17

Language and Words

Communication in the Analects of Confucius

Hui-Ching Chang

In this chapter, Hui-Ching Chang critiques previous research on the impact of Confucianism on communication in East Asia for overemphasizing relational hierarchy and social harmony and for translating Confucian values into a set of well-defined rules that prescribe language behaviors for different relationships in different contexts. She engages in a close reading of the Analects in order to accurately gauge the Confucian view of language and words. Like Miike (Chapter 8), Chen (Chapter 18), Yin (Chapter 19), and Tu (Chapter 32) in the volume, Chang asserts that Confucian teaching is first and foremost concerned with ethics and morality. She specifies four Confucian orientations toward speaking: (a) words define and reflect moral development; (b) beautiful words lacking substance are blameworthy; (c) actions are more important than words; and (d) appropriate speaking relies on rules of propriety. Her careful reading pinpoints that Confucius held the view that language use should be inextricably linked to the speaker’s moral development and the appreciation of varying relationships and situations based on human emotion. From her literature review, Chang raises five theoretical issues in Confucian communication research: (1) a scholarly priority that ties Confucianism exclusively to collectivism, (2) the assumed incompatibility between social position and individual will, (3) the absence of discussions on the moral character in language use in Confucian societies, (4) the assumption that the ability to reason and formulate message rests upon the person’s individual freedom, and (5) the tendency to explain Confucianism retroactively after analyses about language behaviors in Confucian societies have been made.

Scholars of language and social psychology in Asian nations often invoke Confucianism to explain Asian communication patterns (Chen, 1993; Chen & Chung, 1994; Cheng, 1987; Oliver, 1971; Yum, 1988). Others have linked Confucianism and language use in social life, showing how it has influenced Asian cultural concepts important to communication, such as the Chinese concepts of kuan-hsi (relation) (Chang & Holt, 1991), pao (reciprocity) (Chang & Holt, 1994), and mien-tzu (face) (Cheng, 1986), as well as the Korean concept of uye-ri (righteousness) (Yum, 1987) and the Japanese idea of ningensei (human beingness) (Goldman, 1994). This is hardly surprising, given Confucianism’s effect on various Asian societies (Bond & Hwang, 1986; Chan, 1963; Cheng, 1986; Fung, 1983; Goldman, 1994; Hofstede, 1991; Okabe, 1983; Triandis, 1995; Tu, 1985, 1996; Yum, 1988).

Although Confucian thought is important in shaping attitudes toward language and words in Asian societies,¹ “Confucianism,” as an abstraction used to explain language and social life, has often been cast in terms of other ideas such as collectivism (Triandis, 1995; Wheeler, Reis, & Bond, 1989), social orientation (Yang, 1981), and harmony (Oliver, 1971). I will argue that subsuming Confucianism under these abstractions prevents us from developing appropriate theories to account for language attitudes in Confucian societies.

Confucian teachings are based on a far more comprehensive and richly textured view of language and words than is suggested by superordinate sociological and psychological ideas, as shown by numerous observations about language, society, and cultural practice in the Analects of Confucius, the most important Confucian text.² Although the Analects extensively treats such issues, few studies have concentrated on the text of the Analects to provide a comprehensive look at how attitudes toward language are advocated by Confucius;³ instead, current literature focuses on the implications of Confucian systems of thought for Asian communication (Cheng, 1987; Yum, 1988). Even when the Analects is discussed, analyses tend to be anecdotal (see Chen & Chung, 1994). This article redresses this deficiency by looking at how words are treated in the entire corpus of the Analects to formulate more appropriate theoretical perspectives for the analysis of communication in Confucian societies.

Confucian Philosophy as Key to Asian Communication—Current Interpretations

Most scholars agree that the people in Confucianist cultures emphasize relational hierarchy and social harmony, translating Confucian values into a set of well-defined rules regulating language behaviors for different relationships on different occasions. Bond and Hwang (1986) summarize the key elements of Confucianism:

Although Bond and Hwang are referring specifically to Chinese, their views are shared by other scholars writing about other Asian societies, influenced by Confucian philosophy. As Yum (1988) puts it, “[The] East Asian preoccupation with social relationships stems from the doctrines of Confucianism, that considers proper relationships to be the basis of society” (p. 374). Yum (1988) further notes that the Confucian ideas of particularism, emphasis on long-term relational development, asymmetrical reciprocity, the drawing of clear distinctions between in-group and out-group members, use of informal intermediaries, and the overlapping of personal with public relations have led to four characteristics of East Asian communication patterns: (a) process orientation, (b) differentiated linguistic codes, (c) indirect communication emphasis, and (d) receiver centeredness (p. 381).⁴

The logic of these analyses is that relational hierarchical structures compel the individual to emphasize maintaining social harmony and respecting the role of each individual in society, leading, in turn, to language behavior that protects face, avoids conflict, matches behaviors, communicates indirectly, and places greater burdens on the receiver to interpret a given message (Bond & Wang, 1983; Cheng, Bond, & Chan, 1995; Goldman, 1994; Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1992; Kim & Bresnahan, 1994; Kim, Sharkey, & Singelis, 1994; Kim & Wilson, 1994; Ting-Toomey, 1988). In a seminal analysis of Asian communication as observed from classical texts, Oliver (1971) notes, “the primary function of discourse [of Asian rhetoric] is not to enhance the welfare of the individual speaker or listener but to promote harmony” (p. 261).

Due to these emphases, attitudes toward language and words in Confucian societies are said to contrast sharply with those in North America (Gudykunst & Kim, 1992; Oliver, 1971). In addition to Hofstede’s (1991) findings that many Asian societies tend to be high on both collectivism and power distance (see also Bond & Wang, 1983; Cheng et al., 1995), Confucian values are seen as virtually interchangeable with collectivist values, as summarized in this description by Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey (1992):

Although Yum (1988) contends that the individualism–collectivism dichotomy (Triandis, 1988, 1995) “is not identical to the difference between the East Asian’s emphasis on social relationships and North American emphasis on individualism” (p. 375), characteristics of Confucian communication described in her article—such as the tendency toward indirectness—are frequently cited as attributes of collectivist cultures (for example, Kim & Bresnahan, 1994). Yum’s (1988) examination of Confucianism has been used to explain idiosyncratic features of Asian communication, including high-context communication (Gudykunst & Kim, 1992) and tactics of request (Kim & Bresnahan, 1994; Kim & Wilson, 1994).

