Endnotes

Chapter 1 Endnotes

1. Many scholars have drawn this distinction between decisions that are quite novel, ill-structured, ambiguous, and highly consequential and those that are more routine, well-defined, and tactical in nature. For instance, see H. Simon. (1960). The New Science of Management Decision. New York: Harper & Row; P. Drucker. (1967). The Effective Executive. New York: Harper & Row; F. Harrison. (1996). The Managerial Decision-Making Process, Fourth Edition. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. For an example of researchers who define strategic decisions in a manner similar to the approach employed in this book, see K. Eisenhardt and L. J. Bourgeois. (1988). "The politics of strategic decision making in high-velocity environments: Toward a midrange theory," Academy of Management Journal. 31(4): p. 737–770.

2. Henry Mintzberg and his colleagues conducted a landmark study in 1976 that documented the dynamic, iterative, and discontinuous nature of many strategic decision-making processes. See H. Mintzberg, D. Raisinghani, and A. Theoret. (1976). "The structure of 'unstructured' decision processes," Administrative Science Quarterly. 21: p. 246–275.

3. N. Tichy and D. Ulrich. (1984). "The leadership challenge—A call for the transformational leader," Sloan Management Review. 26(1): p. 63.

4. J. Byrne, L. Lavelle, N. Byrnes, M. Vickers, and A. Borrus. "How to fix corporate governance," Business Week, (May 6, 2002), p. 68.

5. Bill Wooldridge and Steven Floyd have defined and operationalized the construct of consensus as the multiplicative function of commitment and shared understanding. Their definition, survey instruments, and measurement methodology have now been used by a number of other scholars. See B. Wooldridge and S. Floyd. (1990). "The strategy process, middle management involvement, and organizational performance," Strategic Management Journal. 11: 231–241. To see how I have measured consensus following a similar methodological approach, see M. Roberto. (2004). "Strategic decision-making processes: Moving beyond the efficiency-consensus tradeoff," Group and Organization Management. 29(6): p. 625–658.

6. A. Amason. (1996). "Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict on strategic decision making," Academy of Management Journal. 39(1): p. 125.

7. For more on what can happen when organizations achieve understanding without commitment, or vice versa, see S. Floyd and B. Wooldridge. (1996). The Strategic Middle Manager: How to Create and Sustain Competitive Advantage. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

8. J. Krakauer. (1997). Into Thin Air: A Personal Account of the Mount Everest Disaster. New York: Anchor Books. p. 356–357.

9. Many empirical studies have shown that organizational decision-making processes can be quite diffuse at times, and that they involve simultaneous activity at multiple levels of the firm. In Joseph Bower's seminal work on how resource-allocation decisions are made in organizations, he concluded that "Individual planning and investment decisions are made by managers at many levels of the firm...an idea is shaped as it proceeds up managerial levels until it emerges fully packaged as a request for capital or a business plan for consideration by corporate management. At the same time, each level of management influences the ones above and below it." See J. Bower. (1970). Managing the Resource Allocation Process. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. p. 19–20. For more empirical work consistent with Bower's findings, see R. Burgelman. (1983). "A process model of internal corporate venturing in the diversified major firm." Administrative Science Quarterly. 28: p. 223–244 as well as H. Mintzberg and A. McHugh. (1985). "Strategy formation in an adhocracy." Administrative Science Quarterly. 30(2): p. 160–197. An interesting reflection on the past few decades of research in this stream of literature can be found in R. Butler, H. Mintzberg, A. Pettigrew, and J. Waters. (1990). "Studying deciding: An exchange of views between Mintzberg and Waters, Pettigrew, and Butler." Organization Studies. 11(1): p. 1–16.

10. G. Allison and P. Zelikow. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Second edition. New York: Longman. p. 5. In Allison's book, he examines the Cuban Missile Crisis using three different conceptual lenses. The first—the rational actor model—presumes that one can explain an organization's behavior as the output of the thinking of a rational individual at the top of the institution. The other two conceptual lenses view organizational decisions and action as the result of a more complex set of routines and behaviors involving multiple actors, at different levels, who may have conflicting goals.

11. See M. Roberto. (2002). "The stable core and dynamic periphery in top management teams," Management Decision. 41(2): p. 120–131. In that paper, I provide results from a survey of 78 business-unit presidents at Fortune 500 firms, as well as from field research at several sites. The data show that a top management team performs a variety of monitoring and control functions within most firms, but that a single team with stable composition does not make strategic choices in most organizations. Instead, different groups, with members from multiple organizational levels, form to make various strategic decisions. A stable subset of the top team forms the core of each of these multiple decision-making bodies.

12. D. Hambrick. (1994). "Top management groups: A conceptual integration and reconsideration of the team label," In B. M. Staw and L. L. Cummings (Eds.) Research in Organizational Behavior. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 172. Hambrick offered this acknowledgment one decade after launching the "upper echelons" literature, which focuses on the effect of top management team composition on strategic choices and organizational performance. See D. Hambrick and P. Mason. (1984). "Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers," Academy of Management Review. 9: p. 193–206.

13. J.B. Quinn. (1980). Strategies for Change. Homewood, IL: Irwin. p. 13.

14. For interesting case studies that demonstrate the critical role of "offline" activity as it relates to senior management team decision making, see L. Hill. (1993). "Rudi Gassner and the Executive Committee of BMG International (A)," Harvard Business School Case No. 494-055, as well as D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (1997). "Decision-Making at the Top: The All-Star Sports Catalog Division," Harvard Business School Case No. 398-061.

15. For a comprehensive overview of cognitive bias research, see M. Bazerman. (1998). Judgment in Managerial Decision Making. New York: John Wiley & Sons. To access another useful guide for managers, see J. E. Russo and P. Schoemaker. (2002). Winning Decisions: Getting It Right the First Time. New York: Fireside.

16. For more on the sunk-cost trap, see B. Staw and J. Ross. (1989). "Understanding behavior in escalation situations." Science. 246: p. 216–220; H. Arkes and C. Blumer. (1985). "The psychology of sunk cost," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 35: p. 124–140; J. Brockner. (1992). "The escalation of commitment to a failing course of action," Academy of Management Review. 17(1): p. 39–61.

17. Kathleen Eisenhardt and L. Jay Bourgeois found that political behavior—defined in terms of activities such as withholding of information and behind-the-scenes coalition formation—leads to less-effective decisions and poorer organizational performance. See K. Eisenhardt and L.J. Bourgeois. (1988). However, other studies show that certain forms of political behavior can enhance organizational performance. For instance, Kanter, Sapolsky, Pettigrew, and Pfeffer each have conducted studies that show that political activity such as coalition building can prove helpful in building commitment and securing support for organizational decisions. See R. Kanter. (1983). Change Masters. New York: Simon and Schuster; Sapolsky. (1972). The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; A. Pettigrew. (1973). The Politics of Organizational Decision Making. London: Tavistock; J. Pfeffer. (1992). Managing with Power. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Why the discrepancy in these studies? It appears that the results will depend on precisely how scholars define politics, as well as precisely how managers employ political tactics in organizations.

18. In a classic study of more than 200 capital investment choices, Eberhard Witte found that the decision processes almost never followed a simple linear progression from problem identification to selection of a course of action. See E. Witte. (1972). "Field research on complex decision-making processes—The phase theorem." International Studies of Management and Organization. Fall: p. 156–182.

19. James March has described the "garbage-can model" of decision making in which solutions, problems, and decision makers often come together haphazardly, with the outcome sometimes being that solutions are in search of problems to solve. See J. March. (1994). A Primer on Decision Making. New York: Free Press.

20. See A. Langley. (1989). "In search of rationality: The purposes behind the use of formal analysis in organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly. 34: p. 598–631; M. Feldman and J. March. (1981). "Information in organizations as signal and symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly. 26: 171–186.

21. For more on Iacocca and the Ford Mustang story, see R. Lacey. (1986). Ford: The Men and the Machine. Boston: Little Brown; D. Halberstam. (1986). The Reckoning. New York: William Morrow; L. Iacocca. (1984). Iacocca: An Autobiography. Toronto: Bantam Books.

22. See K. Weick. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

23. For more on the emergent nature of strategy formation, see H. Mintzberg and J. Waters. (1985). "Of strategies, deliberate and emergent," Strategic Management Journal. 6(3): p. 257–272.

24. Welch describes this concept of confronting reality in a video produced at the Harvard Business School that includes a compilation of Jack Welch speaking to students or being interviewed by HBS professors at a series of points during his 20-year tenure as CEO of General Electric. See J. Bower. (2002). Jack Welch Compilation: 1981–2001. Harvard Business School Video. Welch also describes what he means by dealing with reality in his book. See J. Welch. (2001). Jack: Straight from the Gut. New York: Warner Business Books.

25. Bower. (1970). p. 305.

26. In her book, Men and Women of the Corporation, Rosabeth Moss Kanter describes how managers have a tendency to search for subordinates who are similar to them in many ways, including people with similar outward appearances. She argued that homogeneity comforts people, in a sense, particularly during times of uncertainty. See R. Kanter. (1977). Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books. Many scholars also have argued that demographic homogeneity may signify a lower level of cognitive diversity within a firm (i.e., a tendency for more like-minded people). For instance, see D. Hambrick and P. Mason. (1984).

27. For an example of the pressures to not disagree with a powerful chief executive, one might consider the case of Bill Agee, CEO at Morris Knudsen in the early 1990s. Brian O'Reilly describes his management style in great detail in an article for Fortune magazine that appeared in May 1995, after a year in which Agee's firm lost more than $300 million, largely due to a flawed decision to move into locomotive and railcar manufacturing. In the article, O'Reilly quotes a rail company executive commenting on Morris Knudsen's attempt to move into this new business; that executive describes Agee's direct reports as "sycophants and yes-men." See B. O'Reilly. "Agee in exile," Fortune. (May 29, 1995): p. 50–61.

28. Ibid. (1997). p. 190.

29. Ibid. (1997). p. 260.

30. Ibid. (1997). p. 260.

31. Ibid. (1997). p. 245.

32. A. Boukreev and G. Weston DeWalt. (1998). The Climb: Tragic Ambitions on Everest. New York: St. Martin's. [p. 121].

33. Krakauer. (1997). p. 216.

34. Ibid. (1997). p. 219.

35. Ibid. (1997). p. 265.

36. For a complete conceptual analysis of the 1996 Mount Everest tragedy, see M. Roberto. (2002). "Lessons from Everest: The interaction of cognitive bias, psychological safety, and system complexity," California Management Review. 45(1): 136–158. For educators, the events also are detailed in a teaching case; see M. Roberto and G. Carioggia. (2002). "Mount Everest—1996," Harvard Business School Case No. 303-061.

