2.1 Process

A process is a series of actions, events or changes that lead to a particular outcome. Negotiation researchers have used four constructs to study negotiation processes: phases, frames, turning points and transformation. Negotiation phases constitute a coherent segment of interaction in which there is a dominant set of actions (Holmes 1992). Early research in this area typically involved creating models that prescribed or described phases that lead to successful negotiation outcomes. Phases were treated either as stages characterized by a unique set of actions or episodes in which actions lead to the accomplishment of a task or goal (Holmes 1992). Although differing in the specific phases, these models assumed a unitary sequence that flowed from initiation of negotiation during which parties acknowledge the need to negotiate, articulate and define goals, identify differences, disclose priorities and posture. This phase was followed by problem solving during which the parties debate, exchange information, and adjust offers. The final stage is resolution during which agreements are reached and implemented.

Current research has extended these models by examining how strategies unfold during a negotiation. For example, Olekalns, Brett and Weingart (2003) argue that during lengthy negotiations involving many issues, negotiators often use strategies at various points that differ in orientation and function. Strategic orientation reflects whether strategies are focused on distributing resources or are focused on integrating needs and strategic function is based on whether a strategy is aimed at providing information or taking action. Phases appear during which negotiators redirect their strategies. Strategic redirection can result from gradual transitions as negotiators accomplish a given task and move to the next (e.g., after describing their interests, they begin identifying mutually beneficial agreements) or from interruptions resulting from negotiators explicitly trying to end dysfunctional strategic cycles (e.g., noting that a current process is not working or that there is pressure to reach an agreement). Their analysis of multi-group and multi-issue negotiations found that groups typically started with a distributive orientation (i.e., describing individual positions on a specific issue) and then shifted to an integrative orientation (i.e., working toward mutually beneficial solutions) and by initially making demands before providing justifications for the demands. Interruptions were very frequent and typically resulted in a shift from a distributive to integrative orientation.

A variety of methods have been used to identify phases. Early research typically used case studies or ethnographic methods to identify them (e.g., Douglas 1962). Recently, researchers have used quantitative methods such as phase mapping to identify transitions and interruptions (Olekalns, Brett, and Weingart 2003). Weingart, Olekalns and Smith (2004) provide an excellent discussion of options for quantitatively coding phases.

Frames constitute parties’ understanding of the negotiation (Putnam and Holmer 1992). Frames can be focused on the available strategies and outcomes, experiences with the bargaining situation or the issues being negotiated. A variety of perspectives have been used to research framing that can be clustered into either a cognitive or interactional paradigm (Dewulf et al. 2009). The cognitive paradigm typically conceives of frames as relatively stable mental representations that individuals have of the negotiation which in turn guide their communication whereas the interactional paradigm assumes that framing is a communication process that is co-constructed during the negotiation. Regardless of the paradigm, frames are thought to be constructed in a strategic manner that will persuade others to support a cause, create and maintain group cohesiveness and gain advantage during a negotiation (Shmueli, Elliott, and Kaufman 2006). In some cases, negotiating parties remain committed to their individual frames and as a result of these divergent frames, an impasse results (Drake and Donohue 1996) and conflicts can become intractable (Putnam, Burgess, and Royer 2003; Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman 2006). To prevent deadlocks, it may be useful to reframe the issues (Putnam and Holmer 1992). However, reframing may be difficult to achieve. As noted earlier, frames may be created and used in a strategic fashion but after a period of time they become accepted as explanations for a disagreement. Vallacher, et al. (2010) argue that because frames provide a coherent understanding of a conflict, they may be automatically activated whenever a cue associated with the conflict is encountered and although it might be possible to overcome a frame in the short term, it may re-emerge later.

Researchers working within the two framing paradigms employ different methods (Dewulf et al. 2009). Typically researchers working within the cognitive paradigm rely upon experimentation to produce data that are then quantitatively analyzed. Researchers who work within the interactional paradigm often use discourse analytic or interpretive methods to identify frames.

