7

China-Iran-Russia – A Cybercommunity of Information?

In China, the proliferation of cybernetic attacks and counter-attacks, at first glance, looks like chaos caused exclusively by individual interests: kleptomaniacs steal data or paralyze their competitors, whilst private security companies try to keep them from doing so. On the face of it, this is the situation. However, if we dig deeper into the question, notably attaching credence to China’s latest declarations, we see that many of the world’s cyberconflicts take place across a dividing line, with the United States and their Oceanic allies on one side and three continental powers – China, Iran and Russia – on the other. This raises the following question: are China, Iran and Russia all individually and independently concerned with their cybersecurity, or is there actually some sort of cooperation between these states? The following viewpoint will be defended in this chapter: China’s cyberdefense strategy is based increasingly on two Asiatic partners: Iran and Russia. This nascent cooperation results in the discreet emergence of a veritable community of information (or of disinformation, depending on the point of view). Indeed, China’s cyber-strategy is inextricably linked to the increasing geopolitical closeness of China, Iran and Russia. However, this strategic evolution should not be exaggerated, as the primary goal of Chinese cyberdefense is not predation, but rather the maintenance of internal order.

7.1. The hall marks of cyber-cooperation

In a domain which is supposed to be secret, it is possible to present two forms of evidence: circumstantial evidence based on implications, and proof in the only domain where publicity is required: that of cyber-information.

7.1.1. Pax cyber-mongolica

Cyber-attacks within the China-Iran-Russia space are limited. Although there has been a great deal of publicity about the Iranian cyber army which is believed to have attacked the Chinese search engine Baidu, it seems unlikely that the attack was orchestrated by Iran. Indeed, the search engine, which is close to the Chinese government, cannot really be held to have served as a relay for anti-Iranian material. On the other hand, it is known that there have been an increasing number of exchanges of researchers between China and Iran in the cyber domain in recent years. It must not be forgotten that on its border with Afghanistan, China has a Persian language-speaking minority whose engineers are perfectly capable of joining Iran’s research programs. On the other hand, as these nations are growing closer in terms of energy supply due to sanctions, Chinese cultural centers in Iran have developed. The low number of cyber-attacks between China, Iran and Russia has also been noted by the United States, who fear what was indelicately called a “cyber Pearl Harbor”, orchestrated by China, Iran and Russia. The United States, though, has a different cyber view of each of these three countries: China is thought to engage in rational stealing of American technology by sheer effect of mass; Russia, the US’ old adversary, is to be feared because of its creativity; Iran, for its part, seems to be an irrational cyber-actor, which urgently needs to be distanced from the other two master Asiatic powers.

7.1.2. A cyber-community of information – the proof of Syria

A cyber-community of information has been born; the Syrian conflict is the illustration of this. There is a true convergence of the views of the Iranian, Chinese and Russian press on the subject of the Syrian conflict. The Syrian revolution is perceived, on non-allied Internet networks, as an attempt to undermine Bashar-al-Assad’s regime. The Syrian opposition, largely made up of foreign jihadists, is believed to be masterminded by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Qatar with the aim of sparking the collapse of the Syrian “dominoes”. Russian sites deem it to be unacceptable that the opposition should be armed by the United States, and celebrate the arrival of Russian warships in the eastern Mediterranean. For their part, Iranian Websites say it is logical that Russia should come to Syria’s aid, saying that support is based on the continuity of Russian policy. The Islamic Republic’s Websites regularly report secret American military preparation in Jordan, with the aim of coming to the aid of the Syrian opposition. For their part, China’s Websites make their positions known under the guise of neutrality, by alternating between quotes and comments. Chinese sites often repeat the declaration of Hillary Clinton: “The United States will not intervene, and will only provide humanitarian aid”. It is understandable – added to low-level ill-feeling towards China on a daily basis – that America has had enough of war and wants to concentrate on its own problems at home. The Americans do not want to be engaged in another war in the Middle East after Iraq and Afghanistan”. The People’s Daily also relays Bashar-al-Assad’s declarations: “I am not a puppet. I was not made by the West to go to the West or to any other country”. Put simply, although they couch their statements in caution, the Russian, Iranian and Chinese Internet networks openly support Bashar-al-Assad’s regime.

