Chapter 36
The Art of Conflict Resolution
It seems a daily occurrence these days, at least it does in Los Angeles where I live. Somebody has a gun and they’ve taken a hostage. SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams are called in, barricades are set up, news helicopters circle overhead transmitting the live drama, as police negotiators try to resolve the conflict. Sometimes it’s a botched robbery, or an angry ex-employee who wants to settle a grievance with a boss. Sometimes the issue seems minor. In Orange County recently we had an angry parent take a school board member hostage over a dispute about his child’s education.
How do these hostage negotiators handle these conflict situations? What can we learn from them that would be helpful in our day-to-day disagreements with others? In this country we had given very little thought to hostage negotiations until two major incidents galvanized public attention: the Attica State Prison siege in September 1971 and the hostage-taking at the Munich Olympic Games a year later.
The Attica Prison riot stills stands as one of the most disastrous resolutions of a crisis in history. During the four-day prisoner rebellion, 30 miles east of Buffalo, the inmates killed a guard and three other inmates. After only four days, Governor Nelson Rockefeller ordered the state police to take back the prison by force. Police gunfire killed 29 inmates and 10 hostages. To compound the error, the police initially announced that the prisoners had slit the hostages’ throats. The autopsy revealed the truth, that they had been killed by police fire. The prisoners or their families filed 1,280 lawsuits against the prison, the first of which was settled 26 years later for $4 million.
The brutal hostage taking at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games the following year and a disastrously handled rescue attempt killed 11 Israeli athletes, five Palestinian terrorists, and a German police officer. The German police now admit that they were unprepared for what happened. They were more concerned that the world would be reminded of Hitler’s heavy-handed use of the 1936 Olympic games for propaganda purposes, and were trying to keep a low profile. Palestinian supporters had no trouble getting into the training compound and taking nine athletes hostage, in addition to killing two who resisted.
From then on, the negotiators made many mistakes. Following Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir’s urging not to make any concessions to the terrorists, no telephone lines were set up and there was almost no communication with the terrorists. The police allowed the terrorists to move their hostages to the airport, something that would never be allowed by today’s more-enlightened hostage negotiator.
The Germans promised the terrorists safe travel to Cairo, although they did not intend to let them leave. Such deception, we know now, leads to an enraged response when revealed. Finally, when force was used to overcome the terrorists as they tried to board the getaway plane, it was woefully inadequate. Only five poorly trained sharpshooters were used, who had no night-vision devices and lacked radio contact. Just as at Attica, the police tried to cover up their errors. When families of the Israeli victims sued the German government, they denied that any records, “ballistic, forensic, or otherwise,” existed.
Twenty years after the event, a wife of one of the slain athletes appeared on German television and received a call from an anonymous German, who gave her 80 pages of stolen autopsy and ballistic reports. Because of this, the German authorities were forced to reveal a storeroom full of more than 3,000 files and 900 photographs. 1972 was a terrible year for hostage negotiators. More than one thousand hostages lost their lives and 760 of those deaths occurred as police stormed the hostage locations. Clearly the existing strategy of refusing to negotiate with hostage takers and trying to overwhelm them with force was not working. The cure was worse than the disease.
The New York Police Department developed a program to come up with better responses to crises such as hostage taking and suicide threats. They put Lieutenant Frank Bolz in charge of the program, assisted by clinical psychologist Harvey Schlossberg. The program that they developed and then tested in the streets of New York became a model for police departments around the country. As a result, it’s unlikely any hostage will lose his or her life once negotiators have arrived at the scene and made contact with the hostage taker.
In a study by the University of Vermont of child hostage takings, it was found that 98 percent of child hostages were released without physical injury. Also, far fewer of the perpetrators are being killed, which is particularly significant when you factor in the current trend of “police-assisted suicides.” This is a term police apply to hostage takers who are in reality committing suicide. They are inviting the police to kill them. In California now, 25 percent of all police killings of hostage takers are officially classified as police-assisted suicides.
During the NYPD study, Frank Bolz decided that there were five possible responses to a hostage situation. They are:
Attack with little or no attempt at negotiation. (As used at Attica and Munich, with disastrous results.)