37. A. Grove. (1996). Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points That Challenge Every Company. New York: Currency-Doubleday. p. 116.

38. See Amason (1996) for a detailed discussion of the relationship between cognitive and affective conflict, as well as the effect that these two forms of conflict have on outcomes such as commitment, understanding, and decision quality.

39. Many people have speculated about cross-cultural differences with respect to the role of conflict in organizational decision-making processes. I believe that many of the ideas presented in this book represent universal principles, but naturally, managers need to apply these core principles with sensitivity for the cultural settings in which they work. For instance, many people have wondered whether conflict must be handled differently in certain countries, such as Japan. I have chosen not to speculate in this book about cross-cultural differences, given that most of my research has taken place in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. Moreover, other scholars have not yet arrived at definitive research conclusions with regard to cross-cultural differences in senior management decision-making. More work needs to be done in this area.

40. For more on the leadership style of Bill Parcells, see B. Parcells. (2000). "The tough work of turning around a team," Harvard Business Review. 78(6): p. 179–184.

41. H. Einhorn and R. Hogarth. (1978). "Confidence in judgment: Persistence in the illusion of validity," Psychological Review. 85: p. 395–416.

42. For more on overconfidence bias, see S. Lichtenstein, B. Fischhoff, and L. Phillips. (1982). "Calibration of probabilities: The state of the art to 1980," in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.

43. B. Staw, L. Sandelands, and J. Dutton. (1981). "Threat-rigidity effects on organizational behavior," Administrative Science Quarterly. 26: p. 501–524.

44. For more on social identity theory and self-categorization theory, see H. Tajfel. (1978). "Social categorization, social identity, and social comparison." In H. Tajfel (ed.). Differentiation Between Social Groups in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. p. 61–76. London: Academic Press; J. Turner. (1985). "Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior." In E. J. Lawler (ed.). Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research. p. 77–122. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. For a recent empirical study applying these theories to better understand the impact of diversity on work groups, see J. Polzer, L. Milton, and W. Swann, Jr. (2002). "Capitalizing on diversity: Interpersonal congruence in small work groups," Administrative Science Quarterly. 47(2): p. 296–324.

45. C. Argyris. (1990). Overcoming Organizational Defenses. Needham Heights, MA: Simon and Schuster.

46. A great deal of empirical research has shown that certain process attributes tend to enhance decision-making outcomes (i.e., a higher quality process leads to higher quality choices). For instance, see I. Janis. (1989). Crucial Decisions. New York: Free Press; J. Dean and M. Sharfman. (1996). "Does decision process matter?," Academy of Management Journal. 39: 368–396. For a review of studies in this area, see N. Rajagopalan, A. Rasheed, and D. Datta. (1993). "Strategic decision processes: Critical review and future directions," Journal of Management. 19: p. 349–364.

Chapter 2 Endnotes

1. T. Sorensen. (1966). Kennedy. New York: Bantam. p. 346.

2. D. Halberstam. (1972). The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House. As an example of the caliber of the intellects gathered in the White House at that time, consider McGeorge Bundy—Kennedy's national security adviser. He received tenure at Harvard after only two years on the faculty, and he was appointed dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences in 1953 at the remarkably young age of 34.

3. This account of the Bay of Pigs decision draws upon two critical sources: A. Schlesinger, Jr. (1965). A Thousand Days. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; I. Janis. (1982). Groupthink. Second edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

4. Schlesinger. (1965). p. 250.

5. The Bay of Pigs decision represents one of the classic cases of "groupthink" described by Irving Janis. According to Janis, groupthink is "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." Janis. (1982). p. 9.

6. For a discussion of the changes Kennedy made after the Bay of Pigs failure, see Janis. (1982). In addition, see Schlesinger. (1965); R. Johnson. (1974). Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency. New York: Harper Row; A. George. (1974). "Adaptation to stress in political decision making: The individual, small group, and organizational context." In G. Coelho, D. Hamburg, and J. Adams (eds). Coping and Adaptation. New York: Basic Books.

7. For a detailed, first-hand account of the decision making that took place during the Cuban missile crisis, see R. Kennedy. (1969). Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton.

8. Janis. (1982). p. 141.

9. This analysis of the two decisions draws heavily upon a discussion in D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (2001). "What you don't know about making decisions," Harvard Business Review. 79(8): p. 108–116.

10. Schlesinger. (1965). p. 248.

11. The material that follows draws heavily upon empirical research reported in M. Roberto. (2002). "The stable core and dynamic periphery in top management teams," Management Decision. 41(2): p. 120–131.

12. For more on the filtering of information and its potentially detrimental effect on organizational decision making, see A. George. (1980). Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. The book is an excellent analysis of the dynamics of decision making at the most senior levels of government, but the conceptual ideas also apply to many other types of complex organizations.

13. For a conceptual analysis of why NASA downplayed the risks associated with the foam strike that took place during the Columbia's launch in January 2003, see A. Edmondson, M. Roberto, R. Bohmer, E. Ferlins, and L. Feldman. (2005). "The recovery window: Organizational learning following ambiguous threats." In M. Farjoun and W. Starbuck (eds). Organization at the Limit: NASA and the Columbia Disaster. London: Blackwell. In that chapter, we define the concept of a recovery window as the finite time period between a threat and a major accident (or prevented accident) in which constructive collective action is feasible. We argue that executives do not downplay threats such as the foam strike simply because of negligence or incompetence; instead, we propose that organizations are naturally predisposed to downplay threats when they are ambiguous. That predisposition to under-respond derives from certain factors related to human cognition, team design and dynamics, and organizational structure and culture. The paper also outlines an alternative, learning-oriented approach to addressing ambiguous threats that leaders can employ to reduce the risk of catastrophic failures.

14. For more about involving people responsible for implementation in the strategic decision-making process, see L. Jay Bourgeois and K. Eisenhardt. (1988). "Strategic decision processes in high velocity environments: Four cases in the microcomputer industry," Management Science. 34(7): p. 816–835. The authors explain how the CEOs of successful firms in their study tended to consult people responsible for implementation during the decision process, and in particular, involved them deeply in the development of execution triggers, defined as the stream of "subsequent decisions to be triggered by a schedule, milestone, or event" in the initially chosen course of action (p. 829–830).

15. K. Eisenhardt. (1989). "Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments," Academy of Management Journal. 12: p. 543–576.

16. Eisenhardt. (1989). p. 559.

17. M. Roberto. (2002). "The stable core and dynamic periphery in top management teams," Management Decision. 41(2): p. 120–131.

18. Irving Janis and Leon Mann describe the apprehension and anxiety that individuals sometimes experience before making a consequential decision as "anticipatory regret." For a detailed discussion of the concept and its impact on decision makers, see I. Janis and L. Mann. (1977). Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment. New York: Free Press.

19. Eisenhardt. (1989).

20. For a thoughtful summary and analysis of the research on demographic heterogeneity, see K. Williams and C. O'Reilly. (1998). "Demography and diversity in organizations: A review of 40 years of research." In B. Staw and R. Sutton (eds). Research in Organizational Behavior: p. 77–140. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. It should be noted that many scholars have criticized the literature on top management team demographics for reasons beyond the fact that it has produced a series of conflicting findings. For instance, my 2002 article in Management Decision shows that strategic choices are not made by a stable top team within a firm, but by a dynamic blend of participants depending on the situation at hand. Therefore, it becomes hard to argue that the demographic attributes of the top team can accurately predict organizational outcomes. Other scholars have pointed out that most demographic studies cannot determine the direction of causality, pay insufficient attention to intervening team processes which some data suggest matter more than structural attributes, and fail to account for situation-specific factors that affect team process and performance. For an insightful critique of the research on top management team demographics, see A. Pettigrew. (1992). "On studying managerial elites," Strategic Management Journal. 13: p. 163–182.

21. Leaders also should consider the power structure within a top management team and its effects on the decision-making process. Recent studies suggest that scholars who have focused on demographic heterogeneity may not have accounted sufficiently for power imbalances within top management teams. For an insightful study that looks at both power structure and demographics within senior teams over time, see P. Pitcher and A. Smith. (2001). "Top management team heterogeneity: Personality, power, and proxies," Organization Science. 12(1): p. 1–18.

22. Joseph Bower introduced the concept of structural context in his study of resource allocation processes within multidivisional firms. See J. Bower. (1970). Subsequent studies by many of Bower's doctoral students have further explored how structural context shapes strategic decision making within firms. For example, see C. Christensen and J. Bower. (1996). "Customer power, strategic investment, and the failure of leading firms," Strategic Management Journal. 17: p. 197–218.

23. J. Kotter and D. Cohen. (2002). The Heart of Change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

24. Janis and Mann. (1977).

25. F. Fiedler. (1992). "Time-based measures of leadership experience and organizational performance: A review of research and a preliminary model," Leadership Quarterly. 3(1): p. 4–23.

26. J. R. Hackman. (2002). Leading Teams: Setting the Stage for Great Performances. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

27. A. Edmondson. (1999). "Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams." Administrative Science Quarterly. p. 44: 354.

28. For more details regarding the impact of psychological safety on team learning and performance, see A. Edmondson, R. Bohmer, and G. Pisano. (2001). "Disrupted routines team learning and new technology implementation in hospitals," Administrative Science Quarterly. 46: p. 685–716; A. Edmondson. (2003). "Speaking up in the operating room: How team leaders promote learning in interdisciplinary action teams," Journal of Management Studies 40(6): p. 1419–1452.

29. R. Farson and R. Keyes. (2002). "The failure-tolerant leader," Harvard Business Review. 80(8): p. 67.

30. A. Edmondson, M. Roberto, and A. Tucker. (2002). "Children's Hospital and Clinics," Harvard Business School Case No. 302-050.

