Introduction
Amidst calls by the scientific community for help from social scientists (Nature Climate Change, 2014, 2015), climate change is increasingly gaining the attention of leadership scholars, who have begun to consider climate change and other environmental problems as leadership challenges that elicit specific forms, approaches, and styles of leadership in response (e.g., Gallagher, 2012; Redekop, 2010; Stober et al., 2013). It is not enough to apply well-worn leadership conceptions to environmental problems, since those conceptions emerged in the service of our current extractive and unsustainable industrial system (see the Introduction and Chapters 1 and 4 in this volume). Rather, we need to critically evaluate and rethink the form and content of leadership in this new and frightening “Eaarth” we are creating (McKibben, 2010).
When it comes to grand challenges like global climate change, such rethinking must not only be theoretical, but also grounded in real-world practices. It must take into account the lived experience and perspectives of activists and leaders working on this issue worldwide. It must also be grounded in the growing body of scholarly research into the relationship between human beings and the natural environment. Given the relative novelty of the concept of “climate change leadership,” we believe that a broad perspective on the recent history of climate change leadership as it has evolved from the 1980s up to the present day is a useful starting point for further thinking and research on this topic.
Our analysis begins with an overview of the first-generation climate leadership of Al Gore, James Hansen, and Bill McKibben, who can be broadly characterized as propounding a “tragic” and “catastrophizing”1 discourse. It then moves to analysis of in-depth interviews with 14 second-generation climate leaders from the United States, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Hungary, South Africa, Taiwan, and Australia, contextualized by recent academic research on this topic. We suggest that this second generation of climate leaders offers a more “comic” discourse that acknowledges the tragic consequences of inaction but tends to avoid catastrophizing rhetoric, appealing to a sense of hope and possibility despite limited progress on this issue. This part of the chapter is organized into topic areas that reflect the questions we asked our interviewees as well as emergent themes and existing research on this topic.
As we will show, despite significant variations in approach and emphasis, our interviewees generally lend credence to Simon Western’s conception of an emerging Eco-leadership discourse (or paradigm) that eschews traditional forms of hierarchical, positional leadership in favor of approaches more congruent with the healthy functioning of biological systems, aimed at fostering the emergence of leadership at the margins and throughout the organization or social entity (i.e., “grassroots”) rather than simply emanating from the center, and the flourishing of the social-environmental system as a whole rather than narrow economic or political interests (Western, 2008/2013; 2010; see also Wielkiewicz & Stelzner, 2010).
We do not mean to suggest that the eco-leadership paradigm is a totalizing discourse as much as a way to understand and interpret emerging approaches to climate change leadership. As Western (2010) suggests, previous leadership discourses are still with us, overlapping with eco-leadership rather than being entirely displaced by it. Our suggestion in this chapter is that over time, a perceptible shift can be seen taking place, away from more traditional approaches and understandings of leadership, toward an eco-leadership approach; and this shift has been characterized by a trend away from more tragic to more comic discourses of climate change.
First Generation Climate Leaders: Tragic and Catastrophic Discourse
This distinction draws on Foust and Murphy’s (2009) suggestion that there are two variants of apocalyptic discourse about climate change in the US elite and popular press: tragic and comic. The tragic version points to a fallen social order and unstoppable catastrophic ending that limits human agency. In its extreme form, it is a polarizing discourse that invites skepticism and also exempts human beings from responsibility to take action on the issue. The comic discourse, on the other hand, “promotes humanity as mistaken, rather than evil. As such, comic discourse allows some space for bringing ideologically disparate communities together … Time is open-ended, with human intervention possible. Humanity is less likely to be resigned to its fate, and, as such, may be inspired to take steps to change” (pp. 162–163).
While we do not wish to suggest that first-generation climate leaders like Gore, Hansen, and McKibben present entirely negative and pessimistic perspectives, and that second-generation leaders are naively hopeful and optimistic, we believe that the distinction we are making helps to shed light on the general differences in form between first- and second-generation climate change leadership.2 It is also important to note that McKibben, born in 1960 and leader of 350.org, a global, grassroots leader on climate change, should be counted a member of both first- and second-generation cohorts of climate leaders. Nevertheless, the tragic discourse seems more descriptive of the approach of McKibben and other first-generation leaders who felt – and continue to feel – compelled to communicate the awful truth that they have uncovered (e.g., McKibben 1989/2006; McKibben 2010), while the comic approach better characterizes second-generation leaders who have absorbed the tragic message but feel compelled to move beyond it. It is our contention that a conscious synthesis of both approaches may offer a way forward for leaders who seek to find creative avenues for leadership on this issue.
Al Gore
Al Gore (b. 1948) has been at the forefront of the climate change issue from the late 1980s, when he chaired Senate hearings on global warming. He deserves credit for recognizing the importance of this and other environmental issues and bringing them to mainstream attention. Gore has been at least partly responsible both for raising the climate change issue to public awareness, and inadvertently for the politicization and fracturing of the issue along party lines in the United States. As such he presents an example of both the strengths and pitfalls of political leadership on this issue.
