Chapter 2

Information Gathering

Abstract

In this chapter, we learn about why information gathering physically and logically is so relevant to spying, reconnaissance, and surveillance. Why a majority of spying is easily conducted over the public Internet. We discuss social media topics, National Security Agency topics (Snowden), how to conduct information gathering using simply found tools, and how to start spying on a user, group, or entity. We also discuss how to mitigate and the legal and ethical concerns that are raised.

Keywords

Backtrack
Wiretapping
Facebook
Digital Footprint
Social Media
Information Gathering
Mitigate
Identity Theft
Infiltration
Invasion of Privacy
Packet Analysis
Internet
Twitter
Wireless Networking
Maltego

Information gathering

When conducting digital surveillance and reconnaissance, one of the priorities of these tasks is to gather information on a target or a group of targets. No simple task, however, within the digital world, it makes it much easier to do and it can be done from afar. If you know how to cover your tracks, it can also be done privately without concern of being discovered. Prior to using technology, to gather information you would need to physically be on location and hope to not be seen or get caught. As technology became more available, it could then be tapped to reveal information about targets. For example, a phone could be “bugged” with a device to listen to a conversation and recorded. This technique was used to leverage the weaknesses in the old publically switched telephone network that operated with analog technology. Now, with the progress made in the digital realm, you can be at a computer terminal or on your mobile device anywhere in the world, connect to the public Internet, and gather a large amount of information on a variety of targets within minutes all while remaining undetected. This chapter covers many of the methods in which this can be done.
Why is this so important? For one, to be able to attack, you need to find vectors in which you can breech your target. The old analog phone example is a good one to understand the increasing attack vector. Now with digital technology, your telephone conversation can be stored digital within a private branch exchange device, locally to the phone or captured in transmission. Applications can be placed on the receiver device to capture or listen to the conversation. There are more points in the transmission to capture data and more locations in which it is stored.
Now that you are aware of the fact that information can be gathered and it can be quickly and easily acquired, we should consider all of the points in which it can be collected. As well, is all information gathering malicious? Once you understand the attack vector, you can consider if your information is truly private and you can learn to protect yourself and mitigate attack.

Am I Being Spied On?

The first question to ask is, “am I being spied on?” This is a question that just invites paranoia into the minds of many. However, it is a good question to ask because by doing so, it makes you think about protecting yourself, your data, and your interests. It also gets you to consider your digital footprint, that is, where you leave your mark in the digital world. For example, sending a simple e-mail from work to another recipient. Consider that the recipient is also at work. If you are concerned about your information being private, you do not need to look any further than your organizations security policy and specifically on e-mail usage and retention. The fact is, if your policy states that the data you send and receive is by default owned by the organization when using their systems, then the answer is no. Your communications are not private. Now, let’s consider that you are under investigation by Human Resources for a workplace matter. If an issue, complaint, or security violation is suspected, your e-mail can be reviewed by appropriate parties. Something as harmless as showing interest in co-workers and asking them out for a drink could easily turn into a sexual harassment case.
Now let’s consider if you send a private communication from your personal e-mail account to another recipient. Is your communication truly private? The answer is no. Quite simply, if you’re under investigation, your data can be subpoenaed by the judge for forensic review within the court. The Internet Service Provider (ISP) who holds your e-mail account would need to comply.
Another consideration is what if I wasn’t at work and I wasn’t involved in a legal case? Is my transmission private? It could be, however, according to data released on the National Security Agency, data transmissions are captured and filtered. This simple example of an e-mail transmission continues on if you consider that your device could be stolen. You could be hacked or it’s possible someone or something has tampered with your system and collecting your data.
The answer to the question, “Am I being spied on?” is not easily provided. The answer could be your data is never truly private and could be collected at any time for just about any reason, legally or maliciously. If maliciously, you may or may not know your privacy is being violated. Attackers wish to remain anonymous, so they usually conduct surveillance activities with the intentions of remaining anonymous and/or going undetected. Also, governments collecting information on their citizens generally do not want to advertise such activity.

How Private Is Your Life?

As we learned in Chapter 1, everything you do within the digital domain can potentially be stored to include video footage of you going to a local store, when you use your mobile phone and it connects to a cell tower, when you access your favorite social media site, or if you log in to your bank to pay a bill.
In Figure 2.1, we provide an extremely high-level view of the digital landscape and all of the points within it that data is or can be stored. Every one of these points can also be used for information gathering.
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Figure 2.1 Information gathering points.
In this example, we see digital devices such as a laptop or a phone accessing a network to use a resource. These resources can include going to a website to purchase goods, to send an e-mail, to upload a file, or to text with a friend. Every transmission from source to destination leaves residual evidence of the transaction in logs if configured. Data and transmissions are time stamped and a digital forensics expert can uncover a complete map of activity.
As seen in the figure, you can use any device to connect through any network to any resource and your activity can be captured. Marketing firms work very hard to conduct tracking activities to know how to track your buying habits in an effort to show you only the items you may be interested in or have an impulse to buy. This does not necessarily mean that someone or an entity is spying on you in a way that seems to imply that you are in danger; however, it does open your mind to the fact that your habits are tracked and if this data was to get into the wrong hands, could be used against you. For example, within social media sites such as Facebook, by simply “liking” a post, it is added to Facebook internal databases and if what you like is something that may be deemed offensive to some, could impact your privacy since it can be freely searched by others.
This is where surveillance activities can also tie in. If someone was looking to gather information about you in hopes to conduct an attack such as identity theft or password cracking of your protected data, understanding what you like gives attackers a foothold on being able to conduct these types of attacks.
Another problem with data stored on systems is that it could come back to haunt you. For example, if 10 years ago you were involved in criminal behavior but have had your charges expunged, it will not matter when that data is found by prospective job search recruiters looking for viable candidates for an open position. This is a simple example of the many ways that data can be mined in hopes to conduct an attack.
Hacker Site Hacked
In 2014, the EC-Council website (http://www.eccouncil.org) was defaced to not only embarrass the organization itself but also in hopes to bring light to the fact that Edward Snowden was involved with them. Edward Snowden applied for the Certified Ethical Hacker credential and by doing so sent e-mails to EC-Council with personal information within it in hopes to bring notice to Ed’s activities. Within that defacement activity, the hacker(s) posted private e-mails and even a snapshot of Edward Snowden’s passport as seen in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 Edward Snowden’s passport.
Edward Snowden likely did not think that by sending his personal information to a reputable organization would ever wind up publically distributed; however, it did. Therefore, it’s safe to say that because of Ed’s worldwide fame, he increased his likelihood of becoming a target of information gathering and because its proven that most, if not all, data in transmission is stored or saved, that once it’s found could be publically used evading that individuals privacy.
Examples of Privacy Invasion
There are many other examples of how privacy is no longer a guarantee. Consider a typical user of digital technology living in the world today. You leave your home in the morning and go to work. You go out for a lunch date and run an errand. You return to work and once the day is over, go back home. If you are using digital technology in the form of a mobile device and took it with you during these events, there could be a traceable footprint of where you went and at what time. You are under constant video surveillance just about anywhere you go, recording everything you do. Every location you went to likely had a video camera within or in the path to each destination. You paid by credit card when you had lunch. You placed seven phone calls on your mobile phone that day and sent 22 text messages. While at work, you made 19 phone calls and sent and received 120 e-mails.
As you can see, we can continue to flesh out this example by looking at what applications were used on the mobile device, and what systems and servers were used while at work or any other examples of digital technology used within this specific time span; however, it should be enough to show you that your life is under surveillance and all of your actions are digitally recorded or traceable.
Outside of the digital world, it’s possible that you could be watched by those with an interest in watching what you do. If you are the subject of someone under investigation you could be videotaped or photographed. If someone is stalking you, they could potentially follow you to see where you go, who you are with, and what you are doing.
In the physical and digital worlds, your privacy could be at risk and you could be the subject of damages by those who wish to do you harm. Harm can come in many forms. It may not be physical harm but what if while at the restaurant having lunch your credit card information was stolen? What if somehow your credit was damaged or if you used a debit card your bank account emptied? As you can see, invasion to your privacy could at any moment directly impact you at any time.
To protect yourself from being spied on you need to limit your exposure. By living in a digital world where you use your mobile phone and post pictures and engage in social media websites, you need to understand by doing so you subject yourself to exposure. Even if you attempt to mitigate attack by limiting exposure within each technology you use, you have to consider that you may miss something and/or someone you trust may expose you. You could use a credit card instead of a debit card or you could pay in cash. You could turn off your mobile phone if you did not wish to be tracked via cell towers. You could choose not to send an e-mail.
Also, we have focused on individuals; however, entities and groups could also be at risk. For example, let’s assume that an attacker wants to spy on a company. They could gather information publically online using many sources such as a Who is database to pull Domain Name System (DNS) information that could potentially show personal information. They could use the Better Business Bureau website to gather information on a business track record.
All in all, it should be noted that maintaining privacy comes down to minimizing exposure and being aware of your activities. To exist in a digital world, it may be difficult to conceal your actions.

