As we must frankly profit from all the opportunities offered to us to stifle the germs of discord, we affirm our right to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, which have always belonged to Vietnam. (Samuels, 1982: 79)

the Cairo Declaration (1943), the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration (1945) are the basic documents for postwar territorial settlements.… all sovereign rights must be returned to their legal titular, i.e., Vietnam which, since 1949 had inherited (or rather retaken) all the former French rights over these territories.

Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagos are integral parts of Vietnamese territory. Viet Nam has sufficient historical evidence and legal foundation to assert her sovereignty over these two archipelagos. (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2011)

The law of the sea provides for baseline, the internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, islands, the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos and other archipelagos under sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction. (Vietnam, 2012)

The continental shelf of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the Vietnamese territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of the Vietnamese land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline used to measure the breadth of the Vietnamese territorial sea where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1977)

Viet Nam has indisputable sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagos, the sovereign rights and jurisdictional rights over her exclusive economic zones and continental shelf in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. (SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b)

Historical basis

The historical evidence in Vietnam’s white papers includes maps and records of activities in books published or compiled in feudal times.

From these records, it seems Vietnam intends to show that ‘[u]p to the eighteenth century’ the lords of Nguyen had established a team ‘in charge for the exploitation and administration, as state power, of the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos’ (Murphy, 1994/1995: 203, emphasis added; Vietnamnet, 2011). Quoting Le Qui Don, the 1981 white paper noted that Annamite fishermen and salvage crews were not alone in these endeavours; Hainan fishermen from China were also engaged in such activities (Samuels, 1982: 43).

Chronological activities listed in the second period are recorded in Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien (1848), including surveying and mapping in ‘Hoang Sa’ in 1815, 1816, 1833, 1834, 1835 and 1836 (SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979a: 12).

Vietnam’s historical evidence reveals three things. First, the Vietnamese were not alone in exploiting resources in the Paracels. Chinese fishermen and crew were also involved when Vietnam started activities there. Second, it is during the early nineteenth century that Vietnamese activities were officially approved. Third, Vietnam’s identification of Van-ly Truong Sa with the Spratly Islands is highly questionable (Samuels, 1982: 43).

Succession from France

By the 1884 Treaty of Hue between France and the Nguyen dynasty of Vietnam, the French completed the legal procedure to establish a protectorate over Vietnam (Valencia et al., 1999: 30). France occupied nine of the Nansha Islands from 1933 to 1939. Castan (1998: 96) observes that Vietnam’s sovereignty claims over the Nansha Islands are primarily based on its colonial relationship with France. According to Vietnam’s 1975 white paper:

It also states that since 1949 Vietnam has ‘inherited’ all the French rights over the Nansha Islands (ibid.).

The 1975 white paper, and later the 1981 and 1988 white papers, said the French had conducted different activities on behalf of Vietnam to substantiate Vietnam’s sovereignty claim over the territory. When representing Vietnam externally, the French protested against activities carried out in relation to the Nansha Islands by China in 1931 and 1932 and by Japan in 1933 and 1939 to ‘reassert its sovereignty claim’ (ibid.). After 1933 the French also handled administrative activities such as recruiting private citizens as ‘administrative officer’ for Itu Aba and did ‘scientific survey’ in the Nansha Island area (ibid.). It was based on succession to the prior French title that, at the 1951 San Francisco peace conference, the ROV stepped forward to claim the islands (Castan, 1998: 96). When France withdrew from Indochina in 1954, the French authorities transferred the territory of South Vietnam, including the Nansha Islands, to the Saigon administration (SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979a: 8).

Confusion over the physical location of the Nansha Islands

Although Vietnam provided historical evidence in the three white papers to assert its title to the Nansha group, the legitimacy of its claims is weakened by its failure to identify and distinguish between the Nansha and Xisha Islands (Joyner, 1999: 61). In the white papers, both island groups are treated generically: one group is not geographically distinguished from the other, and activities in the Xisha Islands are generalised and applied to both islands. This situation compounds the difficulty in assessing the lawfulness and propriety of claims, and raises considerable doubts over the authenticity and accuracy of the historical records. This inaccuracy of location of the Nansha Islands is further reflected in both Chinese and Vietnamese historical documents.

