Chapter 12

Factors Influencing the Widespread Uptake of HDR Video

C. Moir; A. Chalmers    University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom

Abstract

From relative obscurity just a few years ago, high dynamic range (HDR) has become a powerful marketing tool in the drive to sell “next-generation” televisions. Although higher resolution 4K (3840 × 2160 pixels) televisions have been around for a number of years, they were gaining limited market penetration, as they provide little noticeable difference from full high definition (HD) (1920 × 1080 pixels) displays. Of the UHDTV, TU-R Recommendation BT.2020, specification for the next generation of televisions (higher spatial resolution, wider color gamut, higher frame rate, and more dynamic range), it is the introduction of HDR that users most notice. The result has been a rush to introduce some form of wider dynamic range to televisions, and to market this heavily as providing an enhanced viewing experience. This chapter considers the factors that could influence and indeed possibly limit, the wide spread adoption of HDR video.

Keywords

HDR video; Adoption; Compatibility; Coordination and standards

1 Introduction

Adoption of high dynamic range (HDR) video is defined as expenditure by firms, households, and governments on products from capture to display that embody a new technology, or bundle of new technologies that make up an HDR pipeline. Thousands of visitors to the 2016 Consumer Electronics Show witnessed the introduction of the first commercially available HDR televisions. Promoted as offering more vibrant colors, much brighter images, greater contrast, deeper blacks, and the major enhancement of 4K resolution, Sony, LG, Panasonic, and Samsung all proclaimed HDR as the technology of the future. Branded as ultra high definition (UHD), the televisions were big. The largest Sony HDR model, for example, has an 85-in. display; the smallest is 55 in. Comfortable viewing would, according to ITU-R recommendations [1], require a room that allowed over 11 ft between the viewer and the 85-in. screen. Commercial adoption of HDR video is in terms of 10 or 12 bit images. The televisions are being sold online, in specialist shops, and department stores in the United Kingdom and the United States among other countries. In televisions at least HDR video had unambiguously been adopted by some leading manufacturers.

Despite the fact that since CES16 HDR has been made widely available by leading television manufactures, content is limited for now. At the same show, Netflix and Amazon offered 4K HDR content. As of Apr. 2016, Netflix had offered viewers Season 1 of the Marco Polo series in 4K HDR. This required the viewer to join the Netflix 4K content streaming plan, priced at $12 per month, and to own an HDR TV, as well as an internet connection of at least 20 Mbps, enough for supporting 4K UHD content streams [2]. Amazon Prime, on the other hand, offered 27 4K HDR films. Again, the viewers needed to be customers of Amazon Prime subscription service and own an HDR 4K TV [3]. Warner Brothers also plans to release 35 4K HDR Blu-Ray films in 2016. All hope others will follow their lead. Video capture in HDR is less of an issue. The ARRI Alexa, Red Epic, Sony F65, and a host of other cameras are capable of capturing raw footage with a dynamic range in excess of the current televisions’ capability to show it [4]. For now (summer 2016), commercially HDR video enabled displays are confined to televisions alone. HDR video is not yet commercially available on phones, tablets, or laptop computers.

Current HDR video commercial adoption is less than technologically optimal. At each stage of the HDR video pipeline, the technology in commercially available HDR televisions is inferior, in performance, to that in the best available technologies. Cameras capturing 10-bit content typically record around 10 f-stops where, with the right sensors, they could capture up to 18 f-stops, or 16 without significant noise. Much of the content is tone mapped on the camera, so a significant proportion of information is lost. Recent perceptual lossey encoding and decoding file compression techniques mean significant information and detail for human consumption does not have to be lost. The HDR branded televisions have a peak brightness of 1000 nits. SIM2 will sell you a 6000 nit monitor. Avoidance of using the best available technology in consumer electronics is the exception, rather than the rule. A more typical story over the last three decades is one technology embodied in one product is quickly replaced by a superior technology embodied in another. Think of Nokia and Blackberry and Apple and Samsung; AOL and Google; Kodak and Cannon or Nikon. In televisions the path has been HD to 4K to 3D to HDR video. Much of this chapter is devoted to trying to answer the question: “Why is there a gap between best available and commercially adopted HDR technologies?”

A complete HDR pipeline is a system made up of key components: (1) cameras capable of capturing at least 14 f-stops of luminance range, fully visible RGB color gamut (0.005–10,000 cd/m2); (2) standards or formats for HDR signals off the camera, for converting data files into a video shown on a display; despite 3 years of MPEG discussion, this is still a contentious element; (3) programming and content provision in the HDR format; (4) transmission or distribution along a coaxial, fiber or wireless network capable of delivering the HDR compressed signal to the household; and (5) televisions capable of receiving and displaying the HDR video image with a peak brightness of, say, around 6000 nits.

We need to define terms. Following the work of COST Action IC1005 [5] and adopted by MPEG ad hoc committee on HDR in their Call for Evidence [6]:

Standard dynamic range (SDR) is ≤10 f-stops (aka low dynamic rage (LDR)).

Enhanced dynamic range is >10 f-stops and ≤16 f-stops.

HDR is >16 f-stops.

Converting f-stops into units of dynamic range 16 f-stops equates with contrast ratio of difference of 216 = 65, 536:1. This is normally noted as 100,000:1; approximately what the eye can see in a scene with no adaptation. Throughout this chapter HDR is taken to be associated with 32-bit images.

The system is disintegrated, in that no single firm takes responsibility for executing and controlling all tasks, products, or processes in the HDR system or pipeline. This has implications for each individual firm’s decision as to whether or not to adopt and invest in any one of the system components. One implication is whether the costs to business of investing in commercial exploitation of best available HDR technologies exceeds what they see as any plausible future revenue stream. Another is an ex ante assessment of whether consumers will pay the kinds of price premiums for a higher 16- or 32-bit HDR television that are implied by the prices of existing SIM2’s 4000 and 6000 nit displays and Dolby’s 4000 and 2000 nit monitors; named Pulsar and Maui, respectively.