These and other lines of research connect Confucianism and collectivism (said to be the principal defining feature of Asian cultures). Confucian philosophy is thus seen as a force inclining Asian cultures toward high-context and collectivist communication that emphasizes role hierarchy and relations rather than the expression of self through direct communication. Inevitably, language behaviors shaped by Confucianism are found to be composed of sets of externally prescribed rules (Goldman, 1994; Oliver, 1971; Yang, 1981), or as Goldman (1994) describes it, “codes of Confucian business and social etiquette requiring adherence to rule-governed interaction” (p. 34). Oliver (1971), in a similar fashion, concludes that Confucian traditions “stressed the value of adhering strictly to patterns of expectations” (p. 262).

Although such studies have contributed to better understanding of Asian communication, they tend to confine their analyses by referring exclusively to the factor of relational hierarchy as espoused by Confucianism. As I look at the Analects in detail, it will be clear that the Confucian view of language and words, built on a sophisticated moral and ethical cosmology emphasizing integration between self and others, proves more complex and interesting than the picture resulting from the current focus.

Issues of Words and Speaking in the Analects

In the Analects, the focus is not on communication as such but on words and speaking. Confucius either explicitly discusses, or refers to, words and speaking throughout the Analects. Seventeen of 20 books address these issues in 63 chapters. Examination of these chapters reveals four orientations Confucius takes toward language and words: (a) words define and reflect moral development, (b) beautiful words lacking substance are blameworthy, (c) actions are more important than words, and (d) appropriate speaking relies on rules of propriety. The Confucian analytic framework concentrates not so much on problems associated with people talking to one another and the process of communication but rather on what one chooses to talk about and in what ways.

Words Define and Reflect Moral Development

Confucius claimed a direct link between words and virtue, viewing speech as neither simply a tool for mutual understanding nor an instrument for personal gain but an indicator of the speaker’s morality. This concern for consistency between internal character and external form points up the most important aspect of Confucian speaking: How moral character is reflected in the individual’s words. As a seeker of moral perfection, Confucius avoids plausible words (V, 24) because “plausible words confound virtues” (XV, 26). Because slow speakers are unlikely to pay attention to external appearances, to speak slowly and bluntly may in fact be closer to humanity (jen) (XIII, 27).

Confucius elaborates the relation between virtue and words: “Those who are virtuous surely have something good to say, whereas those who have something good to say are not necessarily virtuous” (XIV, 5). If one cultivates oneself inside, character flows out through one’s words— words that benefit society (Mao, 1988)—and one will have no problem in speaking. But the opposite is not true: Eloquence is no proof of virtue, and those who merely talk may become eloquent for the sake of eloquence (Soothill, 1968). These are people who can only talk, being unable to put their words into action (Mao, 1988).

Moreover, attitudes toward one’s own moral conduct are more important than words. Responding to Duke Ting’s question about the common saying, “a single sentence could make a country prosperous,” Confucius explains that such an effect cannot be expected from one sentence. Nevertheless, if Duke Tine were to understand the meaning of some statement, such as “it is difficult to be a prince, nor is it easy to be a minister,” then we might say this could almost be considered as an example illustrating the principle that “one sentence can make a country prosperous” (XIII, 15).

Because language is a natural product of moral quality, “From the accuracy or inaccuracy of a man’s⁵ speech his obliquity or uprightness may be gauged” (Soothill, 1968, p. 932). Being able to detect the moral development of a speaker through careful examination of the words he or she employs is seen as a major task in understanding others. As Confucius put it, “He who does not know the force of words, cannot know men” (XX, 3). Because words are the most accurate index of virtue, to know people is to know their words.

However, this understanding is not simply “knowing who the speaker really is,” but an essential task for humanity: Through examining words, one can distinguish good from bad. “Not to speak with one who can be spoken with is to waste a man; to speak with one who cannot be spoken with is to waste one’s words. The intelligent man neither wasters his man nor his words” (XV, 7).

Confucius also suggests that people should incorporate moral qualities in their talk, avoiding speech that causes them to stray from virtue. Confucius comments that those who talk incessantly and whose conversation never ascends to what is just and right will have no way to attain virtue (XV, 16). Soothill’s (1968) translation of the commentary notes: “When moral obligation does not enter into conversation then talk becomes loose, and a demoralizing spirit is produced” (p. 740). That is not to say that one should lecture others about what is right and wrong; the importance of the lesson lies in the awareness of applying moral obligations as guiding principles for speech. Confucius said that the virtues will necessarily have something good to say. Through enrichment of the mind, one will be able to use moral standards to guide various forms of conduct, among which words are but a single kind. Those who talk continually without regard for what is moral, just, and right do so because they neglect to develop their moral qualities.

Confucius notes that one of the three kinds of beneficial pleasure is to discuss the excellence of others (XVI, 5), exposing discussants to better human qualities, so that such qualities will become a major concern and lead ultimately to gradual change in character toward morality. On the other hand, the virtuous must avoid other kinds of talk: “[The] superior man … detests men who proclaim others’ misdeeds, men who occupy lower positions [and] slander their superiors, men who are bold and mannerless, and men who are persistently forward and yet obtuse” (XVII, 24). To indulge in such language is to deny oneself the opportunity for spiritual improvement.

To cultivate virtue, one must be cautious about what one says and reflect before speaking. Being quick to speak is incompatible with the cultivation of virtue (Legge, 1985, p. 385). For example, Confucius notes: To proclaim on the road what you hear on the way is to discard virtues” (XVII, 14). If one hears something and repeats it without taking care to consider it sufficiently, one abuses language. Because words can be manipulated (that is, employed in ways that do not reflect a speaker’s inner convictions), one who cannot discern the potential defects of language cannot be virtuous.

The virtuous are always careful of their words (I, 14) because (as noted in a quotation from Tzu-Kung in the Analects) “The superior man for one word is often deemed wise, and for one word is often deemed foolish” (XIX, 25). Confucius lists nine points with which a superior man must take care, including speaking: “In speaking, his care is to be conscientious” (XV, 10), an attitude equally applicable to learning. In learning, one must broadly study, put aside that which is doubtful, and speak with due caution concerning the rest; in this way, one will seldom incur blame (II, 18). Soothill (1968) notes that “to hear and observe much is the widening of culture; to reserve the doubtful and risky is the essence of selection (discretion); to speak and act warily is the restraining advantage of self-control” (p. 168). Creel (1960) notes that “we must understand what we can, and concerning the rest maintain suspended judgment” (p. 135). Not being demonstrative, the virtuous are often cautious about their words and slow in speaking, and thus, able to discern the good from the bad, qualities that help them to attain virtue.

