Introduction

The past is never dead. It’s not even past.

—William Faulkner1

The Panic of 1907 stands out among history’s financial and economic disturbances. Over a century later, this crisis seems so small—its epicenter was short and intense—but it rippled nationally and internationally for years. The economic damage of the Panic was “extremely severe,” according to economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz.2 It strained the fabric of societies, producing distress, dislocation, and even revolution. Its political impact was massive, triggering and accelerating the final push to establish the U.S. Federal Reserve System, after years of ineffectual debate. It fundamentally changed public attitudes about government intervention into markets and economic affairs. It highlighted the role of human agency in the turn of events. The wrangling of powerful personalities such as J. Pierpont Morgan, Elbert Gary, Henry Frick, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and William Jennings Bryan exposed the diversity of ideologies and motivations that would roil the U.S. political economy throughout the twentieth century. Ranked among pivotal events of the age, the Panic of 1907 ushered out an old guard and its orthodoxy, to be replaced by a new generation of leaders who held new notions.

However, memories are short. Eclipsed by two world wars, the Great Depression, the halting emergence of a new global economic order, and a string of crises in the early twenty‐first century, the events of 1907–1913 have faded from mind. Also, each rising generation tends to believe that its own crises are without precedent and that harnessing lessons from further past is pointless.

The aim of this book is to counterargue: forgetting the past is dangerous; it contains valuable lessons for the present and future. While a deep dive into one important crisis will not foretell the future, it will expose insights into crisis dynamics that can forearm the reader. To study past crises is to learn the paths that adversaries of human welfare—panic and market breakdown—might take.

The onset of the Panic of 1907 and the efforts to quell it form a valuable lens through which to examine the fragility of economic and financial systems, the contagion of fear, the challenges of mobilizing collective action, and the relevance of human agency in the context of powerful forces. Modern theories—and public policies—about financial crises must start from some concept of what a crisis is. The Panic of 1907 is an excellent point of reference.

The Progression of Financial Crisis

A financial crisis is a breakdown of normal financial market activities to such an extent that capital flees, resources are misallocated, institutions are destabilized, and disorder spills into the real economy, causing job loss, bankruptcies, recession, and social distress and political ferment.

Scholars have tended to view crises narrowly. For instance, economists Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger viewed a crisis as the moment when market euphoria turns to revulsion. Unfortunately, this narrow view tends to disregard important events and forces that stage and summon the crisis, as well as the shocks and spillovers that ensue. We argue that to understand financial crises, one must follow the entire progression of crisis, from early benign conditions that sowed the crisis, through to the ultimate recovery in the economy, polity, and society that frames a new orthodoxy in thinking. The word “progression” implies that each new phase acts upon the preceding one and sets the stage for the next one for instance, boom → shock → climax → collapse → reaction → recovery. Thus, the idea of progression requires you to take a longer view.

In the account of the Panic of 1907 that follows, the narrative spans 1897 to 1913. The progression of crisis occurred in four acts. First, an economic recovery of the U.S. economy gathered momentum into one of the largest growth spurts in the country’s history: business optimism rose, as did leverage and strains on the financial system. The good times peaked in early 1906, when it seemed that nothing could go wrong.

Second, shocks battered the system. As in Greek tragedies, nemesis follows hubris. To destabilize a financial system, a shock must be real (not cosmetic), large and costly, unambiguous, and surprising—the San Francisco earthquake of April 1906 surely qualifies. To that event we add discussion of some other surprises that shocked the system.

Third, trouble broke out among the less prepared and more vulnerable financial institutions, what in modern parlance would be the “shadow financial system.” A system is only as strong as its most vulnerable link. Financial institutions on the periphery (out of sight and out of mind to the rest of the industry) have tended to be the vulnerable links. Then trouble traveled to other parts of the system through relations among institutions and markets. The initial responses to the crisis were halting because financial systems are complex and opaque, and it was difficult for people to know what was going on. This bred fear. Contagion spread, at first locally, then nationally, and was reflected in declining security prices and the hoarding of financial assets. Then the crisis, initially confined to the financial sector of the economy, reverberated through the real economy, causing widespread distress and dislocation.

Fourth, the crisis began to ebb as confidence recovered—but the ripple effects of the crisis set the stage for the establishment of a “new order” of public sentiment, political power, and regulation. The institutional changes that ensued from the Panic of 1907 were as much a part of the entire progression of crisis as the shocks, instability, and spillovers.

Causes and Dynamics

As the following chapters show, the speed and fury of day‐to‐day events left little time for reflection and understanding. Yet any plan of action must proceed from some theory about the origin and progress of crises. With what theory could J.P. Morgan or anyone else have seen the Panic coming?

