6
Influence

In a society that is becoming more and more digitalized, where facts and information are often contradictory or of questionable reliability, we are constantly influenced by diverse information and often harmful rumors. Both of these aspects are central research subjects in the field of competitive intelligence and are becoming more significant – not only in their consequences for “democracies”, but also due to the fact that, of the 200 most powerful entities in the financial field, around 50% are not states. We will therefore briefly analyze both influence and rumor aspects and see to what extent journalists and the media are voluntarily implicated in the media attention given to these two aspects of competitive intelligence.

In today’s environment that is constantly on the move, it is not enough to simply have a strategy – it has to be justified, explained and legitimized. This is necessary because we find ourselves in a hyper-mediatized setting. We are not alone and our competitors are doing the same as us. Not acting at all therefore means falling behind.

6.1. The current foundations of influence

Influence means the way in which “people” (understood generically: people, institutions, etc.) think about and perceive things the way you want them to, without them feeling that you are putting any pressure on them. How has influence emerged so quickly in recent times? It is most likely due to the development of information technologies and communication, and notably the “explosion” of social media, but also the rise in power of NGOs at the international level.

We do not attempt to describe here the ensemble of work [RAC 11, RAC 12, RAC 17] that makes reference to this subject; the majority deals with “actions of influence”, found in advertising and lobbying, but we will rather focus on the essentials, and notably influence mechanisms such as those described by Joseph Nye [NYE 16] at the level of soft power.

Generally speaking, influence will call upon simple mechanisms. The first of these is the emotional quotient [FME 10], meaning that which makes people react “without thinking”. Indeed, our reactions at the level of perception are linked 70% to our emotional coefficient, and 30% to our intellectual coefficient.

Before embarking on the path of influence, we should properly analyze the target and especially what will make them react. This analysis has to be rather focused given it must take into account various parameters: we can go from “compassion” to different forms of “permitted” corruption, and so the scale is very large. It is also necessary to avoid analyzing the target in static terms, but it must be done in a dynamic way to predict if possible the evolution of mentalities in a period of time in coherence with the objective which will be defined [JUI 09, JUI 15].

If we want to influence “people”, it is for a precise objective [NAT 91, NYE 16]. This objective must be clear and well defined. It must not take place in too long a time period, because, in this case, perception would be weaker. It is important that the time period be sufficiently short in order to reach the objective and motivate “people”. In other words, we cannot say that we will reach our objective in 20 years’ time, as this would be too long.

Moreover, it is important that the objective be perceived as “honest” and “ethical”, and the cause must be “noble”. It is often in that respect that we make reference to children, elderly people, famine, respect for our environment, or the protection of animals, etc.

We must communicate and therefore send messages we wish to pass on to our target(s). Generally speaking, two forms of communication are used: verbal communication (including the various different media which express it); and non-verbal communication, which often concerns attitudes, or the general appearance of the communicator, etc.

Communicating also means transferring a message. It is therefore important that it be carefully constructed, both in its content, but also containing examples and reference relevant to those to whom the general message is being addressed. Retrospectively, an analysis of the discourse of American politicians legitimizing military intervention in Iraq is a good example.

6.2. Who is going to communicate?

Communication can take place through an “opinion leader”, but also through an intermediary of grouping associations, political parties, etc. The person who is communicating must generally be recognized as neutral, or as someone fighting for a “noble cause”, such as the environment. In other words, we might suggest that there are several possible mediators: social media, NGOs and individuals, which we will now briefly examine.

Social media [MER 12]: we can use them as a sounding board. Indeed, a rumor can make its way around a country like France in around seven days thanks to social media. On the other hand, the retransmission of a rumor or a piece of information by somebody we know (a friend, for example) is perceived as true by more than seven out of ten people. Social media is even more efficient given it uses written, spoken and visual forms of communication.