Gore long ago recognized the entrenched nature of fossil fuels in American life and politics and has called repeatedly for leadership on global warming. His language has been highly apocalyptic from early on. In Earth in the Balance (1992/2006), he speaks in terms of an ecological crisis that is a threat to civilization, with the fight for environmental sustainability similar to the fight against Nazism and failure to do so as a form of appeasement, and of the need for a “global Marshall Plan” to save the environment. He critiques Western capitalist culture as materialistic and our ecological crisis as the result of a spiritual malaise. More recently, he has been speaking in terms of “ecological crisis” and “global planetary emergency” (Barringer & Revkin, 2007).
At the same time, Gore has always sought to work within existing political and economic structures, so much so that he has become wealthy from his investments in media and alternative energy: in 2013, he was reported to be worth around $200 million (Condon, 2013). He has long proposed international agreements that establish rules of acceptable environmental behavior. He helped to negotiate the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol and has continued to be a player in international efforts to secure binding agreements on climate change. Gore is a founder of the Alliance for Climate Protection, The Climate Reality Project, Generation Investment Management, and Current TV; he has also served as a member of the Board of Directors of Apple, a senior advisor to Google, and a partner at the venture capital firm Kleiner, Perkins, Caulfield, and Byers.
Gore has in many respects played the role of both “prophet” and “explainer” of climate change (Traub, 2007). He has always been very well-informed and knowledgeable about the science of climate change, and tireless in warning anyone who will listen about the dangers of inaction. His slide show, film, and book about global warming have done much to publicize the issue and bring it to worldwide attention. Because of this work, he shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Despite his impressive résumé, we would suggest that Gore’s efforts have brought mixed results. Without his stature as Democratic Senator, Vice President, and US presidential candidate, he would not have been able to bring as much attention to the issue; but at the same time, it seems clear that it helped to cement Republican opposition, supported by the fossil fuel industry, to taking action on climate change over the past few decades. The extreme polarization of American politics has meant in this case that “if he’s for it, I’m against it,” aided and abetted by fear among Republicans that regulations aimed at mitigating climate change will expand the scope and reach of the US government. Thanks to Gore’s status as a grandee of the Democratic party, it has become all too easy to identify action on climate change with the Democratic party and supposed Democratic proclivities for “big government.” Gore’s recent sale of Current TV to Al-Jazeera (owned by the petro-state Qatar) has given further ammunition to his enemies and those who wish to stall action on climate change, and has seriously undermined his effectiveness as a public leader on this issue. He appears to have broken one of the fundamental rules of effective leadership: don’t be a hypocrite. This is a truth of common sense and common experience, but also social science research (see for example Martin et al., 2013; Moorman et al., 2013; Palanski & Yammarino, 2007. For an example of critique of Gore along these lines, see Rapier, 2013).
Gore’s putative hypocrisy and growing wealth also undermine one of his previous advantages as a climate leader. As communication scholar Denise Stodola (2010) has astutely pointed out, Gore’s loss in the 2000 presidential election and subsequent reinvention as a global climate change leader helped to humanize him and foster audience identification with him and a similarly beleaguered natural world. It has, however, become increasingly difficult to view him as an “underdog.” His separation from his popular wife Tipper also has not helped him maintain public affection. All of these issues do not negate the grim reality of climate change and the need to address it, but they have seriously damaged Gore’s ability to lead on this issue, and arguably have caused some damage to the cause. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the scope and impact of Gore’s leadership on this issue over many decades.
James Hansen
Dr. James Hansen (b. 1941) is one of the preeminent climate scientists of his generation, and was one of the first and most vocal figures in bringing the science of climate change to public attention. He has been at the forefront of climate change research since the 1980s, and his Congressional testimony in 1989 (at Gore’s behest) launched the modern climate change movement. Honored by Time magazine in 2006 as one of the world’s 100 most influential people, Hansen served as Director of NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies from 1981 until his retirement in 2013. Since then, he has continued to work tirelessly as a scientist, activist, and leader on this issue. He has become a fixture at major climate protests and has been arrested or cited a half dozen times as a result of nonviolent civil disobedience.
Some scientific colleagues have questioned his activism, saying it gives climate skeptics ammunition to say he is not being “objective” (Gillis, 2013). Hansen for his part has called repeatedly for strong political leadership on this issue (e.g., Hansen, 2006), and feels that political inaction means that scientists themselves need to start taking a leadership role. Although he would be the first to say that he is not a “born leader” – portraying himself as by nature a shy, nerdy scientist – he has most certainly become one, by most any standard of leadership, and is seen so by others (e.g., Abraham, 2013).
As Hansen makes clear in his book on climate change, Storms of my Grandchildren (2009), his emergence as a leader on climate change occurred only by necessity and not without a great deal of reluctance and anguish on his part. The book, part popular science and part memoir, can be read as a bildungsroman that chronicles Hansen’s transition from innocent, shy scientist to public activist and leader, based on what he has learned about climate change. Despite his innate shyness, Hansen has not been reticent in clearly and forcefully communicating the realities and dangers of anthropogenic climate change: it is simply “the greatest threat civilization faces” (2009, p. 70); “We really do have a planet in peril” (p. 72); as such, “this is our last chance” (p. xii). Although “rational, feasible actions could divert dangerous consequences, anthropogenic forcing has created a ticking time bomb” (p. 74, 78). “If the world does not make a dramatic shift in energy policies over the next few years, we may well pass the point of no return” (p. 171).
