3

China’s Adaptive Internet Management Strategy after the Emergence of Social Networks

China’s central government welcomed, to some extent, the development of new information and communications technology within the national territory because it is seen as necessary for the economic development and opening up of the country, which remains the very top priority of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Beijing had no other choice but to accept the Internet within its borders, although it represented a political risk from the moment it was first introduced in the early 1990s.

The development of the Internet in China was fast-paced, growing from 22.5 million users in early 2001 to more than 500 million 10 years later (official estimates). In a country dominated by state-owned media, the Internet quickly became the main source of information and discussion for the most connected part of the population (most often the urban middle class). Tricks such as the use of proxies for bypassing the Great Firewall, the main censorship instrument, became well-known among the younger part of Internet users.¹ Posting videos, online comments, and updating personal blogs became a popular daily practice for many users. In this context, the CPC constantly tried to adapt its censorship tools to the latest technological developments, and succeeded to a certain extent in keeping control of the Web.

This chapter considers – from a non-technical viewpoint – the overall development of the Internet and social networks in Mainland China from the early 2000s up to January 2014, and analyzes in particular how the central government in Beijing adapts to these developments, with the constant aim to maintain social and political stability. A particular emphasis is placed on recent years, taking into account decisions taken by the second mandate of Hu Jintao (2007-2012) and the new challenges that the new leadership led by Xi Jinping is currently trying to address. In this aim, latest official communications and press releases on Internet management are analyzed in depth.

This chapter leads to a broader reflection on the domestic political consequences of the development of social networks in a non-democratic regime, both from the perspective of Internet users and government.

3.1. Weibo: the turning point

3.1.1. Adaptive behaviors

In the late 2000s-early 2010s, the development of social networks and in particular Weibo, a Twitter-like platform which quickly became the most popular of the dozen Chinese language social networks available, marked a turning point for the Chinese authorities.² Weibo in itself represented – by the number of its users, the functions of the platform (messages limited to 140 characters, which can carry a substantial amount of information, Chinese being a dense language) and the speed with which it can propagate a message – a political challenge that never existed previously in China. It became a new platform of debate, enabling the expression of diverging views collectively. Key opinion-makers in China are leading bloggers and Weibo users with millions of followers. It is through Weibo that many scandals arose (corruption cases involving local officials, accidents, food safety and pollution cases, etc.), as local witnesses are providing online information unavailable in the state-owned media. In mid-2011, the mishandling of a high-speed train accident by the authorities in charge near Wenzhou, in the southeastern province of Zhejiang, was highly commented upon online, to such an extent that censors have been struggling to keep up with angry comments. At the time, a new practice developed among Internet users: some of them converted themselves into journalists by posting online photos taken on the site of the accident and reporting the latest developments at a faster pace that state-owned media did. It is also through Weibo and other social networks that many protests were launched, coordinated and amplified, leading to street gatherings and demonstrations. In general terms, social networks comparatively gain more weight in China than in countries with an independent media landscape.

In this context, and with Weibo remaining very popular, new platforms such as Weixin emerging and the Internet no longer being confined to an urban and educated public, the government has to learn how to deal with the Internet in the most efficient way according to its two-fold aim of domestic political stability and economic development. Shutting down the platforms is not an option, given their popularity and their economic benefits. Moreover, the rigid censorship and repression used towards traditional media and Web 1.0 pages is not always efficient in the current Web 2.0 era providing a large amount of user-generated content.

The authorities therefore adapt: they continue to use traditional means of control (Great Firewall, blocking of content with “sensitive keywords”, closing of accounts, etc., in close cooperation with local Internet companies), but are now combining these automated controls with a case-by-case human and flexible approach on the ground depending on the risk of propagation. For instance, several groups of protesters against the construction of paraxylene (PX – a potentially harmful chemical) factories in Dalian (August 2011), Ningbo (October 2012) or Kunming (May 2013), finally won part of their case against the authorities as the protest became popular online and in the streets.