A third implication for decision making is one firm’s decision of whether or not to invest in best available HDR technologies is conditional on future, often uncertain, expectations of other firms’ intentions. This does not have to be simultaneous. Camera manufacturers supply cameras that can capture greater ranges of luminance and color gamut than the typical television or cinema projector can display. When America switched from black and white television to color, the studios and broadcasters created a library of color film and broadcast footage long before color televisions were sold in significant numbers [7].

It is conditional because of the need for technological and product compatibility; both backward-looking and across contemporary, and future technologies. Without compatibility the incentive for a firm to invest and adopt is much reduced. The risk of investing in a technology that is not backward compatible, for example, is the value of past investments trends to zero. They are left stranded by superior technologies if the functions of past technologies cannot be incorporated in new products. Producers and consumers can suffer from stranding.

Compatibility is helped by a coordinating mechanism among firms. Coordination makes it more likely that investments are made in complementary technologies. The problem is the costs and benefits of coordination may not be neutral across interested businesses. Coordination through exploitation of market power by leading producers sponsoring a standard, for example, usually results in the accumulation of significant license income (excess profits) to the sponsor to the detriment of other, license buying, firms. Coordination through the creation of standard by a committee, for example, MPEG, risks selecting a standard that becomes technologically inferior soon after it is adopted, or is not seen as commercially viable option by enough firms for it to be widely adopted. Coordination by government regulation that imposes a mandatory standard on the sector, risks rewarding many winners but penalizing many losers whose products and technologies do not conform. Losers usually complain or go to court; winners keep quiet.

These influences on a firm’s investment decision form the basis for assessing the likelihood that the current commercial HDR adoption will converge with best available HDR technologies. There is, though, one more factor that is key to thoughts on adoption. The market for HDR video has the characteristics of a network. When one firm with a relevant technology or product enters the market, other firms supplying complementary technologies all benefit. When one new buyer buys a particular kind of consumer electronic device, all other consumers with compatible devices also benefit from this network expansion. All producers hope to gain from larger scale of production. Greater scale lowers unit costs of production. Reduced costs feed through to lower prices of products in the shop or online. The logic of this line of argument is adoption on a large scale and is more likely if there is one network of complementary HDR technologies in the HDR system. This is rather than many competing networks based on incompatible systems. With competing systems, producers associated with different networks hope to attract more customers, and through this, create a bandwagon of more and more customers joining their network. Ultimately a firm’s aspiration is market dominance for their chosen network. Securing industry-wide agreement to a specific standard or format for HDR signals is often a first step to a particular network assuming market dominance.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the technical characteristics of current HDR television adoption, asks what is new and explores reasons for this kind of adoption, rather than something more radical. Section 3 asks whether current adoption is likely to be short-lived and a step to adoption based on convergence between commercial application and exploiting best available HDR technologies. This is seen from the point of view of cost and other constraints on producers of switching to a 16-bit, and then a 32-bit pipeline. Section 4 reviews the significance of the need for coordination and compatibility within the context of competing networks. Section 5 explores how compatibility and coordination might be brought about, with particular emphasis on contrasting action through standards promoted by sponsoring firms, or agreement through a committee. Finally, Section 6 concludes by offering some observations on prospects for further adoption and whether what we currently experience is likely to endure.

By definition, we are attempting to analyze a world that does not exist. This is the widespread future adoption and dissemination of 32-bit based HDR video on a variety of consumer devices and in cinemas. We believe there is value in drawing on evidence from recent developments in the market for phones, tablets, laptops, and desktop computers and to a lesser extent, the adoption of color televisions, albeit many years ago.

2 Current HDR Video Television Adoption: What and Why

2.1 Incremental Innovation

The adoption of recently launched HDR televisions represents an increment of innovation, mainly in the application of full array LED backlighting on a commercial scale. Of greatest significance is reducing LED heat and power consumption, so that television running costs approach levels consistent with profitable sales. Successful innovation leads to profitable sales based on the combined value of enhanced viewing experience of HDR video over SDR, and the price premium charged for the former over an equivalent sized 4K television. In other respects, for camera, distribution, and compression, maximum use is made of existing IT transmission infrastructure. (Fiber, wireless for hardware, share of spectrum; a software processing languages consistent with 10 or 12 bit pipelines.) The world’s major suppliers of televisions have overcome a perennial question of early adopters. Is it better to go first, or wait and learn from others’ mistakes? They unambiguously have gone first.

Arguably the greatest novelty is in the peak brightness of the new consumer HDR displays. This is around 1000 nits, or twice that of conventional SDR televisions. Contrast ratios on the larger commercial HDR television are thought to be around 211:1 compared to about 28:1 on a flat screen SDR television. Highlights are brighter. Frame rates are up and there is a lot of research to improve the color gamut, including the use of quantum dot technology [8]. The amount of enhanced viewing experience that comes from watching HDR content is scene dependent. Scenes with bright sunlight, white snow, and dark forests inhabited by bears and wolves lend themselves to HDR because of the wide range of light: bright to dark. This is also true for scenes where there is mystery lurking in dark areas, and where the unveiling is in the detail of grades of gray areas. Daylight scenes with a narrow range of light, and few areas in shade offer less benefit from HDR. Images of fields of sunflowers or bright red roses show off the vibrancy of color far more in a 4K HDR video than an LDR HD sequence. In these senses newness has very variable relevance to the viewer. As Fig. 1 shows, daylight scenes with a narrow range of light and few areas in shade offer less benefit from HDR than a candle in a dark room.

f12-01-9780128094778
Fig. 1 A single candle lit in dark a room has a dynamic range 16.8 million to 1, while items evenly lit by sunlight only have a dynamic range of 256 to 1 [9]. (Image courtesy of Jassim Happa.)