31. Experimental studies have been conducted that compare the different group decision-making procedures discussed in this section (Consensus vs. Dialectical Inquiry vs. Devil's Advocacy). The analysis in these pages draws upon the results of that research. For instance, see D. Schweiger, W. Sandberg, J. Ragan. (1986). "Group approaches for improving strategic decision making," Academy of Management Journal. 29: p. 51–71. My colleague David Garvin and I have developed a set of group exercises, based on these experimental studies, that enable students to experience these different approaches to decision making, and to compare and contrast their evaluations of the three methods. See D. Garvin and M. Roberto (1996). Decision-Making Exercises (A), (B), and (C). Harvard Business School Cases No. 397-031, 397-032, 397-033. The teaching note accompanying those exercises examines these three methods in depth. Moreover, we discuss these approaches in D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (2001). "What you don't know about making decisions," Harvard Business Review. 79(8): p. 108–116.

32. E. De Bono. (1985). Six Thinking Hats. Boston: Little, Brown.

33. For a more in-depth discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each method, see the following articles: D. Schweiger, W. Sandberg, J. Ragan. (1986); R. Priem, D. Harrison, and N. Muir. (1995). "Structured conflict and consensus outcomes in group decision making," Journal of Management, 21(4): p. 691–710; A. Murrell, A. Stewart, and B. Engel. (1993). "Consensus vs. devil's advocacy," Journal of Business Communication. 30(4): p. 399–414.

34. Recall, for instance, the finding of Solomon Asch in his famous experiments conducted in the early 1950s. He exposed an individual to a group that was instructed to unanimously articulate a position in clear violation of the facts. The individual often experienced enormous pressures for conformity. However, when the experimenter introduced a second person unaware of the experimenter's instructions for the majority, Asch found that the two individuals tended to be less likely to succumb to conformity pressures. See S. Asch. (1951). "Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments." In H. Guetzkow (ed). Groups, Leadership, and Men: p. 177–190. New York: Russell and Russell.

35. Priem, Harrison, and Muir. (1995); Murrell, Stewart, and Engel. (1993).

36. I have created a set of group exercises that explore the impact of a leader announcing an initial position at the outset of a meeting. See M. Roberto. (2001). "Participant and Leader Behavior: Group Decision Simulation (A)-(F)," Harvard Business School Case Nos. 301-026, 301-027, 301-028, 301-029, 301-030, 301-049. The teaching note accompanying those exercises describes the legitimacy, conformity, and framing effects, and it provides sample data pertaining to the impact that taking an initial position has on perceptions of fairness, levels of commitment, etc.

37. J. Russo and P. Schoemaker. (1989). Decision Traps: The Ten Barriers to Brilliant Decision-Making and How to Overcome Them. New York: Fireside. p. 15.

38. My colleague, Michael Watkins, has coined the phrase "charade of consultation."

39. D. Balz and B. Woodward. "America's chaotic road to war: Bush's global strategy began to take shape in first frantic hours after attack," The Washington Post. January 27, 2002: p. A01.

40. I have written a case study documenting the way in which President Bush and his advisers decided to go to war in Afghanistan in the days after the September 11 tragedy. See M. Roberto and G. Carioggia. (2002). "Launching the War on Terrorism," Harvard Business School Case No. 303-027.

41. A. Edmondson, M. Roberto, and M. Watkins. (2003). "A dynamic model of top management team effectiveness: Managing unstructured task streams," Leadership Quarterly. 14(3): p. 297–325.

42. G. Stasser and J. Davis. (1981). "Group decision making and social influence: A social interaction model," Psychological Review (88): p. 523–551; G. Stasser and W. Titus. (1985). "Pooling of unshared information in group decision making: Biased information sampling during discussion," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. (48): p. 1467–1478; G. Stasser. (1999). "The uncertain role of unshared information in collective choice." In L. Thompson, J. Levine, and D. Messick (eds). Shared Cognition in Organizations. p. 49–69. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

43. An experimental study by University of Illinois-Chicago Professor Jim Larson and his colleagues supports the proposition that a more activist leadership style may induce people to share more private information. See J. Larson, P. Foster-Fishman, and T. Franz. (1998). "Leadership style and the discussion of shared and unshared information in decision-making groups," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 24(5): p. 482–495.

44. K. Eisenhardt, J. Kahwajy, and L.J. Bourgeois. (1998). "Conflict and strategic choice: How top management teams disagree." In D. Hambrick, D. Nadler, and M. Tushman (eds). Navigating Change: How CEOs, Top Teams, and Boards Steer Transformation. p. 141–169. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

45. Edmondson, Roberto, and Watkins. (2003). p. 312. We draw our definitions of mediation and arbitration from D. Lax and J. Sebenius. (1986). The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain. New York: Free Press.

46. Edmondson, Roberto, and Watkins. (2003). p. 312.

47. Eisenhardt. (1989). Note that authors, researchers, and managers have used the term consensus in many different ways. It might be useful at this point to recall that we have defined consensus in this book as the combination of commitment and shared understanding. That definition differs from the use of the term employed by Eisenhardt, in which it refers to agreement among group members. It is important to point out that one could employ the approach to reaching closure described by Eisenhardt, which many leaders do, but not achieve high levels of commitment and common understanding.

48. D. Garvin. (2000). Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

49. It should be noted that former President Dwight Eisenhower may have encouraged President Kennedy to engage in process-centric learning after the Bay of Pigs failure. In late April 1961, Eisenhower traveled to Camp David at Kennedy's request. Kennedy explained his views regarding the causes of the failure: faulty intelligence, tactical mistakes, poor timing, etc. According to historian Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower offered the following inquiry: "Mr. President, before you approved this plan did you have everybody in front of you debating the thing so you got pros and cons yourself and then made your decision, or did you see these people one at a time?" Apparently, Kennedy acknowledged that he and his advisers had not debated the plan openly in a full team meeting. See S. Ambrose. (1984). Eisenhower: The President, Volume 2. New York: Touchstone. p. 638.

Chapter 3 Endnotes

1. Welch. (2001). p. 96. In Chapter 7 of Welch's book, he provides a vivid description of General Electric's culture when he began as CEO. For a case study of Welch's leadership of the transformation at GE during the 1980s, see J. Bower and J. Dial. (1994). "Jack Welch: General Electric's Revolutionary," Harvard Business School Case No. 394-065.

2. In Bower and Dial's case about Jack Welch, they include a quote from one of Welch's colleagues, who comments that the CEO's decision-making style reflected his early years playing ice hockey as a child in Salem, Massachusetts: "Hockey is the kind of game where people bang you up against the boards and then go out and have a drink with you after...Jack will chase you around the room, throwing arguments and objections at you. Then you fight back." Bower and Dial. (1994). p. 3–4.

3. Russo and Schomaker have described this situation as a "debating society." See Russo and Schoemaker. (1989). Note that several studies show a positive correlation between cognitive conflict and team performance, with no evidence of a curvilinear relationship. See Amason. (1996) and L. Pelled, K. Eisenhardt, and K. Xin. (1999). "Exploring the black box: Group diversity, conflict, and performance," Administrative Science Quarterly. 44: p. 1–28. On the other hand, Karen Jehn performed a study in 1995 that did show a curvilinear relationship between cognitive conflict and team performance. See K. Jehn. (1995). "A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict." Administrative Science Quarterly. 40: p. 256–282.

4. I am not suggesting that personality plays no role whatsoever. Some people clearly are more comfortable with conflict than others. Some individuals find it easier to express dissenting views than others, independent of the context in which they are operating.

5. ABC News. (2003). "Final mission," Primetime Live.

6. This material on the Columbia accident is drawn from a year of intensive research that I conducted along with my colleagues Amy Edmondson and Richard Bohmer and our research associates, Erika Ferlins and Laura Feldman. I am deeply indebted to them for enabling me to join them in such a fruitful and intellectually stimulating research program. Along with reviewing all the publicly available materials about the accident, we conducted our own interviews with key experts. For educators wanting to teach about the Columbia accident, we have developed a traditional case study (Harvard Business School Case No. 304-090). In addition, we have created an innovative multimedia case study (Harvard Business School Case No. 305-032) that puts students in the shoes of six key managers and engineers at NASA, and enables them to experience the first eight days of Columbia's final mission as those individuals did. In our classes, we then role play a critical management meeting that took place on Flight Day 8. The case discussion is unlike any other we have experienced, because students come to class with asymmetric information, reflecting the reality at NASA during the mission itself. In the multimedia case, students receive a wealth of information, all based on actual communications that took place within NASA. Students hear audio reenactments of meetings that took place (based on actual transcripts), read internal NASA reports, see e-mails sent and received (and can even open attachments), obtain "while you were out" notes denoting phone calls that took place, view Microsoft PowerPoint slides shown at key meetings within NASA, etc. We also have conducted interviews with experts such as members of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and a former shuttle astronaut. Those video clips are interspersed throughout the simulation. The teaching note accompanying the multimedia case explains how to lead the class discussion of this material.

7. This account of the events that took place during Columbia's final mission draws heavily upon the detailed account in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's official report on the accident. For those unfamiliar with this report, it is one of the most remarkable accident investigation reports that I have ever read. In large part, that is because the report goes "beyond the widget" as board member Duane Deal (a retired brigadier general) has said. That is, they did not stop with a finding of the technical cause of the tragedy. They examined the underlying organizational causes in great depth, and in so doing, they drew heavily upon social science research and organization theory to help explain why NASA behaved as it did before and during the mission. See "Columbia's Final Flight," Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report. August 26, 2003. Washington, D.C. For Brigadier General Duane Deal's perspective, see D. Deal. (2004). "Beyond the widget: Columbia accident lessons affirmed," Air and Space Power Journal. Summer issue.

8. NASA Web site, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/47227main_mmt_030121.pdf, accessed February 25, 2004.

9. Columbia Accident Investigation Board report. Vol. 1: p. 157.

10. James Glanz and John Schwartz. "Dogged engineer's effort to assess shuttle damage," The New York Times. September 26, 2003.

11. ABC News. (2003). "Final mission." Primetime Live.

12. Ibid.

13. T. Halvorson. "Judgment errors similar to Challenger, Ride says," Florida Today. April 8, 2003.

14. Interview with D. Vaughan conducted June 24, 2004. Professor Vaughan wrote an extraordinary book on the Challenger accident. In that analysis, she argued that NASA's behavior leading up to the Challenger disaster represented a "normalization of deviance." In other words, as time passed, small deviations from the official specifications became acceptable within NASA, because the shuttle continued to return safely despite O-ring problems. Over time, as Vaughan told us, "The unexpected becomes the expected becomes the accepted." In other words, what to outsiders may seem like serious signals of impending danger do not appear to be risky or dangerous to those within the organization who have gradually become accustomed to a deviation from the original standards. One could argue that a similar normalization of deviance occurred with regard to foam strikes in the years leading up to the Columbia accident. See D. Vaughan. (1996). The Challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

15. Vaughan argues eloquently that the problems at NASA are systemic, and she certainly puts a great deal of weight on that level of explanation rather than the issue of individual behavior. On the other hand, I do not think she means to absolve individuals of accountability by looking to the organizational and cultural determinants of behavior.

