4.6. The Case of Captain Alwin Kramer's Changing Testimony
Here the actions of Captain Alwin Kramer need to be addressed. Kramer's role in the Winds controversy is difficult to assess. Some critics find his recanting of earlier support for Safford a dark indicator of a deep and sinister undercurrent to the entire Pearl Harbor controversy. When Kramer had testified before the Hewitt Inquiry (May – June 1945), he changed the testimony he had given previously to the Naval Court of Inquiry (July – October 1944). Some writers have suggested that Kramer's recanting may have resulted from pressure from the Navy's hierarchy bent on destroying Safford and discrediting his testimony.
Kramer's changing testimony went like this. On 24 July 1944, in front of the Naval Court of Inquiry, Kramer testified that he had been shown a message on teletype paper by the OP-20-GY watch officer, either on 3 or 4 December. The message contained the phrase HIGASHI NO KAZEAME, which referred to the United States. But Kramer could not name the watch officer who had shown him the message. He could not identify what monitoring station had intercepted the broadcast; nor could he recall what Safford did with the copy of the text afterwards, though he assumed it was shown to Admiral Noyes. This vague recollection of events was the sum of Kramer's testimony supporting Safford's position that such a message had been received.[]
Actually, this statement represented a complete change from his first position regarding the existence of a Winds Execute message. Recall, when Kramer responded initially to Safford's letter in December 1943, he had construed Safford's reference to a "Weather Report" to be, in fact, the "hidden word" or STOP message of the morning of 7 December 1941. He did not recall or refer to any Winds broadcast. In fact, it was not always clear to Safford exactly what Kramer might have seen or known. On 29 April 1944, when Captain Safford testified before the Hart Inquiry, he had not included Kramer's name on a list of officers who "recall having seen and read the 'Winds Message.'" Instead, Kramer's name was on a list of those officers who should have "some recollection of the Winds Message."[]
When Kramer appeared before the later Hewitt Inquiry on the afternoon of 22 May 1945, he stated that he had had "no recollection" of the Winds message when it was first mentioned to him in early 1944. Here he was referring to Safford's second letter from the correspondence of December 1943 to January 1944. Kramer added that later he was given some details about the message. He never mentioned where these "details" came from, but it seems likely that Safford spoke to him. He recalled that a message had been received at the OP-20-GY operations center a few days before 7 December. He continued that he remembered showing it to Safford. When asked by the investigating counsel what the subject of it was, Kramer replied that it was a "winds code message." He could not recall the wording, though. Kramer added that he was "less positive of that now than I believe I was at the time." He said he could not recall any overt mention of the United States in the message, only maybe Great Britain.[]
In front of the Congressional Committee on 6 February 1946, Kramer explained that he recalled that on the morning of 5 December 1941, he was shown a short TWX sheet with two or three lines of plaintext Japanese. He said he did not write on the sheet and that he never used the word "war" as a translation of the Japanese text. He said that he and the watch officer entered Safford's office. He testified that he might have said, "Here it is!" but could not remember. At any rate, he said he stayed no more than half a minute, after which Safford departed for Admiral Noyes' office. Kramer noted that subsequently he never saw that message again. In later testimony to the Committee, Kramer asserted that originally, he had confused Safford's reference to the "Weather report" with the "hidden message" when he and Safford had exchanged letters.[]
As for the story Safford told in which both he and Kramer had reviewed the folder of decrypted messages for the Roberts Commission that contained the translation of the Winds Execute message, Kramer said simply he did not recall it happening that way. Kramer did remember that when such a folder was completed, Captain Arthur McCollum from the Office of Naval Intelligence had asked him about the erroneous first translation of the "hidden word" message. It was included in the folder, and Kramer told McCollum that the words "United States" should have been part of the correct translation.[]
When the Congressional Committee asked Associate Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts if he had seen a copy of the Winds message, Roberts denied having received any such thing during his hearings – he actually refused to review the folder of "Magic" material. He later admitted that when he had been queried about the message in a letter from the Committee he had confused that Winds message with a reference to a "wind blowing from the east" contained in the transcript of an intercepted commercial radiotelephone message from Honolulu to Tokyo by a Japanese merchant by the name of Mori who resided in Hawaii.[]
During the hearings, some newspapers had reported that Kramer had been confined to Bethesda Naval Hospital for health reasons, that he was "beset and beleaguered" by the navy brass, and that he had been not allowed to have any visitors. The newspapers added in loud headlines that prior to the congressional hearings Kramer had "disappeared. As it turned out, though, none of these stories were true. Kramer had been in the hospital prior to the hearings. But, contrary to the press, he had been allowed visitors. He stated that he had received somewhere between six to eight visitors during the weeks he was in the hospital, including committee members Frank Keefe (R-WI) and Bertrand Gearhart (R-CA) who interviewed him about the Winds message.[]
In addition, Safford had visited Kramer in the hospital, and over chocolates and chess they had discussed numerous topics, but nothing to do with Pearl Harbor or the hearings.[] As for his supposed "disappearance," Kramer stated that he had been given permission to "subsist," or temporarily check out of the hospital overnight so he could stay with his wife who had arrived to visit him. Kramer noted in his testimony that no one at any time attempted to influence his testimony.[]
Considering the permutations in his testimony and written record – the letters with Safford – it is obvious that Kramer, far from recanting his testimony, had returned to the same position that he had first stated to Safford in his letter of 28 December 1943. He remembered the "hidden word" message of 7 December (and even the incorrect first translation), but did not recall a Winds message of 4 or 5 December. In his initial response to Safford, Kramer had even corrected his friend, stating that the message was not as indicated – a weather message – but was the "one" he delivered on the morning of 7 December.[] Whatever Safford later may have thought of the significance of the Winds message, it appears that, at the time of its purported intercept and translation, as well as even two years later, it made no impression on Kramer.
In a twist to this story, Admiral Kimmel, quite possibly tipped off by Safford regarding Kramer's upcoming testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry in 1944, had written to Admiral William Halsey to have Commander Kramer write an affidavit about the Winds message and send him a copy. [Exhibit #44][] Kimmel believed that Kramer's statement would help exonerate him. In testimony during the congressional hearings, Kimmel claimed that if he had learned of the 4 December Winds message he "would have gone to sea with the fleet...and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack."[]
However, Kimmel's assertion about his probable reaction to a Winds Execute message is difficult to accept. While he was not oblivious to the building crisis in the Pacific and had instituted some important precautions – prior to 7 December he had ordered a number of security measures in the fleet and had expanded aerial reconnaissance missions – he had failed to act directly to his intelligence staff chief's reports about the unaccounted for Japanese carriers and the unexpected communications changes by Tokyo's navy on 1 and 3 December. In fact, he had testified that certain of these actions had not unduly alarmed him.[] It might be asked of Kimmel that if the Japanese Navy's unusual communications activities had not prompted him to act, why then would he have alerted the Pacific Fleet solely on a vague notice to Tokyo's diplomats of relations in danger?
Figure 4.4. Admiral Husband Kimmel
