3.2. Tokyo Sends More Orders about Destroying Cryptographic Material

Almost within a week of the transmission of the two Winds instructions messages, Tokyo began to send out more instructions to its diplomatic stations around the world concerning the destruction of cryptographic holdings and other sensitive papers. These new instructions, which were not all available to the Americans in a timely fashion due to the already slow processing of traffic using cryptographic systems like J-19 and PA-K2, in some instances appeared to contradict prior orders, while, in other cases, seemed to ignore the Winds directives.

3.2.1. The Hidden Word Message – A Complement to the Winds Messages

It now seems that the Japanese were not satisfied with just the open code Winds message by which to warn its diplomats of the status of relations with the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union. They provided their diplomatic stations with another method to warn them of an impending break in relations. On 27 November, Tokyo transmitted a quite long, four-part message, Tokyo Serial No. 2409, encrypted in J-19K10, to a number of embassies and consulates located in North and South America, as well as East Asia. The Navy monitoring station "S" at Bainbridge Island intercepted this message. The complete intercepted version was sent via teletypewriter to OP-20-GY in Washington for decryption and translation. Station "S" copied the message that was sent to the Japanese consulate in San Francisco. The operators noted in the intercept log that the same cipher text, except for two groups at the end of part three, also was sent to Washington. [Exhibit #16]^[]

The Navy had the responsibility for processing this message since it was intercepted on an odd-numbered day. Because the message was sent in four parts, the decryption of the transposed text required four copies of the stencil, or form, from the ten-day period of 21 to 30 November. The indicator in the message was the group BYHBD, which meant that the message was intended for a general or worldwide audience. The navy analysts still had to recover the encryption key for the day. [Exhibit 17]^[] The transcribed code text was then divided into the coded digraphs that were then decoded by a navy analyst prior to being translated. [Exhibit 18]^[]A translation of this message (SIS #25609, OP-20-G JD-1 #6985) was issued on 2 December 1941. [Exhibit #19]^[]

Curiously, the Japanese sent the message in four parts, and in the transmission of it, sent part four prior to part three. This out of sequence transmission had no effect on the decryption or translation of the message. However, the order of the intercept may confuse the reader. So provided above is a chart of the message parts placed in correct order. It illustrates the "analytic chain" used to rearrange the message parts in the correct sequence from intercept to decryption to translation worksheet.

When the Americans viewed the message, it was clear that it carried instructions for another warning system for Japanese diplomats in certain parts of the world.^[] It instructed them in the use of a "hidden word" (INGO DENPO) or open code word system. The new system operated in the following manner. In a crisis, the Japanese intended to send telegrams over commercial radio or telegraph links to the affected diplomatic missions. The warning message would be disguised, with certain "hidden words" placed within seemingly innocuous plain text.

These "hidden words" were found on a table of code words that were transmitted along with the instructions. It consisted of two columns. The left-hand side contained the code words and the right-hand side listed their plain text meaning.

The list contained several words and phrases that covered a broad gradation of relationships between Japan and other countries. There were separate expressions to indicate "severed relations," "not in accordance," "military forces clashing," and for "general war." For example, the codeword message for a general war between the United States and Japan would read "HOSINO MINAMI." In another case, the codeword "ASKURA" meant that Tokyo "will communicate by radio broadcast, you are to directed to listen carefully."^[]

A further distinguishing characteristic of this method of codeword message was the use of the English word "STOP" at the end of a message as an indicator that this was a "hidden word" message instead of a non-code commercial cable, which would use the Japanese word "OWARI," literally "end [of message]." American cryptologists would come to refer to this warning system either as the so-called "hidden word" message or the "STOP message."

Tokyo sent three updates to the list and instructions. Two of the updates, Japanese serial Nos. 2431 and 2432, were transmitted from Tokyo to its embassy in Rio de Janeiro for "special use in your area." The new list consisted of codewords for Latin American capitals and statements about continued passage of Japanese merchant shipping in the territorial waters of these countries. The embassy in Rio, and later the one in Mexico City, was ordered to pass along these updates to all stations in Latin and Central America.^[] On the same day, Tokyo sent another version of the "hidden word" instructions to the Japanese representative in Singapore, which was unique to "the particular needs of your localities to supplement for the already given list."^[]

The Americans apparently interpreted the "hidden word" warning system as a supplement to the two Winds coded methods seen earlier in November. Many, if not all, of the same stations that had received the instructions about the Winds codewords and phrases Japanese serials No. 2353 and No. 2354, also received No. 2409. The reason for these complementary warning systems may have been the technical limitations of the existing Japanese global diplomatic communications network. Some Japanese diplomatic missions, especially small consulates, lacked transceiver radio sets with which to communicate directly with the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. Even if a station had the radio receivers to monitor shortwave (high frequency band) Japanese news broadcasts, there was no guarantee these programs could be heard due to the physical properties of the propagation of radio signals, especially those in the broadcast bands between 300 kHz to 3 MHz and those in the high frequency band (3–30 MHz). Reception of broadcasts transmitted from Tokyo depended upon factors such as the frequency of the broadcast, the time of day, weather along the propagation path, and background signals in the reception area. A broadcast at a certain time and frequency could not be heard by all of Tokyo's diplomats. This fact of radio propagation meant that a warning message could not be transmitted to all stations at the same time with any assurance that all recipients "got the message."