First, the translation of the Phu Bien Tap Luc in Vietnam’s white papers of earlier days is different from that provided recently on Vietnam’s official news websites. For example, Vietnamnet (2011) posted an article entitled ‘Historical documents on Vietnam’s sovereignty over Paracel and Spratly Islands’, in which Dai Truong Sa was explained to include both the Paracels and the Spratlys, and its location seems to be moved further east, as the journey there is described as taking a ‘few watches to [a] few days’.⁵ The description in the white papers, in contrast, is ‘a day or a few watches’.

Second, in Vietnam’s historical documents ‘Truong Sa’ should refer to Vietnam’s coastal islands rather than China’s Nansha Islands, which are located much further away to the east. The name of Truong Sa appears in many other Vietnamese historical documents, such as the Hong Duc Atlas (洪德版) compiled during the rule of Le Thanh Tong (14701497); Volume 2 of Dai Viet su ky thoan thu (大越史记全书), compiled by Ngo Si Lien in 1479; Volume 3 of Kham Dinh Viet Su Thong Giam Cuang Muc (钦定越史通鉴纲), first compiled by Phan Thanh Gial (1798–1867); and Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi (大南一统, History of Unified Dai Nam), compiled by the National Institute of History during the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1945). However, based on the description of the travel route to Truong Sa, some Chinese scholars⁶ conclude that the Truong Sa in these Vietnamese documents is different from present-day Vietnam’s claimed ‘Truong Sa’ (Nansha Islands). The location of ‘Truong Sa’ at that time should be islands scattered off the coast from Vietnam’s port of Hue to Danang.

Third, Jean Louis Taberd’s reference points to a different location. Based on his Note on Geography of Cochinchina provided in Vietnam’s white papers, Chinese scholars conclude that according to Taberd’s description of the location of ‘the Paracels islands’ (stretching to north latitude 11° and east longitude 107° from Paris, i.e. current 109°10’ east from Greenwich), these islands should be along Vietnam’s coast, because the location of today’s Xisha Islands is latitude 15°47’ north and longitude 111°10´–112°15´ east and the Nansha Islands are even further away. The Knowfar Institute for Strategic & Defence Studies (2007) further infers that most probably Taberd’s ‘Paracels’ refers to Pulou Cecir de Terre, eight nautical miles northeast of Lagan Point, because Taberd’s description of the Paracels’ situation is similar to that of Pulou Cecir de Terre.

Lack of comprehensive interpretation of the relevant peace treaties

In the ROV’s 1975 white paper, in a position reiterated by the three white papers issued by the SRV after unification, Vietnam claims that under the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty Japan was obliged to renounce its rights over the two groups of the Xisha and Nansha Islands. Article 2(f) states: ‘Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the Spratlys [Nansha] Islands and to the Paracel [Xisha] Islands.’⁷

According to Vietnam, based on the interpretation of Article 2(a)–(e), Article 2(f) implies that the recipient of sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha groups should be Vietnam. It further stated that its representative at the San Francisco peace conference had reaffirmed Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and no participating country had protested. However, neither the PRC nor the ROC was invited to the peace conference (Chiu and Park, 1975: 14).

The Vietnamese interpretation has overlooked several factors. First, the San Francisco peace treaty is only one of a series of international documents dealing with Japan renouncing the land it had stolen since the beginning of the First World War in 1914. Attention should also be given to relevant bilateral documents to which Japan is a party. The sovereignty issue of the Nansha Islands should be interpreted by considering the interrelated documents in totality, including the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, the 1945 Instrument of Surrender by Japan, the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty, the 1952 Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan⁸ (the Taiwan-Japan Treaty) and the 1972 Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

One of the purposes of the Cairo Declaration is to ensure that all the territories ‘Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China’ (emphasis added). The non-exhaustive list in the declaration intends to make Japan return to China all the territories it had ‘stolen’ from the country. Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration reaffirms the content of the Cairo Declaration. Cordner (1994: 69) believed that both the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty and the 1952 Taiwan-Japan Treaty offered ‘ideal opportunities to allocate sovereign ownership’, including sovereignty over the Nansha Islands.

