3Theoretical approaches to communicative competence
Abstract: The goal of this chapter is to summarize and classify scientific communication theories that provide accounts for competent communication. Some theories concentrate on knowledge-, motivation-, or skill-based message production. Other theories are relevant to knowledge-, motivation-, or skill-based message reception. Still others apply to dyadic or group interaction, including sets pertinent to behavioral adaptation and uncertainty reduction.
Keywords: behavioral adaptation theories, Input-Process-Output models, interactive theories, message production theories, message reception theories, Organism-Stimulus-Processing-Response models, uncertainty reduction theories
1Introduction
It has been written that there is a “dearth” of theories explicitly relevant to the topic area of communicative competence (Spitzberg and Cupach 1984: 74). Without arguing that issue, there is also a relatively wide range of scientific theories relevant to interpersonal interaction that provide explanations for the basis of competent communication. The goal of this chapter is to describe and categorize this range (see Wilson and Sabee 2003, for an analogous effort using a different organizational scheme). Before starting that task, it would be useful to define what I mean by scientific theory (Pavitt 2001). A scientific theory has two essential parts, a scientific explanation and some form of conceptual or formal model. Explanations are in essence stories that make confusing phenomena understandable to a given audience. What distinguishes a scientific explanation from other varieties (e.g., historical explanation) is that the story accounts for patterns of events (rather than just one or a few instances) through the description of some underlying mechanism that produces or drives the event pattern. A conceptual model is a symbolic representation of a theory’s proposed structure or hypothesized processes through diagram or verbal description; a formal model provides the same through equations or computer programs. A given theory’s model provides the framework on which its explanation is hung. Quite a few models directly relevant to communicative competence have been proposed (see for example those reviewed in Spitzberg and Changnon 2009), but very few are presented in conceptual or formal terms and linked with scientific explanations. Non-theoretical models will not be covered in this review.
I will adapt to the purpose of this chapter three types of conceptual models that, as a group, undergird almost every extant “mainstream” theory in communication science (Pavitt 2009). The first two models are straightforward linear formulations. In the Organism-Stimulus-Processing-Response (OSPR) message production model, a person with given psychological characteristics (cognitions, traits, motivations, etc.; this is the O in the model), in a given situation (S), plans a message (P), and delivers it (R). Theories that focus on a person’s capability to send competent messages would fit under the OSPR message production umbrella. The corresponding OSPR message reception model also begins with a person possessing specific characteristics (O) who, after receiving a message (S), thinks about it (P), and responds to it psychologically and/or behaviorally (R). Theories that hone in on the judgments that people make about one another’s communicative competence are consistent with this model. The third type, the interactive Input-Process-Output (IPO) model, differs from the OSPR types in two ways. First, two or more people are explicitly included; in the tradition of writing in computer technology, when describing interactive IPO theories I will use the names Ann and Bob as labels for two imaginary communicators. Second, interactive IPO theories include continual feedback loops between communicators over time. Ann delivers a message (P) that Bob receives (O) and thinks about (I), and then Bob delivers a message in response to Ann (P) that Ann receives (O) and thinks about (I), and then Ann delivers a message in reaction to Bob (P) that Bob receives (O), and so on. The interactive IPO model includes approaches that describe how two or more people engage in competent interaction. In what follows, I use each of these models in turn when describing the fundamentals of a variety of scientific theories and their implications for communicative competence.
2OSPR message production theories: The competent message producer
As just noted, OSPR message production models involve a person with a given psychological makeup (O) who, in a given situation (S), designs (P) and then produces (R) a message. It follows that theories based on this model, when applied to communicative competence, would provide explanations for individual differences in the ability to produce competent messages. This characterization begs the question of what counts as a competent message. Past literature has generally stated that competent messages are both appropriate and effective, although these two criteria are often in conflict, and other standards such as efficiency and ethicality have also been proposed (Wilson and Sabee 2003). A second question implied by the OSPR message production model is how to characterize competence-relevant situations in a principled manner akin to, say, Fiedler’s (1964) three-dimensional scheme for classifying the situations faced by organizational team leaders. Relevant message production theories, however, generally skirt both this issue and details of the message itself.
Most relevant theories focus on the O stage, the attributes that determine the communicator’s competence. It makes sense to consider these attributes in the context of the three necessities for the competent communicator: knowledge, motivation, and skill (Spitzberg and Cupach 1984). The competent communicator must know what needs to be known to produce messages with appropriate, effective, efficient, and/or ethical content. The competent communicator must want to or have a good reason to produce such messages. Given knowledge and motivation, the competent communicator must also have the ability to produce such messages. Theories differ in their emphasis on the three necessities; I shall cover each in turn.
2.1Knowledge-based message production theories
Theories of the OSPR message production set prioritizing the knowledge component share, to a greater or lesser extent, a group of underlying presumptions. First, communicators’ long-term memories include a well-organized structure of “procedural knowledge” that can be called upon in message design. Procedural knowledge consists of personally-relevant goals, the characteristics of often-experienced situations, and a repertoire of possible actions. Second, in response either to previous thought or to the perceived needs of a given situation, a few of the communicators’ possible goals become active, providing the needed motivation for this calling. Third, communicators think strategically in pursuit of these goals, in so doing using their procedural knowledge to concoct action plans guiding their message. The plan is organized both sequentially (what is said first, second, and third) and hierarchically (an abstract pragmatic/speech act level is on top, followed by levels representing the syntactic, semantic, and phonetic aspects of the intended message, along with accompanying nonverbal behavior). The message flows naturally from those plans. The first of these presumptions is relevant to the O part of the model and the second and third to the P part, such that these theories detail the architecture of those parts and, as mentioned earlier, basically take the S and R for granted. Fourth, communicative competence in OSPR knowledge-based message production theories lies in successful achievement of the communicator’s goals, although the specifics relevant to that achievement differ among relevant theories.
