Chapter 1

Digital Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Abstract

This chapter covers digital reconnaissance and surveillance fundamentals and prepares the reader to engage in more detailed techniques in the remaining chapters. It covers why people spy, the motivations, the risks, and the rewards. It discusses fundamental knowledge needed to mitigate the threat of stalking and what information would be relevant for security analysts and the general public. This chapter covers current events, the damage that can occur, and the many methods in which spying can be conducted. Basic cybercrime topics are also covered.

Keywords

Reconnaissance
Surveillance
Spying
Espionage
National Security Agency (NSA)
Edward Snowden
Mobile Technology
Public Internet
Social Media
Video Surveillance
Digital Forensics
Terrorism
Stalking
Cybercrime
Penetration Testing
Law and Ethics

Digital reconnaissance and surveillance

Today, the world operates on a digital landscape. Wearable technology is the latest buzz word and everyone seems to be connected via their phones, pads, and laptops. Virtually everyone everywhere is becoming more and more interconnected and sharing data and socializing. Using this medium has become the norm. While the world continues to grow digitally, so does the risk of exposure. As the landscape grows exponentially, so does the threat of those who would, and will abuse this medium for their own gain.
Modern societies cannot hold back growth and innovation because of fear; those same societies must learn to overcome challenges of a growing interconnected world as seen in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1 Viewing the digital landscape.
Because technological advancements grow exponentially, the security innovations must encapsulate and work within them. Security is not a new consideration; it is an age old practice applied to new situations such as a growing digital landscape.
Reconnaissance and surveillance have been practiced for centuries, primarily as a way for militaries to conduct observation of enemy activities and monitor targets to gain strategic advantage. Reconnaissance and surveillance teams would go out to gather information about enemy activities in hopes to find out location information, size, and strength of their targets and/or to place targeting information for incoming strikes.
Digital reconnaissance (or digital recon for short) is the “digital” form of what these teams or individuals do, except primarily in a computer-based world. These experts perform many of these same basic functions of their military counterparts and the target could be strategic advantage, financial gain, leverage, or to place targeting information for more attacks in a corporate or private landscape. The landscape is not the traditional battlefield, but the cyberworld where computers and mobile technology can be manipulated, video cameras can be hacked into, and databases of personal information can be stolen to gain strategic advantage.
Not all who perform reconnaissance and surveillance activities have bad intentions; some perform these activities in order to protect. In recent news, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been filtering data of the Americans and others in the name of national security. Because it wasn’t disclosed and seemed to overreach, it was immediately brought into questions by the American public when it was brought into light by Edward Snowden, an employee who worked with the NSA and leaked how the NSA was capturing inappropriate data. The threat of government’s spying on individuals is not new; however, it seems to have grown more post 9/11 because of the threat of terrorist attack, the assembling of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the United States, and the ability for many to use technology as a way to gather information quickly about anyone or anything.
In this chapter, we will detail the fundamentals of digital reconnaissance and surveillance, provide some history on the topic, and set the tone for the remaining chapters where we will go into detail on how these activities take place, how vulnerable we are, and how to fortify our defenses and mitigate risk on a more personal level.

Art and History of Spying

As we have just discussed, reconnaissance and surveillance is not new; it’s been practiced for centuries. The term “spying” may come to mind when you read about or watch movies where a “spy” is used to capture information about a target. In this book, we will use this term interchangeably, so when the term spy is referenced, we use it to explain the person or activity of collecting and reporting information on a specific target.
What is surveillance? The word surveillance comes from the French word “watching over.” Surveillance involves monitoring persons or locations to identify behaviors, activities, and other changing information. This will be the primary topic and focus throughout the book, covering the current landscape and attack vectors. Learning how to mitigate and defend against digital surveillance is tricky; today almost everything you do is captured on camera or tracked. We will cover more on this topic as we progress through the book; however, understanding the passive and the aggressive form of surveillance is important.
There are different forms of surveillance to include adversarial surveillance that is to gather information in preparation for an aggressive action and likely criminal in nature. Examples of adversarial surveillance are terrorism (domestic and international), destruction of property (logical or physical), and other crimes against individuals of entities to include theft, stalking, and espionage. Espionage (which is used interchangeably with spying) is defined as the practice of spying on or spying by governmental and military entities to gain information.
Surveillance has also advanced to the point where unmanned aircraft (typically called Drones), as seen in Figure 1.2, is responsible for conducting “spy” missions to gather data and information on targets. This has brought about a large amount of controversy about how privacy is impacted and what legal issues arise from such activity.
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Figure 1.2 Security drone.
One of the most historical legal concepts of spying is the Espionage act of 1917. This highly outdated and misused law does not fully protect those who are charged with spying. Cybercrime is not covered, security clearances are not covered, and it is consistently becoming more and more important in the realm of prosecuting criminals at the highest levels of government. It also brings to light what are the legal implications of spying on your neighbor, such as using their wireless connection, and infiltrating their home. What about the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 that prohibited the storing of certain data on others. As we will learn for decade’s, protection has been put into place to draw specific boundaries to keep privacy of citizens in check; however, this has brought about many legal challenges along the way. In this chapter and throughout the book, we will cover these legal aspects alongside the technical how to and defense tactics you need to put into place for safety and security. You will see in this book, as we progress through the chapters, and looking at how digital spying is conducted, you will find that many of the old tactics used outside of the digital realm still apply. As an example, stalking digitally can also lead to traditional stalking and vice versa. Understanding the concerns and risks of both are relevant to understanding the threat as a whole.
This does not mean that any person or team that conducts surveillance is a threat. Investigative, forensic, and security teams today conduct investigations legally and may require a warrant or some form of legal backing to conduct any type of information gathering; however, not all need to operate within these boundaries. Therefore, it’s important to understand some legal concepts when either you are the victim of these activities or, if perpetrating an attack, what you may or may not be held liable for.

Threat of digital reconnaissance and surveillance

What is at stake? Currently, much is at stake. Your privacy is at stake. Your safety could be at stake. Your identity can be stolen. You can be impacted financially. As the digital landscape grows, so does the threat exponentially. We will cover each of these in depth; however, it’s safe to say that the threat is very real and the need to understand it and protect yourself should be considered and practiced.
The threat of digital spying is also growing at a rapid rate, generationally, and more and more are creating an online footprint. As more people get mobile devices and attach to the public Internet, there are more opportunities for attackers to conduct surveillance on selected targets.
Your identity can be stolen. You finances can be impacted. Your safety can be threatened.
To understand this concept in more detail, we need to consider the size, depth, and breadth of the threat landscape.

Threat Landscape

As mentioned before, threats grow exponentially. The math is simple. As more people connected to the public Internet via a growing number of devices to include mobile phones, laptops, wearable technology, and pads, the number of possible victims also grows. The attack vector also extends.
The Internet fueled by search engines, social media, and the ability to retain all that it collects is a digital spy’s goldmine when doing reconnaissance work. Considerably, one of the biggest threats today on the Internet is in the form of search engines and social media. You can virtually learn a person’s history, what they like, their location, and who their friends and family are. You can learn where they work. You can even track their movement day by day. This is a reminder that George Orwell’s book “1984” may indeed have come to 2014 and Big Brother is watching. In fact, this book may turn you into a Winston Smith, looking for ways to evade Big Brother’s roving eye! Today’s roving eye looks more in line with the millions of cameras that can be found in stores, businesses, and home across the world as seen in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3 Digital surveillance camera.
Search engines are so far one of the first (and easiest) tools to use to start reconnaissance on a target. You may even attempt to safeguard your personal information or the websites you use may attempt to safeguard it; however, let’s take a look at how easy it is to gather information on a target.
In this example, we will look at the growing world of online dating. One would think that by going online and filling out a profile on a website that is marketed as safe, one could simply find and meet their perfect “match.” Before the online dating craze took hold, traditionally a person may get a “reference check” from a friend of family member about a person who may be right for them. They may meet somewhere and get to know each other, perhaps at a school, work, or a venue. They may talk on the phone and get to know each other. Today, you simply need to create an online profile and sit back and wait.
You may think it’s safe; you are not identifying yourself by last name, you may not be putting up a picture, or you may lie about who you are. But what if you were honest? What if you put a few key pieces of information up like your first name, last initial, your occupation, and the town where you reside? This is all that is needed to give a spy (or worse, a stalker) enough information to begin to track you in a search engine. For example, Rhonda K., a Horticulturist who resides in Kissimmee, Florida, may be enough to find your LinkedIn profile. Now, there is enough to begin to track more information about you. As we progress through the book, we will learn how to dig deeper and find more information; however, this is enough for now. To show you the “threat landscape” and how deep and wide it goes. Rhonda may have just been divorced and looking for a safe way to date that fit into her busy lifestyle; however, by attempting to remain anonymous while she tested the online dating waters may have exposed herself to stalking.
Social media is also another treasure trove of information. By simply infiltrating someone’s social sites, you may be able to launch attacks directly against a victim in the form of bullying, stalking, and worse, criminal behavior. With sites such as Twitter, Facebook, and Linkedin, one could conduct surveillance and reconnaissance of a target and gain information such as identity, occupation, location, movement patterns, and more.
Mobile technology has widened the threat landscape by giving each and every user of a mobile device a way to track their every movement. A stolen, hacked, or bugged phone can provide information on a user’s identity, location, movement patterns, and communication history. Digital pads from Microsoft, Google and Apple are also commonplace today and they store just as much information. What makes these devices all the more enticing to someone who is tracking you is, they are not left at home! If a phone is bugged, normally it never leaves the owner’s side providing data on everywhere they go, everything they do.
Stationary devices are just as much of a threat now as they had ever been. Computers are used at work and at home and if exposed locally or remotely, can also provide a great deal of information to those collecting it. Other stationary devices such as video cameras are now found everywhere. While driving, cameras track your movements and report location to a centralized collection system. While walking into stores, schools, work, or now in personal homes, cameras track your movement in the name of safety and security. What if those cameras were used for reasons other than good?
A good example of use can be seen in Figure 1.4. Here, we see traffic camera’s providing services such as allowing citizens to see what a major roadway may look like to pick a better route to work, one that may be less congested or accident free. It provides a way for law enforcement to maintain safe driving patterns by ticketing those who break laws such as running red lights. It allows law enforcement agencies to track a child abductor by tracking a license plate through such cameras. However, these systems can be quickly misused.
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Figure 1.4 Traffic cameras.
We also need to consider the digital threats that only add on to the already existing threats that existed prior to the existence of the public Internet, mobile phones, and computers. The reason why it’s pertinent is that you understand the threat landscape is because it is growing. It’s everywhere you go, everything you use, everything you touch, and everything you send digitally. Nothing is safe, nothing is untraceable. In this chapter, we learn how to safeguard as much as possible to ensure that you do not easily become a victim to surveillance and reconnaissance.

Why spy?

Now that we have discussed the foundations of digital reconnaissance and surveillance, let’s look at some of the current newsworthy high profile stories of how digital spying is affecting the world. It is difficult to turn on the news today and not hear about the NSA and Edward Snowden, to date, one of the biggest news stories around covering the topics of digital spying by the American government on its own citizens. Other news stories will be covered; however, this is one of the biggest stories to break the new media about spying in the past few years.
We also need to understand why spying takes place. What is to gain? What is to lose? Spying is done on purpose … there are reasons someone spies on another person, organization, or entity. Those reasons will be discussed in depth in this chapter. It’s important to understand the motivations behind those who spy, by doing so you may be able to proactively know when you are at risk.
We will also cover the details on who the bad guys are and who the good guys are and how the lines blur. Not all spying is done by a stalker, an ex-boy or girlfriend, or by a husband or wife. Not all spying is done by organizations looking to achieve competitive advantage over other entities.
Some surveillance is done simply to protect interests. For example, military organizations perform surveillance and reconnaissance missions to gather information about an entity. Some governments perform these functions as a way to protect its citizens. As mentioned above, however, those lines are easily blurred.
In this section of this chapter, we will also cover the fundamentals of digital forensics. Since we will be covering investigations (both criminal and noncriminal), it only makes sense to discuss the science of digital forensics.

