SECTION IV
Hazard and emergency management concepts for the future
CHAPTER 11
Foundations and principles of emergency planning and management
Introduction
It is certainly the case in the United States, and I suspect in most other parts of the world, that natural and technological hazards are not major concerns to most people – until actual emergencies or disasters occur. The reason for this indifference is easy to understand. In any given year the chance that a specific disaster will affect individual citizens severely is very low. So people do not worry about what is not likely to happen directly to them. This does not mean that people deny or do not fear the threat of disaster. They certainly do. And if a community-wide emergency occurs, rest assured that they will want be warned, to be informed about what is happening, to have basic services restored, and to have their individual needs met to the extent possible. But this does mean that people tend to think about more immediate problems of daily living, and not community emergencies and disasters. It is also true that public knowledge about most hazards and what to do about them is limited. Thus, sensitizing citizens to unlikely threats requires public education.
The closer we are to those who must deal directly with the immediate problems of disasters – local communities – the more difficult it is to sustain a readiness posture. Disasters are much more likely to be considered problems at the national level because they happen more often and their damages and costs pile up in higher numbers (Wright et al 1979; Rossi et al 1983). So it is not surprising that the push for emergency planning comes from the top down (from national to regional to local levels). But apart from the rare extreme event which captures everyone's attention, disasters occur far less often at local and even regional levels. At these levels, the need for emergency management seems far less compelling; and public support for disaster preparedness is very difficult to sustain.
There is no simple path to effective emergency planning and management. Most of the time, the threat of a disaster cannot compete with everyday issues in motivating local officials, élites in the private sector, and the general public to take action (Rossi et al 1982). The challenge for emergency management is to overcome somehow indifference about disaster planning and preparedness. This chapter offers ideas for responding to that challenge. I will try to communicate what goes on during an emergency situation, the problems that face impacted communities, and then offer some principles of emergency planning and management for dealing with them.
The first part of this chapter highlights two central foundations of emergency management – improvisation and preparedness. Each foundation will be illustrated by an actual emergency situation, as extracted from the archives of the Disaster Research Center (DRC) at the University of Delaware (Kreps 1985, 1989a; Bosworth and Kreps 1986, Saunders and Kreps 1987). These examples show, first, that improvising during an emergency is a basic strength of human communities, and second, that the ability to improvise can be increased by preparing beforehand.
The second part of the chapter offers a set of focused principles of emergency preparedness. I believe that these principles can be applied to any level of government within a society. It is useful to begin by thinking about local communities as initial contexts because it is these areas that typically are impacted the most directly. The principles are based on realism about the disaster environment and the potential of emergency preparedness.
Most of my commentary on the above topics is based on disaster studies in the United States. It is only appropriate, therefore, that I end the chapter with a very simple but important question: how relevant are all of my previous points to the disaster preparedness and response problems of Britain, other developed, and less developed societies? I will assert that the foundations and principles I have discussed are universal. In other words, I propose that societal differences are best seen as matters of alternative settings in which these foundations and principles operate. In taking this position, I try to build on Quaraentelli's (1988) recently published commentary on cross-societal differences as they relate to emergency management.
Foundations of emergency management: improvisation and preparedness
Human communities are threatened by a number of different hazards; emergencies do occur; and so do actual disasters. It is only prudent, therefore, that local leaders know about and prepare for obvious hazards facing their citizens. Emergency preparedness – even if it is only modest – can make an important difference should a disaster take place. Such preparedness should be based on an understanding of what typically happens during these non-routine events.
It is important to emphasise that those having responsibility for emergency management never have to start from scratch. Despite the fact that disasters are non-routine, and regardless of whether preparedness is well developed or not, it is remarkable how adaptive communities and regions can be in meeting disaster-related demands. Thus in thinking about preparing for emergency management, it is important to understand how and why communities are able to adapt so well. Government officials need to know that local citizens, groups, and organisations can and usually do improvise during an emergency. This is a basic strength of human communities. Why? A primary reason, and this is certainly true of the United States and Britain, is that most (including nationally declared) disasters are far less than total in comparison with remaining human and material resources (the impact ratio). This means that impacted communities usually can mobilise quickly through their own efforts and through assistance provided from the outside. This is not to deny that smaller to larger numbers of victims suffer a great deal. That is a given. But the resiliency of individuals and communities in coping with physical harm and social disruption must never be underestimated, regardless of whether the society is highly developed or not. This is not to deny that there are critical problems and needs, particularly when the more rare extreme event occurs. Many if not most of these problems are organisational in character. Offering solutions to them is a major objective of emergency planning and management.
