Chapter 12
East-West Relationships in Russia

Comparing this Research with Other Work on Russia and Trust

It is now appropriate to compare the findings being presented here on the development of trusting relationships in Russia with those posited elsewhere by researchers into Russian business relationships, and researchers investigating trust. This chapter will compare the research findings with a variety of other researchers who have explored the functioning of east-west enterprises in the post-Soviet Russian business environment to find points of agreement and difference, and also to lead us to possible conclusions about the formation of trust in this particular cultural melting pot. The following chapter explores in detail how the trust data and determinants identified in this research compare and contrast with other models of trust development, and makes recommendations for improving the east-west business relationship, based on these findings.

Research into Trust in East-West Business Relationships in Russia

The key aim of this research has been to build theory on those factors that create or destroy trust in east-west relationships within Russian-western enterprises in Russia. It has been established, in Chapter 2, that cooperation based on firm mutual trust is an important pre-requisite for partnership success in east-west strategic alliances in Russia. Such trust should be characterised by the long-term personal trust typical of family and friend relationships, rather than 'rational' arm's-length contacts and contracts.

To develop such trust, good relationships between partners are vital. However, in strategic alliances in general, let alone those in Russia, there is broad agreement that: 'because of their hybrid nature, interorganizational relationships are notoriously difficult to manage, and failure rates are high (Miles and Snow, 1992; Parkhe, 1993). The success and failure of such relationships depend on whether partners can develop enough trust and mutual understanding so that potential problems can be worked out (Browning et al, 1995; Powell, 1990)' (Peng and Heath, 1996: 499). In alliances that cross cultures, this is a particular problem: 'Different cultural encoding and decoding create significant barriers to mutual understanding between persons of different nationalities' (Michailova, 1997: 14).

For investors in Russia, the difficulties of managing these interorganisational relationships have to be overcome if business success is to be assured. 'It is impossible to do business with a Russian if you do not get along with him personally... commitment and business between firms take place only if mutual trust between individuals is created first' (Salmi, 1996, cited in Holden et al, 1998: 155). Yet one of the major problems for foreign companies investing in Russia is in exactly such relationship-building between partners, in the interaction between westerners and Russians: 'in the way "West meets East" on a daily basis' (Shekshnia, 1996: 239).

If building trust and trusting relationships is vital to the success of east-west business alliances in Russia, then it is important to identify the determinants of such trust, following Butler's observation that 'a useful approach to studying trust consists of defining and investigating a number of conditions (determinants) of trust' (1991: 647). Butler made this comment observing the fact that 'Many managers have a greater need to know what causes trust than to understand the construct itself (1991: 649).

A multidisciplinary approach was taken to the research (Bachmann, 1999: 298). This is reflected in the work of Arino et al, who investigated trust in east-west alliances in Russia: 'Alliances among culturally different partners is just another complex phenomenon that demands the convergence of different social sciences as recognized in a large number of management issues' (1998: 35).

Trust has been defined here as a matter of expectations: past and present actions influence expectations of the future unmonitored behaviour of others in a situation of vulnerability. Such expectations arise not simply in the course of the history of the relationship, but out of the cultural backgrounds of each side, and the behaviours and perceptions this gives rise to. Traditional elements in trust definitions such as reputational information, choice of partner and the possibility of exercising some form of deterrent against opportunistic behaviour, or of exit, cannot be applied in the same way to discussions of building trust in the east-west context in Russia as is possible in traditional definitions of trust, which assume a commonly-known and stable institutional context for the establishment of business relationships. In Russia, partners are coming to the relationship with little or no bases for previous knowledge of each other, and yet are investing substantially in the partnership. Business, at least in the early stages, is being conducted under conditions of great uncertainty and high risk in an emerging business environment that cannot be fully relied on to guarantee business transactions.

In investigating the trust determinants, serious attention was paid to the comments of Flores and Solomon (1998) that small infidelities and infelicities, routine frustrations, broken promises and commitments, ie the everyday 'trivia' of workplace relations, cause breakdowns or confirmations of trust. Due consideration was also given to Butler's comment that trust is both multidimensional as a construct and is activated and sustained by a multidimensional set of conditions (1991). This fact is strongly evidenced across all chapters, where considerable overlap between categories is observable.

It is now appropriate to compare the hndings being presented here with those posited elsewhere. This chapter will compare the research findings with a variety of other researchers who have explored the functioning of east-west enterprises in the post-Soviet Russian business environment.

Factors External to the Enterprise

As stated in Chapter 2, much of the softer research into east-west business revolves around issues of culture. Before moving onto those, it is necessary to take a quick detour into one of the undoubtedly 'hard' issue of entering Russia - the enormous business risks that this potentially entails.

In defining trust for this research, the author was keen to distance the trust definition from those that discounted the external environment as a static variable to be 'assumed way'. Other authors have similarly recognised the impact of the external business environment on the internal one. On the matter of the high-risk nature of investing in Russia, Holden et al's respondents claimed the situation to be one of 'normal commercial risk' that was not significantly high. They suffered 'anxieties' over taxation, bureaucracy, the mafia, personal safety and illness, but they found crime to be 'no worse than anywhere else' (1998: 153).

The finding of normal commercial risk is at odds with the findings or this research. Interviewees told this researcher that Russia is a high-risk place to do business. However, they often put this in the context of the need to invest according to long-term horizons, which consequently left them unwilling to withdraw from the market once the investment has been made. It appeared that they accepted high risk as part of the equation of being in Russia, with large investment amounts being committed in the hope of long-term profits. Long lists of potential risks were often reeled off - of losing money, losing stock, having warehouses burnt down, having lorries hijacked, etc.

At the more mundane level, and moving into the second set of Holden et al's findings on risk, interviewees for this research agreed largely with the list of 'anxieties', and reported at length on the difficulties of getting anything passed through customs, the impossibility of the tax and legal system ('the biggest impediment to business in Russia today' (expatriate director)), the uncertainties surrounding obtaining approvals and licences, the 'trees' of documentation required, and the need for potentially unethical practices on occasions to get what rightfully belongs to the business. Generally they agree with Holden et al that: 'Foreigners cannot claim that they are uniquely targeted victims of the machinations of the government and its cumbersome, business-averse apparatus. Russian businessmen... share the same frustration' (1998: 153). However, the westerners do still harbour some suspicions, as evidenced in the Moose joint venture, of local bureaucrats being anti-western business. Also, the difference between the Russians and the westerners is that the Russians are more likely to have the local competence to address these problems when they arise.

