-
- Page numbers followed by f refer to figures.
-
- Academic institutions:
- access to AI knowledge for, 211
- America's AI leadership in, 135–136
- in driving AI results, 131–132
- responses to RFIs from, 98, 99f, 104–106, 115, 116
- AICT (Artificial Intelligence Capabilities and Transparency) Act, 170–171
- AI.gov, 86
- AI-IA (Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act), 167–169, 171
- AI industrialization, 139
- in America, 32–33
- in China, 19, 150
- ethics and governance in, 10
- need for experts in, 149
- OSTP's lack of attention to, 9, 79–80, 97, 107, 111, 114, 117, 119
- plan needed for, 139, 227
- in recommended AI plan, 224–225
- Strategy 8 for, 120, 131–132
- strategy for, 6
- AI leadership:
- by America, claim of, 76–77
- in American private sector and universities, 135–136
- America's loss of, ix–x, 9–11, 227
- Biden on, 83, 85
- by China, 8, 16
- Cruz on, 147
- drivers of, 64, 136–138, 226
- executive leadership for, 73–75
- inspirational, need for, 141
- lack of, 87–88
- national plan for (see National AI strategy (US))
- NSCI statement on maintaining, 137
- and supply-side thinking, 125, 127
- AI revolution, 218–221
- AI Super-Powers (Lee), 43
- AI supply chain:
- in America, 197–200
- data sensors for, 200–201
- from investment perspective, 210–212
- as narrative for developing AI systems, 196–197, 196f
- American Artificial Intelligence (AI) Initiative, 75–80
- establishment of, 114
- flaws in, 5–7, 11
- loss of momentum in, 148
- OSTP report on, 120–121
- OSTP RFI as basis for, 115–118
- timeline of actions to advance, 120–121, 122f–124f
- American Institute of Artificial Intelligence (AIAI), ix, 223
- American institutions:
- Anchoring bias, 171, 221
- Armed Forces Digital Advantage Act, 167
- Artificial intelligence (AI). See also specific topics
- Chaillan's vision for, 2
- China's deployment of, 213
- China's power in, 40
- in cognitive warfare, 28
- complexity and extent of, 74
- as critical capability, 63
- disruptive rise of, 14–16
- factors in development of, 194
- in identifying and solving problems, 7–8
- IT development vs. development of, 40–42, 195
- IT's differences from, 62–63
- leadership in (see AI leadership)
- link between supply chains and, 32, 212–214
- major American “clubs” of, 142–143
- Musk on, 151
- as paradigm change vs. as technology, 5
- problems and solutions related to, 225–226, 226f
- problems in deployment of, 7
- in rethinking and new types of work, 176–177
- social perception of, 16–18, 82–83, 202–203, 227
- as a supply chain (see AI supply chain)
- technology development model for, x
- theory underlying concerns about, 220–222
- as transformative force, 82, 154–155, 226, 226f
- US government's approach to, 2, 34 (See also National AI strategy (US))
- viewed as a national asset, 205–206
- Artificial Intelligence Capabilities and Transparency (AICT) Act, 170–171
- Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act (AI-IA), 167–169, 171
- Ashford, Emma, 36–37
- Associations, RFI responses from, 98, 99f, 107–110, 115, 116
- Austin, Lloyd, 5, 87
- Australia, 68
- Automation Anywhere, 208
- Autonomous driving, 176–177
- Avoidance, fallacy of, 140
-
- Believability of AI issues, 141–142
- Bethel, Cindy, 149
- Beyer, Don, 151
- Biden, Joe:
- China policy of, 48, 62
- containment strategy under, 53–54, 76
- domestic terrorism concerns of, 29
- FTC head chosen by, 41
- national AI strategy plan of, 81–87
- restrictions on Chinese companies by, 67
- on supply chain problems, 32, 33
- Trump-like policy under, 40
- Xi's meetings with, 54
- Big Tech, 41–42