Article 2 of the 1952 Taiwan-Japan Treaty reads:

According to Chao (1989/1990: 88), the nature of the 1952 Taiwan-Japan Treaty indicated that title to the renounced islands, including the Xisha and Nansha Islands, was to be handed over to China. While the 1951 peace treaty listed clearly five categories of sovereignty issues, the 1952 Taiwan-Japan Treaty only mentioned land features in Article 2(b)⁹ and 2(f),¹⁰ which implies that both countries consider the sovereignty of the Xisha and Nansha Islands as a bilateral issue. As Japan handed over sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu to China based on Article 2(a), the sovereignty for the Nansha and Xisha Islands listed in Article 2(f) should also be handed over to the same signatory, i.e. China. The 1952 treaty and the bilateral process leading to it show Japan’s tacit recognition of China’s claims over the two SCS island groups. Article 3 of the 1972 China-Japan Joint Communique reaffirmed Japan’s compliance with Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration in which Taiwan and Penghu were returned to China. Samuels (1982: 80) concluded that through the two bilateral treaties Japan, as a defeated nation in the Second World War and the occupier of the Nansha and Xisha Islands, recognised China’s sovereignty over the two groups.

Second, at the San Francisco conference Andrei Gromyko, leader of the Soviet delegation, recognised that these islands were China’s ‘inalienable territory’ (Chao, 1989/1990: 88). Although China and Taiwan were not present at the conference, before the conference on 15 August 1951 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai remarked:

Third, two scholars noted that at the 1951 San Francisco conference the US delegation may have allowed China to assume sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands if the Nationalist government had not retreated to Taiwan (Buszynski and Sazlan, 2007: 144). Therefore, to prevent Communist China from regaining its ‘lost’ sovereignty, power politics had played a role in sovereignty reallocation after the Second World War.

No respect for the principle of estoppel

Before unification, the DRV recognised China’s sovereignty over the four island groups in the South China Sea. On 15 June 1956, during a meeting with China’s chargé d’affaires ad interim to the DRV, Li Zhimin, Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem stated that ‘according to Vietnam’s materials, from a historical perspective, Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands should be part of Chinese territory’ (Shen, 1997: 53; Beijing Review, 1979a: 20).

On 4 September 1958, by its declaration on the territorial sea, China clearly stated its territorial sovereignty over the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha Islands (Chapter 3). On 14 September 1958 DRV Premier Pham Van Dong stated in a note to Premier Zhou Enlai that ‘the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam recognizes and supports the declaration of the People’s Republic of China on China’s territorial sea made on September 4, 1958’ and that ‘the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam respects this decision’ (Beijing Review, 1979a: 20; Shen, 1997: 54).

In a statement of 9 May 1965 on the US president’s designation of the ‘combat zone’ for US armed forces in Vietnam, the Vietnamese government expressed recognition of China’s sovereignty over the Xisha Islands: ‘U.S. President Lyndon Johnson designated the whole of Viet Nam, and the adjacent waters which extend roughly 100 nm from the coast of Viet Nam and part of the territorial waters of the People’s Republic of China in its Xisha Islands as “combat zone” of the United States armed forces’ (Beijing Review, 1979b: 25).

In the 1970s, before unification, the DRV had adhered to this position. After the ROV incorporated the Nansha Islands into its local government in September 1973 and later occupied five of the islands, it started awarding oil concessions in the sea area around the Nansha group to foreign companies. The DRV issued strong protests against the ROV’s actions (Samuels, 1982: 99).

Vietnamese official maps published before 1975 referred to the Xisha and Nansha Islands by their Chinese names, and supplied notes to show they belonged to China. These include world maps drawn and published by the Mapping Department under the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army in 1960, which clearly marked, in the Vietnamese language, ‘Xisha Islands (China)’ and ‘Nansha Islands (China)’; the maps published by the Vietnamese Department of Cartography in May 1964; and the world maps printed in May 1972 and the second edition of the world political maps printed in March 1974, both by the Vietnamese National Survey and Drawing Bureau and both showing the Xisha and Nansha Islands in their Chinese names in the Vietnamese language. The fact that these two groups were never called ‘Hoang Sa’ or ‘Truong Sa’ Islands, as they are now named by the Vietnamese authorities, shows Vietnam’s recognition of China’s sovereignty over the islands (Beijing Review, 1979b: 25–6).