Along with a cautious attitude toward words, the Analects also praised the ability to express oneself with humility. For example, Confucius lauds those who do not boast. The warrior, he says, it the last to flee in the face of defeat, and although this may be considered honorable, the warrior refuses to boast. Instead, he says, “It is not that I dare to be in the rear; my horse would not come [forward]” (VI, 13). This gentle refusal to acknowledge accomplishment is praiseworthy because if one remains humble, one is unsatisfied, and to be unsatisfied with oneself is the best incentive to attain higher levels of virtue.

In discussing the dreams of four students, Confucius relates that one student expressed his ambition in these terms:

At this, Confucius smiled. When another student asked why, Confucius replied, “The administration of a country demands the rule of propriety, but his speech lacked modesty—that is why I smiled at him” (XI, 25). Although Confucius granted his student might have been able to achieve his ambition, the student’s lack of modesty showed moral deficiency. Confucius believed that governing a country depends entirely on the ruler’s moral qualities (Fung, 1983). Because cultivating moral qualities is the basis for ruling, rulers must be considerate toward subjects and willing to accept advice given by others. Being bold and aggressive in speech shows lack of the most important qualities needed to govern the nation.

From these examples, we observe the importance of humility in speech. To be humble in speech is not merely an external manifestation but the expression of a humble heart seeking life’s best experiences to develop moral stature. Virtue is not only the basis for speaking, it is essential to moral development. As King (1985) puts it, “Confucianism is distinctly concerned with the concept of self-cultivation. Indeed, the moral autonomy of the self is unequivocally affirmed by Confucians” (p. 57).

Unfortunately, in scholarly discussion of Confucianism and Confucian philosophy, scant attention is paid to Confucius’s dictums about primacy of the self and its moral development. Instead, the Confucian perspective is often rendered as a set of rules guiding specific language behaviors, irrespective of content, precisely the opposite of what Confucius taught. If we do not inquire into the Analects to discover the true spirit of the Confucian view of language, we will allow ill-conceived stereotypes about Confucian societies to dictate our analyses of their use of language and words.

Beautiful Words Lacking Substance Are Blameworthy

The Analects shows clearly Confucius’s distaste for artifice in speaking. For Confucius, “Beautiful words, insinuating manner, are lacking in human-heartedness [jen]” (I, 3). Jen is the fundamental perfection of virtue, incorporating all moral qualities that guide human interaction. Beautiful words that do not accord with true feelings but cleverly flatter others are judged hypocritical and, thus, lacking in jen (Legge, 1985, p. 126). Commenting on this passage, Mao (1988) notes, “Jen emphasizes putting morality into action. In this hypocritical world, if one wants to know the other’s morality, one needs to observe another’s actual behavior, rather than to evaluate from the other’s language and manners alone” (p. 3).

Having lived through the violent Warring States period of Chinese history, Confucius most despised the “sharp tongued” who overthrow the nation (XVII, 18), even while acknowledging that such people can manipulate events: “The keen tongued can make things look the very opposite, the worthy unworthy and vice versa, so that if a Prince believed them, it would not be difficult to overthrow his country” (Soothill, 1968, p. 840). Through artful speech, right and wrong can be confused, and people find themselves unable to attain virtue. Hence, Confucius argues, good people should first distance themselves from the sharp tongued and then avoid contradictory language (XIV, 39).

Unfortunately, glib speakers who confuse moral standards often seem to rule rather than the exception. Observing politics, Confucius grieves: “A decadent age loves flattery and takes pleasure in external charms … without these it is hard to get on” (VI, 14; Soothill, 1968, p. 304). One characteristic of the sharp tongued is that their artful speech often does not accord with what they think, but is only uttered verbally (Soothill, 1968). Because of the potential danger inherent in sharp-tongued speech, Confucius said that, to govern, one must “distance [oneself] from specious talkers” (XV, 10).

The wisdom needed to detect falsehood in artful political speech is equally useful in personal life. Much as governors are advised to distance themselves from specious talkers, one should not make friends with such people because they may damage one’s virtue. Elaborating the distinction between good and bad qualities of friendship, Confucius described three kinds of harmful friends: “Plausible men, [those with] insinuating manners, and the glib-tongued” (XVI, 4). One must avoid friends who are simply polite without being straightforward, practice insincere flattery, and engage in empty talk without substantial information (Soothill, 1968, p. 788).

This attitude toward words can also be seen in two stories of interactions between Confucius and his students. At one point, Confucius praises a student, noting that although the person seldom speaks, whatever he says hits the right point (XI, 13). Another story concerns making excuses. In an argument over a military action proposed by a student’s Prince, but which Confucius thought inappropriate, Confucius criticized the student for not being able to perform his duty as an officer by guiding the Prince to do the right thing. The student replied by telling Confucius the reason why the action was necessary and unavoidable. However, Confucius responded, “A superior man detests those who decline to say plainly that they want a thing and insist one making excuses in regard hereto” (XVI, 1). Such dishonesty, insincerity, and inconsistency between the internal and external stand in opposition to the Confucian view of language.

An important Confucian virtue is “basic stuff” (chih, and its accompanying quality, uprightness). To cultivate chih, one mush project true outward expressions, not deceive others, and reject all empty form and falseness (Fung, 1983). Confucius never hesitated to show his distaste for those who cultivate forms of speaking not consonant with their genuine internal states. As Oliver (1971) puts it, Confucian philosophy “turned attention inward, inviting people to examine themselves, rather than outward, to seek to influence others … a man who cannot rectify himself … surely cannot improve others” (p. 132).

By attending to internal content and avoiding external manipulation, we let sincerity and truthfulness guide our words. Whether one is sincere in uttering words determines whether one will be accepted by others:

The student Tzu-Lu could solve a dispute by “a half sentence” because he never broke a promise (XII, 12). Soothill (1968) notes, Tzu-Lu’s “sincerity and acuteness made men submit to his decisions without waiting for him to finish speaking” (p. 582). The power of words, then, rests on such speaker attributes as sincerity and truthfulness. When people trust the speaker’s sincerity, words themselves are unimportant, because whatever the speaker says will be accepted.