- abusive AI policies of, 81, 84
- China's control of, 164–165
- commercialization of innovations by, 127
- in creating national AI strategy, 86
- and development of AI policy, 137
- in driving AI results, 131–132
- ethics and governance in, 129, 153, 204
- growth opportunities for, 143
- lobbyists for, 125, 212
- political stance of, 206
- responses to RFI from, 115, 116
- Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, 33
- Blanchette, Jude, 38–39
- Blankenship, Brian D., 51–52
- Blue Prism, 202, 203, 207, 208
- Bolsonaro, Jair, 206
- Bolton, John, 46
- British R&D system, 218
- Brockman, Greg, 147
- Bruck, Robert, 219–220
- Bush, Barbara, 26
- Bush, George H.W., 25–26, 72, 88
- Butcher, Jamey, 212–214
-
- Cantwell, Maria, 154
- Capitol Hill attack (January 6, 2021), 27, 29
- Castro, Daniel, 149
- CDOs (chief data officers), 198–199
- Chaillan, Nicolas, 1–2, 6, 219
- Chemonics, 213
- Chief data officers (CDOs), 198–199
- Chief information officers (CIOs), 186–187, 199
- Chien, Steve, 147
- China:
- AI adoption in, 219
- AI and productivity in, 42–43
- AI development in, 152
- AI revolution in, 43–44, 60
- AI superiority of, 8, 16
- in AI War with US, 62–64, 228
- America's economic dependence on, 56
- America's strategic moves against, 228
- ban on Chinese companies operating in US, 61–62, 212
- Big Tech reigned in by, 164–165
- bullet train launch in, 27
- capabilities of, 146
- competition with, 20–21
- competitive advantage of, 6, 19
- concept of AI in, 202–203
- countering AI advances by, 21, 22 (See also Containment strategy)
- Covid management in, 20, 31
- deployment of AI in, 213
- economy of, 38, 55–58
- in great-power competition, 35–37
- humanitarian projects of, 213–214
- Le on economic status of, 11–12
- military weapons of, 19
- narrative about threat of, 45–47
- national AI strategy of, 129–130
- NSCAI on, 136, 141
- power projection by, 39, 44
- rise of, 37–40
- in semiconductor market, 212
- surrender of AI war against, 1–2
- tariffs on, 47–48, 59
- top professors’ relationships with, 211
- unexpected technological emergence of, 15–16
- US imports from and exports to, 59
- US reactivity to, 140–141
- US strategic confusion about, 14
- warnings about doing business with firms of, 64–68, 76
- Western influence in, 68
- wolf warrior diplomacy of, 12–14
- Xi's meetings with Biden, 54
- CIOs (chief information officers), 186–187, 199
- CIO Council, 187
- Clinton, Bill, 43, 71–73, 75, 88, 131
- Cognitive automation, 202
- Cognitive warfare, 27–30
- Cold War, 25–26, 47, 62
- Commercialization of technology, 127–128
- Committee for AI strategy development:
- recommendations for, 223–224
- Select Committee on AI, 77, 114, 115
- Companies, RFI responses from, 98, 99f, 106–107, 115, 116
- Competition:
- AI capabilities defining, 20–21, 152
- between America and China, 12, 136
- America's assessed readiness for, 134 (See also National Security Council of Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) report)
- among great powers, 34–37
- beginning of, 17
- with mega investment model, 209–210
- power dynamics of, 51–52
- research priorities and nature of, 218
- in semiconductor market, 212
- Conference on AI (March 2019), 113, 114
- Congress, 145–171
- AI caucuses of, 150–152, 166–167
- bills containing term “artificial intelligence,” 155–156, 156f–162f
- bills introduced since 2020, 165–171
- focus to advance AI needed by, 164–165
- and Foster's interview on AI, 162–164
- FUTURE of AI Act, 153–155
- “Japan-bashing” by members of, 145, 146f
- limited understanding of AI in, 152–153
- need to expect more from, 139
