In the last two decades or so, media in Asia, especially in the media giant countries such as China, Japan, India, and South Korea, have become more and more globalized as a result of various motivations and strategic approaches.

China: A Newly Emerged Major Player in the Global Media Arena

For nearly three decades from 1949, when communist China was established, to the mid‐1970s when the country was still under the control of Mao Zedong, the late chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and his followers, Chinese media were completely closed to the outside world. The media were used purely as a party machine by the Chinese Communist Party for political and ideological ends.

Mao’s death in 1976 and China’s new leaders’ “open door” policy, which started in the late 1970s and early 1980s, have since drastically changed the country’s course, including the mass media system, which is one of the most enormous and complex media systems in the world. Over the past three decades, Chinese media, ranging from newspapers, magazines, books, radio and television broadcasting, to film production, have all experienced tremendous changes. After 30 years of reform, they are no longer purely a propaganda machine of the communist authorities, but are a multi‐function service. While their fundamental role remains little changed as the mouthpiece of the Communist Party and the government, they are now also considered as a provider of information and entertainment to the people and as a public service. Moreover, the media have become an important part of the economy. The government long ago terminated subsidies to media organizations, though all media organizations are still considered as government institutions. They must now survive through market competition for advertising revenues, and the media have become a crucial part of the overall economy by making financial contributions to the government. In the decades since the 1970s, market orientation and commercialization (at least in name) have become the Chinese media’s lifeline which support the everyday existence and operation of the “communist” media system.

Since the 1980s, all the sectors of China’s media industry have experienced unprecedented growth. The number of newspapers published rose from 186 in 1978 to 1939 in 2010, and their advertising revenue from RMB 0.96 billion in 1978 (about $0.12 billion at the time) to RMB 48.7 billion in 2011 (about $8.7 billion at the time). The number of magazines increased from 930 in 1978 to 9884 in 2010. Television programming grew from 38,100 hours in 1985 to 97 750 million hours in 2010. Television penetration was 97.82% in 2011, whereas it had only been 57.3% in 1982. Digital cable television, especially, has seen astonishing growth since the turn of the twenty‐first century. The number of digital cable TV subscribers increased from a total of 276 000 in 2003 to more than 100 million in 2011, growing more than 362‐fold in just eight years. Despite the fact that radio broadcasting has been affected by TV’s development as well as by the emergence of Internet‐based new media, the advertising revenue from radio broadcasting still grew several hundredfold from RMB 18 million in 1986 (about $2.2 million at the time) to RMB 5.4 billion in 2011 (about $0.86 billion at the time). As for book publishing, the total number of books published in 1978 was only 15 000, but in 2010 328 387 books were published. The most eye‐catching change is probably the growth of the number of Internet users. The Internet did not emerge in China until 1997. In 1998 there were just 2.1 million Internet users in a country of 1.2 billion people, far behind most developed nations. But by June 30, 2012, China’s Internet users had increased to 538 million, surpassing the total number of Internet users (245 million) in the United States, thus making China the country with the most Internet users in the world (2009 China Statistics Yearbook, 2009; China Internet Network Information Center, 2012; Collections of China Journalism and Publishing Statistics, 1978–2008, 2009; Cui & Hou, 2012; Deng, 2012; He, Zhang, & Wang, 2012; Hu, Li, & Huang, 2012; Miao, Yue, & Lu, 2012; Yin & Cheng, 2012).

In 2011, the total revenue from China’s media industry reached RMB 638 billion (about $101 billion at the time). This amount reflects a 9.2% increase over the total media revenue in 2010, a 27.8% increase over the total media revenue in 2009, a 51.5% increase over the total media revenue in 2008, a 70.1% increase over the total media revenue in 2007, and a 90% increase over the total media revenue in 2006 (Cui & Hou, 2012). In other words, China’s media industry doubled its scale in just five years, moving toward becoming an increasingly sizable and noticeable player in the global media arena.

For a long time, China Radio International (CRI) was the third largest external broadcasting service in the world, following Voice of America (VOA) as the largest and Radio Moscow as the second largest one. In the last two decades or so, CRI has seen rapid expansion. Not only has it now replaced Radio Moscow (now renamed Voice of Russia) to become the world’s second largest external broadcasting service, but in many aspects it has even surpassed VOA in terms of expansion speed and broadcasting languages. Particularly since the beginning of the 2000s the Chinese Communist Party and government have launched a series of campaign to push Chinese media organizations to internationalize as part of China’s new strategy to boost its soft power. With both policy support and financial subsidies from the government, in 2011 CRI established 13 new FM broadcasting stations abroad. By the end of 2011, it had launched a total of five overseas regional stations and 18 overseas production and broadcasting centers, increasing the number of CRI’s FM broadcasting stations outside China to 70. The daily broadcasting hours of CRI reached 3000 (Hu, Li & Huang, 2012; 2009 Report on Development of China’s Radio, Film and Television, 2009). The government claimed these developments and expansions represented important progress in the history of Chinese media.

Meanwhile, the seven channels of China Central Television (CCTV) oriented to a foreign audience, which broadcast in six foreign languages, have also been expanding their overseas market. The seven channels are now reaching audiences in 171 countries all over the world. Their total number of worldwide subscribers has reached 249 million. CCTV’s offices in the United States and Europe both expanded substantially. Moreover, CCTV has established a joint venture with the United States’ Satellite TV to transmit its Great Wall programs directly to American audiences through Satellite TV. In only a few years the subscribers of Great Wall programs have reached 100 000, and the Great Wall program is becoming well known. At the same time, the “open door” policy has also substantially internationalized and globalized China’s media market as well. In recent years, on average more than 100 foreign TV dramas, that is, more than 1000 episodes, have been imported into the country, compared to a nominal number 30 years ago. Now, more than 70 countries regularly trade television programming with China. Moreover, eight foreign TV channels, including those belonging to the media tycoon Rupert Murdoch, are now permitted to broadcast in certain areas, and a total of 34 foreign TV channels are allowed to be seen in thousands of hotels across China (Hong, Lu, & Zou, 2008; Hong, 2009).

During the last decade or so, China’s only privately owned – or the only non‐governmentally owned – satellite TV organization, Phoenix TV, has moved quickly to target its broadcasting services at an international audience rather than just at an audience within China. This Hong Kong‐based television broadcaster was launched in 2000, with the unacknowledged support of the Chinese government, in an attempt to broadcast the “voice of China” to people of Chinese origin across the world. It has already become a multifaceted world media conglomerate, owning electronic media such as Phoenix Chinese Channel, Phoenix Movie Channel, Phoenix News Channel, Phoenix Europe Channel, and Phoenix America Channel, print media such as Phoenix Weekly, and online media such as Phoenix Online Service. Phoenix’s audiences and readers are found all over the world (Hong, Lu, & Zou, 2008).