16. I recognize that this distinction between "hard" and "soft" becomes blurry at times. Naturally, organizational structure and culture are intricately intertwined. Structure and culture shape and influence one another over time.

17. Welch. (2001). p. 96.

18. See J. Bower. (2002). "Jack Welch Compilation: 1981–2001," Harvard Business School Video.

19. Interview with Dr. Widnall conducted May 21, 2004.

20. This description and analysis of the incident draws heavily from the insightful examination found in S. Snook. (2000). Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

21. Snook. (2000). p. 90–91.

22. For a discussion of the pros and cons of a CEO-COO structure at the top of a firm, see D. Hambrick and A. Cannella, Jr. (2004). "CEOs who have COOs: Contingency analysis of an unexplored structural form," Strategic Management Journal. 25(10): p. 959–979. This paper provides an empirical investigation of the CEO-COO structure. The authors find that firms with a COO perform worse than those without a COO. They argue that the negative performance may be due to problems such as the filtering of information and the partial separation of responsibility for strategy formulation from implementation. However, they also suggest that CEOs who select COOs may be less comfortable and/or competent in their roles than those who choose not to hire a COO.

23. See A. George. (1980). p. 153.

24. Rumsfeld, Donald. "Rumsfeld's Rules," Revised September 10, 2001.

25. Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe offer an example of an industry and a firm in which senior teams tend to consist of members who have been together for a lengthy period of time. In particular, they point out that Union Pacific had a strong inclination for appointing people with long tenures in the railroad industry to the top management team, particularly after a time when an outsider had brought changes that were not readily accepted by experienced railroad industry veterans. Moreover, Weick and Sutcliffe suggest that this preference for long-tenured industry executives has its risks: "It makes for a cohesive top management team. But that team is of one mind simply because the minds that compose it are redundant. Everyone sees the same warning signals and is blind to the same unexpected warnings." K. Weick and K. Sutcliffe. (2001). Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

26. R. Foster and S. Kaplan. (2001). Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market—And How to Successfully Transform Them. New York: Currency.

27. For a discussion of how senior management team dynamics may change over time as CEO tenure and overall team tenure grows, see D. Hambrick and G. Fukutomi. (1991). "The seasons of a CEO's tenure," Academy of Management Review. 16(4): p. 719–742. Also see D. Hambrick. (1995). "Fragmentation and the other problems CEOs have with their top management teams," California Management Review. 37(3): p. 110–127.

28. A. Edmondson, R. Bohmer, and G. Pisano. (2001). "Speeding up team learning." Harvard Business Review. 79(9): p. 125–134; A. Edmondson, R. Bohmer, and G. Pisano. (2001). "Disrupted routines team learning and new technology implementation in hospitals," Administrative Science Quarterly. 46: p. 685–716; A. Edmondson. (2003). "Speaking up in the operating room: How team leaders promote learning in interdisciplinary action teams," Journal of Management Studies. 40(6): p. 1419–1452.

29. ABC News. (1995). "Friendly fire: death over Iraq." Primetime Live.

30. I am deeply indebted to Leslie Freeman, a leader in learning and leadership development activities at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, who has helped me identify the parallels between this friendly fire incident and problems that occur in business settings of various kinds. Freeman has co-authored a teaching case about this incident. See S. Snook, L. Freeman, and J. Norwalk. (2004). "Friendly Fire," Harvard Business School Case No. 404-083.

31. J. Andrus. (1994). AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report of Investigation: U.S. Army Black Hawk Helicopters 87-36000 and 88-26060. U.S. Air Force. TAB V-026: p. 18.

32. M. Salter. (2003). "Innovation Corrupted: The Rise and Fall of Enron," Harvard Business School Case No. 904-036.

33. Widnall interview. (2004).

34. I have written a teaching case about the Storm King Mountain fire. See M. Roberto and E. Ferlins. (2003). "Storm King Mountain." Harvard Business School Case No. 304-046. For a more detailed analysis of the fire, see J. Maclean. (1999). Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire. New York: William Morrow and Company. For academic perspectives on decision making during this incident, see the following articles: M. Useem, J. Cook, and L. Sutton. (forthcoming). "Developing leaders for decision making under duress: Wildland firefighters on Storm King Mountain and its aftermath," Academy of Management Learning and Education; K. Weick. (1995). "Findings from the wildland firefighters human factors workshop." Paper presented at the Decision Workshop on Improving Wildland Firefighter Performance Under Stressful, Risky Conditions: Toward Better Decisions on the Fireline and More Resilient Organizations. Missoula, Montana. June 12–16, 1995.

35. Edmondson, Roberto, and Tucker. (2002).

36. The concepts in this section are described in depth in Edmondson, Roberto, Bohmer, Ferlins, and Feldman. (2005).

37. Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. (2003). p. 22.

38. For more on framing for execution vs. learning, see A. Edmondson. (2003). "Framing for learning: Lessons in successful technology implementation." California Management Review. 45(2): p. 34–54.

39. Vaughan interview. (2004).

40. Interview with R. Tetrault conducted May 24, 2004.

41. M. Roberto and E. Ferlins. (2004). "Massport (A)-(D)," Harvard Business School Case Nos. 304-081, 304-097, 304-098, 304-099.

42. E. Schein. (1992). Organizational Culture and Leadership. Second edition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

43. Interview with T. Durden conducted May 26, 2004.

44. D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (1997). "Decision-making at the top: The All-Star Sports Catalog Division," Harvard Business School Case No. 398-061.

45. Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. (2003). p. 170.

46. W. Langewiesche. (2003). "Columbia's last flight," The Atlantic Monthly. 292(4): p. 58–87.

Chapter 4 Endnotes

1. The term confrontational by design has been used by Charles Knight, former chairman and CEO of Emerson Electric, to describe the strategic planning process that he created and led for many years at his firm. See C. Knight. (1992). "Emerson Electric: Consistent profits consistently," Harvard Business Review. 70(1): p. 57–70.

2. As noted in an earlier chapter, building a more diverse team—one with more demographic heterogeneity—may increase cognitive conflict, though it could spark affective conflict as well. For an example of the empirical research on the link between demographics and cognitive conflict, see D. C. Pearce, K. G. Smith, J. Olian, H. Sims, K. A. Smith, and P. Flood. (1999). "Top management team diversity, group process, and strategic consensus," Strategic Management Journal. 20: 445–465. One should note, however, that demographic heterogeneity certainly may be helpful, but naturally, it does not guarantee a higher level of cognitive diversity or divergent thinking. In fact, one study showed that group process was a stronger predictor of top management team performance than demographic composition. See K. G. Smith, K. A. Smith, J. Olian, H. Sims, D. O'Bannon, and J. Scully. (1994). "Top management demography and process: The role of social integration and communication," Administrative Science Quarterly. 39(3):p. 412–438.

3. Naturally, as mentioned in the preface, leaders also need to take into account the national culture in which they are working. Some would argue that certain principles regarding conflict are not universal; that is, certain national cultures tend to deal with conflict differently, people in some countries tend to be more averse to conflict in group settings, etc. Because I have not conducted a great deal of research in non-Anglo Saxon cultures, I have chosen not to speculate in this book regarding cultural differences. In my view, some cultural differences do exist, although it is not clear to me that the typical stereotypes about certain countries are always accurate. There is certainly a need for more academic research on cultural differences in this area.

4. D. Scott. "Hot off his Manning impersonation, Huard now mimics Delhomme," The Charlotte Observer. January 24, 2004

5. Eisenhardt and her colleagues also have written about the importance of role-play exercises. See Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois. (1998).

6. Grove. (1996). p. 89.

7. Grove. (1996). p. 92–93. For an insightful academic analysis of Intel's exit from the DRAM business, see R. Burgelman. (1994). "Fading memories: A process theory of strategic business exit in dynamic environments," Administrative Science Quarterly. 39(1): p. 24–56. In this work, Burgelman describes how middle managers gradually shifted resources at Intel from the DRAM business to microprocessors, thereby altering the firm's competitive strategy. During this time, senior management continued to maintain that DRAMs represented a core element of Intel's corporate strategy; by the time Moore and Grove came to their epiphany, the organization's strategy had already been altered substantially. They were, in a sense, engaging in post-hoc rationalization of the new strategy that had taken hold at lower levels.

8. G. Klein. (1999). Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; G. Klein. (2003). Intuition at Work: Why Developing Your Gut Instincts Will Make You Better at What You Do. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

9. P. Wack. (1985). "Scenarios: Uncharted waters ahead," Harvard Business Review 63(5): 72–79; P. Wack. (1985). "Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids," Harvard Business Review. 63(6): p. 139–150.

10. Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois. (1998). p. 163.

11. J. Clawson and J. Grayson. (1996). "Scenario planning," Darden Business Publishing No. UVA-G-0260.

12. Klein. (2003).

13. M. Roberto. (2001). "Strategic Planning at Sun Life," Harvard Business School Case No. 301-084

14. The problem, of course, is that the selection of a particular conceptual lens entails the implicit selection of a frame for the problem at hand. How one frames a problem, of course, drives the type of solutions that are generated and considered. Therefore, scholars often advocate the explicit generation and consideration of multiple frames. See Schoemaker and Russo. (1989).

15. M. Roberto and G. Carioggia. (2003). "Polycom's Acquisition Process," Harvard Business School Case No. 304-040.

16. Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan. (1986). For more information, see also Garvin and Roberto (1996) and Garvin and Roberto (2001).

17. M. Roberto and G. Carioggia. "Electronic Arts: The Blockbuster Strategy," Harvard Business School Case No. 304-013.

18. A. George. (1980). George's comments build on the work of Richard Tanner Johnson, who wrote a book about different presidential decision-making styles. He described Franklin Roosevelt's style as a "competitive" model of decision making. Johnson contrasted Roosevelt's approach with the "formalistic" model adopted by presidents such as Eisenhower and Truman. That style emphasized the hierarchical flow of information by well-defined channels and procedures. Subordinates had clearly defined roles and areas of expertise, and the president synthesized the input received from various advisers. Kennedy, in contrast, employed a "collegial" model of decision making. According to Johnson, this approach emphasized a team-oriented approach to problem solving in which a great deal of informal communication occurred. Moreover, advisers behaved more as generalists than as specialists expected only to provide input on matters related to a narrow domain of expertise. The president did not receive information filtered through and synthesized by one cabinet head or by the chief of staff, but rather worked closely with the whole group to hear the debate among his advisers. See Johnson. (1974).