Turning points arise from prominent internal or external events that cause one or more parties to enact behaviors that are different than earlier behavioral patterns or events (Druckman and Olekalns 2011). These actions can be abrupt or gradual and have both short and long term consequences for the negotiators and the negotiation. To analyze turning points, one must first identify closely proximal precipitant events. These can include procedural changes (e.g., bringing in a third party), substantive changes in offers (e.g., fractionating a proposal into separate parts), or external events (e.g., a change in leadership). Then one must identify subsequent departures from earlier events and patterns that include phase switching or reframing. Finally, one must identify the consequences of the turning point such as escalation or de-escalation of conflict, reaching agreement or impasse or the degree to which an agreement serves the interest of both parties. Although there is no theory which guides turning points research, Druckman and Olekalns (2013) argue that research identifies the following four step sequence. A percipient action or event occurs that is out of sync with negotiations and results in a disruption such as an impasse. In response to the disruption, negotiators depart from the dysfunctional patterns by reframing the negotiation. Reframing has short term consequences such as advanced talks which in turn can have long term consequences including continued negotiation.

Researchers studying turning points have used both cases studies and experimentation. In some cases, researchers have statistically analyzed patterns across several actual cases of turning points (Druckman 2001) and others have used experimental scenarios that parallel actual cases (Druckman, Olekalns, and Smith 2009).

Transformations constitute moments in a negotiation at which the parties reach new understandings of a situation (Putnam 2004). Transformations are evident during the process of negotiation as parties coordinate their actions and in the outcomes of negotiation in which they changed attitudes or cognitions, relationships, group processes and institutions. A critical communication process is thought to be shifting the level of abstraction in which issues are discussed from specific to general, concrete to abstract, part to whole, individual to systems and literal to symbolic. These shifts could allow negotiators to better understand and accept their differences and use them to find creative agreements rather than denying them or viewing one as more legitimate than another. Putnam (2004) argues that transformation differs from reframing. Transformation is focused on a change in the fundamental understandings of a conflict whereas reframing is focused on specific processes such as redirecting interpretations of messages or altering elements of a frame. Because of the strong emphasis on language processes, the study of transformations lends itself to discourse and interpretative methods.

2.2 Parties

Negotiation parties are those individuals and groups who directly or indirectly try to influence the nature of an agreement. By definition, negotiation is at minimum dyadic. Research focused on dyadic negotiation informs as to how communication processes and outcomes are related to the relative power (Wolfe and McGinn 2005), gender (Bowles and McGinn 2005), role (Donohue and Taylor 2007), personalities of the parties (Jordan and Roloff 1997) and the closeness of the relationship between the parties (Valley, Neale, and Mannix 1995). In contrast, some researchers have focused on negotiations involving three or more parties and noted how multi-party negotiation expands the number of interests and makes communication more difficult (Palmer and Thompson 1995). Consequently, parties sometimes simplify negotiations by conducting a series of dyadic negotiations rather than to negotiate simultaneously with all possible partners. In some multiparty negotiations, two parties may make offers to each other that are contingent on the ability of one or both to reach agreements in upcoming negotiations with other parties. Finally, because the parties can include groups as well as individuals, researchers also have examined how members of a negotiation team coordinate their strategies during a negotiation such as using a “good cop/bad cop” approach (Brodt and Tuchinsky 2000) or determine who will be responsible for dealing with constituents and who will be in contact with opposing parties (Friedman and Polodny 1992). In some cases, negotiation teams exchange more information and are more likely to discover mutually beneficial agreements compared to negotiations between two individuals (Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt 1996).

In contrast to the parties at the negotiation table, some parties are not present during negotiation but have an indirect influence over it. Indirect influence occurs when parties select others to negotiate on their behalf or agree to act in concert with other parties during a negotiation. Such cases often involve background negotiations during which linked partners reach agreements for how direct negotiations will be conducted and acceptable agreements that might be reached. Researchers have studied a variety of parties who have indirect influence. For example, some negotiators are formally elected or designated to represent the interests of a constituency such as a labor union or electorate. When individuals are representatives, accountability to a constituency restricts their bargaining freedom and they become more competitive in pursuit of constituency interests that can lead to an impasse (Roloff and Campion 1987). If constituencies have unrealistic expectations, representatives may engage in intraorganizatonal negotiation in an attempt to convince them to make their expectation more realistic (Turner 1990). Although constituency pressure seems to reduce negotiator effectiveness, its impact may be lessened when representatives are negotiating as a team rather than individually (O’Connor 1997) and may enhance negotiation effectiveness when representatives are committed to meeting the interests of their constituency and the interests of the opposition (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984). In other cases, individuals hire an agent to negotiate on their behalf (Rubin and Sander 1988). Conflict can emerge when the principal and agent have different preferences, stakes in the outcome and information. Consequently, principals and agents may encounter problems related to monitoring, providing incentives and coordinating their action and using agents can increase the likelihood of reaching an impasse (Bazerman et al. 1992). Finally, in multiparty negotiations, parties may form coalitions so as to increase their power or to join with others with similar interests (Polzer, Mannix, and Neale 1998). When doing so, parties may negotiate the terms under which they are willing to enter into or stay within a coalition that may include the benefits afforded to them resulting from a coalition victory (Komorita and Cherkoff 1973).