The protests in the Arab world from 2011 certainly reinforced Beijing’s consciousness of the power of the Internet, and the importance of taking the social network “threat” seriously and promptly. Shortly after the rise of protests in Egypt, the Chinese authorities were concerned about online activists’ calls for a similar revolution in China. A “Jasmine revolution” did not develop at national scale, which the police managed to contain through traditional on-line censorship and a heavy presence in cities where demonstrations were to be organized.³ But such events led Beijing to fine-tune its management of the Internet.

After the Arab spring events, Chinese authorities modified their approach towards social media, taking into closer account a wider set of online protests, even minor ones (there is no “small crisis”), reducing reaction time and adapting the type of response – rigid repression or flexible control,⁴ contrary to some other authoritarian states – according to the case-by-case risk of nationwide propagation. Indeed, the party most of all fears the rapid nationwide spread of discussion of unpredictable events over social media. As a matter of fact, Beijing’s management of the Internet has became flexible in recent years: strong online access restrictions are implemented when the risk of nationwide propagation of some criticism is high, but some degree of tolerance exists for the numerous online criticisms against specific, localized issues, which may not turn to a more general call for political system change. Cutting off access completely would be counterproductive, as it would generate strong Internet users’ dissatisfactions, as well as generate economic loss.

Exceptionally, in the most sensitive place and time, the Internet has been partly or completely shut down in some provinces such as Tibet or Xinjiang. Such strict decisions reminds us that simple, technical options are in the hand of the authorities to limit suddenly the political risks attached to the Internet⁵. But this last resort option has never been used at national level, and when imposed locally, being offline in a digital age leads to several economic or social costs which can quickly contradict the strategy of economic development and social cohesion that the central government tries to implement, in particular to calm down ethnic tensions in provinces considered as sensitive. Positive or negative consequences on the economy are usually taken into consideration by the government before it takes decisions regarding management of the Internet (see section 3.2, page 89).

Social networks also force the CPC to reconsider its decades-long communication habits and adapt to the new media landscape. So far the traditional state-owned media such as the People’s Daily or the national TV news bulletin on CCTV remain unchanged both in style and content – spreading official discourse and showing the leaders’ meetings and achievements under a positive light. But these traditional media are regarded with greater cynicism both in light of the Web 2.0 era and the proliferation of both online and print media sources that provide increasingly in-depth reporting.

In addition, the traditional opacity that has surrounded China’s political system since the creation of the People’s Republic of China becomes an issue for the CPC in the Web 2.0 era. For instance, the silence surrounding the Bo Xilai case throughout 2012 or the public disappearance of the General Secretary-in-waiting for a duration of 2 weeks in September 2012 generated an online “wind of rumors” on internal party infighting and coup d’Etat attempts that Beijing had trouble clearing up. Hypotheses and guesses posted on the Internet are proportionate to the existing lack of information, which often applies to the most sensitive domestic political issues such as intra-party tensions or CPC leaders’ wealth.

However, it would be incomplete to only regard the Internet as a threat for the CPC and the political stability – or “harmonious society” (hexie shehui) – it is trying to maintain. The Internet is also, and increasingly, used by the CPC as a political communication tool.

3.1.2. Participative behaviors

Ministers and other senior officials are conducting online interviews and chat sessions on the Internet versions of state-run media,⁶ while several ministries and central government institutions are encouraged to develop online communication campaigns toward the local population and public diplomacy toward foreign audiences (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own Weibo account, for instance). Beijing now tolerates – to some extent – online denunciation of local corrupted officials, and since the 18th Party Congress, social networks spread family pictures of Xi Jinping in an attempt to make the new leader appear closer to the people. A new form of online Party propaganda is emerging to influence and guide Chinese users (through online informal pro-CPC comments for instance)⁷, attenuate rising scandals and try to rebuild part of the lost legitimacy of the Party.

The Internet is not only a new propaganda field but also an instrument of analysis and forecasting. It helps the CPC to anticipate crisis and social unrest, not only by facilitating the collection of information on dissidents, but also by helping to understand trends in public opinion.