One line of thought attributes crises to a hodgepodge of period‐specific factors. For instance, the contemporary Wall Street observer Henry Clews cited nine causes for the panic of 1907.3 Charles Kindleberger ascribed 13 origins to the Panic of 1873.4 With enough detail (and imagination) an analyst could summon a long list of possible causes for financial crises. The problem with that approach is its idiosyncrasy: If there is a different explanation for each crisis, then what can we say about crises in general?

Other approaches rest on one big idea: a sole cause large enough to cover a multitude of sins. A favorite big idea among some economists, for example, is that financial crises are caused by a lack of liquidity in the financial system. The economist Milton Friedman blamed the government’s failure to manage well the money supply as a leading contributor to such events. Likewise, Roger Lowenstein, writing about the stock market bubble and collapse of 1997 to 2001, blamed the credo of shareholder value.5 A related “silver bullet” explanation is greed. Radical and progressive critics blamed financial crises on the wealthy, the profit motive, and class exploitation. Unfortunately, the silver bullet explanation produces generic remedies that poorly treat the disease. One wants a Goldilocks explanation for crises that is neither too much nor too little, neither too idiosyncratic nor too simplistic.

By drawing on a detailed history of the Panic of 1907 and on research about financial crises in general, we offer an alternative view: crises are cascades of shocks and information problems to which bank runs, market crashes, rumors, hoarding, fear, and panic are predictable responses. Scholars such as Charles Calomiris, Gary Gorton, and others have documented the informational aspects of crises. To our knowledge, this is the first book‐length study of a single financial crisis to apply this view. And we extend this view to consider institutional changes that ensue.

Information problems are central to an understanding of financial crises. Over time, innovation in financial institutions, markets, instruments, and processes breed growing complexity in the financial system. Complexity makes it difficult for decision makers to know what is going on. The resulting information asymmetries spawn problematic behavior, arising from adverse selectiona and moral hazard.b Information problems contribute to the overoptimism associated with buoyant business expansion and the tendency of debtors to overlever and of lenders to ignore prudent credit standards.

The architecture of a financial system links institutions to one another in a way that enables contagion of the crisis to spread. Trouble can travel. Safety buffers (such as cash reserves and capital) may prove inadequate to meet the coming crisis. Then, one or more shocks hit the economy and financial system, causing a sudden reversal in the outlook of investors and depositors. Confusion reigns. Public sentiment changes from optimism to pessimism that creates a self‐reinforcing downward spiral. In the vicious cycle, bad news prompts behavior that generates more bad news. Collective action proves extraordinarily difficult to muster until the severity of the crisis and the insight and information held by a few actors prompts mutual response.

Information matters, as our narrative of the Panic of 1907 shows. Key figures relied on information networks to assess conditions, identify trouble spots, set priorities, allocate rescue funds, and make other changes to restore the confidence of depositors and investors. The intense round of meetings, dinners, breakfasts, telegrams, and phone calls essentially aimed to resolve information asymmetries in order to make better decisions.

A Question of Leadership

Do times make the leaders? Or do leaders make the times? Modern historians have dismissed Thomas Carlyle’s “great person theory” in which brilliant and talented individuals bend the arc of history. Instead, a modern vogue inclines some historians toward determinist theories in which the clash of large forces changes history and incidentally renders some individuals rich, powerful, and famous and others out of luck. The events surrounding the Panic of 1907 afford an interesting debate between the two theories.

Technological change (the Second Industrial Revolution), demographic change (waves of immigration), social change (urbanization), political change (progressivism, populism, socialism), and economic change (industrialization, growth and growing inequality) loomed over the first decade of the twentieth century. Against such powerful tides, it is easy to view the strivings of individuals as incidental to larger events.

Yet it is also true that the central figures of the episode brought to bear unusual attributes of character, intelligence, and talent. Theodore Roosevelt arguably changed politics and the presidency more than they changed him. And by virtue of his reputation, intelligence, resources, and social network, J. Pierpont Morgan mobilized a fractious financial community into collective action. One of Morgan’s strengths was an ability to size up people and their problems quickly—maybe hastily. These and other big personalities brought unique attributes to the Panic as it brewed, erupted, and subsided. Perhaps their good (or bad) luck figured in their role in the unfolding events. Certainly, the choices they made reveal underlying attributes of character that also affected the course of events. Thus, this narrative commences with a sketch of the times and the financial leaders who shaped it.

What’s New Here?