When Dolby have shown off their state-of-the-art 4000 nit higher dynamic range monitor at IBC or NAB exhibitions, they have done it in a dark room. They are mimicking the light conditions of a commercial or home cinema. The market for their monitor is the studios and other movie content makers. It is not surprising that they base their marketing on replicating a viewer watching a movie in a cinema. Home cinemas typically are in rooms 4 × 8 m [source SIM2]. Dark rooms in a home might be the conventional viewing conditions of people who buy the latest Sony, Samsung, Panasonic, or LG television. This seems unlikely given the investment these businesses have put into widespread marketing of their HDR televisions in specialty shops and department stores. But what household in Europe or North America living in houses, apartments, or condominiums is going to be able to accommodate an 85-in. television in their sitting room? Perhaps HDR TVs are not aimed at a mass market of existing television owners seeking to replace their aging televisions.

Viewing in a dark room extenuates the perceived contrast on the screen and offers an enhanced viewing experience. It differentiates an HDR television from an SDR one to a point where it is easy to see consumers being prepared to pay a higher price for it. But if the room lighting is approaching day light, so that the contrast is less stark, would the price premium be anywhere near as much? A recent survey of a number of consumers of HDR TVs has shown that in order to clearly see the benefits of HDR video backlit LCD, displays should be viewed in ambient lighting of <5 nits, while OLED HDR displays with their deeper black levels should only be viewed in a dark environment, in which walls are not painted white [10].

Despite significant work for more than 3 years by the MPEG ad hoc committee on HDR, there is as yet (Jul. 2016) no single agreed standard for HDR. A number of televisions, including Sony, Samsung, and Panasonic use HDR10, while others, such as LG, use both HDR10 and Dolby Vision to deliver HDR [11]. Common to both these methods is the Perceptual Quantitiser (PQ) method of HDR video encoding [12]. PQ is derived from the Barton curves of Barten [13], so not that new. Nor are the methods used to distribute content from capture to household display new. The larger bit-depth of 10 or 12 bits, needed to facilitate the retention of more data and create the digitized HDR image is a modest increase on that required by an 8-bit SDR television. Video codecs for distribution use uniform standards such as H265 or high efficiency video codec (HEVC) [14].

While there is commercial novelty in the widespread marketing of new UHD/HDR televisions, the technology that creates the HDR video display image is older. A technology using a full array matrix of either white or colored LEDs to backlight the front television panel was presented by Brightside in 2004 [15], and further developed by Dolby and SIM2 after the acquisition of Brightside by Dolby in February 2007. What is new, compared to the original approach of Brightside, is the use of LEDs around the edge of a display that throw directed light onto mirrors at the back of the panel.

The distribution of HDR content from camera (as raw uncompressed linear data or tone map compressed) requires conversion into smaller file sizes so that distribution, and then creation of an image on the HDR display is more manageable and cost-effective. This is not new either. All the new HDR televisions receive data files in this way and convert them to create the desired image using the PQ curves [12].

4K HDR televisions available complement, rather than replace existing producers’ range of 4K or full HD televisions of different screen size. They do differ in internet capability. Some are branded as SMART TV, others Android. The price difference between 4K and 4KHDR, for otherwise the same specification television, is around double. Prices of Samsung 65-in. 4K and 4K with HDR televisions are £1400 and £2700, respectively, in a well-known UK department store. The difference between the prices of 48-in. TV full HD compared with 4K HDR television was just under £1000. Prices were £470 and £1400, respectively. These are large price premiums. It is not known how many HDR 4K televisions have been sold.

2.2 Why Might Any Form of HDR Video Imaging Be Adopted?

At its most basic, the recent adoption of HDR televisions can be explained in terms of television manufacturers innovating in response to pressures caused by falling retail prices of TVs, short- and long-term. The average quality adjusted price of televisions in the United States has declined by around 90% since 1997, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics [16]. The price of a 32-in. LCD television fell from $725 in 2008 to just $200 in 2013 [17]. Another market research report, this time for the United Kingdom, shows the price of 4K televisions declining from £7615 in Nov. 2013 to £1314 in Jul. 2015.

2.2.1 Response to Falling Prices

Price falls have not been uniform across all types of televisions. Larger television prices have held up better than small screen televisions. However, the price of a larger television at its launch is higher than the same television being sold a year later. There is nothing unusual in these price trends. They follow a pattern of price falls in a range of consumer electronic devices, including phones and laptops. To take one recent example, the price of an iPhone 6 (64 Gb) dropped from £699 at launch to £620 12 months later. Samsung Galaxy 6 (64 Gb) prices declined even further [18].

Some of the price falls in televisions reflect structural shifts in demand away from televisions to watching video on computers, laptops, tablets, and phones. Following technological convergence across viewing formats, the numbers watching televisions has also been affected by the relative decline in the preference of households to watch films or sports via membership of a cable network.

2.2.2 Rapid Technological Change

Turning to the competition; mobile devices, the first iPhone launched in 2007 had a 3.5 in. display, a resolution of 320 × 480 (HVGA), and graphics processor of 103 MHz. The camera was 2 MP and captured at 30 fps. The latest iPhone 6 plus has a screen of 5.5 in., a resolution of 1020 × 720 and a graphics processor of 450 MHz. The camera captures 8 MP at 60 fps. Whatever the device that shows the video footage to the viewer, the effect has been the same. There has been a marked improvement in the visual image, in color quality, in resolution, in sharpness of image, smoothness of movement, the absence of ghosting, and in observed detail. Whether the video is to inform, entertain, excite, or change moods, innovation in the use of new imaging technologies makes their achievement more likely.

Combined with advances in communication technologies, access to watching video is no longer as restricted by location. Few in developed countries have to go to a cinema or stay at home to watch a film. Distribution of content is no longer to dedicated fixed points where people can watch it. Rather than consumers moving to where the content is, the content is now sent to mobile devices where the consumers are. Increasingly it is made available when the viewer wants to watch it and not when the broadcaster or cinema wants to show it. Widespread past adoption of new imaging technologies has widened and deepened the market for, and supply of, video content. Think of this in terms of the number of electronic devices capable of displaying video content, diversity of consumer electronics having a functional ability to show off moving images, or total viewing hours on all types of products. Adoption of HDR video is part of this trend.