China has become one of the world’s main film production nations. In 1978 China produced only 46 feature films (excluding those that were produced in Hong Kong and Taiwan; subsequent figures also exclude Hong Kong and Taiwan). Ten years later, in 1997, the number increased to 88. But after entering the twenty‐first century, China’s film production has proliferated. In 2002 a total of 100 feature films were produced, and the number jumped to 140 in 2003, 212 in 2004, 260 in 2005, 330 in 2006, and 402 in 2007. In 2011 558 feature movies were produced in China, making the country the third largest film producer in the world (2009 China Statistics Yearbook, 2009; Liu & Lu, 2009; Yin & Cheng, 2012).

The box office revenue of China’s movies has increased dramatically as well. In 2004 box office revenue reached a historical high, RMB 3.7 billion (about $450 million at the time). By 2011, it had become RMB 13.1 billion (about $2.08 billion at the time), demonstrating a 254% growth over 2004 and a 28.93% growth over 2010. Moreover, 53.61% of the box office in 2011 was from movies produced in China, surpassing the box office from imported movies. Furthermore, Chinese movies have been shown in theaters in many countries and have often become a focal topic of social occasions. In 2011 52 Chinese‐produced movies were imported by 22 countries. Of the RMB 13.1 billion revenue from films in 2011, RMB 2.02 billion (about $321 million) came from overseas. Despite the fact that in the last few years the global film market has been shrinking, China’s film industry has been growing healthily. Its overseas box office revenue was RMB 0.6 billion in 2003 (about $72 million), RMB 1.1 billion in 2004 (about $132 million), RMB 1.7 billion in 2005 (about $210 million), RMB 1.9 billion in 2006 (about $232 million), and RMB 2 billion in 2007 (about $286 million) (Liu & Lu, 2009; Yin, 2009; Yin & Cheng, 2012). These steady increases demonstrate the growth of the export of Chinese movies and the increasing popularity of Chinese‐produced movies among both audiences across the world and international film‐makers. For example, in the year 2011 alone, 49 Chinese‐produced movies won a total of 74 awards at 17 international film festivals (Yin & Cheng, 2012). In addition, in the past few years China has co‐produced several dozen movies with other countries or areas, including Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, France, the United States, and Canada. Each year, almost all the top 20 grossing movies domestically were co‐produced by China and other countries (Liu & Lu, 2009; Yin, 2009).

Since the beginning of the twenty‐first century, China International Television Corporation, which belongs to the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television, has been coordinating a number of China’s leading central and regional TV stations and television production companies to attend the Cannes Film Festival (MipTV and Mipcom) to promote Chinese TV programs. The China Film Overseas Promotion Corporation has been helping both state movie studios and independent film production companies to exhibit movies at this and other international film festivals. Since 2007, the China Film Forum has become a regular part of the Cannes Film Festival, and it has received growing attention and interest from renowned film‐makers from all over the world (Xu, 2007).

At the same time, China has also hosted international TV festivals to promote sales of Chinese television programs to foreign TV companies. Among others, the Shanghai International TV Festival, the Chengdu International TV Festival, the Hangzhou International Animation Festival, the Beijing International TV Week, the Guangzhou International Documentary Convention, the China International Film and TV Fair, the China Radio Development Forum, China‐ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Radio & TV Summit, have become internationally recognized important events. More and more foreign companies regularly attend these events and the sales of Chinese TV programs and movies at these festivals and fairs have increased steadily (Hong, 2009).

As part of the Chinese government’s Going Abroad Project, which encourages and helps TV stations and production companies broadcast more Chinese voices and images to the world, many Chinese TV stations and production companies now have branches or joint venture businesses in various countries across the world. Chinese‐produced television programs are now available in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma (Hong, Lu, & Zou, 2008).

Animation production was one of the most successful aspects of the Going Abroad Project. In 2008 a CCTV‐produced 52‐episode animation series, Xiao Li Yu Li Xian Ji (The Little Carp’s Adventures), was imported by 51 countries. Its budget was RMB 30 million. This program alone made RMB 11.86 million (about $1.7 million) from the overseas market, setting a new record. The Story of Three Kingdoms, China’s first high‐definition animation program that was co‐produced with Japan, was sold to more than 40 foreign TV companies in 20 countries (Lu, 2009). From 2007 to 2011, China’s animation production grew dramatically year by year. In 2007 the total amount of animation produced was 101 900 minutes, but it increased by 19.2% in 2008 to reach 131 042 minutes, by 28.6% in 2009 to 171 816 minutes, by 31.1% in 2010 to 220 530 minutes, and by 18.5% in 2011 to 261 224 minutes (Deng, 2012).

The advertising industry in China has grown remarkably in the last few years. In 2011 advertising revenues from radio and television reached RMB 82.62 billion (about $13.11 billion), a 15.89% increase over the figure in 2010. The advertising revenue of other media industries has kept growing in the last few years as well. For example, the online advertising revenues in 2011 reached RMB 51.2 billion, a 59.4% of growth over 2010. In 2011 the advertising revenues of online gaming industry alone reached RMB 41.4 billion, a 26.4% increase over 2010. Even a traditional media industry such as film saw its advertising revenue in 2011 reached RMB 17.84, a 13.5% increase over 2010 (Cui & Zhou, 2009; Cui & Hou, 2012).

The “open door” policy has not only allowed China to open its market to foreign companies, including foreign and transnational media companies, but the government has also vigorously encouraged Chinese media organizations to export media and cultural products to other countries. Despite the fact that many scholars think the government’s push for Chinese media to enter the global media arena is more of a political than an economic move, after years of effort the Chinese media have become active new players in the global media arena and are much more noticeable than a couple of decades ago.

The globalization of the Chinese media follows a bifurcated strategy. Media organizations are no longer interested only in the domestic market; they are also aiming at the much bigger and more profitable international market, especially the markets of Western nations. With the restructuring of China’s political system and economic approach since the late 1980s, the Communist Party and government are more eager to use the export of Chinese media and cultural products to expand China’s soft power in the world. In other words, while the Chinese media practitioners are eager to use globalization as an opportunity to gain a share of the global media market, the Chinese authorities are more eager to have China’s voice heard in the world’s political, economic, and cultural forums, and thus exert more soft power in the global arena.

