The Seveso Directive requires stringent safety measures to be put in place to prevent major accidents from occurring and in case they do happen to effectively limit their consequences for human health and the environment. For instance, the Directive requires the drawing up of a major-accident prevention policy (MAPP) by the operator, and for particularly hazardous plants (so-called upper-tier establishments) a safety report to ensure high protection levels. Through the safety report, the operator is obliged to demonstrate that (1) a MAPP has been implemented, (2) major-accident hazards and associated accident scenarios have been identified and necessary measures have been taken to prevent these accidents and limit their consequences if they nevertheless occur, (3) adequate safety and reliability have been taken into account in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the installations, and (4) internal emergency plans have been drawn up and provide sufficient information for the preparation of the external emergency plan. The Seveso Directive also addresses domino effects by requiring the identification of establishments for which the risk of a major accident may be increased due to the geographical position and the proximity of these establishments, and their inventories of hazardous substances. Provisions on land-use planning control the siting of new or the modification of existing hazardous establishments, or new developments in their vicinity.

Following a series of Natech and other major chemical accidents (e.g., the spill of cyanide-laced tailings from a dam breach in Romania due to heavy rainfall and rapid snowmelt, or the release of chlorine from a flooded general-chemicals manufacturer), it was decided that an amendment of the Seveso Directive was needed to address the remaining gaps. The latest amendment, which entered into force in 2012, now explicitly addresses Natech risks and requires that environmental hazards, such as floods and earthquakes, be routinely identified and evaluated in an industrial establishment’s safety report (European Union, 2012). Awareness of Natech risks has been growing ever since in Europe.

From the point of view of Natech risk reduction, the Seveso Directive is the most important legal act at EU level. Other regulations exist that control different industrial activities or areas of concern that sometimes indirectly address Natech risks. One example is the EU Water Framework Directive, which aims to establish an integrated river basin management in Europe and which includes provisions against the chemical pollution of surface water (European Union, 2000). The EU Floods Directive requires Member States to develop flood risk maps that shall also show hazardous installations, which might cause accidental pollution in case of flooding (European Union, 2007). With respect to offshore oil and gas infrastructure, the recent EU Offshore Directive requires a demonstration that all major hazards related to offshore activities are identified, their likelihood and consequences assessed, and appropriate risk-control measures put in place. This includes environmental and meteorological conditions that could pose limitations on safe operations (European Union, 2013).

Since the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the seismic code for high-pressure gas storage facilities has been improved to account for the effects of long-period seismic motion-induced liquid sloshing on storage tanks. Furthermore, the new code increases the seismic resistance capacity of the supporting frames of pipe braces by reinforcing the intersection of the braces.

In addition, a new Land Resilience Basic Law was introduced in 2013 with the goal to promote long-term societal resilience through sustainable construction design, as well as ensuring land resilience through improved ground conditions and design. More specifically, the new Law requires the adoption of comprehensive countermeasures against (1) destruction, fire, and explosion at industrial complexes, (2) operational failures or disruption of the supply chain of oil and LPG, and (3) occurrence of an extended and complex disaster in highly populated bay areas (e.g., Tokyo Bay, Osaka Bay) caused by industrial-installation damage. The countermeasures against (1) include an amendment of the regulation concerning underground storage tanks, and the publication of a seismic risk-assessment guideline for industrial facilities with hazardous materials. Those against (2) include a guideline on storage and transport of hazardous materials to ensure smooth operations in case of an emergency, and an amendment of regulations concerning the shipping and storage of hazardous materials by ship and tanker truck also to guarantee well-ordered operations during emergency conditions.

In the frame of the new law, an alliance between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the UNGRD was established to respond to the need to strengthen capacities at the local and national levels, and to improve territorial planning. Furthermore, a public–private partnership was established between UNDP and the Colombian Petroleum Company S. A. (Ecopetrol S. A.). The aim of the partnership was to contribute to the design and implementation of a national strategy for the promotion of the safe and sustainable coexistence between the transport of hydrocarbons (there are over 8000 km of oil and high-pressure gas pipelines in Colombia), the territory, and the inhabitants living in or near the pipeline corridors. Thus, one of the main objectives of the project was the incorporation of technological risk-management instruments in local and national territorial planning (Cruz, 2014).

A recent survey among Seveso regulatory bodies aimed to assess the status of Natech risk management in the EU, collect case histories and lessons learned, and identify needs and/or limitations in implementing Natech risk-reduction strategies in EU Member States (Krausmann and Baranzini, 2012; Krausmann, 2010). The results of the survey were encouraging as they showed an increasing awareness among the competent authorities of the potentially disastrous impacts of natural hazards on chemical facilities. However, the survey also highlighted a number of gaps in Natech risk reduction, as well as related research and policy challenges.