Because speech comes from within, readiness to speak is also unimportant (V, 4). The Analects recounts several instances in which people who do not talk very well are nevertheless virtuous. Observing his student Hui receiving instruction, Confucius notes the importance of conduct as contrasted with the unreliable index of language:

Readiness to speak often leads one to focus on external expression and ignore the internal mind, and hence, one can only engender dislike in others (V, 4). How should one use language for self-expression? As Confucius stated, “in language it is simply required that it convey the meaning” (XV, 40). As long as language is sufficient for clear meaning, whether it is ornate or not is unimportant.

From observations like these, one sees the essence of language and speaking in Confucianism: Language and words must be used according to what is right and appropriate, as determined by the speaker’s level of spiritual training. Confucius considered one Chinese classic, the Book of Odes, an important teaching resource. Advising students to study the book, Confucius noted: “Odes serve to stimulate the mind, to train observation, to encourage social intercourse, and to modify the vexations of life” (XVII, 9). Thus, the Book of Odes serves as a basis for people to engage in social intercourse with others: “If you do not learn the Odes, you will not be fit to converse with” (XVI, 13). Well-cultivated, superior people enrich themselves internally before expressing themselves to others.

These tenets of Confucianism—that external forms are untrustworthy and one should be unwilling to express oneself outwardly until one is cultivated inside—are virtually ignored in scholarly literature. On the contrary, hesitancy in language use is often cast, not as a self-initiated attempt at internal refinement, but the result of society-imposed constraints. Such accounts diminish the essential role played by the speaker in Confucian societies and lead us mistakenly to conclude that language use in Confucian societies is a mechanistic response to structure. This is a considerable distance from the Confucian teaching that beautiful words often are blameworthy because they lack substance.

Actions Are More Important than Words

A third issue regarding the role of speaking it to be deduced from the relation between speaking and actions. According to Confucius, there must be a match between words and actions: “The superior man is ashamed of his speaking exceeding his actions” (XIV, 29). In speaking, the most important thing is to be able to put words into practice; otherwise, words are merely empty form. To Confucius, actions were far more important than speaking. Confucius defined a superior person as one who wishes to be slow in speech but earnest in his actions (IV, 24), or more specifically, as someone who “acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his actions” (II, 13). Confucius praised the excellence of ancient people in speaking: “People of ancient times did not readily give utterance to their words out of shame lest they should come short in deed” (IV, 22). However, one must also note that making actions correspond with one’s words is not the result of blind persistence but rather because such actions accord to what is right (I, 13).

Four important points clarify the Confucian view of word–action correspondence. First, the importance of action in Confucian philosophy is seen in Confucius’s emphasis on observing one’s words against one’s behavior. Confucius cautioned that even if a person’s speech and discourse seem solid, one is still not sure that this individual must be a superior person (XI, 20). Legge (1985) notes “we may not hastily judge a man to be good from his discourse” (p. 269). Words create a world that extends beyond one’s actions. Therefore, one must not simply trust others’ words without checking their deeds: “Observe what the person does. … How can a person hide himself!” (II, 10) (see also XII, 20). Although Confucius would like to trust people’s words as guarantees of their conduct, unfortunately, such an ideal situation seldom exists in a morally imperfect world. Criticizing one of his students who overslept, Confucius remarked, “Formerly, my attitude toward others was to hear their words and give them credits for their deeds. Now my attitude toward others is to listen to their words and note what they do” (V, 9).

However, checking the conduct of others against their words does not mean that one should make rigid, indiscriminate judgment about others. Confucius taught that “the superior man does not promote a person simply on account of his words, not does he put aside good words because of the man’s character” (XV, 22). In other words, when participating in politics, one must be able to discriminate between people and what they say (Soothill, 1968, p. 746). One must be cautious not to be overwhelmed by others’ words, but at the same time, one must remain open minded in accepting good words uttered by someone who may be wicked. Even a wicked person may be sincere when uttering good words. Moreover, there are also situations in which one’s words are usually good. Master Tseng said, “When a bird is about to die, his notes are mournful; when a man is about to die, his words are good” (VIII, 4).

A second indication of the importance of action in Confucian thought is seen in observations about giving advice. “To words of just admonition can anyone refuse assent?” Confucius asks. “But it is amendment that is of value. With advice gently but persuasively offered can anyone be otherwise than pleased? But it is the application that is of value. Mere interest without application, mere assent without amendment—for such a man I can do nothing whatever” (IX, 23). Even though one may be willing to follow advice, only advice that is applied is important—otherwise, advice has no impact.

Third, because of the worry over being unable to carry out one’s words, boasting and exaggerating, together with other forms of extravagant speech, are especially to be avoided because “he who speaks without modesty will perform with difficulty” (XIV, 21).⁶ In giving advice to one of his students who had a loose tongue, Confucius said that a virtuous man is one who is hesitant in his speech (XII, 3). Soothill (1968) notes: “The good man is not demonstrative, hence his hesitancy in speech … which forms one feature of moral character” (p. 562). Because Confucius emphasized the correspondence between words and actions, if one is unable to perfect linkage, one should simply refuse to say anything. Hence, being hesitant in speech is one way to cultivate virtue (Mao, 1988, p.185). One the other hand, being sincere in carrying out one’s words constitutes only the first step toward humanity. When asked what constitutes a scholar, Confucius replied that the most important factor is a sense of shame, the next being filial and fraternal, and the next being “sincere in what they say and carrying our what they do” (XIII, 20).

Fourth, the relative importance of words and deeds can be seen in the nature of things. Universal principles manifest themselves directly for human beings to contemplate, and for this reason, words may not be important at all. Unfortunately, few people understand the depth of universal principles; rather, they treat language as the only means to acquire truth. This point is exemplified in the following story. “I wish I could do without speaking,” Confucius said. “If you do not speak, Sir,” asked Tzu-Kung, “what should we disciples pass on to others?” Confucius replied, “What speech foes Heaven have? The four seasons run their courses and all things flourish, yet what speech does Heaven have?” (XVII, 19). To this, Soothil (1968, p. 842) translates the commentary as follows: “So every motion of the Sage was a revelation of his profound Truth and essential rectitude, indeed [a manifestation of] Heaven itself, and why wait for speech to see him revealed.” The sage wished to model himself after Heaven; for this reason, “it is no wonder that Confucius said very little about the Way of Heaven; he simply preferred to follow Heaven’s example and remain speechless on the subject (Liu, 1996, p. 94). Confucius set up examples through his own conduct rather than his words. The discrepancy in recognizing the importance of language in searching for universal principles between Confucius and his students explains why Confucius is considered as the Master (Fung, 1983).