How to Gather Information

Gathering information can be quickly and easily done. Now that you understand your footprint, let’s take a look at some of the ways your privacy can be evaded. There are many surveillance tools as well as those that do specific information gathering tasks and others that are manual tools where information can be collected and correlated.
In this section, we look at specific tools that can be used to conduct these tasks. Before we do we should generalize their use and impact and the reasons why they are so popular in the first place.
Data mining of information is not a new practice. As more and more data is centralized and tools evolve to do a better job of extracting key information for reporting and general use, the ability to use this for spying grows exponentially. Big data and informatics/analytics are major areas of technology growth today, where organizations need to tap their stored data to derive specific results from it. When considering how this type of data analysis can be used or misused, it’s safe to say that regardless, the data is gathered, stored, and, if exploited, could be used against a target.

Information Gathering Tools

One of the most interesting tools to assist security professionals to come to light is called Backtrack. Backtrack is used to provide penetration testing analysts, a portfolio of security tools that can be used to test the security of a system, network, or service. If placed in the wrong hands, it can, in fact, be used to conduct surveillance of targets.
As an example, I have loaded Backtrack within Kali Linux as a virtual machine to demonstrate the product as seen in Figure 2.3. Once loaded, you can click on Applications and follow the path in the graphic to Information Gathering where you will find many tools that you can use that will collect, gather, and exploit data from a source.
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Figure 2.3 Using Backtrack.
Some of the tools within Backtrack such as Creepy will allow you to target Twitter accounts as well as Flickr accounts via Yahoo. We will get into more detail on how picture metadata can be used to exploit a target; however, for now, load up the tools and review what is offered within the toolset. Another interesting point to mention about Backtrack is how it uses network-level protocols such as DNS, Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) to gather information from a target.
Backtrack is commonly used by Penetration Testers and Security Analysts to conduct security review of software, systems, services, and infrastructure to produce a report on where weaknesses exist and adjustments need to be made. In the wrong hands, it can be used to gather information on unsuspecting targets.
You can also build databases of information to conduct investigations on targets. A tool such as Maltego Tungsten can be populated with a subject or set of subjects as seen in Figure 2.4. Once populated, you can run queries against the source data and gather information on a target. In this example, I used Edward Snowden and attempted to map known e-mail accounts.
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Figure 2.4 Using Maltego.
Data mining can then be performed to gather more information and a “case file” can be created for future use or reference. This tool in the wrong hands can become a stalkers dream. Imagine an ex-boyfriend or girlfriend having the power to create a file on you and keep it updated to track any known information about you. These are tools custom built to assist with data information gathering and are very good at it.
You can also tap into already established and legitimate tools to gather data. For example, if you are able to go online and use a search engine, you can conduct a large amount of data collection by understanding key words and how to search using an engine. For example, if you knew a target by name, you can then begin to add information after the name to include key words such as “addresses,” “phone number,” and so on. There are literally hundreds of databases online that contain personal information that are freely searchable. A notable one could be the White Pages seen in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5 Searching online databases.
As we can see, you can also find address information and other personal information about a target without downloading and installing any tools. One point to mention is, as I used “John Smith” in my search, the more generic the name, the harder it is to search for their private information.
There are information gathering techniques that can also be used against an organization if that was your intended target. For example, here you can run a query against a domain name in a Who is database and find out contact information as well as location. By gathering this data, you could conduct a social engineering attack to gather more information. As seen in Figure 2.6, gathering data on a corporate entity to conduct an attack such as a social engineering attack could be done quickly using the Internet and a Who is database search.
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Figure 2.6 Conducting a Whois search.
As you can see, gathering information can be easily and quickly done and if you are organized and have a few pieces of key information to start with such as a name or a location of a target, you can map out information that can be used to conduct surveillance, such as the location of the target as an example.
Other paths can be used as we will see in the next section as we expand on information gathering; however, before we do, we must understand the legal and ethical concerns that are raised when performing such actions.

Online reconnaissance

As we learned in the last section, there is a lot of information you can gather on a target using the public Internet. Our focus in this part of this chapter is to show you just how easily it can be done. Online reconnaissance takes place when an attacker consciously decides to spy and conduct surveillance on a target using the Internet as their method of doing so. They do so with the intention of gathering intelligence and data on their target to plan an attack of some kind. The attacks are many; however, you can consider stalking being one of the most common. In this section of this chapter, we will look at the infrastructure that delivers the Internet as well as the applications, sites, pages, and other media that is used within it acting as resources and services. We will also take a look at the attacks that are performed and ways to mitigate them or lower your exposure to being attacked.

The Internet Threat

The public Internet is a goldmine for those conducting intelligence. When used in non-malicious ways, the Internet can be a source of a lot of information. Research on a homework assignment, locating the best travel path, or getting movie times are all simple examples of what can be done in seconds without having to leave your home or pick up your phone. When used for good reasons, the Internet can prove to be extremely helpful; however, when used for bad reasons, the Internet can be used to gather information to conduct attacks.
Another issue with the Internet is that once you put something on a server such as a blog post, a data file, or other source of data, it could remain there for a long time, possibly forever. Data backups collect data from servers and archive it.
Data can also be added without your knowledge. In the world of social media, it’s common for people you connect to and with to “post” data such as an old picture of you. It can also be done in real time. For example, a favorite bar you frequently visit can quickly be online news if someone posts about it, tags a picture of you within it, or they post that you are in a group at a certain location. Attackers can use this information to ascertain your habits, favorite frequented places, and many other facts about you.
Data can also be doctored. Pictures can be digitally edited, words can be manipulated, and if someone has stolen your identity and posing (and posting) as you on the Internet, could cause serious issues for you.
Information is also added willingly, almost too willingly by many. Social media sites today encourage those who are part of them to post data, connect to others for no other reason other than to increase their numbers, and like things you normally wouldn’t ever comment on outside of the digital world.
So, in sum, without any effort at all, your information can be added to the publically searchable Internet within seconds, stay within it indefinitely, and even if you think you have had it removed, it could still be archived somewhere for retrieval.
To add, this does not include the data that can be obtained from globally interconnected devices that can also provide those who seek information a source to get it. Servers cache data as an example to speed up Internet browsing and if this system was hacked, could reveal the browsing habits of an entire community as an example.
We should be concerned as a society, that if those who wish to do us harm need only to first have an Internet connection and second a “will” to be interested in gathering data on you, that all it takes is a few clicks of their mouse to obtain it.