On the subject of the mafia and personal safety, respondents in this research did indeed recognise the potential mafia threat, and some had experience of such practices. As has already been stated, it is difficult to gauge the true picture due to interviewee reluctance to talk openly about mafia issues - the general response was that yes it is a problem, but it is a problem for someone else, this business is fine. The mafia was an area that tended to elicit responses along the lines of 'we would not be party to such activities, and would rather leave than give in'. However, some respondents did admit to their business coming under threat, but only one actually confessed that the Moscow offices were 'looked after'.¹

On the matter of personal safety, interviewees for this research confirmed that foreigners generally, while well aware of the horror stories, do not spend their daily lives in fear of coming under attack, pointing out that it is usually the Russians, not foreigners, who are in danger. Indeed, in this regard, respondents commonly report amusing stories about being pulled over by the traffic police on some mundane charge in order to extract a bribe - this they simply view as further evidence of a corrupt society. Holden et al reflect this picture: 'There is indeed no shortage of horror stories of foreign businessmen being beaten up and even killed by criminal groups; of intimidation to the local staff of foreign companies; of hijacking of foreign trucks; of the operations of middle-men - from shady fixers to well-placed government officials - to arrange deals and favours for foreign firms for an appropriate consideration, and so forth. Yet these facts of life did not seem to deter our informants' (1998: 153).

Research into East-West Business Relationships in Russia

Chapter 2 presented a list of the common 'softer' findings that occur in research into east-west business in Russia, and made the comment that reading one set of research results in this area often feels uncomfortably like reading another.

Work-Related Cultural Differences in East-West Joint Ventures

• Orientation towards hierarchy and bureaucracy - subsumed under which are:
  • responsibility avoidance;
  • failure to take initiative;
  • poor communication skills;
  • culture of the technocratic expert, rather than a generalist manager;
  • misinterpretation of participative management styles.
• Low work ethic - subsumed under which are:
  • lack of urgency;
  • lack of service mentality;
  • lack of loyalty to organization;
  • failure to accept compensation schemes linked to performance.
• Lack of business knowledge and skills - subsumed under which are:
  • younger workers are preferred as more enthusiastic and less constrained by working habits of the old system;
  • meetings that are long and philosophical, with little fast or sure resolution of issues under discussion, unsuitable information being presented, and where participants may be expected to drink in large quantities;
  • well-educated staff but with no practical application.
• National pride and suspicion of westerners.
• Disregard for laws and regulations - subsumed under which are:
  • use of blat - ie contacts and networking;
  • mutual protection valued;
  • reliance on personal relationships and trust.

These differences between the two sides are discussed below, in relation to the data gathered for this research.

Hierarchy and Bureaucracy

Orientation towards hierarchy and bureaucracy is the first point to be noted: 'Decision-making power is still generally in the hands of one man or woman at the top. Soviet law called for strict adherence to and observance of the hierarchy (Ivancevitch, et al., 1992). This concentrates power' (Tullar, 1995: 50). One everyday example of this is the Russian obsession with protocols (Holden et al, 1998). One long-term expatriate deputy in the interview sample commented that signatures are required for every single action, and 'that's not the way we like to do things' (expatriate general director). In fact, in Moose, it was the need for a protocol to be signed over the water disposal contract agreement that lit the fuse which led up to the crucial meeting between the two deputy directors. Generally, westerners observe the Russian need to sign all sorts of things 'to move something from one side of the warehouse to the other' - they may not like it, but it is not an issue the Russians, in their highly bureaucratic society, are prepared to give ground on.

On this point, subsumed under a heading of 'orientation towards hierarchy' are: responsibility avoidance, failure to take initiative, poor communication skills, culture of the technocratic expert rather than a generalist manager, and misinterpretation of participative management styles: 'Accustomed to receiving and executing orders from the boss, Russian employees including senior managers are often reluctant to make decisions, take initiative and assume responsibility. They are looking for instructions even in the simplest situations' (Shekshnia, 1995: 244). He continues: 'On the other side of the same coin is Russians' loyalty to the boss, whose personal approval they regard as a decisive factor for their well-being in the company far more important than their own performance. As a result, you almost never see Russian employees confronting the boss or even openly questioning his/her opinion' (ibid). The technocratic manager, as described in Chapter 2, was a key figure in the Soviet managerial landscape, and has come through the ranks not as a professional manager, but as, eg a scientist or an engineer (Tullar, 1995).

In a point of cross-over that typifies the multidimensional nature of trust in both its construction and outcomes, the elements that fall under the general heading of orientation towards hierarchy/bureaucracy arise under both interpersonal competence and functional competence trust determinants.

When first setting up business relationships, hierarchical tendencies among partners can lead to surprising results, as noted by one of Barnes et al's interviewees: 'The moment they figure out that someone is a 'boss' [in the western partner] they do not take anyone else into account... He is respected, and everyone else is treated according to his rank in the hierarchy' (1997: 542). Once the partnership is up and running, the orientation towards hierarchy was exhibited through perceived tendencies on the part of Russian staff to always look to the boss, and to avoid responsibility and fail to take initiative. This occurred at different levels - in the workplace, expatriate managers noted considerable demands on their managerial skills to encourage a more participative, team-based workplace style among employees, in which they did not fear being punished for mistakes, where information was to be shared and communicated, rather than kept to oneself. Indeed, in a number of instances, they stated their discomfort with the expectations of 'god king' foisted upon them, promoting instead more egalitarian workplace values and behaviours. However, Michailova (1997) found the way that 'softer' more participative western style managerial approaches are received to be an important issue: 'The western staff of the management group tries to apply soft and human leadership methods and invoke democratic values in X. This is interpreted by Russian employees as "confusion and lack of clear vision", "lack of strategy" and "lack of understanding of the specificity of the situation in Russia" and has therefore demotivating consequences' (1997: 15).

Arino et al identify this as a cultural issue, commenting that the two main sources of difficulties, and thus hindrances to success are 'the operational and cultural differences between Russian and western companies, with the cultural having a key impact on the operational' (1997: 30). They gave a number of examples of the problems in practice that this poses: 'while Russians are conscious of a goal to be reached, they do not seem to feel the time pressure or to be diligent in taking steps to achieve that goal.... they seem not to take the initiative to solve problems that crop up; rather they present them to the Western partner with no suggestions for solutions... Another described how difficult it was to show people that they have to make their own decisions and assume certain responsibilities' (ibid). This has clear parallels with responses in this research - from managers commenting on Russian tendencies to throw up their arms and say 'there's a problem, there's a problem', to others who tried to teach his staff 'if you take the ball to the edge of your area and there is no one there to pick it up, you walk those extra few yards until there is someone to take it' (Moose, expatriate contractor).

