Comines well remarks, “It is better to be the servant of a prince whose suspicions have no end, than of one whose credulity has no measure²⁴”.

PROVERB.

(14.) A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel²⁵.

Explanation.

There is implanted in man by nature a noble and excellent spirit of compassion, that extends itself even to the brutes which by the divine ordinance are subject to his command. This compassion therefore has a certain analogy with that of a prince towards his subject. Moreover it is most true, that the nobler a spirit is, the more objects of compassion it has. For narrow and degenerate spirits think that these things concern them not; but the spirit which forms a nobler portion of the universe has a feeling of communion with them. Whence we see that under the old law there were many commandments, not so much purely ceremonial as institutions of mercy; as was that of not eating the flesh with the blood thereof, and the like. The Essenes and Pythagoreans even abstained altogether from eating flesh: and the same superstition still prevails among some of the inhabitants of the Mogul Empire. Nay, the Turks, though by race and habits a cruel and bloody people, yet are wont to give alms to brute creatures, and cannot endure to see them ill used or tortured²⁶. But lest these things which we have mentioned should seem to countenance every kind of mercy, Solomon wisely adds, “That the mercies of the wicked are cruel.” Such is the sparing to use the sword of justice upon wicked and guilty men; which kind of mercy is more cruel than cruelty itself; for cruelty is only practised upon individual persons, but this mercy to crime by granting impunity arms and lets loose upon the innocent the whole army of villains.

PROVERB.

(15.) A fool utters all his mind, but a wise man reserves something for the future²⁷.

Explanation.

This proverb seems to be espceially aimed not at the levity of foolish men, who with equal readiness let out what should be uttered, and what should be concealed; not at that plain speaking, with which they inveigh without discrimination and judgment against everybody and everything; not at that talkativeness whereby they weary others usque ad nauseam; but at another fault which is less observed, namely, a method of discourse of all others most unwise and impolitic; I mean, when a man in private conversation so frames his discourse as to produce whatsoever he has to say pertinent to the matter in hand all at once and in a breath, without any stop or pause. Now this is a great impediment to business.

For in the first place a speech that is broken and let fall part by part makes far more impression than a continuous one; because in the latter the matters touched are not distinctly and severally apprehended and weighed; and they have not time enough to settle; but one reason drives out another before it has taken firm hold. Secondly, no one is endowed with such powerful and persuasive eloquence as with the first stroke of his discourse to make his listeners dumb and speechless, but the other party will always have some answer to make, and will perhaps raise objections; and then it falls out, that the arguments which should have been reserved for refutation or reply, having been used and tasted beforehand, lose their strength and grace. Thirdly, if a man does not use all his arguments at once, but delivers them in parts, throwing in one after the other, he will detect by the countenance and answer of his opponent how each is taken, and what effect it produces, and he may thence take warning what to suppress and what to select in that which is to follow.

PROVERB.

(16.) If the spirit of the ruler rise up against thee, leave not thy place; for management pacifies great offences²⁸.

Explanation.

This proverb directs a man how to behave when he has incurred the wrath and indignation of his prince, and contains two precepts; first, that he resign not his place; and secondly, that he carefully and prudently apply himself to the remedy, as he would in the case of a serious disease. For generally, when men perceive the anger of princes stirred against them, partly through impatience of disgrace, partly that they may not by their presence irritate the wound, and partly that their princes may see their sorrow and contrition, they withdraw from their offices and appointments, nay sometimes they resign their places and dignities into his hands. But Solomon censures this remedy as injurious, and with good reason. For in the first place it makes the disgrace too public, whereby enemies and enviers become the bolder to attack, and friends the more timid to assist. Secondly, it thus happens that the anger of the prince, which if it had not been divulged might have died away of its own accord, is more deeply rooted, and having as it were commenced by displacing the person proceeds to his overthrow. Lastly, this resignation savours somewhat of a malcontent spirit and one offended with the times which aggravates anger with suspicion. The precepts for the remedy are these; first, let a man take care above all things neither by dullness on the one hand nor high spirit on the other to let it appear that he is insensible to the indignation of the prince, or not properly affected by it: that is, let him compose his countenance not to a sullen gloom but to a grave and modest sadness; and in all his duties and actions let him exhibit less cheerfulness and pleasure. It will be also advantageous for him to engage the assistance and mediation of some friend with the prince, who should take occasion at fit times to insinuate how deeply the offender is grieved. Secondly, let him carefully avoid all, even the slightest occasions, which may lead to the reopening of the subject of offence, or draw upon him fresh indignation or open rebuke, for whatever cause, from the prince. Thirdly, let him diligently seek for every occasion of making his services acceptable to the prince, that he may both show an anxious wish to redeem his past fault, and that the prince may perceive of how good a servant he will be deprived if he loses him. Fourthly, let him either contrive to transfer the fault to others, or insinuate that it was committed with no bad intention, or even let him point out the malice of those who complained of him to the king or exaggerated the matter more than it deserved. Lastly, let him be watchful in everything, and intent on the remedy.

PROVERB.

(17.) He that is first in his own cause is just, then comes the other side, and searches him²⁹.

Explanation.

In every cause the first information, if it have dwelt for a little in the judge's mind, takes deep root, and colours and takes possession of it; insomuch that it will hardly be washed out, unless either some clear falsehood be detected in the matter of the information, or some deceit in the statement thereof. A bare and simple defence, though it be just and of greater weight, will hardly counterbalance the prejudice of the first information, or restore to an equilibrium the scales of justice which have once inclined. Wherefore as it is safest for the judge to know nothing of the merits of the case till both parties are heard together, so it is the best course for the defendant, if he finds the judge prejudiced, to apply himself, as far as the case allows, to detect some fraud or deceit employed by the opposite party to abuse the judge.

PROVERB.

(18.) He that delicately brings up his servant from a child, shall afterwards find him insolent³⁰.

Explanation.

According to the advice of Solomon, princes and masters ought to keep a measure in conferring grace and favour on their servants. In this three points are to be observed; first, that the promotion be by steps, and not by jumps; secondly, that they be accustomed to an occasional disappointment; and thirdly, as Machiavelli well advises, that they should have ever before their eyes some ulterior object of ambition³¹. Otherwise princes will be requited by their servants with disrespect and contumacy instead of duty and gratitude; for sudden promotion begets insolence; continual obtaining of desires begets impatience of refusal; and if there be nothing further to aspire to, there will be an absence of alacrity and industry.

PROVERB.

(19.) Seest thou a man swift of despatch? he shall stand before kings, and shall not be reckoned among the mean³².

Explanation.

Of all the qualities which kings especially look to and require in the choice of their servants, that of despatch and energy in the transactions of business is the most acceptable. Men of deep wisdom are objects of jealousy to kings, as being too close observers, and being able to use their abilities as an engine to turn and wind their masters against their will and knowledge. Popular men are disliked as standing in the light of kings and drawing the eyes of the people upon themselves. Men of great spirit and courage are often accounted turbulent and over-daring. Men of honour and integrity are reputed unmanageable and not pliant enough to all their masters' commands. Lastly, there is no other virtue which does not present some shadow of offence to the minds of kings. Expedition in the execution of their commands is the only one which contains nothing that is not acceptable. Moreover the minds of kings are hasty and impatient of delay; for they imagine that they have power to do what they will; all they want is, that it be done quickly; whence of all things despatch is most pleasing to them.

PROVERB.

(20.) I considered all the living which walk under the sun, with the second child who shall rise in his stead³³.

Explanation.

This proverb remarks upon the vanity of men, who are wont to crowd around the appointed heirs of princes. The root hereof is in that madness, deeply implanted by nature in human minds, of being too fond of their own hopes. For there is scarcely any one but takes more delight in what he hopes for than in what he has. Novelty also is very pleasing to man, and is eagerly sought after. Now in a prince's heir hope and novelty are combined. And this proverb implies the same as that which was said of old, first by Pompey to Sylla, and afterwards by Tiberius respecting Macro. “That there be more who worship the rising than the setting sun³⁴.” And yet princes are not much disturbed at this, nor do they care much for it, as neither Sylla nor Tiberius did; but they rather scorn the fickleness of mankind, and do not care to strive with dreams; and hope, as was said, is but the dream of a waking man³⁵.

PROVERB.

(21.) There was a little city, and few men within it; and there came a great king against it, and built great bulwarks round against it, and besieged it. Now there was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city, yet no man remembered that same poor man³⁶.

Explanation.

This proverb notes the corrupt and ungrateful nature of mankind, who in dis tress and adversity have commonly recourse to the wise and active men, Whom they formerly held in contempt; but as soon as the storm has passed over, they are found ungrateful to their preservers. Machiavelli might well make it a question, “Which was more ungrateful to their benefactors, a prince or a people?³⁷” but meanwhile he implies that both are guilty of ingratitude. But the ingratitude of the prince or the people is not the only cause of this; there is added the envy of nobles, who are secretly displeased with the issue though fortunate and prosperous, because it did not originate in themselves; whence they both depreciate the merit of the work, and depress the author.

PROVERB.

(22.) The way of the slothful is as an hedge of thorns³⁸.

Explanation.

This proverb very elegantly expresses the fact, that sloth is in the end laborious. Diligence and careful preparation remove the obstacles against which the foot would otherwise stumble, and smooth the path before it is entered; but he who is sluggish and defers everything to the last moment of execution, must needs walk every step as it were amidst briars and thorns, which catch and stop him. This likewise may be noted in the management of a family; wherein if care and forethought be used, everything goes on smoothly and of itself, without noise and discord; but if they be wanting, on any important emergency everything has to be done at once, the servants are in con fusion, and the house in an uproar.

PROVERB.

(23.) To have respect of persons in judgment is not good; for, for a piece of bread will that man forsake the truth³⁹.

Explanation.

This proverb most wisely marks that in a judge facility of disposition is more pernicious than bribery; for it is not every one that offers a bribe, but there is scarcely a case wherein something may not be found to bias the mind of the judge, if he be a respecter of persons. One man will be respected because he is popular; another because he has a shrewd tongue; another because he is rich; another because he is agreeable; another because he is recommended by a friend. In fine, where respect of persons prevails, there will be unequal measures everywhere, and for the most trifling reason, as it were for a morsel of bread, judgment will be perverted.

PROVERB.

(24.) A poor man that oppresses the poor, is like a sweeping rain, which causes famine⁴⁰.

Explanation.

This proverb was anciently figured and represented under the fable of the full and hungry horseleech; for the oppression of a poor and hungry man is far more severe than that of a rich and full one, inasmuch as the former practises all the arts of exactions, and searches every corner for money. The same used also to be likened to a sponge, which when dry sucks in strongly, but not so when wet. And it contains a useful warning for princes and peoples; for princes, that they commit not offices or the government of provinces to needy persons and such as are in debt; for peoples, that they allow not their rulers to be too much in want of money.

PROVERB.

(25.) A righteous man falling down before the wicked is as a troubled fountain and a corrupt spring⁴¹.

Explanation.

This proverb teaches that an unjust and scandalous judgment in any conspicuous and weighty cause is above all things to be avoided in a state; especially where it involves, not the acquittal of the guilty, but the condemnation of the innocent. For particular injuries passing unpunished do indeed trouble and pollute the waters of justice, but it is only in the streamlets; whereas unjust judgments, such as we spoke of, infect and corrupt the very fountain-heads. For when the judgment seat takes the part of injustice, there succeeds a state of general robbery, and men turn wolves to each other, according to the adage⁴².

PROVERB.

(26.) Make no friendship with an angry man, and walk not with a furious man⁴³.

Explanation.

The more religiously the laws of friendship are to be observed and honoured among good men, the more care should be taken to make a prudent selection of friends at the first. Now the disposition and manners of our friends, so far as they affect ourselves only, should by all means be borne with; but when they compel us to alter our bearing and deportment towards other men, the condition of the friendship becomes very hard and unfair. Wherefore, as Solomon advises, it is of the first importance for the peace and security of life to have no dealings with passionate men, or such as easily engage in disputes and quarrels; for they will perpetually involve us in strife and faction, so that we shall be compelled either to break off our friendship, or disregard our own safety.

PROVERB.

(27.) He that covers a transgression seeks friendship, but he that repeats a matter separates very friends⁴⁴.

Explanation.

There are two ways of making peace and reconciling differences; the one begins with an amnesty, the other with a recital of injuries, combined with apologies and excuses. Now, I remember that it was the opinion of a very wise man and a great politician, that “he who negotiates a peace, without recapitulating the grounds of difference, rather deludes the minds of the parties by representing the sweetness of concord, than reconciles them by equitable adjustment”. But Solomon, a wiser man than he, is of a contrary opinion, approving of amnesty and forbidding recapitulation of the past. For in it are these disadvantages; it is as the chafing of a sore; it creates the risk of a new quarrel, (for the parties will never agree as to the proportions of injuries on either side); and lastly, it brings it to a matter of apologies; whereas either party would rather be thought to have forgiven an injury than to have accepted an excuse.

PROVERB.

(28.) In every good work there is abundance; but where there are many words there is commonly penury⁴⁵.

Explanation.

Herein Solomon makes a distinction between the fruit of the labour of the hand and that of the tongue; from the one proceeds abundance, from the other penury. For it generally happens that they who talk much, boast much, and make many promises, are needy persons, who make no profit of the things whereof they discourse. For the most part also they are no ways industrious and active in point of work, but merely feed and fill themselves with words, as with wind. Surely, as the poet says, “He that is silent is sure⁴⁶”; —he who knows that he is succeeding in what he is about, is satisfied and holds his tongue; whereas he who feels that he has got hold of nothing but wind, betakes himself to talking and boasting.

PROVERB.

(29.) Open rebuke is better than secret love⁴⁷.

Explanation.

This proverb rebukes the mistaken kindness of friends, who do not use the privilege of friendship freely and boldly to admonish their friends, as well of their errors as their dangers. “What can I do,” says a man of this character, “or what steps can I take? I love him as much as any one, and if any misfortune were to befall him I would gladly substitute myself in his place; but I know his disposition well; if I deal freely with him I shall offend him, or at all events put him out of humour, and do no good by it; and I should sooner estrange him from his friendship for me, than from those things which he has fixed his heart upon.” Now a friend of this sort Solomon reprehends as weak and useless, affirming that more advantage may be gained from an open enemy than from such a man; for a man may chance to hear by way of reproach from an enemy, what the friend is too good-natured to utter.

PROVERB.

(30.) A wise man looketh well to his ways, but a fool turneth to deceit⁴⁸.

Explanation.

There are two kinds of wisdom; the one true and sound, the other degenerate and false, which Solomon does not hesitate to term folly. He who applies himself to the former takes heed of his own ways, foreseeing dangers, preparing remedies, employing the assistance of the good, guarding himself against the wicked, cautious in entering upon a work, not unprepared for a retreat, watchful to seize opportunities, strenuous to remove impediments, and attending to many other things which concern the government of his own actions and proceedings. But the other kind is entirely made up of deceits and cunning tricks, laying all its hopes in the circumventing of others, and moulding them to its pleasure; which kind the proverb denounces as being not only dishonest, but also foolish. For in the first place, it is not among the things which are in our own power, nor does it even depend on any certain rule; but fresh stratagems are daily to be contrived, as the old ones are used up and worn out. Secondly, a man who has once earned a character for deceit and trickery, entirely loses one of the principal instruments of business, which is credit; whence he will find everything turn out otherwise than he expects. Lastly, these very arts, however fair and specious they may appear, generally fail: as Tacitus has well remarked, “Bold and crafty counsels are fair in promise, hard in execution, and unfortunate in issue⁴⁹”.

PROVERB.

(31.) Be not righteous overmuch, neither make thyself over wise; why shouldest thou destroy thyself before thy time⁵⁰.

Explanation.

“There are seasons,” says Tacitus⁵¹, “wherein great virtues are the surest causes of ruin.” And upon men eminent for virtue and justice it comes sometimes suddenly, sometimes long foreseen. But if they have also the gift of wisdom, that is, if they are cautious and watchful for their own safety, they gain this advantage; that their ruin comes upon them all at once and entirely through dark and secret plots, whereby envy is avoided, and destruction assails them unawares. But with regard to that overmuch which the proverb speaks of (as these are not the words of a Periander, but of Solomon, who, though he often takes notice of what is bad in human life, never enjoins it), we must not understand it of virtue itself (in which there can be no overmuch), but of the vain and invidious affectation and show thereof. Something of the same kind is suggested by Tacitus in speaking of Lepidus; placing it in the light of a miracle that he never uttered a servile opinion, and yet lived safely in such dangerous times: “The thought occurs to me,” says he, “whether these things are controlled by fate, or whether it is in our power to steer an intermediate course between slavish obedience and abrupt contumacy, free alike from danger and from indignity⁵²”

PROVERB.

(32.) Give opportunity to a wise man, and he will increase his wisdom⁵³.

Explanation.

Here distinction is made, between the wisdom which is grown and ripened into a true habit, and that which floats only in the conceit of the brain, or is boasted in talk and has no deep root. The former, upon occasion presented for its exercise, is instantly excited, made alert, and enlarged, so that it appears greater than it was; but the latter, which before the occasion was eager and active, when the emergency occurs, becomes amazed and confused; so that even he who considered himself possessed of it, begins to doubt whether the notions he had formed of it were not mere dreams and idle speculations.

PROVERB.

(33.) He who praises his friend with a loud voice, rising early in the morning, it shall be counted a curse to him⁵⁴.

Explanation.