A further distinction can be made between “bottom-up” and “top-down” theories of this type. The difference between the two sub-types rests in the extent to which communicators are pictured as responding to moment-to-moment events versus relying on a pre-planned strategy during conversation. The exemplar case of a knowledge-based bottom-up OSPR message production theory, one featured in Wilson and Sabee (2003), is Greene’s (1984) action assembly theory. In the first version of this theory (a second generation can be found in Greene 1997), communicator knowledge (O) consists of “procedural records” that describe actions that are implied by a given situation and the likely outcome of those actions; for example, if I apologize, then my wife will forgive me for having hurt her feelings. When a specific situation (S) occurs that calls for message production, such as my wife telling me her feelings have been hurt, a small proportion of the available procedural records are “activated” based on their match to the current situation, the relevance of the likely outcome of the action to the communicator’s goal, and their past activation level. These are then “assembled” into a plan (P) that guides the actual message (R). As the conversation continues, the situation constantly changes and different procedural records must be activated and assembled. As mentioned above, the O and P portions are described in detail, the S and R mostly taken for granted.
The implications of action assembly theory for communicative competence are fairly clear, having been spelled out in Greene and Geddes (1993). First, a communicator must activate the optimum number and range of procedural records for goal achievement. If too few are activated, the communicator does not know what to say or how to say it; if too many, the communicator has too much to say and the resulting message becomes incoherent. In addition, past usage will increase the odds of a procedural record’s activation, which can have helpful or harmful consequences. On the plus side, repetitive use of a consistent set of procedural records makes it more likely that they will be activated together when called for by situation and goal; this is why one should practice one’s public speech before its deliverance. On the minus, oft-used procedural records may become activated when uncalled for, possibly resulting in the communicator saying something she has been thinking about which she later regrets.
The exemplar for a top-down approach is Berger’s (1997) planning theory. Here, long-term memory includes a hierarchical structure of goals, previously formulated (“canned”) plans, procedural knowledge concerning possible communication strategies, and “declarative” knowledge pertaining to relevant topic areas (O). When facing an upcoming interaction (S), the communicator first searches long-term memory for a relevant canned plan. If one is found, it is adopted; if not, the communicator develops one based on available procedural and declarative knowledge (P). Plans themselves differ in complexity, with more complex plans including more steps and, in particular, alternative paths that can be taken at crucial points during the interaction depending upon the receiver’s responses during the interaction up to those points. Plan complexity is a function of goal importance and amount of relevant knowledge. As with action assembly theory, the plan directs the communicator’s message (R). Planning theory also includes a process by which the communicator can respond to plan failure (implied communicative incompetence) by altering the plan and then repeating it, with the alterations beginning at the phonetic level (saying the same thing louder and slower) and only moving up the plan hierarchy one level at a time when motivated by continued failure. It is safe to say that in planning theory, as goal achievement is usually more likely with more highly complex plans, the ability to concoct such plans is one facet of the competent communicator. A second implied component of competence is the ability to recognize and respond to plan failure.
Other knowledge-based OSPR message production theories differ to a greater or lesser extent with action assembly and planning theories concerning the details of the communicator’s knowledge base. Each also boasts unique twists. Meyer’s (1997) approach has particular relevance to communicative competence by including explicit consideration of both message appropriateness and effectiveness as necessities. Although similar to action assembly theory in general structure and process, it divides the processing stage between the production of a tentative plan and a revision of that plan into a final form if its predicted outcomes are either inconsistent with the communicator’s primary goal or fail to satisfy the appropriateness versus effectiveness tradeoff. Smith’s (1982) contingency rules theory of interpersonal persuasion likewise approximates action assembly theory’s structure, but provides more detail concerning the match between O and S along with explicitly considering the receiver’s response to the message. Message producers are hypothesized to choose the type of message that best meets their estimate of the contextual factors most relevant to the message receiver, and their accuracy in that estimation determines the success of their persuasive attempt and, thus, their competence. Recent constructivist communication theory (Burleson 2007) has been explicit in tying message production-relevant knowledge to competent communication. Closer in spirit to planning theory, the complexity of one’s declarative knowledge structure relevant to social information helps determine the sophistication of one’s interactional goals, which in turn impacts the proficiency of communication plans and subsequent messages. Competence is particularly important in problematic circumstances, in which messages expressly designed to be effective for the specific audience, i.e. “person-centered” messages, are desirable.
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness theory differs from other members of this set by in effect assuming the communicator knows what to say and attending to the decision on how to say it; in essence ignoring the O and concentrating on the S and P. The situation includes three relevant aspects: the communicator’s degree of relational distance from and relative power in relation to the intended message receiver, and the degree of “imposition” the message implies for the receiver. In the processing stage, the communicator in essence combines the relational distance, relative power, and imposition indices into an implicit regression equation that allows the calculation of the ideal amount of threat to the positive face (self-regard) and/or negative face (freedom of action) of the communicator and/or receiver implied by the situation. The level of bluntness or politeness with which the resulting message is worded reflects the results of that calculation. Analogously with Meyer (1997), a competent message successfully navigates the appropriate-ness/effectiveness conflict through wording at the optimal politeness/bluntness level.