Hansen presents himself as a “witness” rather than a “preacher”: someone who has knowledge that is so terrifying he cannot remain silent (Hansen, 2009; Hansen, 2012). The birth of his grandchildren had much to do with his transition from bench scientist to vocal public activist and leader, and they are featured in photos throughout Storms of my Grandchildren. As a top NASA administrator during the Bush administration, Hansen faced tremendous pressure and even at times censoring. He proved himself to be indefatigable and fearless in stating the science above political interference by the White House (Bowen, 2007; Hansen, 2009). He started writing letters to public leaders in 2007 and since then has been deeply involved in policy discussions, with a moratorium on the building of new coal plants a major goal. Hansen has also recently been working on making a case for nuclear power as an alternative to the burning of fossil fuels (Kharecha & Hansen, 2013).
Hansen has begun studying Gandhi’s concepts of civil disobedience, arguing that “We cannot give up” even if the democratic process fails us (2009, p. 246), and that “Civil resistance may be our best hope” (p. 277). He was arrested for the first time at Coal River Mountain, West Virginia, in 2009, and was subsequently arrested in civil protests in 2010, 2011, and 2013. Bill McKibben calls Hansen the “patron saint” of 350.org, and Hansen has served as a model to other climate scientists about “how to navigate a world where speaking truth about climate change guarantees vitriolic attack” (Abraham, 2013).
Although he has repeatedly offered solutions to the problem of climate change, including for example the idea of a revenue-neutral “carbon fee” on fossil fuels, Hansen’s main discursive trope has been tragic: humanity is on a collision course with the laws of physics and seems unable to act in a rational manner in response, despite the best efforts of scientists to get the word out. It is his task to share the terrible truth that he and others have uncovered, before it is too late. As in Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), there is a stealthy, spectral enemy in our midst, and it is us.
Bill McKibben
If James Hansen is the reluctant scientist/leader, Bill McKibben is the activist/leader intent on spreading Hansen’s message that 350 ppm of CO2 is the only “safe” level for the perpetuation of human civilization in its current form. McKibben has mobilized young and old worldwide, using the internet to carry out “distributed political action” that seeks to combat climate change (McKibben, 2010, p. 210). McKibben is a journalist and author who wrote the first book on climate change for a popular audience (The End of Nature, 1989), and is currently Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College when not on the road campaigning for 350.org.
His recent book, Eaarth (2010), is a tough, unflinching look at global warming as it is already happening, while seeking to chart a way forward in sustainable living that leaves a lighter footprint on this new, transformed planet Eaarth. “Imagine we live on a planet. Not our cozy, taken-for-granted earth, but a planet, a real one, with melting poles and dying forests and a heaving, corrosive sea, raked by winds, strafed by storms, scorched by heat. An inhospitable place” (2010, p. 1). McKibben charts, in painful detail, all that is already happening on earth due to climate change, arguing that this was not an issue for our grandchildren, but for our parents. And he does so as a master of darkly humorous doomsaying: “We’re not … going to get back the planet we used to have, the one on which our civilization developed. … We’re like the guy who smoked for forty years and then he had a stroke. He doesn’t smoke anymore, but the left side of his body doesn’t work either” (2010, p. 16). McKibben laments the loss of “Earth” as we knew it, replaced by an “Eaarth” that we are only just beginning to understand. “We have traveled to a new planet, propelled on a burst of carbon dioxide. That new planet, as is often the case in science fiction, looks more or less like our own but clearly isn’t. I know that I’m repeating myself. I’m repeating myself on purpose. This is the biggest thing that’s ever happened” (2010, pp. 45–46).
McKibben goes beyond doomsaying in the book, however, to talk in practical terms about what in his view needs to change, including the fixation on economic growth; even the idea of “green growth,” promoted by Al Gore, is criticized as wrongheaded, given the scope of the challenges faced by Eaarth (2010, pp. 49–52). Instead of growth, McKibben talks about “backing off”: “So here are my candidates for words that may help us think usefully about the future. Durable, Sturdy, Stable, Hardy, Robust. These are squat, solid, stout words. They conjure a world where we no longer grow by leaps and bounds, but where we hunker down, where we dig in.” They are words that imply maturity, and steadiness; “think husband, not boyfriend” (2010, pp. 102–103).
McKibben thus goes firmly against the grain of American optimism and youth culture. Yet he has been able to inspire grassroots action by all ages – including young people – via 350.org with a distributed international staff of (at last count) 56 people, most under the age of 35, many in their 20s. The approach has been to use the internet to organize local events and share them, rather than all gathering together into one place, which makes little sense given the resulting CO2 emissions. This approach thus features a distributed leadership model, fostering leadership at the local level via organizing events to coincide with the global events that 350.org organizes. This is but one example of the ways in which conscious attention to the natural environment impacts leadership styles and approaches. The organization has been heavily involved in protesting completion of the Keystone XL pipeline via a variety of demonstrations and marches that have included civil disobedience and arrests. It has also been a leader in the fossil fuel divestment campaign, which is beginning to gain traction in various institutions, including universities.