The Japanese used two communications methods to ensure that all diplomatic stations received all relevant circular, or large or general audience messages. In the first, Tokyo designated some diplomatic stations as "radio relays," that is, they retransmitted important messages to other diplomatic facilities in the same or adjacent geographic region. For example, Berlin would retransmit messages to Lisbon, Portugal, Helsinki, Finland, Budapest, Hungary, and Vienna, Austria. The Japanese embassy in Berne, Switzerland, would send along messages to Vichy, France, Ankara, Turkey, Madrid, Spain, and Lisbon. In Southeast Asia, Bangkok would pass along circular messages to Hanoi and Saigon. While this method overcame many of the problems of local reception, it still was not a complete guarantee that messages intended for a large or general audience would receive them in a timely manner.

A second method for communication between Tokyo and its foreign diplomatic missions was to send telegrams or cables over commercial radio or cable systems, or through national Post Telegraph and Telephone agencies (PT&T). In the United States, Japanese diplomatic messages destined for its embassy or consulates, or messages that were intended for other countries and that transited the US cable system, were handled by American communications firms such as the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), Western Union, or Mackay Wireless. A courier would deliver the cable from the telegraph office in a city to the Japanese consulate or embassy. The Japanese diplomats would deliver their cable, usually encrypted or encoded, to the cable company office for transmission to Tokyo. Very often, an important message would go by radio and cable, or even over multiple company cable lines. (In fact, the famous fourteen-part final message from Tokyo to Washington that was delivered to Secretary of State Hull the afternoon of 7 December was sent simultaneously over both the Mackay Wireless and RCA cable networks.)

The danger of any cable system was that it was subject to control by the host country. Because of censorship regulations in effect in 1941, American commercial communications firms provided the War and Navy Departments, and later the U.S. Office of Censorship, with copies of all Japanese diplomatic cable traffic, encrypted or plain text, sent through U.S. cable terminals. [See Exhibit #20 for an example of a cable passed to the Censorship Office.]^[]

3.2.2. Tokyo Sends Even More Instructions, 28 November – 6 December

Even after the "hidden word" message had been sent on 27 November, Tokyo continued to pass more instructions to its diplomats about the destruction of sensitive material, including cryptographic material like codes and cipher devices, to its diplomats around the world.

The first of these was a message, encrypted in J-19K10 that was sent to the Japanese consulate in Honolulu on 28 November. This message, which was not decrypted and translated until 7 December, and therefore not available to American intelligence offices during this critical period, contained important new provisions regarding the use of the special warning messages, in particular those in the "hidden word" instructions. Tokyo told its consul in Honolulu "these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing its diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality [our italics] but retain them as long as the situation there (sic) permits and until the final stage is entered into." [Exhibit #21]^[]

The provision in this instruction about retaining codes seemed to contradict the earlier orders that called for the destruction of all codes upon the receipt of the Winds code phrases or words. These new prescriptions suggested that Japanese diplomats could retain all or some of their cryptographic material for as long as they felt they could securely and safely do so. These new instructions also implied that the Winds execute codes did not necessarily mean that a final break in relations between the United States and Japan was about to occur.

Three days later, Tokyo began to transmit another series of messages to its diplomats around the world that outlined more provisions for the destruction of cryptographic material that they held. One of the first was from Tokyo to Washington, Japanese serial No. 2444, sent on 1 December (and translated the same day by OP-20-G). The message informed the Washington embassy that the diplomatic missions in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to destroy their "code machines." The cipher machine (Purple) in the consulate in Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, had been returned to Tokyo. The Washington embassy was ordered to hold onto its machines and "machine codes."[Exhibit #25]^[]

On 1 December, the Japanese embassy in London received separate instructions for its destruction measures. The embassy was to send the single word SETUJU ("receipt" or "received") to acknowledge that it had received the instructions and then to transmit the word HASSO ("forwarding") when the destruction was complete.^[]

Another circular message from Tokyo, Japanese serial No. 2445, was sent the next day, 2 December (but not translated by the SIS until 8 December) to all diplomatic stations. It ordered them to destroy all codes except for a copy of the OITE (PA-K2 code) and the LA systems. This order included all codes for the military and naval attachés as well. The diplomats were further told that as soon as they completed the destruction of this material, they were to send a one-word message to Tokyo – HARUNA (an active volcano located in the Gunma Prefecture in Japan).^[] Tokyo also instructed the missions to destroy all of their confidential papers, but to do so in such a way as to avoid attention or suspicion. A second version of this circular message, Japanese serial No. 2447, which was sent on the same day (but translated by the SIS on 6 December) carried much the same information. To assure its reception, Tokyo had some of its diplomatic facilities relay the message to diplomatic missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. [Exhibit #26]^[]

