Index

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  • Page numbers followed by f refer to figures.
  •  
  • Academic institutions:
    • access to AI knowledge for, 211
    • America's AI leadership in, 135–136
    • in driving AI results, 131–132
    • responses to RFIs from, 98, 99f, 104–106, 115, 116
  • AICT (Artificial Intelligence Capabilities and Transparency) Act, 170–171
  • AI.gov, 86
  • AI-IA (Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act), 167–169, 171
  • AI industrialization, 139
    • in America, 32–33
    • in China, 19, 150
    • ethics and governance in, 10
    • need for experts in, 149
    • OSTP's lack of attention to, 9, 79–80, 97, 107, 111, 114, 117, 119
    • plan needed for, 139, 227
    • in recommended AI plan, 224–225
    • Strategy 8 for, 120, 131–132
    • strategy for, 6
  • AI leadership:
    • by America, claim of, 76–77
    • in American private sector and universities, 135–136
    • America's loss of, ix–x, 9–11, 227
    • Biden on, 83, 85
    • by China, 8, 16
    • Cruz on, 147
    • drivers of, 64, 136–138, 226
    • executive leadership for, 73–75
    • inspirational, need for, 141
    • lack of, 87–88
    • national plan for (see National AI strategy (US))
    • NSCI statement on maintaining, 137
    • and supply-side thinking, 125, 127
  • AI revolution, 218–221
  • AI Super-Powers (Lee), 43
  • AI supply chain:
    • in America, 197–200
    • data sensors for, 200–201
    • from investment perspective, 210–212
    • as narrative for developing AI systems, 196–197, 196f
  • AI War, 62–64, 228. See also Losing the AI battle
  • Albert, Tom, 2–3
  • Algorithms, in AI supply chain, 196–197, 196f
  • Allies and alliances:
    • in containment strategy, 68–69
    • economic, 60–61
  • American Artificial Intelligence (AI) Initiative, 75–80
    • establishment of, 114
    • flaws in, 5–7, 11
    • loss of momentum in, 148
    • OSTP report on, 120–121
    • OSTP RFI as basis for, 115–118
    • timeline of actions to advance, 120–121, 122f–124f
  • American Institute of Artificial Intelligence (AIAI), ix, 223
  • American institutions:
  • Anchoring bias, 171, 221
  • Armed Forces Digital Advantage Act, 167
  • Artificial intelligence (AI). See also specific topics
    • Chaillan's vision for, 2
    • China's deployment of, 213
    • China's power in, 40
    • in cognitive warfare, 28
    • complexity and extent of, 74
    • as critical capability, 63
    • disruptive rise of, 14–16
    • factors in development of, 194
    • in identifying and solving problems, 7–8
    • IT development vs. development of, 40–42, 195
    • IT's differences from, 62–63
    • leadership in (see AI leadership)
    • link between supply chains and, 32, 212–214
    • major American “clubs” of, 142–143
    • Musk on, 151
    • as paradigm change vs. as technology, 5
    • problems and solutions related to, 225–226, 226f
    • problems in deployment of, 7
    • in rethinking and new types of work, 176–177
    • social perception of, 16–18, 82–83, 202–203, 227
    • as a supply chain (see AI supply chain)
    • technology development model for, x
    • theory underlying concerns about, 220–222
    • as transformative force, 82, 154–155, 226, 226f
    • US government's approach to, 2, 34 (See also National AI strategy (US))
    • viewed as a national asset, 205–206
  • Artificial Intelligence Capabilities and Transparency (AICT) Act, 170–171
  • Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act (AI-IA), 167–169, 171
  • Ashford, Emma, 36–37
  • Associations, RFI responses from, 98, 99f, 107–110, 115, 116
  • Austin, Lloyd, 5, 87
  • Australia, 68
  • Automation Anywhere, 208
  • Autonomous driving, 176–177
  • Avoidance, fallacy of, 140
  •  
  • Believability of AI issues, 141–142
  • Bethel, Cindy, 149
  • Beyer, Don, 151
  • Biden, Joe:
    • China policy of, 48, 62
    • containment strategy under, 53–54, 76
    • domestic terrorism concerns of, 29
    • FTC head chosen by, 41
    • national AI strategy plan of, 81–87
    • restrictions on Chinese companies by, 67
    • on supply chain problems, 32, 33