Contemporary Climate Change Leaders: From Tragic to Comic Discourse
In order to move beyond the focus on paramount leaders like Gore, Hansen, and McKibben, and to gain a wider perspective, we conducted in-depth interviews with 14 second-generation environmental leaders from the United States, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Hungary, South Africa, Taiwan, and Australia, who are leading, in one way or another, on climate change. They ranged in age, at the time of the interviews, from their early 20s to mid-50s, with ten in their 20s and 30s, and four in their 40s and 50s. Their names and occupations/affiliations are listed at the end of this chapter. Our goal was to conduct in-depth conversations with second-generation climate leaders from around the world; we acknowledge that our sample is neither particularly large nor representative of all those who are leading on this issue. It was limited by a number of factors, including the difficulty of finding individuals willing to engage in a one-hour recorded interview. Nevertheless, we believe that our sample provides useful data on climate change leadership in a variety of settings, and that in-depth interviews provide the necessary nuance and context for such a complex, systemic issue as climate change.
We asked each interviewee the same basic questions and fully transcribed their answers. Responses were analyzed and correlated by question and topic for comparative purposes. What follows are some of the more salient questions we asked, followed by a representative sample of our interviewee’s responses. Our goal in this section is to provide a sketch of some of the primary themes and issues that are emerging on the ground by a variety of climate leaders, put them into context – including the relevant academic research that has been done on this topic – and compare them to the themes and topics of first-generation climate leaders like Gore, Hansen, and McKibben. The first question we asked our interviewees acknowledged the tremendous challenges of climate change:
What do you see as the biggest obstacle for leaders when it comes to this issue?
Answers to this question were diverse and included: breaking through social-media dilettantism to get people actively engaged in their communities; lack of political will on the part of those in power; the difficulty of translating grassroots efforts into national-level policy, and vice versa; untangling the science from the politics; dealing with government harassment of NGOs; finding good role models people can relate to; discovering an appropriate leadership development model; the power of the fossil fuel industry; how to connect local impacts to the larger global phenomenon of climate change; overcoming fears that action on climate change will harm the economy; and overcoming apathy and the feeling of being overwhelmed by this issue. One interviewee said that his answer to this question “changes on a daily basis.”
Most of our respondents did not say that lack of information was a major challenge; and indeed, most researchers are in agreement that simply communicating scientific data about climate change is not enough to motivate relevant behavior change (e.g., Chess & Johnson, 2007; Dunwoody, 2007; Kahan et al., 2012; Lakoff, 2010; Moser & Dilling, 2007; Nisbet, 2009; Whitmarsh et al., 2011). On the other hand, a number of our interviewees mentioned the utility of bringing attention to the local impacts of climate change, and one individual noted that bringing clear, objective, and actionable information to politicians is one of the best ways to influence them toward action on this issue.
Critics of the straightforward scientific approach to shaping public policy argue that if scientific data becomes the ultimate arbiter of action on global warming, then there will always be those who will deny or bend the science to suit their own interests, ideology, and partisan political affiliation, which can easily trump scientific data when it comes to beliefs about climate change (see for example the studies by Kahan et al., 2012, and Wolsko et al., 2016). Rather, the thinking goes, we need to focus on pragmatic arguments like energy security and efficiency, economic development, and national health policy, rather than science, to move forward on this issue. It might even be best not to mention “climate change” or “climate science” at all (Hampel, 2015; Nature Climate Change, 2017).
This viewpoint was reflected in the responses of many of our interviewees. For example, some indicated that instead of engaging climate change deniers directly on the science, they shift the ground to talk about known health benefits of lower fossil fuel emissions. Others suggested that they focus on local impacts or contributors to climate change that are not in doubt – e.g., air pollution from power plants. The point is to frame the problem in terms of shared environmental values and effects that are obvious and local. Yet even here there is a slippery slope, since scientific data plays a key role in deciding the nature of public health problems like the effect of coal plant emissions on respiratory problems, just as it does in providing guidance on climate change. This leads us to the next question we asked our climate change leaders:
What is your main approach to influencing others to act on climate change?
We also received a wide variety of responses to this question. Our interviewee from the Philippines focused on “naming culprits and calling for justice,” and seeks to “get people enraged.” One of the climate leaders from Mexico stated that “it depends on whom I am talking to.” She uses simple language and provides basic information about climate change impacts and responses to local communities. A unique challenge in Mexico is to overcome fear of government corruption when dealing with local land use programs that are aimed at mitigating climate change. As indicated above, most interviewees stressed the need to connect global climate change to local impacts; this was one of the most commonly cited influence strategies, and is a finding strongly supported by empirical research (e.g., Dunwoody, 2007, pp. 93–95; Leiserowitz, 2007; Moser, 2007, p. 70; PRRI/AAR, 2014; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2011, p. 5). It seems clear that those who want to lead on climate change should familiarize themselves with data on local impacts and share it with others as a first step toward mobilizing support and action.