In Moose in particular, the legacy of the autocratic boss was still visible in the perceived behaviour of many of the Russian managers, the Russian deputy general director in particular, and this fuelled distrust of him and 'his cronies' on the part of many of the western staff. Michailova sets out the ensuing interrelationship, as her interviewees observe: 'Most of the things are totally controlled by the managing director. If one does not get his acceptance, it will not happen. There is no real consultation. Initiative and creativity at the lower levels are missing'. Michailova goes on to comment that openness is not valued as a result because, according to an interviewee: 'If one talks openly about the problems one has, this is seen as the expression of a lack of personal qualifications' (Michailova, 1997: 12). This is once more a reflection of the high functional competence demands so evident in Moose in particular, and the comment by one western case study interviewee that the Russian view is 'make one mistake and you're out'. But it is a real issue in Russian management practice: 'the Russian managers experience much more skepticism towards their own abilities and knowledge in comparison with their western colleagues' (Michailova, 1997: 12).

This is an area in which the interpersonal competence element mixes with the motives element. While the westerners are suspicious of the autocractic style of management behaviour, to Russian staff, this may well signify integrity in the Soviet tradition of paternalism: 'The Russian employees' perception of dependency ... is interrelated with paternalism, understood as guardianship of the collective on the part of management... it is a specific managerial orientation towards the human aspect of work life and at the same time an expression of the hierarchical division and inequality within the organization (the figure of the general director in contrast to the mass of employees)' (Michailova, 1997: 12).

In the Moose joint venture, a further element in this equation was the expectation from the Russians of a technocratic expert in the field - an expectation that was exhibited through the Russians' disappointment with the western staff over perceived poor functional competence, leading to a lack of trust on the part of the Russians towards their western partners. This perceived lack of functional competence focuses more on the technical competence than the managerial competence elements, but it is possible that the westerners' lack of local competence may be muddying the waters.

The disappointment of the Russians' expectations over the westerners' perceived lack of technical competence is not compensated for by the westerners' managerial competence - in fact, the reverse may be true on account of the high monitoring bureaucratic system prevalent in Mammoth that is extended to the joint venture. And then the disappointment is made worse by the westerners' lack of local competence. The westerners are clearly unable, at least in the early stages of the relationship, to provide local competence; further, some technical competence matters will be rooted in the local ways of operating, local technical skills, skills related to managing the local workforce etc, and so the local and functional competence elements overlap.

Perhaps an admission of weakness by the westerners would go some way to building bridges here. As the Russian deputy states, the Mammoth partners should be more 'modest' in the descriptions they give to themselves. In such a situation, the westerners' lack of local competence may be more acceptable to the Russians if they admit that this is the case. Similarly, although the western partners enjoy technical superiority in respect of western technologies, the Russians too have a technical/technological pedigree (both in terms of education and the achievements of the USSR, and in the Moose context of applying their own technology to the local conditions). The westerners may gain ground by respecting this and working with it, rather than the reverse. In this way, their managerial competence may be seen as more legitimate.

But in the situation prevailing in Moose, with both local and technical competence perceived as low by the Russians, little wonder they are unprepared to evaluate highly the westerners' managerial competence. It is, therefore, not possible to effectively leverage the managerial and useful technical knowledge of the western staff, and skills transfer suffers as a result.

This situation has echoes in Michailova's work, which emphasises the outgroup element inherent in this situation: 'The westerners are perceived by the Russian employees as outsiders. In this role, it is difficult for them to know the background of the problems with which they are confronted. However, the western expatriates have the advantage of possessing more varied experience and the possibility of referring to certain situations from other organizations where they have been working prior to their assignment in X' (Michailova, 1997: 15). This has close parallels with the views of John, the expatriate deputy, who is frustrated by Russians' constant probing and questioning, when he sees his own experience and that of his expatriate counterparts permitting him to know the answers to Russians' questions without further discussion - he believes it is their lack of experience that gives rise to the Russians' constant need to raise questions.

Finally on this point, westerners generally observed the tendency towards hierarchy in external agencies as a brake on the reform process, where more traditional 'Soviet' ways of behaviour meant that lower level officials and bureaucrats would not take personal responsibility to help eg pass goods through customs.

Work Ethic

The next set of tendencies to be noted in the list are those related to a perceived low work ethic, comprising: lack of urgency, lack of service mentality, lack of loyalty to the organisation, and failure to accept compensation schemes linked to performance: 'They pretend to pay us, and we pretend that we work... such ways of thinking have been handed down for several generations in Russian society because they were valued as a survival tactic... Russians existed in a severely regulated system, where individual achievement was largely disregarded' (Barnes et al, 1997: 545). This is an area that was commented on by both the Russians and westerners during this research, and generally occurred in comparisons of the managerial functional competence of western and Russian staff.

A number of western managers talked of the need to reverse the 'Soviet' mentality of being at work to look after yourself and your family and friends first, and the customer or employer last. Westerners described difficulties with getting a day's work for a day's pay, with getting staff to take pride in their work rather than interpreting insistence on standards as nitpicking, even getting reception staff not to answer the telephone with a blunt 'allo'. This reflects the findings of other researchers that: '[s]ince such values as friendship, social contacts, entertainment, and equality are much more important for Russians than work, they come to work thinking about friends, contacts, conversations etc' (Shekshnia, 1995: 244). One western interviewee for this research described how many members of his shop's staff were 'in gloom' when the bonuses were awarded to those who had achieved their sales targets, and the rest 'wanted what they had'. This is a point elaborated by Shekshnia thus: 'Salary in their eyes is attached to the position, not to the performance, so that task is to keep the job, not to do the job' (1995: 244).

The Russians, too, see the demands made of workers as a difference between western and Russian organisations. One Russian respondent compared the 'can do' attitude of western organisations with 'sluggishness and unhurried ways' in Russian organisations - 'and then, who cares?', as he commented wryly. A number of Russians claim to prefer the team spirit, the helpful attitude towards co-workers, the positive approach to problem solving engendered in western organisations, and even say they have changed themselves in this regard. This is a break-away from the 'Soviet' stereotype, and evidence of changing values and attitudes - as one expatriate general director described it: 'Young Russian people in the cities have proved themselves to be very able, dynamic and very hardworking - everything you would not have associated with the old Soviet Union'. However, in Moose, some Russians hinted that despite the positive elements, they were working a lot harder for their money, and the money was not enough.