More breadth and depth. The first edition of this book was published in 2007, on the verge of the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007‐2009 and the global financial and economic crisis associated with the COVID‐19 pandemic tested conventional theories and policies. These eruptions arrested the attention of policy‐makers and researchers; and they sparked new interest in their ancestor of a century earlier. Researchers in the academy, government, and business turned to the Panic of 1907 as a laboratory in which to test ideas. This version of the book adds the findings from more than four dozen relevant research papers and books published since the original edition in addition to other older sources that came to our attention. Throughout this edition, we provide more graphs and visual figures to help the reader grasp the significance of economic developments.

This new edition extends coverage of the crisis to communities across the United States and addresses international spillovers. And it illuminates the buoyant economic expansion over the decade before the crisis, along with the growth of debt financing in the economy.

Furthermore, this edition treats the civic reaction of 1908–1913 in more detail to illuminate the deep institutional changes that occurred. We examined contemporary analyses, newspaper accounts, and government archives about the civic reaction. The hearings of the Stanley Committee (1911–1912) and Pujo Committee (1912–1913), reports of Treasury Secretary Cortelyou as well as memoirs of Paul Warburg, Carter Glass, and Robert Owen yield insights into the motives of individuals who sought to shape the new regime of state intervention into financial markets and institutions.

Finally, in selected chapters we have added original findings that enrich or challenge the interpretations of researchers. In Chapter 2 we test the statistical significance of the plunge in the Bank of England’s gold reserves to explain the motive behind the BoE’s sharply restrictive monetary policy in October 1907. Our analysis of call loan interest rates in Chapter 14 affirms that the spike in volatility vastly exceeded the historical “noise level” and persisted much longer than implied in other accounts. In Chapter 16, we depict the declines in trust company deposits by firm size that shows the asymmetry in experience among firms. Chapter 19 gives evidence of hysteresis, a lingering slowdown in economic growth following the Panic. In Chapter 21, we analyze the panel of witnesses called to testify at the Pujo Committee hearings to illustrate the focus of the investigation. Our statistical analysis of the runs on trust companies in the technical appendix (after Chapter 24) illuminates the diversity among those firms, associated with variations in business model and the extent of affiliation with notorious figures. And various chapters show that the extensive impact of the Panic lasted well beyond the October–November 1907 period that figure in conventional discussions.

Plan of the Book

The next five chapters set the stage, with a profile of the buoyant lead‐up to the Panic of 1907. Chapters 6 through 18 describe the epicenter of the Panic from mid‐October to early November. What began as a failed attempt to corner the market in a stock traded “on the curb” led to runs on local trust companies, and then financial institutions throughout the nation. The New York Stock Exchange nearly closed for want of liquidity. At the center of this phase of the narrative is a close look at the difficulties of mobilizing collective action among key players in the financial community, and the success of J.P. Morgan in doing so. Chapter 19 recounts the contagion of crisis to other regions of country and world, and spillovers into the real economy.

Chapters 2022 recount the political and civic reactions over the years 1908 to 1913, culminating in the founding of the Fed. This segment surveys the competitive jockeying for dominance of a preferred model for state intervention into the U.S. financial system. Chapter 23 affords an epilogue for the political movement and lives that figured so largely in the Panic of 1907. And the final chapter, 24, offers summary reflections on the entire narrative.

As a useful reference to the sequence of events, we offer Exhibit I.1, which lists key dates and notes their significance.

Motivating One’s Attention to History

As William Faulkner argued, the past is not dead; it is always with us. Just as victims of crime and veterans of combat must endure the indelible imprint of their experience, so societies must deal with the lingering effects of financial crises. To learn from the experience of a financial crisis requires one to process events and their causes, assess consequences, acknowledge agency, and derive meaning. There are no shortcuts to insights: begin at the beginning and trace events to the end. In this volume, we offer the long view. It is insufficient to study only the climax of a panic; one must also study the precursors and the long consequences to frame a deep understanding of these events. Therefore, our narrative begins in the buoyant decade, 1897 to 1906.