On 2 December, the Japanese embassy in Washington received additional instructions about the disposition of its cryptographic holdings. The SIS translation of this message, Japanese serial No. 867, was available the next day. The embassy was told to retain a copy of both the PA-K2 and LA code systems and to burn all of the rest. In addition, Washington was ordered to destroy one of its cipher machines (Purple). When all of this destruction was completed, the embassy was instructed to send the codeword HARUNA. All other classified papers were to be destroyed at "your discretion."[Exhibit #27]^[] This message, except for the reference to the disposal of the embassy's extra machine cipher devices, was the same as the circular messages (Nos. 2445 and 2447) sent the same day, but not translated until 8 December.

The next day, 3 December, the Japanese Foreign Ministry sent another circular message, Japanese serial No. 2461, to all of its stations. This instruction, translated by OP-20-G on 6 December, reminded all stations to keep the "hidden word" list and the broadcast (Winds) codes until the "last moment." Tokyo added that if any stations accidentally had destroyed these papers, the Gaimusho would retransmit the pertinent instructions. This message added that "it," the Winds code words and phrases and the "hidden word" code word lists, was a "precaution." [Exhibit #28]^[] While this message appeared to reinforce the penultimate importance of both warning systems – the "hidden word" and Winds code – the references in the message to holding until the "last moment" and the description of the codes as a "precaution" suggest that even these methods might become irrelevant or circumvented by events.

Within that first week of December, right up to 7 December, many of Japan's diplomatic posts around the world reported that they had destroyed their cryptographic holdings and classified files. The codeword HARUNA was seen on many cable and radio circuits. On 2 December the consulates in New York City, Vancouver, British Columbia, and Hollywood, California, reported that they had completed the destruction. The next day, diplomatic facilities in the Netherlands East Indies and Portland, Oregon, did the same. The U.S. Navy liaison in Wellington, New Zealand, reported that the Japanese consul there had received special orders to destroy his codes. The embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, reported the completion of the destruction on 7 December. During this six-day period, the Americans monitored as many as twenty Japanese diplomatic facilities sending the codeword HARUNA to Tokyo. The intercept of most of these transmissions was available to army and naval intelligence in Washington within a two-to-four-day period; most intercepts were sent to Washington by airmail, though a few still arrived after 7 December. [Exhibit #29]^[]

However, this flurry of Japanese code destruction presented a dilemma to the Americans. Army and navy intelligence officials had come to construe the destruction of cryptographic holdings by diplomats to be a good indicator of an impending break in relations. Tokyo's numerous instructions to its diplomats and the continuous reports of completed code destruction strongly indicated that a break with Tokyo might be near, but the cryptologists and others might have wondered when exactly the rupture might occur and under what circumstances. The early December flurry of code disposal instructions and the belated, nearly week-long, staggered responses from diplomatic posts around the world complicated any American calculation of a "deadline," as well as clouded understanding of Japanese intentions.

The orders in the instructions to both the "hidden word" and Winds code warning systems had specified that all cryptographic material and important papers were to be destroyed upon receipt of the correct phrases or codewords. On the other hand, the messages of 1 and 2 December from Tokyo had ordered Japanese diplomats to destroy all codes but two (while Washington and presumably other major embassies maintained their cipher machines). The 3 December message had reminded the diplomats to hold on to their copies of the "hidden word" (STOP) and Winds codes until the last moment, or as a "precaution."

Yet it must be recalled that the Americans did not have all of these messages available as translations prior to 7 December. Because of the sometimes-tardy exploitation of these messages, intelligence officers in the army and navy knew only parts of the complete program. It is possible that they viewed the Japanese actions as ominous, but also contradictory and perhaps even confusing. More importantly, though, the binge of code destruction was occurring without the transmittal of the Winds Execute message. How could the American cryptologists account for this?

It could be argued that the instruction of 1 and 2 December amplified those in the Winds and STOP messages of late November. The December directives had exempted the PA-K2 and LA codes from destruction. But these messages contained no references to the instructions in the Winds or STOP messages. And those orders had specifically mentioned the destruction of "all codes." It is possible, though unlikely, that there were other messages that "bridged" the difference between the November and December transmissions, but there is no evidence for this. Another possibility is that the 1 and 2 December messages were not related at all to the Winds and STOP instructions, though it is not clear why such a distinction would have been made in the first place. Then there is the 3 December message that reminded its recipients to hold onto the Winds and STOP codes until the last moment. This last message might have refined the instructions in the 19 and 27 November messages.