Praises, when moderate and seasonable, and expressed on fit occasion, contribute greatly both to the reputation and fortune of men; but when immoderate, noisy, and unseasonably lavished, they do no good; nay rather (if we believe the Proverb), they do great harm. For in the first place they openly betray themselves as either springing from excessive partiality, or got up and affected for the purpose of gratifying the object of them by false encomiums, rather than of honouring him with his just attributes. Secondly, sparing and moderate praises generally invite the audience to add something to them; whereas lavish and immoderate praises provoke them to take off and detract. Thirdly (which is the principal point), he that is over-praised becomes an object of envy; for all excessive praises seem to point to the reproach of others who are no less deserving.

PROVERB.

(34.) As the face is reflected in the water, so is the heart of man manifest to the wise⁵⁵.

Explanation.

Here is distinguished between the mind of a wise man, and that of others; the former being compared to water or a glass which represents the forms and images of things; the other to the earth, or an unpolished stone, which gives no reflection. And this comparison of the mind of a wise man to a glass is the more proper; because in a glass he can see his own image together with the images of others, which the eye itself without a glass cannot do. But if the mind of a wise man is sufficiently large to observe and distinguish an infinite variety of dispositions and characters, it only remains to take care that the application be as various as the representation. “A wise man will know how to adapt himself to all sorts of characters⁵⁶.”

Thus have I stayed perhaps somewhat longer on these Proverbs of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example, being led on by the dignity of the subject, and the renown of the author. Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the ancients, that as men found out any observation which they thought good for life, they would gather it and express it in some short proverb, parable, or fable. Fables, as has been said elsewhere, were formerly substitutes and supplements of examples, but now that the times abound with history, the aim is more true and active when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing, which of all others is fittest for such variable argument as that of negotiation and scattered occasions, is that which Machiavelli most wisely and aptly chose for government; namely, Observations or Discourses upon Histories and Examples. For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particulars knows best the way back to particulars again; and it contributes much more to practice, when the discourse or discussion attends on the example, than when the example attends upon the discourse. And this is not only a point of order, but of substance also. For when the example is laid down as the ground of the discourse, it is set down with all the attendant circumstances, which may sometimes correct the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for imitation and practice; whereas examples alleged for the sake of the discourse are cited succinctly and without particularity, and like slaves only wait upon the demands of the discourse.

But it is worth while to observe this difference; that as Histories of Times are the best ground for such discourse upon governments as Machiavelli handles; so Histories of Lives are the most proper for discourse on business, because they include all kinds of occasions and transactions, both great and small. Nay, we may find a ground for discourse on business fitter than them both, which is discourse upon such Letters as are wise and weighty, like those of Cicero to Atticus, and others; for letters have a closer and more lively representation of business, than either annals or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this first part of the knowledge of negotiation touching scattered occasions, which we note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this knowledge, which differs as much from that whereof we have spoken, as general wisdom differs from wisdom for oneself; the one moving as it were from the centre to the circumference, the other from the circumference to the centre. For there is a wisdom of imparting counsel to others, and there is a wisdom of foresight for one's own fortunes; and these sometimes meet, but oftener sever. For many are wise in their own ways, who yet are weak for government or counsel, like ants, which are wise creatures for themselves, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom for oneself the Romans, though excellent guardians of their country, took much knowledge of; “For,” says the comic poet, “a wise man fashions his fortune for himself⁵⁷”. And it grew into an adage amongst them, “Every man is the maker of his own fortune”. And Livy attributes it to the elder Cato, “Such was his vigour of mind and understanding, that wherever he had been born he would have made his fortune⁵⁸”.

This kind of wisdom, if it be too much declared and professed, has always been regarded as not only impolitic, but unlucky and ill-omened; as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who having done many great services to the state in his government, and giving the customary account thereof to the people, concluded every particular with this clause, “And in this fortune had no part⁵⁹”. But it happened that he never prospered in anything he took in hand afterwards; for this is too high and too arrogant, savpuring of that which Ezekiel says of Pharaoh, “Thou sayest, my river is mine own, and I have made it for myself⁶⁰”; or of that which Habakkuk says, “They exult and offer sacrifices to their net⁶¹”; or of that which the poet expresses of Mezentius the despiser of the gods:—

Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro Nunc adsint⁶².

Lastly, Julius Cæsar never, as far as I recollect, betrayed the weakness of his secret thoughts, except in a similar kind of speech. For when the augur brought him word that the entrails were not favourable, he murmured in a low voice, “They will be more favourable when I choose⁶³”; which speech did not long precede the misfortune of his death. For this excess of confidence was ever as unlucky as unhallowed; and therefore great and truly wise men have thought it right to ascribe their successes to their fortune, and not to their skill or energy. Thus Sylla surnamed himself “the Fortunate⁶⁴”, not “the great”; and Gæsar (better in this instance than the last) said to the master of the ship, “You carry Cæsar and his fortune⁶⁵”.

Nevertheless, proverbs such as these, “Every man is the architect of his own fortune”; “A wise man shall rule over the stars;” “No path is impervious to virtue⁶⁶; “and the like; if taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to insolence, rather to beget in men resolution and strength of judgment than arrogance or outward declaration, have ever been rightly held round and good, and are doubtless imprinted in the greatest minds, so as sometimes they can scarce contain such opinions within; as we see in Augustus Cæsar, (who, compared with his uncle, was rather unlike than inferior, though decidedly a man of more moderation), how on his death-bed he desired his friends around him to give him a “Plaudite” when he expired, as if he were conscious to himself that he had well played his part in life⁶⁷. This part of knowledge I report also as deficient; not but that it is used and practised even more than is fit, but it has not been handled in books. And therefore according to my custom, I will as before set down some heads or passages of it, and call it the Architect of Fortune, or the Knowledge of Advancement in Life.

Wherein at first sight I shall appear to handle a new and unwonted argument, in teaching men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine indeed, wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he has experience of the difficulty thereof. For the things necessary for the acquisition of fortune are neither fewer or less difficult nor lighter than those to obtain virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politician, as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerns learning greatly, both in honour and sub stance; in honour principally, that pragmatical men may not imagine that learning is like a lark, which can mount and sing and please itself and nothing else; but may know that it rather partakes of the nature of a hawk, which can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon its prey at pleasure. Again, it tends to the perfection of learning, because it is the perfect law of the inquiry of truth, “that nothing be in the globe of matter which has not its parallel in the globe of crystal or the understanding”; that is, that there be nothing in practice, whereof there is no theory and doctrine. Not however that learning admires or esteems this architecture of fortune otherwise than as an inferior work. For no man's fortune can be an end worthy of the gift of being that has been given him by God; and often the worthiest men abandon their fortunes willingly, that they may have leisure for higher pursuits. But nevertheless, fortune as an instrument of virtue and merit deserves its own speculation and doctrine.

To this doctrine are attached certain precepts, some summary, and some scattered or various; whereof the former relate to the just knowledge of ourselves and others. Let the first precept then (on which the knowledge of others turns) be set down as this: that we obtain (as far as we can) that window which Momus required⁶⁸; who seeing in the frame of man's heart such angles and recesses found fault that there was not a window to look into its mysterious and tortuous windings. This window we shall obtain by carefully procuring good information of the particular persons with whom we have to deal; their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, with their principal means of support and influence; so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, where they lie most open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, patrons and clients; their enemies, enviers, and competitors; their moods and times;

(Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noris)⁶⁹:

lastly, their principles, fashions, prescribed rules, and the like; and this not only of particular persons, but also of the particular actions which are on foot from time to time, and as it were under the anvil; how they are directed and succeed, by whom promoted or opposed, what is their weight and importance, what consequences they involve, and the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons will be very treacherous and erroneous; for men change with actions, and whilst they are involved and engaged in them they are one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These informations of particulars touching persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no truth or excellence of observations or axioms (whence the major political propositions are drawn) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error in the minor proposition. For the possibility of this knowledge Solomon is our surety; who says, “Counsel in the heart of man is like deep water, but a man of understanding will draw it out⁷⁰”. And although the knowledge itself falls not under precept, because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for obtaining it may be laid down with advantage.

Knowledge of men may be derived and obtained in six ways; by their countenances and expressions, their words, their actions, their dispositions, their ends, and lastly, by the reports of others. With regard to the countenance, be not influenced by the old adage, “Trust not to a man's face⁷¹”; for though this may not be wrongly said of the general outward carriage of the face and action, yet there are some more subtle motions and labours of the eyes, mouth, countenance, and gesture, by which (as Q. Cicero elegantly expresses it), the “door of the mind⁷²” is unlocked and opened. Who more close than Tiberius Cæsar? Yet Tacitus, in noting the different character and manner of speaking which he employed in commending the exploits of Germanicus and Drusus to the Senate, says, that his praises of Germanicus were set forth “in words which appeared rather studied for outward effect, than as if he really felt them”; but of his praises of Drusus, he says, “that he said less, but spoke more earnestly and sincerely⁷³”. Again, Tacitus in speaking of this same Tiberius, and remarking on some speech, as being somewhat less ambiguous, says, “At other times he appeared to have a difficulty with his words, but he spoke more freely when he took anybody's part⁷⁴”; so that it is hard to find any man so skilled and perfect in the art of dissimulation, or any countenance so controlled or commanded (as he calls it) as to sever from a feigned and dissembling tale all these marks, and prevent the style from being either more careless, or more adorned, or more tedious and wandering, or more dry and hard, than usual.

As for words, though they be (as physicians say of waters) full of trickery and deceit, yet they are excellently detected in two ways; namely, either when they are spoken on the sudden, or in passion. Thus we see Tiberius, being suddenly incensed at some stinging words of Agrippina, and thrown a little off his guard, advanced a step out of his natural dissimulation. “These words (says Tacitus) drew from him a voice seldom heard from that dark bosom, and taking her up sharply, he reminded her in a Greek verse that she was thus offended, because she did not reign⁷⁵”. And therefore the poet elegantly calls passions “tortures”, which urge men to confess their secrets:

Vino tortus et irâ⁷⁶.

And experience shows that there are very few men so true to their own secrets, and so settled in their purpose, but that sometimes through anger, sometimes through bravado, sometimes through affection for their friends, sometimes through a weakness of mind unable any longer to bear the burden of its thoughts, and sometimes through some other affection, they open and communicate their secret thoughts and feelings; especially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the Spanish proverb, “Tell a lie, and find a truth”.

Neither should deeds, though the most assured pledges which the human mind can give, be entirely trusted, without a judicious and careful consideration of their magnitude and nature. For the saying is most true, “that fraud begins by winning credit in small things, that it may deceive with greater advantage⁷⁷”; and the Italian thinks himself upon the point of being bought and sold, if he is better used than he was wont to be, without manifest cause⁷⁸. For small favours do but quiet and lull to sleep men's caution and industry, whence they are rightly called by Demosthenes, “sops to feed sloth⁷⁹”. Again, the treacherous and ambiguous character of some deeds, even such as are taken for favours, may be seen from that deception which Mucianus practised on Antonius Primus; when after the hollow and unfaithful reconciliation which was made between them, he advanced many of the friends of Antonius to great offices: “At the same time he bestows on his friends tribuneships and governments⁸⁰”; wherein under pretence of strengthening Antonius, he entirely disarmed and isolated him by winning his friends.

But the surest key to unlock the minds of men is by searching and thoroughly understanding either their natures and characters, or their intentions and ends; wherein the weaker and more simple sort are best interpreted by their natures, but the wiser and more reserved by their ends. For it was both pleasantly and wisely said, though I think very untruly, by a nuncio of the Pope, on his return from an embassy to a certain nation, where he had served as legate; who, when his opinion was asked touching the appointment of his successor, gave as his advice, “in no case to send one who was remarkably wise, but one rather of moderate abilities; because (said he) no very vase man would ever imagine what they in that country were likely to do”. And certainly it is a very frequent error, especially among wise men, to measure others by the standard of their own genius, and to shoot over the mark, by supposing that men have deeper ends in view, and more subtle schemes than ever entered into their minds; as is elegantly expressed by the Italian proverb, which remarks, “There is always less money, less wisdom, and less faith, than men imagine⁸¹”. Wherefore in men of a meaner capacity, because they do many foolish things, we must form our opinion rather from the propensities of their natures, than from their designs and ends.

Princes also (though for a very different reason) are best interpreted by their natures, but private persons by their ends. For princes, being at the summit of human desires, have for the most part no particular ends whereto they earnestly and constantly aspire, by their position and distance from which a measure and scale of the rest of their actions might be taken; and this is one of the principal causes why their hearts are (as the Scriptures declare) inscrutable⁸². But every private person is like a traveller striving earnestly to arrive at the end of his journey where he may rest; whereby it is not difficult to conjecture what he will do, and what he will not do. For if it be a means to his end he will probably do it; but if opposed to his end, he will probably not do it. Nor is it enough to inform ourselves only of the variety of men's natures and ends simply; but we should also examine them comparatively, and find what it is that predominates and directs the rest. Thus, we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in providing pleasures and catering to Nero's humours, “he wrought” (says Tacitus) “on Nero's fears⁸³”, whereby he displaced his rival.

As for the knowing of men at second hand from the reports of others, a few words will suffice. Men's weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from their servants, their opinions and thoughts from their familiar friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the judgments of superiors are not much to be trusted; for to them men are more masked. “The truest character comes from a man's own household⁸⁴.”

But to all this inquiry the most compendious way rests in three things; the first is to have a general acquaintance with those who have a varied and extensive knowledge both of persons and things; but especially to endeavour to have at least some particular friends who, according to the diversity of business and the diversity of persons, can give perfect and solid intelligence in every several kind. The second is to keep a discreet temper and mediocrity both in liberty of speech and in secrecy; in most cases using liberty, but secrecy when the occasion requires it. For liberty of speech invites and provokes a similar liberty in others, and so brings much to a man's knowledge; but secrecy induces trust, so that men like to deposit their secrets there, as in their own bosom. The last is the gradual reducing of a man's self to such a watchful and ready habit of mind, that in every conference and action he may both carry on the matter in hand, and also observe other incidents. For as Epictetus lays down that a philosopher in every particular action should say to himself, “I both wish to do this, and also to keep to my rule⁸⁵”: so a political man in everything should inwardly resolve, “I will both do this, and learn something more for future use.” Wherefore those who are so intent and absorbed in the matter which they have in hand, that they have not even a thought to spare for anything that may turn up by the way (which Montaigne confesses to have been his weakness⁸⁶), are indeed the best servants of kings and commonwealths, but fail in advancing their own fortunes. Meanwhile special care should be taken to restrain too great an energy and zeal of mind, lest by much knowledge we be drawn on to much meddling, than which nothing is more unfortunate and rash. So that this variety of knowledge of persons and things, which I recommend to be gained, returns in the end only to this, that we make a more judicious choice of the actions we undertake, and of the persons whose assistance we use; whereby we may manage and conduct everything with more safety and dexterity.

Next to the knowledge of others comes the knowledge of self. And here we must use even greater care in gaining good and accurate information touching ourselves, than touching others; since the oracle “know thyself” is not only a rule of universal wisdom, but has a special place in politics. For St. James says well, “That he who looks at his face in a glass, yet suddenly forgets what manner of man he was⁸⁷”; so that there is need of very frequent inspection. And this holds good likewise in politics, though the glasses are different; for the divine glass in which we ought to behold ourselves is the Word of God, but the political glass is nothing else than the state of the world or times wherein we live.

Men ought therefore to take an accurate and impartial survey of their own abilities, virtues, and helps; and again, of their wants, inabilities, and impediments; making the account in such a manner that the former are always estimated rather more, and the latter rather less than they really are. From this examination they should frame the following considerations.

First, to consider how their natural and moral constitution sort with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and consonant, then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty, and indulge their dispositions; but if there be anything differing and discordant, then in the whole course of their life to be more close, retired, and reserved. And this we see in Tiberius, who being conscious that his tastes did not well suit with the age, never attended the public games, and during the twelve last years of his life never even went into the Senate; whereas Augustus lived ever in men's eyes, which Tacitus observes: “Tiberius's habits (says he) were different⁸⁸”. Pericles also acted on the same principle.

Secondly, to consider how their nature sorts with the professions and courses of life which are in use and repute, and whereof they have to make election; so that if their profession is not already determined, they may make choice of that which is most fit and agreeable to their disposition; but if they have already entered on a path of life for which they are not naturally suited, that they may leave it the first opportunity, and adopt a fresh profession. And this we see was done by Valentine Borgia⁸⁹, who was brought up by his father to the priesthood, but afterwards quitted it in obedience to his own inclination, and betook himself to a military life; although equally unworthy of the office of prince and priest, seeing that he dishonoured both.

Thirdly, to consider how they sort with their equals and rivals, whom they are like to have as competitors in their fortune; and to take that course of life wherein there is the greatest scarcity of distinguished men, and they themselves are likely to be most eminent. As Julius Cæsar did, who at first was an orator and pleader, and devoted himself entirely to a civil life; but when he saw how Cicero, Hortensius, and Catulus excelled in eloquence, and that there was no man of any great reputation in military matters but Pompey, he forsook the course he had begun, and bidding a long farewell to a civil greatness, transferred his designs to the arts of a soldier and a general; whereby he mounted to the highest power of the state⁹⁰.

Fourthly, to consider their own nature and disposition in the choice of their friends and dependences. For different natures require different kinds of friends: to some is suited such as are solemn and silent; to others such as are bold and arrogant, and so on. And it is worthy of mark what kind of men the friends of Julius Cæsar were (namely, Antony, Hirtius, Pansa, Oppius, Balbus, Dola-bella, Pollio, and the rest), who used to swear, “that they were ready to die, so Cæsar might live⁹¹”, displaying an infinite affection for Cæsar, but arrogance and contempt towards every one else; men active in the execution of business, but of no great character or reputation.