Exhibit I.1 Key Dates Related to the Panic of 1907 and the Civic Reaction

Wednesday, April 18, 1906San Francisco Earthquake. Fires resulting from the earthquake burned out of control for three more days.
Friday, October 19, 1906Bank of England tightened monetary policy, banned American finance bills.
March 9–25, 1907Stock market slump. Called “silent crash” or “rich man’s panic.”
May 1907Economic recession began in the United States.
Friday, June 28, 1907New York City failed to place a public bond offering. Failed again in late August. In September, the city government turned to J.P. Morgan to place the bonds privately.
* * *
Tuesday, October 15, 1907Failure of attempted “corner” on United Copper Company stock.
Wednesday, October 16, 1907Gross & Kleeberg failed.
Thursday, October 17, 1907Otto Heinze & Co. failed. State Savings Bank of Butte, Montana, failed. A run began on the Mercantile National Bank, of which Augustus Heinze was president. He appealed to the New York Clearing House (NYCH) for assistance. NYCH agreed to extend assistance on condition that Heinze resign as president of the Mercantile.
Sunday, October 20, 1907J.P. Morgan returned to New York City and convened meetings with leaders in the financial community. The New York Clearing House (NYCH) agreed to aid other banks in the Heinze‐Morse orbit: the Mercantile, New Amsterdam, and North America National Banks, and ordered Augustus Heinze and Charles W. Morse to be eliminated from all banking interests in New York City.
Monday, October 21, 1907Announcements that the NYCH declined to aid the Knickerbocker and that National Bank of Commerce refused to clear payments for the Knickerbocker Trust Company. Runs began on the Knickerbocker Trust Company. Charles Barney resigned as president of the Knickerbocker.
Tuesday, October 22, 1907Runs on the Knickerbocker surged. The Knickerbocker suspended withdrawals. Credit grew scarce. Call loan interest rates rose sharply. Runs increased on Trust Company of America (TCA) and Lincoln Trust.
Wednesday, October 23, 1907Benjamin Strong affirmed the solvency of TCA. J.P. Morgan organized a private rescue pool among some banks for TCA. Later that day, he organized a supplementary rescue pool for TCA among CEOs of other trust companies.
Thursday, October 24, 1907The CEOs of trust companies reneged on their commitment to TCA. Therefore, Morgan organized another rescue pool for TCA with some banks. Credit crisis hit the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE): call loan interest rates peaked at 100 percent. Illiquidity threatened to cause fire‐sale liquidation of stocks. J.P. Morgan organized a rescue pool for NYSE. Treasury Secretary Cortelyou committed $25 million in government funds to assist distressed financial institutions and relieve the credit crunch.
Friday, October 25, 1907J.P. Morgan and crisis committee augmented rescue funding for NYSE, TCA, and Lincoln Trust.
Saturday, October 26, 1907NYCH decided to issue Clearing House Loan Certificates in lieu of currency for settlement of payments among banks. President Roosevelt issued a letter commending Treasury Secretary Cortelyou and leaders in the financial sector for actions to quell the crisis.
Sunday, October 27, 1907A New York City official visited George Perkins and warned of another financial crisis for the city.
Monday, October 28, 1907The mayor of New York visited J.P. Morgan and described the city’s cash crisis. A loan payment was due on November 1, but the city had run out of cash and was unable to refinance the obligation.
Tuesday, October 29, 1907J.P. Morgan organized a private placement of bonds for New York City.
Saturday, November 2, 1907Morgan organized a proposal to rescue brokerage firm, Moore and Schley. The proposal entailed the purchase by U.S. Steel of Tennessee Coal & Iron (TC&I). The same day, Morgan learned of renewed and threatening runs at TCA and Lincoln Trust. At an overnight meeting in his library, Morgan finally mobilized the presidents of trust companies to organize a rescue pool up to $25 million for distressed trust companies, particularly Trust Company of America and Lincoln Trust.
Sunday, November 3, 1907U.S. Steel agreed to acquire Tennessee Coal & Iron, contingent on approval by the U.S. government. Elbert Gary and Henry Frick traveled overnight to gain President Roosevelt’s approval before the NYSE opened the next day.
Monday, November 4, 1907Roosevelt agreed not to oppose U.S. Steel’s acquisition of TC&I. The Bank of England raised its base interest rate from 5.5 percent to 7 percent, the highest in decades.
Wednesday, November 6, 1907The first shipment of gold arrived from France. A total of $36 million more was expected to arrive subsequently.
Friday, November 17, 1907The U.S. Treasury invited bids for $150 million in U.S. bonds and notes to increase the money supply. The offering was undersubscribed.
November 25, 1907Banks began to issue currency against new Treasury notes. Newspaper headlines suggested the money crisis had ended.6
December 12, 1907The U.S. Senate adopted a resolution requesting information from Treasury Secretary Cortelyou about government deposits in national banks during the Panic. This responded to Democratic Party senators, who a week earlier had called for deeper investigation of Treasury Department policies.
January 1908Senator Nelson Aldrich, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, began to circulate draft legislation to create emergency currency in the event of a banking crisis.
January 29, 1908Cortelyou delivered a 232‐page report to Senate regarding Treasury actions during the Panic.
February 18, 1908The Senate adopted a resolution to investigate New York banks for the use of Treasury Department deposits during the Panic. Cortelyou was required to present necessary data and any complaints lodged against the New York banks.
March 19, 1908Senator La Follette alleged that the Panic was “deliberately planned” by insurance companies with the Morgan and Standard Oil groups of banks.
May 30, 1908President Roosevelt signed the Aldrich–Vreeland Act, which empowered an expansion of the money supply in the event of a financial crisis and created the National Monetary Commission.
June 1908Economic contraction ended. U.S. economy began its recovery.
November 3, 1908Federal elections: William Howard Taft won the presidency, running against William Jennings Bryan.
* * *
November 8, 1910Mid‐term federal elections. The Democratic Party won a majority in House of Representatives.
January 16, 1911Senator Aldrich submitted “A Suggested Plan for Monetary Legislation to the Monetary Commission.”
May 16, 1911The House of Representatives authorized the Stanley Committee Investigation into U.S. Steel. Hearings began in June.
July 1, 1911The Commissioner of Corporations published a report that finds that U.S. Steel did not monopolize the steel industry but did display monopolistic tendencies.
July 8, 1911Representative Charles Lindbergh, Sr., declared the existence of a “money trust” in the United States and called for an investigation.
October 26, 1911The Department of Justice under the Taft Administration filed a lawsuit against U.S. Steel for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
January 11, 1912The National Monetary Commission published its 24‐volume report that marked a major shift in thinking in favor of creating a central bank.
February 24, 1912The House of Representatives voted to investigate the possible existence and impact of a “money trust.”
May 16, 1912Pujo Committee “money trust” hearings began. The final report was published on March 2, 1913, two days before Woodrow Wilson’s inauguration as president.
August 2, 1912The Stanley Committee published its final report of the hearings on U.S. Steel.
November 5, 1912Federal elections. Woodrow Wilson was elected president, defeating Taft and Roosevelt. The Democratic Party won majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives.
January 15, 1913Pujo Committee hearings ended.
December 23, 1913Congress passed and President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act, creating the Federal Reserve System “to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.”
November 16, 1914The Federal Reserve System commenced operations.
March 1, 1920The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Department of Justice suit that U.S. Steel violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.