NGOs: the influence of these mediators is growing significantly. More than 70% of NGOs are those created by States, multinational companies or pressure groups. They are incredibly influential given that they are often perceived as honest mediators by the public due to the different causes they defend. It is therefore necessary to understand the ways in which they operate in order to know whether or not they are manipulated. For example, political policies concerning the defense of our environment are an example; likewise there are “struggles” of some organizations and other NGOs to fight against genetically modified organisms, even if it means stopping some research under public pressure, whereas other countries continue and take a decisive lead. NGOs always appeal to our emotions [WIK 15]. Their themes are always focused on the defense of our children, a better future, the fight against poverty, looking after our planet, etc. In addition, the development of their resources concerning local wars and climatic incidents increases the impact of NGOs in the “public sphere”. Some North American foundations will create the necessary influence by financing certain developments so that the “funded” decision-makers act in the desired direction. This is what makes Joseph Nye [NYE 14] say the following when he draws a parallel between Chinese influence and American influence:

“Chinese officials seem to think that influence is generated mainly by government policies and public diplomacy, but much of America’s influence is generated by its civil society rather than by its government”.

The breeding ground of influence operations has long been prepared by a strong cultural influence, for example by cinema [MAZ 11]. In the Marshall Plan, which allowed the recovery of Western Europe after the Second World War, the cinema aspect was important. It spread American values and thus helped to divert Europeans from Marxism. We find identical cultural vectors at the level of music (jazz, rock, etc.), songs, literature, sports, etc. It is the same for large events, such as exhibitions for example [REN 15]. Different strategies of influence can be developed on the most diverse levels and subjects. Knowing how to detect and analyze them is a necessity for states, organizations, institutions and companies [FRA 16].

For individuals, the problem is different. They should, as far as possible, defend their ideas in such a way that they will also answer the questions posed by the “receiver”. The goal is to make it move from a passive form, “listening”, to an active form, “transmitting”, ideas and solutions provided by the individual engaged in the process of influence. By bringing the desired response, the “receiver” is transformed into a “transmitter” which is the initial desire at the outset. Indeed, we will use five ways of acting grouped into two categories: organizational power (legitimate, reward, coercive) and personal power (expert and referent).

6.3. Knowledge of the target and information

In order to be fully aware of the target on which one wants to make influence, it requires thorough preparation. This is mainly based on the exploitation of information concerning the target itself, but also its environment. Since the majority of information is currently accessible with minimum constraint (open information), you have to learn how to search for it, be able to group it and then analyze it. Currently, the tendency is more and more to use technological facilities including “Big Data” which are growing more and more, from “cookies” on the Internet, your own acceptance for your personal data to be used (saying yes on smartphone applications), the analysis of your purchases in supermarkets and in the medium term in all data from smart cities [DOU 14].

Knowing how to optimally search open information and analyze it is not innate. It can, however, be learned. There are methods, software and open sources of information particularly suited to these analyses. We must go beyond the simple use of Google, for example, and use all the possibilities that are available to us. This “fine” knowledge of the target will then allow us to develop, according to our initial objective, the messages, behaviors and actions necessary for you to be aware, without realizing that you have won “the cause”. If scientific databases and patent databases were the first to be exploited [DOU 15, DOU 16b, HOL 05] in the analytic (bibliometric) sense to have a dynamic view of the environment of a subject, an institution or an enterprise and also the multiplication of data sources open a new field that goes beyond the scientist. For example, the use of social media, tweets and blogs allows us to better understand the ins and outs of a subject. We are not looking for something specific; we are going to work in a random way and therefore through a path that will, over the course of the answers found and their analyses, generate new questions, new approaches that may not have first come to mind. We are not dealing here with the finality of such representations because, by themselves, they constitute a means of influencing our reasoning which would be in itself a new article [MAY 13]. It is only explained that such analyses will make it possible to better target sets of behaviors and thus to better develop actions of influence.

It is therefore obvious that, without your knowledge, you enter into a specific typology that will allow you to develop actions of influence concerning you without you feeling that there is any pressure.