19. J. Thompson, Jr. (1968). "How could Vietnam happen?—An autopsy," The Atlantic Monthly. 221(4): p. 47–53. Thompson provides an insightful analysis of the decision making about the conflict in Vietnam, writing with the perspective of having spent five years working in the White House and State Department for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. For instructors wanting to teach about the Johnson administration's decision-making processes with regard to the war in Vietnam, I highly recommend asking students to view the movie Path to War, produced by HBO. The film provides an up-close look at how Johnson drew upon the input and counsel of his staff to make important decisions. I have written a brief orientation guide that I ask students to read before watching the movie. The guide provides a bit of background about the conflict, and it provides brief biographies of Johnson and each of his key advisers. See M. Roberto. (2004). "Orientation for Viewing 'Path to War," Harvard Business School Case No. 304-088.

20. Janis. (1982). p. 115.

21. Ibid.

22. Jeffrey Pfeffer has pointed that agenda control represents an important lever by which managers exert power. Moreover, he notes that some managers may purposefully crowd an agenda so as to avoid an intense focus on a subject about which they do not want lengthy debate. See Pfeffer (1992) and J. Pfeffer (1981). Power in organizations. Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing.

23. The adoption of a production, or routine operational, frame provides a powerful explanation of the organization's behavior during the Columbia recovery window (Deal, 2004). That framing partially explains why NASA emphasized schedules and deadlines as much as it did. Moreover, it contributes to our understanding of why Mission Management Team meetings were run in a very regimented, orderly, and efficient manner—after all, in a routine production environment, meetings are typically conducted in that manner. In short, Ham led the meeting in a manner consistent with the "operational frame" in which the shuttle program was organized. Her behavior is partially a product of the context in which she worked. That argument fits with Vaughan's analysis of the organization; as she said, "This was no personality problem. This was a structural and a cultural problem. And if you just change the cast of characters, the next person who comes in is going to be met with the same structure, the same culture, and they're going to be impelled to act in the same way." Vaughan interview (2004). For a lengthier discussion of the impact of the operational framing of the shuttle program, see Edmondson, Roberto, Bohmer, Ferlins, and Feldman, (2005).

24. Deal. (2004).

25. My colleague David Garvin often has pointed out that the subgroups in the Cuban missile crisis only spent a few days together, not many weeks or months. The limited timeframe may explain, in part, why people did not become so wedded to their subgroup positions as to induce a great deal of affective conflict and/or impede implementation of the final decision.

26. Lengthy time spent in subgroups may induce and accelerate social categorization processes, in which individuals may adopt highly positive perceptions about their in-group (their own subgroup) and negative perceptions about their out-group (the other subgroup). As Polzer and his colleagues have noted, such categorization activity can have a detrimental effect on team communication, conflict management, and performance. See Polzer, Milton, and Swann. (2002).

27. Langley. (1989).

28. M. Roberto and G. Carioggia. (2003). "Polycom's Acquisition Process," Harvard Business School Case No. 304-040.

29. A related problem in acquisition decision-making concerns the effects of momentum. Scholars Philippe Haspeslagh and David Jemison have described how many acquisition decision processes take on a "life of their own." In that atmosphere, it becomes difficult to question the strategic logic of a deal that appears destined to be completed, and for which all debates seem only about the fine points of the quantitative analysis. See P. Haspeslagh and D. Jemison. (1991). Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value Through Corporate Renewal. New York: Free Press.

30. D. Schweiger, W. Sandberg, and P. Rechner. (1989). "Experimental effects of dialectical inquiry, devil's advocacy, and consensus approaches to strategic decision making," Academy of Management Journal. 32: p. 745–772.

31. Bower and Dial. (1994). p. 4.

32. Welch. (2001).

33. Knight. (1992).

Chapter 5 Endnotes

1. This account of the Caesar comedy-writing team draws from an Institute for Management Development case study about the group, as well as Sid Caesar's autobiography. See B. Fischer and A. Boynton. (2002). "Caesar's Writers," IMD Case No. 3-1206, and S. Caesar. (1982). Where Have I Been? New York: Crown.

2. Fischer and Boynton, (2002). p. 7.

3. Caesar. (1982). p. 5.

4. Fischer and Boynton. (2002). p. 8.

5. My colleague David Garvin and I have described these two modes of decision making as advocacy and inquiry. See Garvin and Roberto. (2001). Chris Argyris and his colleagues have described advocacy vs. inquiry in a slightly different way in their work on group process and learning. See C. Argyris, R. Putnam, and D. Smith. (1985). Action Science: Concepts, Methods, and Skills for Research and Intervention. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

6. M. Roberto. (2004). "Strategic decision-making processes: Moving beyond the efficiency-consensus tradeoff," Group and Organization Management. 29(6): 625–658; K. Eisenhardt, J. Kahwajy, and L. Bourgeois. (1997). "How management teams can have a good fight," Harvard Business Review. 75(4): p. 77–85.

7. C. Lord, L. Ross, and M. Lepper. (1979). "Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 37: p. 2098.

8. Many studies have reported a relationship between cognitive and affective conflict. For instance, see Amason. (1996) and Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin. (1999).

9. My colleague David Garvin and I created a set of group decision-making exercises modeled after the experiments found in Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan. (1986). See Garvin and Roberto. (1996). When we conduct these exercises with MBA students and executive education students at Harvard Business School, cognitive conflict often leads to affective conflict despite the fact that teams discuss simple, disguised case studies in their decision-making processes, and of course, the choices do not pertain to real issues in their own organizations.

10. Interview with B. McMillan conducted August 19, 2002. See also M. Roberto and G. Carioggia. "Electronic Arts: The Blockbuster Strategy," Harvard Business School Case No. 304-013.

11. David Garvin and I have developed an innovative multimedia case study about Levy's turnaround of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. The research's distinguishing feature is that we were able to track the turnaround in real time; in fact, we conducted lengthy (2+ hours) video interviews with Levy every two to four weeks during the first six months of the turnaround. The multimedia case study includes clips from those interviews, internal e-mails and documents, and articles that appeared in the press—all of which document the turnaround in great depth. The material has been organized in a calendar, where students can see the major activities that took place each month, and then drill down deeper to hear Levy's comments about the event, read e-mails and other internal documents that may pertain to it, and examine press accounts as well. The case also presents a representative week from Levy's actual calendar/schedule so that students can understand precisely what he does on a day-to-day basis as he launches the turnaround. See D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (2003). "Paul Levy: Taking Charge of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center," Harvard Business School Multimedia No. 303-058. A detailed teaching note explains how to teach this multimedia case. In addition, we have written an article examining some of the leadership lessons from this story. See D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (February 2005). "Change through persuasion," Harvard Business Review. 83(2): p. 104-113.

12. C. Gersick and J.R. Hackman. (1990). "Habitual routines in task-performing groups," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 47: 65-97.

13. R. Fisher and W. Ury. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. New York: Penguin Books. p. 6–7.

14. M. Roberto. (2001). "Strategic Planning at Sun Life," Harvard Business School Case No. 301-084

15. Interview with Monique Burns was conducted September 12, 2003.

16. M. Tennant. (1988). Psychology and Adult Learning. London: Routledge. p. 89.

17. For more information about the Myers-Briggs personality types, see I. Myers Briggs and P. Myers. (1995). Gifts Differing: Understanding Personality Type. Mountain View, CA: Davies-Black Publishing.

18. It is interesting to note, however, that students in the MBA and advanced management program (executive education) at Harvard Business School, and at similar programs at other institutions, often complete the Myers-Briggs test soon after arriving on campus. Perhaps discussion of the survey results enhances people's respect for others' cognitive styles, and thereby improves our ability to stimulate constructive debates in our classrooms. To my knowledge, we have not examined the impact of the Myers-Briggs evaluations on subsequent student interaction in our classrooms, but I believe that this question may warrant further investigation.

19. Interview with Burns. (2003).

20. W. Ury. (1993). Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation. New York: Bantam Books. p. 78.

21. See Vaughan (1996) for a detailed description of the events that took place during the teleconference prior to the final launch of the Challenger space shuttle. See also Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. (1986). Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Many different analyses of this teleconference have been done, from various conceptual angles. For instance, James Esser and Joanne Lindoerfer argued that the managers and engineers engaged in "groupthink" during the critical prelaunch meeting. See J. Esser and J. Lindoerfer. (1989). "Groupthink and the Space Shuttle Challenger accident: Toward a quantitative case analysis," Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. 2: 167–177. Vaughan, however, argues that many of these other analyses do not offer either accurate or complete explanations of the accident. For instance, she makes the case that the groupthink hypothesis does not fit the facts with regard to what took place at the teleconference. See Vaughan. (1996). p. 525.

22. Vaughan. (1996). p. 6.

23. A. Edmondson and L. Feldman. (2003). "Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A), (B), (C), and (D) (TN)," Harvard Business School Teaching Note No. 604-032. For educators who are interested in teaching these concepts, Edmondson's teaching note explains how she uses an ABC film (Challenger—a 1990 movie directed by Glenn Jordan) to stimulate discussion about the Challenger launch decision. In class, she then conducts a role play of the deliberations that took place at the midnight teleconference on the eve of the launch. As students engage in the role play, she encourages them to think about how posing the right type of questions can foster an inquiry orientation and more effective collaborative learning process. She also describes how certain types of comments simply lead to a hardening of positions and more affective conflict.

24. Edmondson and Feldman. (2003). p. 14.

25. Ury. (1993). p. 80.

26. P. Drucker. (1954). The Practice of Management. New York: Harper Row. p. 351.

27. H. Gardner. (2004). Changing Minds: The Art and Science of Changing Our Own and Other People's Minds. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. p. 11, 14. Gardner's book provides a useful framework for thinking about how to engage in effective persuasion during a situation in which others disagree with you. Specifically, Gardner identifies seven levers that one can use to convince others to reconsider their position on a subject. The book builds upon Gardner's earlier work on the nature of human intelligence. See H. Gardner. (1983). Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences. New York: Basic Books.