7.1.3. The counter-point of Mali

On the other hand, the coverage of the crisis in Mali between 11 and 22 January 2013 reveals a difference of position between the Russian, Iranian and Chinese press apparatus. The Russian newspapers reacted very quickly, condemning France’s intervention for a number of reasons: France was pursuing a neo-colonial policy in Africa, seeking to mine gold and uranium from West Africa. Also, it was still paying for its mistakes in Libya. By a curious paradox, in Mali, France was fighting the Islamists which it had supported in Syria. The war was hugely costly for France – around €400,000 per day. In addition, France did not have the forces needed to defeat the jihadists. Unlike what was being said in the Western press, the Tuaregs would absolutely not support their intervention. On the other hand, France would have to rely on the United States, benefitting from their aerial logistic support and their intelligence capabilities. In brief, behind the French operation could be seen the unmistakable profile of the “FUKUS axis”, the inverted “axis of evil” denoting France, the UK and the US – powers who were seeking clandestinely to overthrow Russia. The Iranian press quickly took up the baton on most of Russia’s criticisms, and added one rather cruel one: the French offensive seemed to be a misdirection ploy by the French President in order to turn public attention away from France’s own internal problems. For their part, China’s news websites remained reserved, contenting themselves with using quote marks to mark their disapproval: “Last weekend, the air strikes by the Malian army, supported by French air strikes, “destroyed” a number of Islamist support bases in thenorth of Mali. These were “targeted” strikes. The authorities in these countries say they are convinced that there is strength in the union, and are expecting a “happy ending” from this “acting solidarity” over Mali”. Thus, unlike Russia and Iran, therefore, the Chinese websites favored cautious, guarded coverage of the Malian issue. The reason for this is very simple: it is in China’s interests for France to secure the Sahel to exploit the uranium mines in Niger. The treatment of these two crises by the Chinese, Russian and Iranian press is revealing of the different approaches taken by the three states.

Put briefly, the territory of the new Mongol Empire of China, Iran and Russia not only appears to be a space of cyber-peace, but also as a domain in which an information community has emerged. In actual fact, these cyber-realities are merely the reflection of the geopolitical relations of strength.

7.2. The geopolitical bases for the cyber-Mongol empire

Figure 7.1. The Turkophone island, key to control of the new Mangol empire

7.2.1. An undeniable closer Sino-Iranian relationship

The relations between Iran and China are fluid and changeable, both for pragmatic and sentimental reasons. There is an underlying basis of common ground between the two countries, which leads to the development of their past, present and future relations. China and Iran are the heirs to two major civilizations, and the links between them go back to the Second Century BCE, when the Han Dynasty opened up the Silk Route. This trade route played a major role in the exchanges between the Hans and the Arsacid Empire.¹ In addition, whilst this route helped promote trade, it also encouraged cultural exchanges between the Persians and the Chinese for many centuries. This shared heritage of the Silk Route serves today as a historical link between Iran, Central Asia and China. These links are important, in that they are used by the Chinese and Iranian leaders to demonstrate friendship between the two nations, and also (on the contrary) to recall their unfortunate experiences and tense relations with the Western powers.² Iran and China share not only a common history, but also a profound sense of victimization and “humiliation” by the West.³ These two countries feel themselves excluded from the regional and global politics practiced by the major powers. The discourse of victimization continues to play an important role in the rhetoric from the Chinese and Iranian authorities. China and Iran are deeply suspicious of the eventuality of a world order dominated by the United States, and are working to bring about a multi-polar worlds where American influence is diluted. During a visit to Iran in 1991, the Chinese Premier Li Peng declared: “we are opposed to the domination of the United States or of a minority over the rest of the world, and to America’s building of a new order in international relations, and on this point we are in perfect agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran”.⁴ In June 2009, Hu Jintao reaffirmed this position, declaring that: “Tehran and Beijing should work together to manage developments, on the international scale, which favor their nations, or else the very people who are the cause of the current international problems will continue to rule the world.”⁵ The Iranian leaders have, many times, demonstrated similar sentiments. The President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has often spoken of the creation of “a new world order”.⁶ Russia, for its part, is becoming more and more sensitive to Western injunctions, and its good relations with Iran are darkening. In 2009, Russia expressed its displeasure at Iran’s refusal to send slightly enriched uranium to Russia and France to be transformed into fuel for its reactor generating medical isotopes. Invoking the United Nations Security Council resolution of June 2010 forbidding all countries from supplying conventional weapons to Iran, Russia prohibited the delivery of S-300 missiles to Iran.⁷ Moscow has also previously backed a series of UN resolutions sanctioning Iran.

