Chapter 19

Physical Security Requirements

THE CISSP EXAM TOPICS COVERED IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE:

  • Operations Security
    • Manage incident response
      • Detection; response; reporting; recovery; remediation
  • Physical (Environmental) Security
    • Participate in site and facility design considerations
    • Support the implementation and operation of perimeter security (e.g., physical access control and monitoring, audit trails/access logs)
    • Support the implementation and operation of internal security (e.g., escort requirements/visitor control, keys and locks)
    • Support the implementation and operation of facilities security
      • Communications and server rooms; restricted and work area security; data center security; utilities and HVAC considerations; water issues (e.g., leakage, flooding); fire prevention, detection and suppression
    • Support the protection and securing of equipment

Among numerous other topics, the Operations Security domain of the Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) for the CISSP certification exam deals with managing incident response as and when a security indicent occurs. It also delves into the mechanics of such a response, including detecting that an incident has occurred, and then responding to, reporting on, and recovering from or remediating its results.

The Physical (Environmental) Security domain of the Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) for the CISSP certification exam deals with topics and issues related to facility construction and location, the security features of a facility, forms of physical access control, types of physical security technical controls, and maintaining security by properly sustaining the environment and protecting human life.

The purpose of physical security is to protect against physical threats. The following physical threats are among the most common:

  • Fire and smoke
  • Water (rising/falling)
  • Earth movement (earthquakes, landslides, volcanoes)
  • Storms (wind, lightning, rain, snow, sleet, ice)
  • Sabotage/vandalism
  • Explosion/destruction
  • Building collapse
  • Toxic materials
  • Utility loss (power, heating, cooling, air, water)
  • Equipment failure
  • Personnel loss (strikes, illness, access, transport)

This chapter explores each of these issues and discusses safeguards and countermeasures to protect against them. In many cases, you’ll need a disaster recovery plan or a business continuity plan should a serious physical threat (such as an explosion, sabotage, or natural disaster) occur. Chapters 15, “Business Continuity Planning,” and 16, “Disaster Recovery Planning,” cover those topics in detail.

Facility Requirements

It should be blatantly obvious if you’ve read the previous 18 chapters that without control over the physical environment, no collection of administrative, technical, or logical access controls can provide adequate security. If a malicious person can gain physical access to your facility or equipment, they can do just about anything they want, from destruction to disclosure or alteration. Physical controls are your first line of defense, and people are your last.

There are many aspects of and elements to implementing and maintaining physical security. A core or foundational element is selecting or designing the facility to house your IT infrastructure and your organization’s operations. The process of selecting or designing a secure facility always starts with a plan.

Secure Facility Plan

A secure facility plan outlines the security needs of your organization and emphasizes methods or mechanisms to employ to provide security. Such a plan is developed through a process known as critical path analysis. Critical path analysis is a systematic effort to identify relationships between mission-critical applications, processes, and operations and all the necessary supporting elements. For example, an e-commerce server used to sell products over the Web relies on Internet access, computer hardware, electricity, temperature control, storage facility, and so on.

When critical path analysis is performed properly, a complete picture of the interdependencies and interactions necessary to sustain the organization is produced. Once that analysis is complete, its results serve as a list of items to secure. The first step in designing a secure IT infrastructure is providing security for the basic requirements of the organization and its computers. These basic requirements include electricity, environmental controls (in other words, a building, air conditioning, heating, humidity control, and so on), and water/sewage.

Security staff should participate in site and facility design considerations. Otherwise, many important aspects of physical security essential for the existence of logical security may be overlooked. With security staff involved in the physical facility design, you can be assured that your long-term security goals as an organization will be supported not just by your policies, personnel, and electronic equipment, but by the building itself.

Physical Security Controls

The security controls implemented to manage physical security can be divided into three groups: administrative, technical, and physical. Because these are the same categories used to describe access controls, it is vital to focus on the physical security aspects of these controls. Administrative physical security controls include facility construction and selection, site management, personnel controls, awareness training, and emergency response and procedures. Technical physical security controls include access controls; intrusion detection; alarms; closed-circuit television (CCTV); monitoring; heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC); power supplies; and fire detection and suppression. Physical controls for physical security include fencing, lighting, locks, construction materials, mantraps, dogs, and guards.

Corporate vs. Personal Property

Physical security controls embrace both visible and invisible aspects in many ordinary business environments. You see them at the post office, at the corner store, and in certain areas of your own computing environment. They are so pervasive that some people choose where they live based on their presence, as in gated access communities or secure apartment complexes.

Alison is a security analyst for a major technology corporation that specializes in data management. This company includes an in-house security staff (guards, administrators, and so on) that is capable of handling physical security breaches.

Brad experienced an intrusion—into his personal vehicle in the company parking lot. He asks Alison whether she observed or recorded anyone breaking into and entering his vehicle, but this is a personal item and not a company possession, and she has no control or regulation over damage to employee assets.

This is understandably unnerving for Brad, but he understands that she’s protecting the business and not his belongings. When or where would you think it would be necessary to implement security measures for both? The usual answer is anywhere business assets are or might be involved. Had Brad been using a company vehicle parked in the company parking lot, then perhaps Alison could make allowances for an incidental break-in involving Brad’s things, but even then she isn’t responsible for their safekeeping. On the other hand, where key people are also important assets (executive staff at most enterprises, security analysts who work in sensitive positions, heads of state, and so forth), protection and safeguards usually extend to embrace them and their belongings as part of asset protection and risk mitigation. Of course, if danger to employees or what they carry with them becomes a problem, securing the parking garage with key cards and installing CCTV monitors on every floor really begins to make sense. Simply put, if the costs of allowing break-ins to occur exceeds that of installing preventive measures, it’s prudent to put them in place.

When designing physical security for an environment, focus on the functional order of controls. Security controls should be deployed so that initial attempts to access physical assets are deterred (in other words, boundary restrictions). If deterrence fails, then direct access to physical assets should be denied (for example, locked vault doors). If denial fails, your system needs to detect intrusion (for example, using motion detectors), and the intrusion should be delayed sufficiently to enable authorities to respond (for example, a cable lock on the asset). It’s important to remember this order when deploying physical security controls: first deterrence, then denial, then detection, then delay.

Site Selection

Site selection should be based on the security needs of the organization. Cost, location, and size are important, but addressing the requirements of security should always take precedence. When choosing a site on which to build a facility or selecting a preexisting structure, be sure to examine every aspect of its location carefully.

Securing assets depends largely on site security, which involves numerous considerations and situational elements. Site location and construction play a crucial role in the overall site selection process. Susceptibility to riots, looting, break-ins, and vandalism or location within a high-crime area are obviously all poor choices but cannot always be dictated or controlled. Environmental threats such as fault lines, tornado/hurricane regions, and close proximity to other natural disasters present significant issues for the site selection process as well because you can’t always avoid such threats.

Proximity to other buildings and businesses is another crucial consideration. What sorts of attention do they draw, and how does that affect your operation or facility? Proximity to emergency-response personnel is another consideration, along with other elements. Some companies can afford to buy or build their own campuses to keep neighboring elements out of play and to enable tighter access control and monitoring. However, not every company can exercise this option and must make do with what’s available and affordable instead.

At a minimum, ensure that the building is designed to withstand fairly extreme weather conditions and that it can deter or fend off overt break-in attempts. Vulnerable entry points such as windows and doors tend to dominate such analysis, but you should also evaluate objects (trees, shrubs, or man-made items) that can obscure break-in attempts.

Visibility

Visibility is important. What is the surrounding terrain? Would it be easy to approach the facility by vehicle or on foot without being seen? The makeup of the surrounding area is also important. Is it in or near a residential, business, or industrial area? What is the local crime rate? Where are the closest emergency services located (fire, medical, police)? What unique hazards may be found in the vicinity (chemical plants, homeless shelters, universities, construction sites, and so on)?

Accessibility and Perimeter Security

The accessibility to the building or campus location is also important. Single entrances are great for providing security, but multiple entrances are better for evacuation during emergencies. What types of roads are nearby? What means of transportation are easily accessible (trains, highway, airport, shipping)? What about traffic levels throughout the day?