Wait out the situation to see what would happen. (This is a good approach if you determine that nothing bad will happen. As I explain in my book The Confident Decision Maker, this should be your first consideration when faced with a “do we or don’t we” type of decision. What will happen if you do nothing? The people surrounding the compound in Waco, Texas, should have known this. Nothing bad was happening inside the compound and the agents should have waited to see what would have developed.)
Negotiate without making any concessions. (This was the popular rallying cry of the Reagan years. We will not negotiate with terrorists! It sounds good to the public, but it is foolishly inflexible. We should be negotiating with terrorists and the willingness to make minor concessions should be a part of the negotiation. What must not happen is for the terrorists to succeed in their major demands. That would obviously encourage others to emulate their actions.)
Negotiate and lie about concessions. (This approach appeals to the public. A gunman once took a class of children hostage at a school in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Governor Guy Hunt videotaped a pardon of the hostage taker and sent it to him. He released the children however, was immediately arrested. The governor rescinded the pardon on technical grounds, saying that you can only pardon a convicted person and that the pardon was given under duress. The hostage taker was given a life sentence. At first glance, it seems to be a very effective technique, and why should we be concerned about lying to violent criminals? However, the tactic of lying to hostage takers is a classic example of a short-term gain and a long-term loss. It affects the outcome of all subsequent negotiations, because it limits the negotiator’s ability to build trust with the hostage taker.)
Negotiate and be willing to make concessions.
The program the NYPD developed was a variation of the last approach. The model they developed calls for the negotiator to be calm, take a humane approach to the problem, earn the hostage-taker’s trust, and offer partial satisfaction by making minor concessions to the hostage taker. Let’s take a look at the procedure used at a typical crisis scene, and as we do so, let’s be thinking of how much of this would apply to the type of crisis situation in which we might be involved, such as an angry customer wanting to cancel an order. The three types of crises to consider are suicide threats, barricaded suspects, and hostage taking. The rules for each of these situations are similar.
The first officers to arrive on the scene must assess the seriousness of the situation; secure the area from potential accomplices, the press, and the curious public; judge the threat to hostages and bystanders; and call for the appropriate backup units.
Securing the area is a critical component, particularly in hostage situations. In almost every case, the suspect must be denied mobility. To let them leave the area will usually exacerbate the situation. In a bank robbery in Houghton, a small town in Michigan, a 24-year-old man walked into a bank in the middle of winter, took a teller hostage, and strapped a bomb to her. He then demanded a getaway car from an employee, seriously injuring the bank manager in the process.
Police, who quickly stopped him, only found out about the bomb when they opened the car door and told him to get out. He threatened to explode the bomb and they backed off, but as they did, they calmly shot out all four tires. This stopped him from going more than a few yards because his deflated tires stuck in the snow. Police surrounded the car and started to negotiate. Unfortunately, the negotiation did not go well. Seventeen hours later the standoff ended when police sharpshooters shot the robber as he wearily put down the bomb detonator. The hostage escaped unhurt. Shooting out the tires may seem like a risky thing to do, but securing the area and not giving the hostage taker mobility is usually the right thing to do.
The next step is to bring in reinforcements. A team of negotiators is set up, who will make contact with the suspect, identify their demands, and try to resolve the conflict without loss of life or injury to anyone. This team consists of a primary negotiator who will communicate with the suspect, a backup negotiator who will take notes and offer advice to the primary negotiator. The third member is the intelligence negotiator who gathers information by interviewing anyone who knows the suspect. Particularly critical information includes the suspect’s criminal record and mental health record.
A SWAT team is brought in. Hopefully they won’t be needed, but they are there to neutralize the suspect if negotiations fail. The police appoint a field commander to supervise the entire operation. The field commander is very aware that if the situation is not resolved successfully he will be the subject of very vocal and public criticism. Everyone from the mayor to the newspaper editors will be second-guessing his judgment. To protect himself and the reputation of his department, he wants to complete the operation by the book. He will insist that established procedures be followed. The smart ones use a checklist similarly to the one that pilots use in their pre-flight routine. This ensures that they don’t overlook a critical step in the height of the trauma.