Words are but an imperfect means through which one gets in touch with the world; they are used to compensate for the inability of the human mind to comprehend Heaven’s teaching through the manifestation of things. The words of the sage serve to lead people to the fundamental realization of the universe, which then serves as a model for them to emulate. Hence, the superior person stands in awe of the words of sages, whereas the inferior person insults the words of sages (XVI, 8). Here we see the interconnection among moral development, words, and the principles of the universe. When one is able to observe and contemplate the world directly and comes to understand the universal principle, Tao (the Way), and to act in accordance with it, words are simply not necessary.⁷

For Confucius, language stands at the nexus between human affairs and the universe. If the universe can manifest itself through the multiplicity of extant things and if actions can speak for themselves, one often need not bother with words. It is unfortunate that such an elevated view of language is almost never encountered in current literature which focuses primarily on the easily observed aspects of language and words in Confucian societies, too frequently concluding that unwillingness to speak results from the overwhelming effects of social structure.

Appropriate Speaking Relies on Rules of Propriety

Because speaking has such strong moral connotations, use of language, for Confucius, is not simply an external act following a rigid moral code, but must accord to one’s own heart and the cultivation of virtue (Creel, 1960). This attention to the human mind can be refined by attending to li, the rules of propriety, which are based on human emotion and the principles of Heaven and Earth (Fung, 1983). Observation of human emotion in turn leads to appropriate speaking according to different situations and relationships.

According to Fung (1983), “All the rules for everything pertaining to human conduct may be included under the terms of li” (p. 68). It is only through li that one learns to be a superior person, someone able to carry li into practice by genuine nature (Fung, 1983). Li is the basis of human-heartedness (jen). When asked what is jen, Confucius contended that to restrain oneself to respond to propriety (li) is the essence of jen, and that without li, one has no way to establish oneself (XVI, 13). Hence, words should be employed to keep away from vulgarity and impropriety (VIII, 4). Confucius further elaborates four aspects of human conduct that must be in accord with li: looking, listening, speaking, and moving (XII, 1). Cultivation of virtue must come from one’s seemingly insignificant everyday conduct (Mao, 1988), including speaking and behaving.

Li arises from human emotion; hence, one’s speech much also correspond to what is appropriate according to human emotion. Propriety implies that the speaker needs to be attuned to emotional concerns relating to the other and flexible in appreciating different contexts.

Because a major focus in Confucianism lies in delineating interpersonal relationships, it is important to see how the content of speech varies according to different types of relationship. For example, although people may consider frankness as expression of sincerity, Confucius contended that frankness without rules of propriety will lead one to rudeness (VIII, 2), and hence be against human emotion. One well-known example is Confucius’s contention that a son aggressively criticizing his father for misconduct is not upright because such behavior is against human nature (XIII, 18). Given the emotional tie between the father and son, it is only natural for a father to conceal the misconduct of his son, and the son do the same on behalf of his father. “Mutual screening between father and son is the highest law of Nature, and of humanity” (Soothill, 1968, p. 632). Fung (1983) explains that “the son either wished to get the name of uprightness through sacrificing his father, or lacked feeling toward his father. Hence this could not be true uprightness” (p. 67). Uprightness must be expressed in a refined or cultured way: “Love of straightforwardness without a love to learn finds itself obscured by warped judgment” (XVII, 8).

Talking is a form of politeness as well as an exhibition of “being cultured.” In serving superior people, Confucius contends that appropriate speaking depends on the right timing. There are three kinds of errors regarding speaking: speaking before the time to speak, not speaking when it is time to speak, and speaking without observing the superior man’s countenance (XVI, 6). One of the virtues discussed in the Analects is to speak only at an appropriate time so that people will not be tired of one’s talk (XIV, 14). Because the superior man is serious in showing respect toward his own conduct, even in boarding a carriage, he does not talk hastily (X, 17). While eating and while in bed, Confucius did not speak (X, 8). Only by so doing did Confucius feel in accord with etiquette (Fung, 1983).

To speak appropriately, one must have the flexibility to attend to different situations and different types of relationships. For example, in his village, Confucius talked with simplicity and humbleness as if he had not gifts of speech, whereas in the ancestral temple or at the Court, he expressed himself readily and clearly (X, 1). In the village, one interacted with relatives and friends, so that there was no need to speak fluently, whereas in the places such as Court or temple—the source of law—where things must be placed in discrete order, it was necessary that talk be precise, ready, clear, and specific, though spoken with a reserved manner (Legge, 1985, p. 244; Mao, 1988). In talking to people of different ranks, Confucius also conducted himself differently: He was free and straightforward when talking to officers of lower rank, affable and precise when talking to officers of higher rank, and when the Prince was present, he conducted himself respectfully and with self-possession (X, 2). An Analects passage by Tzu-Hsia well describes Confucius himself: “The superior man varies from three aspects. Seen from a distance he appears stern, when approached he proves gracious, as you listen to him you find his language firm and serious” (XIX, 9). Here the emphasis is placed on the meaning and spirit of the social forms rather than simply on the outer form and manner of expression. It is imperative that “a man must have a sincere genuineness before he may practice ceremony and etiquette” (Fung, 1983, p. 66).