Business Knowledge and Skills

On overlapping category is that of lack of business knowledge and skills on the part of Russian employees, subsumed under which is a preference among western organisations to employ younger workers (this also relates back to the low work ethic described above - it was not felt possible by most western managers in Russia to create the required culture shift to western service standards amongst older Russian individuals 'spoilt' by Soviet ways), the feeling that meeting styles are generally inappropriate and that meetings generally fail to achieve a great deal, and the observation that staff, though well-educated, cannot apply this knowledge.

On the subject of employing young staff, Arino et al (1997) commented that: 'a significant number of western managers believed [they would] have to wait for the next generation of young people with a western mentality, given the impossibility - as one manager stated - of older people adapting their mindset to rapidly changing conditions'. A sentiment reflected by Reineke: 'In many cases it is not possible to bring about the necessary change in thought and behavior among the older generation of managers' (1995: 97). Western managers in this research felt that Russians over a certain age generally, although not always, were unsuited to the demands of a western-type organisation - too long spent working in 'Soviet' ways was perceived as preventing the required culture shift in attitudes and behaviour. Indeed, it was not unusual for organisations to employ Russians with an average age that was little above 25, and many westerners observed that 35 tended to be the upper age limit.

In the Moose joint venture, while many of the Russian staff employed in the enterprise reflected this tendency, at the more senior levels, the managers were generally at least 45, but often much older. One could speculate that this is a real-life example of the difficulties that ensue when a western organisation is faced with a Russian partner that insists on its 'own' staff, and of the problems inherent in employing 'older', ex-Soviet staff. While the Russian managers themselves embraced many of the changes, eg towards team-working, budget holding etc, that working for a western-style organisation brought, some of the more 'Soviet' aspects of their behaviour caused conflict - for example the Russian deputy's autocratic management style, which was reflected by others in the higher echelons, an observed tendency to work with 'cliques' of individuals known to them and so on.² The opposite side of this was these same Russians' expectations of their western counterparts - they expected older, experienced, well-educated managers, and were greatly disappointed by college graduates in their twenties, refusing to accept that they could bring functional competence to the enterprise.³

In the related area of meeting styles, Holden et al made a number of findings on western perceptions of their Russian partners' skills as business communicators and negotiators. They found that 'Russian business people in general:

1. want one big outcome
2. want personal relationships
3. "fear" being outsmarted
4. like to harangue
5. like meetings with bluster.' (1998: 154)

They went on to comment on business communication and negotiation as a process:

1. .business negotiations are tough, slow and exasperating
2. the Russian side is acutely status conscious
3. the Russian side is obsessed with protocols
4. the boss is the boss
5. younger Russians are easier to deal with.' (1998: 156).

A number of the points on the above lists can be aggregated within the context of meeting and negotiation styles - wanting one big outcome, a tendency to 'bluster', liking to harangue, tough and exasperating negotiations - these have all been suggested in the data presented here. One highly experienced westerner in Russia interviewed by this researcher described a love of brinkmanship, Russians as keen chess players being reflected in meeting styles, the need to pretend to be disinterested to a large extent in what you really want - he saw it as something one needs to develop a feel for over time. This is all reflected in Holden et al's findings: 'the Russian tendency is to pursue an overriding drive for absolute advantage' (1998: 154).

On the matter of what could be achieved at meetings, westerners for this research typically recounted how the 'Soviet' way of meeting was characterised by 'huge philosophical preambles', great 'pontificating about the way things should be', and finishing up with much drinking and bonhomie. This was a point of difficulty for westerners who wanted to reach resolutions on issues and agree courses of actions - at least one western partner lamented the constant need to check up that what has been agreed at one meeting has actually been carried out by the time of the next one. However, some also observed that the Russians had moved somewhat towards a more 'western' style in meetings, bringing more useful information and/or putting out mineral water and a light lunch rather than vodka and a full Russian meat and vegetables course. Holden et al's Russians seemed less sympathetic: 'informants found that their meetings were badly organized and that key Russian counterparts were not well prepared. They did not always seem to care or realize how this disadvantaged them' (1998: 154).

Regarding the Russian partners more generally, while western interviewees were generally impressed with the educational achievements of their Russian staff,⁴ they invested heavily in training to bring Russians 'up to speed' with western management techniques. 'Russians easily understand new things, and in that sense they are good trainees. Problems start when they have to use on the job what has been learned in class' (Shekshnia, 1996: 241). As one western director commented, if you put someone into a position that you think they could do 'with their eyes closed', but without any training 'they will be useless'. The counterpoint to this, however, is the observation that the Russians have 'an almost insatiable appetite for learning', and so training tends to be well-received; the difficulty is only then in implementing what has been learned - often this arises out of the other problematic elements mentioned above, such as preferences for hierarchy and a low work ethic. Of course, in Moose, the Russians' own perceived superior level of education led them to ascribe low functional competence skills to their western counterparts in comparison.

On the issue of partner competencies, Arino et al found that the most important characteristics western investors looked for in their Russian partners were task-related and partner-related criteria (Geringer, 1991). Task-related criteria included knowledge of local business conditions, products and clients, economic trends, the regulatory system, assistance in the search for a good location, the ability to manage the process of securing regulatory approvals and the capacity to influence politicians. Partner-related criteria included reputation, potential to maintain a continuing and stable relationship, position within the industry (this may help with, eg, start-up costs if the partner's facilities 'can be easily accommodated to the western practices', or providing connections with local companies), professionalism (in the sense of Russian partners who already have a western mentality and managerial skills), honesty and seriousness, convergence of goals, and enthusiasm for the project. 'Task-related criteria are closely connected with the contributions each company will make to the partnership, and... partner-related criteria will affect the process of managing the relationship' (Arino et al, 1997: 30).

There are parallels between Arino et al's distinction and the data categories identified here. Clearly, task-related criteria as required from the Russian partners parallel the local competence category identified in this research. Arino et al view the contribution of the western partners as being knowledge transfer 'related to their business skills': technical know-how, marketing skills, and management systems; and financial resources, ie they contribute functional competence, both managerial and technical. Extensive training programmes were reported as part of this knowledge transfer process.

The partner-related criteria of eg honesty and seriousness, enthusiasm and commitment, stable relationship potential, reputation, reflect the motives category; this is an element that was found in Chapter 9 to be sought out strongly by both the western and Russian sides of a partnership.