For all of the new instructions and the destruction activity, the point is the Winds instructions were still in place and had to be viewed as at least one of Tokyo's primary methods of warning its diplomats of the situation between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

This flurry of destruction had not gone unnoticed and it was acted upon. On 2 December, the United States Navy ordered some of its facilities in the Pacific to begin destroying their cryptographic material and report completion with the single code word of "Boomerang."^[] Colonel Bratton, after seeing the messages from Tokyo that ordered the code destruction, approached General Sherman Miles, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Major General Leonard Gerow and asked that an additional warning message be sent to the Army Pacific commands. Both generals demurred on this point and claimed that enough warnings had been sent. Undeterred, Bratton contacted his opposite in naval intelligence, Commander Arthur McCollum, for help. He suggested to Bratton that Commander Joseph Rochefort in Hawaii was the most knowledgeable person on Japanese communications and that his Communications Intelligence Unit (known as Station "H" or HYPO) had been tasked to listen for the Winds Execute message. So Bratton drafted a message signed by Miles to the head of military intelligence in the Hawaii Department, Brigadier General Kendall Fielder, and sent it on 5 December. [Exhibit #30]^[]

It read, "Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through the Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather." There was a problem in that General Fielder did not have access to Magic material and therefore had no prior interaction with the navy in Hawaii concerning communications intelligence. In testimony after the war, he recalled not seeing the cable from Washington. However, Fielder's deputy, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, did see it and later contacted Rochefort, who assured Bicknell that the navy was listening for the message.^[]

Perhaps not unexpectedly, in light of the new instructions from Tokyo about code destruction, some officers in army and navy intelligence began to question the ultimate importance of the Winds Execute message. During the Joint Congressional Committee hearings after the war, a number of senior naval officers testified that they had begun to doubt the importance of the Winds Execute message during the final week before Pearl Harbor. Admiral Noyes stated that the new instructions received at the beginning of December lessened the significance of the Winds method. Maybe, he suggested, the messages were still important enough to monitor for, but their role as an indicator or warning of war had been considerably reduced.^[]

Admiral Royal Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (ACNO) at the time, weighed in that even if a Winds code message had been heard, the "most it could have done was to have confirmed what we had already sent out [the earlier War Warning message sent from the CNO to Admiral Kimmel on 27 November] and it [a possible Winds message] was not as positive [a sign] that war was coming as we had sent out."^[] Captain McCollum noted that the Winds message was only one of several messages instructing Japanese diplomats what to do with their sensitive papers and codes.^[] And even Colonel Bratton, who urged the Army brass to send out another warning message on 5 December, admitted in testimony after the war that, in light of the 2 December instructions to Japanese diplomats to destroy their codes, "any Winds Execute message received after that would simply just be another straw in the wind confirming what we already knew."^[]

The questioning of the usefulness of the Winds Execute message as a warning or indicator of Japanese intentions for the Americans has merit. The vague reference in the instructions to "relations in danger" could encompass a multitude of situations. Therefore, it would be hard to define exactly what level of rupture in relations constituted a "danger." On the other hand, the STOP/"hidden word" message carried a number of more detailed possibilities, to include beginning of hostilities. This system seemed to be a more discrete indicator of what Japan was planning. Still, despite the obtuseness of the Winds warning, and whatever doubts about the usefulness of the warning carried in the coded phrase or words, the military and FCC monitoring stations continued to listen for the messages.

3.2.3. 7 December 1941: The Hidden Word Message Is Sent

Shortly after 4:00 AM (Eastern Time) on the morning of 7 December 1941, the navy monitoring site at Bainbridge island intercepted a message from the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo to twelve diplomatic stations, including San Francisco, Panama, Honolulu, New York, Seattle, and Ottawa, Canada. The Japanese radio station "JAH" transmitted the message on the frequency 7630 kHz. [Exhibit #32]^[] Bainbridge noted that the message, Japanese serial No. 2494, was addressed to "KOSHI [Minister] Washington" and that the Tokyo operator had sent a service message note to the radio operator in San Francisco that this particular message, along with another copy of the message marked urgent for "KOSHI, Panama," was very important.^[] The other addressees were consuls (RIYOJI, or RYOUJI)). To further ensure reception of the messages, Tokyo had transmitted on both the RCA and MRT (Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company) commercial radio circuits. The message, in Kana, read as follows:

KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI HATTORI MINAMI KINEN-BUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGKAU SIKYUUDENPOO ARITASI

STOP – TOGO

The inclusion of the word "STOP" at the end of the message marked it as a "hidden word or STOP message. Bainbridge sent the intercepted text to OP-20-G headquarters in Washington by leased teletype. The trick for the navy analysts in Washington was to translate the text and then place the correct values to the three hidden codewords (shown in darkened lettering).

The literal translation of the message read thus:

"Please have director Koyanagi send a wire stating the sum which has been decided to be spent on the South Hattori memorial Library. Stop – Togo"

In Washington, Lt. Alwin Kramer hurriedly put together a translation of the codewords he saw in the text, SIS # 25856 and JD-1 #7148.^[] It originally read: "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." "KOYANAGI" was the codeword for "England," while "HATTORI" meant "Relations between Japan and ...(blank)... are not in accordance with expectations." A translation was published that same morning and was ready for a 10:00 AM meeting in Washington of the secretaries of state, war, and the navy. It was slipped into the same folder that contained the translation of the first thirteen parts of the awaited fourteen-part message that Japan had transmitted the day before.