    • Trump-like policy under, 40
    • Xi's meetings with, 54
  • Big Tech, 41–42
    • abusive AI policies of, 81, 84
    • China's control of, 164–165
    • commercialization of innovations by, 127
    • in creating national AI strategy, 86
    • and development of AI policy, 137
    • in driving AI results, 131–132
    • ethics and governance in, 129, 153, 204
    • growth opportunities for, 143
    • lobbyists for, 125, 212
    • political stance of, 206
    • responses to RFI from, 115, 116
  • Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, 33
  • Blanchette, Jude, 38–39
  • Blankenship, Brian D., 51–52
  • Blue Prism, 202, 203, 207, 208
  • Bolsonaro, Jair, 206
  • Bolton, John, 46
  • British R&D system, 218
  • Brockman, Greg, 147
  • Bruck, Robert, 219–220
  • Bush, Barbara, 26
  • Bush, George H.W., 25–26, 72, 88
  • Butcher, Jamey, 212–214
  •  
  • Cantwell, Maria, 154
  • Capitol Hill attack (January 6, 2021), 27, 29
  • Castro, Daniel, 149
  • CDOs (chief data officers), 198–199
  • Chaillan, Nicolas, 1–2, 6, 219
  • Chemonics, 213
  • Chief data officers (CDOs), 198–199
  • Chief information officers (CIOs), 186–187, 199
  • Chien, Steve, 147
  • China:
    • AI adoption in, 219
    • AI and productivity in, 42–43
    • AI development in, 152
    • AI revolution in, 43–44, 60
    • AI superiority of, 8, 16
    • in AI War with US, 62–64, 228
    • America's economic dependence on, 56
    • America's strategic moves against, 228
    • ban on Chinese companies operating in US, 61–62, 212
    • Big Tech reigned in by, 164–165
    • bullet train launch in, 27
    • capabilities of, 146
    • competition with, 20–21
    • competitive advantage of, 6, 19
    • concept of AI in, 202–203
    • countering AI advances by, 21, 22 (See also Containment strategy)
    • Covid management in, 20, 31
    • deployment of AI in, 213
    • economy of, 38, 55–58
    • in great-power competition, 35–37
    • humanitarian projects of, 213–214
    • Le on economic status of, 11–12
    • military weapons of, 19
    • narrative about threat of, 45–47
    • national AI strategy of, 129–130
    • NSCAI on, 136, 141
    • power projection by, 39, 44
    • rise of, 37–40
    • in semiconductor market, 212
    • surrender of AI war against, 1–2
    • tariffs on, 47–48, 59
    • top professors’ relationships with, 211
    • unexpected technological emergence of, 15–16
    • US imports from and exports to, 59
    • US reactivity to, 140–141
    • US strategic confusion about, 14
    • warnings about doing business with firms of, 64–68, 76
    • Western influence in, 68
    • wolf warrior diplomacy of, 12–14
    • Xi's meetings with Biden, 54
  • CIOs (chief information officers), 186–187, 199
  • CIO Council, 187
  • Clinton, Bill, 43, 71–73, 75, 88, 131
  • Cognitive automation, 202
  • Cognitive warfare, 27–30
  • Cold War, 25–26, 47, 62
  • Commercialization of technology, 127–128
  • Committee for AI strategy development:
    • recommendations for, 223–224
    • Select Committee on AI, 77, 114, 115
  • Competitive advantage:
  • Conference on AI (March 2019), 113, 114
  • Congress, 145–171
    • AI caucuses of, 150–152, 166–167
    • bills containing term “artificial intelligence,” 155–156, 156f–162f
    • bills introduced since 2020, 165–171
    • focus to advance AI needed by, 164–165
    • and Foster's interview on AI, 162–164
    • FUTURE of AI Act, 153–155
    • “Japan-bashing” by members of, 145, 146f
    • limited understanding of AI in, 152–153
    • need to expect more from, 139
    • Senate hearings on artificial intelligence, 146–150
    • tone and messaging about AI in, 165
  • Consulting firms, 115, 116, 192
  • Containment strategy, 21–22, 51–69
    • allies and alliances in, 68–69
    • under Biden, 53–54, 76
    • and drivers of AI leadership, 64
    • and economic decoupling and recoupling, 55–58
    • and opening of the Data War, 61–64
    • and supply chain failure, 58–61
    • under Trump, 51, 76
    • and warnings about doing business with Chinese AI firms, 64–68
  •  
  • Data:
    • in AI supply chain, 196–197, 196f, 210
    • for AI systems, 213