7.2.2. Arms sales in Russo-Iranian and Sino-Iranian relations

The sale of arms to Iran by China and Russia, which all three countries believe to be legal, is a major source of discord between China/Russia and the United States. Russia remains Iran’s main supplier. China also trades with Tehran in this area, and participates in exchanges of military technologies and materials which could be used for civil or military purposes.⁸ In spite of thorny relations with Iran after the fall of the Shah in 1979, the USSR succeeded in selling arms to the Islamic Republic. In 1989, Moscow and Tehran negotiated their main armament contract along with the scientific and technical cooperation accords. Until the latter half of the 1990s, Russia had a stable position as Iran’s main supplier of conventional weapons. Between 1995 and 2000, Russia suspended its arms sales to Iran in fulfillment of an agreement with the United States.⁹ Over the first decade of the 21^st Century, Russia sold over 5 billion dollars worth of military equipment to Iran, including Tor-M1 short-range anti-aircraft missiles, warplanes, submarines and armored vehicles.¹⁰ Iran sought to obtain ballistic missiles, and in 2004 the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, alerted the international community to the fact that Iran could try essayer to adapt nuclear warheads to fit ballistic missiles.¹¹ Iran was reported to be trying to develop a Shahab-6 missile – a variant of the North Korean Taep’o-dong-2C/3 missile, with a range of over 5,000 kilometers. Moscow may have aided Tehran with technology transfers for this program, and even helped Iran to build a missile with a 10,000 kilometer range capable of reaching the east coast of the United States.¹² With regard to China, Beijing is known to have sold arms to Iran since the Iran/Iraq war from 1980 to 1988. Between 1980 and 1987, China is thought to have sent Iran armaments with a value of over 3 billion dollars.¹³ After the war, arms sales fell, but the trade resumed at the beginning of the 1990s. From 1993 to 1996, China supplied weapons to Iran for a total of 400 million dollars, and 600 million dollars between 1997 and 2000.¹⁴ It has been established that China was the second-largest supplier of arms to Iran between 2002 and 2011.¹⁵ Many of these weapons are believed to be sophisticated, and potentially capable of doing damage to the American airforce and naval fleet. China has also transferred a range of industrial technologies to Iran, and in doing so, contravened its own laws on technology transfers and unilateral American legislation. Besides small-caliber weapons, China has supplied Tehran with artillery, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, fighter planes, tanks, armored vehicles for transporting troops and speedboats.¹⁶ The Obma administration are thought to have concluded that Chinese companies were contributing to the development of missiles and the Iranian nuclear program, in violation of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.¹⁷