Fifthly, to take especial heed how they guide themselves by examples, and not vainly to endeavour to frame themselves upon other men's models; as if what is open to others must needs be open to them, not at all reflecting how far the nature and character of their models may differ from their own. And it was this error into which Pompey evidently fell, who, as Cicero has recorded, was so often wont to say, “Sylla could do this, why should not I⁹²?” Wherein he was much deceived, the nature and proceedings of himself and Sylla being as far removed as the heaven from the earth; the one being fierce, violent, and in everything pressing on to the end; the other solemn, respectful of the laws, and regulating everything with a view to his dignity and character, which made him far less strong and effectual in accomplishing his designs. There are likewise other precepts of this nature, but these will be enough for an example of the rest.

But it is not enough for a man only to know himself; for he should consider also of the best way to set himself forth to advantage; to disclose and reveal himself; and lastly, to turn and shape himself according to occasion. Now for the first we see nothing more usual than for the worse man to make the better external show. It is therefore no unimportant attribute of prudence in a man to be able to set forth to advantage before others, with grace and skill, his virtues, fortunes, and merits (which may be done without arrogance or breeding disgust); and again, to cover artificially his weaknesses, defects, misfortunes, and disgraces; dwelling upon the former and turning them to the light, sliding from the latter or explaining them away by apt interpretations, and the like. Tacitus says of Mucianus, the wisest and most active politician of his time, “That he had a certain art of setting forth to advantage every thing he said or did⁹³”. And it requires indeed some art, lest it become wearisome and contemptible; but yet it is true that ostentation, though carried to the first degree of vanity, is rather a vice in morals than in policy. For as it is said of calumny “calumniate boldly, for some of it will stick,” so it may be said of ostentation (except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity), “boldly sound your own praises, and some of them will stick”. It will stick with the more ignorant and the populace, though men of wisdom may smile at it; and the reputation won with many will amply countervail the disdain of a few. But if this self-display whereof I am speaking be carried with decency and judgment, as with a natural, candid, and ingenuous bearing; or if it be employed in times of danger, as by military persons in the time of war, or at times when others are most envied; or if what a man says in his own praises appears to drop carelessly and unintentionally, without being dwelt upon too long or too seriously; or if a man at the same time that he praises does not refrain from ridiculing and finding fault with himself; or if he do it not spontaneously, but appears provoked and challenged to it by the reproaches and insolence of others, it adds greatly to his reputation. And surely no small number of those who are of a solid nature, and who from the want of this vento-sity cannot spread all sail in pursuit of their own honour, suffer some prejudice and lose dignity by their moderation.

But for this enhancement of virtue, though some persons of weaker judgment and perhaps too scrupulous morality may disapprove of it, yet no one will deny that we ought at least to take care that virtue be not undervalued and unduly debased through neglect. This depreciation in the price of virtue may be effected in three ways: first, by a man offering and obtruding himself and his services in any business when he is unasked and uncalled for; wherein men think he is rewarded, if he be not rejected. Secondly, by doing too much at the commencement of an action, and by performing all at once what ought to be done by degrees; which in matters well managed procures a premature favour at first, but in the end induces satiety. Thirdly, by feeling too soon and easily the fruit of virtue in commendation, applause, honour, and favour, and being content therewith; on which there is a prudent warning, “Take care lest you appear unaccustomed to great things if you are thus delighted by a small thing, as if it were great⁹⁴”.

But a diligent covering of defects is of no less importance than a prudent and skilful display of virtues. Defects may be principally concealed in three ways, and as it were under three coverts; namely, caution, colour, and confidence. Caution is, when men discreetly avoid those things to which they are not equal; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits thrust themselves without reflection into matters of which they have no experience, and so publish and proclaim all their defects. Colour is, when men warily and skilfully make and prepare a way for themselves, for a favourable and convenient construction of their faults or wants; as proceeding from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose, than is commonly imagined. For as to the concealment of vice, it is well said by the poet, that “vice often hides itself in the neighbourhood of virtue⁹⁵”. And therefore, whatsoever want a man has, he must take care to borrow the mask and colour of the neighbouring virtue that shadows it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so on. It will be of advantage also for a man to frame and spread abroad some probable reason why he shrunk from doing his best, that the want of power may be imputed to want of will. As to confidence, it is indeed an impudent, but yet the surest and most effectual remedy; namely, for a man to profess to depreciate and despise whatsoever he cannot obtain; after the principle of prudent merchants, whose business and custom it is to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down the price of others. But there is a confidence which surpasses this other in impudence; and this is, for a man to brazen out his own defects, by putting them forward and displaying them to view; as if he believed himself especially eminent in those things wherein he is deficient. And the more easily to impose on others, he should appear to have least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is really the best: just as we see it is the practice of poets, who when they recite their verses, and you except to any, will immediately say “that that line cost them more labour than any of the rest”; and presently they will bring forward some other verse, which they know well enough to be the best in the number and the least open to objection, and seeming to suspect it themselves they will ask your opinion of it. But above all, if a man means to make a good figure and maintain his just position in the world, I consider it of the greatest importance to him, not to show himself disarmed and exposed to scorn and injury by too much goodness and sweetness of nature; but rather in everything to exhibit from time to time some sparks of a free and noble spirit and one that carries with it no less of the sting than of the honey. This kind of fortified carriage, with a spirit ready and prepared to defend itself against insults, is sometimes accidentally forced upon men by something inherent in their person or fortune; as in the case of persons deformed, illegitimate, or disgraced. Whence men of this nature, if ability be not wanting, commonly turn out fortunate.

With regard to the disclosing of a man's self, it is a very different thing from the self-display of which I have been speaking. For it relates not to a man's virtues or faults, but to his particular actions in life; wherein there is nothing more politic for a man than to preserve a sound and wise mediocrity in declaring or concealing his meaning in particular actions. For although depth of secrecy and concealment of designs, and that manner of action which effects everything by dark arts and methods (or menées sourdes as the French call them), be both useful and admirable; yet frequently, as is said, dissimulation breeds errors which ensnare the dissembler himself. Whence we see that the greatest and most noted politicians have not hesitated to declare freely and undisguisedly the objects which they had in view. So Lucius Sylla made open profession “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies”. So Cæsar, when he first went into Gaul, did not scruple to profess, “that he had rather be first in a village than second in Rome⁹⁶”. And again, as soon as he had begun the war, he by no means played the part of a dissembler, if we may judge by what Cicero says of him, “The other (meaning Cæsar) does not refuse, but rather demands to be called a tyrant, as he really is⁹⁷”. So we see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, how little of a dissembler Augustus Cæsar was; for on his very entrance into public life, when he was still the darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people he would use this form of oath; “As I hope to attain to the honours of my parent⁹⁸”; which was nothing less than the tyranny. It is true indeed that to lessen the envy of it, he would at the same time stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Julius Cæsar which was erected in the place; whereat men laughed, and applauded, and wondered, and said to one another, “What is this? What sort of young man is this?” and yet thought a man could mean no mischief who spoke his feelings so openly and ingenuously. Now all these, whom I have mentioned, were prosperous; whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and dissembling manner (as Tacitus says of him, “A more reserved, but not a better character⁹⁹”; wherein Sallust concurs, “Of honest tongue and shameless mind¹⁰⁰”), made it his design, and attempted by innumerable intrigues to keep his own ambition and desires quite secret, and in the mean time to drive the state into such anarchy and confusion that it should be forced of necessity to cast itself into his arms, and the sovereign power might thus be thrust upon him, apparently against his will and inclination. But when he had brought it, as he thought, to this point, when he was chosen sole consul (as no one had ever been before), yet was he no way nearer to his ends; because they who certainly would have assisted him did not understand what he wanted; so that in the end he was fain to go on the common and beaten track of procuring arms and raising an army under colour of opposing Cæsar; so tedious, uncertain, and mostly unfortunate are those designs which are concealed beneath a deep dissimulation. And this appears to have been the feeling of Tacitus, when he constitutes the artifices of dissimulation as a wisdom of an inferior form to the arts of true policy, attributing the former to Tiberius, but the latter to Augustus; for speaking of Livia, he says, “That she was equally suited to the arts of her husband, and the dissimulation of her son¹⁰¹”.

With regard to turning and shaping the mind, we must strive with all possible endeavour to render the mind obedient to occasions and opportunities, and to be no ways obstinate and refractory towards them. For nothing hinders men's actions or fortunes so much as this, “to remain the same, when the same is unbecoming¹⁰²”; that is, for men to be as they were, and follow their own nature, when occasions change: whence Livy, in introducing Cato the Elder, as a most skilful architect of his fortune, adds well of him, “That he had a wit that could turn¹⁰³”. This also is the reason why grave and solemn wits, which know not how to change, have generally more dignity than good fortune. But this viscous and knotty temper which is so averse to change is nature in some; in others it is the result of habit (which is a second nature), and an opinion (which easily steals into men's minds), namely, that men can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change that course which they have found by experience to be prosperous and successful. For Machiavelli notes wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have retained to the last his old habit of temporising and protracting the war, when the nature of the war was altered and required more vigorous measures¹⁰⁴. In others again the fault arises from weakness of judgment, that they do not discern in time when things or actions have reached a period, but come in too late, when the occasion has passed by; as Demosthenes says, when in reproving the Athenians he compares them to country fellows, who, in playing in the fencing school, when they have received a blow, always remove their shield to that ward, and not before¹⁰⁵. In others again it is a dislike to lose their labours in the path which they have once entered, and an unwillingness to sound the retreat, with a confidence that by perseverance they will overcome the occasion. But from whatsoever root this stubbornness and restiveness of mind proceeds, it is a thing most prejudicial to man's actions and fortunes; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of the mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune. And so much for the two summary precepts of this Architecture of Fortune; whereof the scattered precepts are numerous, but I will select a few for example's sake.

The first precept is that the carpenter of fortune should make a good use and a right application of his rule; that is, that he should accustom his mind to judge of the proportion and value of all things, as they conduce more or less to his fortune and ends, and that he do this substantially, not superficially. It is a thing strange, but true, that the logical part (if I may so term it) of many men's minds is good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can judge well enough of the consequences, but most unskilfully of the values of things; whence it happens that some take delight in private and secret converse with princes, others in popular fame and applause, supposing them to be things of great value; whereas in many cases they are full both of envy and peril. Others again measure things according to the labour and difficulty bestowed upon them, and think if they be only moving they must needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar said ironically of Cato of Utica, when he describes how laborious and assiduous and indefatigable he was to no great purpose, “All these things he did with much earnestness¹⁰⁶”. Hence too it comes that men often deceive themselves, in thinking that if they procure the assistance of any man of worth and reputation, they are certain to succeed; whereas it is not the greatest but the fittest instruments that finish the work both quickest and best. Now for the true information of the mathematical part of the mind, it is worth while to know and have a description of what should be set down first for the raising and advancing of a man's own fortune, what second, and so on. First I set down the amendment of the mind; for the removing of impediments and working out the knots of the mind will sooner open the passage to fortune, than the obtaining of fortune will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down wealth and means, which many perhaps would have placed first, because of their great use in everything; but that opinion I may condemn, for the reason which Machia-velli gave in a case not much unlike. For whereas there was an old proverb, “that money is the sinews of war¹⁰⁷”, yet he maintained on the contrary that the true sinews of war are nothing else than the sinews of a valiant and military people. And so in like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not money that is the sinews of fortune, but it is rather the sinews of the mind, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In the third place, I set down character and reputation, the rather because they have certain tides and seasons, which if they be not taken in due time are difficult to be recovered, it being extremely hard to restore a falling reputation. And lastly, I place honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three, much more by all combined, than if you begin with honour, and then proceed to the rest. But as it is of no little consequence to preserve order in matter, so it is of no less consequence to preserve order in time, the confusion whereof is one of the commonest errors; while men fly to their ends, when they should only be attending to their beginnings; and carelessly passing over the things which lie before them they rush at once to the highest and greatest of all; whereas it is a good precept, “Attend to present business¹⁰⁸”.

A second precept is to beware of being carried by an excess of magnanimity and confidence to things beyond our strength, and not to row against the stream. It is excellent counsel regarding men's fortunes, “Be ruled by the Fates and the Gods¹⁰⁹”; for we ought to look round and observe where things lie open to us and where they are closed and obstructed, where they are difficult and where easy, that we may not waste our strength on things to which convenient access is forbidden. For in this way we shall avoid repulse, not occupy ourselves too much about one matter, earn a character for moderation, offend fewer persons, and get the credit of continual success; whilst things which would perhaps have happened of themselves will be attributed to our industry.

The third precept seems to be somewhat repugnant to the former two, though not so if rightly understood. The nature of it is this, that we should not always wait for occasions, but sometimes challenge and induce them; and it is that to which Demosthenes alludes in high terms, “In the same manner as it is a received principle that the general should lead the army, so should wise men lead affairs, causing things to be done which they think good, and not themselves waiting upon events¹¹⁰”. For if we diligently observe, we shall find two different kinds of sufficiency in performing actions and managing business. Some can make an apt use of occasions, but plot or invent nothing of themselves; others are wholly bent on their own plots, but cannot take advantage of accidental opportunities; either of which abilities without the other is very lame and imperfect.

A fourth precept is to undertake nothing which of necessity takes up a great quantity of time, but to have this sound ever ringing in our ears, “time is flying, time which cannot be retrieved¹¹¹”. And this is the reason why those who have devoted themselves to laborious professions and the like, as lawyers, orators, learned divines, and writers of books, are not so clever in founding and promoting their own fortunes; because their time is so much occupied with other things that they cannot investigate particulars, wait occasions, and devise and meditate on plots to advance their fortunes. Moreover, in the courts of princes and in commonwealths you will find that the ablest persons both to improve their own fortunes and to assail the fortunes of others are those who have no public duty to perform, but are ever occupied in this study of advancement in life.

A fifth precept is to a certain degree to imitate nature, which does nothing in vain; no very difficult task, if a man will skilfully mix and interlace his several kinds of business. For in every particular action a man ought so to direct and prepare his mind, and should have one intention so underlying and subordinate to another, that if he cannot obtain his wishes in the best degree, he may yet be satisfied if he succeed in a second, or even a third; and if he cannot obtain them at all in that particular, then he may turn the labour spent in it to some other end besides the one intended; and if he cannot reap any fruit of it for the present, he may yet make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can derive no substance from it either now or hereafter, he may try at all events to win some good opinion by it, or the like; by always exacting an account of himself, by which it may appear that each action and scheme has borne him some fruit more or less, and never allowing himself to stand amazed and confused, or to despond immediately that he fails to hit his chief mark. For nothing is more impolitic than to be entirely bent on one action. He that is so loses an infinite number of occasions, which indirectly fall out by the way, and are perhaps more proper and propitious for the future use than for the present matter; wherefore men must be perfect in that rule, “These things ought ye to do, and not to leave the others undone¹¹²”.

A sixth precept is not to engage oneself too peremptorily in anything, though at first sight it seem not liable to accident; but ever to have either a window open to fly out at, or a secret way to retire by.

A seventh precept is that ancient precept of Bias, not construed to any point of perfidiousness, but only to caution and moderation, “Love as if you were sometime to hate, and hate as if you were sometime to love¹¹³”; for it utterly betrays and destroys all utility, for men to embark themselves too far in unfortunate friendships, troublesome and turbulent quarrels, or foolish and childish jealousies and emulations.

These will suffice for an example of the doctrine of advancement in life. I would however have it frequently remembered, that I am far from meaning that these sketches of things which I note as deficients should be set down as complete treatises, but only as shreds or fragments to serve as samples of the whole piece. Nor again am I so foolish as to assert that fortunes are not gained without all this contrivance which I have mentioned. For I well know they come tumbling into some men's laps; and that others only obtain them by simple diligence and attention (using only a little caution), without any great or laborious art. But as Gicero, in his portrait of a perfect orator, does not mean that every pleader should be or can be such; and again, as in the description of a prince or courtier by such as have handled those subjects, the model is always framed according to the perfection of the art, and not according to common practice; so likewise have I done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own fortune.

But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which I have selected and set down on this subject are of that kind which may be called Good Arts. As for Evil Arts, if a man would propose to himself that principle of Machi-avelli, “that virtue itself a man should not trouble himself to attain, but only the appearance thereof to the world, because the credit and reputation of virtue is a help, but the use of it is an impediment”; or again, that other principle of his “that a politic man should have for the basis of his policy the assumption that men cannot fitly or safely be wrought upon otherwise than by fear; and should therefore endeavour to have every man, as far as he can contrive it, dependent and surrounded by straits and perils¹¹⁴”; so that his politician would appear to be what the Italians call “A sower of thorns:” or that principle embodied in the verse quoted by Cicero, “Let friends fall, provided our enemies perish with them¹¹⁵”; as the Triumvirs did, who with the lives of their friends purchased the destruction of their enemies: or if he would be an imitator of L. Catiline, to set on fire and trouble states, that he may the better fish in muddy waters and make way for his own fortune; “For,” said he, “if a fire be lighted in my fortunes, I will quench it, not with water, but with destruction¹¹⁶”: or if he would make his own that saying of Lysander, “that children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths¹¹⁷”; with the like depraved and pernicious doctrines, whereof (as in all other things) there are a greater number than of the wise and good: if any one, I say, takes pleasure in such kind of corrupt wisdom, I will not certainly deny that (with these dispensations from all the laws of charity and virtue, and an entire devotion to the pressing of his fortune), he may advance it quicker and more compendiously. But it is in life as it is in ways, the shorter way is commonly the foulest and muddiest, and surely the fairer way is not much about.