Younger-generation leaders focused on the need to stay positive (more on that in a moment); sincerity, authenticity, and personal connections were important to a number of our interviewees. Our Australian interviewee stated that it is very important to understand peoples’ motivations and concerns, and to work with visceral and emotional responses, navigate them, and find “connection points” with people. He appeals to Australians’ national pride and pride of place, their entrepreneurial spirit, and he works to create a space for dialogue rather than reinforcing a single point of view. This focus on dialogue and engagement at the grassroots level – rather than top-down information campaigns – is gaining increasing traction in the scholarly literature (e.g., Brulle, 2010; Regan, 2007; Whitmarsh et al., 2011) and will be discussed further below.
One interviewee spoke of trying to induce behavior change with small steps that can lead to changes in habits. Research shows that habits are powerful predictors of behavior and can override intentions and make us resistant to new information (see for example Verplanken, 2011). As such, it is useful to understand how habitual behaviors can be changed. Life-course changes can bring about changes in habits, for example; and some even argue that forced behavior change – for example via legislation – aided by cognitive and emotional reinforcement can lead to positive changes in habits (Verplanken, 2011, pp. 26–28). This latter viewpoint conflicts, at least on the surface, with the finding that intrinsic motivation tends to be superior to extrinsic motivation when it comes to spreading pro-environmental behaviors (Redekop, 2010a), pointing to a question for further research: what are the situational variables that predict the superiority of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation when it comes to behavior changes relevant to climate change? One important contextual variable to consider is that of age, leading us to our next question:
Do you use different influence strategies according to age? Are there generational differences in awareness on this issue?
Most interviewees acknowledged that younger people – those still in school – are generally more aware and accepting of the science of climate change. Predictably, younger people are more easily activated on this issue, and more ready to challenge the status quo. A Taiwanese interviewee called it a “sassy issue” for young people. Our South African climate leader felt that those 55 and older were tired out from the fight against apartheid, and were looking to younger generations for leadership on climate change. One of our Mexican respondents feels that older generations did not grow up with the idea that global phenomena like climate change can affect their lives, in the way that younger generations have. However, although our Canadian interviewee felt that school-age children were more aware of the issue, she did not see much of a correlation between age and level of engagement. The climate leader from the Philippines felt that the older generation is more interested in achieving middle-class status and comforts than protecting the environment.
A 2010 national (US) survey that looked at generational differences in attitudes and beliefs about climate change reinforces the idea that while younger people – e.g., 18–34-year-olds – are in some ways more informed about the issue, there is “no predictable portrait of young people when it comes to global warming. While less concerned about and preoccupied with global warming than older generations, they are slightly more likely to believe that global warming is caused by human factors and that there is scientific consensus that it is occurring” (Feldman et al., 2010, p. 2). Statistics show that climate change, as an issue, becomes more concerning to people as they grow older. However, twice as many people aged 18–22 think global warming is “personally important” than 23–34-year-olds. The younger cohort is also more open to changing their mind about climate change than the somewhat older cohort.
In general, interview and survey data indicate that while there are some differences between age cohorts when it comes to beliefs and understandings about climate change, “generational differences on this question are modest” (PRRI/AAR, 2014). The main conclusion that we feel can be drawn is that younger people are the age cohort most open to education and influence on this issue, and developing a variety of ways to reach and engage younger people is of great importance.
The jury is still out on whether “new media” is a catalyst for change or a way to feel like one is engaged without really doing anything. New media certainly provides connections, but it does not replace the old-fashioned need to organize and inspire people on the ground and away from their computers (O’Neill & Boykoff, 2011). This was a common challenge highlighted by some interviewees – how to leverage social media to get people to actually do things in the ‘real’ world. One tempting approach is to heighten fears about the impacts of unchecked climate change. We asked our interviewees:
To what degree is it useful to frighten people about the future, as opposed to projecting optimism about being able to meet its challenges?
If there was one topic that seems to divide the generations, it is this one. If first-generation climate leaders like Al Gore, James Hansen, and Bill McKibben have often used catastrophizing rhetoric to bring the issue of climate change to public attention, younger-generation leaders are strongly averse to “doom and gloom” and the use of fear tactics. Our youngest interviewees – those in their 20s – were the most adamant that fear tactics were counterproductive and to be avoided at all costs. One interviewee stated that “it makes me cringe” to even think about frightening people; she and others felt that people need a “yes” to move forward. All but two of our interviewees were under 50 years old, and ten were under 40. Nearly all were opposed to fear tactics: information and understanding – yes; doom and gloom, no. The consensus is that fear is disempowering and “switches people off” – if overwhelmed, people will feel detached and helpless. They need a sense of hope and optimism and clear pathways toward making a difference on this issue, tied to local concerns and interests. One of the climate leaders from Mexico (aged 32) stated that although she does talk about “the bad perspectives on the future” when seeking to motivate people to act, “I always have to be very positive … I’m always quite optimistic when I approach actors to highlight the roles [they] can play” in making a difference on climate change. One respondent spoke about the need to “enrage” people rather than frighten them. Although this was not a common response, it still reinforces the idea that people need to feel empowered rather than frightened.
There is in fact a growing body of research that supports the idea that “fear won’t do it” when it comes to motivating people to act on climate change. Empirical studies show that “although [fear-inducing] representations have potential for attracting people’s attention to climate change, fear is generally an ineffective tool for motivating genuine personal engagement. Nonthreatening imagery and icons that link to individuals’ everyday emotions and concerns in the context of this macro-environmental issue tend to be the most engaging” (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009, p. 355; see also DeLuca, 2009, p. 268; Moser, 2007). If this is the case, one might ask, how can we move beyond, and not simply between, the poles of debilitating catastrophism and blind optimism in attempting to influence others on this issue?