In order to avoid the risk of online unrest (potentially leading to offline unrest), the CPC reinforced what its Internet management strategy, which includes the prevalence of strict, traditional censorship, the uses of online propaganda (both traditional, and “smart”, involving grass-root pro-CPC comments) as well as the development of a very sophisticated network of public opinion monitoring (polling, online comments analysis and synthesis), conducted throughout the country. Indeed, the most significant development in recent years is the use by the Chinese government of online polls and its close analysis of hot topics and popular online comments. In recent years, ministries have been using the Internet to keep up with popular demands, anticipate complaints, and in general terms try to reduce the disconnect between officials and the lives and expectations of the “ordinary people” (laobaixing)⁸. Online monitoring and polling is launched and supervised at various levels, by both central and provincial administrations. In general terms, opinion trends emerging from online comments and polls seem to be increasingly taken into account in the domestic policy-making process.

In a country where street demonstrations and elections are not taking place, it appears that the Internet is one of the rare sources that the central government can rely upon to keep up to date with the opinion trends of the domestic population, and hope to maintain some form of legitimacy by addressing the most popular issues. In fact, the “democracy of opinion” processes observed in the majority of Western countries exist in another form in China, in a different political context. A form of authoritarianism of opinion can be seen from the way the single-party is paying attention to opinion trends emerging on participative Internet platforms.

3.2. Latest adjustments under Xi Jinping

3.2.1. Smart management of the Internet: a top priority under the new leadership

Under the new Chinese leadership led by Xi Jinping, Internet management is more than ever mentioned as a top priority for the government. The leadership transition had been partly troubled by online debates and discussions on various scandals and news releases (Bo Xilai scandal, release on several Western media of the wealth of several top leaders and their family members, etc.), and the new team arrived to power fully conscious of the challenges that the development of social networks poses to the official aims of “social harmony” and political stability.

Once the 18th Party Congress was over and the new standing committee appointed, Beijing started to launch a stricter set of rules regarding social network use. In December 2012, it adopted a rule ushering in “a new era of cyberspace management”, according to a journalist of the state-owned Xinhua press agency:⁹ Internet users are accordingly required to use their real names when signing Web access agreements with service providers. In practice, implementation of this rule appeared difficult and incomplete. Both Internet users and service providers were reluctant to adopt it for different reasons (barriers to freedom of expression¹⁰, but also barriers to business developments, from the viewpoint of enterprises). However, it marked a reinforcement of Internet control under the new leadership. Indeed, the focus on Internet management was reinforced throughout 2013. In addition to the above mentioned rule, new rules against the spread of so-called rumors and personal attacks were issued¹¹ and several leading bloggers and social media commentators were punished.¹²

In the same line, official declarations on the topic suggests that the central government expects further reinforcement of Internet control in addition to the existing fast and comprehensive automated and human-led censorship mechanisms. Internet management is considered as a top “public security” priority, within the document “Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms”, which list key general objectives and areas of reform adopted at the close of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in mid-November 2013:

“Improving the public security system. (…) We will strengthen comprehensive measures for public security, introduce multi-tiered prevention and control system for public security, and strictly guard against and punish all sorts of unlawful and criminal activities in accordance with the law. Adhering to the principles of active utilization, scientific development, law-based management and ensured safety, we will strengthen management of the Internet in accordance with the law, accelerate the improvement of leadership system for Internet management, and guarantee the country’s Internet and information safety. We will establish the Council of State Security and improve the national security system and strategies to guarantee the country's national security.”¹³

The explanatory speech given by Xi Jinping related to these decisions is even more specific on the matter. Internet management appears as one of the 11 major issues underlined by the President (issue number 8):

“Eighth, concerning accelerating the perfection of leadership systems for Internet management. Network and information security involve national security and social stability, and this is a new comprehensive challenge that we face.

From the point of view of practice, and in the face of the flying development of Internet technology and applications, clear malpractices exist in the current management system, which mainly are multi-headed management, overlapping of functions, lack of unity of powers and responsibility and low efficiency. At the same time, following the fact that the media nature of the Internet becomes ever stronger, online media management and sector management can by far not catch up with the developments and changes of the situation Especially in the face of micro blogs, WeChat and other such social media that have rapid dissemination, great influence, broad coverage and a strong capacity for social mobilization, as well as the rapid growth of instant telecommunication tool users, how to strengthen the construction of an online legal system and public opinion guidance, and ensuring the online information dissemination order, national security and social stability, have become current prominent issues put in front of us.