Search Engines

Search Engines provide a wealth of information to those who know how to use it. As we just discussed, there is a public Internet full of information that is gathered en masse. Key word searches and refinement of topics as well as using specific tools and websites can give an attacker anything they need to begin surveillance on a target. As an example seen in Figure 2.7, you can search for anything within a search engine and it will attempt to show you data on your search query.
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Figure 2.7 Searching for data with Google.
In this example, the search for Edward Snowden pulled up interesting articles, pictures (images), and many other pieces of information. This can also be refined by altering your key word search to include information such as “address,” “phone number,” or “contact” to narrow down what has been posted or placed on the Internet and as you search through the findings, you may just find it.
It should be noted that not all information found on the Internet is either relevant or factual. Just remember that if it is posted, it exists therefore you should not consider that all information you find is real. It just means it was tagged a certain way to be picked up by the search engines and based on “relevancy” will raise the most relevant to the top of the search findings.
Phishing
Phishing is an attack where an attacker is able to pose as a legitimate source on the Internet to trick you into believing they are the legitimate entities you are attempting to visit. When searching the Internet, you may find (or go directly to) a website where you want to conduct business. For example, let’s use the example of logging into your bank account online to conduct a transaction.
If an attacker is able to manipulate that site either through manipulating DNS or through redirecting your browser, you would be brought to a site that you thought may be real, which in fact may be a phishing site. When you attach to it, you may put in your credentials and find out quickly that it is not in fact the site you wished to visit. That being said, the attacker has gathered information on you to be used to defraud you, steal from you, or conduct other attacks. If you use the same username and password for all of your sites, you have just given access to every site you have protected.
Protection against this attack can be found in most modern web browsers on the market today. Internet Explorer, for example, has a SmartScreen filter that runs a check against an online database to verify if a site is authentic as seen in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8 Content filtering.
Tracking
Another way you can be subject to information gathering is by websites that track who you are and where you come from. This can be used for marketing purposes; however, in the hands of those who wish to do harm, can be used to track you interests, location, your digital device (such as your PC), and your identity.
There are tools that allow you to block content, stop cookie usage, and other methods to stop personalized tracking of your digital footprint. You can use the Internet Explorer Tracking Protection options as seen in Figure 2.9 to ensure that you control what information is leaked out about you.
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Figure 2.9 Microsoft tracking protection list.

Social Media

Social media sites are popping up in droves and all of them offer a way to connect and share. It’s a way to socialize with long lost friends, family, or your co-workers. You can conduct business, share data, and meet new people, find new opportunities, and, in general, find new ways to connect to anything that interests you.
With this new found power comes a lot of responsibility. For one, you need to know who you are talking to, what you are sharing, and consider how this can impact you. For example, we mentioned earlier in the chapter that people you know can post anything about you, to include pictures and where you are physically located at any given time.
Also, when you join up for free social media sites such as Facebook, you have signed away your rights to your privacy. The owners of the site can use your data in any way they see fit based on the privacy policy you sign but probably do not read. As well, these site owners change this policy often and when they do, it’s usually in ways to loosen up the restrictions that they place upon themselves in regard to protecting your identity and data.
More and more people join these sites daily and there does not seem to be a stop to using them, they only grow more important as they displace tradition TV and radio as sources of getting information. Just like the Internet, when used for good, they can be wonderful additions to the Internet in the form of allowing those who wish to connect and communicate forums to do so. In the hands of malicious users, however, it too becomes a goldmine for those who wish to conduct surveillance on targets and gather information to be used in malicious ways.
It’s also amazing how generationally more and more people seem to feel; it’s ok to put daily updates about their life online for all to see, pictures of what they do, who they know, and, worse, specific data that can be used against them. There are many who become wise to how this can harm them either by being harmed or by learning too late how to protect their data, their identities, and themselves. However, these numbers are fewer than those who do not.
A good example of how this information can be used against you is when people say they will be on vacation for a week and send pictures of themselves on the beach while they are there. You should not be surprised that when your home is burglarized during that time, the first question to be asked is, did anyone know you were away? These same people stop their mail delivery and leave outside and inside lights on while they are away; however, digitally show no restraint in letting the world know they are not home.
Another common attack used for information gathering using social media is when an attacker steals your identity and poses as you on the site. For example, an attacker can take a copy of your picture of your profile, set up a new profile, and add all of your friends. They can say, “Sorry, I accidently deleted my account and need to re-add you” and if you do not log into your account frequently (which can also be figured out by stalking you online), post as you, talk to your friends, and conduct any number of attacks while you are away.
In sum, safety should be something you consider when using social media sites. As you can see, there are quite a few ways in which you can be stalked, information can be gathered about you, and, in some cases, used against you.
Identify Theft
It may be funny in the movies, but not funny when it happens to you in real life (and it can). Identity theft, fraud, and other methods of acquiring and using your personal information against you consist of many legal issues today. Banks lose money, insurance rates rise, it costs individuals money, and criminals make a lot of money. Social security accounts are stolen and used, bank fraud takes place, and as we mentioned in social media earlier in this chapter, your personal identity can be used to impersonate you to gather more information.
You can limit exposure by considering what you post online. You can limit exposure by paying in cash instead of by credit card. There are many ways you can change your habits so that you can better protect your most valuable asset: you.

Scanning, Sniffing, and Mapping

Other ways to gather information rely on looking into lower levels of digital communications, primarily on the network. For example, you can use tools such as Wireshark, NMAP, and others to capture data and conduct packet-level analysis or port screening to gather and verify information about a target.
This type of information gathering requires you to be connected to a network and sometimes you will need to have access (or gain access) to unprivileged areas to conduct an attack; however, if you are able to you will be able to get the data you require. In this section, we look at using Backtrack to invoke NMAP to conduct information gathering on a host as seen in Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10 Using NMAP.
In this attack, we simply load up NMAP and query the host we want to interrogate for information. It will reply back with specifics such as open ports. These open ports and IP addresses could potentially be manipulated for more information.
Although this is a simple example, more infiltration can be conducted as more information is learned. For example, an attacker may know that a specific port left opened may be something that they can penetrate and once they get to the next level of the attack, conduct another information gathering session to learn what else is open within the network.
Although this is information gathering at its lowest level, it should be considered a threat to you or anyone else because this is the same attack that can be conducted against any digital device using an IP address today. That means that any device you use that has an IP address can be probed for revealing information.