The conventional explanation of these rapid technological changes in a video pipeline combine observations about improved camera sensors, continued relevance of Moore’s law, the ability of semiconductor designers and manufactures to squeeze ever more computing power on smaller and smaller processors, more efficient file compression, and marked reductions in power consumption used by LEDs of a given brightness. Seen in this way, technological change in video is innovation led on the back of greater integration of hardware and software.

2.2.3 Process of Adoption

Historically, technological innovation to market exploitation and success involved extensive experimentation, validation, and evaluation by selected early adopters. More wide-spread technological diffusion followed once lessons learned by early adopters had reduced technology and market risk. Risk reduction stemmed from revision of what customers would accept and product adaptation reflecting a more precise understanding of customer requirements, and the price they were prepared to pay to have them satisfied. The learn-adapt cycle was repeated until either market maturity was reached, or commercial failure was evident, and the innovation was written off.

This is a poor descriptor of adoption and diffusion of new technology in consumer electronics. Here product cycles are measured in months, rather than years. Payback periods are typically 2 years, rather than 5. Benefits from adoption of consumer electronics devices are very evident to an ever-increasing number of consumers very early on.

The past adoption of video technologies or systems occurred because technological change was in things which mattered to producers or consumers. Speed of technological change creates its own dynamic. Successful advances today, based on accumulation of new knowledge today, encourage further incremental change and innovation tomorrow. Momentum in the adoption of new video imaging technologies is neatly illustrated by the very short product life of MP4 players. They were very soon surpassed in their functionality and utility by smartphones that bundled up video downloads with audio, and a mass of other applications. The emergence of HDR televisions is one aspect of this technological dynamic.

2.3 Why Is Adoption at the Moment Taking the Form It Is?

A related question to this is: “Why now?” Possibly because all other viable ways of differentiating televisions have already been tried, for example, 4K and 3D. Arguably both were easier and quicker to implement than HDR displays, because the required technological advance came quicker. The time lag between technological development to go from SD (640 × 480 ppi) and HD (1920 × 1080 ppi) was 38 years. From HD to 4K was much shorter; at 11 years, while from 4K to HDR, 3 years.

Early HDR displays had technological deficiencies. They were power hungry, had very noisy fans, and needed significant amounts of piping containing liquid coolant to help reduce the heat given off by the array of numerous LEDs. No more; the latest 65-in. HDR televisions consume as much power as a 32-in. HD television 4 years ago: around 120 W.

2.4 Is It a Form of Adoption That Will Persist, or Be Quickly Replaced by Something Better?

Current HDR video commercial adoption is less than technologically optimal. Defining commercial adoption of HDR video in terms of 10 or 12 bit images is closer to terminology usually associated with SDR. HDR imaging offers the potential of capturing the full range of lighting in a scene and delivering it in a digital format along a pipeline to a display. Known as “scene referred,” this full range of lighting can be kept, while maintaining physical accuracy, if 32-bit IEEE floating point values are used to represent each color channel. This means that 96 bits per pixel (bpp) are needed, compared with a standard image of just 24 bpp [19]. A single HDR frame of uncompressed 4K UHD resolution (3840 × 2160 pixels) requires approximately 94.92 MB of storage, and a minute of data at 30 fps needs 166 GB. This is currently prohibitive on existing ICT infrastructure. Efficient data formats and compression techniques are thus essential if HDR video is to be widely adopted [9]. This is partly semantics. Its relevance to the issue of HDR video adoption is 10 or 12 bit imaging is significantly below what is technologically possible, and a long way from the view that true HDR represents imaging that matches the human visual system.

2.4.1 Focus on Costs of Switching and Stranding

Why 10 or 12 bit images and not higher? One factor that helps explain the adoption of 10, or 12 bit HDR video, is it overcomes the problem of stranding. Stranding occurs where the adoption of a new technology makes all earlier technologies obsolete in technical and commercial terms. Under conditions of stranding, all previous sunk investment in all parts of the video pipeline would be worthless upon the adoption of a completely incompatible with old, new technological system. This is not an attractive proposition for firms involved in current video production of hardware, software, and content. Having sunk significant investment in current TV technologies, it is in their vested interest to adopt technology that is backward compatible. This is an HDR system that complements 4K and 3D, and uses existing IT communications infrastructure capacity. Much more important is it means the possibility of significant financial benefit for those businesses that can switch to 10 or 12 bit imaging at a modest extra cost. The avoidance of stranding introduces a bias in favor of the status quo. Consumers can also suffer from stranding. UK Broadcasters switching off the analog signal is a recent example of the risk that a consumer might be left stranded.

3 Current Adoption: Short Term or Enduring?

3.1 Is This Kind of Adoption Likely to Persist, or Be Overtaken by a More Impressive Technology?

Current best available HDR video technologies are far more advanced than 10 or 12 bit imaging. A 16-bit HDR pipeline is perfectly feasible. A 32-bit pipeline has been shown by academic researchers at IBC and NAB. Capture of at least 14 f-stops is possible from a range of commercially available cameras ARRI, Sony, and Grass Valley. There is no need to tone map on the camera. In the current workflow, this footage is then mastered for 1000 nits and encoded using ST.2084. For high bit rates, the file format used is ProRes 422HQ. Other HDR video codecs, both one-stream and two-stream could be used [20]. Distribution is facilitated by H265 or HEVC compression. Existing Dolby HDR monitors, such as the Pulsar and Maui, although not commercially available, have peak luminances of 4000 and 2000 nits, respectively. The latest SIM2 displays, on the other hand, have a peak luminance of 6000 nits with a 10,000 nit display due to be shown at IBC in September 2016. At NAB in 2015, goHDR, Vicomtech, ARRI, SIM2, and the University of Warwick demonstrated live streaming of HDR video from an ARRI Alexa to a SIM2 display. While this clearly demonstrated the potential of HDR to provide a step change in viewing experience, the large data requirements of HDR video means that for remote broadcast of HDR video, the quality is compromised by the need to significantly compress the video stream to handle it on existing ICT infrastructure.