During a meeting with China’s Vice-Premier Li Xiannian on 10 June 1977, Vietnam’s Premier Pham Van Dong explained that Vietnam’s recognition of China’s sovereignty over the two islands groups had to be viewed in light of the special period of war against ‘the U.S. imperialism’ (Beijing Review, 1979a: 21). Li promptly pointed out that ‘this explanation was not convincing because the territorial question between our two states should be dealt with seriously; war cannot justify a different interpretation’. Li further stated that there was no war going on in Vietnam when, on 14 September 1958, Pham Van Dong acknowledged in his note to Premier Zhou Enlai that the Xisha and Nansha Islands were Chinese territory (ibid.). After 1979 Vietnam provided a new explanation to the 1958 note, claiming that it was simply a ‘goodwill’ gesture to a fraternal country and if ‘some errors’ were made in textbooks and maps, they should not be attributed to the government. The Chinese responded by saying that ‘this explanation is hardly credible’ and territorial sovereignty is not ‘bartered away’ (Farrell, 1992: 419).

In conclusion, the DRV clearly recognised China’s sovereignty over the four SCS island groups up until its unification, through repeated declarations and in official documents. According to the principle of estoppel in international law, analysed in Chapter 3, this recognition is effective and the Vietnamese government has the duty to respect ‘the title of the other party’ (China). The change of position by North Vietnam (later unified Vietnam) since 1974 violates the principle of estoppel under international law. The later explanation of its previous position is invalid and against international legal principles with regard to territorial sovereignty.

The Vietnamese historical ownership claim appears weak for several reasons. First, significant gaps in sovereign control are apparent before and during the French occupation of Vietnam. No consistent evidence supports the concept of ‘effective control, administration and governance’ of sovereign territory. Second, France specifically stated that its annexation of the Nansha Islands in 1933 was never ceded to Vietnam. Third, the DRV’s support for Chinese sovereignty claims against the ROV in 1956 and 1958, followed by a reversal of that position in 1975, further weakens the Vietnamese historical case. The current government of Vietnam is a successor to the DRV government, not the ROV; therefore the DRV’s previous confession to the Chinese government in 1956 would be binding. Fourth, Vietnam’s activities in and around the Nansha Islands should be viewed in comparison with activities carried out by other countries. As analysed in Chapter 2, China can provide even earlier evidence of its connection with the islands, and its historical evidence is comparatively stronger than Vietnam’s in accuracy, content and geographic scope.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies in its historical case, Vietnam has occupied many features in the Nansha Islands since 1973, and this creates difficulties for China in the settlement of a territorial dispute which troubles these two countries in good times and bad.

As far as the islands in the sea are concerned, the red line drawn by the officials of the two countries responsible for delineating the boundary shall be extended southward from the eastern hill-top of Chagushe [Wangzhu in Chinese] and constitutes the dividing line. The islands lying east of this line shall belong to China. The islands of Jiutousan (Gotho in Vietnamese) and other small islands west of this line shall belong to Vietnam. (Zou, 1999b: 238)

To friends and foes alike… as long as one single island [in the Paracels and Spratlys] is forcibly occupied by another country, the government and people of the republic [of Vietnam] will continue their struggle to recover their legitimate rights. (Ibid.: 104)

Phase 1: From simmering to open dispute (pre-1975)

As noted, before the fall of the ROV in April 1975 the DRV had officially recognised China’s sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. However, scholars (including Dzurek, 1996: 19; Howell and Morrow, 1974: 127) observed that Hanoi had second thoughts about its acquiescence to China’s claim. When the Saigon government fell, Hanoi’s forces immediately (between 11 and 29 April 1975) occupied all six features previously held by ROV troops, and went on to make a formal territorial claim over the Nansha Islands (Samuels, 1982: 107; Beijing Review, 1979a: 21; Dzurek, 1996: 19).

Later, in May 1979, China published observations on the development of China-Vietnam relations in this period (Beijing Review, 1979b), saying that after the 1973 armistice in Vietnam, and especially since 1974, noticeable changes had taken place on the issue of the Sino-Vietnamese boundary. According to Hoang Tung, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee, after the war ceased ‘it is no longer so vital’ for the country to follow a policy of friendship with China, and the Vietnamese openly asserted that in dealing with China ‘we have begun to lean more and more towards the U.S.S.R.’ (ibid.: 20). Although there was no open confrontation just after the fall of Saigon, Hanoi’s actions over the Nansha Islands and the open rhetoric of Vietnam’s leadership showed signs of upcoming tensions.