NSA and Edward Snowden

In terms of spying, surveillance and reconnaissance, and intelligence collection, the NSA is an intelligence agency that operates under the Department of Defense (DoD) for the US Government. The NSA is tasked with collecting intelligence to keep the country safe.
The NSA is allowed to operate in a manner that may seem inappropriate in hopes to safeguard the United States and its interests abroad. How the agency does this is through mass surveillance of communications, phone records, Internet transactions, and e-mail. It collects this data, filters it, and software mines it for key words and other triggers.
So why so much news media about the NSA lately if this is what they were tasked to do?
Edward Joseph Snowden, an American computer analyst working as a contractor, was accused of allegedly leaking top secret information about the NSA who he accused of spying on the American citizens by collecting data on them as seen in Figure 1.5. He claimed that all data being collected seemed to fall outside of the boundaries of targeting individuals who may be deemed a threat. Instead, the NSA was collecting and filtering data on everyone who communicated within the United States, as well as outside of it.
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Figure 1.5 Edward Snowden.
Although some of the biggest news during the printing of this book is revolving around Edward Snowden and the NSA, this is not a new topic. It should not be shocking, although it is. As mentioned earlier, for centuries, governments and military organizations have been performing intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. This is also not the first government scandal to take place (America or otherwise). The secret Five Eyes organization made up of five ally countries (made up of countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia) routinely share information among each other. Edward Snowden released that the United States had been sending Israel unfiltered data to a foreign country that contained private information about the US citizens. Had it not been for the current leak of information, this practice that has been going on for decades would not be of personal public interest because it would not have been a top story in the news.
Another interesting story to consider would be how the US public is surveilling its own government. When the story of Wikileaks broke in the news, not only was it very popular but also it became the subject of a newly released movie. Wikileaks released data of US military missions online for all to see as seen in Figure 1.6. This was a very controversial move by the citizens to show that spying can also be dangerous to the government if they do not protect their secrets, and secrets that are made public can cause a government major problems such as put agents at risk or destroy trust.
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Figure 1.6 Military surveillance.
So what is breeding paranoia and fueling fear that tests public trust? The same question may come up as to why I decided to write this book and perhaps why you have decided to read it. The answer may be simple … it may be that there is a lack of public trust these days, now more than ever. Perhaps, it is because there are too many stories on the news about how easy it is to hack into social media accounts and conduct cyber-bullying. Perhaps, it is because identity theft has become a common crime. Perhaps, it’s because everywhere you turn there is a video camera recording your every move, or because everyone carries a mobile device that can capture the moment and post it online for the world to see within seconds. It may be an answer that is more radical it may just be that fear and paranoia make a great news story and ratings have never been higher. No matter what the reason, the threat is real, and in this book, we will cover how to defend yourself, mitigate risk, protect your identity, and close attack vectors whenever possible.

Public Trust

Honestly, everyone likes a great spy novel. Famous movies are abundant and 007 James Bond is a household name. We get excited about these movies and we read spy novels, but what if you were actually spied on? How does it feel to be excited about seeing a spy in a movie use their cool gadgets developed for espionage? Then to find out someone was stalking you online and following you around without your knowledge after tracing your movement patterns? It is interesting that a culture excited about the prospect of excitement in the world of spying would be polling so low when it comes to the fact that they have become the stars of the latest spy thriller.
These questions come down to public trust. Public trust is low these days and while writing this book, it can be considered to be at an all time low. In recent Gallup polling, it is no wonder folks do not trust their governments – they are polling and showing results that public trust is a cause and effect based on how negatively the news is portraying governments involved in what they have been doing for a long time.
The news media is a large distributor of propaganda to sell products and gain views from those who are willing to view their products as seen in Figure 1.7. The term “spy” is used often to generate fear, probe those who distrust or are unsure, and question their privacy in a way to build paranoia to sell products. This doesn’t make what they are saying is untrue; however, it needs to be viewed in a way that is educating and not in a way that causes citizens to worry about their privacy, or in a way that causes them to fear everything and everyone around them.
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Figure 1.7 Newspaper headlines denoting spy activity.
That being said, let’s move away from the world of international spies and military covert operations and move into the day-to-day operations most of us live today – our personal lives. Public trust in each other and our neighbors, the people we work with, and our families and friends should not be rocked by government scandals and daily news stories on how your privacy is not safe. The truth is, your privacy may not be safe and it’s up to you to safeguard it. We will teach you how to do so in this book.
So why disclose this information to you in this chapter? To show you that spying is nothing new, nothing uncommon and seemingly done often without concern for the law. It’s mentioned to explain to you, the citizen, how you can protect yourself from spying at any level, how you can be spied on, and how you can better protect yourself from these actions.
Is paranoia breeding the growth of more surveillance? Today, people are setting up digital surveillance systems in their own homes, businesses, and elsewhere for safety and security. As we will learn in this chapter, there are those who can access those systems to spy on you.
Consider the following. You are worried about your own safety so you get a digital surveillance system to protect your home, business, or other property. The first question to consider is, will you be monitoring this system yourself or will you hire a company to do it for you. There are many companies today who offer this service and Internet service providers (ISPs) are starting to offer it as a part of their Internet connectivity and digital TV packages.
An example of an entity monitoring your privacy for security reasons is seen in Figure 1.8.
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Figure 1.8 Companies performing surveillance.
Let’s say you do not personally own it; however, you get it as a service through your ISP. You need to understand that other people are maintaining it, monitoring it. How can you trust them? How can you ensure that your private life is not being watched by someone you do not trust? What happens to that trust when the entities monitoring your cameras have a security breach? These questions are hypothetical to build critical thinking among you and your family to consider, for each benefit there could be a consequence.

Cybercrime

So now that we covered government and military, what about the local and the state laws against criminal behavior. Can you be stalked online and charged with a crime? Obviously, it’s hard to charge an entire government that has been given carte blanche to “spy” in order to keep the public safe, what about the public itself?
Cybercrime is crimes committed using a computer and/or a computer on a network. It’s a simple definition; however, there are many considerations such as does it take place on workplace computers? Over the Internet? Does it take place using e-mail, mobile phones, or within chat-rooms owned by a service provider?
This becomes important because if someone is caught spying and it’s over the Internet from another country, how is the crime prosecuted? It can be conducted over the public Internet that then makes it cross-border crimes since it touches the global landscape. For an example of the size and scope of cybercrime activities, please refer to the chart as seen in Figure 1.9.
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Figure 1.9 Cybercrime activity.
What is important to consider is that these are in fact crimes and because of that, there is a process involved. Criminal activity if caught must follow specific protocols operating within the realm of law. After these crimes have been committed, normally digital forensics are used to substantiate the evidence brought to trial, as industry experts comb over the computers, phones, and networks to preserve evidence and bring it within the court of law.
As we mentioned earlier, espionage can also be considered a major cybercrime. This ties into the motivations those have to conduct cybercrimes … a major one would be financial theft, another identity theft. So why would someone do these things? What are their motivations?

Why Spy? Motivation

At a bigger level, we mentioned why organizations, governments, and militaries spy. Although we do not cover the details of all computer-related crimes, we do cover some of them here so you can understand that stalking someone online is no different than stalking someone at a public location. We do cover spying in general so that we can teach you how to protect yourself overall; the best way to understand how to protect against someone wishing and willing to do you harm is to understand why they want to do such a thing.
At a macrolevel, reconnaissance and surveillance are performed by the government agencies and the military for security and safety reasons, to gain tactical advantage and to thwart terrorism. The reasons why people spy on the microlevel are many; however, to create a small list of some of the most common reasons, you will find that whether at the macro or microlevel, leverage, advantage, and gain are some of the most common threads that bind any reasoning to any who spy.
Consider a couple divorcing and is in the middle of a legal custody and financial battle. You have heard it before, to gain advantage in the court (tactical advantage), one of the injured parties may request the assistance of a private investigator (PI) to “spy” on the other to learn of their activities. Those activities if shown to shed light in an unfavorable manner in the court may give the other party leverage.
Consider a small business opening up near another business of the same kind and the two entrepreneurs visiting each other’s establishment in order to gain competitive advantage. Of course, they do so without each other knowing who they are. Taking this into the digital realm, these same entrepreneurs visit each other’s web properties to perform the same tasks. Consider that one of these parties chooses to deface, discredit, or defraud the other in hopes of injuring their reputation.
Consider someone who realizes that their spouse is looking through their phone when they are not around to see what they are up to, who they are talking to, what sites they have been to, and what their e-mail content is.
Consider an author publishing a new book that directly competes with a title of similar content and launches a smear campaign using the comments section of the site in which it’s sold to discredit the title.
Consider a high school student who is consistently picked on (bullied) and only way to get back at those who are conducting these actions launches a cybercrime against the perpetrators, for example, hacks into and defaces their public Twitter page.
What if an ex-boyfriend wanted to stalk an ex-girlfriend and posed as someone else on Facebook to track, monitor, and interact with her? Facebook and other social media site as seen in Figure 1.10 are a large source of controversy today in regard to privacy. These sites are easily used to provide portals into private lives and give those who use them for the wrong reason to track you, find out where you live, when you take a vacation, and where you work.
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Figure 1.10 Social media concerns.
At a more microlevel, an individual can spy to learn more about another person. For example, if someone you worked with wanted to get to know more about you … instead of just asking you or trying to get to know you, they search for you online in a search engine.
The motivations are endless, they are many. Legal reasons, divorce, leverage, financial, theft, revenge … the list goes on and on. This is why people may decide to conduct their own investigations on others, why they would consider spying on others. Make no mistake; however, most of these activities are spying and many of them may be considered a cybercrime.

What Is to Gain? Reward

When someone spies it’s always to achieve a specific goal. Whether the goal is to learn information, take photos, or document activities, this is where spying and actual crime can become a challenge to define. It is easy to understand if you split the two into two separate activities. Surveillance is conducted to gather information about individuals, organizations, businesses, and infrastructure. It may be gathered in order to commit an act of terrorism or other crime. At both the macro and microlevel, there is much to gain. There are massive rewards.
In the United States, the banking and finance sector accounts for more than 8% of the annual gross domestic product and can be considered one of the major arteries of the entire world economy. Spying on these targets at any level to produce information to sell or to produce intelligence for a digital attack can be extremely rewarding.
At the microlevel, gains can be just as rewarding to those who wish to do wrong. For example, you want to find out if your neighbor’s wireless is open for use so you do not have to pay for yours. You do some reconnaissance work and scan the area to find a signal. You attach to the wireless Service Set Identifier and bypass the password configured. Later, you find that you are able to attach to the main network and connect to their in-home video surveillance security system. Some would think that being able to watch their neighbors unsuspected would be a reward.
In another example, pictures were scoured off the Internet from young girls taking “selfies” that provided their location (possibly home address) within the metadata of the picture. This enabled those who wish to do wrong the ability to track and possibly stalk these girls.
As you can see, there is much to gain especially by those with ill-conceived notions. That’s where the possible crimes take place and afterward, the investigations into those crimes possibly as part of a case in the court of law.