It should be noted that Confucius himself does not argue against people who are gifted at speech. In one chapter (XI, 2), for example, gifts of speech are considered to be an accomplishment⁸ of one of his students. In another chapter (V, 7), Confucius points out that one student—who was famous for his knowledge of rules of ceremony, particularly relating to dress and conversational intercourse (Legge, 1985)—could be employed to converse with guests, even though he did not know whether this student could be said to have perfect virtue. Although Confucius argued against beautiful words because they lack sincerity as their foundation, he viewed speaking appropriately and adjusting to different situations and relationships as a gift. Speaking itself is not against the perfect virtue of jen; it is only when words uttered do not accord to humanity that words should be condemned. Appropriate speaking in accordance with moral development is to be highly esteemed.⁹

This flexibility in speaking according to different kinds of situations is especially important when one must deal with a disordered world. “When order prevails in the nation, one may be bold in speech and bold in action, but when the nation is disordered, one may take bold action and should lay restraint on one’s speech” (XIV, 4). Soothill’s (1968) translation of Chu Hsi’s commentary on the Analects notes that “the man of honour must hold his convictions unshaken, but there are times when to escape calamity he may not dare to express himself freely” (p. 652). Legge (1985) notes, “What one does must always be right; what one feels need not always be spoken—a lesson of prudence (p. 315). Mao (1988) explains:

When accused of being glib by reclusive Taoists, Confucius replied, “A glib talker I would not dare to be, and I should hate to be obstinately immovable” (XIV, 34). To Confucius, what is more important is to help the nation restore order, a process in which language plays a significant role. So long as one’s external expression matches inner genuineness, speaking cannot be faulted. Thus, the Confucian ideal of speaking must be viewed as active and oriented toward the world.¹⁰ The discriminating application of rules for speaking is not what is conventionally considered “playing different games in different situations.” One’s ability to adjust to different contexts effortlessly is a stage achieved only after a life-long learning process.

Although many investigators have often sought explanations for Asian communication behaviors in the presumed influence of Confucian relational hierarchy, conceptions of relational hierarchy remain very narrowly defined. Instead of a flexible social mechanism attuned to different degrees of emotion and situational factors (as articulated by the Analects), scholars tend to construe relational hierarchy as culturally imposed rules clearly spelling out how people of different relations ought to behave toward each other. This not only distorts Confucianism, it also, in general, reinforces mistaken assumptions about how rules are used to guide social actions, whether in language use or otherwise.

Rethinking Attitudes Toward Language and Words in Confucian Societies

Recapturing the Confucian Vision

The Confucian model treats language use as inextricably tied to the speaker’s moral reasoning and appreciation of varying relationships and situations based on human emotion, viewing language as merely an imperfect means through which individuals convey ideas. To have force, words must be backed by a highly developed moral character. If one’s morality—including one’s sincerity, truthfulness, genuine state of mind, and ability to follow propriety—has been appropriately developed, one should be able to formulate messages naturally and spontaneously, and these words will affect others regardless of the form in which they are expressed. Confucius reasoned that words will be effective not because one is able to articulate language to construct images but because listeners will naturally be moved (persuaded) by the virtue of speakers.

Confucius held that one must not be oriented exclusively toward the self but must be cognizant of the presence of others who occupy various social positions. For Confucius, the personal and the social are not two conflicting categories: It is the integration of the two that constitutes the foundation of any individual’s morality. More important, the ability to integrate the personal and the social in one’s use of language represents not merely constraints imposed by the social rules but also the possibility to achieve understanding of the infinite multitude of possible interpersonal connections and the social fabric they weave. Indeed, the effective communicator is someone who can prioritize actions ahead of words, who appreciates contexts and relationships, and who need to be a particularly fluent speaker. The goal is to refine the language one uses not simply because society formally dictates it but because the formal language itself carried the spirit of social complexity as constituted in the diverse relationships among those who occupy various social roles.

Problems of Current Interpretation

Although links established in scholarly literature between Asian attitudes towards words and Confucianism (in all of it admittedly considerable complexity) have been valuable, these studies have obviously been limited. As I have shown, among four orientations in the Analects, only one—communication according to different relationships—has been extensively discussed, leaving the remaining three essentially ignored, thus resulting in a distorted picture of the Confucian view of language. This should be particularly troubling to scholars of language and social psychology because the key element in constructing theories of language use in Asian cultures (the Confucian view of language) has been misapprehended—if the key element is misunderstood, then the theory as a whole must be called into question.

Especially problematic is the prevailing view that assumes that indirect forms of communication result from role prescriptions that work at the expense of individual self-expression. This assumption, coupled with a narrow rendering of the Confucian idea of different orders of relationships, paints a picture of Asian use of language as a process plagued by restraint and limitation rather than the product of a sophisticated yet flexible moral reasoning that underpins externally manifested communicative activities. This interpretation—laden with Western value judgments—prevents us from developing better theories to account for language attitudes and behaviors in Confucian societies. Specifically, there are five problems with current interpretation.

The first problem may be one of scholarly priorities. By foregrounding the collectivist metaphor (with associated concepts of situational orientation and social harmony), scholars have subordinated the complete Confucian view.¹¹ Under the powerful influence of the idea of collectivism—particularly as opposed to individualism—scholarly have favored a structural view of Confucian societies that ignores the role of the individual. The harder one tries to differentiate individualism and collectivism, the easier it is to conclude that collectivist (that is, nonindividualist) cultures use language in collectivist ways—that is, according to the dictates of external rules and constraints.

As King says, “[T]he fundamental weakness of the structural conception of Chinese society lies in its failure to recognize that the individuals who comprise the society have selves, which are particularly stressed, as shown above, in Confucian ethics” (King, 1985, p. 60). Countering the widespread view that Confucius emphasized collectivist values, King (1985) offers the notion of “self-centered voluntarism” (p. 57) to show how central Confucian ethics are to Chinese cultures. Triandis (1995) notes that “when reading Confucius … one is struck by the extent to which some of his statements urged people to be individualists” (p. 21). By putting individual speakers back into analyses of language in Confucian societies, we will be better able to construct theories not merely about how social structure influences language but also how people use discourse relevant to their moral judgments to create and reconstruct their social identities.

A second problem, closely related to the structural interpretation of Confucian views of language, comes from assuming that social position is incompatible with individual will. Assuming this, scholars conclude that if culture does not emphasize individual free will, it must emphasize control through social position. This dichotomous thinking is a problem not only with cross-cultural research but also with studies of social cognition and language use. Harré (1981) sees this separation of individual and society as problematic: “Not only is much of our social knowledge socially located, but … some very important cognitive processes are not inner and private, but public and collective” (p. 212).

Confucius, too, refused to see society as opposed to the individual. As King (1985) says, “Confucians focus on the organic relationship between the individual and society and consider the two inseparable and interdependent … the problem is that ‘society’ is only vaguely defined, as if the idea of ‘group’ if one is referring to a unit larger than the family” (p. 57). Although the current consensus is that Confucian values emphasize the in-group, the concept of ‘in-group”—at least for the Chinese—is not precisely defined (Chang & Holt, 1991; King, 1985; Ward, 1968).¹² Surprisingly, whereas scholars acknowledge that, in the main, individuals are central in producing social discourse, theories of language use in Confucian societies generally ignores the significance of the individual. This leads theorists to disregard the complexity of language behaviors in such cultures and thereby to miss the most noteworthy linguistic achievements of their people.