7.2.3. Sino-Russian support for Iranian civil nuclear development

Other economic considerations guide both the Chinese and the Russians in their attitude to Iran. Over the course of the past decade, Russian and Chinese diplomats have tried, many times, to slacken the Security Council resolutions – particularly those which could restrict their economic collaboration with Iran – particularly in the field of energy. They have managed to preserve their economic interests in Iran, in spite of the UN’s economic sanctions. In February 2010, Oleg Rozhkov, the Adjoint Chief of the Security and Disarmament Affairs Department in the Russian Foreign Ministry, declared that Russia would only abide by the sanctions against Iran which “aim to solve the issues of non-proliferation and of Iran’s nuclear program”. He also mentioned that Moscow was “not going to work on sanctions or measures which could lead to the political or economic or financial isolation of this country”.¹⁸ With the exception of the case of the S-300 missiles, the trade links between Russia and Iran have not been greatly affected, and Russia is one of Iran’s main suppliers.¹⁹ Russian companies have assumed a leading role in aiding the development of Iranian civil energy, which also includes the nuclear sector. The building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant began in the 1970s under the Shah, and the project was then resumed many years later by the Russians. The plant officially began producing electricity in September 2011.²⁰ Having concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Russia committed to make the plant operational, provide the nuclear fuel and recover the used fuel for the first few years of the plant’s operation.²¹ The Russians find it easier to cooperate with Iran in the development of its civil nuclear capabilities because they officially believe Iran does not intend to use its civil nuclear sector to produce a nuclear weapon. In December 2011, the Russian Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Ryabkov, declared: “We have seen and verified data showing that there is no tangible evidence of the existence of a military component in Iran’s nuclear program.”²²

7.2.4. A clear-cut Sino-Russian diplomatic position on the Iranian program

China and Russia are asking the Iranians to refrain from developing a nuclear weapon, and to be more transparent about their research efforts. At the same time, these two countries have often defended Iranian positions on the Security Council, and even cooperated with Iran in the nuclear domain. The Chinese and Russian diplomats note that the existing sanctions against Iran have not managed to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, but instead have caused Tehran to become more deeply entrenched in its positions. They are calling for dialog and renewed efforts. In June 2010, on the Security Council, Moscow and Beijing sided with the West and voted for sanctions against Tehran, which was accused of carrying on its sensitive nuclear activities. These activities violate the previous Security Council resolutions, prohibiting Iran from enriching uranium or conducting other activities which could contribute to the development of its nuclear weapons, until Tehran exhibits more transparency in the context of its nuclear research.²³ This firmer attitude towards Iran on the part of the Chinese and Russians became clear when Russia and China refused Iran full member status in the SCO. They deemed that Iran could not benefit from that status as long as the country is subject to sanctions by the UN.²⁴ Neither China nor Russia want Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, but both partners have always defended the right of Iran or any other country to carry out nuclear activities for pacific ends, such as energy production. In 2007, President Vladimir Putin summarized Russia’s position concerning Iran: “We have no evidence of Iran’s intention to produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, we proceed from the premise that Iran has no such plans. But we share the concern of other partners and believe that Iran’s programs must be transparent.”²⁵ In May 2008, in a shared declaration, the Chinese Premier Hu Jintao and the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev affirmed that “China and Russia propose that Iranian nuclear problem be resolved by dialog and consultation.”²⁶ In September 2010, China and Russia placed the emphasis on a long-term global solution which was necessary to “restore the international community’s confidence in Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy.”²⁷ Following a tripartite meeting in November 2010, The Chinese, Indian and Russian Foreign Ministers once again recognized Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.²⁸ In July 2011, China and Iran celebrated the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between them. China seized the opportunity to reiterate that it desires a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear problem.²⁹ The Russians and Chinese probably wish for a change of behavior from the Iranian authorities, although they are concerned about regime change in Iran. Were the Iranian opposition to come to power, it would certainly take a dim view of Sino-Russian support for President Ahmadinejad. During the demonstrations in 2009, the protesters vehemently criticized the Sino-Russian assistance to the Iranian regime. They also reproached the Russians and Chinese for their rapid congratulations³⁰ to President Ahmadinejad after his election, which was contested by the opposition.