Digital Forensics

Digital forensics is considered the investigation work done after a crime is committed on digital devices and networks. Although we have only described a small handful of possible crimes that can take place in the cyberworld, it’s important to understand for the purpose of this chapter that as you commit cybercrimes, they can be detected, thwarted, and brought into the court of law. For example, if you wanted to use an application to track someone using their phone, if that phone winds up in the hands of a digital forensic analyst, it’s likely that they will be able to produce that software and show the cyberattack in detail in the court of law.
Digital forensics can be used for surveillance as well. As we will learn, some of the data gathered from your devices memory, logs, and storage devices can be very revealing. These items can disclose where you have been online, sometimes where you have been physically, what you have done, what you have said, and what you have stored, and give those who are performing surveillance a bird’s eye view into your digital behaviors. An example of the amount of storage devices that data can be gleaned from is seen in Figure 1.11.
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Figure 1.11 Portable storage devices.
These same digital devices can be brought inconspicuously into your home or business and data from your devices can be transferred onto them without your knowledge.
One thing to note is that digital forensics can recover for the investigative purposes almost anything on a computer or network system as long as it has not been tampered with. For example, information kept in memory may be lost if the device is turned off. Although a major discussion on forensic science falls outside the scope of this book, we will in fact cover forensic specifics throughout the book when discussing relevant topics.

Who spies?

We covered the nuts and bolts of why reconnaissance and surveillance takes place. We discussed the legal aspects of it; however, before we end this chapter and move into the details of how it is conducted, we should take a close look at those who spy and specifically, if they are doing it for the right or wrong reasons.
Who spies? It’s easy to just say “everyone” at some level because of human nature and how people can be curious; however, we will break down key categories so that you can understand not only who, but why. A good saying is “Curiosity killed the cat”. Its human nature to take interest in things they want to know or learn about; however, ethically there are boundaries.
The government spies in the name of national security. The military will spy to conduct covert operations.
Organizations spy to gain competitive advantage. The public spies for many reasons to include harmless curiosity all the way to conducting major crimes.
One topic we did not cover is the list of diverse professionals who work within the digital realm to conduct investigations, surveillance, and reconnaissance work on a daily basis. We just recently covered the legal aspects of conducting surveillance work and touched on the role of PI; however, there are many other roles that conduct surveillance work, investigation work, and not all of them are “bad guys.” Some of them are and we will cover the distinctions throughout the book when we delve into the actual “how” it’s done; however, to start, lets take some time to review the professionals today who conduct digital surveillance and reconnaissance work and the reasons they do.

Professional Roles

Digital surveillance and reconnaissance is conducted by many. As we have discussed earlier, the military, the government, your neighbor, and your co-worker may for some reason or another, wish to gather data or intelligence on another or another entity for specific or even no-specific reasons.
There are those, however, who work professionally in the field. These professionals are also experts in working in the digital realm or technology. Digital forensics, cybercrime investigators, penetration testers, and law enforcement specialists are only but a few of the diverse offerings within the field of digital security.
What we will not cover here that we have already discussed in this chapter are military and government agents who conduct reconnaissance and surveillance work for gathering intelligence.

Hackers (White, Gray, and Black)

One of the biggest threats today in the digital world is the “Hacker,” who traditionally manipulated your computer, mobile, and video systems so that they could tamper with them, gain access, or acquire information from them. These same folks were able to create malware (malicious software) to perform these same functions; however, some of these programs were able to track your activities, impersonate you, and or steal your identity. What a hacker does is broad; however, it needs to be understood that the malicious form of the term hacker has been rebranded.
Black hat hacker’s are those who wish to do harm, are malicious or operate in an unethical manner. White hats are considered to be hackers who are non-malicious. White hats are generally computer system experts who work in the security field to find problems with systems that their malicious counterparts would look to expose for financial reasons, leverage, or simply for fun. Gray hats are said to cross both black and white boundaries and generally will not be overly malicious.
There is a reason you need to understand why these types of experts spy; they spy to gain something and unfortunately since they may happen upon your computer system with your personal information stored, they may collect it for their own personal use or to sell for a profit. They may attach to your systems without your knowledge and conduct their operations in a clandestine manner in which you may not detect.

Digital Forensics Examiner

As we discussed earlier when covering the world of digital forensics, there is much to be gleaned from digital devices and most, if not all, activity can be found and brought into a court of law to bolster a case as evidence. Unfortunately, if you are the malicious party, it’s likely that you will have all of your activity presented unless you masterfully know how to cover your tracks and/or dispose of evidence correctly.
These experts are often brought in to testify as experts in their field and present evidence in the form of data, logs, and provable activity. Digital forensic examiners use special tools and software (Encase is one of the most commonly used) to scour a computer system or device in order to find data and, as long as the crime scene or evidence is untampered with, can be used to show all activity of those using such systems and devices.

Cyber Intelligence Analyst

Intelligence agents (or analysts) are those who work in the Intelligence field and typically are employed by military and government agencies. When Intelligence is gathered on a target, these individuals or teams review and assist with the activities revolving around building cases, fighting crime, stopping malicious activities from taking place, and more.
These experts work on cybercrime cases and assist with the analysis of the data collected. For example, if a Virus was used to steal government data, these intelligence experts may work with developers, companies, other software teams, and so on to assist with reviewing the findings and assisting them with the stopping of the criminal behavior taking place.

Cyber Security Engineer

Security engineers (or analysts, in general) work within the field of information technology security and typically assist with the design and assembly of digital computer security systems. For example, they may be firewall, intrusion detection/prevention system experts who understand access control, authentication, and accounting in depth.
In regard to surveillance and spying of and on systems and people using systems, these experts are those who are in charge with building and engineering systems that offer security to prevent unauthorized access to private networks, computers, and systems.

Penetration Tester

Penetration testers (or pen tester for short) are charged with testing access of systems that have already been engineered. These experts verify that access cannot be gained, and if it is, they provide reports on what needs to be fixed. It would be extremely difficult to spy on a home through their video cameras if this weakness was considered, tested, and then locked down post test.
They use software such as Backtrack, Nessus, and others to verify that access cannot be gained unless permitted and exposure is limited. They mitigate the possibility of problems taking place by exposing that they are problems to begin with and give such findings to those charged with locking open holes down. They are also highly employed by those looking to ensure that systems and networks that are to be and remain compliant are in fact configured correctly to be compliant to policy.

Private Investigator

Private investigation is a form of surveillance work. We discuss it here in this section of this chapter coincidentally; it’s a common form of work performed to gather information on a target. Private investigation is a trade where trained professionals conduct surveillance work for clients as per request.
A PI is a professional who performs investigations. Although we have touched on this topic throughout the chapter, PI’s are responsible for conducting private investigation for those who request their services. They often conduct surveillance activities for those who hire them and can be considered a private detective conducting investigations for criminal cases, civil cases, and for collection of evidence. Sometimes referred to as a private eye, these professionals commonly work for attorneys who need to collect evidences to support legal cases.
They can (and often are) hired to spy on individuals to bolster cases with documented evidence commonly produced by video and camera footage (Figure 1.12). Today, professionals undergoing these work activities are generally licensed to do so and operate within ethical standards.
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Figure 1.12 Private investigation.

Law Enforcement

Law enforcement professionals (such as police, agents, and detectives) are commonly used to conduct and/or stop surveillance activities. If a crime is suspected, for example, detectives may be called in to open a case and start to collect and review evidence. To do so, these experts must at times do reconnaissance and surveillance work in order to build cases and report on them, and/or use such evidence in the court of law.

Legal and ethical principles

Until now, we have talked about a lot of scary stuff and how it relates to the court of law; however, there are many factors to consider when it comes to digital spying when brought in front of a judge. We know what experts are counted on to bolster cases and we know the types of malicious characters who may be committing crimes. We now know that there is a blurry line separating government and public activities and some of the legislature created to create clearer lines to follow.
To close this chapter, we should discuss legal and ethical principles revolving around surveillance activities. In the remaining of this book, we will cover surveillance at a more personal level; however, it’s important to understand that for those committing spying and stalking crimes (for example), there could be a punishment. As easily as it may be to use the digital landscape to conduct your crime, it’s as easy to gather the evidence of it happening.

Ethics

Ethically you should not use any of the information learned in this book to conduct a crime. It is here for one purpose, awareness. The goal of this book is to help security professionals in the field and/or the typical citizen remain aware of digital surveillance issues taking place today and to assist those parties with providing a way to be aware of them, mitigate them, and protect against it. It is by no means a book that shows someone with a vengeful heart a way to conduct such unlawful activities.
Ethically, you should always consider that there are those with ill intentions out in the world and you should learn how to protect yourself against them, not become one of them. You should also consider that since you are protected by laws, so if you do suspect you are a victim, you should not retaliate or counterattack. This behavior is not only counterproductive and inflammatory but also could be illegal and used against you.

The Law

With the growing digital landscape, cybercrime has grown just as quickly as the networks, systems, and applications have. Because of this, legally, lines have been blurred as cyberlaw has attempted to keep up. Cyberlaw is the cyber-based legal dealings of any legal issues and actions that take place in the digital world. The reason why this is critically so important to consider is that if you become a victim of cybercrime, what is your recourse? Also, if you are thinking of committing a cybercrime, think again – the police, FBI, and other federal intelligence groups are keeping an eye open and are armed with evidence collection methods, laws, and safeguards to protect and serve the innocent.
Some of the most common issues that raise questions in the court of law is, how does the Internet fall into jurisdiction issues? What about privacy rights? In our attempts to answer these questions, we will review a cybercrime case to show how cyberlaw works and how those who fall victim can be protected and those who perpetrate crimes can be held accountable. In some cases, such as that of Alexis Pilkington (New York) who committed suicide allegedly from cyberbullying, the crimes perpetrated could lead to death.