6.4. Rumors

We shall not present all published works on rumors, but rather situate them in the field of negative influence. For more information, the reader can consult the following references: [GAI 12, KAP 87, KIM 04, TAF 06]. They can be described as negative influence actions, the rumor being able, in the majority of the cases, to be exercised against a competitor whether it is a firm, a person, a State, etc. We have seen that the Internet and social media allow the very rapid spread of a rumor. Rumors can be, if we are not careful, completely destructive and lead to the loss of a company, for example. If the actions of influence are more cunning since they are aimed at “winning the cause” for us, the rumors are more easily identifiable, because they are more direct. Generally, as they are false, those to whom they are directed do not take them seriously. Yet letting a rumor spread without “counter-fire” is incredibly dangerous, because the longer a rumor lasts, the more influence it will gain. There are various sources of information describing and commenting on rumors, for example those concerning the Procter & Gamble logo [GAË 06, KAP 87, LAR 08] (this is alleged to have “made a pact with the devil” to do business better, according to the analysis of the image on its logo. The rumor was so strong that, despite very significant explanations against these rumors, the firm had to change its logo which dated from its creation). For more information on rumors (or hoaxes), the site hoaxbuster.com presents a more exhaustive list. This French site “dissects” some false rumors by presenting the related references, for example the rumors that followed the attacks of November 13, 2015 in Paris [ENG 15]. But there is no need for the Internet to spread rumors. For example, about 50 years ago, in Marseille, a rumor persisted: in a certain shop selling wedding dresses, some people disappeared in the dressing rooms. This rumor took some time to fade, but it certainly had to benefit a competitor.

Fighting the spread of a rumor is to ask the question of how and by whom it was emitted (to know the source) and whom it “benefits”, allowing us to put a suitable reaction in place. We then enter the field of “crises” that we must learn to manage [COM 12]. This is not done immediately, because it is necessary to anticipate the crises and to constitute an inventory of actions to carry out to counteract their effects. Indeed, the image of a particular person’s enterprise can quickly be warped, and thus the “reputation” of this person is questioned.

6.5. The “media sounding board”

The journalist is often, and in some cases in spite of themselves, at odds with their true self – or they are assigned as certain objective – given they are often forced to act immediately and thus to circulate and transmit information without having had the time to validate the sources and analyze their real scope. We are not concerned here by the so-called trusted third-party information, that is to say by information that is real and validated and on which we can base a reasoning. This is important because, in France, we often miss these landmarks or at least their dissemination to the general public. A good example is that of the extension of Nantes airport, where all types of information and analysis were carried out with both scientific and psychological arguments that would lead to a reasoned solution, but which ultimately ended in a referendum where all the objective, destructive, political, etc. passions developed, including “avoiding” – that is, refusing to make a decision. This is the “dark” side of influence [BAC 10].

Let us return to the media. Their constant search for an audience pushes them into immediacy, often without having a clear idea of the consequences of the information disclosed. Should journalists be held accountable [DEG 11a]? For a small majority maybe, but for others, it is the momentary context in which the profession is exercised that must be questioned. A study carried out in 2011 by Amandine Degand [DEG 11b] – still relevant today – highlighted that “Web journalists lack time to cross-reference information. This is one of the findings that emerges from fifty-six days of immersion in eleven Belgian editorial offices. This article proposes, through a comprehensive approach, to look deeper at the question of immediacy and its implications. It appears that the balance between the journalistic values of immediacy and reliability has become disrupted. This situation introduces into practice an uncertainty that journalists still only partially master, thanks to temporary arrangements”.