Wired and Wireless

Wired networks rely on cables and wireless networks rely on antennas using radio signals to attach to access points. Both eventually will connect to a higher level network that may ultimately connect to the Internet. That being said, let’s look at the inherent strengths and weaknesses found in both technologies.
When considering wired networks, we consider networks and devices that are cabled together with either copper or fiber cabling. The types of networks are more difficult to gather information on because it is not easy to crack into a cable to extract information from it. By doing so, you can ruin the cable and terminate the signals carrying the information. This makes it more secure than wireless networks and generally produces a higher transmission speed. Its main weakness is that it requires cable to be run from source to destination and is generally costly and harder to maintain.
Wireless networks provide flexibility and the ability to roam between networks, and most devices today use this type of technology. Mobile devices, laptops, pads, and other handhelds rely on wireless to provide and maintain a network connection. There are, however, major weaknesses.
When wireless networks are used, they rely on radio signals that traverse through the air from source to destination and unless encrypted with strong encryption, they are easily captured, manipulated, and can be used for harm. Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks can be conducted where you can impersonate someone on the network. Information can be stolen and, in some cases, replayed against a destination system. A typical wireless network can be seen in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.11 Wireless networking.
Infrastructure
Other concerns about keeping data private and safe revolve around the myriad of devices that your data transfers through. From your client–device (phone, laptop, PC), you can connect via a wireless access point, through multiple switches, servers, proxies, routers, security devices, and so on before your data reaches its destination. It is important to realize that every point in the network that your data traverses, that data can be stolen, read, intercepted, or manipulated. You would need to rely on the security teams entrusted to ensure your safety and privacy. This relies too much on the people in charge and is subject to human error.

Mobile Device Threat

The biggest trend today is the use of the mobile device. This includes (but not limited to) any device that you can use digitally that connects to a network for data. Global Positioning System (GPS) units, mobile phones, handhelds, pads, laptops, 2 in 1s, and many other devices today allow you to be flexible by being mobile. They rely on the ability to connect to networks (and thus the Internet) wirelessly and are as easy to manipulate by a malicious user because of their many flaws. For example, most devices allow you to install software on them from many sources. These software applications (or apps for short) are sometimes vetted by the mobile device provider (such as Apples attempting to provide a layer of security via the iTunes store) and sometimes they are not. That being said, once malicious software winds up on your device, you can likely be tracked, hacked, or worse.
Mobile devices use apps that allow for mapping of their exact location as an example. Apple uses Location Services to allow applications to provide additional functionality, but inadvertently also disclose your exact location at a specific time.

Data Threat (Metadata)

There is no bigger threat than being tracked online. You post a picture to Facebook and the next thing you know, you are a target. This can be done easily. For example, when using an Apple iPhone (or an Android device), you take pictures and information is stored in metadata without your knowledge. Again, when used for good, it serves as a way to archive your pictures and to know when and where you took them; however, when used for bad, it is a source for stalkers to pinpoint your exact location.
When considering the iPhone, you can adjust your privacy settings to turn Location Services off. An example can be seen in Figure 2.12.
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Figure 2.12 Apple’s location services.
If left on, or if someone takes a photo of you (or your children) with it on, you are in a situation where that picture if in the wrong hands could expose exactly where it has been taken. An example can be seen in Figure 2.13.
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Figure 2.13 Location mapping.
Here, if you look at the picture details, it will provide a GPS latitude and longitude recording that when plugged into Google map data, can provide an exact location of your whereabouts. A stalker across the world can find you and learn your location quickly and easily.

Physical reconnaissance

Our last section in the chapter will discuss physical reconnaissance and surveillance. Until now, we have discussed how infiltration, interception, and information gathering takes place within the digital world; however, some of the most successful attacks take place outside of it. There are many reasons for this – people are more overwhelmed and busy today and this could translate into not being aware of their surroundings, it could also be that people do not take into consideration that physical spying does in fact take place.
People will try evasive tactics to protect themselves online; however, they may not do so when traveling to work, for example. If they take the same path to work everyday, stop at the same 7-11 to get coffee, and park in the same spot, it’s easy to discern patterns. This is how some private investigators learn how to “tail” their targets.
In this chapter, we will talk about how information can be gathered on a target by physically following them, talking to them, and/or intercepting phone calls. It should also be mentioned that some of these physical information gathering attacks sometimes cross boundaries into the digital world.

Tailing and Stalking

One of the oldest forms of investigation, information gathering, or stalking technique is to physically follow someone without their knowledge. Private investigators when conducting an information gathering session will generally use video and film footage gathered while following their intended targets. Law enforcement will do the same when conducting an investigation. Attackers will do so to gather information about a target. Stalking a target is considered tailing or following them sometimes to gather information, sometimes to do harm. There is generally no other good reason to follow and stalk someone.
There is no way to explain how this can be done without saying the key is to be inconspicuous (aka sneaky). You must remain out of site, but not so far out of site that you lose sight of your target. There is a balance that must be maintained and if that boundary is crossed, you risk being “made.”
The only way to mitigate this danger is to be aware of your surroundings and change up your routine from time to time. Park somewhere different. Go to a different store. Take a different path. Practicing evasion when you pick up on someone tailing you is dangerous. You should not speed to get away and risk your life and those of others. If you are in danger, a trick is to drive to a police department or other location where you may be safe.

Social Engineering

Another tactic for information gathering revolves around a term called social engineering. What this means is, you trick someone through conversation to produce answers you need. For example, I place a call to you from a spoofed phone number that appears to you to be from a trusted source. I then tell you things that relate to you, us, or our conversation so that I can gain your trust. By asking specific questions and answers, I may be able to ascertain information from you needed to do another task, such as your account information to get into a personal website or bank account. This can then be leveraged into the digital world by exploiting the gathered information.
There are also software tools that can be used as seen in Figure 2.14. Here, Backtrack can load up social engineering programs that can assist you in performing such attacks.
image
Figure 2.14 BackTrack’s social engineering toolkit.
There are other attacks too that can be used to gather information such as dumpster diving. This would be to sift through trash to gather up data you threw away that may contain personal information that can be used against you.
Another form of attack is shoulder surfing, which is simply looking over the shoulder of an unsuspecting victim to view what they are doing such as entering a password or texting someone to gather information about what they are doing.

Tapping

Phone conversations are easy ways to gather information. Even easier is the ability to “tap” a phone line to get information. Before the digital revolution, analog phones were used en masse. They still, however, are becoming a thing of the past as more and more people leverage digital cell phone technology. Before we review how to tap digital phones, we should cover how analog phones are tapped.
Wiretaps are nothing more than getting in between the phone source and destination and inserting a listening device in between. Since the phone system can be considered one long circuit from source to destination and creating a loop, all one would need to do is interject a load in that loop to tap it. An example of an older analog phone can be seen in Figure 2.15.
image
Figure 2.15 Analog phone tapping.
These copper wires contained in the phone and the loop itself are easily manipulated and information can be gathered rather quickly when conducting surveillance of a target.
In the digital age, phones transmit data over networks and sometimes over the public Internet. Mobile phones are now carried by most people today and because they are always in someone’s possession, harder to tap from the client side. From the server side, voicemail servers can be hacked, cell tower logs can be stolen, and data could be captured from source to destination and if unencrypted, read quite easily; however, intercepting it can be difficult.
The easiest way to tap a digital device such as a mobile phone is to be able to get your hands on it. Once you do so, there are many software applications and tools as well as exploits that can be leveraged around it to listen in, track, and bug a device to gather information. Some tools, such as the one seen in Figure 2.16 called TapeACall can record a call without the recipient’s knowledge for later playback.
image
Figure 2.16 Recording iPhone calls.
It should be noted that there are other ways that law enforcement, government, spies, and attackers can “tap” into your phone conversations. Eavesdropping on calls is a quick way to gather information needed.