Keep in mind that accessibility is also constrained by the need for perimeter security. The needs of access and use should meld and support the implementation and operation of perimeter security. The use of physical access controls and monitoring personnel and equipment entering and leaving as well as auditing/logging all physical events are key elements in maintaining overall organizational security.

Natural Disasters

Another concern is the potential impact that natural disasters could make in the area. Is it prone to earthquakes, mudslides, sinkholes, fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, falling rocks, snow, rainfall, ice, humidity, heat, extreme cold, and so on? You must prepare for natural disasters and equip your IT environment to either survive an event or be replaced easily.

Facility Design

When designing the construction of a facility, you must understand the level of security that your organization needs. A proper level of security must be planned and designed before construction begins.

Important issues to consider include combustibility, fire rating, construction materials, load rating, placement, and control of items such as walls, doors, ceilings, flooring, HVAC, power, water, sewage, gas, and so on. Forced intrusion, emergency access, resistance to entry, direction of entries and exits, use of alarms, and conductivity are other important aspects to evaluate. Every element within a facility should be evaluated in terms of how it could be used for and against the protection of the IT infrastructure and personnel (for example, positive flows for air and water from inside a facility to outside its boundaries).

There’s also a pretty well-established school of thought on “secure architecture” that’s often called crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). The guiding idea is to structure the physical environment and surroundings to influence individual decisions that potential offenders make before committing any criminal acts. The International CPTED Association is an excellent source for information on this subject (www.cpted.net), as is Oscar Newman’s book Creating Defensible Space, published by HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research (free PDF download at www.defensiblespace.com/book.htm).

Work Areas

The design and configuration of work areas and visitor areas should be considered carefully. There should not be equal access to all locations within a facility. Areas that contain assets of higher value or importance should have more restricted access. For example, anyone who enters the facility should be able to access the restrooms and the public telephone without going into sensitive areas, but only network administrators and security staff should have access to the server room. Valuable and confidential assets should be located in the heart or center of protection provided by a facility. In effect, you should focus on deploying concentric circles of physical protection. This type of configuration requires increased levels of authorization to gain access into more sensitive areas inside the facility.

Walls or partitions can be used to separate similar but distinct work areas. Such divisions deter casual shoulder surfing or eavesdropping (shoulder surfing is the act of gathering information from a system by observing the monitor or the use of the keyboard by the operator). Floor-to-ceiling walls should be used to separate areas with differing levels of sensitivity and confidentiality (where false or suspended ceilings are present, walls should cut these off as well to provide an unbroken physical barrier between more and less secure areas).

Each work area should be evaluated and assigned a classification just as IT assets are classified. Only people with clearance or classifications corresponding to the classification of the work area should be allowed access. Areas with different purposes or uses should be assigned different levels of access or restrictions. The more access to assets the equipment within an area offers, the more important become the restrictions that are used to control who enters those areas and what activities they are allowed to perform.

Your facility security design process should support the implementation and operation of internal security. In addition to the management of workers in proper work spaces, you should address visitors. Should there be an escort requirement for visitors, and what other forms of visitor control should be implemented? In addition to basic physical security tools such as keys and locks, mechanisms such as mantraps, video cameras, written logs, security guards, and RFID ID tags should be implemented.

Server Rooms

Server rooms, server vaults, and IT closets are enclosed, restricted, and protected rooms where your mission-critical servers and network devices are housed. Centralized server rooms need not be human compatible. In fact, the more human incompatible a server room is, the more protection it will offer against casual and determined attacks. Human incompatibility can be accomplished by including Halotron, PyroGen, or other halon-substitute oxygen-displacement fire detection and extinguishing systems, low temperatures, little or no lighting, and equipment stacked with little room to maneuver. Server rooms should be designed to support optimal operation of the IT infrastructure and to block unauthorized human access or intervention.

Server rooms should be located at the core of the building. Try to avoid locating these rooms on the ground floor, the top floor, and the basement whenever possible. Additionally, the server room should be located away from water, gas, and sewage lines. These pose too large a risk of leakage or flooding, which can cause serious damage and downtime.

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The walls of your server room should also have a one-hour minimum fire rating.

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Making Servers Inaccessible

The running joke in the IT security realm is that the most secure computer is one that is disconnected from the network and sealed in a room with no doors or windows. No, seriously, that’s the joke. But there’s a massive grain of truth and irony in it as well.

Carlos operates security processes and platforms for a financial banking firm, and he knows all about one-way systems and unreachable devices. Sensitive business transactions occur in fractions of a second, and one wrong move could pose serious risks to data and involved parties.

In his experience, Carlos knows that the least accessible and least human-friendly places are his most valuable assets, so he stores many of his machines inside a separate bank vault. You’d have to be a talented burglar, a skilled safecracker, and a determined computer attacker to breach his security defenses.

Not all business applications and processes warrant this extreme sort of prevention. What security recommendations might you suggest to make a server more inconvenient or inaccessible, short of dedicating a vault? A basement with limited access or an interior room with no windows and only one entry/exit point makes an excellent substitute when an empty vault isn’t available. The key is to select a space with limited access and then to establish serious hurdles to entry (especially unauthorized entry). CCTV monitoring on the door and motion detectors inside the space can also help maintain proper attention to who is coming and going.

Visitors

If a facility employs restricted areas to control physical security, a mechanism to handle visitors is required. Often an escort is assigned to visitors, and their access and activities are monitored closely. Failing to track the actions of outsiders when they are allowed into a protected area can result in malicious activity against the most protected assets.

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Deploying Physical Access Controls

In the real world, you will deploy multiple layers of physical access controls to manage the traffic of authorized and unauthorized individuals within your facility. The outermost layer will be lighting. The entire outer perimeter of your site should be clearly lit. This enables easy identification of personnel and makes it easier to notice intrusions and intimidate potential intruders. Just inside the lighted area, place a fence or wall designed to prevent intrusion. Specific controlled points along that fence or wall should be points for entry or exit. These should have gates, turnstiles, or mantraps all monitored by CCTV and security guards. Identification and authentication should be required at all entry points before entrance is granted.

Within the facility, areas of different sensitivity or confidentiality levels should be distinctly separated and compartmentalized. This is especially true for public areas and areas accessible to visitors. An additional identification/authentication process to validate the need to enter should be required when anyone moves from one area to another. The most sensitive resources and systems should be isolated from all but the most privileged personnel and located at the center or core of the facility.

Forms of Physical Access Controls

You can deploy many types of physical access control mechanisms in an environment to control, monitor, and manage access to a facility. These range from deterrents to detection mechanisms.

The various sections, divisions, or areas within a site or facility should be clearly designated as public, private, or restricted. Each of these areas requires unique and focused physical access controls, monitoring, and prevention mechanisms. The following sections discuss many such mechanisms that may be used to separate, isolate, and control access to various areas within a site.

Fences, Gates, Turnstiles, and Mantraps

A fence is a perimeter-defining device. Fences are used to clearly differentiate between areas that are under a specific level of security protection and those that aren’t. Fencing can include a wide range of components, materials, and construction methods. It can consist of stripes painted on the ground, chain link fences, barbed wire, concrete walls, and even invisible perimeters using laser, motion, or heat detectors. Various types of fences are effective against different types of intruders:

  • Fences 3 to 4 feet high deter casual trespassers.
  • Fences 6 to 7 feet high are too hard to climb easily and deter most intruders, except determined ones.
  • Fences 8 or more feet high with three strands of barbed wire deter even determined intruders.

A gate is a controlled exit and entry point in a fence. The deterrent level of a gate must be equivalent to the deterrent level of the fence to sustain the effectiveness of the fence as a whole. Hinges and locking/closing mechanisms should be hardened against tampering, destruction, or removal. When a gate is closed, it should not offer any additional access vulnerabilities. Keep the number of gates to a minimum. They can be manned by guards or not. When they’re not protected by guards, use of dogs or CCTV is recommended.

A turnstile (see Figure 19.1) is a form of gate that prevents more than one person at a time from gaining entry and often restricts movement in one direction. It is used to gain entry but not to exit or vice versa. A turnstile is basically the fencing equivalent of a secured revolving door.