Notes

  1. a. Adverse selection arises if a better‐informed party in a transaction can exploit information to the disadvantage of the less well‐informed party. Think of buying a used car (the seller knows more about the condition of the car, possibly a “lemon”) or selling health insurance (the buyer knows more about his or her health outlook). Concern about adverse selection may drive parties out of the market, thus diminishing liquidity and the ability of the market to clear. Also, adverse selection might drive quality goods out of the market because sellers of high‐quality goods cannot obtain the prices they deserve. In finance, “Gresham’s Law” (i.e., bad money drives out good money) is an example of adverse selection.
  2. b. In the case of moral hazard, a party to an agreement fails to act in good faith and shifts risk onto counterparties. For instance, debtors who believe that the government will always bail them out in a crisis may simply borrow more, ultimately shifting risk onto taxpayers.
  3. 1. William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun (New York: Random House, 1951, reprinted 1994), p. 73.
  4. 2. Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 156, 157.
  5. 3. Clews wrote, “The real causes of all the trouble can be summed up as follows: (1) the high finance manipulation in advancing stocks to a 3.5 to 4 percent basis, while the money was loaning at 6 percent and above, on six and twelve months, time on the best of collaterals; (2) capital all over the nation having gone largely into real estate and other fixed forms, thereby losing its liquid quality; (3) the making of injudicious loans by the Knickerbocker Trust Co., hence suspension; (4) the unloading by certain big operators of $800,000,000 of securities, following which were the immense sales of new securities by the railroads; (5) the California earthquake, with losses amounting to $350,000,000; (6) the investigation of the life insurance companies; (7) the Metropolitan Street Railroad investigation; (8) the absurd fine by Judge Landis of $29,400,000 against a corporation with a capital of $1,000,000; (9) the Interstate Commerce Commission’s examination into the Chicago & Alton deal and the results thereof” (Clews 1973, p. 799).
  6. 4. Kindleberger (1990), p. 71.
  7. 5. Lowenstein (2004), pp. 218–219.
  8. 6. “Banks To Release Millions To‐Day: Money Crisis Over,” New York Times, November 25, 1907, p. 1; “Plan for Banks of Issue: Thinks Corner Has Been Turned,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 24, 1907, p. 1.
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