Narrative Approaches
This leads us to the topic of narrative approaches to climate change. This topic was not covered by our initial interview questions, but it emerged as a salient subject through our interviewees’ responses as well as a survey of the literature on climate change communication. The Australian climate leader we interviewed indicates that he is “quite big” on narrative approaches. As part of his focus on “connecting” with people on a personal basis, he feels that public narrative bridges the emotional gap between people and that stories help to address emotional responses to the issue of climate change. He feels that you have to “give away” part of yourself, or find something in yourself that might be endearing to others. The ReCharge program, with which two of our interviewees are affiliated, includes storytelling as one of its four leader-development quadrants. One climate leader we interviewed uses Jonah Sacks’ book Story Wars as a guide. He employs what he calls “narrative campaigning” that connects climate change to problems experienced by the most vulnerable, inserting messages that enrage and highlight injustice, and framing the audience as partaking in a “hero’s journey” as described by Joseph Campbell.
One of our respondents quite naturally brought up the topic of narrative and storytelling in response to our question about fear tactics, saying: “There used to be so many [negative] stories that were so far away from me. … Now I hear more and more sad stories that [have occurred] closer to me. … So, I’m always trying to use these stories [to tell people] that climate change is not only happening at the North Pole with the polar bears, it actually is showing itself close to me or my family or around the world. It’s a way to make it closer.” Thus, although not all of our interviewees mentioned narrative and storytelling as a communication tool, a number of our respondents use very well-developed narrative approaches, and spoke about them in the course of answering other questions.
According to Nature Climate Change (2014a), “The stories we construct to contextualize climate change and formulate policy responses are not only important for their role in shaping our goals and objectives, but also have the capacity to inspire or demotivate.” The editors argue that “Climate change is – perhaps because of its cross-cutting nature – particularly open to being interpreted within a multitude of different overarching frames, or narratives. Consequently, disagreements about facts and figures seem to be, at bottom, due to disagreements about the fundamental story into which these details fit, rather than facets of the details themselves” (n.p.). The communication theorist George Lakoff (2010) suggests that when it comes to complex issues like global warming, frames matter. “What is needed is a constant effort to build up the background frames needed to understand the crisis, while building up neural circuitry to inhibit the wrong frames.” Leaders thus need to “provide a structured understanding of what [they] are saying. Don’t give laundry lists. Tell stories that exemplify your values and rouse emotions … find general themes or narratives that incorporate the points you need to make” (p. 74; pp. 79–80).
Nisbet (2009) provides a typology of eight narrative frames applicable to climate change: social progress; economic development/competitiveness; morality/ethics; scientific & technical uncertainty; Pandora’s box; public accountability/governance; middle way; conflict and strategy. These frames can provide arguments both for and against taking action on climate change, and as such are “deductive mental boxes and interpretive storylines that can be used to bring diverse audiences together on common ground, shape personal behavior, or mobilize collective action” (p. 22). Nisbet notes that “One way to reach audiences is to recruit influential peers to pass on selectively framed information about climate change that resonates with the background of the targeted audience and that addresses their personal information needs” (p. 22). This latter point was raised by two of our interviewees. In both contexts (Hungary and Canada), they are involved in recruiting speakers on climate change for various audiences. Their task, as they see it, is to align speaker background and experience with appropriate audiences, thereby enhancing the credibility of the message or story about climate change that audiences will hear.
The storytelling theme resonates throughout the literature and research on pro-environmental influence strategies. For example, Hamilton (2011) describes “Open Homes” events in England designed to share eco-renovation projects with the public: “The greatest strength of the Open Homes events seems to be the power of real-life experience and the telling of a ‘story’ by an ordinary citizen about their own home, combined with the visitor’s experience of being in, seeing and touching their home” (p. 175). In a study of the leadership shown by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in climate change negotiations, the authors conclude that SIDS were most powerful and influential when telling a story about the existential threat of climate change to their communities and way of life (Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 293). In a quite different context, researchers suggest that when it comes to using social comparisons to promote public engagement with climate change, the evidence suggests two basic strategies will be most effective: either compare the ingroup’s environmental behavior to underperforming or non-normative outgroups, or “inform the target group about its deteriorating performance in comparison with its past results” (Rabinovitch et al., 2011, p. 80). In other words, tell a story about how the in-group has fallen away from its own better self as it existed in the past.
Conclusion: Eco-Leadership at the Grassroots
Finally, a question that we asked our interviewees had to do with their views on the best or most appropriate forms of leadership to make progress on climate change. It was posed both as a specific question and as a thematic element of the interview as a whole:
What kind of leadership is needed to move forward on this issue?