7.2.5. Oil and gas at the heart of economic relations

The Chinese, for their part, have benefited from a situation where few countries are trading with Iran. Thus, Chinese companies have managed to fill the holes in various sectors of the Iranian economy – particularly that of energy – left by Western companies. In 2009, China became Iran’s main trading partner, ousting Germany, which had held the position up until then. Iran is not only one of China’s main oil suppliers, but is a crossroads for energy transport between the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe. Their relationship remains asymmetrical, mainly because of Iran’s economic isolation: Iran needs China more than China needs Iran. Since the 1980, China’s relationship with Iran has evolved from the trading of weapons to the trading of energy, to support China’s uncontainable economic growth. The numerous sanctions imposed by the United States and other Western countries against Iran have forced the Iranians to turn to the East to find outlets for its abundant energy resources. In its quest for energy to feed its development, China has often sought to exploit the opportunities in place which others have neglected or turned away from. The American and European companies have been turned away or have left, and the Chinese took advantage of the opportunity to take their place.³¹ The Chinese and Iranian governments played a crucial role in cementing the energy partnership. Iran is aware that Chinese companies can put in investment, and the Iranian government offers incitements to attract new investors. During his tour of the Arabian Peninsula in January 2012, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared, in response to the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, that “China is not the only country trading with Iran”, and that China had no concerns about trading oil with Iran.³² At the same time, Chinese oil companies have the indulgence of Beijing, enabling them to pay lesser administrative charges and benefit from rates on finance for their projects which are lower than the market rate.³³ China is seeking to diverse its suppliers, and the links it maintains with oil- and gas-exporting countries. Iran remained one of China’s main oil suppliers, through 2009, 2010 and 2011.³⁴ China not only buys crude oil from Iran, but involves itself upstream and downstream in the production process through investment. Upstream (early in the process), China has become involved in prospecting and production of crude oil. Since 2005,Chinaand Iran have signed numerous accords in the energy sector, involving the three main Chinese companies: China National Petroleum Corporations (CNPC), Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation. In 2007, Sinopec and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) signed a two-billion-dollar agreement for the exploitation of the Yadavaran oil field, with a production capacity of 300,000 barrels of oil per day.³⁵ Its downstream investment is in oil refining and distribution of crude oil products. Chinese investors have conducted negotiations to develop the refineries at Anahita, Abadan, Shiraz and Isfahan.³⁶

Cooperation between Iran and Russia in the energy domain goes back to 1916, when the Iranian government offered a concession to a Russian merchant. More recently, in 1970, the trans-Iranian pipeline, 1,106 kilometers long, was commissioned to link the Soviet Union to Iran. It was the first Iranian gas pipeline devoted to export. In 1972, gas exports rose to 8 billion cubic meters.³⁷ In 1972, a treaty was signed, authorizing the Soviet Union to engage in the development of Iranian gas and oil, along with petrochemical industries and electricity plants. In December 1976, an agreement was signed between Iran and the USSR to export natural gas from Iran to Germany and France through Soviet territory.³⁸ The Iranian revolution in 1979 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR’s troops had a considerable effect on the relations between the Iranians and the Soviets – all the more so because the USSR supplied arms to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq conflict. Exchanges in the energy sector were tentatively resumed at the start of the 1990s. Over the course of the next 20 years, cooperation in that sector did not experience phenomenal expansion. Although Iran and Russia have considerable energy reserves, they are not able to conclude a true partnership in order to hold greater sway over the international energy market. In July 2010, the Russian Energy Minister announced the launch of a massive program of cooperation with Iran in the field of oil, natural gas and the petrochemical industry.³⁹ In December 2011, Russia and Iran signed a contract relating to oil with a value of over a billion dollars. That contract, signed between the oil company Tatneft and Iranian Petroleum Engineering and Development Company, envisages developing the Zageh oil field in the Iranian province of Bushehr on the coast of the Persian Gulf. This collaboration should be able to deliver a production rate of over 55,000 barrels per day by 2016.⁴⁰