But men ought to be so far removed from devoting themselves to wicked arts of this nature, that rather (if they are only in their own power, and can bear and sustain themselves without being carried away by a whirlwind or tempest of ambition) they ought to set before their eyes not only that general map of the world, “that all things are vanity and vexation of spirit¹¹⁸”, but also that more particular chart, namely, “that being without well-being is a curse, and the greater being the greater curse”; and “that all virtue is most rewarded, and all wickedness most punished in itself;” as the poet excellently says:—

Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri, pro laudibus istis

Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum

Dii moresque dabunt vestri¹¹⁹.

And so on the other hand, it is no less truly said of the wicked, “His own manners will be his punishment¹²⁰”. Secondly, men in projecting their schemes and diffusing their thoughts abroad on every side, in order to forecast and advance their fortunes, ought in the midst of these flights of the mind to look up to the Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often overthrows and brings to nought the machinations and evil designs of the wicked, however deeply laid; according to that Scripture, “He hath conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing¹²¹”. Moreover, although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant, restless,and as it were Sabbathless pursuit of fortune leaves not the tribute which we owe to God of our time; whom we see demands and separates for himself a tenth part of our substance, but a seventh of our time. For what advantage is it to have a face erected towards heaven, with a spirit perpetually grovelling upon earth, eating dust like the serpent? As the heathen also observed, “the particle of the Divine Spirit cleaves to the ground¹²²”. But if here any man flatter himself, that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill; as was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, and Septimius Severus, “that either they should never have been born, or else they should never have died¹²³”, they did so much mischief in their rise to greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet, let him bear in mind that such compensations of evil with good are to be approved after the evil is done, but that such counsels are to be condemned. Lastly, it will not be amiss for men, in this eager and excited chase of fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles the Fifth in his instructions to his son, “That fortune has somewhat of the nature of a woman, who, if she is too much wooed, is commonly the further off¹²⁴”. But this last is only a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted by a disorder of the mind. Let men rather build upon that foundation, which is as a corner stone of both Divinity and Philosophy, wherein they nearly agree as to that which ought to be sought first. For Divinity says, “Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you¹²⁵”; and philosophy says something like it, “Seek ye first the good things of the mind, and the rest will either be supplied or their loss will not be felt”. And although the human foundation is sometimes built upon the sand, as we see in Marcus Brutus, when he brake forth into that speech at his death,—

Te colui, Virtus, ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es¹²⁶:

yet the same foundation, laid by the hand of heaven, is ever laid upon the rock. Here then I conclude the doctrine concerning advancement in life, and with it the general doctrine concerning negotiation.

CHAPTER III.

The Divisions of the Doctrine concerning Empire or Government are omitted;—An Introduction only is made to two Deficients; namely, the Doctrine concerning the Extension of the Bounds of Empire, and the Doctrine concerning Universal Justice, or the Fountains of Law.

I now come to the Art of Empire or Civil Government, which includes Œconomics, as a state includes a family. On this subject, as I before said, I have imposed silence on myself, though perhaps I might not be entirely unqualified to handle such topics with some skill and profit, as being one who has had the benefit of long experience, and who by your Majesty's most gracious favour, without any merit of his own, has risen through so many gradations of office and honour to the highest dignity in the realm and borne the same for four whole years; and, what is more, being one who has been accustomed for eighteen successive years to the commands and conversation of your Majesty (whereby a very stock might be turned into a statesman), and who also, besides other arts, has spent much time in the study of laws and histories. All which I report to posterity, not through any vain boasting, but because I think that it is of no little importance to the dignity of literature, that a man naturally fitted rather for literature than for anything else, and borne by some destiny against the inclination of his genius into the business of active life, should have risen to such high and honourable civil appointments under so wise a king. But if my leisure time shall hereafter produce anything concerning political knowledge, the work will perchance be either abortive or posthumous. In the mean time, now that all the sciences are ranged as it were in their proper seats, lest so eminent a seat should be left entirely vacant, I have determined to mark as deficient only two parts of Civil Knowledge, which do not belong to the secrets of Empire, but have a wider and more common nature; and according to my custom I will set down examples thereof.

The Arts of Government contain three political duties; first, “the preservation,” secondly, “the happiness and prosperity,” and thirdly, “the extension,” of empire. Of these the two former have in a great measure been excellently handled, but nothing has been said on the last. I will therefore set it down among the deficients, and according to custom, propose an example thereof, calling it “the Statesman in Armour,” or the “Doctrine concerning the Extension of the Bounds of Empire”.

Example of a Summary Treatise touching the Extension of Empire.¹

THE speech of Themistocles if applied to himself was certainly haughty and arrogant, but if generally applied to others it seems to contain both a wise observation and a severe censure. Desired at a feast to touch a lute, he said, “he could not fiddle, but yet he could make a small town a great city²”. Now these words, transferred to a political meaning, excellently describe and distinguish two very different abilities in those that deal in business of state. For if a true survey be taken of the councillors, senators, and other public statesmen who have ever been, there will be found some, though very few, who can make a small city or kingdom great, and yet cannot fiddle; and on the other hand, there will be found many very cunning on the lute or lyre (that is, in the follies of courts), who yet are so far from having the power to make a small state great, that they appear rather to be naturally gifted to bring a great and flourishing state to ruin and decay. And certainly those degenerate arts and shifts, whereby many councillors and ministers often gain both favour with their masters and estimation with the people, deserve no other name than a certain knack of fiddling; being things rather pleasing for the time, and graceful to themselves only, than advantageous to the weal and advancement of the state, whereof they are ministers. There will no doubt be found other councillors and ministers, of no mean character, equal to their business, and able to govern the state well, so as to preserve it from manifest precipices and inconveniences, who nevertheless are far removed from the ability to raise and amplify an empire in power, means, and fortune.

But be the workmen what they may be, let us consider the work itself; that is, what is the true greatness of kingdoms and states, and how it can be obtained It is a subject indeed fit for princes to have ever in their hands and carefully to consider; to the end that neither by over-measuring their forces they may engage in vain enterprises beyond their power; nor on the other hand by undervaluing them they may demean themselves to timid and pusillanimous counsels.

The greatness of an empire as regards its size and territory falls under measure; as regard its revenue under computation. The number of the population may be taken by a census; the number and greatness of cities and towns by maps and surveys. But yet there is nothing among civil affairs more subject to error than the forming a true and right valuation of the power and forces of an empire. The kingdom of heaven is likened not to an acorn or any larger nut, but to a grain of mustard seed³; which is the smallest of all seeds, but yet has within itself a certain property and spirit hastily to get up and spread. So there are some kingdoms and states very great in extent of territory, and yet not apt to enlarge or command; and some that have but a small dimension of stem, and yet are apt to be the foundations of great monarchies.

Walled towns, stored arsenals and armouries, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like; all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike. Nay, number itself in armies is not much advantage where the people are of weak courage; for, as Virgil says, it never troubles the wolf how many the sheep be⁴. The army of the Persians in the plains of Arbela was such a vast sea of people, that it somewhat alarmed the commanders in Alexander's army; who came to him therefore and wished him to set upon them by night; but he answered, He would not pilfer the victory: and the defeat was easy⁵. When Tigranes the Armenian, being encamped upon a hill with four hundred thousand men, discovered the army of the Romans being not above fourteen thousand marching towards him, he made himself merry with it, and said, “Yonder men are too many for an embassage, and too few for a fight⁶”. But before the sun set, he found them enough to give him the chase with infinite slaughter. Many are the examples of the great odds between number and courage; so that it may be set down as a sure and tried rule, that the principal point of greatness in any state is that the people itself be by race and disposition warlike. Neither is money the sinews of war, as it is trivially said, where the sinews of men's arms in base and effeminate people are failing. For Solon said well to Crœsus, when in ostentation he showed him his gold, “Sir, if any other come that has better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold⁷”. Therefore let any prince or state think soberly of his forces, except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers. And let princes, on the other side, who have subjects of martial disposition, know their own strength, unless they be otherwise wanting unto themselves. As for mercenary forces (which is the usual help in this case), all examples show that whatsoever state or prince rests upon them, he may spread his feathers for a time, but he will mew them soon after.

The blessing of Judah and Issachar will never meet; that the same people or nation should be both the lion's whelp, and the ass between burdens⁸. Neither will it be that a people over-laid with taxes should ever become valiant and martial. It is true that taxes levied by consent of the state do abate men's courage less; as it has been seen notably in the excises of the Low Countries⁹; and, in some degree, in the subsidies of England. For you must note, that we speak now of the heart and not of the purse. So that although the same tribute and tax, laid by consent or by imposing, be all one to the purse, yet it works differently upon the courage. So that you may conclude that no people over-charged with tribute is fit for empire.

Let states that aim at greatness take heed that their nobility and gentlemen do not multiply too fast; for that makes the common subject grow to be a peasant and base swain, driven out of heart, and in effect but the gentlemen's labourer. Even as you may see in coppice woods; if you leave your staddles too thick, you will never have clean under-wood, but shrubs and bushes. So in countries, if the gentlemen be too many, the commons will be base; and you will bring it to that, that scarce one man in an hundred will be fit for an helmet;. especially as to the infantry, which is the nerve of an army: and so there will be great population and little strength. This which I speak of has been nowhere better seen than by comparing of England and France; whereof England, though far less in territory and population, has been nevertheless an overmatch; and for this reason, that the yeomen and lower classes of England make good soldiers, which the peasants of France do not. And herein the device of King Henry the Seventh (whereof I have spoken largely in the history of his life) was profound and admirable: in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard; that is, maintained with such a proportion of land attached inseparably to them, as may allow a subject to live in convenient plenty and no servile condition; and to keep the plough in the hands of the owners, or at least the tenants, and not mere hirelings. And thus indeed you shall attain to Virgil's character which he gives to ancient Italy:

Terra potens armis, atque ubere glebæ¹⁰.

Neither is that state, (which, for anything I know, is almost peculiar to England, and hardly to be found anywhere else, except it be perhaps in Poland), to be passed over; I mean the state of free servants and attendants upon noblemen and gentlemen, who are no ways inferior to the yeomanry as infantry. And therefore out of all question, the splendour and magnificence and great retinues and hospitality of noblemen and gentlemen received into custom conduce much unto martial greatness; whereas, contrariwise, the close and reserved living of noblemen and gentlemen causes a penury of military forces.

By all means it is to be looked to, that the trunk of Nebuchadnezzar's tree of monarchy¹¹ be great enough to bear the branches and the boughs; that is, that the natural subjects of the crown or state bear a sufficient proportion to the stranger subjects that they govern. Therefore all states that are liberal of naturalization towards strangers are fit for empire. For to think that an handful of people can, with the greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too large extent of dominion, it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. The Spartans were a difficult and jealous people in point of naturalization; whereby, while they kept their compass, they stood firm; but when they did spread, and their boughs were become too great for their stem, they became a windfall upon the sudden. Never was any state in this point so open to receive strangers into their body as were the Romans; therefore it sorted with them accordingly, for they grew to the greatest monarchy. Their manner was to grant naturalization, which they called the right of citizenship, and to grant it in the highest degree, that is, not only the right of commerce, the right of marriage, the right of inheritance; but also, the right of voting, and the right of bearing office; and this not to single persons alone, but likewise to whole families; yea, to cities, and sometimes to nations. Add to this their custom of plantation of colonies, whereby the Roman plant was removed into the soil of other nations: and putting both constitutions together, you will say that it was not the Romans that spread upon the world, but it was the world that spread upon the Romans: and that was the surest way of greatness. I have marvelled sometimes at Spain, how they clasp and contain so large dominions with so few natural Spaniards; but sure the whole compass of Spain is a very great body of a tree, far above Rome and Sparta at the first. And besides, though they have not had that usage to naturalize liberally yet they have that which is next to it; that is, to employ, almost indifferently, all nations in their militia of ordinary soldiers; yea, and sometimes in their highest commands¹². Nay, it seems at this instant they are sensible of this want of natives and desire to remedy it; as appears by the pragmatical sanction published in this year¹³.

It is certain that sedentary and within-door arts, and delicate manufactures (that require rather the finger than the arm), have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition. And generally all warlike people are a little idle, and love danger better than work; neither must they be too much broken of it, if they shall be preserved in vigour. Therefore it was great advantage in the ancient states of Sparta, Athens, Rome, and others, that they had the use of slaves who commonly dispatched those manufactures. But that is abolished in greatest part by the Christian law. That which comes nearest to it is to leave those arts chiefly to strangers, who for that purpose are to be invited or at least easily received, and to contain the principal bulk of the vulgar natives within those three kinds; tillers of the ground, free servants, and handicraftsmen of strong and manly arts, as smiths, masons, carpenters, and the like; not reckoning professed soldiers.

But above all, for empire and greatness, it is of most importance that a nation profess arms as their principal honour, study, and occupation. For the things which we have formerly spoken of are but qualifications for the use of arms; and what is qualification without intention and act? Romulus after his death (as they report or feign), sent an injunction to the Romans, that above all they should attend to arms, and then they should prove the greatest empire of the world¹⁴. The fabric of the state of Sparta was wholly and carefully (though not wisely) framed and composed to that scope and end to make the people warriors. The Persians and Macedonians had it for a flash. The Britons, Gauls, Germans, Goths, Saxons, Normans, and others, had it for a time. The Turks have it at this day, (being not a little stimulated thereto by their law), though in great declination. Of Christian Europe they that still have it are in effect only the Spaniards. But it is so plain that every man profits most in that to which he most attends, that it needs not to be stood upon. It is enough to point at it; that no nation, which does not directly profess arms and devote themselves to the practice thereof, may look to have any special greatness fall into their mouths. And on the other side it is a most certain oracle of time, that those states that continue long in that profession (as the Romans and Turks principally have done), do wonders in extension of empire: and those that have professed arms but for an age have notwithstanding commonly attained that greatness in that age which maintained them long after, when their profession and exercise of arms has grown to decay.

Incident to this point is for a state to have those laws or customs which may reach forth unto them just occasions or at least pretexts for making war. For there is that justice imprinted in the nature of men, that they enter not upon wars (whereof so many calamities do ensue), but upon some weighty, at the least specious, grounds and quarrels. The Turk has at hand for the cause of war the propagation of his law or sect; a quarrel that he may always command. The Romans, though they esteemed the extending the limits of their empire to be great honour to their generals when it was done, yet they never rested upon that alone to begin a war. First therefore, let nations that pretend to greatness have this, that they be quickly sensible of wrongs, either upon borderers, merchants, or public ministers; and that they sit not too long upon a provocation. Secondly, let them be-prompt and ready to give aids and succours to their confederates and allies, as it ever was with the Romans, insomuch, as if the confederate had leagues defensive with divers other states, and upon invasion offered did implore their aids severally, yet the Romans would ever be the foremost and leave it to none other to have the honour. As for the wars which were anciently made on the behalf of a kind of party or tacit conformity of estate, I do not see how they may be well justified; as when the Romans made a war for the liberty of Greece; or when the Lacedemonians and Athenians made wars, to set up or pull down democracies and oligarchies; or when wars were made by commonwealths and princes, under the pretence of justice or protection, to deliver the subjects of others from tyranny and oppression, and the like. Let it suffice for the present, that no estate expect to be great that is not awake upon any just occasion of arming.

No body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor politic; and certainly to a kingdom or estate a just and honourable war is the true exercise. A civil war indeed is like the heat of a fever; but a foreign war is like the heat of exercise, and serves most of all to keep the body in health. For in a slothful peace both courage will effeminate and manners corrupt. But howsoever it be for happiness, without all question for greatness, it makes to be still for the most part in arms; and the strength of a veteran army (though it be doubtless a costly business), always on foot, is that which commonly gives the law, or at least the reputation amongst all neighbour states, as may be well seen in Spain; which has had, in one parter other, a veteran army almost continually, now by the space of six-score years¹⁵.

To be master of the sea, is an abridgment of a monarchy¹⁶, Cicero writing to Atticus of Pompey's preparation against Cæsar, says, “Pompey's counsel is plainly that of Themistocles, for he thinks that whoever is master of the sea is master of the empire¹⁷”. And without doubt Pompey had tired out and reduced Cæsar, if upon vain confidence he had not left that way. We see the great effects of battles by sea from many instances. The battle of Actium decided the empire of the world. The battle of Lepanto arrested the greatness of the Turk¹⁸. There be certainly many examples where sea-fights have put an end to the war; but this is when princes or states have risked their whole fortune upon the battles. But thus much is certain, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will; whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits. Surely at this day with us of Europe the advantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great Britain) is great; both because most of the kingdoms of Europe are not merely inland, but girt with the sea most part of their compass; and because the wealth and treasures of both Indies seem in great part but an accessory to the command of the sea.