FIGURE 19.1 A secure physical boundary with a mantrap and a turnstile

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A mantrap is a double set of doors that is often protected by a guard (also shown in Figure 19.1) or some other physical layout that prevents piggybacking and can trap individuals at the discretion of security personnel. The purpose of a mantrap is to immobilize a subject until their identity and authentication is verified. If a subject is authorized for entry, the inner door opens, allowing entry into the facility or onto the premises. If a subject is not authorized, both doors remain closed and locked until an escort (typically a guard or a police officer) arrives to escort the subject off the property or arrest the subject for trespassing (this is called a delay feature). Often a mantrap includes a scale to prevent piggybacking or tailgating.

Lighting

Lighting is a commonly used form of perimeter security control. The primary purpose of lighting is to discourage casual intruders, trespassers, prowlers, or would-be thieves who would rather perform their misdeeds in the dark. However, lighting is not a strong deterrent. It should not be used as the primary or sole protection mechanism except in areas with a low threat level.

Lighting should not illuminate the positions of guards, dogs, patrol posts, or other similar security elements. It should be combined with guards, dogs, CCTV, or some other form of intrusion detection or surveillance mechanism. Lighting must not cause a nuisance or problem for nearby residents, roads, railways, airports, and so on. It should also never cause glare or reflective distraction to guards, dogs, and monitoring equipment, which could otherwise aid attackers during break-in attempts.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard for perimeter protection using lighting is that critical areas should be illuminated with 2 candle feet of power at a height of 8 feet. Another common issue for the use of lighting is the placement of the lights. Standards seem to indicate that light poles should be placed the same distance apart as the diameter of the illuminated area created by illumination elements. Thus, if a lighted area is 40 feet in diameter, poles should be 40 feet apart.

Security Guards and Dogs

All physical security controls, whether static deterrents or active detection and surveillance mechanisms, ultimately rely upon personnel to intervene and stop actual intrusions and attacks. Security guards exist to fulfill this need. Guards can be posted around a perimeter or inside to monitor access points or watch detection and surveillance monitors. The real benefit of guards is that they are able to adapt and react to various conditions or situations. Guards can learn and recognize attack and intrusion activities and patterns, can adjust to a changing environment, and can make decisions and judgment calls. Security guards are often an appropriate security control when immediate situation handling and decision making onsite is necessary.

Unfortunately, using security guards is not a perfect solution. There are numerous disadvantages to deploying, maintaining, and relying upon security guards. Not all environments and facilities support security guards. This may be because of actual human incompatibility or the layout, design, location, and construction of the facility. Not all security guards are themselves reliable. Prescreening, bonding, and training do not guarantee that you won’t end up with an ineffective or unreliable security guard.

Even if a guard is initially reliable, guards are subject to physical injury and illness, take vacations, can become distracted, are vulnerable to social engineering, and may become unemployable because of substance abuse. In addition, they sometimes focus on self-preservation instead of preserving security at the guarded facility. This may mean that security guards can offer protection only up to the point at which their life is endangered. Additionally, security guards are usually unaware of the scope of the operations within a facility and are therefore not thoroughly equipped to know how to respond to every situation. Finally, security guards are expensive.

Guard dogs can be an alternative to security guards. They can often be deployed as a perimeter security control. As a detection and deterrent, dogs are extremely effective. However, dogs are costly, require a high level of maintenance, and impose serious insurance and liability requirements.

Keys and Combination Locks

Locks keep closed doors closed. They are designed and deployed to prevent access to everyone without proper authorization. A lock is a crude form of an identification and authorization mechanism. If you possess the correct key or combination, you are considered authorized and permitted entry. Key-based locks are the most common and inexpensive forms of physical access control devices. These are often known as preset locks. These types of locks are subject to picking, which is often categorized under a class of lock mechanism attacks called shimming.

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Using Locks

Keys or combination locks—which do you choose and for what purposes?

Ultimately, there will always be that forgetful element of users who just cannot be reminded enough. Elise constantly forgets her combination, and Francis can never remember to bring his security key card to work. Gino maintains a pessimistic outlook in his administrative style, so he’s keen on putting combinations and key card accesses in all the right places.

Under what circumstances or conditions might you employ a combination lock, and where might you instead opt for a key or key card? What options put you at greater risk of loss if someone discovers the combination or finds the key? Can you be certain that these single points of failure do not significantly pose a risk to the protected assets?

Many organizations typically utilize separate forms of key or combination accesses throughout several areas of the facility. Key and key card access is granted at select shared entry points (exterior access into the building, access into interior rooms), and combination locks control access to individual entry points (storage lockers, file cabinets, and so on).

Programmable or combination locks offer a broader range of control than preset locks. Some programmable locks can be configured with multiple valid access combinations or may include digital or electronic controls employing keypads, smart cards, or cipher devices. For instance, an electronic access control (EAC) lock incorporates three elements: an electromagnet to keep the door closed, a credential reader to authenticate subjects and to disable the electromagnet, and a sensor to reengage the electromagnet when the door is closed.

Locks serve as an alternative to security guards as a perimeter entrance access control device. A gate or door can be opened and closed to allow access by a security guard who verifies your identity before granting access, or the lock itself can serve as the verification device that also grants or restricts entry.

Badges

Badges, identification cards, and security IDs are forms of physical identification and/or electronic access control devices. A badge can be as simple as a name tag indicating whether you are a valid employee or a visitor. Or it can be as complex as a smart card or token device that employs multifactor authentication to verify and prove your identity and provide authentication and authorization to access a facility, specific rooms, or secured workstations. Badges often include pictures, magnetic strips with encoded data, and personal details to help a security guard verify identity.

Badges can be used in environments in which physical access is primarily controlled by security guards. In such conditions, the badge serves as a visual identification tool for the guards. They can verify your identity by comparing your picture to your person and consult a printed or electronic roster of authorized personnel to determine whether you have valid access.

Badges can also serve in environments guarded by scanning devices rather than security guards. In such conditions, a badge can be used either for identification or for authentication. When a badge is used for identification, it is swiped in a device, and then the badge owner must provide one or more authentication factors, such as a password, passphrase, or biological trait (if a biometric device is used). When a badge is used for authentication, the badge owner provides an ID, username, and so on and then swipes the badge to authenticate.

Motion Detectors

A motion detector, or motion sensor, is a device that senses motion in a specific area. Many types of motion detectors exist, including infrared, heat, wave pattern, capacitance, photoelectric, and passive audio. An infrared motion detector monitors for significant or meaningful changes in the infrared lighting pattern of a monitored area. A heat-based motion detector monitors for significant or meaningful changes in the heat levels and patterns in a monitored area. A wave pattern motion detector transmits a consistent low ultrasonic or high microwave frequency signal into a monitored area and monitors for significant or meaningful changes or disturbances in the reflected pattern. A capacitance motion detector senses changes in the electrical or magnetic field surrounding a monitored object. A photoelectric motion detector senses changes in visible light levels for the monitored area. Photoelectric motion detectors are usually deployed in internal rooms that have no windows and are kept dark. A passive audio motion detector listens for abnormal sounds in the monitored area.

Intrusion Alarms

Whenever a motion detector registers a significant or meaningful change in the environment, it triggers an alarm. An alarm is a separate mechanism that triggers a deterrent, a repellent, and/or a notification. Alarms that trigger deterrents may engage additional locks, shut doors, and so on. The goal of such an alarm is to make further intrusion or attack more difficult. Alarms that trigger repellants usually sound an audio siren or bell and turn on lights. These kinds of alarms are used to discourage intruders or attackers from continuing their malicious or trespassing activities and force them off the premises. Alarms that trigger notification are often silent from the intruder/attacker perspective but record data about the incident and notify administrators, security guards, and law enforcement. A recording of an incident can take the form of log files and/or CCTV tapes. The purpose of a silent alarm is to bring authorized security personnel to the location of the intrusion or attack in hopes of catching the person(s) committing the unwanted or unauthorized acts.