A new Mongol Empire has thus been born, but for a variety of reasons, China, Iran and Russia are in no danger of reconstituting the Mongol Empire of Antiquity which federated them. Unlike in the 13^th Century, today these three civilizations actually encircle the Turkish community, which previously brought them together, as a sort of “island”: China is pursuing its policy of confining the Turko phone minorities to Xinjiang; Russia is having trouble containing the Altaic peoples of Caucasia; Iran, for its part, views Turkey as a rival power in the region. Secondly, all three countries suffer from a structural demographic weakness, which is likely to prevent them from exercising power in the long term. In spite of these weaknesses, the cultures in these states offer an exceptional capacity for innovation. Thus, the Mongol Empire could be reborn today, in the form of a very pragmatic alliance between three powers in whose interests it is to support one another. The materialization of such an alliance is something the United States fears; the united states’ best tactic, indeed, involves keeping those states divided. In spite of its attempts, however, an alliance has taken shape. In 2001, China and Russia founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, one of the main objectives of which is to counter American influence in Central Asia. Tajikistan is another of the founding members. It was joined by Iran in 2005 and Afghanistan in 2012. This means that the whole of the Persian-speaking world now belongs to that alliance. Including 1.5 billion inhabitants over 26 million square kilometers, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has at its disposal 50% of the world’s uranium and 40% of the world’s carbon supply. It is in this context that joint military maneuvers have been carried out, along with exchanges in the fields of medicine and nanotechnologies. The new Mongol Empire therefore cannot be viewed as a dead zone in the inexorable march toward pacifying globalization: hence, this alliance is founded on shared geopolitical interests, promoting a world vision that runs counter to the stereotypes held in the West.

7.3. Order in cyberspace: an absolute necessity within China

It would be misguided to approach a discussion about China as though it were a country like any other, ultimately destined to be part of the inevitable peaceful, globalized Utopia. From a purely industrial standpoint, China is naturally looking to conquer the markets, but in light of its 4000-year history, this is a relatively secondary objective. In addition, during the Renaissance era, although its own ships absolutely dwarfed the tiny Portuguese caravels, China made no attempt to seize the overseas territories that it explored. In reality, far more than control of the markets, China is concerned primarily with its internal unity. The domain of cyberconflict, though, is no exception to the rule.

7.3.1. Interior order and exterior disorder

The Chinese strategies are, to a large extent, determined by China’s astronomical number of inhabitants. In China, innumerable people may be in agreement over even the slightest decision; their chain reactions are concomitant to their phenomenal collective “mass”. Even when faced with apparent disorder, therefore, it is helpful to preserve a level of order which nothing can overthrow. The old or new Mandarins present themselves as the ultimate guardians of order. In addition, the administration’s absolute dominance over the populace has, for centuries, relied on the existence of an inspection body. Consider the example of the strategically important province of Tibet: China’s primary water source and a strategic observation post looking over China and India, Tibet has been kept weak for centuries by the theocracy of the monks. This space is particularly sensitive from the cybernetic point of view. Pro-Tibet sympathizers outside of China (human rights organizations or pressure groups, for example) have been the target of cyber-attacks. In addition, China has announced the launch of an Internet- and phone-monitoring program affecting 4 million users. What is true for Tibet is also true for Xinjiang: it is imperative to preserve internal order, in the face of the risk of implosion – internal order must be preserved at all costs. With external order, it is a different matter. At any rate, the issue is not a new one. The question was once put by Louis XV to an old Jesuit returning from China. He narrowed his eyes a little and responded: “Sire, I shall merely quote what one of the Emperor’s counsellors once said to him: ‘The barbarians are like animals, and absolutely should not be governed in the same way as the Chinese are. If we try to control them using the maxims of good reason, only trouble will come of it. The old kings understood that, which is why they ruled the barbarians by means of disorder. Therefore, governing the barbarians through disorder is the true way, the best way, to govern them’”. At the time, this answer raised a great many eyebrows in society. Yet after all, what is a cyber-attack if not ruling by means of disorder?