3.2 Constraints: Why Not Adoption Closer to Technological Optimum Possibilities?

3.2.1 Uncertainty Over Consumer Demand and Willingness to Pay

Would extending the dynamic range significantly above what is currently offered on mass market televisions make enough of a difference to viewing experience that as sizable proportion of consumers would pay to enjoy it? One thing to note is, currently an HDR 4K television carries nearly a 100% price premium over an equivalent 4K non-HDR enabled TV. Another is evidence on consumer response to the launching of HD televisions is supportive, although there was significant variation across age groups and income levels in both willingness to adopt and pay higher prices [21]. Early adopters of HD television were more likely to be young and have high disposable incomes. They were also well-informed about the technical characteristics of the television and could relate the benefits of higher resolution and larger screens to their enhanced viewing experience [22]. Demographics and income levels also helps to explain why successive generations of smartphones, with every improving imaging attributes, took market share off previous generations of phones. Older generations adopted HD televisions at a much slower pace. Critically they valued the gain from the new technology less than they valued the loss of familiarity with old technology [23]. Much, it seems, hinged on consumers’ reference points in their purchasing decision. These reference points included the attributes and characteristics of their existing television, their interest in new technology, and whether they would be unable to watch television if they kept their existing set [24].

None of these points, taken on their own, are likely to stimulate huge industry investment in much higher dynamic range televisions. There is too much risk and too little prospect of reward. And one interpretation of the arguments put forward by proponents of the 10 or 12 bit image generation, is there is no need to increase the bit depth because the viewer could not tell the perceptual difference between videos shown at higher bit depth [12]. However, not everyone agrees [25].

The risk reward tradeoff could be improved by a focus on reducing cost constraints of 16-bit HDR adoption. Two constraints are of particular importance. First is the cost of 4000 nit displays. A SIM2 47-in. display sells for around £19,000. A 4000 65-in. Dolby Vision reference monitors is thought to cost around $60,000. The second is the cost of firms switching from 10- to 16-bit pipeline.

3.2.2 Display Costs

Prices of displays could, in principle, come down if costs of components and manufacturing production came down. This might be because of (a) technological improvements in the LEDS, reduced voltage and current for the same level of brightness, or intensity of RGB colors (peaks or duration) or the means of lighting-specific pixels on the display: individual pixels or in clusters, (b) falling costs of LEDs of a given quality, (c) in the production of the (LCD) front panels, and (d) the manufacture and assembly of HDR televisions.

Samsung claims that their 1000 nit HDR television (Samsung UE65KS9000) consumes 118 W or an annual consumption of 164 KWh; 118 W equates with an average video luminance of around 30% of the peak luminance, and that the peaks are present in the video for only 5% of the total time. Applying a similar estimation method to a SIM2 4000 nit display gives rise to an annual consumption of around 350 KWh. Significantly higher certainly, but not four times higher. And much less than an estimated 463 KWh that a 42-in. plasma screen consumed in 2009 [26]. The innovative power management and heat dissipation technologies present in the SIM2 displays means that for any given level of luminance, SIM2 technologies, in fact, use less power and generate less current and hence, heat than those technologies embodied in the Samsung television.

SIM2 monitor manufacturing is labor intensive and carried out in a high-cost country. Conventional SDR televisions are also manufactured using labor intensive methods, but they are made in low-cost countries, in very large volumes, and at ever-decreasing unit costs of production. This suggests costs of HDR displays could come down by shifting production and assembly to low-cost countries and producing on large scale. This has been the experience of production systems used in the manufacture of a range of consumer electronic devices. Costs of producing Apple smartphones, for example, have fallen because of disintegration of supply and value chains. Costs fell because of declining transaction costs at different technology interfaces and the separation of production processes and supply of key components. Unbundling processes into separate tasks allowed sourcing from the most competitive supplier. Most importantly of all, costs were reduced by the production of components in very large volumes. This meant reaping a major benefit of economies of scale. Unit costs were further reduced because of firms learning to do manufacturing processes more efficiently.

3.2.3 Switching Costs

Firms that supply the technologies that facilitate the creation and showing of video incur switching costs if they move from a 10- or 12-bit to a 16-bit pipeline. Significant investment is required to switch from, say a 1000 nit screen, to one that gives out four times as much peak brightness. A 4000 nit display, however, only has value if other transmission technologies facilitate the transfer of data into pixels and then a video. Costs of switching to a transmission system to accommodate 16-bit files are significant. In part, this is because where bandwidth was at full capacity, 16-bit allocation of time banded slots would mean, either fewer slots, longer time slots, or slower transmission speeds. With scarce bandwidth, this would mean higher prices charged by those that own the distribution channels to facilitate transmission of bigger 16-bit files. There would also need to be significant investment in design and manufacture of decoding semiconductors and software that runs on them. Then there is a chicken-and-egg problem. Investment in 16-bit transmission infrastructure is more likely if there is sufficient content to justify it. Investment in content is more likely if there is confidence transmission to the home is in place.

It seems highly unlikely that the costs of switching to implement a 16-bit HDR system in either absolute terms or relative to current costs would be the same for producers at each stage of the video pipeline. The switching costs for camera producers would be low because 16 f-stop cameras can already capture most of the color gamut and luminance range associated with 16-bit HDR video. If firms in some parts of the pipeline do not switch, adoption is unlikely. This is because adoption is beneficial only if all in the HDR video pipeline adopt. If firms in one part of the HDR pipeline fail to adopt, no adoption of the whole system can take place. The default inert option is all interested firms do nothing until there is greater certainty over future costs and new technology application.