Surveillance and Cybercrime Sample Law

In the next section, we will review a case where the United States and Erik Bowker had their day in court. On September 25, 2001, Bowker was charged with one count of interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1); one count of cyberstalking, in violation of 18U.S.C. § 2261A(2); one count of theft of mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708; and one count of telephone harassment, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). On June 6, 2002, a jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges. The government moved for an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines based on the victim’s extreme psychological harm. On September 10, 2002, the district court sentenced Bowker to 96 months incarceration, 3 years supervised release, and a $400 special assessment. In assessing the term of incarceration, the district court granted the government’s motion for an upward departure.
Count1 (interstate stalking)[1], Count 2 (cyberstalking)[2], and Count 4 (telephone harassment)[3] track the language of the relevant statutes. Count 1 alleges that between July 10 and July 30, 2001, Bowker knowingly and intentionally traveled across the Ohio state line with the intent to injure, harass, and intimidate Tina Knight, and as a result of such travel placed Knight in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1). Count 2 alleges that between December 25, 2000 and August 18, 2001 Bowker, located in Ohio, knowingly and repeatedly used the Internet to engage in a course of conduct that intentionally placed Knight, then located in West Virginia, in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). Count 4 alleges that between June 12, 2001 and August 27, 2001, Bowker, located in Ohio, knowingly made telephone calls, whether or not conversation or communication ensued, without disclosing his identity and with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, and harass Knight, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). Because the indictment stated all of the statutory elements of the offenses, and because the relevant statutes state the elements unambiguously, the district court properly denied Bowker’s motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 4 of the indictment. The indictment’s reference to the specific dates and locations of the offenses, as well as the means used to carry them out (travel, Internet, telephone), provided Bowker fair notice of the conduct with which he was being charged.
We hold that the above-described facts amply justified the district court’s upward departure determination. Cf. United States v. Otto, 64 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1995) (affirming upward departure where stalking victim lived in constant fear for herself and for her children and was always on the lookout for the defendant; could not eat or sleep; lost weight; required counseling; and feared the defendant’s ultimate release); United States v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1993) (affirming upward departure after the defendant had engaged in a 3-year campaign of harassment; noting that the victim had been afraid to answer the telephone or open her mail for 3 years; was afraid to remain in the New York area; and believed that the years of harassment had hastened her husband’s demise).
372 F.3d 365 (2004)
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Erik BOWKER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-4086.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Submitted: March 10, 2004.
Decided and Filed: June 11, 2004.
366*366 367*367 368*368 369*369 370*370 Edward F. Feran (briefed), Assistant United States Attorney, Cleveland, OH, for Appellee.
Jay Milano (briefed), Milano & Co., Rocky River, OH, for Appellant.
Before MARTIN and CLAY, Circuit Judges; MILLS, District Judge.[*]

Opinion

CLAY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Erik S. Bowker appeals his convictions and sentence for one count of interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1); one count of cyberstalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2); one count of theft of mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708; and one count of telephone harassment, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). Bowker also appeals the district court’s failure to rule on his motion to return seized property and the district court’s enhancement of his sentence based on extreme psychological harm to the victim. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM Bowker’s convictions and sentence, but REMAND to the district court for a ruling on Bowker’s motion to return seized property.

I. Facts

A. Procedural History

On August 28, 2001, United States Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert signed a criminal complaint charging Erik. S. Bowker (“Bowker”) with one count of telephone harassment in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). Bowker was arrested on August 29, 2001. On September 7, 2001, the magistrate judge held a preliminary examination and detention hearing for Bowker. The magistrate judge determined that probable cause for Bowker’s arrest had been established, and he ordered Bowker detained.
On September 25, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a four-count indictment against Bowker. Bowker was charged with one count of interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1); one count of cyberstalking, in violation of 18U.S.C. § 2261A(2); one count of theft of mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708; and one count of telephone harassment, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C).
371*371 Bowker filed several pretrial motions which are the subject of this appeal – a pro se motion to represent himself, a motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 4 of the indictment, a motion to sever Count 3 from the indictment, a motion to suppress evidence, and a pro se motion for return of seized property and items, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court denied all of the foregoing motions, except for the motion to return seized property, on which the district court never ruled. On March 26, 2002, after the denial of Bowker’s pro se motion to represent himself, Bowker’s counsel moved to withdraw from the case, and Bowker signed a separate statement asking the court to grant the motion and assign him new counsel. The district court granted the motion and assigned Bowker new counsel.
Bowker’s jury trial commenced on June 3, 2002. On June 6, 2002, the jury returned verdicts of guilty against Bowker on all counts. On September 5, 2002, the government moved for an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines based on the victim’s extreme psychological harm. On September 10, 2002, the district court sentenced Bowker to 96 months’ incarceration, three years of supervised release, and a $400 special assessment. In assessing the term of incarceration, the district court granted the government’s motion for an upward departure.

B. Substantive Facts

In March, 2000, Tina Knight began working as a part-time general assignment reporter at WKBN Television in Youngstown, Ohio. WKBN has a general email account for most employees, and in June, 2000, WKBN received a number of emails relating to Knight. The emails were sent from several different email addresses and purported to be from an individual variously identified as “User x,” Eric Neubauer, Karen Walters, and “BB.” Several of the emails attached photographs with verbal captions. One caption referred to Knight being shot with a pellet gun, and another email said, “Thanks for my daily Tina Knight fix. Thanks for helping me get my nuts off,” and another said “More Tina Knight, that is what I want and need.” After receiving approximately nine of these types of email, WKBN’s news director took them to the station’s general manager. They then contacted Special Agent Deane Hassman of the FBI. Soon thereafter, Knight was shown the emails, and she was stunned and frightened.
FBI Agent Hassman began investigating the Tina Knight emails in July, 2000. Hassman was concerned about Knight’s personal safety based on the content of the emails. One of the emails that concerned Hassman stated, “I’m not the type of obsessed viewer that hides in the bushes near your home to watch you come home from work, but we shall see. That may actually be fun.” Another disturbing email stated, in part, “Dear Ms. Knight. Now I’m really pissed that you were looking even cuter than normally. You fucked up a little bit and here I am watching on this black and white thrift store TV. Cute, cute, cute. I bet you were a Ho at Ohio University in Athens, doing chicks and everything. Wow.”
On July 25, 2000, Hassman sent emails to the various email addresses on the correspondence pertaining to Knight. Hassman asked the sender of the emails to contact him so that he could determine the sender’s intent. Within 24 to 48 hours, Hassman received a telephone call from an individual who identified himself as Erik Bowker. Hassman wanted to set up a meeting with Bowker so Hassman could positively identify the sender of the emails and also ask him to cease and desist from 372*372 contacting Knight. They arranged to meet at the public library in Youngstown, but Bowker never showed.
A few weeks later, Knight began receiving hand-written notes at WKBN, the majority of which were signed by “Doug Wagner.” By September, the letters were arriving at the station almost every couple of days. One of the letters included the phrase, “All this week I will be playing the role of Doug Wagner.” A letter dated August 9, 2000 was signed “Chad Felton”; stated, “I think you are a super babe”; and included a necklace. The return addresses on the letters were one of two P.O. Boxes registered to Erik Bowker or his mother.
Knight left her employment at WKBN in November, 2000 to take a position at WOWK CBS13 in Charleston, West Virginia. WKBN did not inform the general public of Knight’s new location.
In late December, 2000, Knight’s parents, who reside in Medina, Ohio, received a card and a handwritten note at their home. The card purported to be from “Kathryn Harris.” The letter read, “Dear Tina Knight: I am Kathryn Harris today. I didn’t want your parents asking you a lot of questions, nor did I want to attract a lot of attention to you. My letters to you are all online at yahoo.com in a standard mail account. It is all explained there so please check in and read what I have written…. The E-mail address is [email protected].” Agent Hassman visited the email address to check if any letters had been sent to the email address mentioned in the letter. Hassman discovered that an email had been sent December 25, 2000. At the end of the email, the name “Doug Wagner” was typed. The email read, in part, “I told you I would not contact you by mail anymore but I am sorry, I am in agony. I’m thinking about you all the time. You really are my dream girl…. I am blinded with affection for you. I did not ask for this. Nope, it’s all your fault…. Please don’t cat dance on my emotions by failing to respond to me at all.”
In February, 2001, Bowker filed a lawsuit against Knight in the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court. Knight’s social security number was stated in the complaint, which was served at Knight’s home address in West Virginia. Bowker’s lawsuit accused Knight of stalking him. Agent Hassman attended a status conference for the lawsuit on March 16, 2001, so that he could make face-to-face contact with Bowker. After meeting Bowker at the hearing and confirming that Bowker had been sending the unsolicited correspondence to Knight, Hassman told Bowker that the correspondence was unwelcome and might be a violation of federal law. Hassman advised Bowker that if the conduct continued, it might result in his arrest. Bowker responded that he had a First Amendment right to engage in that type of conduct. Nevertheless, during the meeting, Bowker wrote and signed a note stating, “I understand that Tina M. Knight wishes all further contact with her or any family member to stop and I agree to do so, pursuant to conversation with Deane Hassman, special agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation….” Bowker also agreed to voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit against Knight.
Despite Bowker’s March, 16, 2001 agreement to cease and desist from any further contact with Knight, on that very same day, Bowker mailed a letter to Knight. Bowker also continued to attempt telephone contact with Knight. Between January 26 and August 29, 2001, Bowker made 146 telephone calls from his cell phone to WOWK CBS 13, where Knight worked. Bowker also made 16 calls to Knight’s personal residential telephone in 373*373 West Virginia between August 11 and 28, 2001. Knight’s number was unlisted and unpublished. According to telephone records, each of the 16 calls placed to Knight’s home were preceded by *67, which enables a caller to block identification of his telephone number on the recipient’s caller identification display. Bowker also called Knight’s co-worker and a neighbor.
As the telephone calls to Knight’s television station persisted through the summer of 2001, Agent Hassman believed it was important to capture Bowker’s voice on tape, so Hassman provided Knight with a recording device at the television station. On June 12, 2001, Knight recorded a 45 minute telephone call from Bowker who, at one point, identified himself as “Mike.” During the conversation, Bowker referred to Knight’s neighbors, her family members and her social security number. He also indicated he might be watching Knight with his binoculars. Knight provided the tape to the FBI and never spoke to Bowker again on the telephone.
On July 16, 2001, Knight received a letter at the television station. In the letter, Bowker referred to Knight’s parents and stated several times, “You do not hang up on me.” The letter also crassly referred to Knight’s car, threatened to file a mechanic’s lien on her car and her co-worker’s car, accused Knight and her colleague of being “fuck-ups, assholes and seriously emotional and mentally unbalanced,” and contained numerous sexual references. The letter stated that Bowker would be contacting Knight’s neighbors, pointed out that Knight had not registered her car in West Virginia, and concluded with the words, “So bye-by, fuck you, you are an asshole and a sociopath and an embarrassment to mothers everywhere sir…. Adios, Eric…. Smooch, Smooch.”
On August 10, 2001, Knight received a certified letter mailed to her residence in West Virginia. Accompanying the letter were numerous photographs of Bowker at various locations in West Virginia, Knight’s home state. The letter stated, in part, “Send me an E-Mail address. It keeps me long distance, you know what I mean.” Knight forwarded the letter and the photographs to the FBI. Bowker’s credit card statement later revealed purchases from a Kmart and a Kroger near Knight’s place of employment and residence in West Virginia between June 12 and July 30, 2001.
In August 2001, Bowker left a series of messages on Knight’s answering machine asking that Knight or Knight’s friend call him back, which did not occur. Among other things, Bowker stated:
I don’t even know why I’m nice to you ever at all, you and your fucked-up friend should not even be working in the media. You know you gotta mother-fucking realize there’s like 50 percent men in this country and you better mother-fucking learn that you’re going to have to deal with us sometime….
Well, it looks like nobody is going to answer me if Tina Knight is okay, so I’m gonna take the 1:00 a.m. bus out of Columbus, Ohio and come down there and see for myself. Okay, I’ll be there about 6:00 a.m. Bye.
Knight testified that these messages made her afraid to leave the house everyday, and she feared that Bowker might try to rape her. She gave the answering machine recordings to the FBI.
Bowker was arrested on August 29, 2001 at a self-storage facility in Youngstown where he kept some of his possessions. Among other things recovered from the storage facility, Bowker’s car and other locations, were a police scanner set to the frequency of the Youngstown Police Department, 374*374 a paper with scanner frequencies from the Dunbar, West Virginia Police Department, letters bearing the name “Chad Felton,” a credit report for Tina Knight, Knight’s birth certificate, a map of Dunbar, West Virginia, Greyhound bus schedules with West Virginia routes, and photos taken by Bowker during a West Virignia trip on July 11, 2001, which included pictures of Knight’s place of work, her car and CBS news trucks. The FBI also discovered that Bowker had in his possession a Discover Card credit card bill addressed to Tina Knight in West Virginia. Knight never received that statement in the mail.