Especially during the past few years, China has accelerated the pace of internationalization and globalization of its media. Among a number of new actions, three strategic ones are particularly worth noting. The first was the establishment of China Satellite News Gathering Alliance (CSNG) in December 2008. CSNG consists of China’s 50 leading television broadcasters, with CCTV as the leader of this alliance. The purpose of this action was to change China’s television broadcasting from many scattered individual “trees” to a mustered “forest” so that it can compete with CNN and the BBC in the world television arena. The second action was Xinhua News Agency’s launch of a visual news service, thus bringing it up to the same level as the leading global news agencies such as Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, which are effective and competitive in the world media market by transmitting both print and visual news items to their subscribers (Lu & Gao, 2009). The third action was a billion‐dollar decision on the internationalization of China’s media. Earlier in 2009 the Chinese Communist Party and the central government decided to allocate RMB 45 billion (about $7 billion) to an unprecedented “media project.” The project is to build up China’s media “aircraft carrier” in an attempt to give them more power to compete with the world media giants, such as Time Warner, AOL, Disney, News Corp, Viacom, and Bertelsmann, in the global arena. However, the most important and ultimate purpose of all these actions for the internationalization and globalization of China’s media is still a simple and political one: to give China a greater say in world affairs, to let its voice be heard across the world, and to help balance the currently still seriously unbalanced world information and communication order. As soon as this unprecedented strategic media project was revealed by the Western media, it immediately attracted great worldwide attention. Despite the Chinese government’s official denial of the project, many Chinese media organizations have already started to work vigorously toward its fulfillment.

Japan: A Worldwide Conqueror through Animation

Japan is a major player in some aspects of the media and entertainment industry. In particular, it is strong in the global trading of animation and horror films. Japanese animé (animation) and horror movies represent a level of expertise that is not seen in any other country. In the last few decades, Japan’s film and animation industries have been remarkably successful both in their home and in the overseas markets. One of the reasons why Japanese films and animations have made their mark worldwide is their themes.

Japanese film exports are highly concentrated on animations and horror movies. Figures 13.1 and 13.2 depict the market share of Japanese animation films and their box office revenues. Animation films accounted for the majority of Japanese exports to the United States. For example, between 2000 and 2008, 91% of the Japanese titles released in the US market were animations whereas other genres of films accounted only for 8%. The figure was 60% for Italy, and 27% for South Korea. Horror films comprised 44% of Japan’s film exports to South Korea. In general, Japanese animation makes up more than 60% of the world animation market.

The big‐hit films in Japan’s domestic market or the films that win awards at international film festivals are widely distributed abroad. For example, Howl’s Moving Castle, which was nominated for an Oscar in 2006 and won another eight awards in 2005–2006, broke several records at the Japanese box office and was shown in many foreign countries such as Korea, France, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States (WebJapan, 2005). According to statistics published by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in November 2004, the film’s success raised the total animated film ticket sales to 16 times more than in the same month of the previous year.

In order to expand its global reach, Japanese film production companies started joint productions with their American or other Asian counterparts. For example, Disney is now buying Japanese animé, together with games and other products, for distribution in other regions. It is also considering joint film and animé productions in Japan. Disney has established an entertainment content purchasing division within its Japanese subsidiary. Like Disney, many foreign television stations and distribution companies are now investing in animation and film productions in Japan or in joint productions with Japanese companies.

An animé production company, IG, whose productions Ghost in the Shell and other titles won numerous overseas fans, established a US subsidiary that retains lawyers and accountants familiar with American business practices and legal affairs to help their sales negotiations and joint productions with American distributors. Another major production company, Toei Animation, also established a US subsidiary in 2004.

Using new communication technology, Japanese producers and distributors are testing a new global joint venture. Toei Animation is now distributing animation titles via the Internet, and its consumers can directly download and watch their programs from its archives. Since the direct sales from the producer to the consumer through the Internet allows consumers all over the world to access the content without distributors or exhibitors, consumers can enjoy the programs at a more reasonable price and in relative comfort. Hal Film Maker set up a joint venture with a Chinese company for animé production, programming, and character merchandising (Japan External Trade Organization, 2005a). With these new approaches, Japanese animation and films are aiming to expand business across various regions in the world. In the past few years, Japanese animation market sales have increased by 5.1% from $1.48 billion in 2006 to $1.88 billion in 2011.

Many Japanese productions are increasingly outsourcing to subcontractors in China, Korea, and elsewhere. They send original prints and other digital data to the subcontractors for animating, coloring, and other less complex operations. While Japanese production companies concentrate on planning, financing, and other processes that require high expertise, the subcontractors perform the more mundane tasks of animating and coloring the work. Some market experts estimate that over 90% of the Japanese animation industry is outsourced. Most market experts agreed that Japanese animation production’s outsourcing stands at 60%. There is no doubt that very few animation titles are produced solely in Japan now. For example, Studio Ghibli, a Japanese animation company headed by the world‐renowned directors Hayao Miyazaki and Isao Takahata, subcontracted part of the work on Spirited Away to Korean companies. Some animation productions now even have their own production studios in other countries. For example, Toei Animation has more than 130 employees at its production house in the Philippines (Bynum, 2008).

The remaking of Japanese films has recently been very popular in Hollywood. After the remake of a Japanese horror film, The Ring, turned out to be a big hit in the US market in 2002, many American film producers have bought the rights from Japanese films (mainly horror films) and animations. As shown in Table 13.1, recently remade Japanese films include The Grudge, Dark Water, Pulse, The Ring, The Ring Two, and Shall We Dance? The Ring and The Grudge were the most profitable in the US market. Remade by DreamWorks, it garnered more than $129 million in the US box office and $230 million worldwide, almost six times the remake cost. DreamWorks bought the remake from the director Nakata Hideo for only $1.2 million and spent another $40 million to remake the film (Xu, 2008). Between 1996 and 2008, 10 Japanese films were remade by the major Hollywood studios. Table 13.1 shows the titles, genres, and release years of these films.

The remakes in recent years have received much more attention than previous remakes of Japanese films because of their scale and profitability. Previous remakes were isolated and random events, but in recent years marketing strategies have changed. For example, the Americanized Ring’s success was followed by other sales of Japanese horror films such as Ring Two (purchased by DreamWorks), Dark Water (purchased by Disney), and Jouon (purchased by Columbia Pictures) (Bynum, 2008; Xu, 2008).

Horror films account for the majority of remakes that have been produced or are being planned. For example, of the 10 major sales of remake rights, eight were horror films, while only two were dramas. This is mainly because Japanese horror movies seem to appeal to a wide range of audiences around the world. As Taplin (2007) explains, the appeal of Japanese horror films derives from solid and well‐crafted storytelling, whereas Hollywood movies rely heavily on special effects and pyrotechnics. In addition, the demand of audiences for exotic cultures and action are fueling the current trend of remakes.

A modernized system of production and distribution, and the home market effect, are some of the main factors for the wide acceptance of Japanese films and animations. Given the second largest entertainment market in the world, Japan has a good home market to support the growth of cultural products. This market size for entertainment and cultural products has helped Japanese films and animations to expand their business abroad. Japan has the largest film market in Asia, at $7.7 billion, as shown in Table 13.2, which accounts 47% of the total media spending. Domestic films do well at the box office, increasing their ratio of the market to more than 40%, but overall box office spending has fallen in large part because of the low demand for American films. The weakness of US films at the Japanese box office has seriously impacted domestic spending in the film market.