However, Kramer's initial translation was incorrect. He had missed the significance of the word "MINAMI," which ordinarily meant "south," but in the INGO DENPO code really meant the "United States." So the message should have read, "Relations between Japan and United States and England are not in accordance with expectations." Kramer soon realized his error and later that morning phoned in the change to the recipients of the translation who were meeting at the State Department. [Exhibit #33]^[]

The "hidden word" message, if considered alone, arguably might be regarded as some sort of indicator of an impending break in relations between Japan and the United States and Great Britain. As mentioned above, the code system for the STOP message had several codewords that referred to a number of possible situations between Japan and other countries, including outright hostilities. Yet the message that arrived in Washington and the rest of North America carried the word for relations "not in accordance with expectations" and not an open codeword that would alert the Americans that the opening of hostilities was mere hours away.

Was there a chance that a STOP message that indicated that war was going to start had been sent to some other Japanese diplomatic station(s)? On 7 December, the War Department's G-2 sent a priority message to all of the army intercept sites in the Pacific region with the order to scour all of their files for any STOP messages since 27 November. [Exhibit #34]^[] There is no record that any other field site had intercepted any other version of a STOP message.

The STOP message from Tokyo had arrived on 7 December as American cryptologists were completing work on the decryption and translation of the last part of the fourteen-part message, Japanese serial #902, which had arrived earlier that morning. This was the final part of the Japanese statement of its position to an earlier United States diplomatic statement, the so-called modus vivendi, which offered several points for the Japanese to accede to if talks were to continue.^[] Shortly after this message arrived, another was received from Tokyo, Japanese serial No. 907, which instructed the Japanese representatives Kursuru and Nomura to deliver the entire fourteen-part message to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1:00 PM (EST).^[]

At about 10:00 AM, Lieutenant Kramer delivered to the secretaries a folder that contained the translations of the STOP message, part 14 of message No. 902, and message No. 907 that specified the 1:00 PM delivery time. Kramer pointed out the time of delivery to the secretaries. The interest of the Roosevelt administration leaders was directed at the final installment of the fourteen-part message. The STOP message, with its incorrect translation did not add or detract anything from the understanding of the Japanese position, except to suggest problematic relations between Japan and Great Britain – no surprise to Roosevelt's cabinet secretaries. Intelligence reports from the previous day had reached American commands in Washington and the Pacific, which reported Japanese troop transports had been sighted steaming from bases in French Indochina towards the coast of British Malaya.^[]

In fact, it was the time of delivery mentioned in message No. 907 (Japanese serial) and not the text of the "hidden word" message that convinced Colonel Bratton that morning to have General George C. Marshall send an additional warning message to the various military commands in the Pacific region. The story of the failed effort has been recounted elsewhere. The message was delayed in transmission and delivery through a series of technical mishaps.^[]

There is little to suggest that even a correct translation of the "hidden word" message that referred to relations to the United States being not in "expectations" would have influenced the already pessimistic American assessment of the situation. In any event, that particular set of words would have made much less impact than the important last sentence of the fourteen-part message: "The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify the American Government that...it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."^[]

Despite the timing of the "hidden word" message, there was nothing in its contents that would have warned the Americans of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

3.2.4. 7 December 1941: The Winds Execute Message Is Sent

It had been almost three weeks since Tokyo had sent out instructions to its diplomats for the Winds codeword or phrase warning system. Since 28 November, American, British, and Dutch radio operators had been monitoring Japanese voice and manual Morse news broadcasts for any of the three code phrases or words sent in the specified format during a news program. Late on 7 December, Tokyo finally sent the Winds Execute message. But the message that was transmitted would be anticlimac-tic in its timing and content.

The morning of 7 December was a busy one for the staff of the Japanese embassy in Washington. Aside from message No. 902, which came in fourteen parts, and the further instructions to deliver it at 1:00 PM, Washington time, the staff was burdened with further problems of getting message 902 ready to deliver because of difficulties in decoding the last part and a late start on typing it up to present to Secretary Hull. Another message, Japanese serial No. 910, arrived shortly after the other messages telling the staff to begin destroying the last cipher machine. To this, the embassy replied that once the previous day's long messages had been decoded, it would comply with the latest instructions.^[]

Nomura and Kurusu arrived at Secretary Hull's office shortly after 2:00 PM. At the time the envoys were delivering the long message to Hull, the first wave of Japanese aircraft were in the midst of their attack (almost 9:00 AM, Honolulu Time) on the ships of the Pacific Fleet. In a cold fury, Hull received the message from the two diplomats and then brusquely dismissed them noting that "In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with falsehoods and distortions – infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale too huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."^[]