- Senate hearings on artificial intelligence, 146–150
- tone and messaging about AI in, 165
- Consulting firms, 115, 116, 192
- Containment strategy, 21–22, 51–69
- allies and alliances in, 68–69
- under Biden, 53–54, 76
- and drivers of AI leadership, 64
- and economic decoupling and recoupling, 55–58
- and opening of the Data War, 61–64
- and supply chain failure, 58–61
- under Trump, 51, 76
- and warnings about doing business with Chinese AI firms, 64–68
- Covid pandemic, 20, 31, 45, 53
- Cruz, Ted, 15–16, 146–149, 166
- Cybersecurity, 6, 19
-
- Data:
- in AI supply chain, 196–197, 196f, 210
- for AI systems, 213
- AI systems arising from, 198
- on Americans, China's gathering of, 65
- investment in, 210
- for IT and from AI, 40–41
- relevance of, 200
- from social media apps, 31
- for training AI systems, 195
- Data management, 197–200
- Data science, 198, 211
- Data sensors, 200–201
- Data War, 61–64
- “The Dawn of Artificial Intelligence,” 146–149
- Decoupling/recoupling:
- of economies, 55–58
- financial, 57, 66–68
- recommended US AI plan as basis for, 225
- Deep learning, 15, 43–44, 202–203
- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 188–189
- Delaney, John K., 150, 152, 155
- Dell, 60
- Demand pattern changes, 33–34
- Denison, Benjamin, 51–52
- Department of Defense (DoD; Pentagon):
- advancing AI capabilities of, 167, 169, 170
- AI projects of, 87–88
- ecosystem of, 2
- Mattis' attempt to change culture of, 3–4
- meaning of “speed of relevance” in, 4
- strategic plans of, 181–185
- Deployment of AI, 7, 213
- Deployment of technology, 127–128
- “Digital Decision-Making,” 149
- Digital World Acquisition Corp (DWAC), 207
- Discover, predict, automate (DPA) cycle, 42–43
- DLA (Defense Logistics Agency), 188–189
- DoD, see Department of Defense
- Domestic conflict in America, 19, 31–32
- DPA (discover, predict, automate) cycle, 42–43
- Dransfield, Joe, 4
- Drivers of AI leadership, 64, 136–138, 226
- Dunford, Joseph, 4
- DWAC (Digital World Acquisition Corp), 207
-
- Economic environment of R&D systems, 217–219, 221
- Economies:
- AI as underlying force in, 82
- AI's productivity multiplier effect on, 16
- central planning models for, 223
- decoupling and recoupling of, 55–58
- humanitarian aid to, 213–214
- Economy of China, 38, 55–58
- Economy of the United States:
- AI as transforming force for, 82, 154–155
- consolidation in, 143
- Foster on, 162–164
- interdependence of Chinese economy and, 55–58
- and move of operations to China, 13–14
- structure of, 7–8
- Emerging Citizen Technology atlas, 178–179
- Entity List, 65–66
- Environmental factors:
- in decline of AI superiority, 228
- in R&D systems, 217–219, 221
- Espinel, Victoria, 149
- Ethics in AI, 10, 154–155, 227
- Biden on, 83–84
- in Big Tech, 129, 153, 204
- in China, 129
- in DoD 2018 Plan, 182–183
- guidelines for, 130–131
- in national AI strategy, 80–81
- posturing on, 153
- time spent on, 129
- as topic for futurists, 203
-
- Facebook, 206
- Fear of AI. See also Threats to America
- AI revolution as source of, 221–222
- and Biden's messaging about AI, 82
- futurists' concept of, 203–204
- and House caucus on artificial intelligence, 152
- and OSTP's focus, 97
- from repeated messaging about AI's evil, 194
- Felten, Edward, 149
- Financial activity, 82, 163–164
- Financial capital, access to, 67–68. See also Investment in AI
- Fiscal policy, 47–48
- Ford, Christopher, 13
- Foster, Bill, 151, 162–164
- Futreal, Andrew, 147
- FUTURE of AI Act, 153–155
- Futurists:
- FY21 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021), 169–170
-
- General Services Administration (GSA), 176, 177