In 2004 62.5% of Japan’s box office revenue was from imported films and 37.5% from domestic films, which is relatively high compared to Western nations other than the United States. The ratio of domestic to imported films in terms of box office revenue and of film releases has increased by 17.8% and 8.01%, respectively. According to JETRO (2005a), animation films have boosted the market since the mid‐1990s. Spirited Away set a record of 23.5 million moviegoers. In addition, some other big animation hits such as Studio Ghibli’s Howl’s Moving Castle and Sekai no Chuushin de Ai wo Sakebu also helped to boost the domestic share. While domestic films are expanding their market share, imported films are slowly but steadily losing their dominant position in Japan. For example, the success of Howl’s Moving Castle in 2004 helped the domestic films’ market share rise to 37.5%. This suggests that domestic films have a competitive advantage over foreign films and are creating a positive home market effect. In terms of the number of releases, a total of 165 first‐run domestic films were released in 2003, showing a big growth from the previous years. The number of domestic film releases has steadily increased during the last few years by 8% annually. The ratio of domestic films in the market has increased from 44.6% in 2001 to 47.8% in 2004 (JETRO, 2005a).

While Japanese animations are widely accepted all over the world, Japanese TV programs are less accepted by other nations, particularly other Asian countries, for political reasons. Korean and Chinese memories of Japanese occupation led to these countries banning Japanese television programs. However, as Taiwan lifted its ban on Japanese programs in 1993 and South Korea relaxed its ban in the late 1990s, exports of Japanese TV dramas to Taiwan and South Korea have rapidly increased. According to an annual report of Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2012), the total export of Japanese TV programs in 2010 was worth approximately ¥6.25 billion. Recently, Japanese TV dramas have also been shown to many foreign audiences with widespread acceptance, including in other Asian countries.

As Figure 13.3 shows, Asia is now the most important target market of Japanese television programs, at 50.1%, followed by North America (25.2%), Europe (19.6%), South America (3.8%), and others (1.3%). Between 2011 and 2012 the Asian market grew from 43.2 to 50.1%, while the European and North American markets declined from 25.5% to 25.2%, and from 27.6% to 19.6%, respectively. In terms of genre, as shown in Figure 13.4, animation (46.8%) was the most widely accepted by the global audience, followed by variety programs (22.6%), drama (12.1%), sports (3.8%), and documentary (3.4%). Animation and drama are the two most accepted genres for import by other countries.

The boom of Japanese TV program exports started in the early 1990s when STAR TV began to carry Japanese dramas to neighboring countries. For example, a Japanese drama, Oshin, was aired in 28 countries. Even in Iran, which has low cultural proximity to Japan, the drama’s ratings hit a historic high of 70% nationwide. However, there are still some obstacles to Japanese TV dramas breaking into the US market. Japanese drama is less attractive to American audiences because it tends to have slow story development and to focus on local themes (Kanayama & Kanayama, 2005). In addition, Japan has recently experienced increased competition from its neighboring media giants, Taiwan, China, and South Korea, in the regional media and cultural product market.

India: Bollywood as Hollywood in the East

With the growing impact on the global film industry, India is transforming itself into a new powerhouse of filmed entertainment in the global media market. Although by the end of the 1980s its film industry was in bad shape, India is now becoming the world’s largest film producer and an important exporter with the growing Indian diasporas overseas, the entry of satellite television, and the inflow of new financial resources in the 1990s. For example, in 2009 India released 1200 feature‐length films, almost twice the number of films (694) released by the United States in that year (UNESCO, 2011).

India’s film industry is now affectionately nicknamed Bollywood, from “Hollywood” and “Bombay,” the former name for Mumbai, the center of India’s film production. Bollywood was originally used to refer to India’s Hindi film industry in Mumbai, but the term is now becoming a globally recognized brand of the Indian film industry. As Mishra (2006: 3) observes, “Bollywood has become a globally recognized brand; like Darjeeling tea or the Taj Mahal, it has become an emblem of India.”

Bollywood exports a massive scale of films to the world, and is creating a major cultural force both in India and overseas (Lorenzen & Taeube, 2009). Its films are especially widely accepted in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, East Europe, and now the United States and the United Kingdom too, where there are many immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Mishra, 2006).

Despite the fact that India’s film industry has a long history, it has mainly served the national market for a century. However, led by media liberalization and the growth of overseas diasporas, since the 1990s India has been evolving into a hub of the film industry, producing and exporting hundreds of films across the world. Both India’s huge diasporas and the growth of satellite television have facilitated the internationalization of Indian films, helping Bollywood become a powerhouse that produces more than 800 films annually in 15 languages including Hindi, Tamil, and Telugu. Bollywood is now producing and exporting its films with a 60% growth rate in the last four years, and is integrating into the global media economy (Lorenzen & Taeube, 2009).

The Indian film entertainment industry obtains around $200 million to $360 million in revenue from overseas annually (KPMG and CII, 2005; Lorenzen & Taeube, 2009). In addition, Zee TV, India’s biggest Hindi TV channel, has about four million subscribers abroad, earning 40% of its revenue from exports, and Comcast, the leading cable provider in the United States, is now offering its video‐on‐demand services for Bollywood films to its subscribers (Lorenzen, 2009).

According to 1998 data (see Figure 13.5), the main importers of Indian films in recent years were the Middle East with 35.4% of India’s total film exports, the former Soviet Union nations with 14%, and Indonesia with 14%. More recently, Indian films have been consumed in large part by Indian diasporas or the same language groups in the countries. For example, countries like Bangladesh with a 136 million Bengali‐speaking population, Sri Lanka with 3.5 million Tamils, and Malaysia with 1.5 million Tamil speakers are all good potential markets for Indian films (KPMG & CII, 2005; Lorenzen, 2009).

Since the late 1990s, the Indian film industry has seen a huge growth in exports to the Indian diasporas in North America, the United Kingdom, and a range of Arabic countries, and they have recently started entering other Asian countries as well. In the past, the distribution of Indian films abroad was difficult due to geographical and technological problems. For example, the British and North American markets were geographically dispersed and therefore difficult to cover with a small number of screens for Indian films. However, more efficient distribution methods like DVDs and home videos are guaranteeing better dispersal for Indian productions, which has enabled the growth of film exports at 30 to 50% annually (Lorenzen & Taeube, 2009). According to KPMG and the Confederation of Indian Industry (2005), two major Indian film distributors report that the US and UK markets account for more than half their export revenues. India has accounted for the largest proportion of foreign films screened in the US market recently, and some Indian films are big hits, earning more than $1 million in their first week. In 2005 Bollywood films in the United States were estimated to have earned $100 million (Woodman‐Maynard, 2006). As shown in Figure 13.6, the proportion of revenue from international distribution is the same as that from domestic theaters.