Because multiple parties may be involved in a single negotiation, some theories focus on the influence of multiple parties. For example, McGrath (1966) argued that negotiators are subject to forces arising from their relationship with each other, relationship with their constituencies and relationship with others in the surrounding community. Forces associated with the relationship between the negotiators and between the negotiators and the community facilitate successful negotiation while forces related to the constituency reduce it.

When studying negotiation parties, researchers most often focus on a single unit of analysis such as negotiation between dyads, coalition members or representatives/constituents and have used both experimental and field observational methods. A few studies have attempted to examine linked negotiations so as to determine how one set influences another and these often use observational methods in the field (McKersie et al. 2008).

2.3 Interaction

Negotiation requires that parties interact with each other and researchers have focused on four elements of interaction. The first is the degree to which the interaction involves explicit or tacit bargaining. Explicit bargaining involves interactions in which the parties acknowledge their differences and directly and intentionally exchange offers with the goal of reaching an explicit agreement that has the potential for compromise (Lawler and Ford 1995). In contrast, tacit bargaining occurs when parties perceive that they might be in conflict and adjust their actions in anticipation of each other’s moves without directly communicating with each other (Schelling 1960). Unlike explicit bargaining, tacit bargaining is primarily nonverbal, occurs at a distance and focused on prominent cues associated with the negotiation issues. Tacit bargaining often occurs when social structures (e.g., norms, laws) make direct contact difficult or inappropriate and when parties do not trust one another (Schelling 1960). Often researchers study the two forms of bargaining by restricting the ability of parties to directly communicate or by restricting their communication channels. Communication restrictions tend to impede cooperation although the mechanism that produced this outcome is unclear (Balliet 2010).

A second element is the communication content enacted during a negotiation. Researchers create taxonomies and coding schemes that reflect the myriad of verbal and nonverbal behaviors enacted during a negotiation. In doing so, they some-times use or adapt schemes developed for other contexts such as conversations (Neu 1988) or small group interaction (Theye and Seiler 1979) but some researchers develop schemes that are uniquely tied to negotiation. When doing so, they often collapse individual actions such as thought units into broader categories such as strategies. Putnam and Jones (1982) coded thought units into 25 behaviors and using factor analysis clustered the behaviors into defensive, offensive and integrative strategies. Drake and Donohue (1996) coded speaking turns into phases focused on factual, interest, value or relational frames. Taylor (2002) developed a scheme in which actions are coded into three negotiation orientations (avoidant, integrative or distributive) and within each orientation, actions are coded into three themes used to resolve issues (identity, relational or instrumental). Within each theme, the intensity of the action is assessed. Donohue (1981) developed a coding scheme in which actions are treated as cues requiring a response from an opposing party and responses to previous cues from the opposing party and then coded into attacking, defending and regressing moves. Finally, Donohue and Roberto (1993) coded the linguistic features of thought units into measures of spatial and implicit immediacy.

The aforementioned examples indicate that a given negotiation transcript can be coded in a number of different ways and researchers often develop their own scheme that is tied to a specific construct. Köszegi and Vetschera (2010) provide an overview of various schemes, and Weingart, Olekalns and Smith (2004) provide a useful guide for creating them.