The immediacy sought is certainly a major detail, but media dependence on the audience and advertisers are other points to consider. We will therefore be pushed, despite our better judgment and because of competition, to favor the sensational, to force on the classic clichés (for example in Marseille, certain aspects of the life of the city, etc.). What are the ethics to follow? This is not easy, because it took many months before, for example, the terrorist atrocities were no longer broadcast by television channels. Another example of a form of naivety when one is looking for the sensational and the emotional can be found in the media fiasco of the revolution and the mass graves of Timisoara [MIZ 14] in Romania. The first popular uprising broadcast live on radio and television, the Romanian revolution remains the symbol of an unprecedented media fiasco. For weeks, the Western press relayed unsustainable images, insane rumors and delirious reports, without verifying the reliability of its sources. 20 years later, several journalists who covered the event have deciphered this sensationalist cycle for Le Courrier des Balkans1. We must try as much as possible to protect ourselves against such eventualities. To do this, two aspects are to be taken into account: the issuer, who must check their sources and determine the extent to which the information should be disseminated or not (it is desirable that in this case there is some sort of coordination within the profession or the media as a whole), and the receiver who should not assume that everything that is broadcast is true. We will have to “sort through the facts and fiction” and analyze to what extent this information is plausible (we can easily cross-reference sources), but also to whom it benefits in the end. This attitude will bring us closer to what is called “critical thinking” [ENN 18], which is the essential link between intelligence and emotions and makes people “emotionally intelligent”. That is to say, to associate with our emotions enough intelligence to learn to control them and to analyze in a more detached way the situations with which we are confronted. This is true for individuals, but also for organizations [CLE 04]. This attitude also enters the field of editorial responsibility. Marie Laure Augry [AUG 15] asked the following questions following the terrorist attacks in France:

  • – “what do we choose to show, to say, under such circumstances, without risking endangering anyone?
  • – should we consider that any image is information?
  • – how do we avoid the risks of instrumentalization?
  • – are we careful enough not to play the game of terrorists?”

It is obvious that this argues for the diffusion of magazines that will rerun the story and analyze the information, but after a potentially long “incubation time”. But between the presentation of the events and the reflection, what has happened during this period of time?

In the context of the media, we must also take into account the parameters of repetition. Indeed, there is a significant number of media (for example the number of 24-hour news channels) which come to such a repetition that, even if everyone performs their job correctly, this saturation will create a potentially disturbing or even frightening context for some, changing the nature and the aim of this information, and also the behavior of those involved.

6.6. Cultural or public diplomacy

Culture has an increasingly important role in international relations. From this observation is born the concept of cultural diplomacy. We will see, in Volume 2 in Chapter 6 on social networks, the case of the Confucius Institutes, which are a form of Chinese cultural diplomacy, but it is useful in the context of influence to shed some light on this concept. Indeed, if classical diplomacy has developed from state to state, it is not the same for the cultural diplomacy which finds its field of action in the interaction between government and inhabitants of foreign countries. The aim is to disseminate information or cultural products to people in foreign countries through media (in their preferred language) or by using local human networks within the elite (e.g. scholarships, or access to publications in certain scientific journals, invitations to conferences, etc.) [WIK 18a]. But this vision, very different from classical diplomacy, has been complicated in recent years by the emergence of e-diplomacy, so the terms and “digital diplomacy”, “e-diplomacy”, “open diplomacy” and “diplomacy of influence”, appear. Diplomatic communication is profoundly changed, due to both the need to make things known and the immediacy with the world as a field of action and of course one which exists in various different languages. The communications director for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sums up the problem well:

“It [diplomatic communication] must address new audiences: the Arab Spring has shed a harsh light on the need to implement communications that appeal to the greatest number. The time is over when diplomacy was aimed at official circles or the media alone. From now on, it is young people, the opponents, minorities, civil society in all the diversity of its components that are targeted by the public diplomacy” [VAL 13].

We are witnessing the development of mobile applications, the use of the Web and the use of sharing sites such as YouTube, Dailymotion, etc. We can say globally that public diplomacy has the following objectives [LEQ 13]:

  • – to publicize the official positions of the state, especially the press and other media;
  • – to promote the exchange of positions and debates of ideas;
  • – to develop cultural exchanges (education, research, sport, etc.).