2.2Motivation-based message production theories
Several motivation-based message production theories exist as alternatives to the knowledge-based theories. Buck’s (1997) read-out theory of spontaneous communication focuses on low-order physiological mechanisms that provide the capability to send spontaneous emotional messages. The perception of significant factors in the environment (potential danger) or one’s own physiological state (pain) serves as the motivator for emotional responses that are nonverbally expressed through body, face, or voice. Evolution has also resulted in the automatic recognition of these expressions by perceivers; an example might well be the basic facial displays associated with fundamental emotions (anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise) that appear to be recognized with close to one hundred percent accuracy across the world (Ekman and Friesen 1975). To be sure, we are able to consciously control our emotional displays to a degree, such that those who are skilled at manipulating their displays can fool at least some of their audience some of the time. Corresponding skill differences in accuracy of recognition also undoubtedly exist. Nonetheless, our nonverbal signals of strong spontaneous emotions are largely produced and recognized automatically. The resulting OSPR message production model consists of a person with their given biological inheritance (O) who, in a situation that provides sufficient motivation (S), undergoes a physiological reaction that includes a felt emotional response (P) and an associated nonverbal signal of that reaction (R). The corresponding OSPR message reception model includes a person with analogous biological inheritance (O) who, upon observing/hearing that signal (S), perceives it (P) and recognizes the sender’s emotion (R). Competent communication, in which the expressed emotion is correctly perceived, is largely assured.
Psychological trait-based theories (see: Nicotera, Chapter 28) provide a somewhat different brand of motivation-based approach to message production; two examples will suffice. Argumentativeness is an individual difference factor relevant to the extent to which people enjoy the opportunity to discuss and take a side concerning controversial issues despite the expectation of disagreement. In Infante and Rancer’s (1982) trait-situation interactionist theory of argumentation, the opportunity to argue initiates both inherent approach and avoidance tendencies, with their relative strength determining the person’s characteristic degree of argumentativeness. A given circumstance induces a relevant incentive, such as persuading another person or enhancing one’s personal credibility. The drives toward and away from arguing in that circumstance are respectively a product of the person’s characteristic tendencies to approach and avoid argumentation multiplied by the perceived value and probability of success (in the case of approach) or failure (avoidance) at achieving the incentive. The resulting motivation to argue at that time is determined by the relative strength of the two products. The competent communicator is sufficiently argumentative without stumbling into verbal aggression (personal attack on the audience’s self-concepts).
Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) self-presentation approach to social anxiety is likewise interactionist. Social anxiety is a feeling of apprehension that a person can suffer from the experience or expectation of being evaluated for performance during social interactions. For Schlenker and Leary, the possibility of social anxiety arises when the communicator wishes to control the audience’s impression of the communicator in a given way. The current situation influences the communicator’s assessment of the likelihood of leaving the desired impression. Social anxiety occurs when that assessed likelihood is low, due to the specific characteristics of the audience or the situation and/or a perception of deficits in one’s skill. Those high in chronic social anxiety are more likely to make low assessments, feel anxious in response, and either attempt to avoid communicating or, if they must, display anxiety behaviors (halting speech, nonverbal adaptors) in diverse situations. Social anxiety avoidance marks the competent communicator. In both theories, relevant traits (O) interact with situational factors (S) in determining communication-relevant motivations (P) and resulting behaviors (R).
2.3Skill-based message production theories
Assuming the presence of a communication plan and the motivation to act on it, a competent message producer needs the skill to actualize the plan into talk. Most of the theories described thus far presume this ability without further comment. Although primarily concerned with knowledge, Greene (1984) and Meyer (1997) are among the few that speak to the skill component in that each specifically hypothesizes knowledge elements on the syntactic, semantic, phonetic, and nonverbal levels along with the pragmatic, providing the communicator with what needs to be known to say the intended words in the intended order with the intended pronunciation accompanied by appropriate gestures. The closest to a full-blown OSPR skill-based message production theory is Barge and Hirokawa’s (1989) communication competency model of group leadership. Here, group members possess to a greater or lesser extent a set of skills (O) relevant to the group task (problem analysis, decision criteria establishment, solution proposal and evaluation, procedure governance) and relationships among group members (interaction management, acknowledgement of other members, expressiveness, involvement). The demands (S) of the situation (task complexity, member role clarity, group climate) as moderated by the group’s goal (task versus relational focus) determine the relative importance and overall need for the communicative expression of member skills (P). This expression in turn impacts decision quality, group member satisfaction and cohesiveness, and perceptions of leadership effectiveness (R).
But the task is far more complex than implied by these theories. As part of the cooperative principle, a competent conversationalist strives to make statements easily comprehensible for listeners (Grice 1975). Competent utterances are composed in the context of what knowledge is and is not shared by the conversational-ists (“common ground”; Clark and Marshall 1981) and the present topical focus of the conversation along with other potential topics (Schank 1977). For these reasons, a communication plan for a given utterance must among other things contain markers for correct reference (e.g., “a” for a concept new in the conversation, “the” for a concept already discussed) along with distinguishing what has previously been stated (“given” information) from what is being added (“new” information; Clark and Haviland 1977) through word order (“given” appears before “new” in sentences) and vocal stress (new information is stressed over given).
Levelt (1989) proposed a very detailed multi-stage model of the entire speech production process, based on earlier theories of its specific parts. It begins with the preparation of a pragmatic/speech act plan consisting of a pre-verbal symbolic representation of the concepts to appear in talk along with information relevant to later sentence construction, such as marking the thematic focus and what is given versus new. It follows with the generation of a surface structure with chosen words organized in desired grammatical order along with markings for phonetic information such as stress and pausal patterns. This surface structure exploits a mental dictionary whose individual listings include semantic (Levelt’s example; eat means “ingest for nourishment or pleasure”), syntactic (eat is a verb that if used non-metaphorically requires an animate subject and some form of food as object), morphologic (out of the basic root comes ate, eats, and eaten, with the later requiring a preliminary auxiliary verb such as “has” and usually a subsequent preposition such as “by” or “with”), phonetic (eat contains the two phonemes /i/ and /t/; eaten has stress on the first syllable) and stylistic (when eat is better or worse wording than “dine” or “gobble”).