A third element of interaction is the pattern of communication evident within a negotiation. Often researchers examined the frequency with which certain forms of communication occur and their relationship to outcomes. For example, Tutzauer and Roloff (1988) found that the degree to which parties reached agreements that integrated their needs was positively related to information seeking and logrolling and negatively related to using coercive tactics. Olekalns, Smith, and Walsh (1996) discovered that agreements that afforded greater benefits to one side resulted from frequent information exchange about the parties’ positions on issues whereas those that afforded greater benefits to both sides resulted from exchanging information about their issue priorities. However, a more refined approach examines the sequence of actions occurring within a negotiation episode (Weingart, Olekalns and Smith 2004). At a structural level, such patterns include the degree to which parties are reciprocating (matching) or not reciprocating (mismatching) their actions (See Chapter 10, Burgoon, Dunbar and White). At a content level, the patterns provide insights into the strategic moves and countermoves within the interaction and how they are related to outcomes. For example, Putnam and Jones (1982) found parties often reached an impasse when they enacted reciprocal patterns of attack-attack or defend-defend cycles. One advantage to studying sequences rather than frequencies is that in some cases, infrequently used strategies appear in sequences during which the parties are attempting to transform the negotiation. For example, parties who reach win/lose agreements infrequently use conciliatory or information exchange strategies but often embed the two in sequences that include more common strategies and this move allow them to avoid deadlocking (Oleklans and Smith 2000).

In some cases, researchers have studied how communication patterns unfold over the course of a negotiation episode. By doing so, they can determine whether prior sequences influence the occurrence of futures ones. For example, Weingart, Hyder, and Prietual (1996) found that after enacting a sequence of integrative strategies, some parties continue to do so even when one party stops reciprocating them.

The final interaction element is the channel by which parties negotiate. Early research often focused on whether parties were separated by a barrier during negotiation or communicated face-to-face or through written means. With the growth of electronic forms of communication, researchers have turned their focus to virtual negotiations (See Chapter 23, Walther and Lee). Two meta-analyses provide insight into the effect of different channels of communication on negotiations. Stuhlmacher and Citera (2005) examined how negotiation processes and outcomes differed when parties were engaged in face-to-face or virtual negotiations (video-conferencing, audio, email/texting). Two frameworks guided much of the research. The barrier effect perspective assumed that eye gaze signals dominance and that a channel that allows eye gaze will decrease cooperation and reduce outcomes (Pruitt, 1981). Hence, face-to-face communication and video communication should be disruptive to negotiation relative to audio or texting. In contrast, psychological distance perspectives assume that virtual forms of communication create depersonalization and less concern for the social impact of communication relative to face-to-face communication and these processes are disruptive to negotiation. The results of their meta-analysis provide stronger support for the psychological distance perspective than the barrier effect such that parties negotiating virtually engaged in more hostile behavior (e.g., threats, lies) and achieved lower profits than did those negotiating face-to-face and this was especially true when the parties were anonymous. These relationships were not moderated by the type of virtual communication or whether the parties expected to interact in the future.

Swaab, et al. (2012) took a somewhat different approach to understanding the effects of channels. Their Communication Orientation Model assumes that parties enter negotiations with orientations that can be cooperative, noncooperative (competitive or individualistic) or neutral and the degree to which a communication channel affords visual cues, vocal cues and communication synchronicity will moderate the relationship between their orientation and the quality of negotiation outcomes. When parties have cooperative orientations, there is pre-existing rapport that prompts information seeking and positive interactions. In such cases, parties will find ways of reaching quality agreements even when using channels that limit cues. On the other hand, noncooperative parties mistrust one another, are less like to share information and more likely to engage in negative communication which impede the possibility of reaching high quality agreements. When a channel affords ample cues, these destructive tendencies are more likely than when the channel provides restricted cues and parties are less likely to reach high quality agreements. Finally, neutral negotiators enter negotiations uncertain about whether cooperation or competition is desirable. In such cases, less restricted channels afford the possibility of uncertainty reduction and rapport building than do highly restricted ones and better agreements result. The results of their meta-analysis were consistent with their model. Moreover, they hypothesized that parties from Eastern Cultures are more likely to enter negotiation with a cooperative orientation whereas those from Western Cultures are more likely to enter with a neutral one. Hence, the positive impact of channels that afford unrestricted cues on agreement quality should be greater in Western than in Eastern cultures and the results of their meta-analysis supported the hypothesis.