Legal and Ethical Concerns

In this section, we will cover a famous wiretapping case (case law and outcome) of how information gathering on a target online was brought into court and how it turned out.
The petitioner, Charles Katz, was charged with conducting illegal gambling operations across state lines in violation of federal law. In order to collect evidence against Katz, federal agents placed a warrantless wiretap on the public phone booth that he used to conduct these operations. The agents listened only to Katz’s conversations, and only to the parts of his conversations dealing with illegal gambling transactions.
In the case of Olmstead v. United States (1928), the Supreme Court held that the warrantless wiretapping of phone lines did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. According to the Court, physical intrusion (a trespass) into a given area, and not mere voice amplification (the normal result of a wiretap), is required for an action to constitute a Fourth Amendment search. This is known as the “trespass doctrine.” Partly in response to this decision, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 1933. This Act required, among other things, federal authorities to obtain a warrant before wiretapping private phone lines. In the case of Silverman v. United States (1961), the Supreme Court refined the Olmstead trespass doctrine by holding that an unreasonable search occurs only if a “constitutionally protected area” has been intruded upon.
At his trial, Katz sought to exclude any evidence connected with these wiretaps, arguing that the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search of a “constitutionally protected area” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The federal agents countered by saying that a public phone booth was not a “constitutionally protected area,” therefore, they could place a wiretap on it without a warrant.
Does the warrantless wiretapping of a public phone booth violate the unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
RULING
Yes
REASONING
By a 7-1 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Katz and held that placing of a warrantless wiretap on a public phone booth constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The majority opinion, written by Justice Potter Stewart, however, did not address the case from the perspective of a “constitutionally protected area.” In essence, the majority argued that both sides in the case were wrong to think that the permissibility of a warrantless wiretap depended upon the area being placed under surveillance. “For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection… . But what he seeks to preserve as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected,” the Court stated.
Building upon this reasoning, the Court held that it was the duty of the Judiciary to review petitions for warrants in instances in which persons may be engaging in conduct that they wish to keep secret, even if it were done in a public place. The Court held that, in the absence of a judicially authorized search warrant, the wiretaps of the public phone booth used by Katz were illegal. Therefore, the evidence against him gathered from his conversations should be suppressed.
Retrieved from:
Katz v. United States - 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
U.S. Supreme Court
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Katz v. United States
No. 35
Argued October 17, 1967
Decided December 18, 1967
389 U.S. 347
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Petitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084. Evidence of petitioner’s end of the conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from which the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, since there was “no physical entrance into the area occupied by” petitioner.