Over half of the survey respondents indicated that their countries had experienced Natech accidents, which sometimes resulted in fatalities and injuries in the period 1990–2009. The main natural hazards of concern in this context were lightning, low temperatures, and floods. Considering the recurrence of Natech accidents, the survey results suggest that the legal frameworks for chemical-accident prevention have not always been effective. The reasons may be manifold and include, for instance, the absence of systematic data collection and analysis, which has resulted in incomplete knowledge of the dynamics of Natech accidents. This is turn has led to a lack of equipment vulnerability models for most natural hazards, and of methodologies and scenarios for considering Natech risks in industrial risk assessment. As a consequence, the survey participants expressed their belief that industry in many EU countries may not consider Natech risks appropriately in their facility risk assessment, with potentially low preparedness levels as a result. The survey also revealed strong differences between the actual Natech accident triggers and the natural hazards perceived to be of concern in the participating countries, highlighting an incongruity between actual causes and risk perception.

The recurrence of Natech accidents has also cast doubt on the adequacy of the design basis of hazardous installations with respect to natural-hazard impact, as well as on the associated protection measures in place. Design codes and standards usually assume a cut-off limit for the intensity of a reference natural hazard against which an installation and its components are designed. However, it is unclear which level of damage or even failure is to be expected above the design-basis loading. Moreover, the survey respondents emphasized that the ultimate objective of these codes and standards is the preservation of life safety and hence the prevention of building collapse. While in itself an important goal, the preservation of a building’s structural integrity is not necessarily sufficient to prevent the release of hazardous materials under natural-event loading. Failure to recognize these design limits and the specific requirements of process equipment during natural-hazard impact could have contributed to diminishing the effectiveness of chemical-accident prevention frameworks in reducing Natech risks.

The survey identified a number of key areas for future work for industry, regulators, and science and engineering. The majority of survey respondents called for the development of guidance on Natech risk assessment for industry with the highest priority, followed by the preparation of Natech risk maps to inform land-use- and emergency-planning by identifying a region’s Natech hot spots. Work is underway toward closing these gaps, although data availability remains a challenge.

The survey on the status of Natech risk management in the EU focused on polling Seveso competent authorities, recognizing the major accident potential of Seveso-type installations. However, also industrial installations processing, handling or storing hazardous materials in quantities below the qualifying threshold of the Seveso Directive can pose a significant safety risk. These industrial activities are governed by legal acts whose safety provisions may be less strict than those stipulated by the Seveso Directive. This is an additional factor that may have contributed to hampering effective Natech risk reduction.

The German Major Accident Ordinance currently includes six main types of obligations of operators:

The basic general requirements in Section 3 of the Major Accident Ordinance include the obligations of operators:

For the determination of the safety measures required for accident prevention or the limitation of the consequences of (nevertheless occurring) major accidents, the operator has to take into consideration:

“Environmental hazard sources” include:

The first point includes, for example, other hazardous installations, such as pipelines for the transport of hazardous materials, dams, and high-voltage power lines, while the second point comprises all natural hazards able to cause a major accident via impacts on the hazardous installations in the establishment.

Due to these obligations in Section 3 of the Major Accident Ordinance, operators and authorities in charge of installations or establishments being subject to the Major Accidents Ordinance have had to take Natech risks into consideration already since 1980. Especially in the evaluation of risks and the determination of the required prevention and preparedness measures in safety reports, natural hazards had to be regarded like operational technical hazards. The consequences of this regulation are five important aspects:

In the future, these basic obligations of the Major Accident Ordinance shall remain unchanged and the requirements for safety-management systems and safety reports shall be as stipulated in the amended Seveso Directive, including all requirements for Natech risk management there.

In 2002, the Czech Republic, Austria, and the eastern and southern parts of Germany were affected by a major flood. This flood caused no major accidents in Germany but several minor releases of hazardous substances, mainly heating oil spilled from domestic tanks. In addition, there were at least two “near misses” at establishments according to the Major Accidents Ordinance. In the Czech Republic, the flood caused several spills and a major release of chlorine from a chemical plant. Due to these events the German Environment Agency decided to commission a study on Natech risk management. This study included a review of regulations and technical rules considering Natech, an evaluation of events during the flood in 2002 and of Natech risks at other establishments, and information on the state-of-the-art in Natech risk reduction and recommendations for future activities (Warm and Köppke, 2007). One of the results of this study was that the technical rules applied for Natech risk management in Germany were not developed and hence suitable for establishments. They did not consider the additional risks due to large amounts of hazardous substances present in establishments and therefore the Natech risks from establishments. The authors recommended either to amend the existing rules or to develop special technical rules for Natech risk management with risk-proportional requirements, that is, defining required safety measures according to the Natech risks of establishments.

Another important source of Natech risk-management activities in Germany were discussions on the need to adapt to the effects of climate change. The fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) and several studies with regional scope raised awareness not only of the expected effects of climate change but also of the need to adjust to climate change, including adaptation to more frequent or more intense hydrometeorological extreme events. Therefore, the German Government decided to develop a strategy for adaptation to climate change (Bundesregierung, 2008). This strategy also addresses Natech aspects and determines that concerning process safety there shall be adapted:

According to this decision of the German Government, the Commission for Process Safety, tasked with the determination of the scientific and technical basis for major-accident prevention and preparedness, prepared two Technical Rules on Installation Safety (TRAS) for Natech Risk Management:

Both TRAS were put into effect by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety. The preparation of the TRAS was supported by research projects which provided additional guidance and scientific background information, especially with regard to the consequences of climate change, and which include results of tests made by applying the draft TRAS to installations in establishments (Köppke et al., 2013; Krätzig et al., 2016). These technical rules will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

Further German activities at the national level will be to support the enforcement of both TRAS, and at the international level the raising of awareness of Natech risks and implementation of Natech risk management.