2.4 Agreement

As noted in the definition, the primary purpose of negotiation is to reach an agreement and researchers have studied several aspects of agreements. The most fundamental is whether the parties reach agreement or not. Agreement implies that they reached some sort of an accord whereas a deadlock indicates that they could not. When assessing agreement, one can examine whether the parties were able to resolve all of the issues on the table (comprehensive agreement) or whether they reached partial agreements in which they agree to disagree or leave some issues unresolved for future negotiation or arbitration (Pruitt, 1981). Deadlocking exists when there has been an extended period of nonagreement resulting from the unwillingness or inability of parties to make concessions and a point has passed at which they should have reached agreement (Narlikar 2010). Deadlocks can reflect (1) stalemates in which the parties experience negative consequences arising from their unresolved conflict that may prompt them to deescalate tensions and motivate them to explore new paths to agreement such as bringing in third parties, (2) extended delays during which parties continue to negotiate but become apathetic or disinterested, which reduces the likelihood of agreement and (3) complete breakdowns during which the parties quit negotiating and try to gain advantage through other means such as alliances (Narlikar 2010). Although deadlocks could motivate parties to find ways of reaching agreements, research indicates that impasses result in feelings personal failure, low self-efficacy, negative impressions of the opposing party and reduced confidence in negotiation to solve problems (O’Connor and Arnold 2001). Furthermore, a history of deadlocking can lead future impasse even when negotiating with a different party (O’Connor, Arnold, and Burris 2005).

Researchers have also focused on the degree which agreements are explicit. Accords vary from those in which the elements of the contract (e.g., enforcements, dates for completion) are spelled out in explicit detail to those that are entirely implicit and constitute understandings as to the obligations of the parties (Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino 2009). Theorists argue that explicit contracts primarily serve a safeguarding function by protecting the interests of parties during times of uncertainty and preventing possible exploitation but also help partners coordinate relationships by specifying roles and adapt to future situation by specifying contingencies (Schepker, et al. in press). Implicit contracts emerge when parties believe there are norms that guide their future exchanges (MacNeil 1985) or wish to avoid the transaction costs of writing, enforcing and renegotiating explicit contracts (Tirole 1986). Some agreements are reached that are partially explicit such that the language provides a general framework which will be followed when implementing specific actions (Mouzas, 2006).

Rather than examining the form of the contract, most researchers have examined the individual benefits (e.g., profit) afforded each negotiators. Individual benefits are assessed by comparing how much of their level of aspiration that parties achieved from the agreement or by comparing how much a party receives relative to the opposing party. However, the greatest interest has been in integrative agreements. Integrative agreements are those that yield both parties high benefits and are often nonobvious at the beginning of a negotiation (Pruitt 1981). They may take the form of cost cutting, nonspecific compensation, logrolling, unlinking, reopener agreements or bridging. The integrativeness of an agreement is sometimes operationalized by the degree of mutual gain afforded to the parties or the amount earned by the least benefited party (Pruitt 1981). Others have used the degree to which the agreement affords the highest mutual outcomes relative to all other possible agreements and the degree to which the agreement provides better mutual outcomes than most (Hyder, Prietula, and Weingart 2000).

Although integrative agreements are generally viewed as desirable, not all of them may be. Gillespie and Bazerman (1997) argued that sometimes parties reach parasitic integrative agreements that yield high joint benefits for the parties at the table but have negative consequences for other stakeholders who are not present.

Because the goal of an agreement is to provide guidance for future interactions, researchers have studied the degree to which parties follow or violate their agreements. Explicit agreements can be externally enforced primarily through the legal system but implicit agreements are self-enforced such that violations can result in negative future interactions or a discontinued relationship (Levin 2003) and loss of reputation among third parties (Klein and Murphy 1997). In spite of such enforcements, research indicates that parties violate both explicit (Williamson 1996) and implicit agreements (Robinson and Rousseau 1994).

Researchers have investigated three aspects of contract violations. Some have studied the reactions of those who were the victims of a conflict violation. The reactions have included the willingness to enforce explicit contracts (Anita and Frazier 2001) as well as reactions to breaches of implicit contacts (Zhao et al. 2007). Others have studied how those who violated contracts attempt to contain or repair the resulting damage (Nadin and Williams 2012). Finally, some researchers have examined factors that influence the implementation of contracts such as the development of trust through informal conversations about topics unrelated to the negotiation (Mislin, Campagna, and Bottom 2011) or the refusal to make concessions (Irmer and Druckman 2009).