Local alarm systems must broadcast an audible (up to 120 decibel, or db) alarm signal that can be easily heard up to 400 feet away. Additionally, they must be protected from tampering and disablement, usually by security guards. For a local alarm system to be effective, there must be a security team or guards positioned nearby who can respond when the alarm is triggered. A centralized alarm system may not have a local alarm; a remote or centralized monitoring station is signaled when the alarm is triggered. Auxiliary alarm systems can be added to either local or centralized alarm systems. The purpose of an auxiliary alarm system is to notify local police or fire services when an alarm is triggered.

Secondary Verification Mechanisms

When motion detectors, sensors, and alarms are used, secondary verification mechanisms should be in place. As the sensitivity of these devices increases, false triggers occur more often. Innocuous events such as the presence of animals, birds, bugs, or authorized personnel can trigger false alarms. Deploying two or more detection and sensor systems and requiring two or more triggers in quick succession to occur before an alarm is issued may significantly reduce false alarms and increase the certainty of sensing actual intrusions or attacks.

CCTV is a security mechanism related to motion detectors, sensors, and alarms. However, CCTV is not an automated detection-and-response system. CCTV requires personnel to watch the captured video to detect suspicious and malicious activities and to trigger alarms. Security cameras can expand the effective visible range of a security guard, therefore increasing the scope of the oversight. In many cases, CCTV is not used as a primary detection tool because of the high cost of paying a person to sit and watch the video screens. Instead, it is used as a secondary or follow-up mechanism that is reviewed after a trigger from an automated system occurs. In fact, the same logic used for auditing and audit trails is used for CCTV and recorded events. A CCTV is a preventative measure, while reviewing recorded events is a detective measure.

Secondary Verification

As illustrated in the previous real-world scenario, Gino was at constant risk of security breaches because Elise is constantly forgetting (and therefore writes down) every password, while Francis is habitually forgetful about the location of his key card. What happens when someone else comes into possession of either of these items and has knowledge of how or where to use them?

Gino’s biggest advantage will be any secondary verification mechanisms he has established in the workplace. This may include a CCTV that identifies the face of the person who uses a key card for access or inputs a combination in some area designated under surveillance. Even videotape logs of ingress and egress through checkpoints can be helpful when it comes to chasing down accidental or deliberate access abuses.

With known “problem users” or “problem identities,” many security systems can issue notifications or alerts when those identities are used. Depending on the systems that are available, and the risks that unauthorized access could pose, human follow-up may or may not be warranted. But any time Elise (or somebody who uses that identity) logs onto a system or any time Francis’s key card is used, a floating or roving security guard could be dispatched to ensure that everything is on the up and up. Of course, it’s probably also a good idea to have Elise’s and Francis’s managers counsel them on the appropriate use (and storage) of passwords and key cards, just to make sure they understand the potential risks involved too.

Technical Controls

Technical controls most often employed as access control mechanisms to manage physical access include smart/dumb cards and biometrics. In addition to such controls, audit trails, access logs, and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can serve as physical security mechanisms.

Smart Cards

Smart cards are credit-card-sized IDs, badges, or security passes with an embedded magnetic strip, bar code, or integrated circuit chip. They can contain information about the authorized bearer that can be used for identification and/or authentication purposes. Some smart cards can even process information or store reasonable amounts of data in a memory chip. A smart card may be known by several phrases or terms:

  • An identity token containing integrated circuits (ICs)
  • A processor IC card
  • An IC card with an ISO 7816 interface

Smart cards are often viewed as a complete security solution, but they should not be considered complete by themselves. As with any single security mechanism, smart cards are subject to weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Smart cards can fall prey to physical attacks, logical attacks, Trojan horse attacks, or social-engineering attacks.

Memory cards are machine-readable ID cards with a magnetic strip. Like a credit card, debit card, or ATM card, memory cards can retain a small amount of data but are unable to process data like a smart card. Memory cards often function as a type of two-factor control: The card is “something you have” and its PIN “something you know.” However, memory cards are easy to copy or duplicate and are insufficient for authentication purposes in a secure environment.

Proximity Readers

In addition to smart and dumb cards, proximity readers can be used to control physical access. A proximity reader can be a passive device, a field-powered device, or a transponder. The proximity device is worn or held by the authorized bearer. When it passes a proximity reader, the reader is able to determine who the bearer is and whether they have authorized access. A passive device reflects or otherwise alters the electromagnetic field generated by the reader. This alteration is detected by the reader.

The passive device has no active electronics; it is just a small magnet with specific properties (like antitheft devices commonly found on DVDs). A field-powered device has electronics that activate when the device enters the electromagnetic field that the reader generates. Such devices actually generate electricity from an EM field to power themselves (such as card readers that require only that the access card be waved within inches of the reader to unlock doors). A transponder device is self-powered and transmits a signal received by the reader. This can occur consistently or only at the press of a button (like a garage door opener or car alarm keyfob).

In addition to smart/dumb cards and proximity readers, physical access can be managed with radio frequency identification (RFID) or biometric access control devices. See Chapter 1, “Accountability and Access Control,” for a description of biometric devices.

Access Abuses

No matter what form of physical access control is used, a security guard or other monitoring system must be deployed to prevent abuse, masquerading, and piggybacking. Examples of abuses of physical access controls are propping open secured doors and bypassing locks or access controls. Masquerading is using someone else’s security ID to gain entry into a facility. Piggybacking is following someone through a secured gate or doorway without being identified or authorized personally.

Audit trails and access logs are useful tools even for physical access control. They may need to be created manually by security guards. Or they can be generated automatically if sufficient automated access control mechanisms (such as smart cards and certain proximity readers) are in use. The time a subject requests entry, the result of the authentication process, and the length of time the secured gate remains open are important elements to include in audit trails and access logs. In addition to using the electronic or paper trail, consider monitoring entry points with CCTV. CCTV enables you to compare the audit trails and access logs with a visual recording of the events. Such information is critical to reconstruct the events for an intrusion, breach, or attack.

Intrusion Detection Systems

Intrusion detection systems are systems—automated or manual—designed to detect an attempted intrusion, breach, or attack; the use of an unauthorized entry point; or the occurrence of some specific event at an unauthorized or abnormal time. Intrusion detection systems used to monitor physical activity may include security guards, automated access controls, and motion detectors as well as other specialty monitoring techniques.

Physical intrusion detection systems, also called burglar alarms, detect unauthorized activities and notify the authorities (internal security or external law enforcement). Physical intrusion detection systems can monitor for vibrations, movement, temperature changes, sound, changes in electromagnetic fields, and much more. The most common type of system uses a simple circuit (aka dry contact switches) comprising foil tape in entrance points to detect when a door or window has been opened.

An intrusion detection mechanism is useful only if it is connected to an intrusion alarm. An intrusion alarm notifies authorities about a breach of physical security. There are four types of alarms:

Local alarm system An alarm sounds locally and can be heard up to 400 feet away.

Central station system The alarm is silent locally, but offsite monitoring agents are notified so they can respond to the security breach. Most residential security systems are of this type. Most central station systems are well-known or national security companies, such as Brinks and ADT.

Proprietary system This is the same thing as a central station system; however, the host organization has its own onsite security staff waiting to respond to security breaches.

Auxiliary station When the security perimeter is breached, emergency services are notified to respond to the incident and arrive at the location. This could include fire, police, and medical services.

Two or more of these types of intrusion and alarm systems can be incorporated in a single solution. However, there are two aspects of any intrusion detection and alarm system that can cause it to fail: how it gets its power and how it communicates. If the system loses power, it will not function. Thus, a reliable detection and alarm system has a battery backup with enough stored power for 24 hours of operation.

If communication lines are cut, an alarm may not function and security personnel and emergency services will not be notified. Thus, a reliable detection and alarm system incorporates a heartbeat sensor for line supervision. A heartbeat sensor is a mechanism by which the communication pathway is either constantly or periodically checked with a test signal. If the receiving station detects a failed heartbeat signal, the alarm triggers automatically. Both measures are designed to prevent intruders from circumventing the detection and alarm system.