The wars of latter ages seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honour which reflected upon men from the wars in ancient time. There be now for martial encouragement some degrees and orders of chivalry, which nevertheless are conferred promiscuously upon soldiers and no soldiers; and some remembrance perhaps upon the escutcheon, and some hospitals, for maimed soldiers, and such like things. But in ancient times, the trophies erected upon the place of the victory, the funeral laudatives and monuments for those that died in the wars, the crowns and garlands personal, the style of emperor, which the great kings of the world afterwards borrowed, the triumphs of the generals upon their return, the great donatives and largesses to the soldiers upon the disbanding of the armies, these, I say, and such like dazzling honours, were things able to inflame all men's courage and excite even the coldest breast; but above all, that of the triumph among the Romans was not a pageant or gaudery but one of the wisest and noblest institutions that ever was. For it contained three things, honour to the general, riches to the treasury out of the spoils, and donatives to the army. But that honour perhaps were not fit for monarchies, except it be in the person of the monarch himself or his sons; as it came to pass in the times of the Roman emperors, who did appropriate the actual triumphs to themselves and their sons for such wars as they achieved in person, and left only for wars achieved by subjects some triumphal garments and ensigns to the general.

To conclude: no man can, by taking thought, as the Scripture saith, “add one cubit to his stature¹⁹” in this little model of a man's body; but in the great frame of kingdoms and commonwealths it is in the power of princes or states to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms. For by wisely introducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs, as we have now touched, and others like them, they may sow greatness to their posterity and succession. But these counsels are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.

Such then are the thoughts that now occur to me touching the extension of empire. But what avails this consideration, seeing that the Roman is supposed to have been the last of earthly monarchies? Yet because the extension of empire was set down as the last of the three political duties, I could not have passed it by altogether without deviating from my proposed course. There remains now the other of the two deficients which I mentioned; namely, the treatise of Universal Justice, or the Fountains of Equity.

All who have written concerning laws have written either as philosophers or lawyers. The philosophers lay down many precepts fair in argument, but not applicable to use: the lawyers, being subject and addicted to the positive rules either of the laws of their own country or else of the Roman or Pontifical, have no freedom of opinion, but as it were talk in bonds. But surely the consideration of this properly belongs to statesmen, who best understand the condition of civil society, welfare of the people, natural equity, customs of nations, and different forms of government; and who may therefore determine laws by the rules and principles both of natural equity and policy. Wherefore let it be my present object to go to the fountains of justice and public expediency, and endeavour with reference to the several provinces of law to exhibit a character and idea of justice, in general comparison with which the laws of particular states and kingdoms may be tested and amended. I will now therefore according to my custom set forth an example thereof in one of its heads.

Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms: one Title of it.

PREFACE.

APHORISM 1.

IN Civil Society, either law or force prevails. But there is a kind of force which pretends law, and a kind of law which savours of force rather than equity. Whence there are three fountains of injustice; namely, mere force, a malicious ensnarement under colour of law, and harshness of the law itself.

APHORISM 2.

The ground on which private right rests is this. He who commits an injury, receives either pleasure or profit from the act, but incurs danger from the precedent. For others do not share in the particular pleasure or profit, but look upon the precedent as concerning themselves. And hence they readily agree to protect themselves by laws, that the course of injury may not come round to them in turn. But if through the state of the times, and a communion of guilt, it happen that those whom a law protects are not so numerous or so powerful as those whom it endangers, a party is made to overthrow the law; and this is often the case²⁰.

APHORISM 3.

Private right depends upon the protection of public right. For the law protects the people, and magistrates protect the laws; but the authority of the magistrates depends on the sovereign power of the government, the structure of the constitution, and the fundamental laws. Wherefore, if this part of the constitution be sound and healthy, the laws will be of good effect, but if not, there will be little security in them.

APHORISM 4.

It is not however the only object of public law, to be attached as the guardian of private right, to protect it from violation and prevent injuries; but it extends also to religion, arms, discipline, ornaments, wealth, and in a word, to everything that regards the well-being of a state.

APHORISM 5.

The end and scope which laws should have in view, and to which they should direct their decrees and sanctions, is no other than the happiness of the citizens. And this will be effected, if the people be rightly trained in piety and religion, sound in morality, protected by arms against foreign enemies, guarded by the shield of the laws against civil discords and private injuries, obedient to the government and the magistrates, and rich and flourishing in forces and wealth. And for all these objects laws are the sinews and instruments.

APHORISM 6.

This end the best laws attain, but many pass wide it. For there is a strange and extreme difference in laws; some being excellent, some moderately good, and others entirely vicious. I will therefore set down, according to the best of my judgment, what may be called certain “laws of laws,” whereby we may derive information as to the good or ill set down and determined in every law.

APHORISM 7.

But before I proceed to the actual body of particular laws, I will take a brief survey of the virtues and dignities of laws in general. That law may be set down as good, which is certain in meaning, just in precept, convenient in execution, agreeable to the form of government, and productive of virtue in those that live under it.

TITLE I.

Of the Primary Dignity of Laws, that they be certain.

APHORISM 8.

Certainty is so essential to law, that law cannot even be just without it. “For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle²¹?” So if the law give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare to obey it? It ought therefore to warn before it strikes. It is well said also, “That that is the best law which leaves least to the discretion of the judge²²”; and this comes from the certainty of it.

APHORISM 9.

Uncertainty of laws is of two kinds; the one, where no law is prescribed; the other, where the law is ambiguous and obscure. We must therefore speak first of cases omitted by the law, that in these also we may find some rule of certainty.

Of Cases omitted by the Law.

APHORISM 10.

The narrow compass of human wisdom cannot take in all the cases which time may discover; whence new and omitted cases often present themselves. For these, the remedy or supplement is threefold; namely, by reference to similar cases, by employment of examples which have not yet grown into law, and by jurisdictions empowered to decide according to the arbitration of a good man and sound discretion, whether they be Prætorian or Censorian Courts.

Of reference to Similar Cases, and the Extensions of Laws.

APHORISM II.

In omitted cases, the rule of law is to be drawn from cases similar to them, but with caution and judgment; wherein the following rules are to be observed: Let reason be esteemed prolific, and custom barren. Custom must not make cases. Whatever therefore is received contrary to the reason of a law, or even where its reason is obscure, must not be drawn into consequence²³.

APHORISM 12.

Great public good draws omitted cases to itself. Wherefore when any law notoriously and to an extraordinary degree respects and procures the good of the people, let its interpretation be wide and comprehensive.

APHORISM 13.

It is harsh to torture laws, in order that laws may torture men. We would not therefore that penal, much less capital laws be extended to new offences. If however the offence be old and taken cognizance of by the laws, but the prosecution thereof fall upon a new case, unprovided for by the laws, we ought by all means to depart from the decrees of law rather than leave offences unpunished.

APHORISM 14.

In statutes which directly repeal the common law (especially in matters of frequent occurrence and long standing), we approve not the proceeding by similarity to cases omitted. For when the state has long been without the entire law, and that too in expressed cases, there is little danger in allowing the cases omitted to wait for a remedy from a new statute.

APHORISM 15.

Statutes which have a manifest relation to the time when they were made, and spring out of a temporary emergency of state, when the state of the times is altered, should have all their due, if they retain their authority in the cases proper to them; for it would be preposterous to wrest them to omitted cases.

APHORISM 16.

Consequence does not draw consequence, but the extension should stop within the next cases; otherwise there will be a gradual lapse into dissimilar cases, and sharpness of wit will have greater power than authority of law.

APHORISM 17.

When laws and statutes are concise in style, extend freely; when they enumerate particular cases, more cautiously. For as exception corroborates the application of law in cases not excepted, so enumeration invalidates it in cases not enumerated.

APHORISM 18.

An explanatory statute stops the streams of the statute which it explains, and neither of them admits of extension afterwards. For the judge must not make a super-extension, when the law has once begun an extension.

APHORISM 19.

Formality of words and acts admits not of an extension to similar cases. For formality loses its character when it passes from custom to discretion; and the introduction of new things destroys the majesty of the old.

APHORISM 20.

The extension of the law to posthumous cases, which had no existence at the time of the passing of the law, is easy. For where a case could not be expressed, as having no existence, a case omitted is taken for a case expressed, if there be the same reason for it.

Enough then on the extensions of laws in cases omitted. I will now speak of the employment of examples.

On Examples, and their Use²⁴.

APHORISM 21.

I now come to speak of examples, from which justice is to be derived when the law is deficient. Of custom, which is a kind of law, and of examples which by frequent use have passed into custom as a tacit law, I will speak in their place. But here I will speak of such examples as happen seldom and at distant intervals, and have not yet acquired the force of law; to show when, and with what caution, the rule of justice may be sought from them where the law is deficient.

APHORISM 22.

Examples are to be sought from good and moderate times, not from such as are tyrannical, factious, or dissolute. For those belonging to such times are spurious in their origin, and rather injurious than instructive.

APHORISM 23.

Of examples the latest are to be accounted the safest. For why should not that which has been lately done without any subsequent inconvenience be done again? But yet they have less authority; and if it happen that a reform be needed, modern examples savour more of their own age than of right reason.

APHORISM 24.

Ancient examples are to be received cautiously, and with proper selection. For the lapse of time makes many alterations, so that what in respect of time appears ancient is, by reason of the confusion which it makes and its inconformity to the present state of things, really new. Wherefore the best examples are those of the middle time, or else such a time as is most in conformity with the present age; and this is sometimes to be found in a more remote age rather than in that immediately preceding.

APHORISM 25.

Keep within, or rather on this side, of the limits of the example, and on no account go beyond them. For where there is no rule of law, everything should be looked on with suspicion; and therefore, as in obscure cases, be very careful how you proceed.

APHORISM 26.

Beware of fragments, and epitomes of examples, and look carefully into the whole of the examples with all the process thereof. For if it be unreasonable to judge of part of a law, without examining the whole²⁵; much more ought this to have weight in examples, the use whereof is doubtful, if they do not exactly correspond.

APHORISM 27.

It is of great importance through what hands examples have passed, and by whom they have been sanctioned. For if they have only passed among clerks and secretaries, in the ordinary course of the court, without the manifest knowledge of the higher officers; or among the teacher of all errors, the people; they are to be condemned and held of little account. But if they have passed under the eyes of senators, judges, or the principal courts, in such a manner that they must needs have been strengthened by at least the tacit approval of the judges, they are entitled to more authority.

APHORISM 28.

Examples, which even though they have been little used have been published, yet having been well debated and ventilated in discourse and discussion, deserve more authority; but those which have lain as it were buried in desks and archives and have openly passed into oblivion, deserve less. For examples like waters are most wholesome in a running stream.

APHORISM 29

Examples which have reference to laws should not be sought from historians, but from public acts and the more careful traditions. For it is a misfortune even of the best historians, that they do not dwell sufficiently upon laws and judicial acts; or if by chance they use some diligence therein, yet they differ greatly from the authentic reporters.

APHORISM 30.

An example, which the same or the succeeding age has upon the recurrence of the case rejected, should not be readily re-admitted. For the fact that it was once adopted does not tell so much in its favour, as the subsequent abandonment tells against it.

APHORISM 31.

Examples are to be used for advice, not for rules and orders. Wherefore let them be so employed as to turn the authority of the past to the use of the present.

Enough then of instruction from examples where the law is deficient. I must now speak of the Courts Prætorian and Censorian.

On Courts Prœtorian and Censorian²⁶

APHORISM 32.

Let there be courts and jurisdictions to determine, by the judgment and discretion of a conscientious man, when the rule of the law is deficient. For the law (as has been before said) cannot provide for all cases, but is adapted to meet such as generally occur. And time, according to the ancient saying, is the wisest of all things²⁷, and daily creates and invents new cases.

APHORISM 33.

Fresh cases happen both in criminal causes, which require punishment, and in civil causes, which require relief. The courts which take cognizance of the former I call Censorian, those which respect the latter, Prætorian.

APHORISM 34.

Let the Censorian Courts have power and jurisdiction, not only to punish new offences, but also to increase the punishments appointed by law for old ones, where the cases are heinous and enormous, provided they are not capital. For an enormous crime has somewhat of the nature of a new one.

APHORISM 35.

In like manner let the Prætorian Courts have power both to abate the rigor of the law and to supply its defects. For if relief is due to a person whom the law has neglected, much more is it due to one whom it has wounded.

APHORISM 36.

Let these Prætorian and Censorian Courts entirely confine themselves to monstrous and extraordinary cases, and not encroach upon the ordinary jurisdictions, lest they rather tend to supplant than to supply the law.

APHORISM 37.

Let these jurisdictions reside only in the supreme courts, and not be shared by the lower; for the power of supplying, extending, and moderating laws, differs little from that of making them.

APHORISM 38.

Let not these courts be entrusted to the charge of one man, but let them consist of many. And let not the decrees go forth in silence, but let the judges give the reasons of their decision, and that openly and in full court; so that what is free in point of power may yet be restrained by regard to character and reputation.

APHORISM 39.

Let there be no authority to shed blood; nor let sentence be pronounced in any court upon capital cases, except according to a known and certain law. God himself denounced death before he inflicted it. Nor should a man be deprived of his life, who did not first know that he was risking it.

APHORISM 40.

In the Censorian Courts, let there be opportunity for three verdicts; that the judges may not be obliged to acquit or condemn, but be at liberty to declare the fact “not proven”. And besides the penalty, let there be power also to inflict a note or mark; such I mean as shall not extend to actual punishment, but may end either in admonition only, or in a light disgrace; punishing the offender as it were with a blush.

APHORISM 41.

In Censorian Courts, let the commencements and middle acts of all great crimes and offences be punished, even though the end be not consummated²⁸. And let this be even the principal use of these courts; for it is as well the part of severity to punish the commencements of crimes, as of mercy to prevent their completion, by punishing the intermediate acts.

APHORISM 42.

Especial care must be taken, in Prætorian Courts, not to afford relief in such cases as the law has not so much omitted, as depised for their unimportance, or for their odious nature judged unworthy of redress.

APHORISM 43.

It is of the greatest importance to the certainty of laws (of which I am now treating), that Prætorian Courts be not allowed to swell and overflow, so as, under colour of mitigating the rigour of the law, to break its strength and relax its sinews, by drawing everything to be a matter of discretion.

APHORISM 44.

Let not the Prætorian Courts have authority, under any pretext of equity, to decree against an express statute. For in that case the judge would pass into the legislator, and everything would be at discretion.

APHORISM 45.

Some hold that the jurisdiction which decrees according to equity and conscience, and that which proceeds according to strict justice, ought to be deputed to the same courts; but others would have them kept separate. I am clearly for keeping them separate. For if there be a mixture of jurisdictions, the distinction of cases will not be retained, but discretion will in the end supersede the law.

APHORISM 46.

The Prætor's Table at Rome, wherein he set down and published the rules by which he meant to judge, was not established without good reason. And after this example, judges in the Prætorian Courts ought, as far as possible, to propose certain rules for themselves, and set them up where they can be seen by the people. For as that is the best law which leaves the least to the discretion of the judge, so he is the best judge who leaves the least to himself.

But I will treat more fully of these courts when I come to speak of judgments; for here I have only noticed of them in passing, in what way they remedy and supply the omissions of law.

Of the Retrospective Aspect of Laws.

APHORISM 47.

There is likewise another kind of supplement to omitted cases; namely, when one law follows and amends another; and draws the omitted cases along with it. And this is done by those laws and statutes which are called retrospective. But laws of this kind must be used seldom, and with great caution; for we approve not of a Janus in laws.

APHORISM 48.

He who evades and narrows the words or meaning of a law by fraud and cavil deserves to be himself ensnared by a subsequent law. And therefore in cases of fraud and captious evasion it is just that laws should be retrospective, and be of assistance one to the other; that a man who plots to deceive and upset the present laws may at least feel apprehensions from future ones.

APHORISM 49

Laws which strengthen and confirm the real intentions of acts and instruments against the defects of forms and usages very properly include past actions. For the principal inconvenience of a retrospective law is that it creates disturbance; but confirmatory laws of this sort tend rather to peace and the settlement of past transactions. We must however take care not to call in question matters already adjudged.

APHORISM 50.

It must be observed that not those only are to be considered retrospective laws which invalidate acts passed; but those likewise which prohibit and restrain future acts as necessarily connected with the past. Thus a law which should prohibit certain artisans from henceforth selling their wares seems only to bear upon the future, yet it operates on the past; for such persons have not now the power to seek their living in another way.

APHORISM 51.

Every declaratory law, though it does not mention the past, yet by the very force of the declaration must needs apply to past transactions. For the interpretation does not date from the time of the declaration, but is made as it were contemporary with the law itself. And therefore enact no declaratory laws, except in cases where they may be justly retrospective.

And here I end that part which treats of Uncertainty of laws where no law exists. I must now speak of that other part, where some law is extant, but confused and obscure.

Of Obscurity of Laws.

APHORISM 52.

Obscurity of laws arises from four sources; either from an excessive accumulation of laws, especially if they be mixed with such as are obsolete; or from an ambiguity or want of clearness and distinctness in the drawing of them; or from negligent and ill-ordered methods of interpreting law; or lastly, from a contradiction and inconsistency of judgments.

Of Excessive Accumulation of Laws.

APHORISM 53.

The prophet says, “-He shall rain snares upon them²⁹”. But there are no worse snares than legal snares, especially in penal laws; if being infinite in number, and useless through the lapse of time, instead of being as a lantern to the feet they are as nets in the path.

APHORISM 54.

There are two ways in use of making a new statute. The one confirms and strengthens former statutes on the same subject, and then makes a few additions and alterations. The other repeals and cancels all former enactments, and substitutes an entirely new and uniform law. The last method is the best. For by the former the enactments become confused and complicated, and though indeed the immediate object is effected, yet the body of laws is in the meantime corrupted. But in the latter, though greater care is required in deliberating about the law itself, and former acts must be carefully searched and canvassed before it pass; yet it is the best course for securing harmony in times to come.

APHORISM 55.