3.1 Communication and the likelihood of reaching agreements

One way in which communication affects the likelihood of agreement is through convergence. Drake and Donohue (1996) argue that negotiators often express their arguments through different frames and in some cases enact behaviors in which both parities express the same frame (convergence) or different ones (divergence). They found that convergence was positively related to reaching agreement. Alternatively, some researchers have argued that deadlocks results from escalatory process in which parties become locked into competitive actions. For example, parties that reach impasse engage in frequent contentious behavior but infrequent acts of conciliation or priority information exchange (Olekalns and Smith 2000). Although impasse dyads often engage in complementary forms of cooperation (e.g., responding to conciliatory behavior with information about priorities), as the negotiation progresses, they became less likely to enact cooperative behavior after competitive actions. This implies that impasse could result from how parties react to competitive behavior. Indeed, parties who enact contentious communication (assertions of power and rights) are more likely to stop such behavior when their counterparts do not reciprocate the contentiousness, reciprocate but also enact non-contentious communication or label the contentious communication as ineffectual than if they reciprocated it (Brett, Shapiro, and Lytle 1998).

Researchers have also studied how best to deal with prolonged deadlocks. Much of this research has focused on how to restore trust. One way to do so is through unilateral initiatives. Osgood’s model of graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction (GRIT) posits that trust may be restored when one party announces a desire to reduce tensions followed by a series of unilateral concessions that are verified, diversified and never reduce the party’s ability to retaliate (Lindskold 1978; Osgood 1962). Research supports this reasoning (e.g., Lindskold, Betz, and Walters 1986). One danger of unilateral initiatives is that they can be perceived as a sign of weakness and one must be able to defend oneself if attacked. Boyle and Lawler (1991) found that the effectiveness of unilateral initiatives increased when combined with tit-for-tat retaliation.

Another way to restore trust is through apologies and promises. Schniter, Sheremeta and Sznycer (in press) discovered individuals who violated their promises to provide benefits to their partners tried to restore trust by apologizing and upgraded their promises for what they would provide in future exchanges both of which effectively rebuilt trust and increased mutual benefits in future exchanges. Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow (2006) found that promises for future benefits restored trust in the short term but in the long term were no more effective than actually providing benefits. Apologies had little effect on trust. Importantly, when mistrust resulted from deception, none of the repair strategies were fully effective.

3.2 Communication and maximizing individual outcomes.

Achieving individual outcomes often results from value claiming or the use of distributive strategies aimed at gaining the larger share of resources provided by an agreement. Parties can maximize their individual benefits in several ways. Researchers have studied whether the willingness to negotiate increases a party’s outcomes. In some cases, individuals simply accept what is offered rather than trying to improve upon it through negotiation. Willingness to initiate negotiations varies with a variety of factors including personality (Volkema and Fleck 2012), culture (Volkema and Fleck 2012), self efficacy and ability to recognize negotiable situations (Volkema, Kapoutsis, and Nikolopoulos 2013), power (Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld 2007) and gender (Babcock et al. 2003). Individuals who do not initiate negotiation receive benefits that are lower than those who do (Babcock et al. 2006). However, initiating negotiation can result in negative impressions for some parties which may reduce their future outcomes (e.g., Bowles, Babcock, and Lai 2007).

Researchers have also studied the effectiveness of negotiation strategies such as hard line and soft bargaining approaches. Level of Aspiration Theory suggests that tough bargaining such as making extreme offers, few and small concessions and “take it or leave it” threats signals firmness which lowers an opposing party’s level of aspiration resulting in concessions and better outcomes for the tough bargainer (Siegel and Fouraker 1960). On the other hand, perspectives such as GRIT posit that concession making might stimulate great trust and better outcomes (Osgood 1962). In general, tough bargaining yields higher individual benefits than does concession making and especially so when negotiating with a male, when the parties can see each other, the parties are motivated to maximize their individual outcomes, and they know the range of agreements (Hüffmeier et al. in press). However, concession making yields better outcomes when the opposing party reciprocates strategies and concession making also creates more positive impressions such as being reasonable (Hüffmeier et al. in press).