Emanation Security

Many electrical devices emanate electrical signals or radiation that can be intercepted by unauthorized individuals. These signals may contain confidential, sensitive, or private data. Obvious examples of emanation devices are wireless networking equipment and mobile phones, but many other devices are vulnerable to interception. Other examples include monitors, modems, and internal or external media drives (hard drives, floppy drives, CDs, and so on). With the right equipment, unauthorized users can intercept electromagnetic or radio frequency signals (collectively known as emanations) from these devices and interpret them to extract confidential data.

TEMPEST

Clearly, if a device emits a signal that someone outside your organization can intercept, some security protection is needed. The types of countermeasures and safeguards used to protect against emanation attacks are known as TEMPEST countermeasures. TEMPEST was originally a government research study aimed at protecting electronic equipment from the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emitted during nuclear explosions. It has since expanded to a general study of monitoring emanations and preventing their interception. Thus, TEMPEST is now a formal name for a broad category of activities.

Countermeasures

TEMPEST countermeasures include Faraday cages, white noise, and control zones. A Faraday cage is a box, mobile room, or entire building designed with an external metal skin, often a wire mesh that fully surrounds an area on all sides (in other words, front, back, left, right, top, and bottom). This metal skin is slightly electrified to produce a capacitor-like effect (which is why it’s named after Faraday, a pioneer in the field of electromagnetism) that prevents electromagnetic signals (emanations) from exiting or entering the area that the cage encloses. Faraday cages are quite effective at blocking EM signals. In fact, inside an active Faraday cage, mobile phones do not work, and you can’t pick up broadcast radio or television stations.

White noise simply means broadcasting false traffic at all times to mask and hide the presence of real emanations. White noise can consist of a real signal from another source that is not confidential, a constant signal at a specific frequency, a randomly variable signal (such as the white noise heard between radio stations or television stations), or even a jam signal that causes interception equipment to fail. White noise is most effective when created around the perimeter of an area so that it is broadcast outward to protect the internal area where emanations may be needed for normal operations.

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White noise describes any random sound, signal, or process that can drown out meaningful information. This can vary from audible frequencies to inaudible electronic transmissions, and it may even involve the deliberate act of creating line or traffic noise to disguise origins or disrupt listening devices.

A third type of TEMPEST countermeasure, a control zone, is simply the implementation of either a Faraday cage or white noise generation in an environment where a specific area is protected while the rest is not. A control zone can be a room, a floor, or an entire building. Control zones are those areas where emanation signals are supported and used by necessary equipment, such as wireless networking, mobile phones, radios, and televisions. Outside the control zones, emanation interception is blocked or prevented through the use of various TEMPEST countermeasures.

Environment and Life Safety

An important aspect of physical access control and maintaining the security of a facility is protecting the basic elements of the environment and protecting human life. In all circumstances and under all conditions, the most important aspect of security is protecting people. Thus, preventing harm to people is the most important goal for all security solutions.

Personnel Safety

Part of maintaining safety for personnel is maintaining the basic environment of a facility. For short periods of time, people can survive without water, food, air conditioning, and power. But in some cases, the loss of these elements can have disastrous results, or they can be symptoms of more immediate and dangerous problems. Flooding, fires, release of toxic materials, and natural disasters all threaten human life as well as the stability of a facility. Physical security procedures should focus on protecting human life and then on restoring the safety of the environment and restoring the utilities necessary for the IT infrastructure to function.

People should always be your top priority. Only after personnel are safe can you consider addressing business continuity. Many organizations adopt occupant emergency plans (OEPs) to guide and assist with sustaining personnel safety in the wake of a disaster. The OEP provides guidance on how to minimize threats to life, prevent injury, and protect property from damage in the event of a destructive physical event. The OEP does not address IT issues or business continuity, just personnel and general property. The BCP and DRP address IT and business continuity and recovery issues.

Power and Electricity

Power supplied by electric companies is not always consistent and clean. Most electronic equipment demands clean power to function properly. Equipment damage from power fluctuations is a common occurrence. Many organizations opt to manage their own power through various means. An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is a type of self-charging battery that can be used to supply consistent clean power to sensitive equipment. Basically, a UPS functions by taking power in from the wall outlet, storing it in a battery, pulling power out of the battery, and then feeding that power to whatever devices are connected to it. By directing current through its battery, it is able to maintain a consistent clean power supply. A UPS has a second function, one that is often used as a selling point: A UPS provides continuous power even after the primary power source fails. A UPS can continue to supply power for minutes or hours, depending on its capacity and how much power the equipment attached to it needs.

Another means to ensure that equipment is not harmed by power fluctuations requires use of power strips with surge protectors. A surge protector includes a fuse that will blow before power levels change enough to cause damage to equipment. However, once a surge protector’s fuse or circuit is tripped, current flow is completely interrupted. Surge protectors should be used only when instant termination of electricity will not cause damage or loss to the equipment. Otherwise, a UPS should be employed instead.

If maintaining operations for considerable time in spite of a brownout or blackout is a necessity, onsite electric generators are required. Such generators turn on automatically when a power failure is detected. Most generators operate using a fuel tank of liquid or gaseous propellant that must be maintained to ensure reliability. Electric generators are considered alternate or backup power sources.

The problems with power are numerous. Here is a list of terms associated with power issues you should know:

Fault A momentary loss of power

Blackout A complete loss of power

Sag Momentary low voltage

Brownout Prolonged low voltage

Spike Momentary high voltage

Surge Prolonged high voltage

Inrush An initial surge of power usually associated with connecting to a power source, whether primary or alternate/secondary

Noise A steady interfering power disturbance or fluctuation

Transient A short duration of line noise disturbance

Clean Nonfluctuating pure power

Ground The wire in an electrical circuit that is grounded

A brownout is an interesting power issue because its definition references ANSI standards for power. Those standards allow for an 8 percent drop in power between the power source and the facility meter and a drop of 3.5 percent between the facility meter and the wall outlet before any prolonged instance of low voltage is labeled as a brownout. The ANSI standard further distinguishes that low voltage outside your meter is to be repaired by the power company, while an internal brownout is your responsibility.

Noise

Noise can cause more than just problems with how equipment functions; it can also interfere with the quality of communications, transmissions, and playback. Noise generated by electric current can affect any means of data transmission that relies on electromagnetic transport mechanisms, such as telephone, cellular, television, audio, radio, and network mechanisms.

There are two types of electromagnetic interference (EMI): common mode and traverse mode. Common mode noise is generated by a difference in power between the hot and ground wires of a power source or operating electrical equipment. Traverse mode noise is generated by a difference in power between the hot and neutral wires of a power source or operating electrical equipment.

Radio frequency interference (RFI) is another source of noise and interference that can affect many of the same systems as EMI. A wide range of common electrical appliances generate RFI, including fluorescent lights, electrical cables, electric space heaters, computers, elevators, motors, and electric magnets, so it’s important to locate all such equipment when deploying IT systems and infrastructure elements.

Protecting your power supply and your equipment from noise is an important part of maintaining a productive and functioning environment for your IT infrastructure. Steps to take for this kind of protection include providing for sufficient power conditioning, establishing proper grounding, shielding all cables, and limiting exposure to EMI and RFI sources.

Temperature, Humidity, and Static

In addition to power considerations, maintaining the environment involves control over the HVAC mechanisms. Rooms intended primarily to house computers should be kept at 60 to 75 degrees Fahrenheit (15 to 23 degrees Celsius). Humidity in a computer room should be maintained between 40 and 60 percent. Too much humidity can cause corrosion. Too little humidity causes static electricity. Even on nonstatic carpeting, if the environment has low humidity, it is still possible to generate 20,000-volt static discharges. As you can see in TABLE 19.1, even minimal levels of static discharge can destroy electronic equipment.

Table 19.1 Static voltage and damage

Static Voltage Possible Damage
40 Destruction of sensitive circuits and other electronic components
1,000 Scrambling of monitor displays
1,500 Destruction of data stored on hard drives
2,000 Abrupt system shutdown
4,000 Printer jam or component damage
17,000 Permanent circuit damage

Water

Water leakage and flooding should be addressed in your environmental safety policy and procedures. Plumbing leaks are not an everyday occurrence, but when they do happen, they can cause significant damage.