Held

1. The Government’s eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 389 U. S. 350-353.
(a) The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements. Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511. P. 389 U. S. 353.
(b) Because the Fourth Amendment protects people, rather than places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. The “trespass” doctrine of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, and Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, is no longer controlling. Pp. 389 U. S. 351, 389 U. S. 353.
2. Although the surveillance in this case may have been so narrowly circumscribed that it could constitutionally have been authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such electronic surveillance. Pp. 389 U. S. 354-359.
369 F.2d 130, reversed.
Page 389 U. S. 348
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute.1 At trial, the Government was permitted, over the petitioner’s objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner’s end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
Page 389 U. S. 349
because “[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner].” 2 We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional questions thus presented.3
The petitioner has phrased those questions as follows:
“A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.”
Page 389 U. S. 350
“B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase “constitutionally protected area.” Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional “right to privacy.” That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.4 Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion.5 But the protection of a person’s general right to privacy – his right to be let alone by other people6 – is, like the
Page 389 U. S. 351
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.7
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a “constitutionally protected area.” The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not.8 But this effort to decide whether or not a given “area,” viewed in the abstract, is “constitutionally protected” deflects attention from the problem presented by this case.9 For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 385 U. S. 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 274 U. S. 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Page 389 U. S. 352
See Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 96 U. S. 733.
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye – it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office,10 in a friend’s apartment,11 or in a taxicab,12 a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.
The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 457, 277 U. S. 464, 277 U. S. 466; Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 316 U. S. 134-136, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible
Page 389 U. S. 353
Property.13 But “[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 304. Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any “technical trespass under… local property law.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511. Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people – and not simply “areas” – against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the “trespass” doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.
Page 389 U. S. 354
The question remaining for decision, then, is whether the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards. In that regard, the Government’s position is that its agents acted in an entirely defensible manner: they did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner’s activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States, in violation of federal law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner’s unlawful telephonic communications. The agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which he used the telephone booth,14 and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of the petitioner himself.15
Accepting this account of the Government’s actions as accurate, it is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts, in fact, took place. Only last Term we sustained the validity of
Page 389 U. S. 355
such an authorization, holding that, under sufficiently “precise and discriminate circumstances,” a federal court may empower government agents to employ a concealed electronic device “for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the… allegations” of a “detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense.” Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 385 U. S. 329-330. Discussing that holding, the Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, said that “the order authorizing the use of the electronic device” in Osborn “afforded similar protections to those… of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence.” Through those protections, “no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances.” Id. at 388 U. S. 57.16 Here, too, a similar
Page 389 U. S. 356
judicial order could have accommodated “the legitimate needs of law enforcement”17 by authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance.
The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions in Olmstead and Goldman, and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive
Page 389 U. S. 357
means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful “notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,” Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S. 33, for the Constitution requires “that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer… be interposed between the citizen and the police....” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 371 U. S. 481-482. “Over and again, this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,” United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 342 U. S. 51, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment18 – subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.19
It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this case. Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with an individual’s arrest could hardly be deemed an “incident” of that arrest.20
Page 389 U. S. 358
Nor could the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified on grounds of “hot pursuit.21 “And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect’s consent.22
The Government does not question these basic principles. Rather, it urges the creation of a new exception to cover this case.23 It argues that surveillance of a telephone booth should be exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such authorization
“bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the… search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 379 U. S. 96. And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment
Page 389 U. S. 359
violations “only in the discretion of the police.” Id. at 379 U. S. 97.
These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored “the procedure of antecedent justification… that is central to the Fourth Amendment,”24 a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and because it led to the petitioner’s conviction, the judgment must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”
“(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal.”
We find no merit in the petitioner’s further suggestion that his indictment must be dismissed. After his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, he testified before a federal grand jury concerning the charges involved here. Because he was compelled to testify pursuant to a grant of immunity, 48 Stat. 1096, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 409(l), it is clear that the fruit of his testimony cannot be used against him in any future trial. But the petitioner asks for more. He contends that. his conviction must be vacated and the charges against him dismissed lest he be “subjected to [a] penalty… on account of [a]… matter… concerning which he [was] compelled… to testify....” 47 U.S.C. § 409(l). Frank v. United States, 347 F.2d 486. We disagree. In relevant part, § 409(l) substantially repeats the language of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C. § 46, which was Congress’ response to this Court’s statement that an immunity statute can supplant the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only if it affords adequate protection from future prosecution or conviction. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 142 U. S. 585-586. The statutory provision here involved was designed to provide such protection, see Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 359 U. S. 45-46, not to confer immunity from punishment pursuant to a prior prosecution and adjudication of guilt. Cf. Regina v. United States, 364 U. S. 507, 364 U. S. 513-514.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I feel compelled to reply to the separate concurring opinion of my Brother WHITE, which I view as a wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels “national security” matters.
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they believe national security may be involved, they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested. Rather it should vigorously investigate
Page 389 U. S. 360
and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national security cases. They may even be the intended victims of subversive action. Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that, where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the position of “adversary and prosecutor” and disinterested, neutral magistrate.
There is, so far as I understand constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth Amendment between types of crimes. Article III, § 3, gives “treason” a very narrow definition, and puts restrictions on its proof. But the Fourth Amendment draws no lines between various substantive offenses. The arrests in cases of “hot pursuit” and the arrests on visible or other evidence of probable cause cut across the board, and are not peculiar to any kind of crime.
I would respect the present lines of distinction, and not improvise because a particular crime seems particularly heinous. When the Framers took that step, as they did with treason, the worst crime of all, they made their purpose manifest.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, and unlike a field, Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic, as well as physical, intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment
Page 389 U. S. 361
and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a “place.” My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus, a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected,” because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable. Cf. Hester v. United States, supra.
The critical fact in this case is that “[o]ne who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume” that his conversation is not being intercepted. Ante at 389 U. S. 352. The point is not that the booth is “accessible to the public” at other times, ante at 389 U. S. 351, but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable. Cf. Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253.
In Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, we held that eavesdropping accomplished by means of an electronic device that penetrated the premises occupied by petitioner was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Page 389 U. S. 362
That case established that interception of conversations reasonably intended to be private could constitute a “search and seizure.” and that the examination or taking of physical property was not required. This view of the Fourth Amendment was followed in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, at 371 U. S. 485, and Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, at 51. Also compare Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, at 385 U. S. 327. In Silverman, we found it unnecessary to reexamine Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, which had held that electronic surveillance accomplished without the physical penetration of petitioner’s premises by a tangible object did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This case requires us to reconsider Goldman, and I agree that it should now be overruled.* Its limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.
Finally, I do not read the Court’s opinion to declare that no interception of a conversation one-half of which occurs in a public telephone booth can be reasonable in the absence of a warrant. As elsewhere under the Fourth Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs of law enforcement may demand specific exceptions. It will be time enough to consider any such exceptions when an appropriate occasion presents itself, and I agree with the Court that this is not one.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
I agree that the official surveillance of petitioner’s telephone conversations in a public booth must be subjected
Page 389 U. S. 363
to the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and that, on the record now before us, the particular surveillance undertaken was unreasonable absent a warrant properly authorizing it. This application of the Fourth Amendment need not interfere with legitimate needs of law enforcement.*
In joining the Court’s opinion, I note the Court’s acknowledgment that there are circumstances in which it is reasonable to search without a warrant. In this connection, in footnote 23 the Court points out that today’s decision does not reach national security cases Wiretapping to protect the security of the Nation has been authorized by successive Presidents. The present Administration would apparently save national security cases from restrictions against wiretapping. See Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 388 U. S. 112-118 (1967) (WHITE, J.
Page 389 U. S. 364
dissenting). We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate’s judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
If I could agree with the Court that eavesdropping carried on by electronic means (equivalent to wiretapping) constitutes a “search” or “seizure,” I would be happy to join the Court’s opinion For on that premise, my Brother STEWART sets out methods in accord with the Fourth Amendment to guide States in the enactment and enforcement of laws passed to regulate wiretapping by government. In this respect, today’s opinion differs sharply from Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, decided last Term, which held void on its face a New York statute authorizing wiretapping on warrants issued by magistrates on showings of probable cause. The Berger case also set up what appeared to be insuperable obstacles to the valid passage of such wiretapping laws by States. The Court’s opinion in this case, however, removes the doubts about state power in this field and abates to a large extent the confusion and near-paralyzing effect of the Berger holding. Notwithstanding these good efforts of the Court, I am still unable to agree with its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
My basic objection is two-fold: (1) I do not believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by today’s decision, and (2) I do not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite the Amendment in order “to bring it into harmony with the times,” and thus reach a result that many people believe to be desirable.
Page 389 U. S. 365
While I realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope, and no doubt the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses on such nebulous subjects as privacy, for me, the language of the Amendment is the crucial place to look in construing a written document such as our Constitution. The Fourth Amendment says that