Later that night, shortly after 7:02 PM Eastern Time (0002, 8 December, Greenwich Mean Time), FCC monitors at the Portland, Oregon, monitoring station tuned in to the news programs on two Japanese broadcast stations. For the next thirty-five minutes, these two stations, JLG4 on 17376 and 15105 kHz and JZJ on 11800 kHz, made the same news broadcasts. About halfway through the program, the announcer was heard to make this statement, as translated into English: "This is the middle of the news, but today, specifically at this point, I will give the weather forecast: 'West Wind Clear'." The phrase was repeated twice in the middle and then at the end of the broadcast.^[]

The FCC watch office called Colonel Carlisle C. Dusenberg, the assistant to Colonel Bratton, with the news of the intercept. Dusenberg told the Commission watch officer "the information was received too late." He then thanked the FCC for its work and added that no more monitoring for these broadcasts was necessary. Colonel Bratton was reached later and when told of the broadcast asked that the information be forwarded to the U.S. Service Corps that same hour.^[]

At about the same time in Hawaii, 1:32 PM, Honolulu Time, some five and one-half hours after the Japanese attack had begun, personnel at the FCC field monitoring station "HA-P" were listening to the Japanese language news broadcast of station JZI, Tokyo, on 9535 kHz. For the next half hour, the news anchor read a long program that recounted the day's actions as Japanese forces struck at numerous points across the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia.

After a near breathless report that boasted of a "death defying attack" upon the American naval and air forces in the Hawaiian area, the announcer interrupted the news narrative to state: "Allow me to especially make a weather broadcast at this time, 'West Wind Clear'." He then repeated the phrase. [Exhibit #31]^[] At the end of the news program, the announcer made this statement: "At this time, let me again make a weather forecast: 'West Wind Clear'," which was then repeated. This was the only phrase heard during the news program. After the phrase was repeated, and the news program was over, the announcer then went on to read a statement to overseas Japanese citizens written by a General Yoshizumi from the 2nd Directorate of the Information Bureau.

In a memorandum attached to the transcript, it was noted that the translator from naval intelligence that in the broadcast "Here a weather forecast was made – as far as I recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. The ONI translator also suggested that since these broadcasts could also be heard by the Japanese Navy it also might be some sort of code." The memorandum also mentioned that the same broadcast was made again later on 8 December, but it appears that no transcript of it was made.

There are two obvious points about this broadcast, as well as the one heard by the FCC station in Portland at about the same time. The first is that the warning phrase that was sent was the one that referred to relations with the British, their colonies in the Far East, and the Netherlands East Indies. The code phrase referring to relations with the United States was absent from these broadcasts.

The second point is that the coded phrase had been sent over six hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese landings in Malaya, air raids on the colony's air bases, and air strikes against the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Wake Island. The Japanese offensive across Asia and the Pacific had been going on for several hours when the code phrase was broadcast. Considering that the original intent of the Winds Execute message was to warn Japanese diplomats of a danger to relations, the timing of the broadcast from Tokyo seems almost absurdly anticlimactic or irrelevant. Japanese diplomats in the United States and Great Britain (and its Commonwealth) certainly were not being forewarned through the Winds warning broadcast mechanism. The expectations held by American naval and army cryptologists and intelligence officers of the value of intercepting the broadcast(s) simply went by the boards in the light of what was sent and when.

Events had demonstrated that the "hidden word" message was too little to make a difference; the Winds execute message was too late to matter.

..............................

The smoke had barely cleared from the wreckage of the ships and facilities around the Hawaiian Islands when calls were heard in congress for an investigation of the debacle. Within weeks a commission under Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts went to Pearl Harbor to investigate what happened. In the aftermath of that investigation and those that were to follow in the next four years, the Winds message story should have been a very minor point. After all, it had proven to be a dead end as far as intelligence was concerned and of no value as a warning of Japanese intentions.

Yet within two years of Pearl Harbor, the issue of the Winds message and all of the implications in its story became a major issue in the investigation of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Seemingly once done away with, the issue would return in the decades after the war. New players would emerge and stir up old controversies.

3.2.5. Notes

^[]

^[] "Magic," Vol. IV, Appendix A111-113, Washington to Tokyo, Four Parts, 27 November 1941, #1206.

^[]

^[] "Magic" Volume IV, Appendix A-118, Tokyo to Washington, 28 November 1941, #844. Also located in RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301, Multi-National Diplomatic Translations, SIS # 25445.

^[]

^[] Ibid., Also see A-120, Tokyo to Washington, 1 December 1941, #865. Also MND Translation, SIS #25605. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301.

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 14: 1082-4; Part 20:4487; PHR, p. 394

^[]

^[] "Safford Statement," 2. PHH, Part 8:3579–3581

^[]

^[] For example, see Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, 5 November 1941, Japanese number #1039 that discusses the hearibility of station JLG. "Magic," Volume IV, Appendix, A-188 and Tokyo (Togo) to Washington, 24 October 1941, Japanese #2222, A-286.