II. Probable Cause for Bowker’s Arrest

Bowker argues that the magistrate judge erroneously found that there was probable cause to issue a warrant for his arrest premised on an alleged violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), which prohibits telephone harassment. He further argues that trial court committed the same error when it denied Bowker’s motion to suppress evidence obtained through the arrest warrant. We reject Bowker’s arguments for the reasons stated below.

A. Standard of Review

The Court considers the evidence that the warrant-issuing magistrate judge had before him only to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 973 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). The Court defers to findings of probable cause made by a magistrate, and will not set aside such findings unless they were arbitrarily made. United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 477, 484 (6th Cir.1998). When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, the Court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Id.

B. Analysis

At the preliminary hearing, the government brought a one-count criminal complaint against Bowker for the crime of telephone harassment, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). That section provides for a fine, imprisonment, or both for anyone, who in interstate or foreign communications:
makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number or who receives the communications.
47 U.S.C.A. § 223. Incorporated into the criminal complaint was the affidavit of FBI Agent Deane Hassman, who alleged that Bowker had made numerous telephone calls to Tina Knight in which Bowker did not identify himself, including a conversation with Knight on June 12, 2001, and messages left on Knight’s answering machine on August 17-19 and 25-26, 2001. Agent Hassman’s affidavit also provided extensive background details on Bowker’s campaign of harassment against Knight via emails, letters and telephone calls.
Bowker concedes that the magistrate judge could have found probable cause on the elements of using the telephone with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass. He argues, however, that the magistrate had no basis to find the element of failing to disclose identity during the telephone calls because Knight, the recipient of those calls, allegedly recognized his voice, making it unnecessary for him to state his name. See J.A. 581 (testimony 375*375 of Agent Hassman: “There came a point in time where Tina [Knight] began to recognize a certain voice on the phone, which she believed to be Eric [sic] Bowker.”). Bowker points to the fact that during the June 12, 2001 telephone conversation with Knight, she referred to Bowker as “Eric” [sic].
Bowker’s argument is flawed in several respects. His argument does not address the numerous occasions when Bowker called Knight and no conversation ensued and no messages were left or her answering machine. The evidence before the magistrate showed that Bowker used a caller identification blocking feature (*67) to place these calls, thereby concealing his identity. Since the telephone harassment law prohibits calls made with the intent to harass or annoy “whether or not conversation or communication ensues,” there was probable cause to find that Bowker had concealed his identity in those instances. Knight’s alleged ability to identify Bowker’s voice was irrelevant.
Bowker responds that his use of the *67 feature should be legally irrelevant, since it penalizes him for placing telephone calls to numbers with a caller identification service. He contends that criminal liability should not hinge on what telephone features a person pays for each month to the local phone company. Bowker, however, is not being penalized based on the telephone features to which his victim subscribed, but for using the *67 feature in conjunction with his intent to annoy or harass Knight. Had he lacked that intent, no criminal liability would have attached.
Even assuming that Knight was able to identify Bowker’s voice, the magistrate judge properly found probable cause to believe that Bowker had not disclosed his identity during the June 12, 2001 conversation in which he mis-identified himself as “Mike” and in August, 2001, when he left messages on Knight’s answering machine without providing any name at all. On its face, the telephone harassment statute makes it illegal to place a call, with the intent to annoy, abuse threaten or harass, whenever the caller fails to identify himself. Since Bowker concedes that the magistrate judge could have found probable cause that he had the requisite intent, it was Bowker’s provision of a false name and/or his failure to identify himself – not an erroneous judicial determination about the victim’s recognition of his voice – that led to the issuance of his arrest warrant.
Bowker similarly argues that the district court, which supervised the trial proceedings, erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence derived from his arrest for telephone harassment. In addition to his argument that the evidence did not support a finding of probable cause to believe that Bowker had failed to disclose his identity (discussed above), Bowker argues that the district court erred in ruling that FBI agent Hassman did not intentionally mislead or omit crucial material facts in his affidavit supporting probable cause. Bowker argues that he showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, materially false representations and omissions by Agent Hassman, and that absent those misrepresentations, probable cause would not have been found.
To prevail on a motion to suppress based on allegations of intentional misrepresentation by a law enforcement officer in the course of obtaining an arrest warrant, Bowker must establish (1) the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard “by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence” and (2) “with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, [such that] the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search’ suppressed.” United 376*376 States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). Bowker has not established that Agent Hassman perjured himself in his affidavit in support of the criminal complaint or at the suppression hearing. At most, he quibbles with Hassman’s characterization of Bowker’s letters and emails as sexual and threatening. Hassman’s characterization, however, largely is a matter of opinion, and the content of Bowker’s communications speak for themselves. Thus, there is no indication that the magistrate judge was misled in reaching its probable cause finding. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Bowker’s motion to suppress evidence.

III. Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2 and 4 of the Indictment

Bowker argues that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Counts 1 (interstate stalking), 2 (cyberstalking) and 4 (telephone harassment) of the indictment on the ground that the indictment inadequately alleged the elements of the offenses charged, and on the ground that the statutes that the indictment alleged he violated are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. United States v. Maney, 226 F.3d 660, 663 (6th Cir.2000). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the district court.

A. Sufficiency of the Indictment

Under the Notice Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In addition, the Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that a defendant be charged with only those charges brought before the grand jury. U.S. Const. amend. V. An indictment satisfies these constitutional requirements “if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Maney, 226 F.3d at 663 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1478-79 (6th Cir.1991)). “To be legally sufficient, the indictment must assert facts which in law constitute an offense; and which, if proved, would establish prima facie the defendant’s commission of that crime.” Id. (quoting United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 177 (6th Cir.1992)).
“An indictment is usually sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.” United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1079 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887; United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 388 (1997)). The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that while “the language of the statute may be used in the general description of the offense, ….it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117-18, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).“ ‘Courts utilize a common sense construction in determining whether an indictment sufficiently informs a defendant of an offense.’ Maney, 226 F.3d at 377*377 663 (quoting Allen v. United States, 867 F.2d 969, 971 (6th Cir.1989)).
Count1 (interstate stalking)[1], Count 2 (cyberstalking)[2] and Count 4 (telephone harassment)[3] track the language of the relevant statutes. Count 1 alleges that, between July 10 and July 30, 2001, Bowker knowingly and intentionally traveled across the Ohio state line with the intent to injure, harass, and intimidate Tina Knight, and as a result of such travel placed Knight in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1). Count 2 alleges that between December 25, 2000 and August 18, 2001 Bowker, located in Ohio, knowingly and repeatedly used the internet to engage in a course of conduct that intentionally placed Knight, then located in West Virginia, in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). Count 4 alleges that between June 12, 2001, and August 27, 2001, Bowker, located in Ohio, knowingly made telephone calls, whether or not conversation or communication ensued, without disclosing his identity and with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten and harass Knight, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). Because the indictment stated all of the statutory elements of the offenses, and because the relevant statutes state the elements unambiguously, the district court properly denied Bowker’s motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2 and 4 of the indictment. The indictment’s reference to the specific dates and locations of the offenses, as well as the means used to carry them out (travel, internet, telephone), provided Bowker fair notice of the conduct with which he was being charged.
Relying on the Landham case, supra, Bowker argues that the indictment was defective because it does not charge him with making direct threats against Knight and therefore should have contained a statement of facts and circumstances surrounding 378*378 the alleged indirect threats he made against her, such as an explanation of the parties’ relationship. See Landham, 251 F.3d at 1080 (holding “because the alleged threatening statement must be viewed from the objective perspective of the recipient, which frequently involves the context of the parties’ relationship…., it is incumbent on the Government to make that context clear in such an indictment, unless the alleged threat is direct”).
Landham is distinguishable, however. There, the Court held that the indictment failed to sufficiently allege a kidnaping threat because the indictment was missing several elements of the offense, specifically, a communication containing a threat and a threat to kidnap. Id. at 1082. The indictment failed to acknowledge that the defendant had been in a custody battle with his ex-wife over their daughter and, therefore, the defendant’s obscure statements like “I’m going to get her” were either unreasonably perceived to be kidnaping threats and, even if the alleged threat had been carried out, it would not have constituted a crime as a matter of substantive law. Id. at 1081-83. The Court further held that the indictment failed to sufficiently allege a threat of bodily harm, because the statement charged in the indictment referred to past conduct of the defendant, not present or future conduct, and, in any event, did not mention a threat to inflict bodily harm. Id. at 1082-83. Bowker’s indictment, by contrast, did not contain similar deficiencies. All of the statutory elements of the prohibited conduct were properly alleged, including the intent to cause a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm. And unlike the parties involved in Landham, whose custody battle was highly relevant to the charged conduct, Bowker’s relationship with Knight had no relevant bearing on the alleged illegality of his conduct. We therefore reject Bowker’s challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment.

B. Overbreadth Challenge

According to the Supreme Court, imprecise laws can be attacked on their face under two different doctrines – overbreadth and vagueness. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). The “overbreadth doctrine is a limited exception to the traditional standing rule that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the basis that it may conceivably be applied in an unconstitutional manner to others not before the court.” Staley v. Jones, 239 F.3d 769, 784 (6th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). However, “overbreadth scrutiny diminishes as the behavior regulated by the statute moves from pure speech toward harmful, unprotected conduct.” Id. at 785. “‘[P]articularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)).
Bowker has provided absolutely no argument as to how 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, which prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking, is facially overbroad, merely asserting that the statute “reaches large amounts of protected speech and conduct” and “potentially targets political or religious speech.” We fail to see how a law that prohibits interstate travel with the intent to kill, injure, harass or intimidate has a substantial sweep of constitutionally protected conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1). The same is true with respect to the prohibition of intentionally using the internet in a course of conduct that places a person in reasonable fear of death or seriously bodily 379*379 injury. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). It is difficult to imagine what constitutionally-protected political or religious speech would fall under these statutory prohibitions. Most, if not all, of these laws’ legal applications are to conduct that is not protected by the First Amendment. Thus, Bowker has failed to demonstrate how 18 U.S.C. § 2261A is substantially overbroad.
We also reject Bowker’s argument as to the purported overbreadth of the telephone harassment statute, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). Bowker relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971), which involved a city ordinance that made it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble on a sidewalk and to be “annoying” to passersby. Id. at 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686. The Court struck down the ordinance, reasoning that it was “unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.” Id. at 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686.
Coates is distinguishable. First, the focus of the telephone harassment statute is not simply annoying telephonic communications. It also prohibits abusive, threatening or harassing communications. Thus, the thrust of the statute is to prohibit communications intended to instill fear in the victim, not to provoke a discussion about political issues of the day. See United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir.1978) (holding that in enacting the telephone harassment statute, “Congress had a compelling interest in the protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse or annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives”) (citations omitted). Second, the telephone harassment statute operates in a distinctly different realm of communication than the ordinance in Coates, which governed the manner in which individuals could assemble and communicate in the open on public property. Persons who find sidewalk speech annoying usually are not being singled out by the speaker and, in any event, have the option of ignoring that speech by walking away or taking a different route. Because the sidewalk speaker is operating in the open, annoyed listeners have little reason to fear for their safety and can readily identify and confront the speaker if they so choose. Not so with individuals receiving unwelcome, anonymous telephone calls. Call recipients have to deal with much more inconvenience to avoid the speech (e.g., changing telephone numbers or using a call-screening service); these calls usually are targeted toward a particular victim and are received outside of a public forum (e.g., the home or the workplace); and, because the caller does not identify himself, the speech is more likely to instill fear in the listener and, at a minimum, makes it more difficult for the listener to confront the caller. Accordingly, the domain of prohibited speech is far more circumscribed, and the government’s interest in protecting recipients of the speech is far more compelling, under the telephone harassment statute compared to the city ordinance at issue in Coates.
We acknowledge that the telephone harassment statute, if interpreted to its semantic limits, may have unconstitutional applications. For example, if Bowker had been charged with placing anonymous telephone calls to a public official with the intent to annoy him or her about a political issue, the telephone harassment statute might have been unconstitutional as applied to him. See United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 677-78 (D.C.Cir.1999) (holding that telephone harassment statute was unconstitutional as applied to defendant who had placed seven calls to a U.S. Attorney 380*380 to complain about his treatment by the police and the prosecutor’s conduct of a case against him). But Bowker was not so charged. His calls were predominately, if not exclusively, for the purpose of invading his victim’s privacy and communicating express and implied threats of bodily harm. This type of speech is not constitutionally protected. Landham, 251 F.3d at 1080. But the fact that application of the telephone harassment statute may be unconstitutional in certain instances does not warrant facial invalidation. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (facial invalidation not appropriate when the remainder of the statute “covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct”); Staley, 239 F.3d at 786-87 (holding that “several examples of speech or expressive conduct that could conceivably be restricted under the statute” did not render anti-stalking statute unconstitutional). Whatever overbreadth exists in the statute “can be cured on a case-by-case basis.” Staley, 239 F.3d at 787 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16, 93 S.Ct. 2908). No cure is necessary in this case.