7.3.2. The appearance of peace and the necessity of secrecy

The major advantage of a cyber-attack is that it fits in perfectly with a fundamental tenet of Chinese culture: the desire to preserve the outward appearance of peace. In China, the never-ending quest for peace stems from the ancient philosophical schools of thought, born in the troubled times of warring kingdoms. Thus, counter to the heroism of a Greek warrior, celebrated by the populace before being channeled by the Church, runs the Chinese celebration of the pacific sovereign. In that context, open warfare is perceived as a senseless and extravagant act – losing touch with reality. Hence, apparent peace is preferable to the unleashing of violence and proof of truth by the sword. The exaltation of peace has gradually metamorphosed into a “quest for harmony” in China’s official discourse. The upshot is this: the best cyber-attack would be one which goes unnoticed. Massive-scale cyber-attacks (such as those favored by Russia) are to be avoided, in favor of cyber-harassment. Finally, the culture of secrecy fits in well with the emergence of cyberconflict. In order to effectively combat the centrifugal forces threatening China, it is wise to preserve secrecy. Dissimulation is the normal way of behaving in society. Whilst this makes it difficult to shed light on the way in which China defends itself against cyber-attacks, the strategy is definitely not uncoordinated: its defense system is hybridand decentralized, and therefore perfectly equipped to deal with the threats at hand.

In brief, as we can see, the defense of domestic order at the risk of exportation of chaos involves the promotion of harmony and secrecy. Above all, China’s cyberdefense is intended to safeguard Chinese unity.

In conclusion, the Chinese cyberdefense strategies are founded on other Asiatic powers because of the geopolitical and cultural links between those nations woven over time. An alternative information community, wielding growing saturation power, has been born. Yet from Iran’s perspective, this policy is viewed with caution. Regardless of how great a power it is, China’s cyber-activity has not yet been able to overcome the Iranian feeling of isolation: China can build virtual bridges through the networks, and protect its allies from cyber-attacks from the outside world, but in today’s ever-changing world, Iran still sees itself as an island, relying on a relative degree of isolation to protect itself.

Chapter written by Thomas FLICHY DE LA NEUVILLE.

1 Also known as the Parthian Empire.

2 Ehsan Ahari, “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and its Role in Addressing the Nuclear and Missile Situations in Both Nation”, U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, 14 September 2006, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/06_09_14wrts/06_09_14_ahrari_statement.php.

3 John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, University of Washington Press, 2007, p. 285.

4 John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, University of Washington Press, 2007, p. 107.

5 Ariel Farrar-Wellman and Robert Frasco, “China-Iran Foreign Relations”, American Enterprise Institute, 13 July 2010, http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/china-iran-foreign-relations.

6 “Ahmadinejad Stresses Need for New World Order”, Fars News Agency, 07 June 2010, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8903171502.

7 Fred Weir, “Why Russia is cutting off major arms sales to Iran”, The Christian Science Monitor, 23 September 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0923/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-major-arms-sales-to-Iran.

8 Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Maryland, 2005, p. 45.

9 Lionel Beehner, “Russia-Iran arms Trade”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 November 2006, http://www.cfr.org/iran/russia-iran-arms-trade/p11869#p3.

10 Fred Weir, “Why Russia is cutting off major arms sales to Iran”, The Christian Science Monitor, 23 September 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0923/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-major-arms-sales-to-Iran.

11 Robin Wright and Keith Richburg, “Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb”, Washington Post, 18 November 2004.

12 “Shahab-6/Simorgh-5, 6?”, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/shahab-6.htm, 26 January 2009.

13 Richard F. Grimmet, “Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliers: 1980-1987”, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Government, p. 116, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497150&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, accessed 21 March 2012.

14 Ila Berman, “The Impact of the Sino-Iranian Strategic Partnership”, U.S.-China Economic and security Review Commission, 14 September 2006, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/06_09_14wrts/06_09_14_berman_statement.php.