    • AI systems arising from, 198
    • on Americans, China's gathering of, 65
    • investment in, 210
    • for IT and from AI, 40–41
    • relevance of, 200
    • from social media apps, 31
    • for training AI systems, 195
  • Data management, 197–200
  • Data science, 198, 211
  • Data sensors, 200–201
  • Data War, 61–64
  • “The Dawn of Artificial Intelligence,” 146–149
  • Decoupling/recoupling:
    • of economies, 55–58
    • financial, 57, 66–68
    • recommended US AI plan as basis for, 225
  • Deep learning, 15, 43–44, 202–203
  • Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 188–189
  • Delaney, John K., 150, 152, 155
  • Dell, 60
  • Demand pattern changes, 33–34
  • Denison, Benjamin, 51–52
  • Department of Defense (DoD; Pentagon):
    • advancing AI capabilities of, 167, 169, 170
    • AI projects of, 87–88
    • ecosystem of, 2
    • Mattis' attempt to change culture of, 3–4
    • meaning of “speed of relevance” in, 4
    • strategic plans of, 181–185
  • Deployment of AI, 7, 213
  • Deployment of technology, 127–128
  • “Digital Decision-Making,” 149
  • Digital World Acquisition Corp (DWAC), 207
  • Discover, predict, automate (DPA) cycle, 42–43
  • DLA (Defense Logistics Agency), 188–189
  • DoD, see Department of Defense
  • Domestic conflict in America, 19, 31–32
  • DPA (discover, predict, automate) cycle, 42–43
  • Dransfield, Joe, 4
  • Drivers of AI leadership, 64, 136–138, 226
  • Dunford, Joseph, 4
  • DWAC (Digital World Acquisition Corp), 207
  •  
  • Economic environment of R&D systems, 217–219, 221
  • Economies:
    • AI as underlying force in, 82
    • AI's productivity multiplier effect on, 16
    • central planning models for, 223
    • decoupling and recoupling of, 55–58
    • humanitarian aid to, 213–214
  • Economy of China, 38, 55–58
  • Economy of the United States:
    • AI as transforming force for, 82, 154–155
    • consolidation in, 143
    • Foster on, 162–164
    • interdependence of Chinese economy and, 55–58
    • and move of operations to China, 13–14
    • structure of, 7–8
  • Emerging Citizen Technology atlas, 178–179
  • Entity List, 65–66
  • Environmental factors:
    • in decline of AI superiority, 228
    • in R&D systems, 217–219, 221
  • Espinel, Victoria, 149
  • Ethics in AI, 10, 154–155, 227
    • Biden on, 83–84
    • in Big Tech, 129, 153, 204
    • in China, 129
    • in DoD 2018 Plan, 182–183
    • guidelines for, 130–131
    • in national AI strategy, 80–81
    • posturing on, 153
    • time spent on, 129
    • as topic for futurists, 203
  •  
  • Facebook, 206
  • Fear of AI. See also Threats to America
    • AI revolution as source of, 221–222
    • and Biden's messaging about AI, 82
    • futurists' concept of, 203–204
    • and House caucus on artificial intelligence, 152
    • and OSTP's focus, 97
    • from repeated messaging about AI's evil, 194
  • Felten, Edward, 149
  • Financial activity, 82, 163–164
  • Financial capital, access to, 67–68. See also Investment in AI
  • Fiscal policy, 47–48
  • Ford, Christopher, 13
  • Foster, Bill, 151, 162–164
  • Futreal, Andrew, 147
  • FUTURE of AI Act, 153–155
  • Futurists:
    • on AI, 80–81, 130, 203–204
    • and OSTP policy failure, 227
    • types of, 203
  • FY21 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021), 169–170
  •  
  • General Services Administration (GSA), 176, 177
  • Georgieva, Kristalina, 35
  • Gil, Dario, 149
  • Google, 17, 43, 74
  • Gore, Al, 43, 71–73, 75, 88, 131
  • Governance of AI, 10, 154–155, 227
    • Biden on, 83–84
    • in Big Tech, 129, 153, 204
    • in China, 129
    • in DoD 2018 Plan, 182–183
    • guidelines for, 130–131
    • in national AI strategy, 80–81
    • posturing on, 153
    • time spent on, 129
    • as topic for futurists, 203
  • Government:
    • lack of private sector direction from, 191–193
    • NSCAI on role played by, 136
    • in shaping concept of what AI is to, 179
    • Silicon Valley's perspective on, 205
    • strategy development by (see Strategy development process)
  • Government agencies, 175–189. See also individual agencies