- Georgieva, Kristalina, 35
- Gil, Dario, 149
- Google, 17, 43, 74
- Gore, Al, 43, 71–73, 75, 88, 131
- Governance of AI, 10, 154–155, 227
- Biden on, 83–84
- in Big Tech, 129, 153, 204
- in China, 129
- in DoD 2018 Plan, 182–183
- guidelines for, 130–131
- in national AI strategy, 80–81
- posturing on, 153
- time spent on, 129
- as topic for futurists, 203
- Government:
- lack of private sector direction from, 191–193
- NSCAI on role played by, 136
- in shaping concept of what AI is to, 179
- Silicon Valley's perspective on, 205
- strategy development by (see Strategy development process)
- Government agencies, 175–189. See also individual agencies
- challenges for ML projects in, 185–187
- DLA's materials management system, 188–189
- DoD's strategic plans, 181–185
- in driving AI results, 131–132
- information coordination among, 177–181
- investment in AI by, 121
- procurement of AI by, 144
- responses to RFIs from, 99, 99f
- sourcing and adoption of AI projects in, 175–177, 180
- strategy development process in, 187–188
- “Great-power competition” (GPC), 34–37, 51
- Grievance polities, 13
- Groen, Michael, 184
- Groupthink, 128–130
- Growth, AI as force for, 82, 154–155
- GSA (General Services Administration), 176, 177
-
- Haines, Avril, 12
- Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 71–72
- Heinrich, Martin, 165–171
- Herman, Justin, 177–181
- Horvitz, Eric, 147
- Huawei, 61, 69
- Humanitarian supply chains, 213–213
- Hundai, 212
- Hussain, Saddam, 46
-
- Ideological struggle in America, 45, 225
- India, 68
- Individuals, RFI responses from, 99, 99f, 115
- Industrialization mindset, 5. See also AI industrialization
- Inflation, 19, 47–48
- Information:
- communicated to Americans, 57–58
- Congress' tone and messaging about AI, 165
- coordination of, among government agencies, 177–181
- for determining paths of technological change, 220–221
- embedded in new technologies, 125, 139–140, 179, 220–221
- provided to industry, 140
- Information technology (IT), 16. See also Internet
- AI development vs. development of, 40–42, 195
- AI's differences from, 62–63
- corporate rivalry in, 199
- programmers of, 195
- Infrastructure:
- in America, 19–20, 225
- and China's economic aid projects, 213–214
- for global information, 71–72
- of government agencies, 186
- technology, AI systems in, 176
- Innovation(s):
- AI as underlying force of, 82
- American capacity for, 41
- China's capacity for, 38, 57–58
- commercialization of, 127–128
- impact of mega investment on, 209–210
- information embedded in, 125, 139–140, 179, 220–221
- Intel, 210–212, 220
- Intellectual property theft, 53–54
- Internet, 14, 17, 28–30, 40, 71–75
- Investment (generally):
- in American designer firms, 41
- in Chinese firms, warnings about, 66–67, 76
- in research and development, 42, 72, 76–82, 121
- in research and science, 84
- in STEM human capital, 64
- in universities, 211
- Investment in AI, 205–215
- under American AI Initiative, 79–80
- Biden's promise for, 82, 83
- concerns about, 214–215
- in data, 210
- economic compatibility of, 221
- elitism in, 221–222
- by government agencies, 121
- and link between AI and supply chains, 212–214
- new mega investment model of, 208–210
- new phase of, 206–207
- as OSTP goal, 119
- in private sector, 207–208
- problems with, 221–222
- R&D-centric federal strategy for, 9–11
- recommendations for, 139–144
- research focus in, 6
- in semiconductors, 211–212
- in skills development, 211
- understanding of value chain needs for, 120
-
- JAIC (Joint Artificial Intelligence Center), 184–186