3.2.4 Important Qualification

In time HDR video could appear on other devices/platforms if there was effective technology transfer from HDR televisions. This raises the obvious question as to how consumers might respond to this. There is some anecdotal evidence that LED brightness and reduced power consumption in smartphones might be expected to carry greater weight than improvement in sensors to enhance image capture, for example. Reading forums that compare Samsung and Apple smartphones and tablet technologies, it is clear that the technologies that go into each device are not equal in technological efficiency, see Table 1. However, in terms of what is the key technological differentiator in the eyes of the buyer/final customer, bloggers, or online reviewers’ ranking of technologies according to relevance to customer experience puts display/screen ahead of the processor, battery, and camera?

Table 1

Comparison of smartphones

iPhone 6Galaxy 6
Display size4.7 in.5.1 in.
Resolution750 × 1334 pixels; 326 ppi1440 × 2560 pixels; 577 ppi
Camera1080@60 fps or 720@240 fps2160@30 fps; 1080@60 fps; 720@120 fps
BatteryLi-po 1810 mAh, 6.9 whLi-Ion 2550 mAh

But there is a puzzle. The Galaxy has a far superior image display set of technologies. If quality of video on the screen is important to the customer, it might be expected that Samsung would charge a higher price for the Galaxy 6. Unencumbered by contracts, their respective retail prices were almost the same, at around $750 for a 64 Gb phone. Perhaps there are compensating differences on the iPhone, for example, design or number of apps [27].

4 Supply Conditions and HDR Adoption

4.1 Relevance of Networks

The markets for televisions, smartphones, tablets, DVD players, and a range of other video devices have the characteristics of being networks of consumers and producers. The conventional examples of the benefits of consumer networks are postal networks and more recently, social networks. In each case, when a new person joins the network, everybody in the network gains from having access to an additional subscriber or user. Those using Gmail gain from millions of others using the same email system. A consumer may be reluctant to join Gmail if everybody else used Microsoft Outlook.

Under conditions of network benefits, one supplier of an element of imaging technology gains from other suppliers offering complementary products. Content producers and broadcasters using the same format gain from knowing this means distribution to a larger number of customers. Consumers gain every time another consumer buys a television, tablet, or phone that has the same operating system as theirs. As the market for content expands, so the costs of supplying one unit of content falls, because of economies of scale or scope and thus, creates the possibility of lower prices and higher sales. Indeed consumers may join a network because they believe that by doing so, product prices will fall in the future. Fragmentation and incompatibly between competing systems and formats lessens these network benefits. The point about networks is, once created, they can bring about bandwagon effects so that those joining the network increases the benefits to all. Under circumstances of common interest to all, the greatest benefits come from a single integrated network available to all [28].

4.2 Compatibility

What is important about networks is that the products that people buy to exploit the benefits of being part of a network are compatible. Few technologies are valuable in isolation. Their value comes from the way they are combined with other complementary technologies [28]. In HDR the obvious point is content needs to be captured in ways compatible with distribution and delivery across a range of different displays. Software in one part of the pipeline needs to be compatible with software at the interface at another part of the pipeline. Software needs to be compatible with the hardware it runs on. All producers in the capture to display pipeline know compatibility is essential; incompatibility is road to isolation and ruin (Fig. 2).

f12-02-9780128094778
Fig. 2 There is money to made if all the components of the HDR pipeline are in place.

Compatibility is fundamental to explaining how firms in consumer electronics found all kinds of ways of getting hardware unit costs down. Why and how? Products of the consumer electronics sector were characterized as bundles of technologies that were compatible. This meant that individual products had little value on their own. Their value rose when they combined with other products [28]. The value of each individual product reflected the most advanced technological capability of the business that produced it. This, in turn, stemmed from firm investment in technology-specific research and development and an in-firm tacit understanding as to how best to turn knowledge of new technology into successful products. Costs were reduced by exploiting differences in firm specialization in technologies associated with capture, signal distribution, and image display. Multiple firms produced a multiple variety of products.

Cost reductions in the supply of key consumer electronics components were assisted by modularization in component design and manufacture. Modularization meant that components could be sourced from the most efficient supplier. However, the benefits of modularization largely arose because there was compatibility between components, functions, and software applications. Compatibility increased the scope for a single component to fit in a single product or in numerous products. Greater compatibility in breadth and depth among components and software in laptops, phones, computers, and tablets increased the possibility for higher volumes of individual components and through this, much reduced unit costs of production. It is not obvious why such an approach based on falling unit costs with ever larger volumes could not be applied to the HDR system.

The HDR pipeline from capture to display is disintegrated. No single firm owns or controls all parts of it. For individual firms engaged in different parts of the pipeline, the conditioning of their individual response to the prospect of say 16-bit HDR is likely to hinge on their views about areas of major divergence in compatibility of today’s video technologies compared with tomorrow’s. The important consequence of this is that one firm’s possible future benefit from adopting higher HDR is conditional on others acting in complementary ways. Under these conditions of future uncertainty of supply, no firm gains from acting alone. But they can also lose from incompatibility. One example is a firm was locked into producing a product with an outdated technology. There are lots of past examples. Analog versus Digital TV. Mini discs against music downloads; further back, AM versus FM radio. Some consumers will therefore, be left with equipment that is incompatible with the winning system.

It is easy to make the general case for the need for compatibility. It is much harder to say how it might be applied in practice at some future date. Diversity of product markets for video, and different types of content directed at different audiences complicates compatibility. The significance of variance in scene contrasts and choice of scene selection opens up a divergence of interests between broadcasters and studios among major content suppliers. Many of the examples of where true, scene-referred, HDR would have significantly improved viewer experience come from live sports broadcasts; anywhere where there is bright sunlight and dark shade in a single scene. For example, one part of the football pitch is in sunlight, the other in shade caused by the shadow of big stands. Or the players on the pitch are in shadow, while the fans on the terraces are in sunlight. A goal is scored and the fans’ reactions are shown as a mass of white pixels. It is possible different interests in content will produce the same firm incentives to invest in an HDR pipeline, but it seems unlikely.

At one level, studios and broadcasters can anticipate each other’s general interests in HDR. At a more detailed level, firms producing complementary elements of the HDR video pipeline for both broadcasters and studios, would struggle to say with any certainty the relative proportions of these different content producers’ interests. As important to an investment decision is estimating the magnitude of volume to be produced of these complementary products, and their timing.