Sometimes during an emergency there has been very little planning for what takes place. In this circumstance improvisation becomes essential. On other occasions preparedness is in evidence, and it clearly makes a difference. A couple of examples from United States disasters, extracted from the archives of the DRC, illustrate the ability to improvise on the one hand, and the role of preparedness on the other. I will present the two examples (the first is adapted from Kreps 1985, pp 52–53 and the second from Bosworth and Kreps 1986, p 702).
The ability to improvise: an example
Flood waters rise over a period of several days in a community and are monitored. Flooding eventually covers much of an urban area and virtually the entire downtown of its major city. There are few deaths or injuries but extensive property damage. Major flood conditions prevail for over a week. Initially the police department is involved in traffic control but that action terminates with the complete inundation of central city streets. Several citizens with boats docked in the downtown area conjointly begin evacuating people from buildings. Their preliminary actions are independent of anything being done by the police department. In fact, police officials note that, at this point, they are looking for something to do. There has been no pre-planning for what follows. Having a few boats of their own, the police coordinate their evacuation action with those of private citizens. The need to evacuate the entire downtown area quickly becomes apparent. A large number of boats from other private owners, the bureau of land management, the fire department, and the military are provided. The latter organisations also offer personnel to drive boats, and some citizen volunteers respond to the same need. By now the majority of police personnel have become involved because they are available, in close proximity, and know where to take evacuees. The following morning, local government leaders declare the downtown evacuation as the responsibility of the police department. This is questioned briefly but then accepted by fire department officials and is further legitimated by state and military officials. The police then quickly develop a rather complex task structure – one that involves location, notification, dispatching, and refuelling of boats, assignment of police to all boats, and coordination of water and ground transportation to move evacuees to shelters. About 5,000 people are evacuated during the next three to four days. The operation is maintained by the police department until the demand is met.
The role of preparedness: an example
Evacuation of a potential floodplain is enacted by a fire department prior to impact. A river runs through a large metropolitan area. A state police unit wires the city fire department with information that the river is at flood level, that flood waters are causing considerable damage upstream, and that flood conditions are expected to reach the city within several hours. A fire department communications operator contacts the fire chief who then puts the department on standby alert. The fire department is schooled in evacuation procedures through pre-disaster preparedness activities. After being notified by the operator, the fire chief goes to the site of the initial city police command post and informs police personnel of his intention to evacuate low-lying manufacturing and residential areas of the city. Following this discussion there is agreement that the fire department will handle the evacuation of selected low-lying areas. Upon receiving additional information from the local police and water departments, the chief decides to divide the fire department's equipment and personnel into two sections, one on each side of the river, to ensure an adequate distribution of resources for both evacuation and fire protection. Working through the normal chain of command, he orders fire personnel to mobilise and relocate people and possessions below a certain level (the 1,000 feet map contour) from the bank on each side of the river. Fire department personnel and equipment are then deployed according to the chiefs dictats. While the threatened population already has been warned of flooding via the mass media, fire department personnel move door-to-door in order to evacuate all residents in the selected lowlands. There is sufficient time prior to flooding to both evacuate those threatened and recheck the areas covered. Several threatened individuals choose to remain, arguing that they must protect or secure their property. Some of those who remain are stranded. The evacuation of those stranded by high water is then accomplished by using fire department boats. As conditions become more severe, larger boats are requested by the fire department and several are volunteered. The evacuation is terminated shortly after impact when all those stranded have been successfully evacuated. In the face of considerable property damage, there are no deaths or serious injuries resulting from the flood.
In reviewing each of the above two cases, we should consider the following questions. Was the operation organised? Could the operation have been handled in another way and, if so, would it have made any difference? Comparing the two operations raises another question. Which one of them was more effective?