In a recent report (2017) on the US National Security Strategy, “democracy” is described under the title “Competitive Diplomacy”, where different aspects are considered as well as various tools necessary for it, which are described in detail. More particularly, Part IV: “Advance American Influence” [NAT 17].

6.7. Positive influence

If in most cases influence is considered as harmful (intrusion into the way of thinking of others), it also has positive effects depending on the way it is exercised. Indeed, influence can be used as a vector of good practice; for example to maintain a suitable environment, or to ensure that good decisions are made. In this case, the mode of governance from which the influence will be organized must have an ethical dimension.

6.7.1. Influence, rumors and territorial attractiveness

The regions which have recently been brought together become competitive in the current context. This means that despite European efforts, notably the RIS (regional innovation systems), to differentiate the regions and develop them on their strong points, the competition for tourism, industrial and research establishments are increasingly becoming developed. At the national level, competitive intelligence has undergone a profound overhaul that highlights the shift from a nationally organized competitive intelligence, to a more widespread competitive intelligence that will be the product of the regions [CIW 16]. There will therefore inevitably be discrimination between the regions that will have efficient systems and others that will do little or almost nothing and that will therefore become structurally irrevocable. This is the challenge of territorial attractiveness [DOU 99] and its international impact.

As early as 1998, Henri Dou [DOU 98] indicated this in the context of the attractiveness of the area:

“If we refer to the analysis determining the innovation criteria of the companies, we quickly come to consider that the analyzed company is big enough to present in a visible or potential way the necessary criteria, or it will be necessary, for the difficult zones, to substitute for the notion of single and isolated enterprise, a more global notion. Thus, the notion of an isolated enterprise, then of a network and even of a virtual enterprise, is replaced by a more modern notion, that of an identity linked to the places and the zone in which one finds oneself, to the accessible resources, the quality of the human and intellectual environment. It is the local anchoring which will evolve into the Glocal (contraction of local and global)”.

6.7.2. Becoming attractive

To be attractive, it is basically up to a region to highlight its assets and opportunities and, if possible, to reduce the impact of its weaknesses and the threats that can “weigh” on those who come to work with regional companies. It is therefore necessary to create the notion of collective vision, which it will be necessary to develop or to find within a geographical area, to give it in many cases a kick start to help it back on its way. It is therefore certain that the notions of influence and rumors will take their place. A region will necessarily have to worry about two main axes to create their own influence:

  • – to have a clear vision of its development;
  • – to determine the targets on which its influence must bear.

This cannot be done without resorting to the active forces of the area on the one hand; but on the other hand, by setting up think tanks which will bring, through brainstorming, analysis of the event, and some the ideas that will have to be integrated in the actions of influence. In this context, the development of a centralized unit allowing access to information is necessary. We have emphasized this from the beginning and it is important to master this aspect because it is the basis of group creation, and essential knowledge for necessary action. Everything is important. We find examples in the awarding of the Olympic Games to the city of London instead of Paris [BED 05], and the choice of Valencia for the America’s Cup while Marseille was also a candidate [GAZ 08, OBS 03].

Once the vision and the target are well defined, then we will move to the level of both verbal and non-verbal communication, as described by Joseph Nye [NYE 16]. It is in this context that the press, television and journalists will have to be mobilized according to a plan and definite roles. The triggering of an influence action (or more if the context allows it) must be followed; that is to say that we must also develop indicators to measure the impact of this or these actions.