C. Vagueness Challenge

“[E]ven if an enactment does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.” Morales, 527 U.S. at 52, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). Vagueness may invalidate a criminal statute if it either (1)fails “to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits” or (2) authorizes or encourages “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 56, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (citing Kolender, 61 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855). “It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits….” Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03, 86 S.Ct. 518, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966).
The stalking and telephone harassment statutes charged in Bowker’s indictment provide sufficient notice of their respective prohibitions because citizens need not guess what terms such as “harass” and “intimidate” mean. This Court’s decision in Staley v. Jones, supra, is instructive. That case involved a habeas corpus review of a conviction for stalking under a Michigan law that defines stalking as “a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.411i(e). Michigan law defines “harassment” as “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” Id. § 750.411i(d). Expressly excluded from the definition of “harassment” is “constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.” Id. This Court rejected the petitioner’s vagueness challenge to the Michigan statute, reasoning as follows:
A person of reasonable intelligence would not need to guess at the meaning of the stalking statutes, nor would his interpretation of the statutory language differ with regard to the statutes’ application, 381*381 in part because the definitions of crucial words and phrases that are provided in the statutes are clear and would be understandable to a reasonable person reading the statute…. Also, the meaning of the words used to describe the conduct can be ascertained fairly by reference to judicial decisions, common law, dictionaries, and the words themselves because they possess a common and generally accepted meaning. We therefore conclude that the statutes are not void for vagueness on the basis of inadequate notice.
Staley, 239 F.3d at 791-92.
The Michigan prohibition against willful harassment that causes a reasonable person to feel fear is almost indistinguishable from the federal anti-stalking statute, 18U.S.C. § 2261A(1), which prohibits intentional harassment that causes a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. In fact, the federal statute arguably is less vague because it circumscribes the type of fear a victim must feel, namely a fear of death or serious bodily injury, whereas the Michigan law does not.
Bowker attempts to distinguish the Michigan statute by pointing to the fact that Michigan law defines the word “harassment,” whereas federal law does not. The harassment definition under Michigan law, however, contains nothing not already reflected in the federal statute’s general prohibition. The Michigan definition of harassment requires conduct directed toward a victim, but this requirement is implicitly reflected in the federal statute’s requirement that a perpetrator intend to harass a victim. Michigan’s harassment definition also requires that the conduct cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress, but the federal statute requires conduct that causes a fear of death or serious bodily injury. There simply is no principled basis to distinguish the language of the federal statute from the Michigan statute which this Court upheld in Staley.
We also reject Bowker’s argument that the stalking and telephone harassment statutes’ failure to define words like “harass” and “intimidate” render them void for vagueness. As noted by the Court in Staley, the meaning of these words “can be ascertained fairly by reference to judicial decisions, common law, dictionaries, and the words themselves because they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.” Staley, 239 F.3d at 791-92. Indeed, the Michigan anti-stalking statute, which the Staley Court upheld, does not appear to define the word “intimidate,” a word that Bowker claims is too vague in the federal law. For this reason as well, we reject Bowker’s vagueness challenge to the federal law.
Bowker’s reliance on Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Erie, 99 F.Supp.2d 583 (W.D.Pa.2000), also is misplaced. There, the court held that a city ordinance that restricted the wearing of a mask “with the intent to intimidate, threaten, abuse or harass any other person” was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 591 (quotation marks and statutory citation omitted). The court found that each of these terms, given their ordinary meaning, could encompass forms of expression that are constitutionally protected. Id. Not only might it prohibit certain types of advocacy, such as advocating the return to segregation, but it also might prohibit the simple act of wearing a mask. Id. The court also found that the ordinance did not provide the public with adequate notice of what type of conduct was prohibited. The ordinance, however, is not comparable to the federal anti-stalking statute. The federal anti-stalking statute, which prohibits harassment or intimidation that causes a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily 382*382 harm, imposes a far more concrete harm requirement than the ordinance at issue in Ku Klux Klan, which did not require that the harassment or intimidation result in any particular type of reaction in the audience. See id. at 592 (holding that ordinance was unconstitutionally vague: “To some extent, the speaker’s liability is potentially defined by the reaction or sensibilities of the listener; what is ‘intimidating or threatening’ to one person may not be to another. And, although the provision has a scienter requirement, it is reasonable to expect that the requisite intent could be inferred from circumstantial factors, which may include the effect that particular speech has on the speaker’s audience.”).
We further reject Bowker’s argument that the federal stalking and telephone harassment statutes authorize or encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Although the statutes provide no guidelines on terms like harass and intimidate, the meanings of these terms “can be ascertained fairly by reference to judicial decisions, common law, dictionaries, and the words themselves because they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.” Staley, 239 F.3d at 791-92. Thus, Bowker has not demonstrated that these statutes fail to provide “sufficiently specific limits on the enforcement discretion of the police to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity.” Morales, 527 U.S. at 64, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Only Bowker’s vagueness challenge to part of the telephone harassment statute, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), merits further discussion. As noted above, that statute prohibits using a telephone, without disclosing identity, with the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the number called. Bowker argues that the term “annoy” is unconstitutionally vague, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coates, supra. In rejecting the city ordinance which made it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble on a sidewalk and to be “annoying” to passersby, the Court reasoned:
In our opinion this ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct. Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.
Id. at 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686. The Court further held that the ordinance violated the First Amendment right to freedom of assembly because the “First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its exercise may be ‘annoying’ to some people.” Id. at 615, 91 S.Ct. 1686.
We agree that the word “annoy,” standing alone and devoid of context and definition, may pose vagueness concerns. But that is not the case with the telephone harassment statute. The statute reads “annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.” 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). The Supreme Court has observed that “[c]anons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise.Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (emphasis added). Here, the statutory language must be read in the context of Congressional intent to protect 383*383 innocent individuals from fear, abuse or annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives. Lampley, 573 F.2d at 787. This context suggests that the words annoy, abuse, threaten or harass should be read together to be given similar meanings. Any vagueness associated with the word “annoy” is mitigated by the fact that the meanings of “threaten” and “harass” can easily be ascertained and have generally accepted meanings. Staley, 239 F.3d at 791-92
Even assuming, arguendo, that Bowker’s vagueness argument theoretically has merit, he cannot rely on it to invalidate the indictment or his conviction for telephone harassment, because the statute clearly applies to the conduct he allegedly committed. The Supreme Court held in Parker v. Levy supra, 417 U.S. at 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547:
… [O]ne who has received fair warning of the criminality of his own conduct from the statute in question is [not] entitled to attack it because the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit. One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.
Here, Bowker engaged in an anonymous campaign of threatening and harassing conduct directed toward Knight through use of the telephone (as well as the mails and the computer) that clearly fell within the statute’s prohibition. This type of conduct lies at the core of what the telephone harassment statute was designed to prohibit. Lampley, 573 F.2d at 787. FBI Agent Hassman specifically warned Bowker that he might be arrested if he persisted in his course of telephone harassment, but Bowker ignored that warning. Moreover, the fact that Bowker engaged in this campaign with an intent to threaten or harass mitigates any concern that he may have been punished for merely having a communication over the telephone. As the Third Circuit held in rejecting a vagueness challenge to the very same statutory language:
The section’s specific intent requirement renders unconvincing appellant’s second claim that [the predecessor to § 223(a)(1)(C) is] unconstitutionally vague. It has long been true that (t)he Court, indeed, has recognized that the requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid…. (W)here the punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation of law. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). The appellant cannot claim confusion about the conduct proscribed where, as here, the statute precisely specifies that the actor must intend to perform acts of harassment in order to be culpable.
Lampley, 573 F.2d at 787. Thus, Bowker vagueness challenge fails. The district court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2 and 4 of the indictment.