The new Indian diasporas have played a significant role in making the Indian film industry more stable and profitable. These diasporas have a much higher purchasing power than the Indian home market or the old diasporas. Consumers in the new diaspora markets may have a greater willingness to pay for filmed entertainment and therefore the media market is more potentially profitable. Therefore, the box office revenues in these new diasporas are higher per capita than in the domestic market. In 2005 the average ticket price in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia ranged from $8 to $15, whereas in India the average ticket price was only 35 cents. Thus, the booming exports to these new markets have increased Bollywood’s exports earnings by a 30 to 50% annual growth rate in the last five years (KPMG, 2005). As shown in Table 13.3, the average overseas earnings of the top 20 Indian films amounted to $192.9 million. Three Idiots is the highest grossing film, with $23.9 million in overseas markets, followed by My Name is Khan ($22.15 million), Don 2 ($11.7 million), and Kabhi Alvida Naa Kehna ($10.77 million).

Kabhi Alvida Naa Kehna is probably the best example of a Bollywood film’s success in the world market, and Veer‐Zaara was the top‐grossing Bollywood film in 2006 both at home and internationally, earning over Rs 445 million (about $11 million) (Box Office India, 2009). The main importers of Indian films are the United Kingdom and the United States. Veer‐Zaara opened strongly in the United Kingdom and the United States in 2006 with the first weekend grosses of $1.3 million (Rs 62.4 million) in the United States and $1.4 million (Rs 62.8 million) in the United Kingdom, making it one of the most successful debuts of a Bollywood film. The success of this film did not wane significantly, as it has earned $3.6 million (Rs 175 million) so far in the United States, $3.1 million (Rs 150 million) in the United Kingdom, and $2.5 million (Rs 120 million) in the rest of the world.

Since Bollywood has been fastest in tapping into global business opportunities, many players in the industry are turning their eyes to the overseas markets and are developing new business strategies. For example, in order to capitalize on the growing global market, Bollywood producers like Yash Chopra and Subhash Ghai have set up distribution offices in the United Kingdom and the United States (Pendakur, 2003). Over the last decade, Yash Raj Films, the top distribution house in India and twenty‐seventh in the world, has performed well, particularly in exports. Through Yash Raj Films’ own offices in the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and India, YRF Studios has also widened its horizons by marketing and distributing DVDs and VCDs of classic Indian films (Yash Raj Films, 2009).

Another significant movement toward internationalization can be seen in the India China Film Cooperation Commission. India and China joined forces to create the commission to “strengthen cooperation and promote bilateral exchanges between India and China in the entertainment sector” (Jayaram, 2005). The commission is considering raising film quotas for each country’s films (PwC, 2006). Indian film‐makers expect that co‐production with China would help to break into the highly restricted market in China. China has a screen quota policy that limits the number of foreign films shown. Therefore, co‐productions with China may help Indian films circumvent the restriction. Besides China, India also has many co‐production treaties with other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and Spain (Mahanty, 2012). In the view of Rao (2007), these business strategies can help what Shukla (2003) calls “interpenetrating globalism,” whereby nationalities come together and yet remain highly discrete overseas.

The home market effect, overseas diasporas, and the change in government regulation are major factors for Bollywood’s continued export growth (Kohli‐Khandekar, 2006). As Lorenzen and Taeube (2009) note, the home market boom has served to facilitate Bollywood’s recent growth in revenues as well as exports. With a high annual growth rate of 25%, Bollywood is the fastest growing of the film‐making industries. In terms of output, it is the most prolific in the world, with the commercial film cluster turning out more than 800 films a year (Rao, 2005).

Despite the world’s sluggish economy recently, both India’s box office and home video revenues have quickly recovered from negative growth. Box office revenue fell sharply from $1.77 million in 2008 to $1.524 million in 2009. However, it rose 9.8% in 2010 to $1.673 million. The growth of the domestic film market was fueled by both higher ticket prices and the increase in the number of moviegoers. In 2010 the number of moviegoers was 2.650 million, a 6% increase from 2.5 million in 2009. In the meantime, the average ticket price went up to $0.63 in 2010 from $0.61. In addition, the introduction of 3D screens also contributed to the profitability of the film industry in India. In 2008 there were only 112 3D screens in India, but the number doubled to 279 in 2009. Domestic spending on home video sales and rentals has also recovered since 2009. Between 2008 and 2009, home video revenue declined sharply by 20.99%. However, it has been growing again since 2009. The growth rate was 5.47% in 2009 and 10.37% in 2010.

As shown in Table 13.4, the total domestic film market in India rose 12.07% in 2007 and 10.48% in 2008, but dropped 12.59% in 2009. Nevertheless, it recovered by 9.83% in 2010. India is projected to have the fastest growing film entertainment industry in the next few years, with a two‐digit compound annual increase in the total home video market.

Wildman and Siwek (1988) state that generally producers with a large home market have a clear advantage in international competition because the large markets provide them with greater incentive to make large investment in their productions. They suggest that the larger investment enables the producers to put more elements that are appealing in the films, and therefore the films can overcome the handicap caused by the cultural differences between home and export markets. As India’s GDP is rising rapidly and the middle class grows, Bollywood has also taken advantage of the growth in national demand. Aided by the growing home market, Bollywood is doing well in financing, producing, and marketing over 800 films annually. From a Hollywood perspective, most Bollywood firms are small and independent films because their budget is smaller than Hollywood’s blockbusters, and the producers rarely have vertical ties with distributors. The average Indian film budget is $3 million, in contrast to the average budget of $45 million for a Hollywood movie (Rao, 2005). However, these relatively small‐budget films are able to compete in mainstream box offices with high returns on investment, proving the diversity and dynamism of Bollywood.

The Indian film industry has ethno‐geographical advantages because of the large and widely dispersed Indian diasporas. India has the second largest overseas population in the world after China. There is a potential audience of more than 20 million Indians overseas (see Table 13.5) who are familiar with Indian culture and films (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2012). By selling Bollywood films to an audience who is already familiar with Indian culture and values, the industry can garner additional revenue from them as well as make larger investment in their productions in the expectation of future returns from the audience. Therefore, in one sense, the diasporas are potentially another home market for Bollywood films. These wealthy diasporas function as the most powerful asset for the industry.