Professionalism, as defined by Arino et al, relates to a preference for some level of managerial functional competence in Russian partners. As has already been shown, while this is seen as a desirable attribute amongst partners, generally, during the 1990s, it was not seen as a realistic ambition, given Russians' lack of experience in a market system - waiting for a younger generation to come through was seen as the best approach while the market system was still emerging. Although the data presented here generally confirmed this position, a good number of western managers were most impressed with the drive, ambition and understanding that their Russian counterparts brought to the venture. For example, the expatriate deputy of one telecoms joint venture was full of praise for his Russian counterparts who have 'come on a lot over the past three to four years from being, when we first started talking to them, working with them, a state monopoly to now being a privatised entity with shareholders rattling their cage, and investors questioning their judgement, and competition. So they've had to change quite a lot and they've become more western in their outlook'.

The reverse of this situation was the tales of having to get rid of Russian incumbents in the partner organisation who wanted to take the western partners' money and nothing else: '"just send us the cheque and we'll spend it, you stay away, don't come here". I think that's the way he saw it, he just saw it as a meal ticket to do what he wanted to do' (expatriate deputy director), was the experience of one respondent. But there were also Russian complaints in the data that the Russians had the expertise to do the job, but the western partners chose to ignore it, favouring their own approaches and their 'own people' instead.

National Pride

National pride and suspicion of westerners were listed in Chapter 2 as a common element in business relations between Russians and westerners: 'They [Russians] think that Americans come to Russia only to take advantage of "poor Russians" to ride on their backs, to drive all their secrets out of them, and to squeeze them as lemons and throw them away... I have heard that phrase so many times, I can't count them!' (interviewee quotation in Barnes et al, 1997: 546).

In this research, one interviewee observed that Russians originally saw the westerners as the answer to their prayers, but once product dumping and fly-by-night operators hit the market, such ideas were quickly dispelled. Generally, however, this is an element that came out very strongly in the Moose joint venture. The Russian side were clearly furious at the British partners in the venture for their failure to respect their 'renown' - for the Russians' abilities to send rockets to the moon, build a communist society, make progress in technology and so on - and for a generally patronising, disrespectful attitude to everything they had achieved, both during communism and after. In fact, they saw the British staff in the venture as there to benefit from the Russians' knowledge, to make future gains from it, and all the while showing a disrespectful attitude to Russian partners, yet with the need to 'pretend to be an expert, and simultaneously on the other hand the person is supposed to get knowledge from his Russian colleagues, not letting him know about this process' (Moose, Russian deputy director).

The following comment by Holden et al throws considerable light on the difficulties identified in Moose of low functional competence perceptions from the Russians towards the UK partners: 'most experienced foreign visitors would agree that Russians are frequently very well educated in their own language, mathematics and in many branches of science. This otherwise positive benefit for the development of Russian management systems tends to disguise the fact that Russians expect to be dealing in business with foreign people as well educated as themselves' (1998: 152).

Indeed, and as stated earlier, a Russian manager in his fifties may have something of a problem accepting a twenty- or thirty-something general manager from the western partner. The angry views expressed by the Russians in Moose over the poor professional skills of their western partners, and their inordinately high wages have echoes in Holden et al's work. Reporting on a workshop held in Moscow, Holden et al put forward the Russian view as described by a keynote Russian speaker thus 'Why is this western manager being paid ten times more than me, when he doesn't know anything?' (1998: 34). Indeed, Shekshnia has commented extensively on how local employees feel undervalued, discriminated against or betrayed in the light of such pay differentials: 'When local people don't see super performance by extremely well-paid expatriates (which often is the case due to various reasons), they begin to question the relation between expatriates' costs and the value they add to the company' (1996: 246). Throwing light on why this researcher has only received guarded hints generally from Russians on the subject, Shekshnia comments: 'So far this problem has not caused any major revolts on the Russian side, only silent disapproval, but it could be a time-bomb' (ibid).

Holden et al cite another possible interpretation of this situation, putting forward Aslund's view that the old Soviet industrial managers are convinced that the 'experience of other countries cannot be applied to Russia with its "unique" set of intractable problems' (1998: 115), while insisting 'that they possess extraordinary competence as business people' (ibid). Holden et al go on to describe this as 'a kind of romanticizing tendency on their part to underestimate foreigners' ability to understand Russia's problems and exaggerate their appetite for gloating over Russian misfortune' (1998: 116). Moose's Russian deputy, proudly telling this researcher how Russia has covered 60 years of development in just six, is just one example of Russians' high opinion of their own achievements and abilities.

Further, it is possible to observe a more holistic approach amongst Russians to solving 'economic' problems; for example, Holden et al describe how 'western consultants are regarded as ignorant, lacking "a Russia perspective", and inclined to find economic solutions to problems which Russians see as economic and social and cultural' (1998: 34). In support of this, they give the example of Dutch and Russian approaches to the problems facing an enterprise: 'The Russian consultants included group dynamics and philosophy of the enterprise as dimensions in their analysis of the enterprise: the Dutch included neither of these' (1998: 36).

This approach, and the tensions it gives rise to, is reflected, perhaps, in the view of a young Russian respondent in Moose who described to the researcher Russia's new civil code as 'the best in the world', and who insists that the western ways 'are not always the best'. Similarly, the Russian chief engineer who had worked on an oil recovery project for Moose, and who suddenly spent an entire day raising technical arguments as to why they could not pump oil out at the planned capacity, before finally blurting out in frustration (following the failure of her 'economic' arguments): 'But what about the oil for our grandchildren?', is evidence of the wider stake that Russians perceive in their economic endeavours.

Holden et al view this tendency as having serious implications for the question of Russia's development: 'The Russians are, in a nutshell, doggedly determined to do things their way (which is, of course, their prerogative) and are therefore pursuing - not for the first time in their history - yet another alternative path whereby Russia will somehow lead the west "on to a higher and higher stage of civilisation" (Hosking, 1997). This alternative path is a most distinctively Russian one' (1998: 167).

Attitudes that reject out of hand western approaches and solutions are observable not just at the enterprise level, they cut right through both the state agencies regulating the emergent business environment and the reform process itself. The Moose joint venture gave strong indications of the Russians' refusal to accept foreign standards, insisting instead on their own, and leaving western companies importing western parts and components with a bureaucratic and sourcing nightmare. However, these Russian rules and regulations are subject to constant change and political lobbying.