    • challenges for ML projects in, 185–187
    • DLA's materials management system, 188–189
    • DoD's strategic plans, 181–185
    • in driving AI results, 131–132
    • information coordination among, 177–181
    • investment in AI by, 121
    • procurement of AI by, 144
    • responses to RFIs from, 99, 99f
    • sourcing and adoption of AI projects in, 175–177, 180
    • strategy development process in, 187–188
  • “Great-power competition” (GPC), 34–37, 51
  • Grievance polities, 13
  • Groen, Michael, 184
  • Groupthink, 128–130
  • Growth, AI as force for, 82, 154–155
  • GSA (General Services Administration), 176, 177
  •  
  • Haines, Avril, 12
  • Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 71–72
  • Heinrich, Martin, 165–171
  • Herman, Justin, 177–181
  • Horvitz, Eric, 147
  • Huawei, 61, 69
  • Humanitarian supply chains, 213–213
  • Hundai, 212
  • Hussain, Saddam, 46
  •  
  • Ideological struggle in America, 45, 225
  • India, 68
  • Individuals, RFI responses from, 99, 99f, 115
  • Industrialization mindset, 5. See also AI industrialization
  • Inflation, 19, 47–48
  • Information:
    • communicated to Americans, 57–58
    • Congress' tone and messaging about AI, 165
    • coordination of, among government agencies, 177–181
    • for determining paths of technological change, 220–221
    • embedded in new technologies, 125, 139–140, 179, 220–221
    • provided to industry, 140
  • Information technology (IT), 16. See also Internet
    • AI development vs. development of, 40–42, 195
    • AI's differences from, 62–63
    • corporate rivalry in, 199
    • programmers of, 195
  • Infrastructure:
    • in America, 19–20, 225
    • and China's economic aid projects, 213–214
    • for global information, 71–72
    • of government agencies, 186
    • technology, AI systems in, 176
  • Innovation(s):
    • AI as underlying force of, 82
    • American capacity for, 41
    • China's capacity for, 38, 57–58
    • commercialization of, 127–128
    • impact of mega investment on, 209–210
    • information embedded in, 125, 139–140, 179, 220–221
  • Intel, 210–212, 220
  • Intellectual property theft, 53–54
  • Internet, 14, 17, 28–30, 40, 71–75
  • Investment (generally):
    • in American designer firms, 41
    • in Chinese firms, warnings about, 66–67, 76
    • in research and development, 42, 72, 76–82, 121
    • in research and science, 84
    • in STEM human capital, 64
    • in universities, 211
  • Investment in AI, 205–215
    • under American AI Initiative, 79–80
    • Biden's promise for, 82, 83
    • concerns about, 214–215
    • in data, 210
    • economic compatibility of, 221
    • elitism in, 221–222
    • by government agencies, 121
    • and link between AI and supply chains, 212–214
    • new mega investment model of, 208–210
    • new phase of, 206–207
    • as OSTP goal, 119
    • in private sector, 207–208
    • problems with, 221–222
    • R&D-centric federal strategy for, 9–11
    • recommendations for, 139–144
    • research focus in, 6
    • in semiconductors, 211–212
    • in skills development, 211
    • understanding of value chain needs for, 120
  •  
  • JAIC (Joint Artificial Intelligence Center), 184–186
  • Japan, 66, 68, 145, 146f, 218
  • Jobs, 225
  • Johnson, Boris, 85
  • Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), 184–186
  •  
  • Ke Jie, 43
  • Knowledge:
    • about AI, access to, 211
    • in AI systems, 196–197
    • theoretical domains of, 220
  • Knowledge economy, 8
  • Kratsios, Michael, 76–77, 115
  • Krugman, Paul, 55
  • Kudlow, Larry, 12
  •  
  • Latin American Logistics Organization, 60–61
  • Leadership:
    • in AI (see AI leadership)
    • in developing national US AI strategy, 73–75, 87–88
    • in IT, 40, 41
    • need to expect more from, 139
    • in science and technology, 38
    • in shaping future of Internet, 71–72
  • Lee, Kai-Fu, 43
  • Legislation. See also individual legislation
    • bills containing term “artificial intelligence,” 155–156, 156f–162f
    • bills introduced since 2020, 165–171
    • and transformation, 224
  • Le Keqiang, 11–12
  • LG, 212