IV. Motion to Sever Count 3 from the Indictment

The district court denied Bowker’s motion to sever Count3 of the indictment (mail theft) from Counts 1 (interstate stalking), 2 (cyberstalking), and 4 (telephone harassment). Bowker had argued that joinder of these counts would prejudice his rights under the Fifth Amendment 384*384 and Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, he argued that the mail theft count should not be admissible to support the other three counts for stalking and telephone harassment on the ground that the crimes did not possess the same or similar characteristics and that there was no nexus between the mail theft count and the other alleged crimes. He further argued that he wished to testify concerning the stalking and telephone harassment counts, which require the government to prove intent, but not the mail theft count, and that joinder precluded him from exercising his Fifth Amendment right to testify only as to the stalking and telephone harassment counts. Last, he argued that the jury’s exposure to evidence pertaining to the stalking and telephone harassment counts would prejudice them in deciding the mail theft count. Bowker renews these arguments on appeal.
A motion for relief from the prejudicial joinder of counts must be renewed at the close of the evidence. United States v. Hudson, 53 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir.1995). When the defendant fails to renew the motion, this Court can reverse a conviction only upon a showing of plain error. United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1312 (6th Cir.1996). Bowker failed to renew his motion to sever Count 3 of the indictment from Counts 1, 2 and 4 at the close of the evidence. Accordingly, he must demonstrate plain error by the district court.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged – whether felonies or misdemeanors or both – are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a). Rule 14 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Relief. If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 14(a). The record clearly shows that all of the counts in Bowker’s indictment were of the same or similar character and that the allegations thereunder were an integral part of Bowker’s common scheme to harass and threaten Knight. This scheme involved a 14-month campaign of sending emails and regular mail and placing telephone calls to her workplace in Youngstown; sending mail to her parent’s home; placing telephone calls to Knight’s unpublished home number in West Virginia; placing telephone calls to Knight’s West Virginia workplace; sending mail to Knight’s West Virginia home; and stealing Knight’s mail from her West Virginia home. Thus, all of the counts properly were joined pursuant to Rule 8, and the district court did not plainly err under Rule 14 by refusing to sever the mail theft count.
Bowker also has not demonstrated that the district court committed plain error when it rejected his argument that severance was required in order to permit him to testify as to the mail theft count, but to avoid testimony as to the stalking and telephone harassment counts. The Tenth Circuit confronted a similar argument in United States v. Martin, 18 F.3d 1515, 1518-19 (10th Cir.1994), stating:
Martin contends that the denial of his severance motion “forced [him] to testify 385*385 at trial and convict himself as to the drug count in an attempt to win an acquittal of the gun count.”…. Martin further contends that inasmuch as he “had both important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying on the other,” …. the district court’s refusal to sever the counts deprived him of a fair trial….[N]o need for a severance exists until the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. Applying these standards to our case, we hold that Martin failed to demonstrate a convincing need for a severance.
Several other circuits have applied the same or similar standards. E.g., United States. v. Alosa, 14 F.3d 693, 695 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that defendant did not deserve severance because he failed to make a convincing showing that he had both important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying on the other); United States v. Gorecki, 813 F.2d 40, 43 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that defendant’s bare allegation that the joinder of counts prevented his testimony on one count, without a specific showing as to what that testimony may have been, failed to meet the stringent requirements for severance under Rule 14); United States v. Ballis, 28 F.3d 1399, 1408 (5th Cir.1994) (affirming denial of severance because defendant did not point out this alleged dilemma in testifying about some counts but not others with sufficient specificity for the trial court to have abused its discretion in denying the motion); United States v. Alexander, 135 F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that there may be cases in which a defendant can convincingly show that he has important testimony to give on one count but a strong need to remain silent on another, and in that circumstance, severance may be required; affirming denial of severance because defendant failed to provide specific examples of the exculpatory testimony that he would testify about).
It is clear that Bowker failed to make a “convincing showing” that he had important testimony concerning the interstate stalking and telephone harassment counts, as well as a “strong need” to refrain from testifying on the mail theft count. Indeed, his motion to sever provided absolutely no indication as to what his testimony would be on the stalking and harassment counts, stating only that his testimony was “anticipated to be crucial” because these crimes have a specific intent requirement. In addition, Bowker showed absolutely no need to avoid testifying on the mail theft count, merely arguing that his testimony on this count was “not needed” because mail theft lacks a specific intent requirement. Such non-specific assertions of prejudice are insufficient to warrant severance under Rule 14. For these reasons, the district court did not commit plain error in refusing to sever the counts of the indictment.

V. Right to Self-Representation

Bowker argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court denied his constitutional right to represent himself. We review such a denial for an abuse of discretion. Robards v. Rees, 789 F.2d 379, 384 (6th Cir.1986).
On January 22, 2002, Bowker, then represented by counsel, filed on his own initiative a hand-written motion “for release of appointed attorney.” In that motion, Bowker stated, “Now Comes Defendant, being first advised of his rights to an attorney, and does now knowingly, willingly, and intelligently waive his rights, to 386*386 court-appointed counsel.” The district court purported to deny that motion via a hand-written minute order on January 28, 2002, stating that “Defendant’s pro se motion for new counsel is denied.” The court did not refer to the fact that Bowker’s motion did not seek new counsel, but to waive his right to counsel. Bowker, however, soon had a change of heart about representing himself because on March 26, 2002, Bowker’s attorney moved to withdraw as counsel due to “the fractured lawyer-client relationship.” In an attached statement signed by Bowker, Bowker requested that his appointed lawyer withdraw from the case “and that a new lawyer be appointed to represent” him. The court granted the motion on April 10, 2002 and appointed a new federal public defender for Bowker on April 22, 2002.
The sixth and fourteenth amendments guarantee state criminal defendants the right of self-representation at trial. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Since it is more likely than not that a defendant would fare better with the assistance of counsel, Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, he will be permitted to represent himself only when he “knowingly and intelligently” relinquishes his right to counsel. Id. Such a knowing waiver must be made by a “clear and unequivocal” assertion of the right to self-representation. Id.“Once there is a clear assertion of that right, the court must conduct a hearing to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel.” Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 808 (11th Cir.1984) (citation omitted).
We hold that the district court erred in denying Bowker’s January 22, 2002 motion to represent himself which was accompanied by a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation. At a minimum, the court should have conducted some inquiry into the bases for Bowker’s motion. It is not apparent from the record that the district court did anything other than misconstrue the motion as a motion for appointment of new counsel and then deny the motion. Nevertheless, the district court’s error was rendered harmless by Bowker’s change of heart about self-representation over two months prior to trial. As noted above, after being denied the right to represent himself, Bowker explicitly joined his then-attorney’s motion to withdraw from the case and to have new counsel appointed for him. Thus, Bowker’s last indication to the district court on the matter was that he did not wish to represent himself. Cf. id. at 809 (“Even if Raulerson’s letter of July 18, 1980 constituted a clear and unequivocal demand to represent himself, his agreement to proceed with the assistance of an attorney waived that original request….”). Accordingly, the district court’s erroneous disposition of the January 22, 2002 motion for self-representation was rendered harmless error by Bowker’s subsequent waiver of his right to self-representation. Bowker, therefore, is not entitled to a new trial.

VI. Motion to Return Seized Property

On February 5, 2002, Bowker filed a pro se motion for return of seized property and items, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He sought an order from the court directing the government to return all items and tangible objects which were not going to be used as evidence in his case. As of May 29, 2002, the district court had not yet ruled on the motion, so Bowker filed a “request for ruling on motion for return of property.” On June 4, 2002, the district court denied Bowker’s request for a ruling 387*387 on the motion for return of property. No reasons were provided by the court for the denial, and the district court never held a hearing on, nor has it ever ruled on, the underlying motion for return of property.
Rule 41 provides, in relevant part:
(g) Motion to Return Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(g). In United States v. Hess, 982 F.2d 181 (6th Cir.1992), this Court observed that “‘[a] district court has both the jurisdiction and the duty to return the contested property once the government’s need for it has ended.’ Id. at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted); quoting United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1370 (9th Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (D.C.Cir.1976)). There, the district court had failed to address the legal or factual issues raised in a party’s motion for return of seized records. The Court found it significant that no hearing was held regarding who was entitled to possession of the documents, and the district court had failed to consider the merits of the moving party’s arguments. The Court also was troubled because there were no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding which party was entitled to retain the records. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court did not discharge its duty under Rule 41(g) to hear and decide the issues, reasoning that Rule 41(g) “clearly contemplates a hearing ‘on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.’ Id. at 186.
Hess is directly on point. The district court below simply ignored Bowker’s motion to return records, and when Bowker filed a motion to have the court rule on that motion, the court denied the motion, without ever reaching the merits of the underlying motion. The court held no hearing, took no evidence, and gave no indication that it ever has considered the merits of Bowker’s motion. Accordingly, on remand, the district court shall hold a hearing on Bowker’s motion for return of records, take evidence on any factual issues necessary to resolve that motion, and promptly rule on that motion.

VII. Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal as to Counts 1, 2 and 4

Bowker challenges the district court’s failure to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 1, 2 and 4 of the indictment, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A. Standard of Review

“In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on a claim of insufficient evidence, ‘the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1210 (6th Cir.1993) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). “If the evidence, however, is such that a rational fact finder must conclude that a reasonable doubt is raised, this court is obligated to reverse a 388*388 denial of an acquittal motion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Collon, 426 F.2d 939, 942 (6th Cir.1970)). The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir.1994).

B. Interstate Stalking Count

Count 1 of the indictment charges Bowker with interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1). The government was required to prove:
(1) that the defendant traveled in interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person; and
(3) in the course of, or as a result of, such travel places that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to, that person, a member of the immediate family of that person, or the spouse or intimate partner of that person.
Bowker argues that the government did not prove, pursuant to the interstate stalking count, that the “result of” Bowker’s travel from Ohio to West Virginia in July, 2001, was to put Knight in reasonable fear of her life or bodily injury, because Knight did not learn of Bowker’s travels until August 2001, after he had completed his travel. This argument is specious. Knight learned of Bowker’s travel to West Virginia because he sent her numerous photographs informing her that he had been in the state the preceding month. Accompanying the photographs was the statement, “Take the photos out to read the backs of them. Send me an E-mail address. It keeps me long distance, you know what I mean.” The clear implication of this statement was that Bowker would continue to communicate with Knight, unless she provided him with her email address. The jury was entitled to infer that this statement, combined with the photographs of Bowker at various locations in West Virginia, was intended to intimidate Knight by showing her that Bowker had traveled to her state and would do so in the future. The statute did not require the government to show that Bowker actually intended to harass or intimidate Knight during his travels, only that the result of the travel was a reasonable apprehension of fear in the victim. Since Knight testified that she was afraid that Bowker might rape her, and her fear seemed reasonable, the government proved all of the elements of the interstate stalking count.

C. Cyberstalking Count

Count 2 of the indictment charges Bowker with cyberstalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). The government was required to prove:
(1) Bowker intentionally used the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) Bowker engaged in a course of conduct with the intent to place Knight in reasonable fear of death of, or serious bodily injury to, herself, her spouse or intimate partner, or a member of her immediate family; and
(3) Bowker’s course of conduct actually placed Knight in reasonable fear of death of, or serious bodily injury to, herself.
The evidence shows that Bowker’s intended to instill in Knight a fear of death or serious bodily harm through use of the mails and other facilities of interstate commerce, required elements of the cyberstalking count. During a June 12, 2001 telephone conversation with Knight, Bowker told her:
389*389 You don’t know where I’m at. I might be in your house in Dunbar[, West Virginia]; you don’t know that…. I know all of your neighbors….. And I have access to all that information, just like anybody else does who knows where to find it. I have an enormous amount of things about you that I’m not going to disclose unless I have to. I’m not going to tell anybody about it except if you lie to me. I might not say anything to you at the time, but that might come back, you know….. I know the names of all your relatives and where they live….. I know your brothers’ wives[’] names, their ages, their Social Security numbers and their birth dates …. and their property values….. Maybe I live on 20th street in Dunbar….. Maybe I watch you with binoculars all the time and maybe I don’t.
(J.A. 985-88, 1000.) A July 16, 2001 letter that Bowker sent to Knight at the television station had both sexual and threatening connotations. It read, in part:
No. 1. You do not hang up on me.
No. 2. You do not hang up on me, ever.
No. 3. If and when I call CBS 13 asking about a news story that you reported on, you do not hang up on me. You must at least do the bare minimum and answer my news related questions.
I know what you value most in life, your bullshit fake ass 1997 Pontiac Grand Am, which is about top on your list as well as two other things. As far as the Grand Am is concerned, say good-bye to it. I am going to file a mechanics lien on it immediately and later seek civil forfeiture.
All that you … would have to do is be polite, be nice, and answer my news-related questions, just like the rest of the reporters, except your buddy April Kaull. I’m going to file a lien on her vehicle too. You are both fuck-ups, assholes and seriously emotionally and mentally unbalanced…..
Also, WOWK will hire just about anyone. Or at least a pretty girl reporter, as long as she does her hair and makeup well…..
That vehicle is exemplary of you, pretty on the outside and very worthless inside. You have female genitals and that is about it. You are a very slander to the word woman. Oh, yeah, you dress like one but so do transvestites. I think I would rather spend the evening with a pretty transvestite than with you…..
Anyhow, I also think that it is time for your neighbors to get to know you better and I will be making attempts to inform them about how the prima donna from Ohio things [sic] she can eat from the top and throw her garbage on the sidewalk of West Virginia and Dunbar…..
I also noticed that you already had the job and residence in West Virginia when you had your Ohio License plates renewed, for one year anyhow…..
So bye-bye, fuck you, you are an asshole and a sociopath and an embarrassment to mothers everywhere, sir. In parenthesis: (I wasn’t bringing up the mental case thing again since it is genetic.)
Yes, sir. Adios, Eric [sic]. Smooch. Smooch.
(J.A. 1011-15.) In August 2001, Bowker left a series of messages on Knight’s answering machine asking that Knight or Knight’s friend call him back, which did not occur. These messages contained statements that Knight reasonably could perceive to be threats to her personal safety. Excerpts include the following statements:
390*390 I don’t even know why I’m nice to you ever at all, you and your fucked-up friend should not even be working in the media. You know you gotta mother-fucking realize there’s like 50 percent men in this country and you better mother-fucking learn that you’re going to have to deal with us sometime…..
Well, it looks like nobody is going to answer me if Tina Knight is okay, so I’m gonna take the 1:00 a.m. bus out of Columbus, Ohio and come down there and see for myself. Okay, I’ll be there about 6:00 a.m. Bye.
(J.A. 1226-27.) Since Knight testified that these intentionally intimidating, threatening and harassing interstate communications made her afraid to leave the house everyday and that Bowker might try to rape her, the government proved all of the elements of the cyberstalking count.