The first step of the negotiation process is for the primary negotiator to establish communication with the suspect and cut off his or her ability to communicate with anyone else. The primary negotiator should not have to compete for the suspect’s attention. In this way the suspect becomes dependent upon communication with the primary negotiator and a process of trust building begins. If the suspect has access to a telephone, his ability to call out will be cut off. The police do not want the suspect able to communicate with the media or any one else. They also want to deny access to information about police maneuvers or tactics. Communication is usually by telephone. It is too dangerous to allow the suspect and the negotiator to meet face to face.
In Hollywood dramas, you will frequently see a situation where a friend or relative of the suspect is allowed to talk face to face with the suspect. Tense moments ensue as the friend, relative, or lover risks his or her life because he or she loves the suspect so much. After a tearful embrace the suspect surrenders. This would never happen in real life. For one thing this person may be the cause of the suspect’s rage and exacerbate the situation. But the primary reason is that all contact should be through the primary negotiator during the first few days, so that he or she can gain control of the suspect’s world.
If all else fails, a trusted and trained person might be brought in to change the dynamics of the crisis. The local sheriff was brought in at Waco, Texas, but only because David Koresh knew and trusted him. When Cuban prisoners rioted at Oakdale prison, negotiators brought in a Cuban-born priest. Bringing in a third person, perceived as neutral, is akin to bringing in a mediator to resolve a deadlock, as I told you in a previous chapter. It is not done lightly.
Water, heat, and power are turned off, for different reasons. This prevents the suspect from gathering information from television. It prevents the suspects from disposing of drugs or other incriminating evidence, and it gives a tactical advantage to the SWAT team who can use infrared vision to monitor the scene. It eliminates comforts such as heat and toilet facilities. This can then be used later as a trade-off. It causes the suspect to bond with the hostages, making it much less likely that the suspect will harm the hostages. (People who suffer deprivations together will bond.) This was used very effectively by negotiators at the hostage crisis at the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru. More than 500 hostages were taken by terrorists but none were harmed.
Time is the primary negotiator’s friend. Every moment that passes without anything happening is bringing the situation closer to a resolution. (Unlike Hollywood dramas, where the passage of time is used to build tension.) A missed deadline can be a breakthrough for a negotiator. The hostage taker might say, “Unless the governor of the state is on the phone by 12 p.m. I’m going to kill a hostage!”
Although this might cause an inexperienced negotiator to panic, it pleases the primary negotiator because now he has a suspect who is willing to negotiate. Also, he knows that if he can get past noon without losing a hostage, the suspect has lost credibility and has greatly weakened his bargaining power. That is not as callous as it may sound to you because very few hostages have ever been lost under such a specific threat. Hostages get lost in passionate moments, either very early in the hostage taking, when passions are running high or if the suspect feels betrayed by the primary negotiator.
The relationship that the primary negotiator builds with the suspect is the key to peaceful resolution of the crisis. For one thing, the primary negotiator will have spent weeks in classes learning about the personality of hostage takers and people who publicly threaten to commit suicide. They are experts on neurotic behavior and personality disorders. They thoroughly understand the suspect’s state of mind and know how to manipulate the suspect through the crisis. This is one reason why it is better that only the negotiating team, which consists of the primary negotiator, the backup negotiator and the intelligence negotiator are privy to the actual negotiation.
Even the field commander, who may be experienced in crises, will not understand the nuances of the conversation between the primary negotiator and the suspect. He will be inclined to overreact. When he hears, for example, that the suspect is demanding 10 million dollars, or a press conference with the governor, he might see that as an impossible demand that will lead to violence. The primary negotiator hears it as an opening negotiating position and is glad to have some specifics on the table. Nothing is worse than a suspect who won’t talk.
The primary negotiator monitors the suspect’s state of mind. If he appears volatile, the negotiator will draw him into reasoned negotiations by offering him small concessions in return for a minor reciprocal concession. This way the negotiator moves the suspect from thinking with his right brain, which is erratic and volatile, to thinking with his left brain, which is logical and more controllable. If the suspect is too quiet, it may be a sign of depression. To counter that the negotiator reassures the suspect that there is a way out of the situation, that nobody has to get hurt, and that he still has options. The primary negotiator works to build trust with the suspect. He is careful not to say anything that could later be construed as deception by the suspect. He must comply with every promise or commitment that he makes.