Holden et al's respondents also report poor communication skills among their Russian partners. This skills shortage is put down to the following three factors:

• 'a Russian cultural tradition which admires modesty in the statement of one's achievements
• the long-standing approach to teaching in Russia, and powerfully reinforced in the Soviet era, which actively discouraged participation and promotion of unorthodox views
• innate Russian bashfulness, which does not make Russians into natural salesmen.' (1998: 154).

There are a number of elements that can be detected in the above list. For this particular researcher, the word 'modesty' leaps off the page, as it is a reflection of the comments of the Russian expatriate deputy in the Moose joint venture who stated that the British partners should stop calling themselves 'super experts' - just 'experts' would be more modest - and anyway, he continues, they are not even experts, more just college level - this returns us, yet again, to complaints over low perceived functional competence. The second comment on lack of openness has been addressed at length in the foregoing chapters, and in the literature generally, through discussions of a tendency to look to the boss and responsibility avoidance behaviour. The final comment on innate Russian bashfulness brings to mind one interviewee who told this researcher that he finds Russians to be very shy people, who will 'take it on the chin' if you offend them in any way without letting you know it, and who, in personality surveys used by his company, generally come out as having low self-esteem.

The Legal Environment Versus Informal Arrangements

Finally, disregard for laws and regulations was a key element to emerge in the east-west literature, subsumed under which were: use of blat - ie contacts and networking, valuing mutual protection, and reliance on personal relationships and trust. Such issues are extensively discussed in the literature in the context of the emerging market system in Russia generally.

Arino et al's western respondents specifically mention misunderstandings regarding commitment to the given word, describing verbal agreements that had been reached one day and ignored the next. The authors posit that westerners may consider a verbal agreement binding, but this does not seem to be the case for Russians. In the data presented here, mixed signals occurred in this matter. On the one hand many western interviewees expressed the strong view that in the Russian business environment your word is your bond - 'break that and the relationship is finished' (expatriate general director). While others expressed considerable disappointment that agreements reached, for example, during meetings had always to be checked upon, and that discussions and resolutions reached in meetings generally seemed to resolve little.

Where there was complete agreement both among Arino et al's interviewees, and respondents interviewed by this researcher, was on the fact that legal contracts play no significant role in the process of trust building. 'A few explained that the contract has been carefully designed by lawyers, and every detail had been studied, discussed, and signed; the contract, however, was then set aside and did not govern the relationship. While it is necessary to move prudently and to have a good, tight contract, this is by no means sufficient' (1997: 28). This is a direct echo of interviewees for this research who found that, for example the contract was seen as something to be moulded around situations, rather than governing them, the starting point for negotiations, rather than the end. However, it is important to note in this context the findings of the Moose joint venture experience that contracts are strictly adhered to by outside agencies or suppliers.

The roots of closed networks and their evolution into the present environment are often mapped thus: 'blat, value of mutual protection and a lack of organizational loyalty can be accounted for by the "survival" mentality that evolved in a tightly controlled Soviet society and that continues in post-perestroika Russia where a loose infrastructure, ambiguous laws, and rampant crime have emerged in Russia's "frontier economy", personal trust and tightly-knit networks are perceived crucial for survival' (Barnes et al, 1997: 546). Some perspectives focus on the prevalence of these old Soviet networks not as an efficient response to the demands of reform, but as a threat to its success: 'Closed networks have been able to turn themselves into vehicles for rent seeking, and new enterprises have been discouraged through persistent regulatory interference and corruption (Johnson et al, 1997)' (Raiser, 1999: 9-10). Indeed, some link this into social capital arguments to take the view that in Russia, there is a scarcity, even an absence of the minimal trust that is necessary to allow transactions to take place this is a key obstacle to the development of a market economy in Russia (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998).

The question this seems to pose is how can the Russians trust foreigners if they cannot trust each other? Further, if trust is so low, then why is developing interpersonal trust so commonly identified as a key factor in success by researchers into east-west business in Russia? Part of the answer to these questions may be found in the Russian desire to work with those who are 'iz nashich' - one of us. Both Russian and western respondents describe a preference to work with friends, and the Moose joint venture suggests that former networks may still be active to an extent. The message appears to be that it is important to be 'one of us', because the Russians feel unable to generalise trust beyond their own small, familial networks - as Holden at al state: 'collectivism is an enormously strong theme in Russian history' (1998: 79). This finding has reflections in Fukuyama's argument, that there is a: "'missing middle", namely the absence of intermediate social groups in the area between the family and large, centralized organizations like the Church or the State' (Fukuyama (1995): 55-56). According to Fukuyama's argument, this makes Russia generally a low- trust society, beyond the closed familial networks within which people like to operate. He claims that socialism in the Soviet Union thoroughly destroyed any civil society that took place there, 'a destruction that has hampered the emergence of both working market economies and stable democracies. The Leninist state set about deliberately to destroy all possible competitors to its power, from the "commanding heights" of the economy down through the innumerable farms, small businesses, unions, churches, newspapers, voluntary associations, and the like, to the family itself (Fukuyama, 1995: 54-55).

Clearly the informal aspects of business life in the post-Soviet environment emerged very strongly in the local competence trust determinant, although, typical of the cross-over between determinants, interpersonal competence also presented evidence on this. Local competence was necessary in the Russian business environment because of the high level of bureaucratic requirements, and the continuing tendency to depend on local informal underpinnings to formal relationships in order to get the job done.

Local competence may take place at the purely official level of having the local expertise to go from ministry to official to committee and back again with the various pieces of paper properly filled in to achieve the desired result. Also, to identify local suppliers and distribution conduits, Russian expertise is required. But local competence also takes the form of the more unofficial routes such as contacts in the mayor's office, or, in the case of one western company's Russian partners, giving mobile phones as an inducement to customs officials to pass goods. In many instances, licences were obtained, items were passed through customs, electricity was switched on through local connections and contacts.

In the Moose joint venture, this need for local competence both at the formal and informal level was a considerable source of conflict and lack of trust directed from the western partners towards the Russian ones. The westerners felt excluded from local decision making, and when they joined this exclusion together with abrasive management styles from their Russian colleagues, and certain business practices that were ethically dubious in their eyes - such as having conflicts of interests with supplier organisations - then western trust in their Russian counterparts decreased dramatically.