D. Telephone Harassment Count

Count 4 of the indictment charged Bowker with telephone harassment, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C). The government had to prove that:
(1) Bowker made interstate telephone calls to Knight;
(2) Bowker did not disclose his identity in the telephone calls; and
(3) in the telephone calls, whether or not conversation or communication ensued, Bowker intended to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass Knight or any person at the called number.
Bowker’s primary argument against his conviction for telephone harassment is that Knight allegedly was aware of Bowker’s identity when she received his calls. The statute, however, does not preclude criminal responsibility merely because the recipient may suspect, or have a very good idea of, the caller’s identity. Rather, assuming that Bowker called Knight with the requisite intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass, the only issue is whether Bowker disclosed his identity in those calls. It is clear that in all of the at-issue telephone calls, Bowker never affirmatively identified himself as Erik Bowker. In fact, he denied being Bowker during a conversation with Knight on June 12, 2001, and instead stated that his name was Mike. Thus, a straightforward application of the telephone harassment statute shows that the jury reasonably found the non-disclosure element to be satisfied.

VIII. Motion for a New Trial on Counts 1, 2 and 4

The denial of a defendant’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir.1988). The Court is “limited to examining the evidence produced at trial to determine whether the district court’s determination that the evidence does not ‘preponderate heavily against the verdict’ is a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). As discussed in the preceding section, there was ample evidence to support Bowker’s convictions on Counts 1, 2 and 4 of the indictment. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion to find that the evidence did not preponderate heavily against the verdict.

IX. Upward Departure for Extreme Psychological Harm to the Victim

After Bowker’s convictions, he was sentenced pursuant to the 2000 edition of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”). Based upon a final offense level of 19, and a criminal history corresponding to Category 391*391 V, Bowker’s Guidelines’ range was between 57 and 71 months. The government moved for a three level upward departure in his sentence based on extreme psychological injury to the victim, Tina Knight. The basis for the motion was, in part, Guidelines § 5K2.3. The district court granted the motion for upward departure. Because Bowker argues that the sentence imposed by the district court was outside the applicable guideline range and was based on a factor that is not justified by the facts of the case, this Court reviews the district court’s determination under a de novo standard. 18U.S.C. § 3742(e).
Section 5K2.3 of the Guidelines provides:
§ 5K2.3. EXTREME PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY (POLICY STATEMENT)
If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more serious than that normally resulting from commission of the offense, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the severity of the psychological injury and the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked.
Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently severe to warrant application of this adjustment only when there is a substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when the impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior patterns. The court should consider the extent to which such harm was likely, given the nature of the defendant’s conduct.
Guidelines § 5K2.3 (Nov. 1, 2000). With regard to the crime of stalking, Guidelines § 2A6.2 instructs that “an upward departure may be warranted if the defendant stalked the victim on many occasions over a prolonged period of time.” Guidelines § 2A6.2, Application Note 5.
The record shows that Bowker stalked Knight on many occasions and over a prolonged period of time. See Guidelines § 2A6.2, Application Note 5. FBI Special Agent James McNamara, an expert on stalking crimes, testified at the sentencing hearing as to the extreme nature of Bowker’s conduct. McNamara pointed to the facts that the harassment occurred over a period of years and in two different states; involved numerous, multi-media contacts (letters, telephone calls, email and interstate travel); and involved contacts with Knight’s friends and family members. Further, Bowker’s campaign of harassment substantially impaired Knight’s “behavioral functioning” as manifested by “changes in [her] behavior patterns.” Guidelines § 5K2.3. Knight was so distressed that she was left with profound feelings of paranoia and felt compelled to change banks and unlist her phone number, and have her bills sent to a different address. She also purchased a gun, routinely uses a security escort, and, most unfortunately, decided to forgo her on-air news career.
Knight’s Victim Impact Statement movingly captures the extreme psychological distress that Bowker’s stalking activities inflicted on her:
The two years that I was stalked changed my family and me. First of all since the stalking began because of my job as a television news reporter it has turned me off to a future in that career…..I don’t want to be anyone’s favorite newscaster because I fear it will turn into another situation like the one I had…..I am also concerned about major purchases in the future, like a home, 392*392 and how he may be able to track me down…..Even writing this I am careful not to mention anything about my personal life for fear he will read this and it will give him another means by which to contact me…..I am concerned about the rest of my life…..I am not confident this will stop. That is my biggest fear. When he gets out of jail this could start all over again so I truly can never relax. It’s just putting off my ultimate fear that someday, no matter what I do, he will show up at my front door with intent to harm me. By now I’ve given him reason to really hate me in his mind. I testified against him in court and helped put him in jail. I hope he isn’t out for revenge.[4]
We hold that the above-described facts amply justified the district court’s upward departure determination. Cf. United States v. Otto, 64 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1995) (affirming upward departure where stalking victim lived in constant fear for herself and for her children and was always on the lookout for the defendant; could not eat or sleep; lost weight; required counseling; and feared the defendant’s ultimate release); United States v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1993) (affirming upward departure after the defendant had engaged in a three year campaign of harassment; noting that the victim had been afraid to answer the telephone or open her mail for three years; was afraid to remain in the New York area; and believed that the years of harassment had hastened her husband’s demise).

X. Expert Testimony on Stalking

As noted in the preceding section, the government called an expert on stalking crimes, FBI Special Agent James McNamara, to testify at Bowker’s sentencing hearing. Bowker argues that the district court’s decision to hear the testimony of Agent McNamara was erroneous and that the court’s decision should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, are by their own terms expressly inapplicable to sentencing hearings. Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3). According to the federal statute that governs the use of information in sentencing, “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. The Supreme Court has explained that this statute “codifies the longstanding principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to consider various kinds of information.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997). Accordingly, this Court reviews the district court’s admission of Agent McNamara’s testimony for an abuse of discretion in determining that the testimony had “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Guidelines § 6A1.3(a).
Agent McNamara has been with the FBI for 15 years and is assigned to the FBI as a behavioral analyst. His duties include looking at the behavior of criminals, conducting research with convicted offenders and disseminating the results of that research, and working on active criminal cases as a law enforcement consultant. 393*393 McNamara has been trained in a variety of disciplines, including criminal justice, psychology, forensic science, anthropology and psychology. Based on his review of transcripts and other materials pertaining to Bowker’s case, McNamara testified that Bowker had engaged in multimedia attempts to contact Knight, including letters, email, telephonic contacts, and the sending of gifts. McNamara opined that the sending of gifts in a stalking case is “significantly important in the areas of increased dangerousness.” He further testified that Bowker escalated his activity, from contacts through the mail, to telephonic and electronic mail contact, to traveling interstate to pursue Knight. McNamara also indicated that Bowker’s past history of violence, including domestic abuse, was a predictor of future dangerousness or violence. As a consequence of these findings, McNamara concluded that Bowker was a more dangerous type of stalker.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Agent McNamara’s testimony at the sentencing hearing. His testimony was relevant to the court’s application of Guidelines § 2A6.2, which determines how the base offense level is to be calculated for the crime of stalking. Guideline § 2A6.2 provides for a two-level increase in the base offense level for a pattern of activity involving stalking, threatening, harassing, or assaulting the same victim. McNamara’s testimony directly addressed this issue. Agent McNamara’s testimony also was relevant to determining whether an upward departure was warranted for extreme psychological injury to the victim. See Guidelines § 2A6.2, Application Note 5 (instructing that the severity of the stalking may warrant an upward departure). Therefore, the district court did not err in entertaining Agent McNamara’s expert testimony at sentencing.

XI. Bowker’s Right of Allocution

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) provides that, before imposing a sentence, the court must “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Bowker argues that the district court denied him this right of allocution. We apply a de novo standard of review. United States v. Wolfe, 71 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir.1995).
After Bowker’s attorney cross-examined Agent McNamara, the FBI expert on stalking, the district court asked Bowker directly, “Is there anything that you have to say to this Court before it imposes sentence?” Bowker responded that he would like to read a lengthy statement, and the court told Bowker to proceed. Bowker began by challenging his prior criminal history. The court then went through each crime that formed the foundation for the assignment of a Criminal History Category V. Bowker then asked to address some things that occurred during his trial, and the court told him to proceed. Bowker gave a lengthy justification for his conduct underlying his convictions, complained about not being able to testify as to his intent, and pointed out that he has severe physical disabilities and mental problems. Bowker next complained about the performance of his attorney. Bowker then asked the court to have his mother testify, which the court permitted. The only request the district court appeared to deny Bowker was his desire to read a 15-page statement into the record. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we see no merit to Bowker’s argument that he was denied the right of allocution. Cf. United States v. Kellogg, 955 F.2d 1244, 1250 (9th Cir.1992) (“Although the defendant has a 394*394 right of allocution at sentencing, that right is not unlimited.”).

XII. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Defendant Bowker’s convictions and sentence. This case shall be REMANDED for the district court to conduct a hearing and to rule on Bowker’s motion to return seized property.Retrieved from:
As we have learned in our example, it’s important to understand the ethics that revolve around conducting spying and committing cybercrime within the digital domain. Tracking others and stalking them as we have learned can cause harm, loss, and even death. You should also learn how you can be a victim and that is what we will learn in Chapter 2.

Summary

In this chapter, we have discussed the fundamentals of digital surveillance, what reconnaissance is, and what digital spying is. While discussing the history of digital spying, we looked at how government entities, militaries, and others have been practicing for decades to gain tactical advantage and gather intelligence. While discussing these topics, we covered major legislature put in place to provide privacy to those under the fourth amendment as an example.
We flashed forward to today’s current events to discuss how the US-based NSA is under scrutiny for crossing boundaries it may or may not have been entitled to do and the whistleblower (Edward Snowden) who brought the issues to public eyes. We also examined why trust is so important when it comes to common surveillance activities that are supposed to keep you safe and secure such as traffic camera’s, home monitoring systems, and the government’s goal of stopping terrorism by collecting all incoming and outgoing data transmissions into and out of the country.
Those who spy and why they spy were also covered. We discussed experts in the field who help build legal cases, those who are in charge of our security, those who subvert it, and those who collect information for many reasons both good and bad.
Legal and ethical concerns were covered as well as sample case law to show the effects of digital surveillance from a legal perspective to just how important it is to not only protect ourselves but also be aware of the many dangers lurking in the digital darkness.
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