The Indian government provides Bollywood with neither state subsidies nor any special tax exemption. However, several recent changes in government regulations have positively affected the performance and exportability of Bollywood films. For example, the Indian government now allows foreign direct investment (FDI) in film financing, production, distribution, marketing, and associated activities related to the film industry. Before 1992, the government prohibited foreign investors from directly supporting the domestic film industry. However, after 1992 the government has begun to open up the market to foreign investors. In 2005 the government decided to fully open the industry up to foreign investors, thus allowing Bollywood to attract more finance from oversea diasporas (Lorenzen & Taeube, 2009). Thanks to the inflow of capital to Bollywood, producers can make blockbuster films that may appeal even more to audiences, which enhances the exportability of their films.

Also, since 2001 the Indian government has classified the film industry as an industry that is able to receive finance from the banking industry. The new policy framework has enabled film productions or distributors to get investment from private banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. The new framework has enhanced transparency and fair competition in the film industry. Currently, many financial institutions are investing in Bollywood films. After the reclassification of the film industry by the government, the Industrial Development Bank has provided 55 films with finance. The Bank of Baroda has invested Rs 500 million in Taj Mahal, and the Bank of India has invested Rs 600 million in several film projects (Bist, 2004).The changes in government regulations have modernized the production system of the Indian film industry, which has greatly contributed to the internationalization of the film industry.

There are different opinions on Bollywood. As Bollywood becomes more profitable and expands its business globally, some scholars have raised concerns over the globalization of the Indian film industry. Mishra (2006) argues that current Bollywood films fail to reflect India’s authentic culture and values. He asserts that the influence of overseas diasporas as a source of finance is so significant that Bollywood films are conveying only the “feel good” version of Indian culture (Mishra, 2006). Currently, foreign market earnings are responsible for around 30% of film budgets, equal to or exceeding domestic earnings. In this situation, producers cannot but consider the taste of foreign audiences in planning their films and eliminating the elements that may not translate culturally to an overseas audience. Thus, most Bollywood films targeting foreign audiences focus on entertainment rather than reality. From this perspective, globalization means Westernization or Hollywoodization.

In addition, advertising and the sales of secondary products are increasingly important in film production. Product placement and the sales of music rights account for 9% and 24%, respectively, of Bollywood revenue. This situation is making producers focus more on the tastes of middle‐class and upper‐class audiences. As Rao (2007) indicates, film producers in Bollywood are increasingly focusing on urban audiences who can pay more and buy more and whose tastes need to be catered for. The most popular recent Bollywood films, such as Kabhi Kaho Na Pyar Hai (2000), Kushi Kabhi Gum (2001), Kal Ho Naa Ho (2003), Hum Tum (2004), and Dus (2005), featured Westernized themes and MTV‐style musical numbers (Mishra, 2006; Rao, 2007). Furthermore, advertising, music rights, and secondary products have been growing. Product placement in films is estimated at around Rs 1,000 crores, equivalent to $181 million, in 2010 (PwC, 2011). The increasing revenues from advertising and secondary products often make film producers focus more on the taste of those who has purchasing power. Thus, as Mishra (2006) observes, Bollywood is becoming a dream world with materially successful Indians who want to see only the “feel good” version of Indian culture.

Korea: The Continuing Global Sweeping of “K‐Pop”

Over the past few years, Korean popular culture, including soap operas, music, and films, has gained a popularity in East Asia that is now spreading to other regions with low cultural and geographical proximity, such as North America, the Middle East, and Europe. According to the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (2012), in 2011 exports of Korean cultural products, including books, computer games, animation, cartoons, television programs, recorded musical tapes, and “tie‐in” products, accounted for $4.6 billion. Despite the global economic recession, exports of Korean cultural products have continued to increase. Journalists have dubbed the increased circulation of Korean popular culture around the world as the “Korean wave” (Hallyu) (Faiola, 2006).

According to some scholars, the “Korean wave” started from the big hit of a Korean television drama in China, What is Love All About? The drama aired on the national CCTV in 1997, turning out to be an unexpected hit. When the television station re‐broadcast the drama the following year in a prime‐time slot, it received the second highest rating in China’s television history (Heo, 2002; Shim, 2009).

Since then, in response to popular demand, several television stations in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore have begun to broadcast imported Korean TV dramas and these have gained a huge audience. For example, in 1999 another Korean drama serial, Star in My Heart, became a big hit in Taiwan and China, which led to other Korean television programs being broadcast in the region. With the sudden popularity of such Korean dramas, many television stations in Taiwan, such as FTV, CTV, and Power TV, began importing and broadcasting Korean TV programs instead of Japanese programs (H. M. Kim, 2005). In 2000 the high demand for Korean programs led a cable channel in Taiwan to specialize in airing Korean TV dramas. For historical and political reasons, Taiwan had been especially receptive to Japanese and Korean TV dramas. But the Korean drama Jewel in the Palace was watched by half the population in Taiwan, creating a han‐liu (Taiwanese for “Korean wave”) that dominated young consumers’ tastes in entertainment, fashion, and commercial goods. In addition to the huge success in Taiwan, Korean TV shows also became the most watched television dramas in the region (Chan, 2009).

Korean TV dramas have spread to neighboring countries such as Japan and Hong Kong rapidly, as well as to other East and Southeast Asian countries (Faiola, 2006; Maliangkay, 2006; Shim, 2009). In the past few years, Korean television stations have regarded Korean TV dramas as a substitute for expensive Japanese TV dramas because they were much cheaper than Japanese dramas as well as being commercially profitable. For instance, in 2002 Korean TV dramas were only about a quarter of the price of Japanese ones, and a tenth of the price of Hong Kong ones (Shim, 2009). Therefore, in the economic recession, many Asian buyers preferred to buy the cheaper Korean TV programming than other, more expensive Asian TV programming. As Chua (2006) claims, the Korean wave is the result of a conscious strategy of television stations to establish their presence among local, national, and international audiences. Thus, as the demands for Korean TV dramas and other television programs have continuously increased, Korean television programs, along with other Korean cultural products, have attracted a fan base in the overseas markets. The total exports of Korean television programs were approximately $229 million in 2010, an increase of 23.9% from $184 million in 2009.

The Korean wave in the music industry began in China in the late 1990s. A satellite television channel based in Hong Kong, Channel V, regularly aired Korean pop music videos from 1998, which contributed to the huge fan base of Korean pop stars in Asia (Shim, 2009). Channel V has helped these pop stars expand their fan base in Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, and China. For example, in 1998 a Korean boy band, H.O.T., reached the top of the pop charts in China and Taiwan. In 2000 their concert tickets were sold out in Beijing, attracting more than 12,000 youth for each concert. The Korean pop sensation can be found even in Japan, which has the second biggest music industry in the world. In 2002 a Korean female pop singer, Boa, released her debut Japanese album, Listen to My Heart, which reached the top of the Oricon Weekly Chart, Japan’s equivalent of the Billboard Charts, and became an RIAJ‐certified million‐seller album, making it the first album by a Korean artist to reach the top. Following her success, many Korean pop singers have promoted their albums in Japan, and some of them, including Boa, are now expanding into the global market. SM Entertainment, the largest Korean‐based agency, producer, and publisher of pop music, increased its presence by opening subsidiaries in the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, and China.