28. In Changing Minds, Gardner's description of the power of representational redescription uses the example of the Pareto principle, and it includes graphs such as those shown in Figure 5-2. Gardner draws his example from a book about the Pareto principle. See R. Koch. (1998). The 80/20 Principle. New York: Currency/Doubleday.

29. K. Weick. (1984). "Small wins: Redefining the scale of social problems," American Psychologist. 39(1): p. 40–49.

30. In some organizations, finger-pointing and the designation of blame crowd out learning opportunities when failures take place. Moreover, individuals often do not want to talk about their failures, because they are embarrassed, or because they do not want to admit their mistakes in a public forum. For more on how to enhance tolerance of failure in organizations, see Farson and Keyes (2002). For additional insight as to why organizations do not learn effectively from failure, see A. Tucker and A. Edmondson. (2003). "Why hospitals don't learn from failures: Organizational and psychological dynamics that inhibit system change," California Management Review. 45(2): p. 55–72.

31. Garvin. (2000). Garvin's book, Learning in Action, provides a detailed analysis of the U.S. Army's after-action reviews. For additional information about this learning process, see D. Garvin. (1996). "Putting the Learning Organization to Work," Harvard Business School Publishing Video.

32. At Children's Hospital and Clinics in Minnesota, the staff has come to a similar conclusion with regard to how they conduct "focused event studies"—lessons learned exercises that take place after a medical accident has taken place. The doctors, nurses, and administrators at Children's Hospital have discovered that a focused event study must begin with a detailed mapping of the events that took place leading up to the accident, before people turn to a discussion of the causes of the failure. In part, staff members have come to this conclusion because each individual often does not know the full chain of events that took place. A similar situation may exist with regard to a complex decision-making process. For more details on focused event studies at Children's Hospital, see Edmondson, Roberto, and Tucker (2002).

33. Garvin. (2000).

34. C. Knight. Discussion during Harvard Business School class, February 23, 2004.

35. D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (2003). "Paul Levy: Taking Charge of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center." Harvard Business School Multimedia No. 303-058.

36. C. Raben and J. Spencer. (1998). "Confronting senior team conflict: CEO choices." In D. Hambrick, D. Nadler, and M. Tushman (eds). Navigating Change: How CEOs, Top Teams, and Boards Steer Transformation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. p. 188.

37. Boynton and Fischer, (2002). p. 1.

Chapter 6 Endnotes

1. M. Gendron. "Beth Israel, Deaconess to merge," Boston Herald. February 24, 1996.

2. Editorial, Boston Globe. October 8, 1996.

3. Levy's description of the merger and the subsequent problems at the hospital leading up to his hiring are described, in his own words, in a brief paper case that accompanies the multimedia study that David Garvin and I have developed about the turnaround at the BIDMC. See D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (2003). "Paul Levy: Taking Charge of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (A)," Harvard Business School Case No. 303-008.

4. Russo and Schoemaker (1989) employ the term debating society in their book.

5. R. Charan. (2001). "Conquering a culture of indecision," Harvard Business Review. 79(4): p. 74–82.

6. This definition of culture has been developed by Ed Schein, an expert on the subject who teaches at MIT's Sloan School of Management. See E. Schein. (1992).

7. L. Gerstner, Jr. (2002). Who Says Elephants Can't Dance? Inside IBM's Historic Turnaround. New York: Harper Business.

8. Gerstner. (2002). p. 192–193.

9. The exercise of power plays a vital role in a culture of no. At IBM, the heads of the various business units had a great deal of power, and they could exercise it in the nonconcur process. In some organizations, of course, power is highly centralized, with a large gap between the CEO's power and that of others on the senior team. In others, the business unit chiefs operate independent fiefdoms, control a vast amount of resources, and they have a large degree of independence. The culture of no is more likely to exist in the latter case.

10. J. Pfeffer and R. Sutton. (1999). "The smart-talk trap," Harvard Business Review. 77(3): p. 134–142. p. 137. Interestingly, the authors argue that management education may encourage smart talk in organizations. They point out that students in MBA programs are rewarded for making clever comments, and they are especially lauded if they offer contrarian views and sharp critiques of ideas presented in the case or by others in the class. Furthermore, Pfeffer and Sutton highlight the fact that the students do not need to implement their ideas to be successful in MBA programs; they need only formulate ideas that sound smart and sophisticated.

11. J. Pfeffer and R. Sutton. (1999). p. 138. One interesting study that the authors cite in their article was conducted by Teresa Amabile. She found that book reviewers who offered negative critiques were viewed by others as more intelligent than those who issued positive evaluations. See T. Amabile. (1983). "Brilliant but cruel: Perceptions of negative evaluators," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 19: p. 146–156.

12. An interesting example of "smart talk" may be the interaction that took place between the finance executives and the manufacturing and engineering managers at Ford in the 1950s. Ford President Robert McNamara had recruited a cadre of "whiz kids"—highly intelligent young people, with stellar academic credentials, who were adept at employing sophisticated quantitative techniques to analyze business issues. In David Halberstam's book about the auto industry, The Reckoning, he argues that the finance managers were adept at critiquing the plans and ideas of the "car guys," but their strictly analytical approach also may have stifled innovation and adaptation to the changing business environment in later years. See Halberstam. (1986).

13. Levy speaks about the decision-making problems at the hospital in great detail in a section of the multimedia case study that we have developed. He explains why decisions were not made effectively in the past, as well as how he overcame the "curious inability to decide." Later chapters of the book explain, in part, how he addressed the problem of indecisiveness at the hospital.

14. Charan. (2001). p. 76.

15. For more detail on this example, see D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (1997). "Decision-Making at the Top: The All-Star Sports Catalog Division," Harvard Business School Case No. 398-061. Please note that the names of the company and executives in this case study have been disguised.

16. Jon Katzenbach offers a similar example in his book on senior management teams. See the example about CEO Winston Newberry of Best Fuel Distribution Corporation (disguised case) in Chapter 3 of his book: J. Katzenbach. (1998). Teams at the Top: Unleashing the Potential of Both Teams and Individual Leaders. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

17. A pair of articles describes these findings regarding the link between comprehensiveness and performance in stable vs. unstable environments. See J. Fredrickson. (1984). "The comprehensiveness of strategic decision processes: Extension, observations, and future directions," Academy of Management Journal. 27: p. 445–466; J. Fredrickson and T. Mitchell. (1984). "Strategic decision processes: Comprehensiveness and performance in an industry with an unstable environment," Academy of Management Journal. 27: p. 399–423. I should note that other scholars disagree with these findings. For instance, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt found that, "In high velocity environments, effective firms use rational decision-making processes." See Bourgeois and Eisenhardt. (1988): p. 827. However, in subsequent work, Eisenhardt argues that the high-performing microcomputer firms in her sample did not become handicapped by the comprehensiveness of their decision-making processes because they examined real-time information, rather than relying on elaborate planning systems. Moreover, the effective firms examined a wide range of options, but they worked through them simultaneously so as to conserve time. Less-effective firms moved through different alternatives in a sequential fashion. In short, high-performing firms in a turbulent environment tended to act rationally or comprehensively, but they chose strategies that economized on time without compromising decision quality. See Eisenhardt. (1989).

18. Harrison. (1996). The type of marginal analysis described here is often used in economics. For instance, economic theory posits that competitive firms will maximize profits at the point at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost. In other words, if the incremental revenue of producing one more unit of good does not exceed the incremental cost required to produce it, then the firm will not manufacture that additional unit. For more on the cost of gathering additional information, as well as the optimal level of information search, see K. Brockhoff. (1986). "Decision quality and information." In E. Witte and H. Zimmerman (eds). Empirical Research on Organizational Decision Making. New York: Elsevier Science Publishers.

19. Janis and Mann. (1977).

20. See George. (1980) and Eisenhardt. (1989).

21. Henry Mintzberg has described the reliance on planning systems in many organizations, as well as the problems associated with an emphasis on formal planning as a means of making strategic decisions. See H. Mintzberg. (1994). The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. New York: Free Press.

22. This section draws heavily upon an article that I wrote several years ago about how managers cope with ambiguity in decision making. See M. Roberto. (2002). "Making difficult decisions in turbulent times," Ivey Business Journal. 66(3): p. 15–20.

23. J. Rau. (1999). "Two stages of decision making." Management Review. 88(11): p. 10.

24. Neustadt and May offer an extensive and insightful analysis of the promise and peril of reasoning by analogy, with many vivid historical examples. They also offer a useful framework to help decision makers scrutinize their analogies carefully, so as to avoid drawing inappropriate parallels to past situations. See R. Neustadt and E. May. (1986). Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers. New York: Free Press.

25. My colleagues Jan Rivkin and Giovanni Gavetti have begun exploring the use of analogies in the formulation of competitive strategy within firms. See G. Gavetti and J. Rivkin. (2004). "Teaching students to reason well by analogy," Journal of Strategic Management Education. 1(2): p. 431-450.

26. Russo and Schoemaker. (1989); See also M. Bazerman. (1998). Judgment in Managerial Decision Making. Fourth Edition. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

27. G. Moore. (1965). "Cramming more components on to integrated circuits," Electronics. 38(8): p. 114–117.

28. Russo and Schoemaker. (1989); Bazerman. (1998).

29. Bower and Dial. (1994).

30. In relation to the pervasive tendency for firms to imitate one another, strategy expert Gary Hamel once offered this rather humorous observation: "In nearly every industry, strategies tend to cluster around some central tendency of industry orthodoxy. Strategies converge because success recipes get lavishly imitated... Aiding and abetting strategy convergence is an ever-growing army of eager young consultants transferring best practice from leaders to laggards... The challenge of maintaining any sort of competitive differentiation goes up proportionately with the number of consultants moving management wisdom around the world." See G. Hamel. (2000). Leading the Revolution. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. p. 49. Many firms do imitate others because they seek to find and emulate best practices. However, sociologists have offered alternative explanations for why imitation of strategies, structures, and processes occurs. They describe the phenomenon by which organizations begin to look more alike as isomorphism. See J. Meyer and B. Rowan. (1977). "Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony," American Journal of Sociology. 83: p. 340–363; P. DiMaggio and W. Powell. (1983). "The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields," American Journal of Sociology. 48: p. 147–160.