- Japan, 66, 68, 145, 146f, 218
- Jobs, 225
- Johnson, Boris, 85
- Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), 184–186
-
- Ke Jie, 43
- Knowledge:
- about AI, access to, 211
- in AI systems, 196–197
- theoretical domains of, 220
- Knowledge economy, 8
- Kratsios, Michael, 76–77, 115
- Krugman, Paul, 55
- Kudlow, Larry, 12
-
- Latin American Logistics Organization, 60–61
- Leadership:
- in AI (see AI leadership)
- in developing national US AI strategy, 73–75, 87–88
- in IT, 40, 41
- need to expect more from, 139
- in science and technology, 38
- in shaping future of Internet, 71–72
- Lee, Kai-Fu, 43
- Legislation. See also individual legislation
- bills containing term “artificial intelligence,” 155–156, 156f–162f
- bills introduced since 2020, 165–171
- and transformation, 224
- Le Keqiang, 11–12
- LG, 212
- Li, Cheng, 37
- Losing the AI battle, 25–48
- attacks on American institutions, 28–30
- change in demand patterns, 33–34
- changing mood of the nation, 27–30, 45
- China's opportunity to strike, 42–43
- China's technology revolution, 43–44
- to cognitive warfare, 27–29
- Covid pandemic, 31
- domestic conflict/tensions, 31–32
- “great-power competition,” 34–37
- ideological struggle in America, 45
- inflation and supply chain failures, 47–48
- IT and AI development, 40–42
- rise of China, 37–40
- shaping of China threat narrative, 45–47
- supply chain meltdown, 32–33
-
- McCaul, Michael, 66
- Machine learning (ML):
- across problem domains, 183
- data for, 196
- developing skills in, 211
- testing software for, 175–177
- Machine learning projects, 87–88, 175, 185–187, 192
- Maher, Tom, 219
- Manufacturing, 31, 33–34, 37–38, 196
- Markey, Edward J., 154–155
- Mattis, James Norman, 3–4, 6
- Mega investment model, 208–210
- Microsoft, 114, 202
- Military, RFI responses from, 99, 99f
- Military capacity, 19
- ML, see Machine learning
- Monetary policy, 47–48
- Mood of the nation, 27–30, 45, 88–89
- Moore, Andrew, 147
- Morrison, Scott, 85
- Moynihan, Daniel P., 145
- Musk, Elon, 151
-
- National AI Initiative Office, 78
- National AI R&D Strategic Plan (2016), 77, 86, 91–95
- National AI R&D Strategic Plan (2019), 114–120
- assumptions in, 119
- overview of, 118–119
- RFI for, 115–118
- strategies in, 120
- National AI strategy (China), 129–130
- National AI strategy (US), 75–89, 219–228
- 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan, 91–95
- 2019 National AI R&D Strategic Plan, 114–120
- Albert on, 2–3
- American AI Initiative as, 5–7, 11
- under Biden, 81–87
- building a plan for, 20–22
- Chaillan on, 2, 6, 219
- to counter China's advances (see Containment strategy)
- developed in government agencies, 187–188 (See also Government agencies)
- distinguishing between R&D plans and, 9–11, 128, 222–223, 227
- drivers of leadership for, 64
- ethics, governance, and values in, 10, 80–81
- executive leadership of, 73–75, 87–88 (See also AI leadership)
- experts' opinions on, 148–149
- failure of, 18–20
- flaws in, 219, 221–222
- focus of, 224–225
- Heinrich on, 168
- launches and relaunches of, 86–87
- and mood of the nation, 88–89
- under Obama, 77, 86, 93
- OSTP's development of, 9, 227 (See also Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP))
- other countries' adoption/copying of, 128–129
- outside of OSTP, need for, 140
- politics, talent, and priorities in, 131–132
- problems in developing, 17–20, 18f, 225–226, 226f
- proper development process for, 9–11
- recommendations for developing, 223–225
- supply side thinking in, 125–128, 126f
- under Trump, 75–80, 87, 113
- National Artificial Intelligence Research Development Initiative, 168