Phase 2: Open verbal challenges (1975–1977)

The first indication of tension relating to border disputes after the end of the Vietnam War came during a visit to China by Le Duan, CPV secretary-general, in September 1975. For the first time in discussions between the two sides, Le Duan officially raised the issue of sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands. The visit ended without a joint communique, usually issued for such meetings (Amer, 2002: 6). As preparations were made for the formal unification of North and South Vietnam in 1976, Hanoi published a map of the new DRV that include both the Nansha and Xisha Islands in Vietnam’s territory (Samuels, 1982: 108; Dzurek, 1996: 19).

Another open challenge by Vietnam to China’s sovereignty claim was its senior officials’ attempt to deny its previous recognition. In mid-1977, returning home after a Europe trip, Vietnam’s Premier Pham Van Dong stopped over in Beijing. On 10 June 1977 he held talks with China’s Vice Premier Li Xiannian to exchange views on issues concerning the two countries. Li pointed out the change of North Vietnam’s stance on sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and expressed China’s hope that Vietnam kept its original position on this question (Beijing Review, 1979a: 21). As mentioned, Pham tried to explain that Vietnam’s previous recognition of China’s sovereignty was due to wartime necessity.

Phase 3: Escalation of conflicts (1978–1990)

Starting from early 1978, Vietnam intensified its occupation of the land features in the Nansha Islands and commenced oil exploitation, which escalated the disputes. In March and April 1978 Vietnam invaded and occupied the Grierson Reef (Ranqing Shazhou), Central Reef (Zhong Jiao) and Pearson Reef (Bisheng Jiao) in the Nansha group (Shen, 1997: 55).¹¹ In July the Vietnamese government and Japanese companies signed a cooperation agreement for the exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas resources on and around the Nansha Islands (ibid.).

After the China-Vietnam border conflicts in early 1979, territorial conflicts became increasingly publicised. The disputes involved not only the land border, which was the scene of military activities, but also the Nansha Islands (Amer, 2002: 7).

To elaborate China’s views over these border disputes, including the Xisha and Nansha sovereignty issue, Beijing Review published a series of articles on 25 May 1979. These include a speech delivered on 12 May 1979 by Han Nianlong, head of the Chinese government delegation at the fourth plenary meeting of the China-Vietnam negotiations at the vice-foreign minister level, and two commentaries by the Xinhua News Agency. An excerpt from Han’s speech clearly indicates China’s stand on the Xisha and Nansha dispute:

On 4 October 1979 Vietnam issued a white paper entitled ‘The truth about Vietnam-China relations over the last 30 years’ (SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979b). The white paper accused China of ‘sacrificing the interests of the Indochinese peoples to ensure China’s security in the South, to carry out the design of controlling Vietnam and Indochina’. By referring to feudal history, the white paper also showed Vietnam’s deep mistrust of China’s strategic intention: ‘The Chinese leaders attempted to get hold of Viet Nam and then of the whole Indochinese peninsula, and later on, to use Indochina as a springboard for expansion to SouthEast Asia.’

In response, China’s People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency published a series of commentaries from mid-November. In China’s view, the white paper is ‘a confession of the Vietnamese authorities’ complete betrayal of Sino-Vietnamese friendship’ and the ‘comradeship-plus-fraternity’ (People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency, 1979: 3). The articles listed the facts and communications between the old leaderships of the two countries to show that ‘without (China’s) assistance’, Vietnam could not have won independence from France (ibid.: 15–16) and ‘Viet Nam could not have won the revolution without China’ (ibid.: 27).

Escalation of mistrust brought the sovereignty dispute over the Nansha Islands into the 1980s. At the closing session of the third UNCLOS in December 1982 Vietnam’s head of delegation Le Kim Chung denounced China’s occupation of the Xisha Islands and its ‘open threat to annex’ the Nansha group, and China denounced Vietnam’s ‘expansionist ambitions’ in a written reply (Farrell, 1992: 418). In February 1987 Vietnam occupied the Barque Canada Reef, which includes the South and North Rocks (Shen, 1997: 56). In May 1987 Chinese naval vessels patrolled the Nansha Islands area (Shen, 2002: 149).

As of early 1988, Vietnam began intensifying its occupation of the Nansha features. In January it occupied West Reef (Xi Jiao) (Shen, 1997: 56), which triggered reaction from China. In February 1988 China built a ferry and a heliport on Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Jiao). Under the UNESCO plan (see Chapter 3) and with UNESCO’s support, China also built a maritime observation station on the islands (Shen, 2002: 149). At the same time, Vietnam went further to occupy Ladd Reef (Riji Jiao), Tennent Reef (Wumie Jiao), East Reef (Dong Jiao) and Great Discovery Reef (Daxiao Jiao) (Shen, 1997: 56). On 12 February 1988 a spokesman of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarked that China’s regular patrols and other operations conducted on some of the Nansha Islands and in their surrounding waters were matters entirely within China’s sovereign rights, and Vietnam had no right to interfere (Shen, 2002: 149). The intensified actions and counteractions led to clashes on 14 March 1988.