The connections between individual and society, actualized by dynamic, ever-expanding webs of relationships enacted by those in Confucian cultures, engenders an expressive and sophisticated discourse not confined by but integrating social rules. Although current thinking suggests that in using language, speakers should strive to go beyond social rules—to break out of limitations implied by social structure—the Confucian attitude suggests that the ability to integrate social rules with socially enacted language represents a higher level of development that must be seen as less, not more, limited. In accounting for differences between Confucian and non-Confucian societies, we need to look not at differences in how much members’ language behaviors are controlled by social rules but how social rules can be actualized differently through language use in Confucian and non-Confucian cultures. We would do well to heed Robinson and Giles (1990), who suggest that research needs to “be open-minded and careful in the application of models derived in one culture when attempting to export them to others” (p. 4). If we can jettison the Western conception that individual will and social positioning are incompatible, we stand a better chance of gaining new insight into language behavior in Confucian cultures.

A third problem is the exclusion of moral character from discussions of language use in Confucian societies. As we have seen, Confucius viewed communication according to different orders of relationships as manifesting moral character, a lifelong developmental process through which one learns to let emotion express itself naturally. It is essential, then, to take the moral element into account when constructing theories about language use in Confucian societies. Current accounts limit communicative activity in Confucian cultures only to what society dictates should be said and how, leaving unaddressed questions of how speakers in these cultures, despite relational prescriptions, use sophisticated reasoning that builds on and refines the internal moral foundation.

An example will serve to illustrate. The fact that Chinese, more than Westerners, avoid direct confrontation in conflict situations has less to do with avoidance of conflict to protect social harmony than with the belief that if the conflicting parties are sincere toward each other, the conflict will be resolved in the course of events, without the necessity for conflicting parties to bring up the matter themselves. Moreover, emphasis may be placed on self-examination and self-development before expressing one’s own viewpoint, particularly when criticizing the other party. Scholars attempting to theorize about this communicative context (ubiquitous throughout Confucian cultures) are apt to mistakenly conclude that role constraints prevent expression of dissatisfaction toward the other party.

A fourth problem in the current view lies in assuming that personal freedom is the essence of the ability to reason and formulate messages (as implied by the widespread applications of theories about elaborated code and low-context communication). Assuming this, scholars conclude that because it restricts personal freedom, the Confucian dictum that language be used simply to convey ideas without ornamentation is, in either a mental or a social sense, limited.

Confucius said that those who focus too much on linguistic embellishment lose the ability to cultivate themselves internally. Those who utter words lacking in substance are morally deficient. Thus, elaborated code, particularly if unsupported by the speaker’s morality or actions, is condemned as merely an expression of meaningless linguistic ornamentation. In theorizing about language use in Confucian societies, scholars should realize that it is possible that restricted speakers may simply be unwilling to use language to create a reality that exceeds what they perceive as their level of internal development.

In other words, theoretical explanations of observed divergence between language use by members of Confucian and non-Confucian cultures may not lie in personal freedom or creativity but rather in another variable, perhaps relating to whether people in Confucian societies consider language use necessary. Scholars should look for causes not solely in the broader social structure but also in the conversants’ subjective assessment of the need to speak.

This distinction is particularly important because Confucius saw actions as more important than words—actions speak for themselves. Confucius repeatedly says that words or messages can be done away with if suitable action has occurred. At the very least, there must, in the Confucian ideal, be a match between words and actions. Indeed, one of the ultimate goals of Confucian philosophy is to contemplate the principles of the universe without even using words. It is misguided to assume that Confucianism affects Asian societies either by influencing them to dispense with words as merely as way to avoid disruption of social harmony or else as a helpless bending to the power of omnipotent hierarchical interpersonal structure. In fact, it should now be clear that the emphasis on external formality devoid of substance is the last thing Confucius would advocate.

The final problem with the current view comes from the tendency to explain Confucianism retroactively after analyses about language behaviors in Confucian societies have been made (see Wheeler et al., 1989). The assumption is that what is observed in Confucian societies reflects what was taught by Confucius. Without understanding the complexity of Confucian philosophy, observed communication practices in Confucian societies are likely to be labeled rigid and constraining, compared to the Western ideal of the expressive, free-willed speaker. By tying such practices back to Confucian philosophy, the belief that Confucian values emphasize primarily relational hierarchy and social harmony are reaffirmed.

Although social and political reality in various Asian nations may result in negative interpretations of Confucianism¹³ (Liu, 1996), insights about speaking and words in the Analects are far more complex, provocative, and interesting than is suggested by current accounts. If we are to construct appropriate theories about language use in Confucian cultures, we must know whether we are making judgments based on hidden Western cultural assumptions or on valid premises that permit us to conduct further analysis.

To appropriately theorize about the Confucian view of language—and perhaps more importantly, how language is used in modern-day Confucianist cultures—one must appreciate the full scope of Confucian perspectives on human emotion, the role of emotion plays in different orders of relationship, the cultivation of virtue and moral character, the coordination of form and substance, the establishment of society, and the overall view of the universe. It is only through such in-depth understanding of the philosophical roots and worldviews of Asian cultures that one can come to understand the meaning of Asian communication.

Epilogue

The semantic dimension of speech (its relation to issues of moral development, need for action, and sense of self) must be explored before venturing into analysis of language behavior in Confucian societies. Because research into the subtle and sophisticated elements of Confucius and Confucianism and their effects on Asian communication have thus far been so narrowly constricted, in the following, I offer a few suggestions concerning theoretical and methodological questions that might be addressed by scholars in the future.

First, how are roles structured and what are their levels of complexity, as understood by speakers of Confucian societies? What precisely are the relations between role hierarchy and these speakers’ language behaviors? Although it is true that role relationships in Confucian societies are important in fashioning verbal strategies, the causal connection between the role hierarchy and constrained verbal style cannot be taken for granted.