However, Moose also raises a question mark over the true prevalence of the supposedly all-powerful old Soviet networks. An audit by the local fire department had resulted, for the second year running, in a demand for payment for the 'extra cover' that the joint venture's facilities would require. The previous year this had been taken through to senior ministerial and court levels in Moscow for resolution (the joint venture was found not to have to make the payment), and the same thing was happening again. Considerable (Russian) managerial time was being expended trying to seek a resolution, and once again, trips to Moscow were being undertaken to dispute the demand for money. The Russians were as unhappy with the decision as the westerners, pointing to the fact that the fire department had done the same thing the previous year, and had been told by Moscow that they were not permitted to demand extra money. It is notable that the Russians appeared to be following formal, legal remedies to this situation, and had done the same the previous year. If the old Soviet networks were so powerful, then surely this situation would not be permitted to be taken out of local politics and passed over to Moscow officials for formal resolution?

In the workplace, the more informal way of conducting business was observed by westerners as being exhibited through a tendency to recruit through word of mouth, and a preference for working with friends. Western respondents viewed their efforts in the workplace as most successful when they employed an interpersonal approach to colleagues, sharing in their problems and celebrating birthdays, so as to become more 'one of us' than 'one of them'. Indeed, the new expatriate deputy's much more personal approach in Moose was perceived as going some way towards healing the rift between the Russian and western sides of the venture.

Summary

This research looks specifically at the building of inter-partner trust in east-west joint ventures. This chapter has looked in detail at the cultural mismatches present in the Russian-western process of communication and relationship building in such a cross-cultural enterprise. Behind the communications and behaviours discussed in this chapter lie a whole series of assumptions relating to expectations of how business is done, the appropriate sets of behaviours and language, historical traditions such as an expectation of hierarchy, deeply-held stereotypes and prejudices, and many other things besides. In many respects, the way in which the Russian and western sides communicate is a microcosm of all the expectations they bring to the table.

It is through their interpersonal competence skills, and not through external and internal monitoring activities, that the westerners signal the fact they are not, in Holden et al's terms 'victorious capitalists', ie outgroup members, and thus show that their motives are positive. In this way, their functional competence skills can be applied with the maximum benefit, and local competence skills can be acquired. Arino et al suggest this same pattern in a slightly different way, when they state that partner-related criteria affect the process of managing the relationship - this mix of motives and interpersonal skills allows their task-related (ie functional competence) skills to be put into effect, and local competence skills to be activated, and perhaps transferred (although Arino et al do not identify this element).

Holden et al sum up the findings in this regard well: 'western professionals and their Russian counterparts do not bring to their encounters necessarily compatible or even reconcilable assumptions about their role vis-à-vis one another. The atmosphere of interactions can be prickly to the point of hostility. Russian partners, it seems, have a problem with being partners. The impression is that in the Russian perception of relationships one side must dominate and the other be abject and fawning. Little wonder then that the Russian negotiators are inclined to harangue and lecture their western colleagues, to bluster defensively in case they, the westerners, true to form, get up to their tricks of being clever, superior and catching them out...

We saw too how the Russian position in negotiations and relationships is strongly influenced by the boss. He sets the tone, makes the decisions, does not trouble himself with matters of detail: the underlings deal with all that. The boss is much preoccupied with his status. He is definitely primus inter pares with his colleagues but is no worse than you, his foreign counterpart. In the more formal session he will stress to you the potential of Russia. The potential, he will argue, guarantees the investment. There is, therefore, no problem, hence the detail can be swept aside. The detail gets in the way of the relationship, and the relationship can come alive when the vodka is flowing, when the hearty toasts cement not so much the deal as the moment of boozy bonhomie it has given rise to' (1998: 166).

On the specific subject of building trust, Arino et al make a number of findings. In line with the results of other research into east-west investment activities in Russia, they find that: 'For a partnership to be formed, there must be some initial trust between the companies involved' (1997: 32). Arino et al see trust in the early stages as something akin to reliability, and this can easily come under threat from misunderstandings.

Unsurprisingly to this researcher, Arino et al found that: 'contrary to a priori expectations, the profiles and individuals of the executives involved seemed to play a greater role than the profile of the companies' (1997: 35). In a situation where the person is more important than the deal: 'Interpersonal relationships become the cornerstone of trust building', and develop over time, as the key point is to 'be more concerned with laying the foundations of the business than with growth' (ibid). But the crucial factor in these interpersonal relationships is that: 'Russians ... seem to appreciate a true friendship and distinguish this one from a mere forbearance born out of pure economic interests' (1997: 36).

This researcher believes that the above point is possibly the key factor in building trusting east-west relationships. Russians seek genuine friendship and integrity from their business partners, who should possess a high degree of such personal qualities. At a conference on trust, when presenting a paper on the research presented here, this researcher was asked by an audience member whether the lesson, then, was that organisations should simply send to Russia people with good interpersonal skills. The researcher responded that this is not sufficient - the successful expatriate managers (and consequently the successful businesses) were those who genuinely indulged in interpersonal activities for the intrinsic value they received from such social contact - not because such relations were a means to a business end. It is the trust determinants strengthened by interpersonal competence activities that provide the best conduit for the cross-cultural interchange, permitting both increased inter-partner trust and durable business relationships, accompanied by a more holistic transfer of competences. Table 1 summarises the key findings of this research about the experiences of western investors operating in the Russian environment, and how these experiences affect trust.

Table 12.1 Cultural Issues and their Impact on Building Trust in Russia

Key Insights on Research into East-West Relationships in Russia

It is possible to identify certain key insights arising out the findings of this research as they relate to the literature investigating east-west business collaboration.

Business Risk

On the subject of the external environment in which business is taking place, Holden et al's respondents reported 'normal commercial risk'. This is at odds with the findings of this research, in which interviewees perceived Russia as a high-risk place to do business. However, interviewees placed this observation in the context of the large amounts of long-term investment they were committing to the country that generally had them weathering storms that may have had them leaving other markets. Such risk was accepted as part of the equation of being in Russia perhaps in that way it became 'normal' and acceptable.

Role of Contracts

Still on the subject of the external environment, both Arino et al and Holden et al had a number of connected findings on the role of agreements and contracts. Arino et al found that a verbal agreement was considered by the westerners to be binding but this was not the case for the Russians. The data gathered by this researcher provide mixed signals on this: some interviewees were quite adamant that in Russia your word is your bond, and that to break it is to destroy the relationship; on the other hand, some respondents were clearly irritated by the constant need to check up that decisions reached during meetings were actually put into effect.