I believe that both operations evidence functioning organisations. The first is partially created during the crisis, while the second clearly exists prior to the event. Both organisations are responding to similar demands of flood situations. Both organisations have legitimated domains. The necessary human and material resources are mobilised. There are clear understandings about who is going to do what and how at some point in the process. Looked at on its own terms, each operation appears to be quite successful. The ability to improvise is a key reason for success in the first operation. Pre-disaster preparedness is a key reason for success in the second. So arguably, we have two distinct paths to success: improvisation and preparedness.
The operations are, indeed, similar in important ways. At the same time, I think there are some subtle differences worth mentioning. These differences could become very important in more severe circumstances. While I consider both operations to be successful, there are grounds for evaluating the second one as superior. Consider these differences. There is less confusion about who is going to be responsible in the second operation. The mobilisation of key resources is faster and easier in the second operation. Finally, the second operation is arguably better able to improvise as conditions change because of greater clarity about what it is doing in the first place. These and perhaps other subtle differences point to the genuine value of disaster preparedness. There is no substitute for experience, of course, but in its absence emergency preparedness becomes an important resource for those having responsibility to protect life and property. The differences probably were not consequential for the conditions described above. But imagine flooding of much greater devastation and scope of impact, where resources would be spread more thinly. Under these circumstances the second evacuation operation would have a greater chance of success, in part because of its firm foundation in preparedness.
My general argument is that effective emergency management requires both improvisation and preparedness. Absent the former and emergency management loses flexibility in the face of changing conditions. Absent the latter and emergency management loses clarity in meeting essential disaster related demands. Equally important, improvisation and preparedness go hand-in-hand. One need never worry that preparedness will become so rigid as to decrease the ability to improvise. Quite the opposite, the very effort to prepare, even if it is only modest, increases the ability to improvise (Bosworth and Kreps 1986). These two central foundations of emergency management truly are two sides of the same coin.
Principles of emergency planning and management
Emergency preparedness means getting ready for crises that may not occur. Efforts must be made to anticipate possible impacts of a range of different hazards and to develop counter-measures to neutralise or soften these impacts. People have to be warned, protected, and cared for if they become victims. Emergency personnel and volunteers have to be mobilised to meet a variety pre- and post-disaster needs. All of this involves preparedness, the goal of which is the rapid restoration of normal routines. While disaster plans deal with specific problems and needs, I think it is useful to begin by talking about principles of the preparedness process itself. Many could be offered, but I think the following are among the more important (see Dynes et al 1972).
Prepardness and improvisation are central foundations of emergency management
To prepare is to organise for emergency response prior to an event. What does that mean? It means that various domains of responsibility (such as warning, evacuation, damage assessment, and other emergency management functions) are identified and assigned to social units capable of performing them. It means that how these domains are going to be performed has been worked out in at least a preliminary way. It means that the people and material resources needed to get the job done are available and can be mobilised quickly. Simply put, it means that there is clarity about what is needed, what is to be done, and how it will be done.
To improvise is to organise for emergency response during an event. What does this mean? It means that various domains of responsibility and how they are to be performed may have to be worked out on the spot. It means that people and material resources may have to be moved around because there are too many in some locations and not enough in others. It means that some confusion about appropriate courses of action is inevitable because conditions and needs can change quickly during the emergency period. Simply put, it means that those involved recognise the need for flexibility and know that if need be, there is more than one way to get the job done. Improvisation is not the opposite of preparedness; it goes hand in hand with it!
Preparedness is a continuous process
The development of a written plan at a specific point in time is only a small part of the total process. Thus it is a serious mistake to assume that preparedness is complete when a written document has been produced. Plans need to be kept up-to-date, and changed to meet new conditions and requirements. A totally out-of-date plan may be worse than no plan at all if time is wasted trying to put it to work.
Preparedness reduces unknowns during an emergency
The goal is to anticipate problems and project possible solutions. It is not so much preventing disasters from happening in the first place – which is very hard to do – but rather softening their impacts on the physical and social environment. By isolating the range of problems that might occur, and possible solutions to them, preparedness reduces the uncertainty of emergencies. Preparedness does not eliminate uncertainty, a false quest if there ever was one – but it reduces uncertainty. There is no question that no matter how well-prepared you are, the unexpected will still occur. But as noted in the first principle, preparedness increases the ability to deal with uncertainty.