- National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), 64–65
- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY21 NDAA), 169–170
- “The National Defense Strategy” (NDS), 3–4
- Nationalism, 74–75, 205–207
- National narratives (US):
- about threats to America, 45–47, 141–142
- of AI for promoting good, 82–84
- error in, 10
- “global” narrative, 206
- of “great-power competition,” 34–37
- OSTP's creation of, 10, 81
- from presidents about AI, 74–75
- problems in, 8
- as social perception of AI, 227
- National security. See also Cybersecurity
- AI as underlying force of, 82
- allies and partners in, 85
- Capitol Hill attack, 27, 29
- cybersecurity, 6, 19
- and development of AI policy, 97
- link between AI and, 17
- NSCAI on risks to, 136
- and plan for fixing underlying AI issues/causes, 140
- warnings about doing business with Chinese firms, 64–68
- National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 219
- National Security Council of Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) report, 133–144
- final report, 135–136
- issues not focused on in, 136–139
- recommendations for areas not covered by, 139–144
- National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, 167
- NCSC (National Counterintelligence and Security Center), 64–65
- NDS (“The National Defense Strategy”), 3–4
- Nike, 60
- NITRD (Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development), 94
- Nonprofits, RFI responses from, 98–99, 99f, 107–110
- NSCAI report, see National Security Council of Artificial Intelligence report
-
- Obama, Barack:
- 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan of, 77, 86, 91–95
- lack of tech sector attention by, 41
- preparation for AI under, 93
- on rise of China, 37
- Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 113–124
- 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan of, 76–79, 91–95
- in 2017 and 2018, 114
- 2019 National AI R&D Strategic Plan of, 114–120
- as barrier to success/innovation, x, 78
- cognitive dissonance of, 138
- credibility of, 154
- groupthink in, 128–129
- initial conditions for change created by, 221
- and loss of America's leadership position, 9–11, 227
- mission of, 9, 80
- national narrative created by, 10, 81
- recommended focus for, 140
- RFI developed by, 95–97 (See also Requests for Information (RFIs))
- and timeline of AI initiatives, 120–121, 122f–124f
-
- Pakistan, 66
- Palihapitiya, Chamath, 46
- Parker, Lynne, 93, 94
- Pentagon, see Department of Defense
- Performance measures, 222
- Ping An, 213
- Plan A, 21. See also Competitive advantage
- Plan B, 21–22, 48. See also Containment strategy
- Political environment of R&D systems, 217–219
- Portman, Rob, 165–167, 169–171
- Private sector, 191–204. See also Big Tech
- absence of government direction for, 191–193
- AI supply chain in, 196–197, 196f
- America's AI leadership in, 135–136
- in Covid pandemic, 31
- and data management, 197–200
- and development of national AI strategy, 87
- and futurism and value signaling about AI, 203–204
- investment in AI in, 207–208
- and need for data sensors, 200–201
- RFI responses from, 98, 99f, 106–107, 115, 116
- and RPA as AI in America, 201–203
- and sensemaking about AI, 194–195
- supply side issues for AI, 193–194
- Processing power, 196, 196f, 197
- Productivity:
- AI as transforming force for, 82, 154–155
- AI's multiplier effect on, 16
- in America, 8, 19
- DPA cycle for, 42–43
- in R&D, 218
- Project for Strong Labor Markets and National Development, 35–36
- Putin, Vladimir, 17
-
- Raimondo, Gina, 57–58, 88