  • Li, Cheng, 37
  • Losing the AI battle, 25–48
    • attacks on American institutions, 28–30
    • change in demand patterns, 33–34
    • changing mood of the nation, 27–30, 45
    • China's opportunity to strike, 42–43
    • China's technology revolution, 43–44
    • to cognitive warfare, 27–29
    • Covid pandemic, 31
    • domestic conflict/tensions, 31–32
    • “great-power competition,” 34–37
    • ideological struggle in America, 45
    • inflation and supply chain failures, 47–48
    • IT and AI development, 40–42
    • rise of China, 37–40
    • shaping of China threat narrative, 45–47
    • supply chain meltdown, 32–33
  • Lv, H., 20
  •  
  • McCaul, Michael, 66
  • Machine learning (ML):
    • across problem domains, 183
    • data for, 196
    • developing skills in, 211
    • testing software for, 175–177
  • Machine learning projects, 87–88, 175, 185–187, 192
  • Maher, Tom, 219
  • Manufacturing, 31, 33–34, 37–38, 196
  • Markey, Edward J., 154–155
  • Mattis, James Norman, 3–4, 6
  • Mega investment model, 208–210
  • Microsoft, 114, 202
  • Military, RFI responses from, 99, 99f
  • Military capacity, 19
  • ML, see Machine learning
  • Monetary policy, 47–48
  • Mood of the nation, 27–30, 45, 88–89
  • Moore, Andrew, 147
  • Morrison, Scott, 85
  • Moynihan, Daniel P., 145
  • Musk, Elon, 151
  • National AI R&D Strategic Plan (2019), 114–120
    • assumptions in, 119
    • overview of, 118–119
    • RFI for, 115–118
    • strategies in, 120
  • National AI strategy (China), 129–130
  • National AI strategy (US), 75–89, 219–228
    • 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan, 91–95
    • 2019 National AI R&D Strategic Plan, 114–120
    • Albert on, 2–3
    • American AI Initiative as, 5–7, 11
    • under Biden, 81–87
    • building a plan for, 20–22
    • Chaillan on, 2, 6, 219
    • to counter China's advances (see Containment strategy)
    • developed in government agencies, 187–188 (See also Government agencies)
    • distinguishing between R&D plans and, 9–11, 128, 222–223, 227
    • drivers of leadership for, 64
    • ethics, governance, and values in, 10, 80–81
    • executive leadership of, 73–75, 87–88 (See also AI leadership)
    • experts' opinions on, 148–149
    • failure of, 18–20
    • flaws in, 219, 221–222
    • focus of, 224–225
    • Heinrich on, 168
    • launches and relaunches of, 86–87
    • and mood of the nation, 88–89
    • under Obama, 77, 86, 93
    • OSTP's development of, 9, 227 (See also Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP))
    • other countries' adoption/copying of, 128–129
    • outside of OSTP, need for, 140
    • politics, talent, and priorities in, 131–132
    • problems in developing, 17–20, 18f, 225–226, 226f
    • proper development process for, 9–11
    • recommendations for developing, 223–225
    • supply side thinking in, 125–128, 126f
    • under Trump, 75–80, 87, 113
  • National Artificial Intelligence Research Development Initiative, 168
  • National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), 64–65
  • National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY21 NDAA), 169–170
  • “The National Defense Strategy” (NDS), 3–4
  • Nationalism, 74–75, 205–207
  • National narratives (US):
    • about threats to America, 45–47, 141–142
    • of AI for promoting good, 82–84
    • error in, 10
    • “global” narrative, 206
    • of “great-power competition,” 34–37
    • OSTP's creation of, 10, 81
    • from presidents about AI, 74–75
    • problems in, 8
    • as social perception of AI, 227
  • National security. See also Cybersecurity
    • AI as underlying force of, 82
    • allies and partners in, 85
    • Capitol Hill attack, 27, 29
    • cybersecurity, 6, 19
    • and development of AI policy, 97
    • link between AI and, 17
    • NSCAI on risks to, 136
    • and plan for fixing underlying AI issues/causes, 140
    • warnings about doing business with Chinese firms, 64–68
  • National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 219
  • National Security Council of Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) report, 133–144