Above all, the primary negotiator tries to change the suspect’s stance he has taken, and focus back on their mutual interests. Stances can be 180 degrees apart, and focusing on them obscures the mutual interests that exist between the negotiator and the suspect. This is not to say that the primary negotiator is afraid to be tough with the suspect. The threat of physical force is always present. This is particularly true if the suspect harms anybody. “If you harm a suspect, I can’t protect you,” the negotiator insists. “It will be out of my hands.”
Time passes. The suspect vents his emotions. Deadlines are missed. Demands are modified. No concessions are made without something in return. “You release a hostage and we’ll send in a sandwich.” A forum for bargaining is established. Time wears down resolve. Acceptance time causes the suspect to modify his demands and accept the reality of the situation. The suspect learns to trust the primary negotiator and surrenders to his will. Whether they are dealing with an angry spouse, an employee threatening to quit, or a customer threatening to cancel an order, what can we learn from these trained hostage negotiators that we can apply in our daily lives?
Contain the situation so that it won’t get worse. That may mean getting a suitcase out of a spouse’s hand when he or she is threatening to walk out the door. It may mean getting the car keys out of an angry teenager’s hands, or getting that angry customer to agree to a conference call or a meeting.
Allow the angry person to vent. Hostage negotiators tell you that you must deal with the other person as they perceive the situation, not as you perceive it. They may insist that Abraham Lincoln is talking to them. You don’t have to tell them that you hear it, but you must acknowledge their perception, that they are hearing Abe’s voice. Translated to a daily situation, this means that the other person’s anger may be unjustified, but you must acknowledge that anger as real.
When the other person is angry, look for the hurt. Anger always follows hurt. What caused this person to feel hurt or threatened? Acknowledging the hurt goes a long way toward reducing the anger.
As quickly as you can get them to tell you what it is they want. Get them committed to a position. What would it take to resolve the problem? You do this even if you’re not prepared to make any concessions to the other side at all. For example, you may have an employee who is threatening to quit unless you give them a raise in pay. You may have a firm rule against giving someone an increase in pay if they’re threatening to quit. That’s up to you. But even so, you should get them to tell you how much of an increase in pay they would need to stay. Quantifying the problem goes a long way toward solving it.
Gather all the information that you can. Think of the primary negotiator using his information negotiator to interview everyone who knows the suspect. Focus on the person more than the problem. The solution is always with the person, not the situation. The more you know about the person, the closer you are to resolution. In this stage, another problem may be revealed. Money may not be the real reason why that person is quitting. They may be upset because a rival was promoted before they were. They may have become romantically involved with another employee and need to create some distance between themselves. They may be acting on a false rumor.
Work to get the person off the position that he or she has taken. Get them focused on your mutual interests. Positions can be 180 degrees apart. “You lied to me!” “No I didn’t!” “You cheated me!” “No I didn’t!” These are strong positions that are totally opposed. But it doesn’t mean that you don’t still have strong mutual interests. You may both have a strong mutual interest in that employee staying with your company. Both you and that angry customer may both have a great deal to gain from continuing your relationship. The problem is that when you focus too strongly on positions, you can no longer see your mutual interests. The classic example of that was the Cold War. We took very strong positions. We were calling them an evil empire. They were pounding their shoe on the United Nations table, screaming that they were going to bury us. Those are very strong positions. We both still had huge mutual interests. We had a huge mutual interest in reducing military expenditure. We both had a huge mutual interest in doing business together. They had all that titanium. We needed it for our golf clubs! But we couldn’t see that while we stayed so focused on our positions!
Only when you both have expressed what it would take to resolve the problem, you have gathered the information and worked to get people focused on their mutual interests, do you move to what most people think of as negotiating—the reach for compromise part of it. Here’s where the most important thought that a negotiator can have comes into play. I call it the Power Negotiator’s Creed. The most important thought you can have when you are negotiating is not what can I get them to give me. It is “What can I give them that would not take away from my position, but may be of value to them?”