^[]

^[] MND Translation, Tokyo to Washington, 27 November 1941, SIS #25446. RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301

^[]

^[] "Statement Regarding Winds Message," by Captain L.F. Safford before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 1 February 1946. PHH, Part 8:3580. (The entire statement is included from pages 3578 to 3590.) Captain Safford's statement also is available at NARA RG 38,

Entry 1040 (CNSG Library), Box 166, Folder 5830/69 [See Exhibit 31]

^[]

^[] "Magic" Volume IV, Appendix A-210, Washington to Tokyo, 27 November 1941, Japanese serial #1197.

^[]

^[] "Radio Intelligence Report for the Month ending 30 November 1940, Station "S." NARA – Seattle Records Center. RG 181, "Naval Districts and Shore Establishments – 13th Naval District – Seattle, Box 7392 – Folder A81.

^[]

^[] "Statement Regarding Winds Message," 4

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 36:50

^[]

^[] FBI Memorandum, Pearl Harbor Inquiry," from Robert L. Moore, Special Agent in Charge, to Director FBI. November 27, 1945. RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 1127, Pearl Harbor Investigation.

^[]

^[] On 3 December, an espionage message from the Japanese consul Kita in Honolulu was sent to Tokyo.(MND Translation, SIS #26145 (JD-1 7370), translated 11 December 1941. In it were specifications that set up, among other items, a series of open code messages that took the form of seemingly innocuous radio ads, which reported the type and number of ships in Pearl Harbor, and which were to be broadcast over the two local radio stations. It was later believed that these ads would be heard by the Japanese task force sailing east to attack Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence that any such ads were placed and sent over the airwaves. See PHH, part 12:637–9.

^[]

^[] Baird, Forrest R., "Sometimes They Forgot to Notice..." NCVA Cryptolog (Vol. 10, No. 2, Winter 1989), 2–3. It is not clear if these same four officers included the two that Captain Mayfield assigned to monitor the Japanese language programs on the local Hawaiian radio stations.

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 35:83

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 10: 4914–15

^[]

^[] Message, OCSigO, December 2, 1941. CC H Series XII.S, Box 22. The SIS monitoring station at Fort Shafter, TH, was notified the same day by a separate message.

^[]

^[] Memorandum to the Chief Engineer, FCC, from George Sterling, 5 July 1943. NARA, RG 173, Entry 180, Box 5, "Papers of George Sterling." Also see PHH. Part 18:3305

^[]

^[] Memorandum, Director of Naval Communications, Subject: Japanese Radio Stations, broadcasts from." 4 December 1941. NSA Release 10-20-2004 (DOCID: 2015818)

^[]

^[] "United States Navy Monitoring Stations as of 1941. RG 38, Entry 1040, Box 118, Folder 5750/208, "OP-20-GX/G-3 War Diary"

^[]

^[] Shaw, 10–12

^[]

^[] Wohlstetter, 218.

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 36:81

^[]

^[] Edwin T. Layton, 264–5; SRH-252, John B. Hurt, "AVersion of the Japanese Problem in the Signal Intelligence Service (Later Signal Security Agency) 1930–1945." (Fort George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, 1983) 26–29; Gordon Prange (with Donald Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon), Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History, 315.

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 36:130–131

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 33: 840–1

^[]

^[] NARA CP, RG 80, Pearl Harbor Liaison Office (PHLO), Entry 167EE, Box 122, Exhibit #142, Item 3 (5 pages). Also PHH, Part 18:3305–6

^[]

^[] NARA, RG 173, Entry 180, Box 5, "Personal Papers of George Sterling

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 33, 840

^[]

^[] NARA CP, RG 80 (PHLO), Entry 167EE, Box 122, Exhibit 142A, "FCC Logs." Also, PHH Part 18: 3320–1

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 9:4520 and Part10: 4629

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 10: 4916–17

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 10: 4630, Part 9:4520–21, Part 10:4733–34, and Part 4: 1968–9

^[]

^[] NARA CP, RG 80 (PHLO), Entry 167EE, Box 122, Exhibit 142.

^[]

^[] NARA CP, RG 173, Entry 180, Box 5, "Personal Papers of George Sterling."

^[]

^[] PHH, part 37:662

^[]

^[] "FCC Logs, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log 28 November – 8 December 1941." RG 80 (PHLO), Entry 167EE, Box 122, Exhibit 142A.

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 34: 173–4, Exhibit 12

^[]

^[] RG 38, Entry 1040, Box 156, pages 4506–4514 and 4522–4524, "Diplomatic Intercept."

^[]

^[] R.I.P. 37B, page 7–83. The key was: 12-14-7-13-9-1-19-6-8-17-2-16-11-3-15-18-4-10-5. Also, CCH Series XII.S, Box 22

^[]

^[] Ibid.

^[]

^[] MND Translation, Tokyo to Washington, 27 November 1941, SIS #25609. NARA RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301.

^[]

^[] The addressees included Rangoon (Burma), Colombo (Ceylon), Singapore (British Malaya), Batavia (Netherlands East Indies), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Santiago (Chile), Mexico City (Mexico), Bogota (Colombia), Caracas (Venezuela), Panama, Havana (Cuba), San Francisco, New York City, New Orleans, and Washington, D.C. See RG 38, Entry 1040 (CNSG Library), Box 156, "Diplomatic Intercept." Also see PHH, part 12:186–8.