Rumors will, de facto, counteract the influence actions and they will have to be detected as soon as possible and actions to minimize them will have to be immediately put into place. This, as we have already pointed out, is beginning to emerge. A region or even a specific geographical area must have formed a group of trained people capable of managing crises. This group, through simulation exercises, must be ready for action. It is also assisted by an analysis of possible rumors, generating probable crises. In this field, one can often have a sudden and unpredictable rumor, but there are also fundamentals generating crises that must be controlled in terms of communication, but also influence. This will mainly concern security, various traffic, areas of lawlessness, strikes, cleanliness, etc. Indeed, if we do not control the rumors, we will lead to an image deficit that will be harmful at different levels: tourism, industrial or research facilities, etc. In the southern regions of France, if the climate has undeniable attractiveness, we should not simply accept this as sufficient. Indeed, in the current context of competitiveness, there are numerous factors of attractiveness. Detecting them to act efficiently is a priority in territorial influence actions. In addition, there are more and more indicators that fragmentation of the nation state, or even regions, may occur [DAV 15]. Indeed, the rich do not want to pay for the poor anymore. It will therefore be necessary, even within a territory, to think of a “redistribution” of the result of development and to take it into account concerning the aspects of endogenous influence.

6.8. Conclusion

In a context of exacerbated competition, where friends one day can become the competitors of tomorrow, competition becomes the rule. If at the general level we often talk about ethics at the level of competition, we must be aware that this is only a facade and that the rules of the game are often biased. Influence is via multiple channels…rumors are part of it. So you must not be naive. Building one’s own actions of influence is fundamental, as is the development of crisis cells to fight rumors effectively. We must not be paranoid, but be aware that in a changing world the rules of the game are more and more fluid and that, for example, fighting corruption does not mean that we do not corrupt. We are simply fighting a type of corruption, which allows for the establishment of effective communication, but at the same time we are developing different types of corruption through different channels, all of which serve the same purpose.

The challenge for states, companies, regions, departments and industrial zones is fundamental; it is not enough to have a good strategy, but it must be legitimized, explained and made attractive. It is beyond classical competitive intelligence that we must act and the introduction of strategic intelligence within organizations becomes a necessity. This is because only this will allow, through the analysis of information, the development of think tanks and the lasting creation of knowledge for action. This ties in with the concept of territorial intelligence which must take into account these different aspects (among many others) and which should lead to a new mode of participatory governance of local development, including all the stakeholders and, in particular, the citizens.

6.9. References

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[BAC 10] BACON T., “The art of getting others following your lead”, Power of Influence, 2010, available at: http://www.theelementsofpower.com/index.cfm/how-influence-works/.

[BED 05] BEDÉI J.-P., “JO 2012. La grande désillusion. France − Douche glacée hier à Singapour : Paris a perdu de quatre voix le vote pour l’attribution des JO 2012 face à Londres qui l’emporte grâce à une campagne de lobbying agressif. Un échec cinglant pour la France”, La dépêche.fr, 2005, available at: http://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2005/07/07/318256-jo-2012-la-grande-desillusion.html.

[CIW 16] CIWORLDWIDE, “Important changement dans la structuration de l’intelligence économique en France”, February 2, 2016, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=1876.

[CLE 04] CLERC P., “Hommage au professeur Stevan Dedidjer”, Regards sur l’IE, no. 5, p. 32, 2004.

[COM 12] COMBALBERT L., DELBECQUE E., La gestion de crise, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2012.

[DAV 15] DAVEZIES L., Le nouvel égoïsme territorial : Le grand malaise des nations, Le Seuil, Paris, 2015.

[DEG 11a] DEGAND A., “Le multimédia face à l’immédiat, une interprétation de la reconfiguration des pratiques journalistiques selon trois niveaux”, Communication, vol. 29, 2011, available at: https://communication.revues.org/2342.

[DEG 11b] DEGAND A., “Les journalistes belges face au Web : ‘Je suis un journaliste frustré’”, Apache, February 11, 2011, available at: https://www.apache.be/fr/2013/02/11/les-journalistes-belges-faces-au-web-je-suis-un-journaliste-frustre-1/.

[DOU 98] DOU H., “L’attractivité de zone – Quelques réflexions, comportements et indicateurs”, Rencontres de l’ORME, Technologies et communication, la France en pointe, Marseille, October 5, 1998.