The Plenum Resolution puts forward persisting in the principles of positive use, scientific development, management according to the law and guaranteeing security, expanding power to manage the network according to the law and perfecting leadership systems for Internet management. The objective is to integrate the functions of related organs, shape joint forces for Internet management from technology to content, from daily security to attacking crime, and guaranteeing the correct use and security of the network.”¹⁴

This official declaration appears in line with the previous one released under the Hu Jintao leadership. For instance, in the speech delivered by Hu, then outgoing Party chief, at the opening of the 18th Communist Party Congress in November 2012, he mentioned, under a sub-part entitled “Enrich people's intellectual and cultural lives”, the following:

“(…). We should improve the contents of online services and advocate healthy themes on the Internet. We should strengthen social management of the Internet and promote orderly network operation in accordance with laws and regulations. We should crack down on pornography and illegal publications and resist vulgar trends. (…).”¹⁵

However, what is new with the explanatory speech given by Xi Jinping is that it explicitly mentions the social network that currently appears to cause a problem to the new leadership (the mobile messaging application WeChat).¹⁶ This network is likely to be monitored to a larger extent under the current leadership. In general terms, Mobile apps will be monitored closely as the government is facing a new challenge in its Internet management strategy: the very fastpaced increase of China smart phone users, connected continuously to the Internet. The size of smart phone users increased sharply over the last two years, surpassing the number of users who use desktops in the middle of 2012.¹⁷

In addition, the latest official statements clearly underline the new leadership’s willingness to reinforce the use of the Internet as a political communication tool, in a participative manner through various social networks and other online platforms. For instance, among the Decisions adopted at the close of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central committee in mid-November 2013, was also mentioned the following:

“Bringing the people’s congress system in line with the times. (…) We will increase the contacts between the Standing Committee of the NPC and the NPC deputies, and give full play to the role of deputies. Deputy liaison offices and Internet platforms will be established in people’s congresses to increase deputies’ contact with the people. We will improve the working mechanism of people’s congresses, widen channels for the public to participate in legislative work in an orderly manner through discussion, hearing, assessment and publicizing draft laws; actively address social concerns through inquiry, investigation of specific problems, and putting on record for examination.”¹⁸

The use of public opinion is extremely strategic for the new leadership, who nowadays talk about “supervision through public opinions”, for instance regarding its nationwide anticorruption campaign launched in 2013 and largely mentioned during the 3^rd plenum:

“Be more innovative in creating mechanisms and institutions to combat corruption. (…). We will experiment with publicizing personal information of newly appointed officials. We will improve democratic and legal supervision as well as supervision through public opinions, and apply and regulate Internet supervision.”¹⁹

So far, the new leadership to some extent encouraged Internet users to expose graft and corruption among government officials. Online tracking and denunciations led to several high-ranking officials getting sacked in 2013. For instance, Chinese bloggers pointed to luxury watches on online photos of an official, which was later convicted of corruption and sentenced to prison.²⁰ This development echoed the official concept of “supervision by society over the Internet industry” which started to emerge in recent years²¹. But the Party also appears conscious that it represents a double-edge sword practice that can lead to excesses²² and risky settling of scores among party cadres.

Another development indicating that Internet management is a top priority in the eyes of the new leadership is the creation of a new dedicated top-level institution. Indeed, a central leading small group – traditionally known in the PRC to support high-level decision making process – has been created in February 2014 to “lead and coordinate Internet security and informatization work among different sectors”²³. The rank of this new group headed by Xi Jinping himself (one of three groups newly created and led by members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. The other two include a state security committee and central leading team for comprehensively deepening reform) underlines the degree of importance of Internet related issues under the new leadership.