After this, the various segments of the surface structure are replaced by their phonetic counterparts, resulting in an articulatory plan. This is equivalent to what we “hear ourselves think.” It includes instructions concerning how each sound will be made, including among other aspects whether it is voiced (as in d) or unvoiced (as in t), where the tongue is located, and what parts of the mouth are to be constricted. The articulatory plan is turned into breath control and muscle movements, producing the actual sounds. All of these stages are occurring in parallel on consecutive segments of the pragmatic plan. Finally, the resulting speech is monitored to allow for self-correction of errors after the fact. With all this, Levelt failed to describe the genesis of nonverbal signals such as gestural illustrators and facial expressions that accompany and amplify the message, and representations for these must also be integrated someplace during the speech production process.
3OSPR message reception theories: The competent message receiver
As with message production, OSPR message reception theories divide into knowledge, motivation, and skill categories, which I cover in turn.
3.1Knowledge-based message reception theories
Knowledge-based message reception theories involve a person with a given psychological makeup (O) who, after witnessing a communicative performance (S), thinks about that performance (P), and then makes a judgment (R) concerning that performance’s competence. In essence, these proposals imply that the process of making competence judgments is a specific instance of impression formation. Analogously with message production theories, the O and to a lesser extent P tend to be emphasized. I (Pavitt 2007) have previously characterized impression formation as a four-stage process: observing a behavior, attributing its cause to the person or the situation, forming the impression, and evaluating it. Most theories relevant to the process focus on either the behavior observation (Vallacher and Wegner 1985) or causal attribution (Kelley 1967; Malle 2004). As the third and fourth stages are most obviously relevant to competence judgments, these theories provide little help for us. The remaining theories direct their primary concern towards the O, P, and R parts of the message reception process.
Beginning with the O, there are various possible options concerning the memory organization of the knowledge underlying competence judgments. Although not a theory, Wiemann’s (1977) foundational work on communicative competence implies one possibility. While its introduction and conclusion are written in terms of message production, a careful reading reveals that Wiemann’s research is better interpreted in terms of message reception. Research participants viewed recordings of staged “initial interactions” in which one of two actresses varied her interruptions, pauses, and topic changes. Participants then evaluated that actress on scales relevant to five dimensions: affiliation/support, behavioral flexibility, empathy, social relation, and general competence. The underlying supposition is an OSPR message reception model in which an observer who conceives of competence in terms of these dimensions (O) observes a communicative performance (S) and, through some undescribed thought process (P), makes judgments pertaining to those dimensions (R). It turned out that the data did not support distinguishing among the dimensions, but this result does not necessarily disconfirm the idea that observers have a dimensional conception of communicative competence.
My inferential model of social judgment (a technical description is in Pavitt 2001), originally formulated for this very topic, provides a second possibility. Bob has a “prototype” representing his beliefs concerning the attributes of a competent communicator. Some of these are “attributional beliefs” that link the prototype’s label (“good communicator”) with characteristic behaviors (such as “a good communicator listens well” and “a good communicator actively uses facial expressions”) and traits (such as “a good communicator is expressive” and “a good communicator is open-minded”). These characteristics are also associated with one another through “covariational beliefs”, such as “listening well is related to actively using facial expressions”, “being supportive is related to being open-minded”, and “listening well is related with being open-minded”. During their interaction, Bob concludes from his observations that Ann has actively used facial expressions and listened well to him (stage one of the impression formation process). Bob then begins the process of forming an impression of Ann as a communicator by linking the label “Ann” both with these behaviors and with directly associated traits such as “is open-minded” and “is expressive” (stage two of the process). Then, using the covariational beliefs in the competent communicator prototype as the mold, Bob includes in his impression of Ann the other behaviors and traits in his conception of the good communicator, whether or not he has seen any relevant behavioral evidence. Thus, Ann is also judged to “appear relaxed and comfortable when speaking” and “be interesting”, along with the other characteristics in the prototype (stage three). Finally, using the attributional beliefs in the prototype as the basis for comparison, Bob judges his impression of Ann against his conception of the competent communicator and, in this case, gives Ann a positive evaluation (stage four). In OSPR terms, an observer with a belief structure featuring a competence-relevant prototype (O) watches an actor behave (S) and goes through the four stages of impression formation as just described (P), with the end result of a competence-relevant impression and evaluation of the actor (R). Constructivist communication theory’s (Burleson 2007) approach to social perception skill is consistent with this account, with the proviso that more complex belief structures result in more sophisticated impressions of others.
I am not aware of any other full-blown theories of attribution or impression formation that have explicit relevance to communicative competence, but any such proposal can imply one. For example, the most sophisticated of these theories, Reed and Miller’s (1998) parallel distributed process model, has a very detailed account for all but the evaluation phase. In the theory, an observer’s thoughts about an observed target are a function of the extent to which long-term memory nodes representing impression-relevant concepts have been activated. One can imagine that observations could lead to nodes representing “good communicator” and “poor communicator” becoming differentially activated, resulting in a competence judgment.
In contrast to, but complementary with impression formation theories is Bradac, Bowers, and Courtright’s (1980) model of the genesis and impact of variations in three paralinguistic variables of language: intensity (extremity versus neutrality concerning the topic), immediacy (association with the topic), and diversity (vocabulary range). Each is likely an inverted-U function of arousal, with highest levels with intermediate stress. Each also interacts with speaker/listener agreement, such that higher levels of each increase listener judgments of speaker competence when the two are in agreement but decrease these judgments with disagreement.