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
The first clause protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures....” These words connote the idea of tangible things with size, form, and weight, things capable of being searched, seized, or both. The second clause of the Amendment still further establishes its Framers’ purpose to limit its protection to tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue but those “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither be searched nor seized. In addition the language of the second clause indicates that the Amendment refers not only to something tangible so it can be seized, but to something already in existence, so it can be described. Yet the Court’s interpretation would have the Amendment apply to overhearing future conversations, which, by their very nature, are nonexistent until they take place. How can one “describe” a future conversation, and, if one cannot, how can a magistrate issue a warrant to eavesdrop one in the future? It is argued that information showing what
Page 389 U. S. 366
is expected to be said is sufficient to limit the boundaries of what later can be admitted into evidence; but does such general information really meet the specific language of the Amendment, which says “particularly describing”? Rather than using language in a completely artificial way, I must conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping.
Tapping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping (and wiretapping is nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone) was, as even the majority opinion in Berger, supra, recognized
“an ancient practice which, at common law, was condemned as a nuisance. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 168. In those days, the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private discourse.”
388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 45. There can be no doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and, if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment. They certainly would not have left such a task to the ingenuity of language-stretching judges. No one, it seems to me, can read the debates on the Bill of Rights without reaching the conclusion that its Framers and critics well knew the meaning of the words they used, what they would be understood to mean by others, their scope and their limitations. Under these circumstances, it strikes me as a charge against their scholarship, their common sense and their candor to give to the Fourth Amendment’s language the eavesdropping meaning the Court imputes to it today.
I do not deny that common sense requires, and that this Court often has said, that the Bill of Rights’ safeguards should be given a liberal construction. This
Page 389 U. S. 367
principle, however, does not justify construing the search and seizure amendment as applying to eavesdropping or the “seizure” of conversations. The Fourth Amendment was aimed directly at the abhorred practice of breaking in, ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing people’s personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates. The Amendment deserves, and this Court has given it, a liberal construction in order to protect against warrantless searches of buildings and seizures of tangible personal effects. But, until today, this Court has refused to say that eavesdropping comes within the ambit of Fourth Amendment restrictions. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942).
So far, I have attempted to state why I think the words of the Fourth Amendment prevent its application to eavesdropping. It is important now to show that this has been the traditional view of the Amendment’s scope since its adoption, and that the Court’s decision in this case, along with its amorphous holding in Berger last Term, marks the first real departure from that view.
The first case to reach this Court which actually involved a clear-cut test of the Fourth Amendment’s applicability to eavesdropping through a wiretap was, of course, Olmstead, supra. In holding that the interception of private telephone conversations by means of wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, this Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, examined the language of the Amendment and found, just as I do now, that the words could not be stretched to encompass overheard conversations:
“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things -- the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful, is
Page 389 U. S. 368
that it must specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized....”
“* * * *”
“Justice Bradley in the Boyd case [Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616], and Justice Clark[e] in the Gouled case [Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298], said that the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment were to be liberally construed to effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in the interest of liberty. But that cannot justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight.”
277 U.S. at 277 U. S. 464-465.
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, is an even clearer example of this Court’s traditional refusal to consider eavesdropping as being covered by the Fourth Amendment. There, federal agents used a detectaphone, which was placed on the wall of an adjoining room, to listen to the conversation of a defendant carried on in his private office and intended to be confined within the four walls of the room. This Court, referring to Olmstead, found no Fourth Amendment violation.
It should be noted that the Court in Olmstead based its decision squarely on the fact that wiretapping or eavesdropping does not violate the Fourth Amendment. As shown supra in the cited quotation from the case, the Court went to great pains to examine the actual language of the Amendment, and found that the words used simply could not be stretched to cover eavesdropping. That there was no trespass was not the determinative factor, and indeed the Court, in citing Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, indicated that, even where there was a trespass, the Fourth Amendment does not automatically apply to evidence obtained by “hearing or
Page 389 U. S. 369
sight.” The Olmstead majority characterized Hester as holding
“that the testimony of two officers of the law who trespassed on the defendant’s land, concealed themselves one hundred yards away from his house, and saw him come out and hand a bottle of whiskey to another, was not inadmissible. While there was a trespass, there was no search of person, house, papers or effects.”
277 U.S. at 277 U. S. 465. Thus, the clear holding of the Olmstead and Goldman cases, undiluted by any question of trespass, is that eavesdropping, in both its original and modern forms, is not violative of the Fourth Amendment.
While my reading of the Olmstead and Goldman cases convinces me that they were decided on the basis of the inapplicability of the wording of the Fourth Amendment to eavesdropping, and not on any trespass basis, this is not to say that unauthorized intrusion has not played an important role in search and seizure cases. This Court has adopted an exclusionary rule to bar evidence obtained by means of such intrusions. As I made clear in my dissenting opinion in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 388 U. S. 76, I continue to believe that this exclusionary rule formulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, rests on the “supervisory power” of this Court over other federal courts and is not rooted in the Fourth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, concurring opinion, 338 U. S. 338 U.S. 25, 338 U. S. 39, at 40. See also Mapp v. Ohio, concurring opinion, 367 U. S. 367 U.S. 643, 367 U. S. 661-666. This rule has caused the Court to refuse to accept evidence where there has been such an intrusion regardless of whether there has been a search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As this Court said in Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 373 U. S. 438-439
“The Court has in the past sustained instances of ‘electronic eavesdropping’ against constitutional challenge when devices have been used to enable government agents to overhear conversations which would have been beyond the reach of the human ear [citing
Page 389 U. S. 370
Olmstead and Goldman]. It has been insisted only that the electronic device not be planted by an unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Silverman v. United States.”
To support its new interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which, in effect, amounts to a rewriting of the language, the Court’s opinion concludes that “the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been… eroded by our subsequent decisions....” But the only cases cited as accomplishing this “eroding” are Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294. Neither of these cases “eroded” Olmstead or Goldman. Silverman is an interesting choice, since there the Court expressly refused to reexamine the rationale of Olmstead or Goldman although such a reexamination was strenuously urged upon the Court by the petitioners’ counsel. Also, it is significant that, in Silverman, as the Court described it, “the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners,” 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 509, thus calling into play the supervisory exclusionary rule of evidence. As I have pointed out above, where there is an unauthorized intrusion, this Court has rejected admission of evidence obtained regardless of whether there has been an unconstitutional search and seizure. The majority’s decision here relies heavily on the statement in the opinion that the Court “need not pause to consider whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local property law relating to party walls.” (At 365 U. S. 511.) Yet this statement should not becloud the fact that, time and again, the opinion emphasizes that there has been an unauthorized intrusion:
“For a fair reading of the record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners.”
(At 365 U. S. 509, emphasis added.) “Eavesdropping
Page 389 U. S. 371
accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even those decisions....” (At 365 U. S. 509, emphasis added.) “Here… the officers overheard the petitioners’ conversations only by usurping part of the petitioners’ house or office....” (At 365 U. S. 511, emphasis added.) “[D]ecision here… is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion....” (At 365 U. S. 512, emphasis added.) “We find no occasion to reexamine Goldman here, but we decline to go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch.” (At 365 U. S. 512, emphasis added.) As if this were not enough, Justices Clark and Whittaker concurred with the following statement:
“In view of the determination by the majority that the unauthorized physical penetration into petitioners’ premises constituted sufficient trespass to remove this case from the coverage of earlier decisions, we feel obliged to join in the Court’s opinion.”
(At 365 U. S. 513, emphasis added.) As I made clear in my dissent in Berger, the Court in Silverman held the evidence should be excluded by virtue of the exclusionary rule, and “I would not have agreed with the Court’s opinion in Silverman… had I thought that the result depended on finding a violation of the Fourth Amendment....” 388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 79-80. In light of this and the fact that the Court expressly refused to reexamine Olmstead and Goldman, I cannot read Silverman as overturning the interpretation stated very plainly in Olmstead and followed in Goldman that eavesdropping is not covered by the Fourth Amendment.
The other “eroding” case cited in the Court’s opinion is Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294. It appears that this case is cited for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment applies to “intangibles,” such as conversation, and the following ambiguous statement is quoted from the opinion: “The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.” 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 304. But far from being concerned
Page 389 U. S. 372
with eavesdropping, Warden v. Hayden upholds the seizure of clothes, certainly tangibles by any definition. The discussion of property interests was involved only with the common law rule that the right to seize property depended upon proof of a superior property interest.
Thus, I think that, although the Court attempts to convey the impression that, for some reason, today Olmstead and Goldman are no longer good law, it must face up to the fact that these cases have never been overruled, or even “eroded.” It is the Court’s opinions in this case and Berger which, for the first time since 1791, when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, have declared that eavesdropping is subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions and that conversations can be “seized.”* I must align myself with all those judges who up to this year have never been able to impute such a meaning to the words of the Amendment.
Page 389 U. S. 373
Since I see no way in which the words of the Fourth Amendment can be construed to apply to eavesdropping, that closes the matter for me. In interpreting the Bill of Rights, I willingly go as far as a liberal construction of the language takes me, but I simply cannot in good conscience give a meaning to words which they have never before been thought to have and which they certainly do not have in common ordinary usage. I will not distort the words of the Amendment in order to “keep the Constitution up to date” or “to bring it into harmony with the times.” It was never meant that this Court have such power, which, in effect, would make us a continuously functioning constitutional convention.
With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual’s privacy. By clever word juggling, the Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations that can neither be searched nor seized. Few things happen to an individual that do not affect his privacy in one way or another. Thus, by arbitrarily substituting the Court’s language, designed to protect privacy, for the Constitution’s language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court’s broadest concept of privacy. As I said in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479
“The Court talks about a constitutional ’right of privacy’ as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the ’privacy’
Page 389 U. S. 374
of individuals. But there is not.”
(Dissenting opinion, at 381 U. S. 508.) I made clear in that dissent my fear of the dangers involved when this Court uses the “broad, abstract and ambiguous concept” of “privacy” as a “comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ (See generally dissenting opinion at 381 U. S. 507-527.)
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give this Court the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything which affects privacy. Certainly the Framers, well acquainted as they were with the excesses of governmental power, did not intend to grant this Court such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The history of governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers in courts.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Retrieved from:
As we can see from this case and others we will review, it is particularly important to consider the legal ramifications of cybercrime. With surveillance and reconnaissance in the digital world, there are enforceable laws that can be used to protect victims of related crimes.