Among the climate leaders we interviewed, the most common theme was the need for bottoms-up, grassroots approaches. None spoke of the need for powerful, charismatic, “transforming” leaders, although a few working at higher government levels cited the need for political will and the importance of leadership at the highest levels to get things done; but they too cited the importance of grassroots leadership coming from the bottom up as a key element in the process: “There are a lot of politicians who call themselves leaders, but if you analyze what they do, they are actually only giving good speeches.” This climate activist/leader went on to praise local, “frontline” leaders like an individual she knows who is developing community greenhouses. Our climate leader from Taiwan suggested that in the United States, grassroots leadership was more salient, while in China it is the opposite – the Chinese government is like a father who provides leadership on issues that are of concern to his people. Clearly, the more authoritarian the government, the less likely it is that leadership will flourish at the grassroots. Yet, according to this interviewee, the anger of Chinese citizens about environmental issues “is definitely a reason why the government is doing SO much right now, going so fast right now. … Maybe I shouldn’t be positive but I think this is a very good sign, actually like the Chinese people have some voice being heard.”
The general emphasis (with some exceptions) on grassroots, non-hierarchical approaches is no doubt due in part to the nature of our sample: we interviewed younger climate activists/leaders who are themselves for the most part working at the local level. But even those working among established political, social, and economic constituencies (Mexico, Hungary, Canada) emphasized grassroots leadership and/or education of children as key forms of climate leadership. One interviewee, who is himself clearly a leader on this issue, was hesitant to discuss “leadership” in a traditional positional sense, as a useful construct, and stressed the need to engage on a personal level with other individuals, and in general to make the issue of climate change less abstract and more personal. The only individual to mention charismatic leadership suggested that although people expect it, it “suppresses” the leadership of others and was to be avoided.
In general, the responses we received lend credence to Simon Western’s contention of an emerging Eco-leadership discourse that rejects traditional forms of hierarchical, positional leadership in favor of approaches more congruent with the healthy functioning of biological systems: leadership aimed at fostering the emergence of leadership at the margins and throughout the organization or social entity rather than simply emanating from the center, and the flourishing of the social-environmental system as a whole rather than narrow economic or political interests (Western, 2008/2013, 2010; see also Wielkiewicz & Stelzner, 2010). According to Western, “While traditional historical teaching points to the ‘great man’ theory of leadership, it is the marginalized, grassroots social movements that often lead and innovate change, and so it is with eco-leadership, which emerges from environmental social activism” (2010, p. 43). As such, “Eco-leadership shifts the focus from individual leaders to leadership – a radically distributed leadership – in an attempt to harness the energy and creativity in a whole system” (p. 43). It would seem to be no coincidence that leaders working on complex environmental problems like climate change tend to advocate an eco-leadership model. A systemic problem needs systemic forms of leadership to address it, and people who spend their time thinking about environmental problems are naturally more attuned to the workings of complex ecological systems.
Others argue that both “industrial” and “ecological” leadership approaches are needed to address complex environmental problems (Wielkiewicz & Stelzner, 2010), and it is indeed an open question as to whether any one leadership approach or perspective can on its own adequately address issues like climate change (Redekop, 2010b). Whatever the case, the climate leaders we interviewed, most of whom were under 50 at the time of the interview, articulated understandings of leadership that resonate with, and provide evidence of, an emerging eco-leadership paradigm. Their focus on bottom-up, grassroot approaches was also congruent with another related feature of the literature on environmental leadership: the need for public engagement on climate change. As stated by Whitmarsh et al. (2011), “Proponents of public participation in science and policy making argue that involving the public in knowledge production and decision making can lead to better quality and more acceptable decisions, improve relationships, and build trust” (p. 279; See also Regan, 2007).
Public engagement cultivates efficacy. According to Hőppner and Whitmarsh (2011), “Decades of research … have established efficacy as one key foundation of human agency … In the case of climate change as a collective long-term challenge, engagement fostering collective and political efficacy appears to be crucial, as such beliefs influence how much effort people put into actions, the persistence of their efforts even if they fail to produce quick results or meet opposition, and people’s vulnerability to discouragement” (p. 60). There is thus a growing chorus of voices arguing that the public at large needs to be involved and engaged in policy discussions about climate change, if real and lasting change is to occur. Some refer to this as “a discourse of civic environmentalism” that challenges the dominant discourses of “ecological modernization” and “green governmentality” (Lassen et al., 2011; see also Wolf, 2011).
Reliance on mass information campaigns and political leadership at the highest levels has not yet led to substantial mitigation of climate change; the task, it seems, is much deeper and will require leadership at the local, grassroots level, just as it did in earlier campaigns for civil rights and against nuclear war (for an example of the latter, see Redekop, 2010c). As such, our interviewees are for the most part engaged in a long-term task of deep, substantive change that will, it is hoped, bear fruit in years to come. The tragic and catastrophizing discourse of first-generation climate leaders, arguably an important first step, is slowly being superseded by a more open-ended, “comic” discourse that seeks to encourage human agency at a deep and lasting level. Few people want to spend their daily lives as another act in an ongoing tragedy, and few return home after watching the performance of a Greek tragedy with a renewed sense of hope and optimism about the future. Comic narrative, on the other hand, tends to critique the powerful and empower the weak and marginal. As such, there would seem to be a natural affinity between it and Eco-leadership, and it is to be hoped that together they will help build a better world. It would be naïve, however, to assume that there is no longer any need or place for tragic discourse; as one of the oldest narrative forms, it remains compelling and deeply rooted in our “nature,” and would seem to provide a realistic perspective on our current climate predicament. In the end, some form of synthesis between tragic and comic discourses may be the most productive way forward, and we encourage readers to consider just what such a “tragi-comic” discourse might look like.