3.2.2. “Guiding public opinion”…

The guidance of public opinion is a long term practice in the People’s Republic of China, where traditional propaganda banners have always been widespread in public spaces since its creation in 1949. But such practice has taken new forms lately with the development of the Internet and social networks. In January 2014, senior official Liu Yunshan stressed increased capability in guiding public opinion and the creation of a “positive and upward” atmosphere on the Internet.²⁴ He also emphasized the leadership of the Party over the media, the correct guidance of public opinion, and the pooling of positive energy.²⁵ His speech also calls for a reinforcement of the power of institutions in charge of controlling media, including the Internet.²⁶ Most of all, Liu Qibao, head of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee, called for “greater efforts to guide public opinion on the Internet and strengthened guidance and management in the ideological sphere”²⁷.

This indicates that the central and local governments will probably continue to “guide public opinion” through traditional means (spreading of red propaganda/banners online, hiring of online commentators supporting the Party line, etc.), as well as through new means. It remains unclear what this means will be at the moment. But recent declarations indicate future attempts to develop new, fully Party-affiliated social networks and mobile apps.²⁸ It is likely that the new strategy to “guide public opinion” will cover a wide range of content, beyond Chinese language content and sites, as the new leadership is more than the previous one pointed at the “hostile Western forces” (from NGOs to media) that are trying to “demonize” and “destabilize” China,²⁹ and investing in a wide public diplomacy strategy through partyaffiliated media in foreign languages.

3.2.3. …while seizing economic opportunities

The Chinese authorities are juggling between their two top aims: domestic economic development and political stability. The Internet represents both new sources of economic growth and political instability in the country.

In recent years, the Internet in China – from online applications to shopping websites such as Taobao³⁰ – not only became a major challenge to socio-political stability but also a major source of domestic economic growth. In this context, positive or negative consequences on the economy are carefully taken into consideration by the government before it takes decisions regarding the management of the Internet. The necessity of NTIC development to support the country’s economic growth and modernization is the main reason the government has been tolerating to a certain extent the fast-paced development of the Internet and social networks on its territory, although it has represented significant political challenges since its emergence.

The current leadership is very conscious that the international attractiveness of Chinese e-companies remains limited and that their international development strategy remains incomplete.³¹ It is therefore nowadays trying to push for the development of new online industries, such as Internet finance or security.³² The Internet is now officially identified as a key sector to support China’s economic growth. Internet security in particular appears as an industry which can generate growth while at the same time provide the government with new tools to more easily manage the Internet according to its will. It is certainly because it is compatible with the government’s top two aims (economic development and political stability), and not only because of the recent PRISM scandal and tit-for-tat exchanges opposing the US and China, that Beijing is now identifying it as a key strategic sector to focus on and invest in.

3.3. Bibliography

[BEN 13] BENNEY Jonathan, KING Gary YANG Guobin, The Great Firewall of China, China Policy Institute Blog, November 3, 2013, http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/03/the-great-fearwall-of-china/.

[CHI 13] CHINA DAILY, The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in brief, November 16, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736.htm.

[CHI 13] China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, January 2013, http://www1.cnnic.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201302/P020130221391269963814.pdf.

[KIN 13] KING Gary, PAN JENNIFER, and ROBERTS Margaret E. 2013. “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression”, American Political Science Review, 107, (2 (May): 1-18.

[MOZ 13] MOZUR Paul, “China Wants to Control Internet Even More”, The Wall Street Journal/China Real Time blog, November 15, 2013.

[SCH 13] SCHNEIDER Florian, The Mass-Media logic behind China’s Internet Controls, November 11, 2013, http://www.politicseastasia.com/uncategorized/mass-media-logic-behind-chinas-internet-controls/.

[WAN 12] WANG Aihua, New rules usher in new era of Internet management, Xinhua News Agency, December 28^th, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-12/28/c_132069951.htm.

[XIN 13a] Xinhua News Agency/China Daily, Internet ID policy triggers online discussion, January 4th, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/04/content_16078594.htm.

[XIN 13b] Xinhua News Agency/China Daily, Expert defends China's Internet management, February 4th, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-02/04/content_16198768.htm.