The Athenians had a custom of appointing six men to examine every year the contradictory titles of their laws (which they called Antinomies) and to report to the people such as could not be reconciled, that a definite resolution might be passed concerning them. After their example let the legislators of every state every three or five years, or as often as it appears good, review their Antinomies. And let these be first examined and drawn up by commissioners appointed for the purpose, and then laid before the Parliament, that the matter may be settled and established by vote.

APHORISM 56.

But let there not be too great an eagerness and anxiety to reconcile or salve (as they term it) these contradictory titles by fine and far-fetched distinctions. For this is a web of the wit; which, whatever appearance of modesty and reverence it may bear, must yet be regarded as prejudicial, seeing that it makes the whole body of laws ill-assorted and incoherent. It is therefore far better to let the worse titles drop, and leave the best to stand alone.

APHORISM 57.

It should also be a part of the office of the Commissioners to propose that obsolete laws and such as have fallen into disuse should be repealed, as well as antinomies. For since an express statute is not regularly abolished by disuse, it comes to pass that through the contempt of obsolete laws the authority of the rest is somewhat impaired. And from this ensues a torment like that of Mezentius, whereby the living laws are stifled in the embraces of the dead. And above all things a gangrene in our laws is to be avoided.

APHORISM 58.

But in the meantime let the Prætorian Courts have power to decree against laws and statutes which are obsolete, and have not lately passed. For though it has been well said, “ that no one should be wiser than the laws³⁰,” yet this must be understood of waking and not of sleeping laws. Not so however with more recent statutes, which are found to be injurious to public justice. The power of giving relief in this case should be left not to the judge, but to kings, councils, and the supreme authorities of the state, who should be empowered to suspend the execution of them by Acts or Proclamations, till the re-assembling of Parliament or of that body which has the power of repealing them; lest in the meantime the welfare of the community be endangered³¹.

[When the rights of the people were not sufficiently secured against the powers of the Crown, and therefore to weaken those powers was a patriotic object, such doctrines were naturally protested against. For when the Crown could successfully and safely abuse the powers it had, the evil could only be remedied or mitigated by taking them away. And it was doubtless by restricting its authority in matters like this that the people were in fact enabled to win the game, and exact sufficient securities for themselves. But we must remember that throughout this treatise Bacon assumes the existence of a government otherwise well constituted. And I am much inclined to think that these securities being once attained, and the House of Commons having in fact a veto upon all the proceedings of the Crown, such an authority might be intrusted to the government both safely and beneficially. Bacon was not considering what powers could be exercised constitutionally, i.e. according to law and precedent, by the English government, but generally what powers it was good for a people that the governing authority should have. —J. S.]

Of New Digests of Laws³².

APHORISM 59.

But if the laws by accumulation have grown so voluminous, or become so confused, that it is expedient to remodel them entirely and reduce them to a sound and manageable body, let it by all means be done; and let it be considered a heroic work; and let the authors thereof be justly and deservedly reckoned among legislators and reformers of law.

APHORISM 60.

This kind of expurgation and new digest of laws is effected by five processes. First, let obsolete laws, which Justinian calls old fables³³, be omitted. Secondly, let the most approved antinomies be received, and the rest abolished. Thirdly, let Homoionomies, or laws which are of the same import, and nothing else but reiterations of the same thing, be erased, and let the one which is the most perfect among them be retained in place of all the rest. Fourthly, let such laws as determine nothing, but only propose questions, and leave them undecided, be dismissed in like manner. Lastly, let those laws which are found to be wordy and too prolix be more compressed and abridged.

APHORISM 61.

It will be very useful in a new digest of laws to digest and arrange separately on the one side all the laws received as Common Law, the existence whereof is as it were from time immemorial; and on the other side the statutes which have from time to time been superadded. For in many points, in passing judgment, the interpretation and administration of the Common Law are not the same as the Statute Law. And this was the plan followed by Trebonianus in the Digest and Code³⁴.

APHORISM 62.

But in this regeneration and reconstruction of the laws, by all means retain the words and text of the old laws and law-books, though it be necessary to extract them by scraps and fragments: and afterwards connect them together in proper order. For although this might perhaps be done more conveniently, and, if you look to right reason, more correctly also by a new text than by patching up the old; yet in laws we ought not so much to look to style and drawing up as to authority, and its patron, antiquity. Otherwise the work would appear rather a matter of scholarship and method than a body of commanding laws.

APHORISM 63.

It will be expedient in this new digest of laws that the old volumes do not altogether perish and pass into oblivion; but that they be preserved at least in libraries, though the ordinary and promiscuous use of them be prohibited. For in important cases it will not be amiss to examine and consider the successive changes which have taken place in past laws. And surely it is a reverent thing to intermingle antiquity with things present. But this new body of laws ought to be regularly confirmed by the legislative power of the state; lest under pretence of digesting old laws, new laws be secretly imposed.

APHORISM 64.

It were desirable that this instauration of the laws should be undertaken in such times as are superior in learning and experience to those more ancient times whose works and acts they revise. But the reverse of this happened in the work of Justinian. For it is an unfortunate circumstance, when by the taste and judgment of a less wise and less learned generation the works of the ancients are mutilated and reconstructed. But that is often necessary which is not best.

So much then for obscurity of laws arising from an excessive and confused accumulation thereof. I now come to speak of the ambiguous and obscure drawing up of them.

Of the Confused and Obscure Drawing up of Laws.

APHORISM 65.

Obscure drawing up of laws arises either from their loquacity and verbosity or on the other hand from an excess of conciseness, or from the preamble of the law being at variance with the body.

APHORISM 66.

I must now speak of the obscurity of laws which arises from their being ill drawn up. The loquacity and prolixity used in the drawing up of laws I do not approve. For it does not at all secure its intention and purpose; but rather the reverse. For while it tries to enumerate and express every particular case in apposite and appropriate words, expecting greater certainty thereby; it does in fact raise a number of questions about words; so that, by reason of the noise and strife of words, the interpretation which proceeds according to the meaning of the law (which is the juster and sounder kind of interpretation) is rendered more difficult.

APHORISM 67.

Not that I therefore approve of a too concise and affected brevity, as being the style of majesty and command, especially in these times; lest by chance the law should become like a Lesbian rule³⁵. We must therefore aim at a mean, and look out for a well-defined generality of words; which though it does not attempt to express all the cases comprehended, yet excludes with sufficient clearness the cases not comprehended.

APHORISM 68.

In ordinary laws and proclamations of state however, in which lawyers are not generally consulted, but every man trusts to his own judgment, everything should be more fully explained, and pointed out, as it were with the finger, to the capacity of the people.

APHORISM 69.

Nor should I at all approve of the preambles of laws, which were formerly deemed impertinent, and which represent laws disputing and not commanding, if we could endure the ancient manners³³. But as times now are, these preambles are necessarily used in most cases, not so much to explain the law, as to persuade Parliament to pass it, and also to satisfy the people. But avoid preambles as much as possible, and let the law commence with the enactment.

APHORISM 70.

Though the intention and purport of a law may sometimes be well gathered from the prefaces and preambles, yet the latitude or extension thereof should by no means be sought from thence. For the preamble often selects a few of the most plausible and specious points by way of example, even when the law contains many things besides. Or on the other hand, the law sometimes makes many restrictions and limitations, the reasons whereof need not be inserted in the preamble. Wherefore the extent and latitude of a law is to be taken from the body thereof; for the preamble often either exceeds or falls short of it.

APHORISM 71.

There is one very faulty method of drawing up laws. And this is, when the case at which the law aims is fully set forth in the preamble; and then from the force of the word “such” or some like relative, the body of the law is reflected back upon the preamble, which is thereby inserted and incorporated into the law, and renders it both more obscure and less safe. For the same care is not usually employed in weighing and examining the words of the preamble which is bestowed on the body of the law itself.

But this part of the uncertainty of laws, arising from their being ill drawn up, I will treat of more fully, when I come afterwards to the interpretation of laws. And so much for the obscure drawing up of laws; I must now speak of the methods of expounding law.

Of the Methods of Expounding Law, and Removing Ambiguities.

APHORISM 72.

There are five methods of expounding law, and removing ambiguities: namely, by reports of judgments; by authentic writers; by auxiliary books; by prelections; or by the answers and decrees of learned men. All these if properly instituted will be of great service against the obscurity of laws.

Of the Reporting of Judgments.

APHORISM 73.

Above all things, let the Judgments delivered in the Supreme and Principal Courts on important cases, especially if they be doubtful and contain some difficulty or novelty, be diligently and accurately taken down. For judgments are the anchors of laws, as laws are of the state.

APHORISM 74.

Let this be the method of taking down judgments and committing them to writing. Record the cases precisely, the judgments themselves word for word; add the reasons which the judges allege for their judgments; do not mix up the authority of cases brought forward as examples with the principal case; and omit the perorations of counsel, unless they contain something very remarkable.

APHORISM 75.

Let the reporters be taken from the most learned counsel, and receive a libera salary from the state. But let not the judges themselves meddle with the reports; lest from being too fond of their opinions, and relying on their own authority, they exceed the province of a reporter.

APHORISM 76.

Let these judgments be digested in chronological order, and not by method and titles. For such writings are a kind of history or narrative of the laws. And not only the acts themselves, but the times also when they passed, give light to a wise judge.

Of Authentic Writers.

APHORISM 77.

Let the body of law be composed only of the laws that constitute the Common Law, of the constitutional laws or statutes, and of reported judgments. Besides these, let no others be deemed authentic, or at least let them be sparingly accepted.

APHORISM 78.

Nothing contributes so much to the certainty of laws (whereof I am now treating), as to keep the authentic writings within moderate bounds, and to get rid of the enormous multitude of authors and doctors of laws. For by them the meaning of laws is distracted, the judge is perplexed, the proceedings are made endless, and the advocate himself, as he cannot peruse and master so many books, takes refuge in abridgment. Perhaps some one good commentary, and a few classic authors, or rather some few selections from some few of them, may be received as authentic. Let the rest however be kept for use in libraries, that the judges or counsel may inspect them if necessary; but let them not be allowed to be pleaded in court, or to pass into authorities.

Of Auxiliary Books.

APHORISM 79.

The science and practice of the law should not be deprived of auxiliary books, but rather well furnished with them. These are of six kinds; namely, Institutes: On Terms of Law: On Rules of Law: Antiquities of Laws: Summaries, and Forms of Pleading.

APHORISM 80.

Students and novices are to be educated and trained by Institutes to take in more readily and profoundly the higher parts of the law. Let these Institutes be arranged in a clear and perspicuous order. Let them run through the whole private law, not omitting some things, and dwelling too long on others; but giving a slight sketch of all; so that when the student comes to peruse the body of law he may find nothing entirely new, or of which he has not had a slight notion beforehand. But touch not the public law in these institutes, but let that be drawn from the fountains themselves.

APHORISM 81.

Construct a commentary on legal terms; but let it not enter too curiously or laboriously into an explanation of their full sense. For the object is not so much to look for exact definitions of the words, as for explanations to make the way easier in reading law books. And let not this treatise be digested in the order of the alphabet, but leave that to an index; and let the words which relate to the same thing be arranged together, that the one may serve to explain the other.

APHORISM 82.

A good and careful treatise on the different rules of law conduces as much as anything to the certainty thereof; and it deserves to be entrusted to the ablest and wisest lawyers. For I am not content with the works of this kind which are now extant. The collection should consist not only of the common and well known rules, but of others likewise more subtle and abstruse, which may be gathered from the harmony of laws and decided cases; such as are sometimes found in the best tables of contents; and are in fact the general dictates of reason, which run through the different matters of. law, and act as its ballast.

APHORISM 83.

But let not every decree or position of law be taken for a rule; as is commonlydone, ignorantly enough. For if this were admitted there would be as many rules as laws; for law is nothing else than a commanding rule. But let those be considered rules which are inherent in the very form of justice; and whereby it comes that for the most part nearly the same rules are found in the civil laws of different states; except perhaps that they may sometimes vary with reference to the forms of constitutions.

APHORISM 84.

After a rule has been stated in a concise and solid form of words, let examples, and such decisions of cases as are most clear, be added for the explanation; distinctions and exceptions for the limitation; and kindred cases for the amplification of the rule.

APHORISM 85.

It is a sound precept not to take the law from the rules, but to make the rule from the existing law³⁷. For the proof is not to be sought from the words of the rule, as if it were the text of law. The rule, like the magnetic needle, points at the law, but does not settle it.

APHORISM 86.

Besides the body of law, it will be of service likewise to take a survey of the antiquities thereof; of which though the authority has perished, yet the reverence still remains. And by antiquities of laws, I understand those writings on laws and judgments, whether published or unpublished, which preceded the body of law; for these should not be lost. Wherefore select the most useful of them, (for many will be found to be frivolous and unprofitable) and collect them into one volume; that old fables, as Trebonianus calls them, may not be mixed up with the actual laws.

APHORISM 87.

It is of great importance to practice, that the whole law should be arranged in order under titles and heads; to which reference may be made at once, when occasion shall require, as to a store-house provided for present wants. Summaries of this kind both reduce to order what is dispersed in the law, and abridge what is diffuse and prolix. But we must take care that while they make men ready in practice, they do not make them idlers in the science itself; for their business is to facilitate the recollection of the law, not to teach it. But these summaries are by all means to be constructed with great care, accuracy, and judgment, lest they cheat the laws.

APHORISM 88.

Collect the different forms of pleading of every sort. For this is both a help to practice; and besides, these forms disclose the oracles and mysteries of laws. For many things lie concealed in the laws, which in these forms of pleading are more fully and ciearly revealed; the one being as the fist, the other as the open hand.

Of Answers and Opinions.

APHORISM 89.

Some means should be devised for solving and clearing away the particular doubts which from time to time arise. For it is hard that they who desire to secure themselves from error should not be able to find a guide; but that their actions must themselves run the risk, there being no means of knowing the law before the thing is done.

APHORISM 90.

I do not approve that the answers of learned men³⁸, whether advocates or doctors of law, given to those who ask their advice on a point of law, should have such authority that the judge should not be allowed to depart from their opinions. Let the laws be taken from sworn judges.

APHORISM 91.

I do not approve that men should make trial of judgments under feigned persons and causes, for the purpose of ascertaining what the rule of law will be³⁹. For this lowers the majesty of the laws and is a kind of prevarication. Besides, it is unseemly for judicial proceedings to borrow anything from the stage.

APHORISM 92.

Therefore, let judgments, as well as answers and opinions, proceed from the judges alone; the former in questions on pending suits, the latter on difficult points of law. And let not these opinions, whether on public or private matters, be demanded from the judges themselves, (for that were to turn the judge into an advocate); but from the king or state. Let the king or state refer them to the judges. Let the judges thus authorised hear the pleadings of the advocates, whether selected by the parties themselves, or (if necessary) appointed by the judges themselves, and the arguments on both sides; and after deliberating on the case let them deliver and declare the law. Let these opinions be recorded and published among judgments, and be of equal authority with them⁴⁰.

Of Prelections.

APHORISM 93.

Let the lectures and exercises of those who study and labour at the law be so ordered and instituted, as rather to set legal questions and controversies at rest, than to raise and excite them. For at present they are nothing but schools and institutions for multiplying altercations and controversies on points of law, as if for the display of wit. And this evil is also an old one. For it was likewise the pride of antiquity, as by sects and factions, to keep alive a number of questions of law, rather than to settle them⁴¹. Let this however be provided against,

Of Inconsistency of Judgments.

APHORISM 94.

Inconsistency of judgments arises either from an immature and hasty decision, or from the rivalry of Courts, or from a bad and ignorant reporting of judgments, or from too great facility being given for their reversal. Care therefore should be taken that judgments proceed after mature deliberation; that courts preserve mutual respect for one another; that judgments be faithfully and wisely reported; and that the way to a repeal of judgments be narrow, rocky, and as it were paved with flint stones.

APHORISM 95.

If judgment be given on any case in a principal court, and a similar case occur in any other, do not proceed to pass judgment till a consultation has been held in some general assembly of the judges. For if it be that previous decisions must be rescinded, at least let them be interred with honour.

APHORISM 96.

That Courts should fence and dispute about jurisdiction is natural to humanity; the rather because of a foolish doctrine, that it is the part of a good and active judge to extend the jurisdiction of his Court; which stimulates the disease and applies a spur where a bit is needed. But that through this spirit of contention courts should freely rescind each other's judgments (judgments having nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction) is an intolerable evil, that should by all means be put down by kings or senates or governments. For it is a most pernicious example, that Courts, whose business it is to keep the subjects at peace, should be at war with one another.

APHORISM 97.

Let not the way to a repeal of judgments by appeals, writs of error, new trials, and the like, be much too easy and open. Some hold that a suit should be withdrawn to a higher court, as quite a new cause, the previous judgment being completely laid aside and suspended. Others are of opinion that the judgment itself should remain in full force, whilst only its execution should be deferred. I do not like either of these ways; unless the courts wherein judgment has been delivered be of a low and inferior character; but I would rather let both the judgment stand, and the execution proceed, the defendant only giving security for costs and damages if the judgments be reversed.

This Title then touching Certainty of Laws shall stand as a model of the rest of the Digest which I have in mind.