In fact, Korea was not a traditional powerhouse of pop music in the world. Just a decade ago, Korean popular culture rarely received much attention from the industry or the academy. As Kawakami and Fisher (1994) comment, Korean popular music did not have anything to match the remarkable contemporary sounds of Indonesia, Okinawa, or Japan. However, the Korean pop music, commonly referred to as K‐Pop, is now entering in to the mainstream of world’s music industry and is gaining a global audience. For instance, a Korean singer, Psy, was a global hit with his song “Oppan Gangnam Style,” earning approximately $8.1 million in 2012 (Y. Lee & Nakashima, 2012). The total export of Korean music products in 2010 reached $8.3 million, an increase of 166.3% from the previous year (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2012).

The Korean wave was seen in film entertainment too. In 1999 a Korean blockbuster, Shiri, was released in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, attracting critical acclaim as well as large audiences (S. Kim, 2004). It became the most popular Korean movie, seen by over six million people in Korea and over 1.2 million in Japan. In the view of Joo (2005), Shiri heralded a departure from the past by tapping the hitherto ignored commercial viability of Korean films. After Shiri and other pioneers, many Korean films have become regular fixtures in cinemas across Asia. For example, Joint Security Area, which was released in 2000, became one of the biggest hit films in Japan and was shown on as many as 280 screens (S. Kim, 2004).

Korean films are now spreading to North American and Europe with more blockbusters (Frater, 2003a; Shim, 2009). In response to the growing demand for Korean film, major US distribution companies such as Fox and Columbia have added Korean films to their global distribution runs (Frater, 2003b; Shim, 2009). Recently, some Hollywood studios have bought the rights to remake Korean films. By the end of 2008, more than 25 Korean films’ remake rights had been sold at prices ranging from $300 000 to $1 million (K. Kim, 2008). In 2009 DreamWorks remade a Korean horror film, A Tale of Two Sisters, after buying the rights at $2 million (Clark, 2009). The total export of Korean feature‐length movies grew by 16.5% to $8.6 million in 2011. The main buyers of Korean films are Asian countries, particularly Japan and China, which together account for 56.9% of sales (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2012).

With the growing presence of the Korean wave in regional and international markets, the export of Korean cultural products has grown fast. Korea’s export of cultural products increased from $2.6 billion in 2009 to $3.2 billion in 2010, with a growth rate of 23.9% (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2012). Total cultural product exports rose to a compounded annual growth rate of 21.9% in the past four years. As shown in Table 13.6, video games (49.8%) and publishing (11.1%) were the first and second largest exports. However, the significant increase in the growth rate was made possible largely by cartoons (42.3%), games (31.1%) and music (90.8%).

Many popular TV dramas are produced by Korea’s independent production companies and content providers. However, in most cases terrestrial broadcasters, such as KBS1, KBS2, MBC, SBS, and EBS, provide the productions with financial support and buy both television programs and the right to redistribute the programs. They account for more than 60% of the overseas sales of TV programs.

As shown in Table 13.7, Korea’s neighbors, such as Japan, China, and the Southeast Asian nations, are the top importers of Korean cultural products. In 2010 sales to these countries accounted for 72.7% of Korea’s total cultural product exports. Japan was still the largest buyer of Korean cultural products, which accounted for 26.2% of the total exports. Games and intellectual properties were the main products that Japanese buyers imported from Korea, which accounted for 54.4% and 17.7%, respectively, of Korea’s total exports to Japan. China was the second largest market of Korean cultural products. China held 24.5% of the total exports of Korean cultural products. In particular, China was the main target market for Korean games, accounting for one‐third of that industry’s sales. Southeast Asia imported 36.1% of games, 22.3% of books, and 25.0% of intellectual properties from Korea. North America and Europe mainly imported games, sales of “tie‐ins,” and publishing products from Korea.

For the audiovisual product categories such as film, animation, music, and television programs, as shown in Figure 13.7, the major importers were Japan (43%), Southeast Asia (20%) and North America (18%). Together with the East and South Asian countries, Asia as a whole imported 71% of Korea’s cultural products exported, which means that Asia is the main target market of Korean audiovisual products. It implies that Korean audiovisual products are mainly consumed among the consumers who are in the cultural and geographical proximity of Korea.

The number of exported Korea films has steadily increased, reflecting the success of the Korean wave in the international film market. This is a particularly interesting trend, given the dominance of Hollywood films and the overlooked Korean films in the international film market until a few years ago. Sales of the remake rights of Korean films has increased since 2001 when Miramax bought the remake right of a Korean comedy film, My Wife is a Gangster. A list of films recently remade or in the process of being remade includes Il Mare, My Sassy Girl, My Wife is a Gangster, A Tale of Two Sisters, Seven Days, and Ryung. The most prominent one in this list is the Korean horror film A Tale of Two Sisters. DreamWorks purchased the rights at $2 million. The deal topped $1 million paid for the right to remake the Japanese film The Ring, which was the most successful and profitable remake in the US market (S. Lee, Kim, & Sung, 2009). The list of Korean films being purchased by Hollywood certainly marks a new trend.

The Korean wave is a product of newly liberalized media market. According to S. W. Lee and Waterman (2006), countries that have relatively high domestic consumer spending on a given media product tend to have relatively high exports of that product to other nations. In addition, the deregulation of the film and television markets has expanded the growth of domestic markets and contributed to the exportability of Korean cultural products.

As a result of media deregulation and liberalization in the late 1990s, Korea has seen the rapid growth of its cultural industries. For example, as shown in Table 13.8, the domestic film market has been expanding continuously since the late 1990s, earning $1.15 billion in 2010. Between 2004 and 2010, the compound annual growth rate of box office revenues was 5.2%. With the release of popular domestic films in the early 2000s, South Korea has become the second largest film market in the region (PwC, 2006). With the increase in the number of movie‐goers, there has been an increase in the production of domestic films. The market share of domestic films reached a record high in 2006 of 63.8% of the total market share. These changes have contributed to a dramatic transformation of the Korean film market from a rigid, strictly regulated one to a dynamic one.