    • final report, 135–136
    • issues not focused on in, 136–139
    • recommendations for areas not covered by, 139–144
  • National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, 167
  • NCSC (National Counterintelligence and Security Center), 64–65
  • NDS (“The National Defense Strategy”), 3–4
  • Nike, 60
  • NITRD (Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development), 94
  • Nonprofits, RFI responses from, 98–99, 99f, 107–110
  • NSCAI report, see National Security Council of Artificial Intelligence report
  •  
  • Obama, Barack:
    • 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan of, 77, 86, 91–95
    • lack of tech sector attention by, 41
    • preparation for AI under, 93
    • on rise of China, 37
  • Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 113–124
    • 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan of, 76–79, 91–95
    • in 2017 and 2018, 114
    • 2019 National AI R&D Strategic Plan of, 114–120
    • as barrier to success/innovation, x, 78
    • cognitive dissonance of, 138
    • credibility of, 154
    • groupthink in, 128–129
    • initial conditions for change created by, 221
    • and loss of America's leadership position, 9–11, 227
    • mission of, 9, 80
    • national narrative created by, 10, 81
    • recommended focus for, 140
    • RFI developed by, 95–97 (See also Requests for Information (RFIs))
    • and timeline of AI initiatives, 120–121, 122f–124f
  •  
  • Pakistan, 66
  • Palihapitiya, Chamath, 46
  • Parker, Lynne, 93, 94
  • Pentagon, see Department of Defense
  • Performance measures, 222
  • Ping An, 213
  • Plan A, 21. See also Competitive advantage
  • Plan B, 21–22, 48. See also Containment strategy
  • Political environment of R&D systems, 217–219
  • Portman, Rob, 165–167, 169–171
  • Private sector, 191–204. See also Big Tech
    • absence of government direction for, 191–193
    • AI supply chain in, 196–197, 196f
    • America's AI leadership in, 135–136
    • in Covid pandemic, 31
    • and data management, 197–200
    • and development of national AI strategy, 87
    • and futurism and value signaling about AI, 203–204
    • investment in AI in, 207–208
    • and need for data sensors, 200–201
    • RFI responses from, 98, 99f, 106–107, 115, 116
    • and RPA as AI in America, 201–203
    • and sensemaking about AI, 194–195
    • supply side issues for AI, 193–194
  • Processing power, 196, 196f, 197
  • Productivity:
    • AI as transforming force for, 82, 154–155
    • AI's multiplier effect on, 16
    • in America, 8, 19
    • DPA cycle for, 42–43
    • in R&D, 218
  • Project for Strong Labor Markets and National Development, 35–36
  • Putin, Vladimir, 17
  •  
  • Raimondo, Gina, 57–58, 88
  • Raytheon, 4
  • R&D, see Research and development
  • R&D systems, 217–221
  • Reinsch, William, 66
  • Requests for Information (RFIs), 91–111
    • for 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan, 96–111
    • and AI plan under Obama, 93
    • comments received from, 98
    • OSTP's development of, 95–97
    • and process for formulating 2016 plan, 91–95
    • questions answered in, 100–104, 101f–103f
    • respondents to, 98, 99, 99f, 100f, 104–111, 115–118
    • for updating 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan, 91, 115–118
  • Research and development (R&D):
    • under American AI Initiative, 79–80
    • Biden on investment in, 81–82
    • Bush on government support for, 72
    • factors in inefficiencies of, 218
    • federal funding for, 42
    • as focus of American AI Initiative, 6, 11
    • investment priorities in, 76–77
    • OSTP on budget priorities for, 114
  •  
  • Safety of AI, in DoD 2018 Plan, 182–183
  • SAMMS (Standard Automated Materials Management System), 188–189
  • Samsung, 212, 220
  • Schmidt, Eric, 135
  • Science, US leadership in, 38
  • Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, 77, 114, 115
  • Selling AI, 191–193. See also Private sector
  • Semiconductors, 211–212
  • Sensemaking about AI, 194–195
  • Sensors, data, 200–201
  • Silos, breaking down, 142–144
  • Singapore, 66