31. M. Porter. (1996). "What is strategy?," Harvard Business Review. 74(6): p. 61–78.

32. I worked as a financial analyst at the nuclear submarine division (Electric Boat) of General Dynamics Corporation during this time. Many people expressed serious doubts about the strategy pursued by CEO William Anders at that time. They attributed his desire to focus on defense, while gradually selling off units of the aerospace conglomerate, as a strategy being pursued to maximize his compensation under a highly controversial pay-for-performance plan put in place when he was hired. Although Anders did make a great deal of money, the firm also performed remarkably well. Meanwhile, many competitors struggled mightily as they pursued commercial diversification strategies and mega-mergers. General Dynamics has continued to perform near the top of its industry since Anders's departure, and it is still focused almost entirely on defense. For more on Anders's controversial tenure at the firm, see K. Murphy and J. Dial. (1993). "General Dynamics: Compensation and Strategy (A) and (B)," Harvard Business School Case Nos. 494-048 and 494-049.

33. E. Schein. (2003). DEC Is Dead, Long Live DEC: The Lasting Legacy of Digital Equipment Corporation. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers. p. 64, 69.

34. Schein (2003) provides a fascinating account of DEC's rise and fall, combining academic insights with first-hand observations based upon his time as a consultant to the organization over many years.

35. Charan. (2001). p. 76.

Chapter 7 Endnotes

1. The ability to persuade, of course, does matter a great deal. For more on persuasion, see R. Cialdini. (1993). Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. Second Edition. New York: Quill; J. Conger. (1998). "The necessary art of persuasion," Harvard Business Review. 76(3): p. 84–95; D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (forthcoming February 2005).

2. J. Thibault and L. Walker. (1975). Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.

3. A. Lind and T. Tyler. (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. New York: Plenum Press. p. 26. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the empirical research on procedural justice through the late 1980s.

4. Lind and Tyler. (1988). p. 72.

5. For a discussion of how the concept of fair process applies to decision making in the business context, see D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (2001). In addition, see W. Kim and R. Mauborgne. (1997). "Fair process: Managing in the knowledge economy," Harvard Business Review. 75(4): p. 65–75.

6. This definition of fair process draws upon my field research as well as numerous studies by other scholars. In particular, see M. Korsgaard, D. Schweiger, and H. Sapienza. (1995). "Building commitment, attachment, and trust in strategic decision-making teams: The role of procedural justice," Academy of Management Journal. 38(1): p. 60–84; D. Shapiro. (1993). "Reconciling theoretical differences among procedural justice research by re-evaluation of what it means to have one's views 'considered': Implications for third party managers," R. Croponzano (ed). Justice in the Workplace: Approaching Fairness in Human Resource Management. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum: p. 51–78; W. Kim and R. Mauborgne. (1991). "Effectively conceiving and executing multinationals' worldwide strategies," Journal of International Business Studies. p. 24: 419–448; Kim and Mauborgne, (1997); Lind and Tyler, (1988); Thibault and Walker, (1975).

7. Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza. (1995). 76. As mentioned in endnote 36 for Chapter 2, I have created a set of group decision-making exercises patterned after the experiments conducted by these scholars. They enable students to experience situations in which leaders employ more vs. less fair decision-making processes. At the conclusion of the exercise, students learn that giving people voice, by itself, does not engender commitment. Small changes in leader behavior matter a great deal with regard to others' perceptions of procedural fairness, and therefore, their level of commitment to a decision. See M. Roberto. (2001). "Participant and Leader Behavior: Group Decision Simulation (A)-(F)," Harvard Business School Case Nos. 301-026, 301-027, 301-028, 301-029, 301-030, 301-049.

8. Anthony Iaquinto and James Fredrickson have conducted research demonstrating a correlation between top management team agreement about the comprehensiveness of decision processes and organizational performance. Their study suggests that senior teams with a clear, shared understanding about process comprehensiveness perform more effectively because of less role ambiguity and clearer norms of behavior, which in turn generate a greater focus on the problem that needs to be solved. Although their study focuses on comprehensiveness, it suggests that a clear up-front understanding about overall process design facilitates more effective decision making. See A. Iaquinto and J. Fredrickson. (1997). "Top management team agreement about the strategic decision process: A test of some of its determinants and consequences," Strategic Management Journal. 18(1): p. 63–75.

9. For instance, the story of the development of Insulate at 3M has become legendary. Despite repeated rejections by top management, engineers continued to pursue development of the new product. Ultimately, they made substantial progress, and they convinced top management to allocate resources to enable the completion of the product development process. CEO Desi DeSimone used to tell the story of how he had been the executive who refused to allocate resources to the Thinsulate effort. Ultimately, he became convinced that the product had great potential, and he often reminded his managers that he had made a mistake and changed his mind when that became clear. See C. Bartlett and A. Mohammed. (1995). "3M: Profile of an Innovating Company," Harvard Business School Case No. 395-016. In addition, see Farson and Keyes. (2002).

10. Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza. (1995).

11. For a useful discussion regarding active listening skills, see T. Phelan. (1994). 1-2-3 Magic: Effective Discipline for Children 2-12. Glen Ellyn, Illinois: Child Management Inc. Specifically, see Chapter 26. It may seem odd to cite a book about child development when talking about business leadership, but in fact, the ideas presented in Phelan's book apply equally well in a wide variety of settings. Charles Gragg also has written an interesting perspective on listening in an article about teaching and learning. He points out that listening can be a difficult task: "The imaginative reception of another's thoughts, often only partially created and certainly often poorly expressed, is a grueling task." Gragg makes a powerful case for why listening is essential for teachers to stimulate true learning. His ideas too apply equally well in a variety of settings. See C. Gragg. (1994). "Teachers also must learn." In L. Barnes, C. R. Christensen, and A. Hansen (eds). Teaching and the Case Method. Third Edition: p. 15–22. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

12. M. Korsgaard, D. Schweiger, and H. Sapienza. (1995).

13. For more on the decision making that took place at NASA during the Apollo 13 mission, see G. Kranz. (2000). Failure Is Not an Option: Mission Control from Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond. New York: Berkley Books. In addition, see M. Useem. (2000). The Leadership Moment. New York: Times Books. Instructors who want to teach about the Apollo 13 crisis should consider asking students to view a documentary about the mission. See R. Whittlesey and N. Buckner. (1994). Apollo 13: To the Edge and Back. Universal Studios.

14. G. Kranz. (2000). p. 321.

15. B. Vlasic and B. Stertz. (2000). Taken for a Ride: How Daimler-Benz Drove Off with Chrysler. New York: William Morrow: p. 140–141. My understanding of the decision-making dynamics during the Daimler-Chrysler merger process was greatly enhanced by my opportunity to spend a half day with the authors of this book, Bill Vlasic and Brad Stertz, when they graciously accepted my invitation to come to the Harvard Business School to lead a seminar about that merger.

16. For a case study of the Daimler-Chrysler merger, see A. Cohen and D. St. Jean. (2004). "Daimler Chrysler Merger: The Quest to Create One Company," Babson College No. 404-084.

17. M. Suchman. (1995). "Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches," Academy of Management Review. 20: p. 574.

18. M. Feldman and J. March. (1981). "Information in organizations as signal and symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly. 26: p. 171.

19. M. Feldman and J. March. (1981). p. 178.

20. See A. Langley. (1989); see also J. Bower. (1970). He focuses on the role of the "integrator" in his study of resource-allocation decisions. The integrator is a middle manager who provides impetus to some projects proposed by technical/market specialists, and he tries to convince upper management to approve those capital requests which he endorses. Bower explains the pressures that integrators feel to portray the decision in quantitative terms, even if they have not relied mainly on the financial data to select the projects to which they want to provide impetus: "Managers performing the integrating phase tasks must use strategic measures as well as financial ones...They must be intimately familiar with the strategic aspects of a variety of product-market units and measure of performance of those units in strategic terms. On the other hand, they must defend their judgments to top management in financial terms," Bower. (1970). 307, 309.

21. B. Ashforth and B. Gibbs. (1990). "The double-edge of organizational legitimation," Organization Science. 1: p. 177.

22. My research on procedural legitimacy has been published in M. Roberto. (2004). "Strategic decision-making processes: Moving beyond the efficiency-consensus tradeoff," Group and Organization Management. 29(6): p. 625–658.

23. For more on how individuals make attributions about others, see E. Jones and T. Pittman. (1982). "Toward a general theory of strategic self-presentation." In J. Suls. (ed). Psychological Perspectives on the Self. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. p. 231–262.

24. Feldman and March. (1981).

25. Schlesinger. (1965). p. 241.

26. George. (1980). p. 130. George points out that some presidents have attempted to create a "multiple advocacy" system—a systemized approach to ensure that issues are examined from diverse perspectives, and to prevent one bureaucratic agency or department from controlling all information and analysis pertaining to a particular decision. He describes how the national security adviser typically plays a special role as the "custodian-manager of the policy-making process" when presidents attempt to employ variants of a multiple advocacy model. That person becomes responsible for a number of key activities such as "strengthening weaker advocates" as well as "bringing in new advisers to argue for unpopular options." See George. (1980). p. 191–206.

27. D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (1997). p. 17.

28. When I conduct group decision-making exercises regarding procedural fairness in my classes at Harvard Business School, I plot charts that display the level of misalignment within teams. For instance, in one chart, I measure a team leader's perception of procedural fairness on the x-axis and the team members' perceptions of procedural fairness on the y-axis. We then discuss why some teams find themselves, for instance, in the lower-right portion of the chart (high leader perceptions, low member perceptions). For a detailed discussion of misalignment, including a discussion of how I employ survey data to address the topic in the classroom, see M. Roberto. (2001). "Participant and Leader Behavior: Group Decision Simulation (Case Series) TN," Harvard Business School Teaching Note No. 301-120.

29. For a discussion of the role of the leader as a teacher, see N. Tichy. (2002). The Leadership Engine: How Great Leaders Teach Their Companies to Win. New York: Harper Business.

30. Quotation from Paul Levy. See D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (2005).

31. David Garvin and I discuss Levy's role as a teacher in great depth in the teaching note that accompanies our case study. Specifically, we discuss how he tackled the "curious inability to decide." See D. Garvin and M. Roberto. (2003). "Paul Levy: Taking Charge of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (A), (B), and (C) (TN)," Harvard Business School Teaching Note No. 303-126.

32. Kim and Mauborne. (1997). p. 69.

Chapter 8 Endnotes

1. R. Neustadt. (1980). Presidential Power. New York: John Wiley and Sons: p. 9.

2. Reflecting on the inefficiencies of decision making within the U.S. government, Truman once said, "When you have an efficient government, you have a dictatorship."