But here I have concluded Civil Knowledge (as far as I have thought right to handle it), and together with it Human Philosophy, and, with Human Philosophy, Philosophy in General. At length therefore having arrived at some pause, and looking back into those things which I have passed through, this treatise of mine seems to me not unlike those sounds and preludes which musicians make while they are tuning their instruments, and which produce indeed a harsh and unpleasing sound to the ear, but tend to make the music sweeter afterwards. And thus have I intended to employ myself in tuning the harp of the muses and reducing it to perfect harmony, that hereafter the strings may be touched by a better hand or a better quill. And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning seems to have now made her third visitation to men; and when at the same time I attentively behold with what helps and assistances she is provided; as the vivacity and sublimity of the many wits of this age; the noble monuments of ancient writers, which shine like so many lights before us; the art of printing, which brings books within reach of men of all fortunes; the opened bosom of the ocean, and the world travelled over in every part, whereby multitudes of experiments unknown to the ancients have been disclosed, and an immense mass added to Natural History; the leisure time which the greatest wits in the kingdoms and states of Europe everywhere have at their disposal, not being so much employed in civil business as were the Greeks in respect of their popular governments, and the Romans in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the peace which Britain, Spain, Italy, France too at last, and many other countries now enjoy; the consumption and exhaustion of all that can be thought or said on religious questions, which have so long diverted many men's minds from the study of other arts; the excellence and perfection of your Majesty's learning, which calls whole flocks of wits around you, as birds round a phoenix; and lastly, the inseparable property of time, ever more and more to disclose Truth; I cannot, I say, when I reflect on these things but be raised to this hope, that this third period will far surpass the Greek and Roman in learning; if only men will wisely and honestly know their own strength and their own weakness; and take from one another the light of invention and not the fire of contradiction; and esteem the inquisition of truth as a noble enterprise, and not a pleasure or an ornament; and employ wealth and magnificence on things of worth and excellence, not on things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make at all events that ancient and patient request, “Strike, but hear⁴²”. Let men reprehend them as much as they please, if only they observe and weigh what is said. For the appeal is lawful, though perhaps it may not be necessary, from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the present age to posterity. Now let us come to that learning which the two former periods have not been so blessed as to know, namely, Sacred and Inspired Divinity, the most noble Sabbath and port of all men's labours and peregrinations.

whose work was published in 1825. The distinction between the character of the doctrines of the two schools is not very strongly marked.

¹ This story is told of Zeno. See Plut, de Garrulitate, and Diog. Laert. vii. 24.

² Cic. Ep. ad Attic, xii. 42. The person in question was his nephew, Q. Cicero.

³ Pind. Nem. v. 32.

⁴ Plut, in Cato, c. 8.

⁵ 2 Chron. xx. 33.

⁶ Ovid, De Art. Am. ii. 312:— Let not your looks your words betray.

⁷ No such remark occurs in the letter ofadvice which Marcus Cicero wrote to his brother Quintus, when the latter was about to take possession of his province. But in Quintus's tract De Petitione Consulatsû in which he gives his brother advice as to his conduct in canvassing for the consulship, we find the antithesis quoted in the text, though somewhat differently worded. But of course the passage in which it occurs has no reference to any class of “provinciales.”

⁸ See Cicero, Ep. ad Att.ix. 12; and compare the eighteenth letter of the same book in which the interview with Cæsar is described.

⁹ Livy, xxiii. 12.

¹⁰ Eccles. xi. 4.

¹ Cicero, De Orat. iii. 33.

² De Petit. Consulatûs.

³ I Kings, iv. 29.

⁴ Kings, iv. 33.

⁵ Prov. xv. 1.

⁶ Prov. xvii. 2.

⁷ Prov. xxix. 9.

⁸ Eccles. vii. 21.

⁹ Plut, in Pomp. c. 20.; and in Sertor. c. 27.

¹⁰ Prov. vi. 11.

¹¹ Cf. Eurip. Helena, 513.

¹² Prov. ix. 7.

¹³ St. Matt, vii, 6.

¹⁴ Prov. x. 1.

¹⁵ Prov. x. 7.

¹⁶ Prov. xi. 29.

¹⁷ De Petit. Cons. 5.

¹⁸ Eccles. vii. 8. Vulgate. The English version has, “Better is the end of a thing,” etc.

¹⁹ Erasm. Adag. iii. 3. 26. This proverbial phrase Erasmus found in the Phœdrus of Plato, and in Athenæus.

²⁰ Eccles. x. 1.

²¹ Prov. xxix. 8.

²² Prov. xxix. 12.

²³ Annal, xii. 3.

²⁴ Histoire de Comines, i. 16.

²⁵ Prov. xii. 10.

²⁶ See Busbequius, Ep. 3.—J. S.

²⁷ Prov. xxix. 11.

²⁸ Eccles. x. 4.

²⁹ Prov. xviii. 17.

³⁰ Prov. xxix. 21. The English version has, “ Shall have him become his son at the length.”

³¹ We find Machiavelli's opinion, as to what the conduct of princes towards their ministers ought to be, in the twenty-second chapter of Il Principe. It hardly appears to justify the reference here made to him; but I have not met with any passage in his writings which contains precisely the remark in the text.

³² Prov. xxii. 29.

³³ Eccles. iv. 15, Vulgate. The English version differs considerably.

³⁴ Tac. Ann. vi. 46., and Plut. in Pomp. c. 14.

³⁵ Cf. Quintil. vi. 2. 30.

³⁶ Eccl. ix. 14. 15.

³⁷ Machiavelli, Discorsi, i. 29.

³⁸ Prov. xv. 19.

³⁹ prov. xxviii. 21.

⁴⁰ Prov. xxviii. 3.

⁴¹ Prov. xxv. 26.

⁴² Br asm. Adag. i.1. 70.

⁴³ Prov. xxii. 24.

⁴⁴ Prov. xvii. 9.

⁴⁵ Prov. xiv. 23.

⁴⁶ Ovid. Rem. Amor. 697.

⁴⁷ Prov. xxvii. 5.

⁴⁸ Prov. xiv. 8. 15.

⁴⁹ The words occur in Livy, xxxv. 32, and not in Tacitus.

⁵⁰ Eccles. vii. 16.

⁵¹ Tac. Hist. i. 2.

⁵² Tac. Ann. iv. 20.

⁵³ Prov. ix. 9.

⁵⁴ Prov. xxvii. 14.

⁵⁵ Prov. xxvii. 19.

⁵⁶ Ovid, De Arte Amat. i. 760:—Qui sapit innumeris moribus aptus erit.

⁵⁷ Plaut. Trinumtnus, ii. 2. 84.

⁵⁸ Livy, xxxix. 40.

⁵⁹ Plut, in Sylla, c. 6.

⁶⁰ Ezek. xxix. 3.

⁶¹ Habak. i. 16.

⁶² Virg. Æn. x. 773 [Cf. vii. 648; x. 880]:—

My own right hand and sword assist my stroke, These gods alone Mezentius will invoke.

⁶³ Sueton, in Julio, c. 77.

⁶⁴ Plut. in Sylla, c 6.

⁶⁵ plut. de Roman. Fort. p. 319.

⁶⁶ Ovid, Met. xiv. 113.

⁶⁷ Sueton. in Aug. c. 99.

⁶⁸ See Lucian in Hermotim. 20. But as Bacon, in the Essay on Building, alludes to a part of the story which Lucian does not tell, it is probable that his knowledge of it was derived from some other source. The most obvious one is the Æsopic fable; but there Momus's wish is not quite the same as in the text. In the fable he complains not that there are no shutters, δυρίδες, in the breast, but that αϊ φρένες are inside it, and not on the surface.

⁶⁹ Virg. Æn. iv. 423:—

His times of access you alone can find, And know the soft approaches to his mind.

⁷⁰ Prov. xx. 5.

⁷¹ Juv. ii. 8.:—Fronti nulla fides.

⁷² De Pet. Cons. § 11.

⁷³ Tacit. Ann. i. 52. In the Advancement of Learning, this passage stands thus:— “None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, Etenim vultu offen-sionem conjectaverat. So again, noting,” etc. The passage referred to is in Annals, i. 12, and was probably omitted by an oversight, for it is quite in point.—J. S.

⁷⁴ Tac. Ann. iv. 31.

⁷⁵ lb. iv. 52.

⁷⁶ Hor. Ep. i. 18. 38:—

Tortured with wine and wrath.

⁷⁷ Livy, xxviii. 42.

⁷⁸ Bacon alludes to the Italian proverb:—

Chi mi fa più caresse chè non suole O m'a ingannato, o ingannar mi vuole.

⁷⁹ Cf. Dem. Olynth, iii. 33, and 1 Philipp, towards the end.

⁸⁰ Tac. Hist. iv. 39.

⁸¹ Quoted also in the Advancement of Learning.

⁸² Pro. xxv. 3.

⁸³ Tac. Ann. xiv. 57.

⁸⁴ Q. Cicero, De Pet. Cons. 5.

⁸⁵ Epict. Enchir. c 9.

⁸⁶ Cf. Essay De l'Utilité et de l'Honnêteté.

⁸⁷ St. James, i. 23, 24.

⁸⁸ Tacit. Ann. i. 54.

⁸⁹ Better known as Cæsar Borgia, son of Pope Alexander the Sixth. After his change of profession, for an account of which see Guicciardini, vi. 3, he was made Duke of the Valentinois, and is therefore spoken of by Italian writers as “il duca Valentino”. Bacon has here used this title as a prænomen.

⁹⁰ See Plutarch, Cœsar, c. 3.

⁹¹ The phrase in Balbus's letter to Cicero Ep. ad Att. ix. 8.

⁹² Cic. Ep. ad Att. ix. 10.

⁹³ Tac. Hist. ii. 80.

⁹⁴ Rhetor, ad Heren, iv. 4.

⁹⁵ Ovid, Art. Amat. ii. 662: Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni.

⁹⁶ Plutarch's Apophthegms.

⁹⁷ Cic Ep. ad Attic, x, 4.

⁹⁸ Cic. ad Attic, xvi. 15.

⁹⁹ Tac. Hist. ii. 38.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Sueton. de Claris Grarnmaticis, c. 15.

¹⁰¹ Tac. Ann. v. 1.

¹⁰² Cf. Cic de Clar. Orat. c. 95: Idem manebat neque idem decebat.

¹⁰³ Livy, xxxix. 40.

¹⁰⁴ Machiavelli, Discorsi, iii. 9.

¹⁰⁵ Demosth. 1 Philipp. 46.

¹⁰⁶ Cæs. Bell. Civil, i. 30.

¹⁰⁷ Machiavelli, Discorsi, ii. 10; and cf. Cicero, Philip, v.

¹⁰⁸ Virg. Eclog. ix. 66: Quod nunc instat agamus.

¹⁰⁹ Lucan, viii. 486: Fatis accede Deisque.

¹¹⁰ Demosth. Philip, i. 45.

¹¹¹ Virg. Georg, iii. 284:—

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus.

¹¹² St. Matth. xxiii. 23; St. Luke, xi. 42.

¹¹³ La Bruyère's remarks on this precept are, I think, worth transcribing —

“ Vivre avec nos ennemis comme s'ils devoient un jour tre nos amis, et vivre avec nos amis comme s'ils pouvoient devenir nos ennemis, n'est ni selon la nature de la haine, ni selon les règles de l'amitié: ce n'est point une maxime morale, mais politique. On ne doit pas se faire des ennemis de ceux qui mieux connus pourroient avoir rang entre nos amis. On doit faire choix d'amis si sûrs et d'une si exacte probité que venant á cesser de l'être, ils ne veuillent pas abuser de notre confiance, ni se faire craindre comme nos ennemis.”—Les Caractères, c. 4.

[La Bruyère's rule would, I think, be perfect, if it were possible to make a certain judgment of each man's character beforehand. The defect of it is, that, taking no account of the necessary uncertainty of all such judgments, it fails to give any practical direction in the real affairs of life. Put it thus:—“Treat no man as your enemy unless you are sure that he can never deserve to be your friend, make no man your friend unless you are sure that he will never become your enemy;”—and your practical direction becomes much the same as that of Bias, The question which in morals is really disputable is whether a man should encourage himself to doubt other men, or not to doubt; and this, being a question of more or less, cannot be determined except in reference to particular cases. No man will say generally either that you cannot doubt too much, or that you cannot doubt too little. Perhaps the best general direction that can be given is to lean against your natural inclination whichever way it goes. If you are naturally inclined to distrust appearances, trust them more; if to trust, trust them less.—J. S.]

¹¹⁴ Cf. Machiavelli, Principle, c 17, 18.

¹¹⁵ Cic. pro Deiotaro, c 9.

¹¹⁸ Cic. pro Murœn. c. 25; Sallust, Cat c. 31.

¹¹⁷ Plut, in Lysand. c. 8. The saying seems, however, not to be Lysander's. He apparently adopted it from Polycrates of Samos.

¹¹⁸ Eccles. ii. n.

¹¹⁹ virg. Æn. ix. 252:—

Ye brave young men, what equal gifts can we,

In recompense of such desert, decree?

The greatest, sure, and best you can receive,

The gods and your own conscious worth will give.

¹²⁰ Cic. Ep. ad Att. ix. 12.

¹²¹ Psalm vii. 14, or Job, xv. 35.

¹²² Hor. Sat. ii. 2. 79: Atque affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ.

¹²³ Aurelius Victor, Epit. c. 1. Lampridius de Severo.

¹²⁴ It was on being obliged to raise the siege of Metz that Charles V. remarked that Fortune was like a woman,—that, after having favoured him in his youth, she turned against him when he was no longer young. There are, I believe, several papers of instructions addressed by him to Philip II. In one or two which I have seen the remark mentioned in the text does not appear to occur.

¹²⁵ St. Matth. vi. 33.

¹²⁶ Virtue I worshipped, and as real, sought, But found her empty, and a thing of nought—which, according to Dio Cassius, xlvii., was the dying exclamation of Brutus. From the way in which the lines are introduced by Dio Cassius, they appear to be a fragment of a speech of Hercules in some lost tragedy. The first line and the first portion of the second (which, in effect, is all that is here translated) occur not only in Dio Cassius, but also in Plutarch, De Superstitione, where, however, no reference is made to Brutus. Most editions of Dio Cassius are accompanied by a Latin translation. In the earlier ones of those which I have seen, the words in question are given in prose, and in the later in iambic verse.

¹ This Latin treatise on the Extension of Empire is nearly an exact translation of the Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms. I have therefore retained the original English with very few alterations.

² Plut. in Them. 2.

³ St. Matth. xiii. 31.

⁴ Virg. Ecl. vii. 52.

⁵ Plut. in Alex. c. 31.

⁶ Plutarch in Lucull. 27. and Appian, Bell. Mithrid. c. 85.

⁷ Cf. Lucian's Charon.

⁸ Gen. xlix. 9. 14.

⁹ The excise, or accise (from acciisse) was originally in the Low Countries a municipal tax; it seems to have arisen from a privilege granted by Charles V. in 1536 to certain towns, of imposing duties on wine, beer, and woollen and silken stuffs. See Histoire Générale des Provinces-Unies, i. 236. That the inhabitants of these countries were from an early time jealous of the administration of public money appears from the following passage from Meteranus: “ Status Belgici, Italico et Gallico gravatai bello, novennalem exactionem Regi consentiunt: harum autem pecuniarum administrationem et præsidiorum atque turmarum publice merentium satisfactionem suo officio reservant: quæ res multis sibi id arrogantibus non parum displicuit: hinc Regis subditorumque mutua alienatio et offensio orta, cum Regi esset persuasum, hoc modo suæ majestati summopere derogari”.—Hist. Belg. Meter, in anno 1554.

¹⁰ Virg. Æn. i. 531:—

Hesperia called, a land divinely blessed,

Of strength in arms and fruitful soil possessed.

¹¹ Daniel, c. iv.

¹² E.g. Bourbon, Prosper, Colonna, Pescara, Egmont, Castaldo, Parma, Piccolomini, Spinola. Of these, however, one or two might almost be called Spaniards; and it must be remembered that the dominions of Charles V. and his successors extended beyond the natural limits of the Spanish monarchy.

¹³ In 1618, the Cortes, among other projects of reformation, petitioned the king not to grant any licences for monastic foundations.

The excessive multiplication of religious houses had attracted the attention of the government long before; and the opinions of a number of ecclesiastics were taken on the subject, in 1603, but nothing further seems to have been done. Subsequently, however, to the representation of the Cortes, the state of the kingdoms belonging to the crown of Castile was referred by the king to the council of Castile; and their report, which is given at full length in Davila's Life of Philip the Third (see chap. 86), is known as the Gran Consulta de 1619. The distress and depopulation of the parts of Spain to which it refers are stated in very strong language, the causes assigned being mainly excessive and oppressive taxation, the increase of luxury, and the non-residence of the rich on their estates. To relieve the revenue, the revocation of royal grants, when any fair reason could be found for doing so, is recommended. Sumptuary laws are also proposed, and some regulations tending to the relief of the agricultural class. The king is also advised to be cautious in granting licenses to religious houses. Ortiz states expressly that no measures were taken to carry out the recommendation of the council during the reign of Philip the Third; a statement which seems to be fully confirmed by the silence of so copious and seemingly so painstaking an annalist as Gonzalez Davila. The assertion to be found in some French and English books, that the king made a decree in virtue of which those who introduced agricultural improvements on their estates were ennobled, is in itself exceedingly improbable, and has perhaps no other foundation than the imagination of some French economist who may have been misled by the circumstance that in the Cortes of 1618 something was done with respect to proofs of nobility. I speak, however, without having seen Navarrete's Conservacion delta Monarquia. Soon after the accession of Philip the Fourth a royal decree or Pragmatica was published which attempted to carry out some of the recommendations of the council, and which gave certain privileges to persons who married, and further immunities to those who had six children. For some account of its provisions, see Cespedes' History of the first Six Years of Philip the Fourth (published at Lisbon in 1631, and reprinted in Spain in 1634), book 3, cc. 17. 18. Cespedes does not precisely fix the date of the decree, but it was plainly issued some time in the summer of 1622, and is no doubt that to which Bacon refers. The date assigned by Desormeaux, namely, the 10th of February 1624, is manifestly wrong; the sumptuary part of the enactment was suspended on the occasion of the visit of Prince Charles in 1623. See Mead's Letters to Stuteville, in Ellis's Letters.