Water and electricity don’t mix. If your computer systems come in contact with water, especially while they are operating, damage is sure to occur. Plus, water and electricity create a serious risk of electrocution for nearby personnel. Whenever possible, locate server rooms and critical computer equipment away from any water source or transport pipes. You may also want to install water detection circuits on the floor around mission-critical systems. Water detection circuits will sound an alarm and alert you if water is encroaching upon the equipment.

To minimize emergencies, be familiar with shutoff valves and drainage locations. In addition to monitoring for plumbing leaks, you should evaluate your facility’s ability to handle severe rain or flooding in its vicinity. Is the facility located on a hill or in a valley? Is there sufficient drainage? Is there a history of flooding or accumulation of standing water? Is a server room in the basement or on the first floor?

Fire Detection and Suppression

Fire detection and suppression must not be overlooked. Protecting personnel from harm should always be the most important goal of any security or protection system. In addition to protecting people, fire detection and suppression is designed to keep damage caused by fire, smoke, heat, and suppression materials to a minimum, especially as regards the IT infrastructure.

Basic fire education involves knowledge of the fire triangle (see Figure 19.2). The three corners of the triangle represent fire, heat, and oxygen. The center of the triangle represents the chemical reaction among these three elements. The point of the fire triangle is to illustrate that if you can remove any one of the four items from the fire triangle, the fire can be extinguished. Different suppression mediums address different aspects of the fire:

  • Water suppresses the temperature.
  • Soda acid and other dry powders suppress the fuel supply.
  • CO2 suppresses the oxygen supply.
  • Halon substitutes and other nonflammable gases interfere with the chemistry of combustion and/or suppress the oxygen supply.

FIGURE 19.2 The fire triangle

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When selecting a suppression medium, it is important to consider what aspect of the fire triangle it addresses, what this really represents, how effective the suppression medium usually is, and what impact the suppression medium will exert on your environment.

In addition to understanding the fire triangle, it is also helpful to understand the stages of fire. Fires go through numerous stages, and Figure 19.3 addresses the four most vital stages.

FIGURE 19.3 The four primary stages of fire

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Stage 1: The incipient stage At this stage, there is only air ionization but no smoke.

Stage 2: The smoke stage In Stage 2, smoke is visible from the point of ignition.

Stage 3: The flame stage This is when a flame can be seen with the naked eye.

Stage 4: The heat stage At Stage 4, the fire is considerably further down the timescale to the point where there is an intense heat buildup and everything in the area burns.

The earlier a fire is detected, the easier it is to extinguish and the less damage it and its suppression medium(s) can cause.

One of the basics of fire management is proper personnel awareness training. Everyone should be thoroughly familiar with the fire suppression mechanisms in their facility. Everyone should also be familiar with at least two evacuation routes from their primary work area and know how to locate evacuation routes elsewhere in the facility. Personnel should be trained in the location and use of fire extinguishers. Other items to include in fire or general emergency-response training include cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), emergency shutdown procedures, and a pre-established rendezvous location or safety verification mechanism (such as voicemail).

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Most fires in a data center are caused by overloaded electrical distribution outlets.

Fire Extinguishers

There are several types of fire extinguishers. Understanding what type to use on various forms of fire is essential to effective fire suppression. If a fire extinguisher is used improperly or the wrong form of fire extinguisher is used, the fire could spread and intensify instead of being quenched. Fire extinguishers are to be used only when a fire is still in the incipient stage. TABLE 19.2 lists the three common types of fire extinguishers.

Table 19.2 Fire extinguisher classes

Class Type Suppression Material
A Common combustibles Water, soda acid (a dry powder or liquid chemical)
B Liquids CO2, halon*, soda acid
C Electrical CO2, halon*
D Metal Dry powder
*Halon or an EPA-approved halon substitute
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Water cannot be used on Class B fires because it splashes the burning liquids and such liquids usually float. Water cannot be used on Class C fires because of the potential for electrocution. Oxygen suppression cannot be used on metal fires because burning metal produces its own oxygen.

Fire Detection Systems

To properly protect a facility from fire requires installing an automated detection and suppression system. There are many types of fire detection systems. Fixed-temperature detection systems trigger suppression when a specific temperature is reached. The trigger is usually a metal or plastic component that is in the sprinkler head and melts at a specific temperature. Rate-of-rise detection systems trigger suppression when the speed at which the temperature changes reaches a specific level. Flame-actuated systems trigger suppression based on the infrared energy of flames. Smoke-actuated systems use photoelectric or radioactive ionization sensors as triggers.

Most fire detection systems can be linked to fire response service notification mechanisms. When suppression is triggered, such linked systems will contact the local fire response team and request aid using an automated message or alarm.

To be effective, fire detectors need to be placed strategically. Don’t forget to place them inside dropped ceilings and raised floors, in server rooms, in private offices and public areas, in HVAC vents, in elevator shafts, in the basement, and so on.

As for suppression mechanisms used, they can be based on water or on a fire suppression gas system. Water is common in human-friendly environments, whereas gaseous systems are more appropriate for computer rooms where personnel typically do not reside.

Water Suppression Systems

There are four main types of water suppression systems.

  • A wet pipe system (also known as a closed head system) is always full of water. Water discharges immediately when suppression is triggered.
  • A dry pipe system contains compressed air. Once suppression is triggered, the air escapes, opening a water valve that in turn causes the pipes to fill and discharge water into the environment.
  • A deluge system is another form of dry pipe system that uses larger pipes and therefore delivers a significantly larger volume of water. Deluge systems are inappropriate for environments that contain electronics and computers.
  • A preaction system is a combination dry pipe/wet pipe system. The system exists as a dry pipe until the initial stages of a fire (smoke, heat, and so on) are detected, and then the pipes are filled with water. The water is released only after the sprinkler head activation triggers are melted by sufficient heat. If the fire is quenched before sprinklers are triggered, pipes can be manually emptied and reset. This also allows manual intervention to stop the release of water before sprinkler triggering occurs.

Preaction systems are the most appropriate water-based system for environments that house both computers and humans together.

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The most common cause of failure for a water-based system is human error, such as turning off a water source when a fire occurs or triggering water release when there is no fire.

Gas Discharge Systems

Gas discharge systems are usually more effective than water discharge systems. However, gas discharge systems should not be used in environments in which people are located. Gas discharge systems usually remove the oxygen from the air, thus making them hazardous to personnel. They employ a pressurized gaseous suppression medium, such as CO2, halon, or FM-200 (a halon replacement).

Halon is an effective fire suppression compound, but it degrades into toxic gases at 900 degrees Fahrenheit. Also, it is not environmentally friendly. The EPA has banned the manufacture of halon in the United States, but it can still be imported into that country. However, according to the Montreal Protocol, you should contact a halon recycling facility to make arrangements for refilling a discharged system instead of contacting a vendor or manufacturer directly. This action is encouraged so that already produced halon will be consumed and less new halon will be manufactured.

Owing to issues with halon, it is often replaced by a more ecologically friendly and less toxic medium. The following list itemizes various EPA-approved substitutes for halon:

  • FM-200 (HFC-227ea)
  • CEA-410 or CEA-308
  • NAF-S-III (HCFC Blend A)
  • FE-13 (HCFC-23)
  • Argon (IG55) or Argonite (IG01)
  • Inergen (IG541)

You can also replace halon substitutes with low-pressure water mists, but such systems are usually not employed in computer rooms or electrical equipment storage facilities. A low-pressure water mist is a vapor cloud used to quickly reduce the temperature in an area.

Damage

Addressing fire detection and suppression includes dealing with possible contamination and damage caused by a fire. The destructive elements of a fire include smoke and heat, but they also include the suppression media, such as water or soda acid. Smoke is damaging to most storage devices. Heat can damage any electronic or computer component. For example, temperatures of 100 degrees Fahrenheit can damage storage tapes, 175 degrees can damage computer hardware (that is, CPU and RAM), and 350 degrees can damage paper products (through warping and discoloration).

Suppression media can cause short circuits, initiate corrosion, or otherwise render equipment useless. All these issues must be addressed when designing a fire response system.