Researchers have also explored the impact of making the first offer. Initial offer serves as anchors and subsequent offers are assimilated toward it in part because first offers prompt opposing parties to think of desirable aspects of the offer (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001). Consequently, the party who makes the initial offer will attain greater outcomes from the opposing party concessions. Powerful bargainers are more likely to make the first offer and to attain higher outcomes than are low power bargainers (Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld 2007) but that the effectiveness of making the first offer can be attenuated when the opposing party focuses on the bargainer’s alternatives and resistance point or their own level of aspiration (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001).

Donohue (1981) focused on argumentation as a means of increasing a party’s outcomes. His perspective is grounded in a set of rules that guide negotiation from which negotiators can gain relative advantage through their strategic moves. Parties who receive the best outcomes are more likely to make offers while rejecting their opponent’s offers. Moreover, those receiving the best outcomes are most likely to reject their opponent’s attacks or ignore them and instead introduce new ideas. Those receiving less benefit are more likely to respond to their opponents by providing conditional support for their views.

Researchers have also studied the impact of emotional expression on individual outcomes. Individuals facing an angry opponent are more willing to make concessions than are those facing a happy or unemotional one (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2004) and this effect extends to future negotiations with the party (Van Kleef and De Dreu 2010). Consistent with the logic of the Emotions as Social Information Model (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead, 2010), the advantage of anger expression results from the image of toughness that it creates (Sinaceur and Tiedens 2006) and the perception of that an angry party has ambitious goals (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2004) both of which signal to the opposing party that concessions are required to avoid an impasse. However, the advantage of expressing anger is limited to situations in which the opposing party has little power (Sinaceur and Tiedens 2006; Van Kleef et al. 2006), has a prosocial motivation (Van Kleef and De Dreu 2010), perceives the anger to be appropriate (Adam, Shirako, and Maddux 2010; Van Kleef and Côté 2007), will experience personal costs from retaliating (Van Dijk, et al. 2008) and perceives the anger to be genuine rather than fake (Côté, Hideg, and Van Kleef 2013). Expressing anger is also not entirely functional in multiparty negotiations. Parties form negative impressions of angry negotiators and are less likely to invite them to be members of coalitions and more likely to exclude them from receiving a payoff share (Van Beest, Van Kleef, and Van Dijk 2008). Only on rare occasions in which parties invite angry negotiators to join a coalition or are forced to let them join, do they make concessions to the angry party (Van Beest, Van Kleef, and Van Dijk 2008).

Finally, researchers have studied the degree to which threats increase a party’s outcomes. Under some conditions, threats can prompt an opposing party to make concessions (Tedeschi and Bonoma 1977). One danger associated with making threats arises from the negative images of the threatener which may prompt resistance rather than compliance. The form of a threat and when it is made influence perceptions and resistance. Implicit threats (i.e., those that do not describe the negative consequences of noncompliance) that are made early in a negotiation and explicit threats that are made late, often generate concessions from an opponent largely because they reduce the likelihood that the threatener is perceived to be aggressive (Sinaceur and Neale 2005). However, explicit threats may be more effective than some forms of implicit ones. In addition, Sinaceur, et al. (2011) argued that anger expression communicates an implied threat that unless concession are made an impasse will occur. This implied threat stimulates more negative impressions of the negotiator and likelihood of making concessions than does an explicit threat delivered in a cool and poised manner.

Although most of this analysis suggests that enacting an assertive style is more effective than being conciliatory, some research suggests that a more responsive strategy enacted early in a negotiation might be effective. Swaab, Maddux and Sinaceur (2011) found that online negotiators who actively mimicked the speech of their counterparts early in the negotiation achieved greater individual outcomes than did those who did not mimic or mimicked late in the negotiation. This effect was mediated by increased trust.