15 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Arms Transfer database”, 21 March 2012, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php.

16 Michael Mazza, “China-Iran Ties: Assessment and Implications for U.S. Policy”, American Enterprise Institute, 21 April 2011, http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/michael-mazza-china-iran-ties-assessment-and-implications-us-policy-april-21-2011.

17 John W. Garver, “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2011, p. 76.

18 Ralph Winnie, “Iran: Russia’s Strategic New Client”, The Washington Post, 22 March 2010, http://russianow.washingtonpost.com/2010/03/iran-russias-strategic-new-client.php.

19 Christian Caryl, “The Other Ticking Clock in Iran”, Foreign Policy, 7 October 2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/other-ticking-clock-iran.

20 “Iranian Nuclear Power Stations begins Generating electricity”, The Guardian, 4 September 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/04/iran-nuclear-power-`hehr-plant.

21 “Iran Launches Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant”, Ria Novosti, 12 September 2011, http://en.rian.ru/world/20110912/166785925.html.

22 “No military component in Iran’s nuke program: Russia”, Xinhua, 10 December 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/wap/2011-12/10/content_24122033.htm.

23 Richard Weitz, “Why China and Russia Help Iran”, The Diplomat, 19 November 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/11/19/why-china-and-russia-help-iran/.

24 “L’Iran peut adhérer à l’OCS si l’ONU lève ses sanctions”, Ria Novosti, 13 May 2011, http://fr.rian.ru/world/20110513/189470063.html.

25 Richard Weitz, “Why China and Russia Help Iran”, The Diplomat, 19 November 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/11/19/why-china-and-russia-help-iran/2.

26 “China, Russia rule out military actions on Iran”, Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 24 May 2008, http://www.gov.cn/misc/2008-05/24/content_990969.htm.

27 An Lu, “China, Russia call for increased efforts in Asia-Pacific security: joint statement”, Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 28 September 2010, http://www.gov.cn/misc/2010-09/28/content_1712083.htm.

28 “Joint Communique of the 10th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of China, Russia and India”, Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 16 November 2010, http://english.gov.cn/2010-11/16/content_1746273.htm.

29 “China, Iran celebrate 40th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 July 2011, http://ir.chineseembassy.org/eng/dtxw/t841539.htm.

30 Natalya Shurmina and Guy Faulconbridge, “Russia and China congratulated Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Vote Win”, Reuters, 16 June 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/16/us-iran-president-sb-idUSTRE55F0YA20090616.

31 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, La Politique internationale de la Chine, Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, 2010, p. 370.

32 “Pékin continue de commercer avec l’Iran”, Le Figaro, 19 January 2012, http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2012/01/19/97002-20120119FILWWW00378-pekin-continue-de-commercer-avec-l-iran.php.

33 Peter Mackenzie, “a Closer-Look at China-Iran Relations”, CNA China Studies, September, p4, 2010. http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/D0023622%20A%20Closer%20Look%20at%20China-Iran%20Relations.pdf.

34 Judy Hua and Chen Aizhu, “Update 1-China’s Jan crude oil imports from Iran down 14 pct m/m”, Reuters, 21 February 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/21/china-iran-oil-idUSL4E8DL0FM20120221.

35 “China’s Sinopec, Iran ink Yadavaran deal”, Chinamining.org, 11 December 2007, http://www.chinamining.org/Investment/2007-12-11/1197342543d8153.html.

36 Sadeq Dehqan, “7 Refineries to Go Private By Yearend”, Iran Daily, 30 August 2011, http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20110830044957.

37 Mandana Tishehyar, “Iran-Russia Energy Relations”, Iran Review, 8 July 2011, http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran_Russia_Energy_Relations.htm.

38 Ibid.

39 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Plan to Help Iran Challenges Sanctions”, The New York Times, 14 July 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/world/europe/15russia.html.

40 “Iran, Russia ink $1bln worth of oil deal”, Xinhua, 19 December 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2011-12/19/content_24190611.htm.