It is important for scholars to be sensitized to the true referents of the generic term role as applied to people of Confucian cultures and how they use this referent to construe their linguistic performances. One could examine the range of manifestations of hierarchical relationships in these societies by examining recorded descriptions in a standard anthropological database such as the Human Relations Area Files. Once the complexity of role hierarchy is understood, scholars will then be in a better position to examine the impact it might have on language behavior. Discourse data on actual conversations of people in Confucian societies should be analyzed to determine how the variable “role hierarchy” relates to the variable “verbal style.”

Second, other than structural variables such as role hierarchy, what are some other variables that could account for language behavior in Confucian societies? When analyzing speech behaviors in Confucian societies, account must be taken of other influencing variables. Instead of focusing on role hierarchy as the sole predictor variable for speech behavior, scholars may find it fruitful to introduce individual-level variables such as moral reasoning or emotional consideration either as additional independent variables or as intervening variables to account for language behavior. These variables might be operationalized by asking respondents to generate statements about moral qualities and emotional consideration associated with a specific speech or conversational event and to use these to analyze that event’s degree of complexity. It is quite possible that moral reasoning and emotional consideration may prove better predictors for speech behavior than role hierarchy.

Third, apart from commonly used constructs such as collectivism, social harmony, and social orientation, are there alternative ways to describe key features of Confucian societies? Scholars must be dissuaded from giving unjustifiable preference to collectivist metaphors such as social harmony in explaining Confucianism because they fail to adequately account for the subtleties—particularly with respect to the individual’s central place—in the Confucian view of communication. One way to do this would be to propose alternative metaphors (in the manner of the “generative metaphors” suggested by Schön, 1979) to account for conversational behavior in Confucian societies (Chang, 1996). As Schön (1979) notes, when metaphors (such as collectivist metaphors) become exhausted from overuse, it is only by introducing fresh, generative metaphors that productive discussion can be reengaged and new insight acquired. For example, if scholars were to describe Confucian societies as emphasizing moral orientation, they would be more likely to acknowledge speakers’ active contributions to communicative performance, and not simply as responding to demands of society. This would provide an alternative picture of language behavior in Confucian societies.

Of course, these possibilities only skate the surface of what can be done. The point is that a first step—that of recognizing that what we think we know about Chinese communication and its “Confucian” roots is limited—has now been taken. It is up to scholars of language and social psychology to carry this initial step forward to a new understanding of communication in both Asian and Western cultures.

Notes

1.Several examples from data collected in Taiwan illustrate how Confucian ideas surface in people’s speech or conversation. In commenting on why it is not necessary to communicate complaints to one’s relational partner, a male respondent said, “Life is like a silent movie,” in that much of what is going on is understood without need for verbal explanations. This comment reminds us of Analects passage XVII, 19, in which Confucius wonders why Heaven has any need to speak. In another example, a female informant evaluated the Dale Carnegie course in the following terms: “It’s better to talk to your parents about these suggestions, because they have sincerity.” Th is echoes the Confucian teaching that words lacking internal foundation are merely external ornamentation. Finally, in interviewing many Taiwanese people regarding whether they should make clear to others what they have done for them, most said it would not be necessary. Almost unanimously, they said, “As long as you try your best, people will know who you are.” This statement reflects the Confucian ideal of the person “who wishes to be slow in speech but earnest in actions” (IV, 24).

2.Creel (1960) notes that Analects was “not written by [Confucius] but in the main composed near his own time and on the basis of traditions preserved by his disciples” (p. 111).

3.One exception is Oliver (1971), whose approach is rhetorical rather than socio-psychological.

4.Similarly, Chen and Chung (1994) identify the following as indicative of Confucian influence on communication in organizations: (a) explicit communication rules, (b) complementary relationships, (c) in-group/out-group distinction, (d) intermediaries, (e) vague boundaries between personal and public relationships, and (f) similar communication contexts (p. 100).

5.In ancient China, only men were allowed the opportunity to study. The Confucian notion of the “superior man” also refers to women. Moreover, because all of Confucius’s students were male, the translation of Analects adopts the male pronouns he and him in light of the sociohistorical circumstances in which the text was composed.

6.Book XIV, chapter 21 of Analects has alternative interpretations. Mao (1988), for example, explains this chapter in the following terms: “For a person who is not ashamed of his words, his daily conduct will not be easy” (p. 222). Only if one can face his or her consciousness, can one relate to other people. Such a spiritually elevated state is difficult to attain if the person does not practice virtue in his or her everyday life.

7.This thesis is shared by Confucius with other important figures. Such as Lao-Tzu, in classical Chinese philosophy (see Fung, 1983).

8.The four subject matters mentioned in this chapter—virtue, language, political affairs, and literature—were later called the “four classes” of the Confucian school (Legge, 1985; Mao, 1988). It is interesting to note that language is one of these four classes.

9.Perhaps this is what distinguishes Confucius from the Taoists, who hold that language is more often than not misleading. Taoists exhibit a distaste for language in general, viewing it as an imperfect means of communication. Confucius does not agree with this position.

10.Confucius aimed for balance between internal and external. While maintaining personal virtue, one must also take care of the external world. For Confucius, this meant “looking upon all the worlds as one family, and on China as one person, and he could never for a day forget this” (Soothill, 1968, p. 706).

11.Because Confucian ideals appear to be irreconcilable with Western conceptions, these ideals were subsumed under the umbrella of the collectivist metaphor so that conflicts in cultural values between Confucianism and other perspectives can be resolved (see Xiao, 1995).

12.The Chinese concept of chia (home or family), for example, can be extended to include members of a lineage, people who share same interests, and in fact, any person whom another person wants to include. It depends on the individual who serves as the center of a given role relationship (King, 1985).

13.Scholars have pointed to the distinction between Confucian values and Confucianization (as occurred in the case of Chinese) and to the need to take into account historical factors underlying the development of Confucianism (Chang, 1976; King, 1985). King contends that in the Confucian value system, the five cardinal relations were symmetrical. It was through Hsiao Ching that the concept of filial piety became the center of the Chinese ethics system, resulting in asymmetrical relationships that denied recognition of the independent existence of the individual. With further institutional support, Chinese laws underwent a Confucianization that upheld the hierarchical harmony of the family as an unquestioned value. Simply put, problems come from trying to superimpose a governmentally convenient hierarchy onto an essentially unhierarchical philosophical system. Liu (1996) also argues that there are three possible ways to understand Confucianism: as philosophical insights, as a political ideology, and as a storehouse of popular values (p. 111).

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