According to China, a Chinese survey team landed on Fiery Cross Reef to set up an observation post. Early on 14 March three Vietnamese ships arrived and landed troops on the reef. When China demanded that they leave, the Vietnamese opened fire. Chinese ships returned fire. According to Vietnam, three Chinese warships landed troops on Fiery Cross, removed Vietnam’s flag and planted China’s flag. When the Vietnamese asked the Chinese to leave, the Chinese troops and ships opened fire (Dzurek, 1996: 22). The clash on Fiery Cross was seen as a result of Vietnamese attempts to stop China from erecting structures on the reef, and led to casualties on both sides (Farrell, 1992: 422; Dzurek, 1996: 23–5). However, Vietnam did not stop occupying more features; by 20 March Cornwallis South Reef (Nanhua Jiao), Collins Reef (Guihan Jiao), Lansdowne Reef (Qiong Jiao) and Alison Reef (Liumen Jiao) were under its control (Shen, 1997: 56). In April 1988 Vietnam had garrisons stationed on Petley Reef (Bolan Jiao) and South Reef (Nanluo Jiao) (ibid.).

On 12 May 1988 China proposed negotiations with Vietnam, at the same time repeating its demand for withdrawal of Vietnamese forces (Dzurek, 1996: 22). Nevertheless, between June and July 1989 Vietnam continued to occupy Prince of Wales Bank (Guangya Jiao), Bombay Castle (Pengbo Dao) and Vanguard Bank (Wan’an Tan) (Shen, 1997: 56).

Phase 4: Consolidation of the status quo (1991- present)

After normalisation of relations in 1991, this bilateral dispute over the sovereignty of the Nansha Islands took on new forms.

First, both countries have attempted to explore resources in overlapping sea areas, the jurisdiction over which might stem from either land ownership claims or historical rights. Energy demand could be the main reason that drove these oil exploitation ventures in a sea area of overlapping claims. Second, both countries moved to consolidate administrative control by landing troops on their occupied features, issuing promotional photographs of the features, laying down marker stones and plaques and erecting lighthouses. Each new occupation was accompanied by public relations fanfare, reiterated claims of sovereignty over the entire Nansha Islands and counterclaims by the other side (Murphy, 1994/1995: 195). Third, there is increasing nationalist sentiment in both countries, calling for protection of the sacred land sovereignty of the Nansha Islands. The governments are under pressure to take a tougher position, hence more vigorous action against perceived ‘harassment’ by the counterparty. Fourth, China’s swift rise in economic and military power brings a new dimension to the sovereignty issue. Increasingly, the world is speculating if and how China will leverage its increased military strength to resolve the SCS issue with its neighbours.

Recent moves by Vietnam seem to indicate that its strategy against China is to turn the SCS dispute into a regional or international issue, especially concerning maritime claims (instead of sovereignty over land features). There are general concerns over the uncertainties that could be generated by these tactics. Since 1992 oil exploration and exploitation have augmented tensions between the two countries.

In May 1992 China signed an oil-gas exploration agreement with a US company, Crestone Energy Corporation. The agreement refers to Wan’an Bei WAB-21, a 10,000-square-mile area in the SCS (Amer, 2002: 9); much of the area encompassed by the concession is in or near the Nansha Islands, and its western boundary lies 84 miles off the coast of Vietnam (Murphy, 1994/1995: 196). Vietnam reacted negatively and claimed that the area was located on its continental shelf (Joyner, 1999: 68). Valencia et al. (1999: 27) cite a report by Dzurek to Crestone Energy on ‘Conflicting claims to Wan’an Bei, WAB-21, Oct. 1, 1992’; Dzurek argues that China’s right to the resources of this region is based on the EEZ that could be generated by the Nansha Islands, which China claims. In signing the agreement, China assured Crestone that it would defend American exploration crews. Crestone publicly estimated that oil reserves lying under the concession were over 1 billion barrels (Murphy, 1994/1995: 196).