[XIN 13c] Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164294.htm. [Explanation concerning the CCP Central Committee Resolution Concerning Some Major Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform, speech given by Xi Jinping at the 3rd Plenum on November 15th, 2013.]

[XIN 14a] Xinhua News Agency, Public opinion sought on draft decree on social assistance, January 2nd, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/02/c_133014355.htm

[XIN 14b] Xinhua News Agency, Chinese official stresses increased capability in guiding public opinion, January 3rd 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/03/c_125954678.htm.

[XIN 14c] Xinhua News Agency/People’s Daily, March 8th, 2014. China Eyes Internet Power, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90785/8559640.html.

[YAN 11] YANG Guobin, China’s Gradual Revolution, Opinion pages, The New York Times, March 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14Yang.html?_r=0.

[YAN 12] YANG Guobin, “A Chinese Internet? History, Practice, and Globalization”, Chinese Journal of Communication, Special issue on “Chinese Media and Globalization”, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 49–54, 2012.

[ZHI 12] ZHI Chen, China to tighten Internet management, XINHUA News Agency, September 11^th, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/11/c_131843693.htm.

Chapter written by Alice EKMAN.

1 Circumvention strategies for crossing the Chinese firewall are well known, as Jonathan Benney recalls, “The Great Firewall of China”, China Policy Institute Blog, November 3, 2013, http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/03/the-great-fearwall-of-china/.

2 Jonathan Benny recalls that initially SinaWeibo was a quasi-official microblog service, but that the rapid escalation of its use to cover public events and its nationwide popularity may have taken the state by surprise. Benney, Jonathan, “The Great Firewall of China”, China Policy Institute Blog, November 3, 2013, http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/03/the-great-fearwall-of-china/.

3 On the topic, see for instance YANG, Guobin, “China’s Gradual Revolution”, Opinion pages, The New York Times, March 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14Yang.html?_r=0.

4 King, Roberts and Pan show that human, manual censorship is large in scale and complex, varying between areas and date of posting (for instance, it is particularly strong during major events such as the 2008 Olympic games). King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, Margaret E Roberts. 2013. “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression”, American Political Science Review 107/2 (May): 1–18.

5 On this topic, see for instance : “Behind China’s Cyber Curtain – Visiting the country’s far reaches, where the government shut down the Internet”, Christopher Beam, New Republic, December 5, 2013.

6 For instance, in 2010-2011, during the time he was Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao went online several times to talk with Chinese Web users, in an attempt to demonstrate his awareness of pressing social issues and appear close to the people.

7 From the mid-2000s, the central and local governments started to encourage public comments in favor of the Party, through small financial compensations. Such Internet commentators are known as the “50 Cent Party” (), because they are said to receive 50 cent of RMB for each online post supporting the Party line, or contradicting previous anti-Party posts. This is part of the government’s new “public opinion guidance” strategy.

8 See for instance, “Public opinion sought on draft decree on social assistance”, Xinhua, January 2^nd, 2014, English version available here: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/02/c_133014355.htm

9 Xinhua News Agency, “New rules usher in new era of Internet management”, by Wang Aihua, December 28^th, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-12/28/c_132069951.htm

10 It raised debates and discussions among users. See for instance, “Internet ID policy triggers online discussion”, Xinhua/China Daily, January 4th, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/04/content_16078594.htm.

11 In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate released a judicial opinion announcing that any online rumors which is “clicked and viewed more than 5,000 times, or reposted 500 times” would be viewed as “serious defamation” and could lead to jail sentences of up to three years.

12 Such as the closure in May 2013 of the accounts of Muron Xuexun, a famous author with more than 4 millions followers on his Weibo account.

13 Official, abridged English version of the full text of the document available at: “The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in brief”, China Daily, November 16, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736.htm.

14 “Explanation concerning the “CCP Central Committee Resolution Concerning Some Major Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform’”, speech given by Xi Jinping at the 3^rd Plenum on November 15^th, 2013, which aims to provide a background to the resolution. Full, non-official English translation of the text available at: http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/11/19/explanation-concerning-the-ccp-central-committee-resolution-concerning-some-major-issues-in-comprehensively-deepening-reform/; Full, official Chinese version of the speech ( ) available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164294.htm.