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Don’t forget that in the event of a fire, in addition to damage caused by the flames and your chosen suppression medium, members of the fire department may inflict damage using their hoses to spray water and their axes while searching for hot spots.

Equipment Failure

No matter what the quality of the equipment your organization chooses to purchase and install might be, eventually it will fail. Understanding and preparing for this eventuality helps ensure the ongoing availability of your IT infrastructure and should help you to protect the integrity and availability of your resources.

Preparing for equipment failure can take many forms. In some non-mission-critical situations, simply knowing where you can purchase replacement parts for a 48-hour replacement timeline is sufficient. In other situations, maintaining onsite replacement parts is mandatory. Keep in mind that the response time in returning a system to a fully functioning state is directly proportional to the cost involved in maintaining such a solution. Costs include storage, transportation, prepurchasing, and maintaining onsite installation and restoration expertise. In some cases, maintaining onsite replacements is infeasible. For those cases, establishing a service-level agreement (SLA) with the hardware vendor is essential. An SLA clearly defines the response time a vendor will provide in the event of an equipment failure emergency.

Aging hardware should be scheduled for replacement and/or repair. The schedule for such operations should be based on the mean time to failure (MTTF) and mean time to repair (MTTR) estimates established for each device or upon prevailing best organizational practices for managing the hardware lifecycle. MTTF is the expected typical functional lifetime of the device given a specific operating environment. MTTR is the average length of time required to perform a repair on the device. A device can often undergo numerous repairs before a catastrophic failure is expected. Be sure to schedule all devices to be replaced before their MTTF expires.

When a device is sent out for repairs, you need to have an alternate solution or a backup device to fill in for the duration of the repair time. Often, waiting until a minor failure occurs before a repair is performed is satisfactory, but waiting until a complete failure occurs before replacement is an unacceptable security practice.

Summary

If you don’t have control over the physical environment, no amount of administrative or technical/logical access controls can provide adequate security. If a malicious person can gain physical access to your facility or equipment, they own it.

There are many aspects and elements involved in implementing and maintaining physical security. One core element is selecting or designing the facility to house your IT infrastructure and the operations of your organization. You must start with a plan that outlines the security needs for your organization and emphasizes methods or mechanisms to employ to provide such security. Such a plan is developed through a process known as critical path analysis.

The security controls implemented to manage physical security can be divided into three groups: administrative, technical, and physical. Administrative physical security controls include facility construction and selection, site management, personnel controls, awareness training, and emergency response and procedures. Technical physical security controls include access controls, intrusion detection, alarms, CCTV, monitoring, HVAC, power supplies, and fire detection and suppression. Examples of physical controls for physical security include fencing, lighting, locks, construction materials, mantraps, dogs, and guards.

There are many types of physical access control mechanisms that can be deployed in an environment to control, monitor, and manage access to a facility. These range from deterrents to detection mechanisms. They can be fences, gates, turnstiles, mantraps, lighting, security guards, security dogs, key locks, combination locks, badges, motion detectors, sensors, and alarms.

The technical controls most often employed as access control mechanisms to manage physical access include smart/dumb cards and biometrics. In addition to access control, physical security mechanisms can take the form of audit trails, access logs, and intrusion detection systems.

An important aspect of physical access control and maintaining the security of a facility is protecting the basic elements of the environment and protecting human life. In all circumstances and under all conditions, the most important goal of security is protecting people. Preventing harm is the utmost goal of all security solutions. Providing clean power sources and managing the environment are also important.

Fire detection and suppression must not be overlooked. In addition to protecting people, fire detection and suppression is designed to keep damage caused by fire, smoke, heat, and suppression materials to a minimum, especially in regard to the IT infrastructure.

Exam Essentials

Understand why there is no security without physical security. Without control over the physical environment, no amount of administrative or technical/logical access controls can provide adequate security. If a malicious person can gain physical access to your facility or equipment, they can do just about anything they want, from destruction to disclosure and alteration.

Be able to list administrative physical security controls. Examples of administrative physical security controls are facility construction and selection, site management, personnel controls, awareness training, and emergency response and procedures.

Be able to list the technical physical security controls. Technical physical security controls can be access controls, intrusion detection, alarms, CCTV, monitoring, HVAC, power supplies, and fire detection and suppression.

Be able to name the physical controls for physical security. Physical controls for physical security are fencing, lighting, locks, construction materials, mantraps, dogs, and guards.

Know the functional order of controls. These are denial, then deterrence, then detection, and then delay.

Know the key elements in making a site selection and designing a facility for construction. The key elements in making a site selection are visibility, composition of the surrounding area, area accessibility, and the effects of natural disasters. A key element in designing a facility for construction is understanding the level of security needed by your organization and planning for it before construction begins.

Know how to design and configure secure work areas. There should not be equal access to all locations within a facility. Areas that contain assets of higher value or importance should have restricted access. Valuable and confidential assets should be located in the heart or center of protection provided by a facility. Also, centralized server or computer rooms need not be human compatible.

Understand how to handle visitors in a secure facility. If a facility employs restricted areas to control physical security, then a mechanism to handle visitors is required. Often an escort is assigned to visitors, and their access and activities are monitored closely. Failing to track the actions of outsiders when they are granted access into a protected area can result in malicious activity against the most protected assets.

Know the three categories of security controls implemented to manage physical security and be able to name examples of each. The security controls implemented to manage physical security can be divided into three groups: administrative, technical, and physical. Understand when and how to use each, and be able to list examples of each kind.

Know the common threats to physical access controls. No matter what form of physical access control is used, a security guard or other monitoring system must be deployed to prevent abuse, masquerading, and piggybacking. Abuses of physical access control are propping open secured doors and bypassing locks or access controls. Masquerading is using someone else’s security ID to gain entry into a facility. Piggybacking is following someone through a secured gate or doorway without being identified or authorized personally.

Understand the need for audit trails and access logs. Audit trails and access logs are useful tools even for physical access control. They may need to be created manually by security guards. Or they can be generated automatically if sufficiently automated access control mechanisms are in place (in other words, smart cards and certain proximity readers). You should also consider monitoring entry points with CCTV. Through CCTV, you can compare the audit trails and access logs with a visually recorded history of the events. Such information is critical to reconstructing the events of an intrusion, breach, or attack.

Understand the need for clean power. Power supplied by electric companies is not always consistent and clean. Most electronic equipment demands clean power in order to function properly. Equipment damage because of power fluctuations is a common occurrence. Many organizations opt to manage their own power through several means. A UPS is a type of self-charging battery that can be used to supply consistent clean power to sensitive equipment. UPSs also provide continuous power even after the primary power source fails. A UPS can continue to supply power for minutes or hours depending on its capacity and the draw by equipment.

Know the terms commonly associated with power issues. Know the definitions of the following: fault, blackout, sag, brownout, spike, surge, inrush, noise, transient, clean, and ground.

Understand how to control the environment. In addition to power considerations, maintaining the environment involves control over the HVAC mechanisms. Rooms containing primarily computers should be kept at 60 to 75 degrees Fahrenheit (15 to 23 degrees Celsius). Humidity in a computer room should be maintained between 40 and 60 percent. Too much humidity can cause corrosion. Too little humidity causes static electricity.

Know about static electricity. Even on nonstatic carpeting, if the environment has low humidity, it is still possible to generate 20,000-volt static discharges. Even minimal levels of static discharge can destroy electronic equipment.

Understand the need to manage water leakage and flooding. Water leakage and flooding should be addressed in your environmental safety policy and procedures. Plumbing leaks are not an everyday occurrence, but when they occur, they often cause significant damage. Water and electricity don’t mix. If your computer systems come in contact with water, especially while they are operating, damage is sure to occur. Whenever possible, locate server rooms and critical computer equipment away from any water source or transport pipes.

Understand the importance of fire detection and suppression. Fire detection and suppression must not be overlooked. Protecting personnel from harm should always be the most important goal of any security or protection system. In addition to protecting people, fire detection and suppression is designed to keep damage caused by fire, smoke, heat, and suppression materials to a minimum, especially in regard to the IT infrastructure.