3.2Motivation-based message reception theories
Kim’s (2001) theory of cross-cultural adaptation is difficult to categorize. I place it here under the assumption that a “stranger’s” desire to adapt to and thrive within a differing “host culture”, such as an Asian in North America or vice versa, is a prerequisite for the process that the theory describes. Assuming such motivation, successful adaptation is encouraged by a stranger who has previous knowledge about the host culture, experience interacting with other cultures, and a flexible personality (O), within a culture that is open to strangers and similar to the stranger’s own (S). Adaptation occurs through a long series of encounters with host culture natives and media sources (P). These encounters can be quite stressful, but such anxiety serves as further motivation to adapt. The result (R) is the ability to communicate competently as both message sender and receiver with host culture natives, greater psychological well-being, and the integration of elements from both original and host culture into a new “intercultural identity” (Kim 2001).
3.3Skill-based message reception theories
Theories such as those above presuppose the skilled interpretation of the verbal and nonverbal aspects of messages. McClelland and Elman’s (1986) TRACE model of speech perception presumes the existence of a long-term memory structure consisting of highly interconnected nodes at the feature (sound characteristics), phoneme, and word levels. Sounds first activate their corresponding nodes at the feature level, with activation continuing for some period of time, allowing for the representation of the features of a sequence of sounds (the “trace”). The speech recognition system uses the trace to “propose” a “hypothesis”, i.e. tentatively activate the phoneme seemingly corresponding to each sound, based on the features of both the relevant sound and those sounds immediately before and after it. Linkages among nodes at the phoneme level provide further evidence, as some combinations (such as /m/ /f/) are much less likely than others (/m/ /i/). After a sufficient period of time, the hypothesized (most highly activated) phoneme is chosen. That phoneme’s node excites all word nodes that contain it, with the finally-chosen word that best matches the sequence of activated phonemes. TRACE has nothing to say specifically about high-level recognition at the syntactic and, perhaps most importantly, pragmatic levels, with the latter perhaps requiring a model resembling some inference process akin to that proposed by Searle (1975) for recognizing indirect speech acts. Analogous to Levelt’s (1989) effort with speech production, it also does not consider the nonverbal behavior that accompanies and aids in the interpretation of the verbal.
4Interactive IPO models: The competent interaction
Interactive IPO models highlight the interaction itself rather than the psychological structure and processes of the interactants. In this model, a message produced by one communicator (P) is perceived (O) and thought about (I) by a second communicator, who produces a message in response (P) to the first communicator. The first communicator then perceives (O), thinks about (I), and responds (P) to the second communicator in turn. In contrast with the OSPR model types described earlier, interactive IPO models feature multiple communicators engaged in continual feedback loops. In essence, the joint goal of the participants is to engage in a successful interaction, and it would follow that their ability to do so would indicate the competence of that interaction.
Argyle’s (1972) social skill model provides a rough sketch of the form of interactive IPO models relevant to communicative competence. The motivation for Ann to engage in interaction with Bob comes from the drive to satisfy either a physiological need such as hunger or thirst or a psychological need such as dependency, affiliation, or dominance through social interaction. The relevant drive arouses in Ann a more specific interaction goal; just to name a few examples, to order a meal at a restaurant, ask for directions when lost, or direct a group to make a decision. In response to her goal and those perceptions, Ann designs a specific message (I) as part of an action plan and then delivers it (P). Bob is analogously motivated by a goal and the drive that underlies it, which may or may not be the same as Ann’s, and in light of that goal may selectively perceive (O) the content in Ann’s message. Bob then designs (I) and delivers (P) a response. Ann’s (O) perception of Bob’s message allows her to alter her action plan (I) and subsequent messages (P) in light of Bob’s. Argyle considered various implications of this model for social skill. The perceptual sensitivity of each interactant to one another, particularly in terms of nonverbal cues, speaks to individual competence on the output side, as does the breadth and depth of the repertoire of known techniques for interaction on the input end. As for the interaction itself, Argyle used as an example of interactional competence the ability of two people to take turns smoothly throughout the interaction without undue gaps or overlaps in their discussion.
In the case of competence-relevant interactive IPO theories, the knowledge/ motivation/skill trichotomy is less useful as a classifier than the distinction between two theoretical subtypes that I will cover in detail; behavioral adaptation theories and uncertainty reduction theories. I finish with a description of an aggregate of interactive IPO theories that do not fit into any particular mold.
4.1Behavioral adaptation theories
Behavioral adaptation theories describe how two interactants coordinate their affiliation-related behaviors, such as the amount of distance and eye gaze between them along with smiling and touching, in response to changes in these behaviors by one or the other over time. These theories need to account for the fact that a change in one person’s behavioral intimacy can be responded to through the other person either reciprocating (making the same change), compensating (making the opposite change), or making no change at all. Thus if Ann were to increase the degree of liking implied by what she is doing by, say, moving closer to Bob, then Bob might begin smiling more (reciprocating her increase), gaze at her less (compensating for her increase), or not responding behaviorally. If instead Ann were to move farther from Bob, he would reciprocate by smiling less and compensate by gazing at her more. In either case, Ann would then respond in turn. In short, these theories posit a homeostatic process through which interactants manage their level of physiological arousal caused by, and resulting emotional response toward, the other’s level of behavior. As a group, the behavioral adaptation theories tend to accentuate the output portion of their explanations and take the input part for granted. To a greater or lesser extent, they share the following interactive IPO model: Ann changes her level of affiliation-relevant behavior (P). Bob notices this change and, under certain theory-specific conditions, becomes aroused by it (O). Bob then plans (I) and changes (P) his own behavior in response. Ann notes Bob’s behavioral changes, and again in certain circumstances becomes aroused (O), plans (I), and alters (P) her own subsequent actions. If a satisfactory homeostasis is achieved, the interaction can be considered to be competently performed.