15 Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18th Party Congress, official English version: Xinhua, November 17th, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259.htm.

16 Also noticed by Paul Mozur, The Wall Street Journal/China Real Time blog, “China Wants to Control Internet Even More”, Paul Mozur, November 15, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/11/15/china-wants-greater-internet-control-public-opinion-guidance/.

17 According to official figures: “By the end of December 2012, China has had 422 million mobile phone Internet users, 64.4 million more than that of the end of 2011. Among all the Internet users, those using mobile phones to access Internet increased from 69.3% at the end of 2011 to 74.5%”, Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), January 2013, http://www1.cnnic.cn/IDR/ReportDownloads/201302/P020130221391269963814.pdf.

18 Official, abridged English version of the full text of the document: “The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in brief”, China Daily, November 16, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736.html.

19 Ibid.

20 See for instance, “China’s “Brother Watch” sentenced to 14 years in prison”, The Telegraph, September 5th, 2013.http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10287972/Chinas-Brother-Watch-sentenced-to-14-years-in-prison.html.

21 For instance, Speaking at the 2012 China Internet Conference, Miao Wei, then minister of industry and information technology, said a comprehensive management system will be introduced to include government management, industrial self-regulation and supervision by society over the Internet industry. Xinhua News Agency, “China to tighten Internet management”, September 11^th, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/11/c_131843693.htm.

22 See for instance, “China fights ‘harmful Internet activities’”, The Diplomat, Shannon Tiezzi, December 19, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/china-fights-harmful-internet-activities/.

23 Xinhua News Agency/People’s Daily “China Eyes Internet Power”, March 8^th, 2014.http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90785/8559640.html.

24 Xinhua News Agency, “Chinese official stresses increased capability in guiding public opinion”, January 3^rd 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/china/2014-01/03/c_125954678.htm.

25 Ibid.

26 “Publicity departments should become powerful in order to do a good job in publicity and ideological work ‘under new situations’,” said Liu, according to Xinhua News Agency, “Chinese official stresses increased capability in guiding public opinion”, January 3^rd 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/03/c_125954678.htm.

27 According to Xinhua News Agency, “Chinese official stresses increased capability in guiding public opinion”, January 3^rd 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/03/c_125954678.htm.

28 “The Chinese media, under the leadership of the CPC, need to quicken their expansion into digital and new media and develop Internet and mobile offerings. That will allow them to maintain their ability to direct public opinion”, said Li Congjun, President of Xinhua News Agency, in an editorial published in People’s Daily (Party affialiated newspaper) in September 2013. Li also added “If we cannot effectively rule new media, the ground will be taken by others, which will pose challenges to our dominant role in leading public opinion” – quoted in english by China Economic, “Xinhua chief: Chinese media must lead public opinion and combat distorted views”, September 5th, 2013, http://en.ce.cn/subject/exclusive/201309/05/t20130905_1327957.shtml

29 For instance, Li Congjun, President of Xinhua News Agency, said in the same September 2013 editorial that “some Western media outlets are trying to demonize China and sow national disintegration as they hate seeing the country prosper”. China Economic, “Xinhua chief : Chinese media must lead public opinion and combat distorted views”, September 5th, 2013, http://en.ce.cn/subject/exclusive/201309/05/t20130905_1327957.shtml.

30 For instance, e-commerce generated in 2012 a total revenue between 190-210 US$ billion, almost as much as in the US (220 and 230 US$ billion). And McKinsey, the consultancy, reckons in its report “China e-tail Revolution” that by 2020, China will become the top 1 e-commerce market. Le Monde, “La Toile où le prince est un Français”, Brice Pedroletti, March 23, 2013.

31 “Although the country has nurtured IT companies with global reach, such as Tencent and Alibaba, an overall improvement across the sector is still badly needed.”, underlines official media. Xinhua News Agency/People’s Daily “China Eyes Internet Power”, March 8^th, 2014. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90785/8559640.html

32 “China Eyes Internet Power”, Xinhua News Agency/People’s Daily, March 8^th, 2014.