It is a historical commonplace to assert that the depopulation of Spain was caused by the expulsion of the Moriscos, but this alone could not have produced so permanent an effect. The energies of the country were exhausted by excessive and unequal taxation; and the increase of the number of religious houses, especially of those belonging to the Mendicant Orders, aggravated the evil. Ranke has justly remarked that Spain must always have been a thinly peopled country; and he might have added, a country in which there seems always to have been a tendency to become depopulated. Thus in a passage of the Side Partidas, quoted in the Gran Consulta, it is said to be part of the duty of the king to see that the population of places does not fall off. Even the word despoblado suggests a different idea from that which is expressed by weald or wilderness. It may be well to remark that there seems no reason to doubt that the population of Spain is much greater now than it was in the sixteenth century, although for a considerable time there must have been a decrease. Cassmany, in an interesting essay on the subject, has shown how much exaggeration there is in the statements made by Spanish writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as to the population and manufacturing industry of the country in earlier times. According to him the population reached its minimum about 1700.

¹⁴ Livy, i. 16.

¹⁵ Commencing, that is, with the wars in Italy which arose out of the invasion of that country by Charles VIII.

¹⁶ [Orig. “Maris dominium monarchiæ quædam epitome est.” The sense is obscure. See the same passage in essays, p. 773.—ED.]

¹⁷ Cic. Ep. ad Att. x. 8.

¹⁸ Orig. Pugna ad Insulas Cursolares. The Insulæ Cursolares or Kurzolari islands are the ancient Echinades. The naval engagement generally, though perhaps incorrectly, called the Battle of Lepanto, took place off these islands in 1571. The Turkish fleet was defeated with great loss. It was on this occasion that Cervantes lost his hand.

¹⁹ St. Matth. vi. 27; St. Luke, xii. 25.

²⁰ The doctrine of this aphorism resembles that of Hobbes, inasmuch as there is no recognition of the principle that moral ideas lie at the root of civil rights. All the evidence of which the nature of the subject admits tends to show that society has always been held together, not by fear, but by notions more or less perfectly developed of the distinction between right and wrong; and to assert that in the absence of any such notions selfish fear could serve as the “firmamentum juris privati,” is at best to assert that which never has been proved and never can be.

Of course it is not meant to deny that fear is the principle by means of which the moral force of society becomes efficient in the repression of crime.

[That a notion of the distinction between right and wrong in general lies at the bottom of all our notions of individual rights and wrongs; that when we think of one man as doing an injury to another, we think of him as doing something not only in its effect hurtful, but in its nature unjust; I do not think Bacon would have denied. That in the absence of any such notion the interest which all men have in protection from injury would lead them to concur in the measures necessary to secure protection to each, he would not, I think, have affirmed. But such questions did not enter into the practical problem with which he had to deal; which was this: Given our common notions of right and wrong, jus and injuria, with all their constituent elements, what is the principle by which they are made to bear upon the protection of individuals? To this he answers: It is the interest which each individual has in being himself protected. That the personal interest would be insufficient without the sanction of the “moral idea” to stimulate and support it, is probably true; for we see that actions the most dangerous to society, if committed by madmen, and therefore not objects of moral disapprobation, are exempted from punishment; the necessity of self-defence requiring only that measures be taken to prevent the recurrence of them, and the sense of justice refusing to sanction any further severity. But that the “moral idea,” unassisted by the sense of personal interest, could be still less relied upon as a “firmamentum privati juris,” seems to me still more certain; for we see that the penalties exacted or denounced by the laws, though proportioned with tolerable accuracy to the danger of the offence, bear no proportion at all to the moral disapprobation of which it is the object. Actions which are morally wrong in the highest degree, if they be such as every man may protect himself against, are not punished at all. Actions which the moral sense scarcely condemns, if such that the general permission of them would entail a general insecurity of property, are punished with great severity. And the truth seems to be, that to make an action seem a fit object of punishment, there must be something morally offensive in it, but that the nature and amount of punishment varies according to the interest of society in preventing it, and the difficulty of effecting that end. Men are not content with less severity than they think necessary for their protection, nor do they feel justified in using more.—J. S.]

²¹ I Corinth, xiv. 8.

²² Arist. Rhet. i. 1.

²³ Paulus, Digest. 141, Ff. De Div. Reg. Jur.

²⁴ It is to be observed, that the principle on which the English courts have proceeded —namely, that a decision on a point not previously decided on is to be accepted merely as a declaration of an already existing law virtually contained in the unwritten corpus juris entitled the Common Law—has had the effect of giving nearly equal weight to all cases decided by a competent tribunal. On the other hand, we find in the history of French jurisprudence that great uncertainty has existed as to the degree of authority to which a “res judicata” was entitled; the principle that “res judicata pro veritate accipitur” extending only to the parties between whom the actual decision was had. Thus it is related that De Thou was in the habit of saying, when it was mentioned that in a case similar to the one before him a decree had been given in favour of the plaintiff or defendant, “C'est bon pour lui”; implying that it was not of authority in any other case. The Parliament of Paris was for a long time in the habit of distinguishing the decisions to the principle of which it intended to give force of law from other decisions by a more solemn form of delivering judgment; thereby in effect claiming what our courts have never claimed, namely, a power of making new law. A collection has been published of these quasi-legislative decisions, with the title of “Arrêts rendus en robe rouge”. It is evident that the practice of the Parliament of Paris, which was probably followed by other of the French Parliaments, escapes from some of the inconveniences of the English theory.

²⁵ Celsus, Digest, i. 3, 24.

²⁶ M. Bouillet remarks that every one who has commented on this tract of Bacon's has condemned the institution of these Courts. M. Dupin is evidently much perplexed by them. “Hic mera utopia proponitur” is the commencement of his note on the thirty second aphorism. Doubtless it is odd that in inquiring how the law may be made certain Bacon should have introduced two Courts, of which the distinguishing character is the absence of any kind of certainty. But to every one who is acquainted with the history of English law, it is manifest that Bacon's intention was to give an idealised description of the Court of Star-Chamber, and of the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Of the two institutions which he thus indirectly praises it is not necessary to say much. The Court of Star-Chamber, though of use in particular cases, was un-questionably on the whole an instrument of injustice and oppression; while, on the other hand, if equity had continued to be as indefinite as the jurisdiction of the “curiæ prætoriæ,” it would soon have become a more intolerable evil than any which it could have been applied to relieve.

[The apparent inconsistency of introducing these discretionary tribunals into a scheme specially designed to make the operation of the law certain, admits in my opinion of a satisfactory explanation. The uncertainty of the law is injurious in two ways. On the one hand, it may lead me to expect that if I observe certain prescribed conditions, my liberty will not be interfered with; and when I think I have observed them, it may, by some arbitrary or unexpected interpretation, take me up and send me to prison. On the other hand, it may lead me to expect protection against particular kinds of injury or (failing protection) redress; and, from some defect in its provisions, it may fail to prevent the injury or to afford the redress. The first kind of uncertainty resides in the interpretation, the second in the framing, of the law; and against both it is necessary, as far as may be, to provide. The perfect remedy is a code of laws so framed as to provide expressly for every possible case, coupled with a rule of interpretation which leaves no discretion whatever to the judge. But this is for Utopia. No lawgiver can perfectly foresee either the conditions of cases or the effect of words. Laws will therefore pass occasionally, which, if strictly construed, will punish the man whom they were intended to protect, and protect the man whom they were intended to punish. To correct such errors, a discretion must be allowed somewhere in the administration of the law; and the question is, where? According to Bacon's scheme, the necessary discretion is to be confided, not to the ordinary tribunals, but to others specially constituted for the purpose, and acting under restrictions and regulations specially framed to prevent them from abusing it; lest in correcting one kind of uncertainty, uncertainties of another kind be introduced. What these restrictions and regulations should be, the rest of the section is occupied in explaining.

Now, to supply the defects of the law by the exercise of this kind of discretion was the proper function of the Star-Chamber and the Court of Chancery; and I see no occasion to seek further for Bacon's motive in introducing “an idealised description” of those Courts,—or, I should rather say, a description of two Courts constituted as, in a perfect administrative system, the Star-Chamber and the Court of Chancery ought to be.

With regard to the character of the actual Star-Chamber, we are not to forget that Bacon was not the only eminent jurist who approved of it. Sir Edward Coke, in the fourth book of his Institutes, which was written in his old age, when he was regarded as the great champion of the people against the Crown, speaks of it in terms as favourable as ever Bacon did. “It is the most honourable Court” (he says)—“our parliament excepted—that is in the Christian world, both in respect of the Judges of the Court, and of their honourable proceeding according to their just jurisdiction, and the ancient and just orders of the Court.” And I cannot help thinking that modern constitutional writers have judged of it too hastily from the accidental and exceptional circumstances which led to its abolition. It was an instrument of government. When the government was oppressive and unjust, it was an instrument of oppression and injustice. So, also, at many periods of our history have the Courts of Common Law been. But if we would know whether a Court constituted like the Star-Chamber had any necessary tendency to become an instrument of oppression, we must consider it in connexion with the rest of the constitution. Was it in any special manner under the command of the Crown? Certainly not: it was under the command of the Crown so far only and so long only as the whole powers of government were under the command of the Crown. So far and so long as the King could appoint his own ministers and maintain them and carry on the government with them in spite of the House of Commons, so far and so long he could exercise an effectual control over the proceedings of a Court constituted like the Star-Chamber; no farther and no longer. The body of the Court was composed of the chief officers of the government; less than eight did not make a quorum; their proceedings were public; each member gave his own sentence with the reasons; the majority decided; the decree was solemnly recorded. As soon as the theory of a responsible ministry was recognised, and the impossibility of carrying on the government without money voted by the House of Commons gave the people an effective check upon the Crown, they would have had a check equally effective upon the proceedings of a court of justice so constituted. Any abuse of its authority would have led to a change of ministry, and to the transfer of that authority to other hands.

With regard to the Court of Chancery, it is less easy to say how it would have worked had its jurisdiction been exercised according to the conditions here prescribed for the Curiæ Prætoriæ; one of which is that it was not to be confided to a single man. “Curiæ illæ” (i.e. Curiæ Censoriæ et Frætoriæ, see Aph. 36) “uni viro ne committantur, sed ex pluribus constent.” And in speculating upon the evil which it might have become with powers so indefinite, we must not forget how great an evil it has actually become, in consequence of the rules by which its discretion has been defined and limited. The nearest approach to certainty attained by the existing system appears to he the certainty of damage to both parties.—J. S.]

²⁷ Xen. Hellen, iii. 3, 2.

²⁸ Of the Star-Chamber Bacon has said in his History of Henry VII., that it took cognizance of “forces, frauds, crimes various, of stellionate, and the incusations or middle acts towards crimes, capital or heinous, not actually committed or perpetrated”.

²⁹ Psalm xi. 6.

³⁰ Bacon refers perhaps to D'Argentré's maxim, “ Stulta videtur sapientia quæ lege vult sapientior videri”. In the passage from which these words are taken, he is condemning the presumption of judges who depart from the text on the pretence of equity. D'Argentré died in 1590. Cf. Arist. Rhet. i. 15, 12; and Thucyd. iii. 37.

³¹ Here, as in the description of the Curias Censoriæ and Prætoriæ, reference is made to what actually existed in England in Bacon's time. In the concluding part of this aphorism he sanctions the doctrine that an act of Parliament may provisionally at least be suspended or set aside by an Order in Council. This doctrine was undoubtedly commonly maintained in Bacon's time, but it was nevertheless even then protested against.

³² This section, and especially the 64th Aphorism, is spoken of with great commendation by perhaps the highest authority on such subjects. See Savigny “On the Vocation of our Time to Legislation,” 3d edition, p. 20.

³³ Institut. Proœm. £ 3. The great bulk of Justinian's Institutiones are merely a reproduction of those of Gaius.

³⁴ The Digest consists of Excerpta from the works of a great number of juıists, so arranged as to form a connected view of the whole of the Roman law. The Codex is a collection of imperial ordinances, most of which relate to particular cases, but are nevertheless of general authority, while others are in form as well as in effect legislative enactments.

The Digest cannot be regarded as a Corpus of customary law: we find in every portion of it continual references to every source of law,—to leges, plebiscita, edicta, senatûs consulta, and imperial rescripts and constitutions, as well as to jus civile, in the narrow sense in which the phrase is equivalent to immemorial custom. It is scarcely necessary to mention that Tribonianus was Justinian's chief instrument in the compilation of the Digest, Codex, and the Institutes. The first of these three works is the greatest in extent and importance. It was drawn up by a commission of seventeen persons, of which Tribonianus was the head, as he was likewise of the smaller commissions by which the other two were compiled. By the Codex I mean the Codex Repetita Prcelectionis: Tribonianus was not at the head of the commission by which the original Codex was drawn up, and it has been conjectured that his dissatisfaction at this circumstance occasioned the revision.

171. 35“ Lesbia regula dicitur quoties præpostere, non ad rationem factum, sed ratio ad factum accommodatur.”—Erasm. Adag. i. 93.

Bacon's meaning is, that if the law be too concisely stated it may be bent by the interpretations which its excessive brevity will render necessary, so as to operate in a way which the legislator did not contemplate. This will more clearly appear to be his meaning from the passage in the Nicomachean Ethics, v. c. 10, to which Erasmus refers. In building with irregularly shaped stones, flexible rules might be found of use, and it would appear that the Lesbians were in the habit of employing them.

³⁶ “Jubeat,” says Seneca, speaking of law, “ non disputet. Nihil videtur mihi ineptius quam lex cum prologo.”—Ep. 95.

³⁷ Paulus, Digest, De diver sis regulis antiqui juris, i. 1.

³⁸ Orig. Respoma Prudentum. By the Roman Jurists the Responsa prudentum are reckoned among the Fontes Juris, but there are few points in the history of Roman law on which it is more difficult to form a satisfactory opinion. We have no satisfactory information either as to the form in which these Responsa were given, or as to the degree of authority with which they were invested. The common opinion is, that they received absolute force of law in virtue of an ordinance of Augustus, and that more precise regulations with respect to cases in which a diversity of opinion existed were made by Hadrian. The connexion between them and the law of citations of Honorius and Valentinian is also a matter of much obscurity. See Booking's Pandekten, i. p. 36. Walter, Gesch. d. R. Rechts, £ 409 and 421. Hug, Gesch. d. R. Rechts, £ 313 and 385.

³⁹ Lord Ellenborough refused to try a case in which a bet had been made on a point of law. He asked, it is said, to see the record, and threw it down “with much indignation”. Tradition adds that he threw it at the head of the plaintiff's attorney. Until lately, when it was found necessary in proceedings in equity to have the decision of a jury on a question of fact, recourse was had to the machinery of a feigned issue; that is, an action was brought on an imaginary wager as to the truth or falsehood of an agreedupon statement of facts. Possibly in Bacon's time a similar course may have been adopted in order to obtain the opinion of the judges on points of law. In modern times the practice has been in accordance with what he a little further on recommends; the point of law being referred to the judges directly, who, after hearing counsel, certify their opinion of it to the Chancellor.

⁴⁰ Bacon refers to the practice of extra-judicial consultations as it existed in his own time. It does not, I believe, appear that it was ever the practice for private persons to obtain through the intervention of the Privy Council authoritative decisions on legal questions, but it is well known that the Court occasionally obtained “præjudicia” from the judges on points in which it was itself interested. The effect of this practice in promoting judicial servility is well seen in the case of ship-money; the extra-judicial decision of the judges in favour of its legality being unanimous, whereas when the case came on in the exchequer chamber, it was affirmed to be legal by a bare majority of seven against five.

[I cannot think that Bacon alludes to extra-judicial consultations of this kind; which were conducted in a different way from those he recommends, and resorted to for a different purpose. The object of the Government in asking the judges' opinions on the case privately before commencing a prosecution, was to ascertain that the case was a good one, and so avoid the scandal and disrepute which then attended the failure of a Crown prosecution. The object of the proceeding which Bacon here advocates, is to provide a means of settling any disputed point of law, without either waiting for a real cause in which it may be involved, or getting up a fictitious one; and the manner of it is to be public and formal. The case is to be regularly argued and the judgment formally recorded.—J. S.]

⁴¹ Our knowledge of the history of the two sects or schools of jurists which existed during what is called the middle period of Roman jurisprudence is still imperfect, though less so than before the discovery of the Institutes of Gaius. It appears probable that the importance of the differences of opinion between them has been exaggerated, and that the sects themselves had died out before the time of Justinian. The two schools respectively regarded Ateius Capito and Anstitius Labeo as their head or founder; but the followers of the former were called Sabinians or Cassians; the other school being that of the Proculeians; all these names being derived from those of certain eminent followers of the two jurists just mentioned. Gaius, the author of the Institutes, belonged to the former school, which is said to have been distinguished from the other by a closer ad herence to the letter of the law. Probably the best writer on the subject is Dirksen.

⁴² Plut. in Themist. c. II.