- Raytheon, 4
- R&D, see Research and development
- R&D systems, 217–221
- Reinsch, William, 66
- Requests for Information (RFIs), 91–111
- for 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan, 96–111
- and AI plan under Obama, 93
- comments received from, 98
- OSTP's development of, 95–97
- and process for formulating 2016 plan, 91–95
- questions answered in, 100–104, 101f–103f
- respondents to, 98, 99, 99f, 100f, 104–111, 115–118
- for updating 2016 National AI R&D Strategic Plan, 91, 115–118
- Research and development (R&D):
- under American AI Initiative, 79–80
- Biden on investment in, 81–82
- Bush on government support for, 72
- factors in inefficiencies of, 218
- federal funding for, 42
- as focus of American AI Initiative, 6, 11
- investment priorities in, 76–77
- OSTP on budget priorities for, 114
- Research and development plans, distinguishing between national AI strategy and, 9–11, 128, 222–223, 227
- Research and development (R&D) systems, 217–221
- RFIs, see Requests for Information
- Richardson, John, 4
- Robotic process automation (RPA), 179, 186, 201–203, 207–208
- Rogers, Dale, 58–61
- Rosenberg, Nathan, 220–221
- RPA, see Robotic process automation
- Rubio, Marco, 35–36, 38, 155
- Russia, 16, 35, 37, 46, 206, 212
-
- Safety of AI, in DoD 2018 Plan, 182–183
- SAMMS (Standard Automated Materials Management System), 188–189
- Samsung, 212, 220
- Schmidt, Eric, 135
- Science, US leadership in, 38
- Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, 77, 114, 115
- Selling AI, 191–193. See also Private sector
- Semiconductors, 211–212
- Sensemaking about AI, 194–195
- Sensors, data, 200–201
- Silos, breaking down, 142–144
- Singapore, 66
- SK Group, 212
- Skills development, 197, 211, 225
- SMIC, 66
- Social environment of R&D systems, 217–219
- Social media, 31, 41, 45, 206
- Social perception of AI:
- Society, AI as transforming force for, 82, 154–155
- Sourcing of government AI projects, 175–177
- Soviet Union, 25–26
- Speed of relevance, 2–7, 228
- agencies' use of term, 4
- Albert on, 3
- American AI Initiative for, 5–7
- Chaillan on, 2
- ecosystem and mindset for, 5, 6
- Mattis' vision for, 3–4, 6
- national US AI strategy for, 9–11 (See also National AI strategy (US))
- problem areas for achieving, 7–8
- SS&C Technologies, 208
- Standard Automated Materials Management System (SAMMS), 188–189
- STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math), 63, 77
- Stieb, Matt, 26
- Strategic plans for AI, 181, 224–225. See also National AI strategy (US)
- Strategy 8, 120, 131–132
- The Strategy Bridge, 4
- Strategy development process, 9–11
- Students, RFI responses from, 99, 99f
- Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), 94
- Supply chain(s):
- AI (see AI supply chain)
- with AI, 225
- and change in demand patterns, 33–34
- and Covid management, 31
- humanitarian, 213–213
- link between AI and, 32, 212–214
- linked to China, 13–14
- problems in, 7, 18, 19, 47–48
- rebuilding, 34, 225
- resiliency of, 219
- Rogers on failure of, 58–61
- for semiconductors, 212
- US, meltdown of, 32–33
- work on options for, 65
- Supply side issues for AI, 193–194
- Supply side thinking, 125–128, 126f
-
- Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp (TSMC), 212, 220
- Tame, Jacqueline, 185
- Tariffs, 47–48, 58–59
- Technological change, 2, 15–16, 85, 220–221
- Technological environment of R&D systems, 217–219
- Technological leadership, 8, 38, 40–44
- Technology(-ies). See also specific technologies
- adapting and changing, 4, 6
- Biden's messaging about, 81–85
- in cognitive warfare, 28