Given Argyle’s social skill model, it is not surprising that the forerunner of this group was Argyle and Dean’s (1965) affiliative conflict theory. The balance between drives toward and away from an intimate interaction with the other determines each interactant’s immediate need for affiliation. If the amount of implied liking Ann experiences from Bob’s behavior is greater or less than desired, arousal occurs, motivating a return to the most comfortable level. Disequilibrium can occur either if one or the other changes their behaviors sufficiently to send a clear signal of greater or lesser intimacy, or if they desire different levels of intimacy. Argyle and Dean (1965: 293) proposed that the two would work out a compromise level of expressed intimacy “more or less satisfactory to both.” Such a compromise would constitute a competent interaction.
A textbook exemplar of an interactive IPO theory consistent with the Argyle social skill model and featured in the Wilson and Sabee (2003) review would be expectancy violation theory (EVT; Burgoon and Hale 1988). Ann and Bob enter their interaction with a range representing the expectancies of the affiliation-relevant behaviors one another will perform. If Ann performs a behavior outside of the range of Bob’s expectancies (P), in other words signals an unexpectedly large change in her affiliation-relevant behaviors, Bob becomes aroused and begins focusing on the behavior (O). Bob will first interpret the behavior (is that movement toward me a sign of attraction or aggression?) and then evaluate it as either positive or negative (I). This evaluation is influenced by Ann’s “communicator reward valence”; Bob views Ann as either a rewarding or punishing person with whom to interact. Bob is more likely to see a rewarding Ann’s move as signaling liking and a punishing Ann’s shift as aggressive. The final behavioral evaluation determines the recipient’s reaction. If Bob positively interprets Ann’s movement toward him, he reciprocates by, for example, smiling more often. If Bob negatively interprets Ann’s movement toward him, he compensates by, for instance, looking away from her (P). In any case, Ann will respond to Bob’s reciprocation or compensation through the same process, resulting in a “negotiation” between the two concerning acceptable behavior in their interaction. Their success in coming to an implied agreement in this matter determines the competence of the interaction. Expectancy violations theory later metamorphosed into interaction adaptation theory (Burgoon and White 1997), with a more complicated approach to each interactant’s behavioral decision process.
Discrepancy arousal theory (Cappella and Greene 1982) is a somewhat different approach to behavioral adaptation between two people. Analogously with EVT, Ann and Bob have a range of expectations for the amount of involvement in their interaction the other should signal, including not only affiliation-relevant behaviors but also, for example, the length and amount of pauses between speaking turns, speech amount and volume, and body orientation. If Ann’s involvement level is either greater or lesser than Bob’s expectation, then Bob will become aroused, with the degree of arousal curvilinearly increasing with amount of discrepancy (the increase occurs at a slower rate as discrepancy goes up). Bob’s emotional experience of this arousal depends on its level, such that relatively low amounts are experienced as pleasurable but further increases less so, up to the limits of Bob’s expectation region. Beyond that border, Bob’s arousal level will become aversive, and ever more so with continued increases. Behavioral response is consistent with emotional experience. Thus, if Ann’s level of behavioral involvement is either slightly above or slightly below Bob’s expectation (P), then Bob will be mildly aroused (O), find that arousal pleasurable (I), and increase his own behavioral involvement (P). If Ann’s level is instead well above or below (P), Bob will be highly aroused (O), suffer it as painful (I), and decrease his behavioral involvement (P).
Cappella and Greene (1982) described some implications of discrepancy arousal theory for communicative competence. Ann is going through the same process of arousal, emotion, and behavioral adaptation to Bob’s behavior as Bob is with Ann’s. This leads to the issue of their behavioral coordination. In normal circumstances there will be significant overlap between their acceptance regions, resulting in each finding the other’s degree of behavioral involvement to be pleasurable and increasing their own, leading to reciprocation and a competent interaction. The smaller the overlap between acceptance regions, the less often there would be pleasurable response and reciprocation and the more there would be displeasure and compensation. No overlap would mean no reciprocating at all and an absence of interactional competence.
Discrepancy arousal theory implies that emotional responses to one another’s behavior are sufficient for explaining behavioral adaptation, whereas expectancy violations theory posits a mix of emotional and cognitive factors. Other theories within the behavioral adaptation set include arousal labeling (Patterson 1976) and cognitive valence (Andersen 1988). Both are more similar to expectancy violations theory than discrepancy arousal in this regard. Both expectancy violations and cognitive valence accounts explicitly refer to perceptions of a behavior’s appropriateness in judgments of its consistency with expectations. Barry and Oliver’s (1996) delineation of the role played by affect in dyadic negotiation is founded on expectancy violations. Each negotiator’s affective state at any one point during a negotiation can be improved or worsened by the extent to which one another’s tactics are more cooperative or contentious than expected, with their own tactics following suit. This implies a tendency for negotiators to match one another’s mood and level of cooperation as the negotiation progresses. The competent negotiation, then, is one in which both are cooperative.
Communication accommodation theory (Gallois, Ogay, and Giles 2005) boasts a substantially different account for the psychological motivations responsible for reciprocation and compensation than the behavioral adaptation theories described thus far. At its core, communication accommodation theory is relevant to circumstances in which a communicator’s membership in a given social group, which could be defined by any number of features (such as age, gender, ethnicity, and occupation), is more salient than the communicator’s personal identity during an interaction. Reciprocation of an interactional partner’s behavior is more likely if that partner is either of the same social group or of a different social group that the communicator evaluates positively, whereas compensation is prevalent when the interactional partner is of a negatively-viewed social group. As with other behavioral adaptation theories, a competent interaction occurs when the behavioral responses of each to the other can achieve a mutually acceptable equilibrium.