Preparedness is an educational activity
The people involved in emergency response must learn the disaster plans if they are going to work. So a good deal of education must go on. Those in charge of emergency preparedness must be conversant with anticipated problems and solutions, then teach other individuals, groups, and organisations what their respective roles will be during an emergency. The emergency planner is also a trainer, one who teaches those likely to be involved in a disaster what is expected of them. Once again, the written plan cannot just sit there on the shelf. It has to be put to work for the people who may have to implement it later.
Preparedness is based on knowledge
Anticipating problems and solutions requires accurate knowledge. Emergency managers must know the difference between myths and reality in preparing for a disaster. Popular conceptions about how people and communities respond to disasters usually centre on themes of personal and social breakdown. When disaster strikes, the massiveness of impact is assumed, and so are the weaknesses of victims and the inability of impacted communities to cope on their own. Most of these popular conceptions are either patently false for a range of natural and technological disasters, as well as more massive wartime disasters, or they have to be specified very carefully (Perry and Lindell 1978, Bolin 1986, Green 1986).
Table 11.1 summarises both popular misconceptions and what are more realistic implications for emergency planning and management. Perhaps the general point is that most peacetime disasters – and certainly those in larger or more industrialised societies like the United States and Britain – are far from massive in comparison with what remains in local human and material resources (the impact ratio). Generally victims are able to cope and communities mobilise quickly through their own efforts and through recovery assistance provided from the outside. This is not to say that people do not suffer both physically and mentally and that there are not needs and problems. But it is to say that emergency managers, and others responding to disasters and emergencies, must know the difference between real problems and myths.
Preparedness evokes appropriate actions
Education and knowledge about what really happens during an emergency evoke more appropriate responses. Effective preparedness can build on that education and knowledge base to increase efficiency and effectiveness of responding groups and organisations. Planning is sometimes seen as a way to increase the speed of response in an emergency. Speed is important in some areas, but appropriateness of response is a far more important goal of planning than speed. For example, it can be assumed that local groups and organisations will mobilise quickly (with or without planning) to respond to the most immediate needs of victims. The disaster environment often appears as a bewildering array of interlocking social units, as new groups emerge, and existing organisations take on responsibilities that are sometimes quite different from their normal ones. The emergency manager is cautioned not to conclude that what is happening is disorganised, or that it must somehow be rigidly controlled. To the contrary, what takes place arguably is natural and necessary. In the early emergency period, a more appropriate planning objective is to ensure that valid information about shorter- and longer-term needs is generated as soon as possible. That takes time because the earliest estimates are usually less reliable than more delayed ones. From a preparedness standpoint, damage assessment is every bit as important as damage control.
Resistance to emergency procedures is a given
The value of preparedness is neither self-evident nor readily endorsed by local officials or the public at large. There are many reasons for this situation. A major one I alluded to earlier is that the probability of disaster is not that high at the local level, so why worry about it. Another is the mistaken assumption that if need be civilian disasters can be handled by a command and control model or through direct military intervention. So again, why worry about them. Another reason is overconfidence: some public officials think they already know what to expect and what to do during an emergency, and will be
able to improvise. Another reason is that disaster planning involves diverting resources from other more pressing concerns. Finally, plans are less valuable if they are not updated and there are not periodic dry runs or exercises. These things again involve costs in time, effort, and money. In the absence of push and leadership from public officials, it is not likely that planning efforts will overcome these obstacles (Quaraentelli 1987).
Modest planning is a reasonable goal
Particularly at the local level, a modest degree of preparedness is all that can reasonably be expected unless emergencies occur repetitively. That is why a focus on principles is so important. In developing plans there is a strong temptation to make them very detailed. I would resist that to the extent possible for the following reasons. First, it is impossible to plan for every contingency. Second, situations are changing constantly and specific details quickly become out-of-date. Third, too many details leave the impression that everything is of equal importance and that is clearly not the case. Fourth, a complex and detailed plan is intimidating for most potential users and tends to be ignored. Thus disaster planning, while it cannot neglect details, especially at the organisational level, should be streamlined as much as possible.
Universal relevance of emergency preparedness foundations and principles
Arguably Britain and the United States are quite similar with respect to emergency planning and management. This relates not only to their common status as highly industrialised societies, but also to their common approach to emergencies and disasters. By that I mean the following:
(i) local municipalities have primary responsibility for emergency planning and management;
(ii) regional and national levels provide support services for local municipalities and also have emergency planning and management responsibilities of their own; and
(iii) coordination within and between levels of emergency planning and management remain central concerns.