Some scholars believe that the Korean wave is partly a result of the government’s proactive role in invigorating its cultural industry. The Korean government played an important role in guiding and facilitating the development of cultural industry (Zhu & Berry, 2009). One of the former Korean presidents called himself the “President of Culture,” and in 1999 established the Base Law for the Cultural Industry Promotion by allocating $148.5 million to promote cultural production (Zhu & Berry, 2009). In this favorable environment, a number of international film festivals have been held in Korea, like the Seoul International Film Festival and the Pusan International Film Festival. These activities were designed to attract foreign buyers of Korean films. During the administration of the above‐mentioned president, the budget for the cultural sector increased to around $1.3 billion, mainly for promoting the film industry, which accounted for 1.15% of the total government budget in 2002 (Shim, 2009). Recently, the government introduced various programs to support local films. In early 2006 the Ministry of Culture and Tourism introduced a $400 million film development fund to support local films and to provide tax relief for investment in the film industry (PwC, 2006). Additionally, the Korean Film Council (KOFIC), with the backing of the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, strongly supports the production and export of Korean films. Since 2007, KOFIC has managed $430 million in the Film Development Fund to support the Korean film industry. The fund is mainly financed from government funds and is partly supported by ticket sales.

In addition to both direct and indirect financial support from the government, the more lenient censorship and media liberalization have also contributed to the growth of Korean popular culture. Several scholars claim that the Korean wave is indebted to media liberalization in Asia from the late 1990s (Dator & Seo, 2004; Shim, 2009). They indicate that deregulation and democratization in Korea in the late 1990s have played a significant role in improving the quality of Korean popular culture. As Dator and Seo (2004) note, full freedom of expression is now guaranteed, and previously taboo subjects, such as ideological struggles, have been allowed without fear of censorship. The more lenient censorship policy in Korean films has allowed the new generation to deal with such sensitive subjects as political issues and homosexuality. For example, Shiri, a Korean blockbuster dealing with North–South relations, was released in 1999, and attracted 6.5 million moviegoers. Two years later, another blockbuster entitled Joint Security Area beat the box office record, and was seen by 2.5 million in Seoul alone. Similarly, a gangland saga, Friend, broke the box office record, attracting more than 8.2 million attendances nationwide (Dator and Seo, 2004).

Many researchers have viewed the Korean wave as a result of revitalized interest in Asian values among Asian people who share a similar process of modernization (Chan, 2009; Chua, 2006; Iwabuchi, 2008; H. M. Kim, 2005; Shim, 2009). Cultural proximity refers to an audience’s tendency to have a strong preference for film content originating from their own or a similar cultural background, which includes language and the nationality of actors (S. Lee, Kim, & Sung, 2009). Therefore, some scholars view the success of Korean products as being due to the blend of good looks and the lack of profanity and sex, in line with a Confucian tradition, which would also appeal to other East and Southeast Asian countries. With the benefit of cultural proximity, Korean dramas and films are outperforming their upscale Hollywood or Japanese ones in other Asian countries. Korean dramas and films tend to emphasize Confucian values, such as family orientation, respect for the elderly, and a preference for sons, which is only too familiar to Chinese, Vietnamese, and Japanese audiences.

As H. M. Kim (2005) explains, the values reflected in Korean dramas and films are very familiar to audiences in other Asian countries. This is especially true in the four most popular Korean dramas in Asian countries: Fireworks, All about Eve, Autumn in My Heart, and Winter Sonata. Popular Korean programs commonly focus on the five values of harmony, tension, compromise, participation, and agreement, which are most appealing to Asian people who have a similar culture frame (M. Kim, 2004). Therefore, cultural proximity is a very important factor in explaining the surge of Korean cultural products, particularly in East Asia (K. Yin & Liew, 2005). For example, Singaporean audiences have reinforced local identities in addition to the apparent familiarities of Koreans. Shim (2009) emphasizes how Korean pop culture skillfully blends Asian and Western values to create its own mix.

In fact, Korean popular culture is a mix of the earlier established Japanese, Chinese, and Western pop cultures. While some scholars support the sense of regionalism or cosmopolitanism the Korean wave is creating (Dator & Seo, 2004; Shim, 2009), others feel that it is just another foreign culture clearly differentiated from the local culture (K. Yin & Liew, 2005). For example, some scholars criticize Korean cultural products for being based on modern Western ideas, for example, Hollywood‐style blockbusters or American‐style pop music. The development of the Korean media industries and their advance into regional markets are clearly a sign of the resilience of the subaltern – and of the “contamination of the imperial,” considering the context of decades‐long American domination of global cultural industries (Shim, 2009).

Also, due to the huge fandom for Korean culture, Korean celebrities have a big impact on consumer culture. It is easy to find Asian youth dressing up in the style of Korean celebrities in Vietnam or Taiwan (Shim, 2009). Given their infatuation with Korean culture, regional fans are eager to imitate Koreans, and this phenomenon has provoked a backlash (Maliangkay, 2006). The huge popularity of Korean cultural products raises concerns about cultural sovereignty. As Korean cultural products have spreading across various Asian countries, some have called for a ban on their import. From the perspective of cultural imperialism, they define the Korean wave as a cultural invasion and urge their governments to protect their domestic cultural industries from it. Several governments have indeed introduced protection programs. Among them, China’s State Administration of Radio, Film and Television decided to cut its imports of Korean drama by half in 2006. Also in 2006 the Taiwanese government imposed a ban on the scheduling of foreign programs in prime‐time slots and cut almost 80% of imports from Korea. In Japan, many blogs began to express antipathy to the Korean wave’s cultural imperialism and are urging people to fight the invasion (Maliangkay, 2006). But some scholars feel that, while Korean pop culture may erode the audience’s local identity, the argument against cultural imperialism often overlooks the fact that Korean cultural products are contributing to an increase in the diversity of the Asian cultural industries and are protecting it from the invasion of Western cultural imperialism.

At any rate, the Korean wave is now expanding beyond cultural products to drive a substantial increase in the sales of other Korean product categories from cars to tourism to electronics (Yoon et al., 2008). As Chua (2006) states, the fan base for Korean dramas has gone beyond the television screen, spawning behavioral changes in consumers. S. Lee (2003) sees Korean dramas as stimulating tourism, raising the number of tourists from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand who come to Korea visit the sites where the dramas were shot. Led by the upsurge of popular cultures in Asia, Korea’s media have evolved into some of the most dynamic markets, producing a wide range of cultural products from recorded music to film to computer games.

Media globalization in Asia is an ongoing process. However, there are several things to note. First, not only is Asia a vast region, with the world’s largest population, but the countries in Asia also have different political, economic, and media systems, and very different cultural heritages. As a result, the pace, scale, scope, and focus of media globalization in Asian countries varies from one to another. Therefore, the above discussion of individual countries cannot necessarily be generalized to the whole of Asia. Second, the motivations in different countries for pushing media globalization also vary widely, ranging from the political and economic, to the cultural and ideological. Thus, more in‐depth studies are needed to fully investigate the overt or covert rationale for media globalization. Third, like many other new trends, media globalization is also a double‐edged sword. In different social settings and at different times, media globalization may have either positive or negative current or potential consequences or both kinds of consequences together.

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