4.2Uncertainty reduction theories
Whereas the behavioral adaptation theories are united in the assumption that interactive behavior is controlled by arousal processes, the basis of uncertainty reduction theories is a presumed motivation to come to understand our interactional partners. The original uncertainty reduction theory (Berger and Calabrese 1975) serves as the subset’s exemplar. Ann and Bob are strangers meeting for the first time and, as such, have high levels of uncertainty about one another. Ann’s high uncertainty (I) leads her to ask Bob a question about himself (“What is your name?”; P). Bob comprehends the question (O) and both answers and, given his own high uncertainty (I), asks one in return (“I’m Bob. What is yours?”; P). Ann’s uncertainty is slightly reduced by Bob’s answer (O), and her answer to his question lowers his. If this back and forth proceeds smoothly, each’s uncertainty continues to drop and their comfort with one another increases. As the conversation progresses, the ease of lowered uncertainty results in faster speech rates and fewer pauses, and a reduction in each’s felt need to quickly reciprocate short question–answer exchanges provides the time for longer speaking turns including the disclosure of more intimate self-relevant information. The end result is an increase in liking for one another, accompanied by more nonverbal expressions of this liking. The implication is that a competent interaction occurs when both Ann and Bob’s uncertainty is reduced sufficiently for mutual liking.
Subsequent theories in this subset add additional motivational factors to the need for understanding. In predicted outcome value theory, Sunnafrank (1986) hypothesized that once enough information about one another has been exchanged for both Ann and Bob to make evaluations of expected outcomes from future interaction, understanding needs would be superseded by hedonistic needs, and interaction would only progress as the original uncertainty reduction theory proposed if both Bob and Ann forecast rewards from the effort. In contrast, expectations of costs result in actions to bring the interaction to a halt. A competent discussion could include either one with lowered uncertainty, positive forecasts, and a desire for future interactions or one with negative forecasts and a polite mutual withdrawal. Afifi and Weiner’s (2004) theory of motivated information management combines notions from expectancy violations theory with the realization that, rather than necessarily lowering uncertainty, people want to maintain it in a given comfort range and might even choose to increase it if it is lower than they like. Uncertainty outside of the comfort range leads to anxiety and a motivation to return to that range. A competent interaction succeeds in managing this return.
Gudykunst’s (1993) anxiety/uncertainty management theory deserves special mention due to an explicit reference to communicative competence. Specifically relevant to interactions between strangers differing in culture or ethnicity, a competent interaction is one with few if any misunderstandings between discussants. Such an interchange is the product of mindfulness, i.e., conscious awareness of the situation and attention to details of the interaction on the part of both parties. Optimal amounts of both uncertainty and anxiety encourage mindfulness, whereas too much leads to its opposite (mindlessness) and too little results in an absence of motivation to interact in the first place.
4.3Other interactive IPO theories
There is a wide variety of other interactive IPO theories relevant to communicative competence that cannot be easily classified. The following is a summary of some of them, ordered roughly from the most psychologically based to the most socially founded. Affect-control theory (Heise 1979) is based on the idea that our attitudes toward another person can have two different aspects; an established or “funda-mental” part based on our overall history of interaction with that person, and a temporary or “transient” part formed during one specific instance of interaction with that person. We are motivated to keep the two consistent with one another, and when the two parts of the attitude are in conflict, i.e. one is positive and the other negative, there is a drive to act in order to resolve the inconsistency. For example, if Ann likes Bob but Bob is critical of Ann, Ann’s fundamental and transient attitudes toward Bob are in conflict, and Ann is motivated to either reprimand Bob for his insult or ask Bob why he did so. Ann’s comment should put Bob in an analogous condition of attitudinal conflict, which could lead to an account and/or apology for his action. If Bob’s response is accepted by Ann, both should return to cognitive consistency. A proviso here, however, is that the two have analogous definitions of the situation, and an absence of such can have disastrous consequences. If Bob believes that the circumstance allows for criticism whereas Ann does not, a prolonged argument could ensue. As one’s fundamental attitude is an amalgam of one’s transient responses, one can imagine that too many exchanges of this type would lead the former to change for the worse. Thus a competent interaction requires similar definitions of the situation.
Berscheid’s (1983) emotions-in-relationship theory is an extension into the interpersonal realm of Mandler’s (1975) account for the genesis of emotion. An “organized action sequence” (OAS) is a series of behavioral events directed toward satisfying a goal that have been performed in a given sequence frequently enough to function as a unit. The interruption of an OAS results in physiological arousal and the experience of emotion, which is then labeled positively or negatively depending on context. To the extent that two people are interdependent, the potential for interruptions of one another’s OAS is present. “Meshed” OASs occur when the OASs for two people facilitate goal achievement for both. Well-meshed OASs mean few interruptions and a calm relationship, but also the absence of surprises in positive contexts (e.g., an unexpected happy event) and potential boredom. It follows that a competent relationship would be highly intermeshed to prevent surprises in negative contexts but include occasional interruptions by one partner that are responded to positively by the other.
In the original version of the coordinated management of meaning (Pearce and Cronen 1980), any communicator has a conception of the regulative rules governing socially-correct action and the constitutive rules defining the significance of these actions within the immediately relevant situation. The extent to which interactants’ relevant rule conceptions are consistent with one another determines the success or failure of goal achievement during their interaction. Pearce and Cronen had an explicit individual-level typology for communicative competence within this theory: minimal competence implies sufficient knowledge of regulative rules to conduct an interaction without an understanding of the constitutive rules describing their meaning; satisfactory competence means knowledge of both types of rules sufficient for successful interaction and understanding; and optimal competence signifies great enough understanding of the underlying circumstance to allow for intentional rule breakage designed to bring about positive change. But given that successful goal achievement requires rule conception consistency among interactants, it is better to view competence as a dyadic achievement in that vein.