To complicate matters further, firms must calculate how much of the value generated by the sales of HDR video systems might accrue to them. Would it matter if the content came from Netflix or Amazon, rather than a conventional broadcaster or Hollywood studio? At the time of writing, the value of streaming or downloading SDR video to tablets and phones accrues mostly to the intellectual property owner of the brand. Apple, for example, received around 60% of the total value added generated by iPhone 4 [29].

Differences in compatibility could come at technology interfaces, in conflicting scope of intellectual property protection, and divergence of view as to how a combined technology might be implemented. The adoption of one sponsored technology might result in less redundancy of a firm’s own technology than another competing technology. The value, in application, of the combination of one’s own technology and a sponsored technology could vary across sponsored technologies; if for example, the attraction of some products increased consumers’ willingness to pay higher prices, but to a varying extent.

If HDR video were to be applied to a variety of display devices such as phones, tablets, laptops, and televisions, each supplied by different producers, a system which is best suited to one device and one set of customer preferences may be less than the most profitable if applied to another device. Differences in power requirements on a phone compared to a television could force producers to adopt different HDR video systems, for example. Instead of uniformity HDR system, we would have variety.

Any sensible investment appraisal made by a firm in the HDR pipeline ought to try and reconcile and give weight to these different elements of future uncertainty on the form, direction, and timing of product compatibility. And they need to confront a chicken-and-egg problem. Investment by one firm in a particular technology is only worthwhile if it knows other firms contributing to the same technology system are also going to invest in creating complementary technologies.

5 Coordination and the Role of Technology Standards

5.1 Role of Standards

Compatibility requires coordination among interested producers. In consumer electronics, generally coordination has taken the form of industry agreement to common interface standards. A standard can be defined as technical specifications that allows one technology to be compatible with another at a specified interface. Their main purpose is to coordinate diverse actions of numerous firms that produce products that complement each other. Standards exist because groups of firms acting together can achieve greater individual and aggregate benefit than they can by acting alone. By agreeing to a standard, firms aim to reduce uncertainty over the path of a particular technology and minimize costs of developing technological redundant (i.e., incompatible technologies) through the generation of competing standards.

5.1.1 Factors Promoting Adoption of a Common Standard

There are a number of important factors:

 One standard’s superiority in functional/performance terms compared to others.

 Very small cost to users of incorporating technology implicit in the standard on existing hardware of current and earlier vintages.

 Very small cost to users of integrating technology implicit in a standard with other computer code or language, that is, a high degree of interface compatibility.

 Very small cost to users of switching from current technology or prevailing standard to new superior standard, that is, how far is a new standard generic suitable to widespread application on a variety of hardware and combined with a variety of other programming languages?

 Significant incremental value in the product produced that embodies the new standard; to producer and user (e.g., quality of video image, attraction of HDR in image).

 Flexibility or adaptability to novel future technologies, such as hardware and applications.

 Significant network benefits.

5.1.2 Factors Impeding Adoption

These include:

 High costs of bringing about compatibility between technologies embodied in a standard and current hardware and software.

 Dominant firms in HDR video pipeline seeking to protect their own proprietary IPR; they create barriers to new standard adoption.

 Absence of backward compatibility.

 Limited take up in absence of clear benefit in application.

5.1.3 Options to Creating a Standard

The standard that is causing the greatest contention is an HDR video standard for the file format or video compression and decompression, when data files enter (from the camera) or leave (to the display) fiber or wireless transmission.

Option 1 involves efforts to find a way of interested industry agreement to a single HDR standard and have embraced most of the possible options to creating a standard. The MPEG option reflects an approach based on collective collaboration through a voluntary standards setting organizations (SSOs) where all interested parties seek consensus on an agreed format or interface technology. They have thus far failed.

Option 2 is large firms that are technology leaders act as standard setters working as a consortium. HDR 10 is an example of such an approach. It is an open standard. At the time of writing, Jul. 2016, it is being more widely adopted than Dolby Vision; a competing closed standard. Both formats are complemented by a separate standard agreed among broadcasters.

Option 3 is sponsored promotion of a particular standard by a single firm in the expectation of significant license income. For license fee payers balancing their benefits from having a single standard with the costs of being locked in to a particular supplier of Intellectual Property is challenging. Dolby Vision is an example of a firm-sponsored standard where take up is controlled by Dolby in the expectation of license income.

Option 4 is market competition or standards wars where different technologies and the firms that seek to promote them hope that their technology will be attractive enough to encourage firms to create a bandwagon. This approach, however, can be high on intensity, costly in duplication, and maybe inefficient, if numerous incompatible standards coexist; inefficient to a point were significant network benefits are forgone. Technological leaders do not have to be dominant firms, but they need something firm-specific that makes their technology superior to others [30]. Thus far, option 4 has not featured in ways of generating an HDR standard, although there are two HDR standards now available: SMPTE ST2084 [31] and ARIB STD-B67 [32]. Central to both of these methods are perceptually based transfer functions. In SMPTE ST2084 this is the PQ curve [12], while ARIB STD-B67 uses Hybrid Log Gamma (HLG) [33].

5.2 Some Observations on MPEG Progress

What might be the explanation of the lack of MPEG progress? Past experience of standard setting by committee suggests failure thus far to find agreement is a function of:

(a) The number of firm-sponsored technologies submitted to it. A firm’s preference will be largely conditioned on what it considers to be the costs of switching from an existing technological path to a new one, and the extent to which it holds the intellectual property rights, rather than having to pay for a license to somebody else. So it (the firm) is likely to sponsor a proprietary standard and resist somebody else’s proposal. The tradeoff is the extra profits (economic rents) each interested firm expects to make if its preferred standard is adopted, and the less than ideal amount of profit or loss it expects to make if an alternative technology is adopted.