  • SK Group, 212
  • Skills development, 197, 211, 225
  • SMIC, 66
  • Social environment of R&D systems, 217–219
  • Social media, 31, 41, 45, 206
  • Social perception of AI:
  • Society, AI as transforming force for, 82, 154–155
  • Sourcing of government AI projects, 175–177
  • Soviet Union, 25–26
  • Speed of relevance, 2–7, 228
    • agencies' use of term, 4
    • Albert on, 3
    • American AI Initiative for, 5–7
    • Chaillan on, 2
    • ecosystem and mindset for, 5, 6
    • Mattis' vision for, 3–4, 6
    • national US AI strategy for, 9–11 (See also National AI strategy (US))
    • problem areas for achieving, 7–8
  • Students, RFI responses from, 99, 99f
  • Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), 94
  • Supply chain(s):
    • AI (see AI supply chain)
    • with AI, 225
    • and change in demand patterns, 33–34
    • and Covid management, 31
    • humanitarian, 213–213
    • link between AI and, 32, 212–214
    • linked to China, 13–14
    • problems in, 7, 18, 19, 47–48
    • rebuilding, 34, 225
    • resiliency of, 219
    • Rogers on failure of, 58–61
    • for semiconductors, 212
    • US, meltdown of, 32–33
    • work on options for, 65
  • Supply side issues for AI, 193–194
  • Supply side thinking, 125–128, 126f
  •  
  • Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp (TSMC), 212, 220
  • Tame, Jacqueline, 185
  • Tariffs, 47–48, 58–59
  • Technological change, 2, 15–16, 85, 220–221
  • Technological environment of R&D systems, 217–219
  • Technological leadership, 8, 38, 40–44
  • Technology(-ies). See also specific technologies
    • adapting and changing, 4, 6
    • Biden's messaging about, 81–85
    • in cognitive warfare, 28
    • commercialization of, 127–128
    • information embedded in, 125, 139–140, 179, 220–221
    • of Japan, 145
    • as source of data for China, 214
    • transaction costs and adoption of, 193–194
  • Technology revolutions:
    • in AI, 43–44, 60, 218–221
    • in America, 41–42
    • Biden's grasp of, 85
    • environment needed for, 228
    • lack of early strategic models in, 181
  • Technology sector. See also Big Tech
    • lack of attention to, 40, 41
    • mega investment model in, 208–210
    • RFI responses from, 111, 115, 116
    • two “clubs” in, 142–144
  • Technology transformation:
    • in China, 38–39, 44
    • Clinton/Gore vision for, 131
  • Terminology, 36–37
  • Theologians, RFI responses from, 99, 99f
  • Think tanks, RFI responses from, 115
  • Threats to America. See also Fear of AI
  • Timeline of AI initiatives, 120–121, 122f–124f
  • Toshiba, 145
  • Transaction costs:
    • for Chinese firms, 65, 67, 69, 130, 228
    • factors affecting, 221
    • in technology adoption, 193–194
  • Transformation:
    • AI as force for, 82, 154–155, 226, 226f
    • geopolitical, in China, 38–39
    • and legislation, 224
    • technological, 38–39, 44, 131
  • Trump, Donald:
    • blocking of social media of, 41, 206
    • on China, 12
    • Chinese firms blacklisted by, 66
    • comments on AI by, 74, 118–119
    • GPC policy under, 51
    • lack of tech sector attention by, 40, 41
    • and Mattis, 3
    • national AI strategy under, 75–80, 86, 87, 113
    • and power dynamics of US, 40
    • style of, 62
    • on Uyghur Muslims, 46
  • Trump, John, 75
  • Trump, Melania, 26–27
  • TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp), 212, 220
  • Twitter, 206
  • Unleash, 212–213
  •  
  • Wang Cong, 68
  • “Warrior Wolf” (movie), 12–13
  • Watts, Clint, 30
  • Wicker, Roger, 149
  • Willett, Thomas D., 56
  • Williams, Collin J., 188–189
  • Wilson, Heather, 166
  • Wolf warriors, 12–14
  • Work, Robert, 135
  • World Bank, 35
  •  
  • Xi Jinping, 16
    • AI vision of, 43–44
    • Biden's meetings with, 54
    • on relationship with United States, 37
    • response to containment strategy by, 68
    • and rise of China, 38–40
    • technology development under, 40, 43
    • Trump's private meeting with, 46
  •  
  • Yang, Andrew, 45
  • Yellen, Janet, 47–48
  • Young, Todd, 154
  •  
  • Zakaria, Fareed, 40, 41
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