^[]

^[] MND Translation, Tokyo to Washington, 27 November 1941, SIS #25609. NARA RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301.

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 12:219–221; also located in NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301, "Multi-national Diplomatic Translations."

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 12: 216–9

^[]

^[] Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo, 13 November 1941. NARA, RG 38, Entry 1040, Box 167, Folder 5830/69, "Pearl Harbor Investigation: Winds msgs." (3 of 3)

^[]

^[] MND Translation #25869, Tokyo to Honolulu, 28 November 1941 (translated 7 December 1941). NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301. Also see PHH, Part 37:668

^[]

^[] MND Translation #225606, Tokyo to Washington, 1 December 1941. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301.

^[]

^[] "Magic," Vol. IV, A-321, Tokyo to London, 1 December 1941, Japanese serial #2443.

^[]

^[] MND Translation #25879, Tokyo to Havana, 2 December 1941. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301

^[]

^[] MND Translation #25837, Bern to Ankara, 2 December 1941. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301

^[]

^[] MND Translation, #25640, Tokyo to Circular,

2 December 1941. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301

^[]

^[] MND Translation, #25855, Tokyo to Circular, 3 December 1941. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301

^[]

^[] SRH-415, "HARUNA messages from Various Japanese Offices Abroad Signalling (sic) Destruction of Codes, December 1941." (Fort Meade, MD: National Security Agency, 1993), 3. It is likely that the destruction of codes and important papers carried out by the Japanese consulate in Honolulu on 6 December was part of this process.

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 14:1407–09

^[]

^[] NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 1369, Folder 4217, "Pearl Harbor Investigation and Miscellaneous Material."

^[]

^[] PHR, 474; PHH, Part 35: 144–5

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 10: 4729–31

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 9:4226

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 36:28; SRH-081, "Information from Captain George W. Linn USNR Ret." 1

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 9:4522

^[]

^[] "Jap Msgs, October – December 1941." NARA, RG 38, Entry 1030 (CNSG Library, Box 156; PHH, Part 37:729

^[]

^[] "Jap Msgs, October – December 1941." NARA, RG 38, Entry 1030 (CNSG Library), Box 164, Folder 5830/50, "PH Investigations: Ops Logs Stations H, M, S, J; 24 Nov – 6 Dec 1941"

^[]

^[] MND Translation, #25856 (JD-1, #7148), Tokyo to Circular, 7 December 1941. RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301. See "Magic" Vol. V, 55–57, for a discussion of the message and Kramer's translation error. Also see PHH, Part 36:355–7. Kahn, The Codebreakers, 56–7

^[]

^[] NARA CP, RG 80 (PHLO), Entry 167EE, Box 120, Exhibit 142; PHH, Part 37:3321

^[]

^[] Center for Cryptologic History Series XII. S. Box 22. One author made a kind of "categorical" connection between the "hidden word" message and the "execute" version of the Winds message. Ladislas Farago in The Broken Seal states at one point that the "hidden word" message sent out early in the morning of 7 December was a sort of "execute message" (sic) itself. There was never any connection between the two systems in the Japanese instructions (New York: Random House, 1967), fn. 326, fn. 328

^[]

^[] MND Translation, #25843 (JD-1 #7143), Tokyo to Washington, 6-7 December 1941. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301

^[]

^[] MND Translation, #25850 (JD-1 #7145), Tokyo to Washington, 7 December 1941. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301

^[]

^[] PHH, Part 14:1246. Exhibit 12, State Department Cable, London to Washington, #5918, 6 December 1941; also CINCAF to OPNAV, CR 0151, 06155 December 1941. PHH, Part 15:1680

^[]

^[] Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), 219–224

^[]

^[] "Magic," Vol. IV – Appendix, A-134, Tokyo to Washington, 7 December 1941, Japanese serial #902.

^[]

^[] MND Translations, #25854 (JD-1 #7147), Tokyo to Washington, 7 December 1941 and #26047, Washington to Tokyo, 7 December 1941 (Translated 11 December 1941). NARA, RG 457, Entry 9032, Box 301.

^[]

^[] Cordell Hull, The Memoirs ofCordellHull, Vol. II (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948), 1096

^[]

^[] Pearl Harbor Exhibit 142D, page 5, Federal Communications Commission, NARA, RG 80 (PHLO), Entry 167EE, Box 120; also see PHH, Part 18:3325–3329.

^[]

^[] "Memorandum to the Chief Engineer [FCC], 9 February 1944." RG 128, Records of the Joint Committees, 51st – 98th Congresses. Pearl Harbor Hearings, Box 334, Folder 112.

^[]

^[] "Pearl Harbor Exhibit 142D, Federal Communications Commission." NARA, RG 80 (PHLO), Entry 167EE, Box 120; also in PHH, Part 18:3325–3329