1 18 U.S.C. § 1084. That statute provides in pertinent part:

2 369 F.2d 130, 134

3 386 U. S. 954. The petition for certiorari also challenged the validity of a warrant authorizing the search of the petitioner’s premises. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not reach that issue.

4 “The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by having it seized privately and by stealth.… And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 381 U. S. 509 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK).

5 The First Amendment, for example, imposes limitations upon governmental abridgment of “freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.” NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 462. The Third Amendment’s prohibition against the unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects another aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion. To some extent, the Fifth Amendment too “reflects the Constitution’s concern for… ... the right of each individual “to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.”“‘ Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 382 U. S. 416. Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case is whether that interference violates a command of the United States Constitution.

6 See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev.193 (1890).

7 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77.

8 In support of their respective claims, the parties have compiled competing lists of “protected areas” for our consideration. It appears to be common ground that a private home is such an area, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, but that an open field is not. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57. Defending the inclusion of a telephone booth in his list the petitioner cites United States v. Stone, 232 F.Supp. 396, and United States v. Madison, 32 L.W. 2243 (D.C. Ct.Gen.Sess.). Urging that the telephone booth should be excluded, the Government finds support in United States v. Borgese, 235 F.Supp. 286.

9 It is true that this Court has occasionally described its conclusions in terms of “constitutionally protected areas,” see, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 510, 365 U. S. 512; Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 373 U. S. 438-439; Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 388 U. S. 57, 388 U. S. 59, but we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.

10 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385.

11 Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257.

12 Rios v United States, 364 U. S. 253.

13 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 464-466. We do not deal in this case with the law of detention or arrest under the Fourth Amendment.

14 Based upon their previous visual observations of the petitioner, the agents correctly predicted that he would use the telephone booth for several minutes at approximately the same time each morning. The petitioner was subjected to electronic surveillance only during this predetermined period. Six recordings, averaging some three minutes each, were obtained and admitted in evidence. They preserved the petitioners end of conversations concerning the placing of bets and the receipt of wagering information.

15 On the single occasion when the statements of another person were inadvertently intercepted, the agents refrained from listening to them.

16 Although the protections afforded the petitioner in Osborn were “similar… to those… of conventional warrants,” they were not identical. A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended search. But if Osborn had been told in advance that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of making such recordings would obviously have been lost; the evidence in question could not have been obtained. In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the federal court that authorized electronic surveillance in Osborn simply recognized, as has this Court, that officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence. See Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 374 U. S. 37-41.

Although the protections afforded the petitioner in Osborn were “similar … to those … of conventional warrants,” they were not identical. A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended search. But if Osborn had been told in advance that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of making such recordings would obviously have been lost; the evidence in question could not have been obtained. In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the federal court that authorized electronic surveillance in Osborn simply recognized, as has this Court, that officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence. See Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 374 U. S. 37-41.

Although some have thought that this “exception to the notice requirement where exigent circumstances are present,” id. at 374 U. S. 39, should be deemed inapplicable where police enter a home before its occupants are aware that officers are present, id. at 374 U. S. 55-58 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN), the reasons for such a limitation have no bearing here. However true it may be that “[i]nnocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion,” id. at 374 U. S. 57, and that “the requirement of awareness … serves to minimize the hazards of the officers’ dangerous calling,” id. at 374 U. S. 57-58, these considerations are not relevant to the problems presented by judicially authorized electronic surveillance.

Nor do the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose an inflexible requirement of prior notice.Rule 41(d) does require federal officers to serve upon the person searched a copy of the warrant and a receipt describing the material obtained, but it does not invariably require that this be done before the search takes place. Nordelli v. United States, 24 F.2d 665, 666-667.

Thus, the fact that the petitioner in Osborn was unaware that his words were being electronically transcribed did not prevent this Court from sustaining his conviction, and did not prevent the Court in Berger from reaching the conclusion that the use of the recording device sanctioned in Osborn was entirely lawful. 388 U. S. 41, 388 U. S. 57.

17 Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 373 U. S. 464 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

18 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 357 U. S. 497-499; Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253, 364 U. S. 261; Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610, 365 U. S. 613-615; Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 376 U. S. 486-487.

19 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 153, 156; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 335 U. S. 454-456; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 174-177; Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 298-300.

20 In Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S. 30, the Court stated:

“The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.”

Whatever one’s view of “the longstanding practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the accused found upon arrest,” United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 339 U. S. 61; cf. id. at 339 U. S. 71-79 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), the concept of an “incidental” search cannot readily be extended to include surreptitious surveillance of an individual either immediately before, or immediately after, his arrest.

21 Although

“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others,”

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 298-299, there seems little likelihood that electronic surveillance would be a realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency.

22 A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements, Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624, but, of course, “the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect.” Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 373 U. S. 463 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

23 Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.

24 See Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 385 U. S. 330.

* I also think that the course of development evinced by Silverman. supra, Wong Sun., supra, Berger, supra, and today’s decision must be recognized as overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, which essentially rested on the ground that conversations were not subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

* In previous cases, which are undisturbed by today’s decision, the Court has upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained (1) by an undercover police agent to whom a defendant speaks without knowledge that he is in the employ of the police, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1966); (2) by a recording device hidden on the person of such an informant, Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427 (1963); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 (1966), and (3) by a policeman listening to the secret microwave transmissions of an agent conversing with the defendant in another location, On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 (1952). When one man speaks to another, he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to whom he speaks will make public what he has heard. The Fourth Amendment does not protect against unreliable (or law-abiding) associates. Hoffa v. United States, supra. It is but a logical and reasonable extension of this principle that a man take the risk that his hearer, free to memorize what he hears for later verbatim repetitions, is instead recording it or transmitting it to another. The present case deals with an entirely different situation, for as the Court emphasizes the petitioner “sought to exclude… the uninvited ear,” and spoke under circumstances in which a reasonable person would assume that uninvited ears were not listening.

* The first paragraph of my Brother HARLAN’s concurring opinion is susceptible of the interpretation, although probably not intended, that this Court “has long held” eavesdropping to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore “presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.” There is no reference to any long line of cases, but simply a citation to Silverman, and several cases following it, to establish this historical proposition. In the first place, as I have indicated in this opinion, I do not read Silverman as holding any such thing, and, in the second place, Silverman was decided in 1961. Thus, whatever it held, it cannot be said it “has [been] long held.” I think my Brother HARLAN recognizes this later in his opinion when he admits that the Court must now overrule Olmstead and Goldman. In having to overrule these cases in order to establish the holding the Court adopts today, it becomes clear that the Court is promulgating new doctrine instead of merely following what it “has long held.” This is emphasized by my Brother HARLAN’s claim that it is “bad physics” to adhere to Goldman. Such an assertion simply illustrates the propensity of some members of the Court to rely on their limited understanding of modern scientific subjects in order to fit the Constitution to the times and give its language a meaning that it will not tolerate.

Summary

In sum, this chapter was written to open your eyes to the amount of ways in which information could be collected to conduct surveillance of a target. The digital footprint you leave everyday (you can’t see it but it is there) could be enormous based on how much you interact in the digital realm.
Unfortunately, we cannot isolate ourselves from living and doing so carefully and with due diligence will keep us safe; however, the method of attack and the growing landscape expanding the attack vector puts everyone at risk. By practicing safe security practices such as being aware of your surroundings, being careful about leaving or losing devices or other personal information, and checking to see if your systems are free and clear of malware are all good ways to be safe.
Information gathering will take place; however, it’s up to us to limit the amount of information that can be gathered. Stalkers gather information on targets, government agencies collect information on the public, their adversaries, and military targets, and corporations gather information on their competition – it is undeniable that this practice will not stop.
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