China’s Crestone oil deal triggered immediate reaction from Vietnam, which entered into a contract with Norwegian company Nopec to conduct a seismic survey in an area that overlaps with the concession area China had granted to Crestone (Valencia et al., 1999: 31). At the farewell to the visiting Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in December 1992, Vietnam Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam said Hanoi had non-negotiable sovereignty over the Vanguard area and all claimants of the nearby Nansha Islands should settle their disputes through dialogue. About this time, British Petroleum (BP) spudded Lan Do 1 well in Vietnam Block 06, near the Crestone concession at WAB-21 (Dzurek, 1996: 27).

In 1993 the PRC and Vietnam made progress on other disputes, but tensions heightened in the Nansha Islands. On 5 May 1993 China sent a seismic survey vessel into part of the WAB-21 concession area which Vietnam leased to BP and Norway’s Statoil Vietnam. Although a Chinese Foreign Ministry official said that ‘the seismic operations conducted by the Chinese survey vessel in the waters off the Nansha Islands are regular scientific exploration activities’ (Gao, 1994: 350), Vietnam intensified its contacts with foreign companies. Following the US relaxation of its trade embargo against Vietnam in early 1993, foreign oil companies began to show strong interest in obtaining deals to explore Vietnamese waters, including two tracts close to the Crestone concession, Dai Hung and Thanh Long (ibid.). In October Vietnam invited oil companies to bid for nine offshore blocks, including contract areas near China’s Crestone area. PetroVietnam chairman Ho Si Thoang stated that this was not in a disputed area and the Nansha Islands were not entitled to an EEZ (Dzurek, 1996: 27). Gao (1994) observed that one of Vietnam’s intentions in courting foreign companies, and US oil companies in particular, was to gain ‘implicit diplomatic insurance against China’.

In 1994 China and Vietnam continued to use foreign oil companies as ‘designated hitters’ in the Nansha Islands and Gulf of Tonkin. In February China was reported to have warned Conoco to stop negotiating with PetroVietnam on areas overlapping with Crestone’s contract area (Dzurek, 1996: 29). In April Vietnam lodged official protests against seismological surveys carried out by Crestone in an area referred to as the Tu Chinh coral reef (Amer, 2002: 11). On 19 April, when Mobil signed a production-sharing contract with PetroVietnam for Block 5-1b (Blue Dragon), China was reported to be planning to drill a well in the same area. Crestone planned a seismic survey of WAB-21 before drilling started later in the year. On 20 April Vietnam protested against the Crestone plans. China reiterated its sovereignty over the Nansha Islands, but expressed hope that negotiations on territorial disputes would progress based on mutually agreed principles (Dzurek, 1996: 29).

In May-June 1994 the China-Vietnam row over the Vanguard Bank continued. In June Vietnam moved an oil-rig into the area. However, a serious confrontation was avoided, although verbal threatening rhetoric prompted concerns that contracted oil exploration activities might trigger open hostilities between China and Vietnam (Joyner, 1999: 689). On 16 June a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded ‘once again’ that Vietnam stopped its ‘acts of infringement’ on China’s sovereignty, and reasserted China’s ‘indisputable’ sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters (Amer, 2002: 12–15). He claimed that Vietnam’s repeated harassment of the scientific surveys and fishing activities of Chinese vessels in the area had violated Chinese sovereignty and put China’s lawful contract with Crestone in serious jeopardy. On 17 June Vietnam responded by refuting the Chinese claim that the Vanguard Bank was part of the Nansha Islands and condemning China’s contract with Crestone as having violated the principles of international law and practice. It went on to say that the Vanguard Bank area was within Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf, and called on China not to make statements or conduct activities that violate Vietnam’s ‘undeniable’ sovereignty over Vanguard Bank (ibid.). The same pattern of verbal exchanges continued in early 1995 (Dzurek, 1996: 37).

In April 1996 disputes erupted following the signing of a contract between PetroVietnam and a US company, Conoco Vietnam Exploration and Production BG, for the exploration and exploitation of Vietnamese Blocks 133 and 134, which overlay the western portion of Crestone’s WAB-21 block. Vietnam insisted that these blocks were located within its continental shelf and the area was ‘completely’ under Vietnam’s sovereignty and jurisdiction. China viewed the contract as an encroachment on its sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and reiterated its ‘indisputable’ sovereignty over the Nansha Islands (Amer, 2002: 17–18; Dzurek, 1996: 42).