Thus, notwithstanding obvious differences between the United States and Britain, I believe that the above foundations and principles apply equally to both countries. How they can be put to work is the subject of a related paper (Kreps 1989b). This proposition may be challenged particularly with regard to two broad types of societies – those identified as already developed and those identified as newly developing.
While remaining highly sceptical about global contrasts of developed and developing societies in disaster research, Quaraentelli (1988) recently has identified some potentially important differences between the two general types. I will restate a few of them here for illustrative purposes and, in so doing, suggest some possible implications for disaster planning and management. My hope is to motivate discussion and greater interest in collaborative cross-societal research.
Differences in technical and organisational complexity
Quaraentelli (1988) argues that many developing societies have less of a technical and social infrastructure than is characteristic of most industrialised societies. With respect to emergency management, for example, many developing societies do not have the elaborate and specialised weather service organisations that can be found in the West or Japan. Moreover, they also do not have anywhere near the number or diversity of mass media organisations that exist in the United States, Europe, Japan, or Canada. But the relative absence of modern warning systems does not mean that there are no institutionalised means of alerting people,to the risks they face. It is possible to have rather intricate informal warning networks that reach populations that are, at best, only loosely connected to any mass communication system. Research on these informal systems is needed.
It is also true that most developing countries do not have well-developed medical-health care systems which can be mobilised rapidly to deliver emergency medical services. This certainly does not mean that medical services will be absent following a disaster. But this does mean that the demands for improvising emergency medical care will be much greater. Parallel examples could be developed for other emergency management functions. Certainly technical and organisational differences exist between developed and developing societies. They also exist within these two general types. But the fact of the matter is that emergency management functions will have to be performed regardless. We need to learn more about how that happens from one society to the next.
Differences in behavioural responses
Quaraentelli (1988) argues that similar patterns of response to the threat and occurrence of disaster are most likely at the micro level (individual); and that differences become more apparent as one moves to the macro level (societal). For example, panic flight.appears to be rare among those threatened in any society. Search and rescue activity is carried out primarily by survivors, neighbours, and private citizens (i.e. those immediately on the scene following impact). Local groups and organisations tend not to be overwhelmed by impact; they mobilise rapidly during an emergency, and they improvise as needed. On the other hand, community recovery processes and disaster-related programmes at the national level may vary a great deal.
While similarities and differences can be described from micro to macro levels, I think the needs to which they relate are universal. Thus it is quite appropriate to identify general foundations and principles of emergency management. The fact that these foundations and principles are grounded in studies of peacetime and wartime disasters dating back to World War II (and even earlier) is testimony to their strength. The real problem is one of identifying similarities and differences in whether and how emergency management functions are performed from one society to the next. Comparative research of their performance is therefore essential.
Differences in disaster experience
Quaraentelli (1988) argues that the more experienced communities and societies are with disasters, the better able they are to cope with these unexpected events. There is no substitute for experience – not because it breeds a constant state of readiness, but rather because it leads to the emergence of what has been called a disaster sub-culture. By disaster sub-culture I mean knowledge, attitudes, and practices that allow repetitively threatened populations to adapt more effectively. They become sensitised to the threat and have developed ways of responding to it. While there have been some studies of disaster sub-cultures in the United States (principally in areas threatened repeatedly by riverine flooding), the United States and other industrialised countries are probably not the best place to learn more about them. This is because major disasters of various types occur more frequently in developing societies than in developed ones.
Differences in levels of disaster preparedness
We have come full circle back to preparedness. It is simply wrong to assume that communities in highly industrialised societies respond well to disasters because they are in a continuing state of readiness. They are not. It is more appropriate to say that they are able to improvise and recover quickly because they are rich in resources. In point of fact, disaster preparedness is generally modest at best at the community level in all societies, unless those societies are at war. It is a fact of life that local officials and the public at large are more concerned with the immediate problems of everyday life.
