¹ Gudykunst (2005, pp. 283–284) argues that interpersonal and intergroup processes can be differentiated in two primary ways. The first, following the work of Miller and Steinberg (1975), focuses on the type of data people use to make predictions about others’ behavior (i.e., how we define others). When people rely primarily on cultural (e.g., norms, values or rules) or sociological data (e.g., social group memberships) to make predictions about others’ behavior, intergroup communication is likely to occur. In contrast, when their predictions are based primarily on psychological data (e.g., personal information), interpersonal communication tends to occur. The second focuses on the identities guiding people’s own behavior (i.e., how we define the self). Specifically, when people’s behavior is guided primarily by their social identities (i.e., social group memberships), intergroup communication tends to occur. In contrast, when people’s behavior is guided primarily by their personal identities (e.g., idiosyncratic characteristics), interpersonal communication tends to occur.

² In other literatures, for example psychoanalysis, the term “mirroring” is used in very different ways. It can refer to a specific therapeutic technique that involves giving feedback to patients by mimicking their behavior as a form of therapy that engenders self-awareness (Marshall 2006; Warner 1996). It is also used to describe therapies in which individuals are confronted with various aspects of themselves and of their lives through the reactions of others, such as those in group therapy, based on what Cooley termed the “looking glass self” (Gormley 2008).