3.3 Communication and reaching integrative agreements

A great deal of negotiation research has focused on the question of how communication facilitates the discovery of integrative agreements. Two perspectives guided much of the research. Cooperation Theory assumes that parties have different motivations that reflect their concern for their own vs. the opposing party’s outcomes. Individuals with egoistic motivations try to maximize their own outcomes and are indifferent to or hostile as to whether the opposing parties achieve their outcomes (Deutsch 1973). In contrast, those who are prosocially motivated seek to maximize their own and the other party’s outcomes and achieve integrative agreements through cooperation. Dual Concern Theory also assumes that prosocial motivations increase the likelihood of integrative bargaining but only when the parties are resistant to yielding (Pruitt and Rubin 1986). In the absence of resistance, they give up too much which reduces joint outcomes. Therefore, individuals who anticipate future interaction with the opposing party often want to meet the party’s needs but they are most likely to reach an integrative agreement when they are highly committed to achieving their own goals or their goals are anchored by a constituency. Because mutually beneficial agreements are difficult to create, parties must expend more energy while preparing for the negotiation and are more likely to identify the integrative potential in the situation (Roloff and Jordan 1991). Moreover, they are more likely to exchange priority information and to logroll during the negotiation (Pruitt 1981). Consistent with Dual Concern Theory, prosocially motivated parties engage in more problem solving behavior and reach agreements that afford higher joint benefits than those who are egoistically motivated but only when resistance to yielding is high (De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 2000).

Although Dual Concern Theory provides a viable explanation for why parties will reach integrative agreements, other models have been developed to fill in gaps in its reasoning. Some scholars have argued that cognitive variables provide useful insights into the discovery of integrative agreements. For example, Trötschel and Gollwitzer (2007) discovered that parties who were prosocially motivated and instructed to form implementation intentions (i.e., to reciprocate the opposing parties fair concessions) were able to overcome cognitive biases and achieve integrative agreement in part through the use of logrolling.

Some scholars argue that Dual Concern Theory focuses exclusively on economic gains with little regard for relational goals. For example, Gelfand et al. (2006) argued that negotiators often seek both economic and relational capital. Relational capital involves liking, trust, knowledge and relational commitment. When parties have little concern for achieving relational goals, they often engage in tradeoffs such as logrolling which affords them economic capital but little relational capital. When parties are strongly commitment to attaining relational goals, they often engage self disclosure, behavioral mimicking, supportive statements and unilateral concession making all which allow them to build relational capital but often reduce their ability to gain economic capital. However, when negotiators are moderately committed to relational goals, they seek to build a positive relationship while establishing justification for receiving economic benefits. Hence, they are thought to be best able achieve both types of capital. There is support for this reasoning (Curhan et al. 2008).

The Dual Concern Theory also says little about how parties manage the communication processes occurring within a negotiation. Olekalns and Wiengart (2008) offer such an approach. They argue that the outcome of a negotiation results from strategy sequences, phases and the goal congruence of the parties. As negotiations unfold, sequences may be enacted that are contrary to the phase of a negotiation (a contentious tactic is enacted within an integrative phase or vice versa). Such inconsistency could reflect the attempts of parties to overcome the dangers inherent within the dominant strategy enacted during a phase. Prolonged contentiousness can lead to impasse and to avoid such, parties must interrupt them with integrative actions. In some cases, continued integrative behavior can be misperceived to be weakness and contentious actions are enacted to demonstrate firmness. Thus, when both parties share a strong goal to be integrative or distributive, they will go through cycles of behaviors consistent with the primary goal but with interspersed inconsistent actions that offset problems.

Perhaps the greatest criticism of the Dual Concern Theory and other negotiation perspectives is that they reflect Western assumption about negotiations including the value of direct communication (Brett and Gelfand 2005). To rectify this, Brett (2007) created a framework focused on how cultural values are related to direct communication and negotiation strategies (Brett, 2007). Although parties from different cultures go through similar negotiation stages, they enact different communication sequences within stages (Adair and Brett 2005), respond differently to emotional expression (Liu 2009), their negotiation behaviors serve different functions (Adair, Weingart, and Brett 2007), their role behavior changes (Cai, Wilson, and Drake 2000) and they can reach integrative agreements but in different ways (Liu and Wilson 2011). Such differences can lead to problems in intercultural negotiation. However, intercultural negotiations in which one party is bicultural are able to communicate in a fashion that reduces social distance and allows them to be more likely to achieve integrative agreements than are parties from the same culture (Kern et al. 2012).