It seems likely that formal preparedness programmes are implemented more widely in industrialised societies because, once again, there are more slack resources to pay for them. Thus relatively fewer identifiable emergency management agencies exist at the national level in developing societies; and as you move from national, to regional, and to local levels the chances of finding them are even less likely. This may mean that developing societies recover less rapidly when disasters strike. The problem with that conclusion is that we do not have systematic comparisons of comparable disasters (say in terms of impact ratios) which would support it. Not only are differences in impacts important to consider, so too are the benchmarks of recovery. It would be quite inappropriate to apply the benchmarks of developed societies to developing ones (Bates 1987).
While the extent of formal disaster preparedness varies greatly, it can and does occur at organisational, community, regional, and national levels. It seems to me that the important issue is not whether developed versus developing societies are better prepared or more adaptive. The need for some kind of preparedness exists in all societies. If developed societies are in fact more prepared, the relevant question becomes what can other societies learn from their experiences? A perhaps obvious, but very important, answer is that preparedness requirements vary by level of government. The range of hazards confronting a given community may be relatively narrow. It is a virtual certainty, however, that in moving from local to national levels of any society the range becomes broader. The disaster management concerns become much greater, and they are somewhat different from that of local communities. In larger communities, it is a good situation when officials of local organisations expected to become involved in emergencies have at least thought about what they are going to do. It is an even better situation when the respective plans (formal or informal) of community organisations have been integrated in some fashion (again formally or informally). Necessary resources can be identified, and perhaps some of them placed on a standby basis. Community coordination and control problems can be anticipated and perhaps discussed. The basic idea is to work toward some kind of a community-wide division of labour to ensure that the kinds of needs outlined earlier are planned for.
Let me repeat, however: an important problem for local emergency planning is that usually disasters do not occur often enough to be a sustained threat. Because of this, emergency preparedness is not a high priority item in community affairs. That is a virtual ‘given’ worldwide. The best that can be hoped for is modest preparedness that is reasonably sustained. In doing that preparedness, community leaders should be sensitive to the kinds of hazards that are more likely to result in emergencies. Fortunately, there are general foundations and principles that can be applied to all hazards. Sensitised to specific hazards, the preparedness approach can and should be general.
Just as it is a good thing for a community's organisations to plan on their own, so is it a good thing for a community's regions to plan on their own. In this sense, encouragement and support from the top down is a very good thing. Once again, moving from community to regional and national levels the range of hazards becomes greater and the preparedness requirements become somewhat different. Central issues for regional- and particularly national-level preparedness programmes are maintaining adequate knowledge, technologies, and resources for identifying and monitoring hazardous conditions, regulating hazard-producing technologies and industries, protecting essential public facilities, and providing support systems for local communities. Thus communities are on the front lines of emergency management while regions and nations are on the front lines of hazard management. The latter requires many more resources, but the resource base to draw on tends to be larger.
In the end, disaster preparedness necessarily involves shared governance (May and Williams 1986). Certainly societies differ along these lines – some national governments exercise greater control over the affairs of regions and localities than others, for example – but dealing with disasters and hazards is as much a down-top process as it is a top-down process. By shared governance I mean at least three things: first, that all levels of government have significant responsibilities for protecting the public; second, that they all have some decision-making roles in some aspect of hazard or emergency management; and third, that they all can have significant influence over what happens prior to, during, and after a disaster event.
It is for these reasons that coordination among national, regional, and local governments becomes very important. Such coordination has to be nurtured, it cannot be assumed or imposed from the top down. If a national government wants to support preparedness initiatives at regional and local levels, it needs to be flexible about how funding can be used. If new programmes are initiated by national governments, then a sense of partnership with regional and local governments needs to be established. And when a local or regional disaster occurs, one that requires involvement of the national government, then the same coordination that exists at the local level must also pertain to intergovernmental relations.
Conclusion
What does emergency planning and management mean? It means to recognise that preparedness and improvisation are central foundations of emergency management. It means to appreciate that there are guiding principles of emergency preparedness and management that can be applied widely. It means to identify emergency preparedness needs that are grounded in the realities of threatened areas and in terms of the specific hazards faced. It means that all societies, developed or developing, face a range of potential disasters, for which modest preparedness can make a difference.
Note
The discussion of foundations and principles in the first section of this chapter is adpated, in part, from the author's forthcoming chapter, ‘Organising for Emergency Management’ in Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer (eds), The Principles and Practice of Emergency Management (Washington, D.C.: The International City Management Association, in press).
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