Understand the possible contamination and damage caused by a fire and suppression. The destructive elements of a fire include smoke and heat but also the suppression medium, such as water or soda acid. Smoke is damaging to most storage devices. Heat can damage any electronic or computer component. Suppression mediums can cause short circuits, initiate corrosion, or otherwise render equipment useless. All of these issues must be addressed when designing a fire response system.

Written Lab

1. What kind of device helps to define an organization’s perimeter, and also serves to deter casual trespassing?

2. What is the problem with halon-based fire suppression technology?

3. What kinds of potential issues can an emergency visit from the fire department leave in its wake?

Answers to Written Lab

1. A fence is an excellent perimeter safeguard that can help to deter casual trespassing. Moderately secure installations work when the fence is 6 to 8 feet tall and will typically be cyclone (also known as chain link) fencing with the upper surface twisted or barbed to deter casual climbers. More secure installations usually opt for fence heights over 8 feet and often include multiple strands of barbed or razor wire strung above the chain link fabric to further deter climbers.

2. Although you will often see fire suppression information and texts reference fire suppression systems based on halon gas, which serve to starve a fire of oxygen by disrupting the chemical reaction between oxygen and combustible materials, halon is no longer approved by the U.S. EPA for new fire suppression systems, nor is manufacture of new halon gas encouraged for charging of such systems (the EPA seeks to exhaust existing stocks of halon to take this substance out of circulation). Halon is an ozone depleting substance, and production of halon 1301, halon 1211, and halon 2403 ceased in developed countries on December 31, 2003. Inert gases (such as nitrogen or argon), halocarbon gases (FE-13, FE-125, FM-200, FE-36, CEA-308, and CEA-410), and halocarbon generators are all recommended as substitutes. See http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file29105.pdf for more information.

3. Any time water is used to respond to fire, flame, or smoke, water damage becomes a serious concern, particularly when water is released in areas where electrical equipment is in use. Not only can computers and other electrical gear be damaged or destroyed by water, so also can many forms of storage media become damaged or unusable. Also, when seeking hot spots to put out, firefighters often use axes to break down doors or cut through walls to reach them as quickly as possible. This, too, poses the potential for physical damage to or destruction of devices and/or wiring that may also be in the vicinity.

Review Questions

1. Which of the following is the most important aspect of security?

A. Physical security

B. Intrusion detection

C. Logical security

D. Awareness training

2. What method can be used to map out the needs of an organization for a new facility?

A. Log file audit

B. Critical path analysis

C. Risk analysis

D. Inventory

3. What type of physical security controls focus on facility construction and selection, site management, personnel controls, awareness training, and emergency response and procedures?

A. Technical

B. Physical

C. Administrative

D. Logical

4. Which of the following is not a security-focused design element of a facility or site?

A. Separation of work and visitor areas

B. Restricted access to areas with higher value or importance

C. Confidential assets located in the heart or center of a facility

D. Equal access to all locations within a facility

5. Which of the following does not need to be true in order to maintain the most efficient and secure server room?

A. It must be human compatible.

B. It must include the use of nonwater fire suppressants.

C. The humidity must be kept between 40 and 60 percent.

D. The temperature must be kept between 60 and 75 degrees Fahrenheit.

6. What is a perimeter-defining device used to deter casual trespassing?

A. Gates

B. Fencing

C. Security guards

D. Motion detectors

7. Which of the following is a double set of doors that is often protected by a guard and is used to contain a subject until their identity and authentication is verified?

A. Gate

B. Turnstile

C. Mantrap

D. Proximity detector

8. What is the most common form of perimeter security devices or mechanisms?

A. Security guards

B. Fences

C. CCTV

D. Lighting

9. Which of the following is not a disadvantage of using security guards?

A. Security guards are usually unaware of the scope of the operations within a facility.

B. Not all environments and facilities support security guards.

C. Not all security guards are themselves reliable.

D. Prescreening, bonding, and training do not guarantee effective and reliable security guards.

10. What is the most common cause of failure for a water-based fire suppression system?

A. Water shortage

B. People

C. Ionization detectors

D. Placement of detectors in drop ceilings

11. What is the most common and inexpensive form of physical access control device?

A. Lighting

B. Security guard

C. Key locks

D. Fences

12. What type of motion detector senses changes in the electrical or magnetic field surrounding a monitored object?

A. Wave

B. Photoelectric

C. Heat

D. Capacitance

13. Which of the following is not a typical type of alarm that can be triggered for physical security?

A. Preventive

B. Deterrent

C. Repellant

D. Notification

14. No matter what form of physical access control is used, a security guard or other monitoring system must be deployed to prevent all but which of the following?

A. Piggybacking

B. Espionage

C. Masquerading

D. Abuse

15. What is the most important goal of all security solutions?

A. Prevention of disclosure

B. Maintaining integrity

C. Human safety

D. Sustaining availability

16. What is the ideal humidity range for a computer room?

A. 20–40 percent

B. 40–60 percent

C. 60–75 percent

D. 80–95 percent

17. At what voltage level can static electricity cause destruction of data stored on hard drives?

A. 4,000

B. 17,000

C. 40

D. 1,500

18. A Type B fire extinguisher may use all but which of the following suppression mediums?

A. Water

B. CO2

C. Halon or an acceptable halon substitute

D. Soda acid

19. What is the best type of water-based fire suppression system for a computer facility?

A. Wet pipe system

B. Dry pipe system

C. Preaction system

D. Deluge system

20. Which of the following is typically not a culprit in causing damage to computer equipment in the event of a fire and a triggered suppression?

A. Heat

B. Suppression medium

C. Smoke

D. Light

Answers to Review Questions

1. A. Physical security is the most important aspect of overall security. Without physical security, none of the other aspects of security is sufficient.

2. B. Critical path analysis can be used to map out the needs of an organization for a new facility. A critical path analysis is the process of identifying relationships between mission-critical applications, processes, and operations and all of the supporting elements.

3. C. Administrative physical security controls include facility construction and selection, site management, personnel controls, awareness training, and emergency response and procedures.

4. D. Equal access to all locations within a facility is not a security-focused design element. Each area containing assets or resources of different importance, value, and confidentiality should have a corresponding level of security restriction placed on it.

5. A. A computer room does not need to be human compatible to be efficient and secure. Having a human-incompatible server room provides a greater level of protection against attacks.

6. B. Fencing is a perimeter-defining device used to deter casual trespassing. Gates, security guards, and motion detectors do not define a facility’s perimeter.

7. C. A mantrap is a double set of doors that is often protected by a guard and used to contain a subject until their identity and authentication is verified.

8. D. Lighting is the most common form of perimeter security devices or mechanisms. Your entire site should be clearly lit. This provides for easy identification of personnel and makes it easier to notice intrusions.

9. A. Security guards are usually unaware of the scope of the operations within a facility, which supports confidentiality and helps reduce the possibility that a security guard will be involved in the disclosure of confidential information.

10. B. The most common cause of failure for a water-based system is human error. If you turn off the water source after a fire and forget to turn it back on, you’ll be in trouble for the future. Also, pulling an alarm when there is no fire will trigger damaging water release throughout the office.

11. C. Key locks are the most common and inexpensive form of physical access control device. Lighting, security guards, and fences are all much more cost intensive.

12. D. A capacitance motion detector senses changes in the electrical or magnetic field surrounding a monitored object.

13. A. There is no such thing as a preventive alarm. Alarms are always triggered in response to a detected intrusion or attack.

14. B. No matter what form of physical access control is used, a security guard or other monitoring system must be deployed to prevent abuse, masquerading, and piggybacking. Espionage cannot be prevented by physical access controls.

15. C. Human safety is the most important goal of all security solutions.

16. B. The humidity in a computer room should ideally be from 40 to 60 percent.

17. D. Destruction of data stored on hard drives can be caused by 1,500 volts of static electricity.

18. A. Water is never the suppression medium in Type B fire extinguishers because they are used on liquid fires.

19. C. A preaction system is the best type of water-based fire suppression system for a computer facility.

20. D. Light is usually not damaging to most computer equipment, but fire, smoke, and the suppression medium (typically water) are very destructive.

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