- commercialization of, 127–128
- information embedded in, 125, 139–140, 179, 220–221
- of Japan, 145
- as source of data for China, 214
- transaction costs and adoption of, 193–194
- Technology revolutions:
- in AI, 43–44, 60, 218–221
- in America, 41–42
- Biden's grasp of, 85
- environment needed for, 228
- lack of early strategic models in, 181
- Technology sector. See also Big Tech
- lack of attention to, 40, 41
- mega investment model in, 208–210
- RFI responses from, 111, 115, 116
- two “clubs” in, 142–144
- Technology transformation:
- in China, 38–39, 44
- Clinton/Gore vision for, 131
- Terminology, 36–37
- Theologians, RFI responses from, 99, 99f
- Think tanks, RFI responses from, 115
- Threats to America. See also Fear of AI
- Timeline of AI initiatives, 120–121, 122f–124f
- Toshiba, 145
- Transaction costs:
- for Chinese firms, 65, 67, 69, 130, 228
- factors affecting, 221
- in technology adoption, 193–194
- Transformation:
- AI as force for, 82, 154–155, 226, 226f
- geopolitical, in China, 38–39
- and legislation, 224
- technological, 38–39, 44, 131
- Trump, Donald:
- blocking of social media of, 41, 206
- on China, 12
- Chinese firms blacklisted by, 66
- comments on AI by, 74, 118–119
- GPC policy under, 51
- lack of tech sector attention by, 40, 41
- and Mattis, 3
- national AI strategy under, 75–80, 86, 87, 113
- and power dynamics of US, 40
- style of, 62
- on Uyghur Muslims, 46
- Trump, John, 75
- Trump, Melania, 26–27
- TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp), 212, 220
- Twitter, 206
-
- UiPath, 208
- Ukraine invasion, 46, 206, 212
- United States of America. See also Congress; Government agencies
- 2016 election in, 29, 30, 88, 177
- AI “clubs” in, 142–144
- AI supply chain in, 197–200
- AI technology development model of, x, 34
- in AI War with China, 62–64
- changes in mood of, 27–30, 45, 88–89
- Chinese imports to and exports from, 59
- competitive power of, 20–21, 209, 226–227 (See also National Security Council of Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) report)
- Covid management in, 20, 31
- economy of (see Economy of the United States)
- elections of 2016 in, 29, 30, 88, 177
- factors underlying technological change in, 220–221
- humanitarian aid model of, 214
- as IT leader, 40, 41
- loss of AI superiority in, 1–2, 8, 11, 16 (See also Losing the AI battle)
- national AI strategy for (see National AI strategy (US))
- national narratives in (see National narratives (US))
- political environment of, 44–45, 225
- politically-charged social media in, 206
- power projection by, 39–40, 44, 54
- R&D systems in, x, 217–221
- RPA as AI in, 179, 201–203
- social perception of AI in, 16–18, 82–83, 202–203, 227
- social psychological state of, 88–89
- strategic confusion in, 14
- strategic geopolitical moves by, 228
- world's perception of, 53
-
- Values, 10, 83–84
- Value chain, 120, 218
- Value signaling, 80–81, 129, 203–204
- Vengua, Manny, 189
- Venture capital industry, 208. See also Investment in AI
-
- Wang Cong, 68
- “Warrior Wolf” (movie), 12–13
- Watts, Clint, 30
- Wicker, Roger, 149
- Willett, Thomas D., 56
- Williams, Collin J., 188–189
- Wilson, Heather, 166
- Wolf warriors, 12–14
- Work, Robert, 135
- World Bank, 35
-
- Xi Jinping, 16
- AI vision of, 43–44
- Biden's meetings with, 54
- on relationship with United States, 37
- response to containment strategy by, 68
- and rise of China, 38–40
- technology development under, 40, 43
- Trump's private meeting with, 46
-
- Yang, Andrew, 45
- Yellen, Janet, 47–48
- Young, Todd, 154
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