Interviews
Transcripts of interviews in possession of the lead author. These were semi-structured interviews aimed at qualitative understanding of the main issues and approaches related to leadership on climate change. Responses were correlated thematically and by question using rubrics. The information given below was accurate at the time of the interview. The authors would like to thank these individuals for being part of this project and for their important work on climate change.
Ferrial Adam: Arab World Team Leader, stationed in South Africa for 350.org. Her campaigns focus on energy and climate change. Ferrial engages in climate change research, activism, and connecting the knowledge gaps between fossil fuel industries and the citizenry on climate change issues.
Ellie Angerame: Recent graduate of Wheaton College in Massachusetts and member of the 2013 Focus the Nation’s ReCharge! Retreat. This program focusses on training students in environmental leadership and offers preparation for careers in environmental sustainability.
Chuck Baclagon: Digital communications specialist for 350.org in East Asia. Chuck has also engaged in activism with Greenpeace. Baclagon influences change in the East Asia region, working from his home base in Manila, Philippines.
Zsolt Bauer: At the time of the interview, Head of Communications and PR at Regional Environmental Center (REC) located in Szentendre, Hungary. Works on awareness-raising projects, educational campaigns for sustainable development, and climate change for MNCs in the region. Zsolt is a member of the board of the Hungarian Business Leaders Forum (HBLF) and a trained presenter of Al Gore’s Climate Reality Project. He is at present Branch Manager for the Climate Reality Project in Europe.
Mariana Bellot: Ms. Bellot is Lead Coordinator for BIOFIN-Mexico, “a global partnership seeking to address the biodiversity finance challenge and to build a sound business case for increased investment in the management of ecosystems and biodiversity.” She previously worked as Director of Climate Change Strategies for the Mexican National Commission for Protected areas (CONAMP), and as Director General of Institutional Development and Promotion for the same organization.
Marta Bonifert: Executive Director at Regional Environmental Center (REC) for Central and Eastern Europe 2003–2017. Responsible for leadership, fundraising, and management of REC, which is staffed by 200 employees from 30 employees; 300 projects in 17 countries. Worked with stakeholders, civil society, and businesses on creating sustainable environmental policy. She is scientific advisor to Agroinnova/University of Turin Scientific Committee and head of the environmental committee of the Hungarian Business Leaders Forum, and serves on many other boards and committees. She is also a trained presenter for The Climate Reality Project.
Garett Brennan: Executive director of Focus the Nation, a clean energy youth empowerment organization. In its ReCharge! Program, Focus the Nation selects 20 rising clean energy leaders from across the country for training and education.
John Canada: At the time of the interview (2013), Canada was a student at the University of Alabama and had served as American Chemical Society representative at COP 17 in Durban, South Africa. His leadership on Climate Change has mainly come in the form of blogs and social media activism.
Audrey DePault: National Manager of the Climate Reality Project in Canada. DePault facilitates climate leadership training and development to present information about the implications of climate change to businesses, policy makers, and the public.
Alexa Lee: Alexa Lee is a native of Taiwan and speaks Mandarin, Japanese, and Bahasa Indonesian. She is currently Manager of Environment & Sustainability for the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. In this role, Alexa coordinates information and advocacy efforts related to ITI members’ energy and environmental policies in China, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
Sandra Guzman Luna: Sandra is founder and general coordinator of the Climate Finance Group for Latin America and the Caribbean (GFLAC). She works on climate finance, energy transition, sustainable mobility, and other issues related to climate change. Ms. Guzman has been representative of civil society in many international climate change meetings under the UNFCCC, since 2008, having an important participation as advisor of the Mexican and other latin American governments in conferences such as COP16, COP20, COP21, among others. She has worked for the World Wildlife Fund and the Mexican Center for Environmental Law.
Adam Majcher: Climate Reality Project Manager at the Conservation Foundation located in Melbourne, Australia. The Foundation strives to coordinate climate change leadership training in Australia and in East Asia. Majcher is a scientist by training; his organization educates local communities to empower citizens and to create an advocacy presence in his region.
Cecilia Simon: Simon works with the Climate Action Reserve in Mexico City on climate change and biodiversity issues. Previously, she worked as the Climate Change Program Director for Pronatura. Simon is primarily interested in the connections between forest biodiversity, carbon emissions, and climate change.
Erin Schrode: Co-founder of Turning Green, an organization that promotes global sustainability, youth leadership, environmental education, and conscious lifestyle choices. Since 2005, her youth-led nonprofit has worked to raise public awareness about environmental and social responsibility for individuals, schools, and communities through education and advocacy.
Notes
1 The notion of “catastrophizing” rhetoric or discourse emerges from cognitive psychology and psychiatry, but is highly relevant to environmental discourse, particularly when it comes to global threats like climate change, which can give rise to truly catastrophic scenarios.
2 This could change, however, as climate impacts become increasingly real and visible – the tragic discourse will likely become more salient as a tragic outcome becomes more visible and likely.
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