(b) The extent to which it is possible for sponsoring firms to form a coalition by aggregating all proposals into a single closed standard. This might balance some vested interests, but create a hybrid standard that is inefficient as a means of coordinating firm actions.

(c) The extent to which it is possible for the sponsor of one technology to secure consensus from others by a system of side payments. However, paying off other vested interests must, in turn, be paid for; perhaps by a higher license fee.

(d) The number of unsponsored technologies lodged with the MPEG, often by academics. Here standard selection is a reflection of the decisions taken by enough firms in a market to create a bandwagon.

(e) The technical superiority of one technology over others according to agreed industry objective and subjective measures of performance, and whether it impedes or accelerates adoption because it overcomes or reinforces inertia between existing technology and a proposed new one. A related issue is how firms are to deal with their own or other’s stranded assets. A number of comparisons of different methods are appearing, for example [20]. One clear challenge is the current lack of robust objective metrics for HDR video, and thus time-consuming subjective metrics are often required to clearly understand the differences in approaches [34].

(f) The speed of technological change which could either delay or accelerate adoption, depending on whether it was felt, by firms, to be better to be locked into today’s technology or wait for a better one tomorrow. All are likely to ask: “Is it better to agree now or wait and see how technology advances proceed?” While delay may carry a benefit to some firms, it carries a cost to others. The issue is whether delay ultimately makes all worse off.

(g) The size and distribution of costs and benefits across interested firms associated with the adoption of each sponsored technology.

(h) Extent of technological differences across competing submissions in both design and application. Large technological difference across standards introduces a possible cost bias in favor of some producers, but against others. Firms would be expected to minimize their own cost of switching to a new technology whist expecting others to act. Problems seem to be greatest were technological change is very rapid and costs of being locked in are significant. At a margin, a single standard is seen as more worthwhile than standards wars among competing standards. Observations based on the work of [35].

To these authors at least, it is not obvious how there will be convergence on a single standard. Probably the emergence of two standards (ST2084, ARIB STD-B67) and Dolby Vision for coding formats used in current HDR television is a sign of things to come.

6 Conclusions

The term HDR is being widely used to try and persuade customers to buy a new television. While it is clear that HDR content on one of these consumer HDR televisions in a dark environment is impressive, the enhanced viewing experience is less obvious in a typical daylight setting. Furthermore, the drive to provide consumer HDR televisions all require 10 bit infrastructures, which precludes being able to view the same content on the large numbers of 8 bit devices, including legacy displays, and most importantly, mobile devices. More and more video content is now being viewed on mobile devices [36]. In addition to the current limitation of 8 bit infrastructure, HDR video on mobile devices introduces more challenges, including dynamically varying ambient lighting conditions, reflections on the screen, etc. [37].

Standards for HDR video encoding are emerging, but there is already evidence that there are more efficient ways of encoding than those of the standards [9].

A theme running through this chapter is future adoption of HDR video will be a consequence of specific forms of interaction between a small number of large businesses in capture, content creation, transmission, and distribution to visualization markets. Interaction is, in part, conditioned by individual firm preference for extending the commercial value of their own past investments in imaging technologies. Past investment reflects what are seen as the basis for offering buyers particular knowledge or expertise that is proprietary, not easily copied, and is the source of significant financial benefit. To many, the ideal solution is adoption turns the adopting firm into a monopolist. In the process, the competition is either avoided or their products are rendered commercially redundant. These are supposed as being important motivations of the market incumbent firms in the HDR pipeline. Their protection against threats from new market entrants, offering more advanced HDR video, comes from the way different incumbent firms combine complementary technologies. They bundle them (the technologies) together so that no single firm has the expertise, breadth, and depth of knowledge to offer a superior combination of new HDR technologies. Industry incumbents are also helped by very uncertain consumer response to future video content and display in 16-bit imaging. All of this creates a bias in adoption the favors the status quo.

The status quo could be destroyed. One way is because of internal conflict between firms in one or more HDR video pipelines. Within formal or informal agreements are inherent features that can contain the seeds of destruction. Perhaps expectations about the supposed future benefits stemming from the actions of others in the HDR pipeline partner firm’s turn out to be wrong. Disappointment sets in, a grievance is created. Perhaps expectations were based on what turned out to be selective disclosure of knowledge offered by partner firms. Not every business need be completely forthcoming about their future intentions with respect to investments in R&D, possible future alliances, or market segments to be targeted. Keeping quiet can be the source of commercial benefit in a bilateral relationship with other businesses.

In other sectors of the consumer electronics industry, major disruption to the state of current technology adoption has come from outsiders and new entrants. Apple and Samsung smartphone technologies dislodging Nokia and Blackberry keyboard technologies is an obvious example. Could the trick be repeated with 16-bit HDR video on phones and tablets based on user capture and display?

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Further Reading

Besen S.M., Farrell J. Choosing how to compete: strategies and tactics in standardization. J. Econ. Perspect. 1994;8(2):117–131.

Economides N. The economics of networks. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 1996;14(6):673–699.

Farrell J., Saloner G. Installed base and compatibility: innovation, product preannouncements, and predation. Am. Econ. Rev. 1986;76(5):940–955.

Hall B.H., Beethika K. Adoption of new technology. NBER Working Paper 9730. 2003. http://www.nber.org/papers/w9730.

M.L. Katz, C. Shapiro, Product introduction with network externalities, J. Ind. Econ. 40 (1) 55–84.

Katz M.L., Shapiro C. Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. Am. Econ. Rev. 1985;75(3):424–440.

Simcoe T. Committees and the creation of technical standards. University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business DRAFT; November 2003. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.2091&rep=rep1&type=pdf citeseer Unpublished working paper.

Stango V. The economics of standards wars Review of network economics. degruyter.com; 2004. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.200.2784&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

Venkatesh V., James Y., Thong L. Consumer acceptance and use of information technology: extending the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology. MIS Q. 2012;36(1):157–178.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1816461?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Farrell J., Saloner G. Standardization, compatibility, and innovation. RAND J. Econ. 1985;16(1):70–83.

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