[DOU 99] DOU H., MASSARI COELHO G., “Au-delà de l’intelligence compétitive : L’attractivité”, ISDM, Information Science for Decision Making, pp. 12–54, 1999, available at: http://isdm.univ-tln.fr/PDF/isdm4/isdm4.pdf.

[DOU 14] DOU H., “A new way to understand the ‘force field analysis’ from Big Data analytics may be the future engine of the smart cities development”, Symposium International ICCI (Competitive Intelligence) Big Data, Beijing, China, October 25–26, 2014, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=1702.

[DOU 15] DOU H., MANULLANG S.-D., KISTER J. et al., “Automatic patent analysis used to improve innovation and development in developing countries”, British Journal of Applied Science & Technology, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 237–252, 2015, available at: http://www.sciencedomain.org/abstract/8053.

[DOU 16a] DOU H., “Introduction à l’intelligence territoriale”, CESER PACA, Commission Prospective, July 22, 2016, available at: http://s244543015.onlinehome.fr/ciworldwide/?p=1942.

[DOU 16b] DOU H., KONÉ H., “L’innovation frugale dans les pays en développement et la nécessité d’une protection intellectuelle appropriée”, Mondes en développement, vol. 44, no. 173, pp. 29–45, 2016.

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[FME 10] FME TEAM, Understanding Emotional Intelligence, Free Management eBooks, 2010, available at: http://www.free-management-ebooks.com/dldebk-pdf/fme-understanding-emotional-intelligence.pdf.

[FRA 16] FRANÇOIS L., ZEBIB R. (eds), Influentia : La référence des stratégies d’influence, Lavauzelle, Panazol, 2016.

[FRÉ 15] FRÉDÉRIC, “Explosion de rumeurs !”, Hoaxbuster, 2015, available at: http://www.hoaxbuster.com/dossiers/explosion-de-rumeurs.

[GAË 06] GAËL, “Procter et Gamble ou le satanisme révélé”, Les sceptiques du Québec, 2006, available at: http://www.sceptiques.qc.ca/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2912.

[GAI 12] GAILDRAUD L., Orchestrer la rumeur, Eyrolles, Paris, 2012.

[GAZ 03] GAZONNEAU A., “Marseille et la coupe de l’America : Un enjeu de quelque 1,4 milliard d’euros”, Batiactu, 2003, modified in 2008, available at: http://www.batiactu.com/edito/marseille-et-coupe-america-un-enjeu-quelque-14-milliard-15569.php.

[HOL 05] HOLDEN G., ROSENBERG G., BARKER K., “Bibliometrics: A potential decision making aid in hiring, reappointment, tenure and promotion decisions”, Social Work in Health Care, vol. 41, nos 3–4, pp. 67–92, 2005.

[JUI 09] JUILLET A., “Stratégies d’influence, le décryptage”, Communication & Influence, Special edition, no. 1, June 2009.

[JUI 15] JUILLET A., L’influence, 3e rencontre de Daklha, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2015.

[KAP 87] KAPFERER J.-M., Rumeurs, le plus vieux média du monde, Le Seuil, Paris, 1987.

[KIM 04] KIMMEL A., Rumors and Rumors Control, Free Press, New York, 2004.

[LAR 08] LA RUMEUR, “La Rumeur sur Procter et Gamble”, December 29, 2008, available at: https://larumeur.wordpress.com/2008/12/29/la-rumeur-sur-procter-et-gamble/#more-69.

[LEQ 13] LEQUESNE C., “La diplomatie publique : Un objet nouveau ?”, Mondes : Les cahiers du Quai d’Orsay, no. 11, pp. 9–12, 2013, available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/MONDES_11_FR-EN_cle0b857d.pdf.

[MAY 13] MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER V., CUKIER K., Big Data: A Revolution that will Transform How we Live, Work, and Think, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston, 2013.

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