Communication privacy management theory (Petronio 2002) is founded on the notion that both those considering disclosing private information and those receiving and responding to disclosures make decisions concerning how vulnerable they wish to be to the risks inherent in such interchanges. Both disclosures and responses can be more or less direct, with more direct messages carrying greater potential for both risk and reward. Competent exchanges satisfying both parties are most likely when both disclosure and response are direct. Reciprocated indirect messages can also be competent when the discloser truly wishes an implicit reaction, but not when the discloser wants otherwise.
Duncan and Fiske’s (1977) approach to turn-taking in conversation is the first of the theories to be described in this chapter based on a functional model of scientific explanation rather than a causal (the difference is explained well in Achinstein, 1983). At any given time, speaker Ann has a given level of desire to give up the floor to listener Bob, and Bob a desire to take the floor from Ann; their respective “transition-readiness states.” Both also have available to them a number of observable cues to signal their transition-readiness state to the other: gestures, posture, head position, pitch and volume of voice, along with syntactic cues in their verbal messages. Duncan and Fiske hypothesized that the number of relevant cues exhibited at a given time serves as an indication of the current level of one’s transition-readiness state; more cues, higher state. At the end of a syntactic unit, either Ann can reserve the floor for a while (e.g.,“… and not only that …”), Ann can give the floor to Bob (“What do you think?”), or the floor can go to the quickest speaker (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1978). Competent turn-taking in conversation without undue interruptions and long pauses requires the skilled use and recognition of the available cues on the part of all interactants.
Bales’s (1953) functional theory of group equilibrium posits that “healthy” groups are able to juggle the sometimes-contradictory demands of task performance and cohesiveness maintenance through achieving optimum proportions and sequences of task-relevant “instrumental” and relationship-relevant “expressive” communicative acts. The healthy group produces several times as many positive expressive messages as negatives, and responds to stress inducements such as negative expressiveness with relevant instrumental work (explaining one’s negativity) followed by positive reactions. Competent group discussion insures the maintenance of cohesiveness without sacrificing proficient task work. Karau and Kelly’s (1992) attentional focus model adds time as a moderator, such that extreme time pressure disallows the expressive communicative acts that can return when temporal constraints have been lifted.
“Sex-role orientation” is an individual difference variable, consisting of that portion of a person’s cognitive structure containing attributes relevant to either “masculinity” or “femininity”. These two function as independent dimensions, such that one’s sex-role orientation can not only be primarily masculine or feminine, but also both (“androgyny”) or neither (“undifferentiated”). Piggybacking on Bales, Ickes (1981) proposed that those with masculine orientations would prefer to send and receive instrumental forms of communication whereas feminines are more comfortable with expressive forms, particularly in regards to nonverbal indicators of interaction involvement. The resulting synthesis is an interactive IPO theory in which satisfaction with the interaction is a product of the degree to which Ann and Bob’s sex-role orientation and resulting communication style preferences intermesh. In a sense, the androgynous are more competent than the other types due to their ability to enact both instrumental and expressive techniques. Nonetheless, interactions as a whole are more likely to be satisfactory to both parties and thus performed competently if the interactants’ styles match, no matter what they are.
Argyle, Furnham, and Graham (1981) considered the implications of assigning the possession of goals to social situations as well as to people (e.g., the goals of negotiation could include one negotiator gaining compliance from the other, the two reaching a compromise agreement, and the two maintaining a friendly relationship). The need for behavioral coordination among participants in pursuit of one or more of these goals has resulted in the emergence of a characteristic group of roles and rules associated with each situation along with a relevant repertoire of verbal and nonverbal actions that, when enacted by all participants, results in situational goal achievement. Assuming that each participant chooses personal goals from the situational goal set that are not inconsistent with one another (from the negotiation goal set, gaining compliance and reaching a compromise are inconsistent situational goals), it follows that performance of the relevant behavioral repertoire, that suggested by situational rules and roles, allows for both personal and situational goal fulfillment. Social skill, a central concept in the authors’ approach, consists of sufficient knowledge of relevant rules and roles and the ability to perform the needed behavioral repertoire, and as such is context-dependent. Situations that are particularly stressful, those in which participants tend to be uncomfortable, fearful, prone to embarrassment, or self-conscious, are those with a greater likelihood of social skill deficits. An interactive IPO account would stress the need for all participants to coordinate their behaviors in line with relevant rules and roles, allowing for satisfactory goal achievement.
5Final remarks
The goal of this chapter has been to review and classify scientific theories that have demonstrable implications for the concept of communicative competence. The focus on scientific theory limits attention to a subset of communication theory, leaving out other viewpoints with analogous relevance. A mention of two examples of these others must suffice. Baxter and Montgomery’s (1996) dialectic approach to close relationships makes specific reference to interactional competence, defining it consistently with the interactive IPO model as communicative patterns revealing the participants’ degree of success at fluidly and creatively managing the complexities and contradictions inherent in the contexts of their specific relationship. Adaptive structuration theory (DeSanctis and Poole 1994) is best modeled within the OSPR message production set. Here, the concept of communicative competence is implied by the extent to which the interaction of work teams using a group decision support system demonstrates a successful blend of the “spirit” (normative usage patterns) encouraged by the support system’s design, the restraints imposed by the task and organizational environment, and the implications of the team’s preexisting structure. Such a demonstration would encompass the degree of equality in team member participation and influence and the effectiveness of conflict management.
Despite its limitations, if the discussion in this chapter has been successful in reaching its goal, it has demonstrated that, although there are very few theories of communicative competence per se, there are a great many theories that have obvious relevance to that topic. In fact, it could be argued that any theory that provides a good account for message production or message reception or interactional coordination has implications for communicative competence. Although I would not go so far as to say that we do not need any explicit theories of competent communication – as far as I am concerned, the more communication theories the better – I would say that, rather than despair of our poverty of competence theories, we should rejoice in our wealth of theories of communication that explain in their various ways how communication can be competently performed.
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