APELL is a program developed by UNEP in conjunction with governments and industry with the purpose of minimizing the occurrence and harmful effects of technological hazards and environmental emergencies. The strategy of the APELL approach is to identify and create awareness of risks in a community, to initiate measures for risk reduction and mitigation, and to develop coordinated preparedness between the industry, the local authorities, and the local population. It aims at helping communities prevent loss of life; damage to health, well-being, and livelihoods; minimize property damage; and protect the environment. APELL objectives are: (1) raising awareness, communicating and educating the community, and (2) improving emergency-preparedness planning, through a multistakeholder participatory approach involving industry, the communities, and local authorities.

APELL was originally developed to tackle risks arising from fixed industrial installations. It has also been adapted, to be applied in specific contexts, through the following guidance: APELL for Port Areas (1996), TransAPELL for Dangerous Goods Transport (2000), APELL for Mining (2001), and APELL for Coastal Settlements in tourism destinations (2008). This last adaptation of APELL included a multihazard approach, taking into consideration natural hazards and technological hazards that could affect a community.

In 2015, a second edition of the APELL handbook was developed, for community awareness and preparedness for technological hazards and environmental emergencies. Among the new elements, this version integrates lessons learned from implementation over the past 30 years. In the handbook, both natural and technological hazards are considered, and UNEP recognizes the increased focus on technological hazards arising directly as a result of the impacts of a natural hazard event. This new edition therefore covers Natech events explicitly.

Often, at community level, the same persons or institutions are responsible for prevention and preparedness of natural hazards and technological hazards. It is even more the case with the APELL methodology as it highlights the importance of integrated emergency plans at community level. In this context, integrated means a preparedness process that is articulated with existing plans, including at regional/provincial levels, but also a process that takes a holistic approach to consider all potential events affecting the community, and the relation between these events. The handbook mentions: “An effective planning process will help communities prevent loss of life, damage to health, well-being and livelihoods, minimise property damage, and protect the environment. These same goals apply regardless of the nature of the environmental emergency, whether it is an industrial accident, a natural disaster or a combination of events, such as might occur following an earthquake or tsunami disaster or smaller scale events such as lightning storms.”

APELL is considered to be applicable to any risk situation, given its flexible methodology. APELL works through a 10-element process which involves ten elements: Identify Participants and Establish their Roles, Evaluate Hazards and Risks faced by the Community; Review Existing Capabilities and Emergency Plans—Identify Gaps; Create the Vision of Success; Make Progress toward the Vision of Success; Make Changes in Existing Emergency Plans and Integrate into Overall Community Preparedness Plan; Obtain Endorsement from Government Authorities; Implement Community Preparedness Plans through Communicating, Educating, and Training Community Members; Establish Procedures for Periodic Testing, Review and Updating of the Plans; Maintain APELL through Continuous Improvement. This process creates a multistakeholder dialog and covers five phases: (I) engaging stakeholders, (II) understanding hazards and risks, (III) preparedness planning, (IV) implementing and testing, and (V) maintaining APELL. The methodology is relevant to the community as it is based upon awareness of the specific hazards and risks present and uses existing strengths and relationships. Tools and assets in a community for preparedness and response are often similar for industrial, natural, or Natech accidents, but specific attention should be given in some cases. For instance, during phase II, in the context of an industrial or Natech accident, knowledge on chemical hazards and specific emergency-response equipment will be required. In addition, different tools can be required for risk assessment and risk reduction. During phase IV, scenarios for drills and exercises should be adapted to include cases of potential Natech scenarios.

Over the years, while implementing APELL, local communities became aware of the local risks and its impacts, and prepared to respond appropriately in the event of an accident, and a better coordination and preparedness of emergency services at local level has been witnessed. In the next implementation of APELL methodologies, further application including Natech events is expected and should be encouraged.

The Sendai framework is a voluntary, nonbinding agreement that has the following aim:

This represents a policy shift at the global level from managing disasters to managing disaster risks, thereby emphasizing the importance of prevention and preparedness, and moving from reactive to more proactive approaches to prevent new and reduce existing disaster risks. The Sendai framework defines four priorities for action and seven global targets whose achievement will be measured using appropriate indicators.

Recognizing the disaster potential of technological and Natech (cascading) hazards following the Fukushima Natech accident in 2011, the scope of disaster risk reduction has been broadened significantly in the Sendai framework which follows an all-hazards approach. As such, it includes natural and man-made hazards, and related environmental, technological, and biological hazards and risks. The framework also calls for a substantial reduction of disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption to their services. Since a loss of lifelines can trigger or exacerbate the consequences of a technological or Natech accident, this target will also directly support Natech risk reduction.