3. Neustadt. (1980). p. 10.

4. This discussion of the decision-making process leading up to the D-day invasion draws from historian Stephen Ambrose's book on Eisenhower's war years. See S. Ambrose. (1970). The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight D. Eisenhower. New York: Doubleday. For instructors wanting to teach about Eisenhower's approach to planning the D-day invasion, they might consider asking students to view a film about the decision-making process that the general led during the first half of 1944. See R. Harmon. (2004). Ike: Countdown to D Day. Columbia Tristar.

5. Ambrose. (1970). p. 323.

6. Ibid. p. 323.

7. Ibid. p. 324.

8. Ibid. p. 371.

9. Ibid. p. 664.

10. Ibid. p. 366.

11. Ibid. p. 351.

12. For instance, see Russo and Schoemaker. (2002) as well as S. Kaner, L. Lind, C. Toldi, S. Fisk, and D. Berger. (1996). Facilitator's Guide to Participatory Decision-Making. Gabriola Island, Canada: New Society Publishers.

13. Russo and Schoemaker. (2002). p. 164.

14. Scholars often talk about how groups should defer judgment and focus on idea generation in the early stages of a creative brainstorming process. In other words, people should not critique other ideas at the outset, but instead focus on generating as many out-of-the-box ideas as possible. See S. Parnes. (1962). A Sourcebook for Creative Thinking. New York: Scribner.

15. Strategy process scholars have spoken about the iterative nature of strategy formulation processes in firms. They do not address the issue of closure, per se, but they do describe benefits from iterative behavior in the strategy process. See J.B. Quinn. (1978). "Strategic change: 'Logical incrementalism,'" Sloan Management Review. 20(1): p. 7–21; T. Noda and J. Bower. (1996). "Strategy making as iterated processes of resource allocation," Strategic Management Journal. 17: p. 159–192.

16. One should note that the types of divergent thinking described in this table emerge naturally in many firms—that is, leaders do not necessarily have to spark such divergence in a forceful fashion. Divergent thinking may arise because people in different units within an organization have disparate mental models regarding the firm's strategy, technological capabilities, customer needs, etc. Deborah Dougherty describes these sometimes conflicting mental models across various organizational units as the "thought worlds" within a firm. She also shows how the existence of multiple "thought worlds" can create obstacles in the product development process. See D. Dougherty. (1992). "A practice-centered model of organizational renewal through product innovation." Strategic Management Journal. 13: p. 77–92.

17. K. Weick. (1984). "Small wins: Redefining the scale of social problems," American Psychologist. 39(1): p. 43.

18. Herbert Simon outlined the theory of bounded rationality in response to the rational choice model put forth by economists. He wrote, "It is obviously impossible for the individual to know all his alternatives or all their consequences, and this impossibility is a very important departure of actual behavior from the model of objective rationality." See H. Simon. (1976). Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization. Third edition. New York: Free Press. p. 67.

19. Maier and Maier conducted an experimental study in the 1950s that demonstrated that groups tend to be more effective when they employ a problem-solving process that is broken down into a few concrete stages, rather than trying to engage in a completely unstructured problem-solving approach. See N. Maier and R. Maier. (1957). "An experimental test of the effects of developmental vs. free discussions on the quality of group decisions," Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 41: p. 320–323.

20. Weick. (1984). p. 46.

21. This account of the 1983 Social Security reform is drawn from P. Light. (1985). Artful Work: The Politics of Social Security Reform. New York: Random House.

22. Light. (1985). p. 185.

23. For more on the concept of a superordinate goal, see M. Sherif. (1979). "Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict." In W. Austin and S. Worchel (eds). The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. California: Brooks/Cole. One way to focus attention on super-ordinate goals can be through the compensation system. For instance, Nucor—the mini-mill steel producer that enjoyed remarkable success for many years—employed group-level incentives. More specifically, people's bonus pay was linked to performance at one level higher in the organizational hierarchy. Front-line employees were compensated based upon the productivity of their production group. Similarly, the bonus pay of department heads depended on overall factory performance, and the compensation of plant managers hinged on the performance of the entire corporation. See P. Ghemawat. (1995). "Competitive advantage and internal organization: Nucor revisited," Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 3(4): p. 685–717.

24. Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois. (1997). p. 80.

25. Light. (1985). p. 184.

26. Ibid. p. 185.

27. L. Bossidy and R. Charan. (2002). Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done. New York: Crown Business. p. 234, 237.

28. J. Hammond, R. Keeney, and H. Raiffa. (1999). Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions. Boston: HBS Press.

29. Scholars may see a resemblance here to the concept of contingent contracting described by negotiation scholars. See M. Bazerman and J. Gillepsie. (1999). "Betting on the future: The value of contingent contracts," Harvard Business Review. 77(5): p. 155–162.

30. For an overview of real options theory, see L. Trigeorgis. (1995). Real Options in Capital Investment: Models, Strategies, and Applications. Westport, CT: Praeger. For a discussion of how managers should apply the concept to capital investment decisions and strategy formulation, see W. C. Kester. (1984). "Today's options for tomorrow's growth," Harvard Business Review. 62(2): p. 153–160; T. Luehrman. (1998). "Strategy as a portfolio of real options," Harvard Business Review. 76(5): p. 89–99. One example of a largely effective "real options" approach may be Cisco's acquisition strategy in the late 1990s. Often, it took a small equity stake in a target firm and became more informed about the company and its management. After learning as much as it could about the target, it then made a decision about whether to acquire the firm outright. For a discussion of Cisco's acquisition strategy, see C. Holloway, S. Wheelwright, and N. Tempest. (1998). "Cisco Systems, Inc.: Acquisition Integration for Manufacturing," Stanford Business School Case No. OIT-26.

31. One issue with adopting a "real options" approach may be that managers become susceptible to the sunk-cost effect. In other words, having made a series of irrecoverable small investments in a course of action that may not be panning out, they may not be able to "cut their losses." Instead, they may become concerned that they will "waste" their prior investments if they do not proceed, and they find themselves "throwing good money after bad." Staw and Ross. (1989): p. 216.

32. See Janis. (1989); Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa. (1999).

33. D. Nadler. (1998). "Leading executive teams." In D. Nadler, J. Spencer, and Associates (eds). Executive Teams. p. 3–20. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. p. 18.

34. Eisenhardt. (1989). p. 572.

35. For studies linking procedural fairness to trust in the leader, see Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza. (1995); R. Folger and M. Konovsky. (1989). "Effects of procedural and distributive justice on reactions to pay raise decisions," Academy of Management Journal. p. 32: 115–130; D. McFarlin and P. Sweeney. (1992). "Distributive and procedural justice as predictors of satisfaction with personal and organizational outcomes," Academy of Management Journal. 35: p. 626–637.

36. This account of the Mann Gulch fire draws on several sources: N. Maclean. (1972). Young Men and Fire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; K. Weick. (1993). "The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster," Administrative Science Quarterly. 38: p. 628–652; M. Useem. (1998). The Leadership Moment: Nine Stories of Triumph and Disaster and Their Lessons for Us All. New York: Times Business. Drawing on these sources, as well as the official investigation report and other accounts, I have written a case study about the Mann Gulch fire. See M. Roberto and E. Ferlins. (2003). "Fire at Mann Gulch," Harvard Business School Case No. 304-089.

37. Maclean. (1972). p. 74.

38. Ibid. p. 95.

39. Useem. (1998). p. 55.

40. Maclean. (1972). p. 40.

41. Ibid. p. 64.

42. Useem. (1998). p. 56.

43. Ambrose. (1970). p. 324-325.

Chapter 9 Endnotes

1. M. Loeb. (1995). "Marshall Loeb on leadership: Ten steps to effective leadership," Speech at the Minnesota Center for Corporate Responsibility. June 21, 1995.

2. "Growing worker confusion about corporate goals complicates recovery, Watson Wyatt WorkUSA study finds," Watson Wyatt. Press Release. September 9, 2002.

3. "Growing worker confusion about corporate goals complicates recovery, Watson Wyatt WorkUSA study finds," Watson Wyatt. Press Release. September 9, 2002.

4. "Declining employee confidence in corporate leadership threatens Canadian competitiveness, Watson Wyatt Survey Finds," Watson Wyatt. Press Release. October 21, 2002.

5. S. Cauldron. (2002). "Where have all the leaders gone?," Workforce Management. December: p. 29.

6. J. Collins. (2001). Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap...and Others Don't. New York: Harper Business. My colleague Rakesh Khurana also has written about the perils that firms face when they pursue charismatic CEOs in the executive search process. See R. Khurana. (2002). "The curse of the superstar CEO," Harvard Business Review. 80(9): p. 60–65.

7. J. Reingold. (2003). "Still angry after all these years," Fast Company. 75: p. 89.

8. T. Peters. (2001). "Rule #3: Leadership is confusing as hell," Fast Company. Issue 44. p. 124–135.

9. For instance, see R. Tannebaum and W. Schmidt. (1958). "How to choose a leadership pattern," Harvard Business Review. 36(2): p. 95–101; V. Vroom and P. Yetton. (1973). Leadership and Decision Making. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

10. Collins. (2001).

11. R. Heifetz. (1994). Leadership Without Easy Answers. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. p. 251.

12. W. Bennis. (1997). "The secrets of great groups," Leader to Leader. 3: p. 29.

13. Heifetz. (1994). p. 2.

14. Nadler. (1998). p. 16.

15. Karl Weick has described how individuals engage in sense making. That is, they try to make meaning of previous actions that they have undertaken. An individual's sense-making process naturally will be constrained by prior life experiences, mental models, etc. Therefore, a leader needs to be wary of relying too heavily on his particular interpretation of a given situation. Others may have made sense of a particular event in a different way. See K. Weick. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

16. For more on this topic, see Edmondson, Roberto, et al. (2005).

17. Breashears's intuition served him well in this circumstance. Scholars define intuition as pattern recognition based upon experience. In this case, Breashears had many years of experience on Everest, and he spotted a pattern, a set of signals, which reminded him of past instances of looming risk with regard to weather conditions. For more on intuition, see Klein. (1999) and Klein. (2003).

18. Boukreev and Dewalt. (1997). p. 120.

19. D. Breashears. Remarks to Harvard Business School class. February 24, 2003.

20. For more on teaching by the case method, see L. Barnes, C. R. Christensen, and A. Hansen. (1994). Teaching and the Case Method. Third edition. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.