There was agreement between Arino et al's respondents, and those of Holden et al that contracts are not adhered to to any great extent. This researcher made a similar finding. However, westerners and Russians in Moose commonly reported that contracts with suppliers, customs forms etc, were strictly adhered to and taken through the courts. This researcher suggests that there is a distinction taking place between within-partnership contracting and contracting with agencies and individuals who are external to the business in question. A question arises also as to how the perceived 'informal' contracting between individuals who know each other might be enforced.

Prevalence of the Old Soviet Networks

There is a possibility that external agencies, when dealing with a western-invested enterprise, could have anti-western motives and invoke more stringent application of the rules and procedures than would normally be the case. However, as Holden et al comment, both Russians and westerners seem to suffer in much the same way from a business-averse bureaucracy.

Indeed, in the Moose joint venture, the fire department demanding money from Moose seemed to confirm this view, and also to suggest that the prevalence of the old Soviet networks may not be as extensive as some westerners think. The prevalence of the old Soviet networks is alternately proposed as an efficient response to the reform process, or a brake on it (Raiser, 1999). While Moose in particular appeared to provide heavy hints that old Soviet networks were still active in the activities of the joint venture, thfough the suspicions of hidden agendas, perceived evidence of conflicts of interest and so on, the fire department audit put a question mark over this.

It is notable that the Russians appeared to be following formal, legal remedies to this situation, and had done the same the previous year. If the old Soviet networks were so powerful, then why were formal resolutions being pursued? Surely this is exactly the sort of situation that would remain within local politics and politicking, rather than be passed over to 'arm's-length' Moscow officials for formal resolution, if the networks were still functioning.

Protocols

Perhaps an interesting aside in this regard is the Russian obsession with 'protocols' - requiring a signature for the most mundane of acts and items - despite Russians' relationships with each other being so averse to contractual issues. The need for protocols can conflict with devolved western styles, but in Moose, the need to sign a protocol was the excuse to bring into the open a whole series of issues through the expatriate deputy's refusal to sign - a significant act. The key point over this whole question of protocols, in this researcher's opinion, is the question of why the Russians insist on maintaining the protocols system? It is possible to hypothesise that the continued use of protocols is a reflection of preferences for hierarchy in business relationships: these pieces of paper provide a rubber stamp that something has been properly authorised and the approved action can proceed.⁵

Young Russians and Changing Workplace Behaviour

This research made some interesting findings about changing values of young Russians. Moose seemed to provide a good example of the difficulties that may be encountered when 'older' Soviet era managers occupy key positions in an organisation. Indeed, most western managers interviewed for this research agreed with those researchers who propose that it would be necessary to wait for the next generation of young people to come through until a 'western' philosophy towards doing business could be instilled.

However, a good number of western managers were most impressed with the drive, ambition and understanding that their Russian counterparts brought to the venture irrespective of age. Further, the young Russians who are so eagerly awaited showed certain signs of a shift in values taking place. This occurred in the focus group interviews, where one Russian commented wryly on the 'who cares' attitude of Russian companies, and another Russian focus group, along with a respondent in Moose, stated that they believed they had changed themselves as a result of this 'new' approach.⁶ Some western respondents in this research recognised this 'breakaway' from the Soviet stereotypes, and were optimistic about young Russians' performance in the future.

The Key Role of Interpersonal Relationships and Expatriates Seconded to the Venture

Arino et al found that interpersonal relationships are the cornerstone of trust building - a finding that has already been well-established throughout the data presented here; Holden et al confirm the same, finding that Russians above all want personal relationships in business, rather than arm's-length contracts. Arino et al confirmed the case study suggestion that a consensual approach to decision-making and conflict resolution brings partners closer together (within Moose, it is difficult to imagine them being further apart), even though it takes much longer to reach agreement. However, in the Moose context, if part of such an effort were the involvement of the UK personnel at eg meetings with Russian suppliers, this may well be perceived as increased monitoring, and trust could be undermined.

In relation to the importance of interpersonal relationships, one of Arino et al's key findings was that the profiles of the individual executives involved was more important than the profiles of the companies. This researcher can certainly confirm this, and would add that the social behaviour of many expatriates in Russia who stress outgroup membership by 'hanging out' with an expatriate crowd, going to expatriate bars and spending large amounts of their expatriate money on the general 'expat lifestyle' will not be the most successful at forging workplace relationships.

Indeed, this researcher takes further Arino et al's suggestion that interpersonal relations must take the form of true friendship rather than mutual forbearance, to suggest that the expatriate managers seeking to establish trusting relations with partners at the social and informal level should only do so on the basis of the intrinsic value that they gain from such contact, rather than in the search for some economic end. This researcher believes that the above point is possibly the key factor in building trusting east-west relationships: Russians seek genuine friendship and integrity from their business partners, who should possess a high degree of such personal qualities. This poses a considerable recruitment challenge western business sending staff to Russia.

¹ The researcher is also somewhat suspicious of the respondent who answered 'no comment' in response to the mafia question.

² This may explain the comments of the Russian deputy that members of the expatriate staff still believed him to be an 'ardent adherent' of socialist ways - a view which clearly infuriated this individual who saw himself as a successful, go-ahead manager. The westerners may have been commenting less on his political views, and more on his behaviour patterns, which they considered to be of the distinctly 'Soviet' variety!

³ One should also recall to mind the finding in Chapter 4 that some respondents were most impressed with the commitment of their Russian partners who have said 'we're going to be a western-style company, we're going to be a Russian western-style company, and it's leadership from him [Russian general director]' (expatriate deputy general director). Evidence of such commitment from the senior Russian managers in the Moose joint venture was a little sparse, according to assessments from the UK partners that die Russians remained somewhat captive to traditional 'Soviet' behaviour (see Footnote 2 on this point).

⁴ Only one western interviewee doubted high levels of education, convinced that the certificates were not worth the paper they were printed on, as the educational system is just as corrupt as everything else.

⁵ The researcher has encountered a similar type of attitude in Russian hotels, where one is not permitted to have breakfast until one has obtained the correct piece of paper from the reception desk each morning. Also, observing behaviour at the currency exchange desk at Moscow airport, the researcher saw US tourists become infuriated with the girl behind the counter for scrutinising carefully each traveller's cheque, and then phoning through to the boss to request permission to accept one that she was not sure about. The US tourists thought she was being deliberately awkward; more likely she was protecting herself from making a mistake.

⁶ In fact, one Russian respondent offered to introduce the researcher to younger entrepreneurial Russian companies to see how they too are embracing 'non-Soviet' workplace behaviours.