In December 1996 American oil company Banken Oscar acquired Crestone Energy Corporation, and the Crestone contract on Wan’an Bei oil blocks was transferred to Banken Oscar. On 5 December a spokesperson of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry replied to a question regarding the transfer, saying the Vanguard area was ‘conclusively’ within Vietnam’s continental shelf, and stating further that the move was a violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty. On 20 May 1997 Vietnam protested against the operation of a Chinese vessel, Discovery 08; China stated the following day that it had ‘indisputable’ sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters, and the presence of Chinese ships was for normal and legitimate activities. Similar incidents occurred again in autumn 1998 (Amer, 2002: 23–5).

Following these tensions over the Vanguard oil blocks between 1992 and 1998, negotiations between China and Vietnam over their land borders and the Gulf of Tonkin achieved substantial progress. No similar incidents were officially reported until 2007.

In 2007 and 2008 Vietnam was reported to be concluding deals with international oil companies ExxonMobil and BP Conoco Phillips in disputed waters around the Nansha Islands, against which China strongly protested. Pressures were reportedly exerted on companies to stop joint exploitation activities with Vietnam. In August 2008 Vietnam signed an agreement with ExxonMobil on oil cooperation.

Again, in 2011, tension over resources near Vanguard Bank increased. On 26 May and 8 June Vietnam’s oil exploration in the overlapping area in Vanguard Bank was met with strong reaction from China, whose patrol boats cut the cables of Vietnam’s seismic vessel Binh Minh in a first instance and Viking II in the second (Raine, 2011: 74–5). Another round of diplomatic rows occurred in late May and early June. In Vietnam there were more than a dozen demonstrations against China and live-ammunition military exercises were conducted near the Vietnamese coast (Zhi et al., 2011; Zaobao, 2011). Although the tension was defused through management by the two countries, the potential for further clashes will continue to haunt them.

Besides resource exploration and exploitation, Vietnam carried out administrative and construction operations to consolidate its occupation of the Nansha Islands. On 19 July 1992 Vietnam started building a small fishing harbour on Dao Truong Sa (Nanwei Dao/Spratly Island) to provide its ships fishing in the islands with port facilities such as gasoline and ‘other services’ (Wu, 2005: 111). On 7 August 1993 Vietnam exempted export duty for fishing in the Nansha Islands (Dzurek, 1996: 27). In September 1993 a three-year tax holiday was given to companies and individuals willing to invest in and export sea products from the islands (Gao, 1994: 350). In April 2006 VinaPhone Mobile Company of Vietnam cooperated with the Vietnamese navy to construct a ground satellite receiving station to provide communication services for mobile phones.

Since 2008 has Vietnam been electing ‘National Assembly deputies’ and ‘People’s Council representatives’ for the Nansha Islands, the latest election being held in May 2011. Such actions drew protests from China. On 10 May 2011 a spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that China had indisputable sovereignty and Vietnam’s actions were ‘illegal’, ‘invalid’ and ‘not in line with the spirit’ of the DOC (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011a).

On 6 May 2009 Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to the CLCS relating to a ‘defined area’ in the south of the SCS. On 7 May 2009 Vietnam made a partial submission relating to the ‘North Area’, which is located in the northwest of the SCS (Vietnam, 2009; see Chapter 1). China protested against both submissions.

Based on its behaviour in handling disputes with China, Vietnam appeared to align its interests with ASEAN and other external countries, thus regionalising or internationalising the disputes.

Since the summit of November 1991, relations between China and Vietnam have been characterised by two contradicting trends: a positive trend, with expanding contacts and cooperation in many fields, and a negative trend, with continued territorial disputes. Generally, the positive trend prevailed throughout the period; however, amicability was occasionally interrupted by tensions caused by border disputes, especially those in the SCS area.

Based on the history of the bilateral Nansha sovereignty dispute, further observations in regard to Vietnam’s actions in the Nansha Islands can be made. First, upon unification Vietnam immediately made sovereignty claims over the islands because of security concerns and its need for development. Second, Vietnam had taken various state actions to consolidate its claims, including public propaganda, occupation of more features, diplomatic protests, administrative measures, resource exploitation and military exercises. These activities could create tension in bilateral relations. However, since 1974, especially after bilateral relations normalised in 1991, there have been mutual efforts to manage the SCS disputes.