SECTION V
Conclusions
CHAPTER 18
Improving hazard management and emergency planning
Introduction
In this concluding chapter we draw upon the principal themes of the preceding chapters and section summaries. We also comment upon central issues of hazard management and emergency planning; discuss recent developments in Britain and the European Community; and suggest improvements for the future.
It would be an impossible task to cover every aspect of hazard management and emergency planning. Inevitably and intentionally, therefore, the scope of this volume is limited in a number of ways. First, it has not been possible to discuss hazard management and emergency planning comprehensively. For example, many of the problems of risk communication are not discussed. Another example is the education and training needs of individuals, functional managers and professional and voluntary hazard managers and emergency planners.
Secondly, most contributors confined themselves to conceptual and strategic issues facing hazard managers and emergency planners. Many issues of an operational nature are not discussed. Instead the focus is more upon issues of culture, policy, approach and explanations for these; and promising concepts, principles and techniques for the future. Thus, we have not discussed in any detail important issues surrounding response control and command or coordination structures, the operation of casualty bureaux or methods for dealing with the media.
Thirdly, the volume focuses most closely upon Britain and the hazard management problems here. However, it has been possible to view British hazard management from the perspectives of contributors from the United States, The Netherlands and Australia; and other contributors make comparisons with aspects of hazard management culture in other parts of the world including Norway and English-speaking countries. Many of the principles of hazard management identified in this volume are widely applicable outside Britain, as are the explanatory perspectives.
Fourthly, the volume is concerned primarily with the management of hazards and disasters affecting human beings and communities. However, risks to the environment and environmental disasters which have important, and indeed serious, ramifications for society are also rapidly being recognised as important. The 1986 Chernobyl disaster, the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spillage, the catastrophic effects of oil spills and oil well fires caused in the 1991 ‘Gulf War’, and global warming have made us acutely aware of the need to prevent such disasters and to plan for their possible occurrence.
Lastly, we have adopted an approach to the selection of hazards and disaster types, which views hazards and disasters as generically similar even though they have individual features with specific implications for hazard management. We should be conscious that the range of hazards and disasters could and should be expanded further, for example to include medical ones such as those arising from harmful side-effects of drugs such as the arthritic drug Opren. A characteristic of most of the hazards and disasters considered in this volume (see also Appendix) is that they are ‘rapid-onset’ ones. However, ‘slow-onset’ disasters, such as drought, are equally important and demand attention. In terms of the social explanations for hazards and disasters they may well share many causative processes in common with ‘rapid-onset’ ones.
The social matrix
One of the main points to emerge from preceding chapters is the importance of the ‘social matrix’ in which hazard management and emergency planning is embedded. Hazard management and emergency planning are fundamentally affected by this matrix of ‘pervasive influences’ including political economy, the technological environment and institutional attitudes and culture: these were introduced in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.1).
Lewis introduces the concept of community vulnerability to emphasise the importance context has within hazard and disaster causation, and thus its potentially important place in reducing hazards especially, though by no means exclusively, in poor countries. The condition of society in general, including the way society is structured in relation to access to resources and wealth, is a central explanation of hazard and disaster (Hewitt 1983, Wisner et al 1976).
The influence on hazard management of currently dominant administrative doctrines which pervade government and policies of government is explored by Hood and Jackson. The ‘new public management’ is related to economic and political ideologies which emerged strongly during the Thatcher era. Penning-Rowsell and Handmer (1990, 12) refer to the importance of the ‘enterprise state’ which strengthened during the same period. Many of the elements of this dominant political, administrative and economic culture provide the ‘organisational ingredients’ for the creation of socially-created disasters, causing Hood and Jackson to suggest that this may well be a recipe for future disasters.
The link between rapid technological change and the occurrence of accidents and disasters is an important one, though it is sometimes difficult to trace. New technology is daily adding to the list of disaster agents through the introduction and transport of hazardous chemicals and wastes, through dependence on computers and through the proliferation of high-rise buildings prone to fire. The inability of organisations to upgrade outdated technological systems sufficiently rapidly to keep pace with demand is one example of the difficulties which arise. For example, air traffic over southern England has grown to such an extent that the West Drayton computer system which controls aircraft around Heathrow airport is increasingly unable to provide the necessary level of service. Breakdown of both the main computer and the back-up system has not been uncommon. Also referring to the influential work of Perrow (1984) on high-risk technologies, Jacobs and ‘t Hart characterise mass sporting and leisure events as ‘tightly coupled’ systems similar to those existing in organisations controlling modern technology.
Spooner identifies government and corporate attitudes which he believes are an important part of our disaster management culture which contribute in fundamental ways towards explaining the perpetuation of hazards and the occurrence of disasters in Britain. He characterises these attitudes as neglectful – a criticism echoed by Milne-Henderson. The dominant culture in Britain is one in which there has been slowness to recognise and alleviate or eliminate hazardous conditions. In some cases lessons have not be learnt and acted upon. Action tends to occur after disasters, if at all, as Barrett and Howells point out.
However, we must also remember that ‘pervasive influences’ are two-sided and can be made to work towards reducing exposure to hazards. Political and economic policies which reduce community vulnerability to hazards or successfully encourage individuals to be more self-reliant and resilient to hazards are an example. Central grant-aid subsidy for sea defence and flood protection projects in Britain is a further example. Hazard managers are increasingly seeking ways of employing modern technology to reduce hazards. The use of electronic databases to store and retrieve information, explained by Murray and Wiseman, is yet another example.
The information culture
The effectiveness of hazard management and emergency planning is intimately linked with information culture and information systems. Effective hazard management is only possible if serious attempts are made to maximise information flow. Michael (1982, 9) observed:
From top to bottom, from the present machinery of government to the archives of the past, from silly examples of bureaucratic intransigence to hard cases of law enforcement and national defence, Britain is about as secretive as a state can be and still qualify as a democracy.
Most Western democracies now presume that information should be more or less publicly available unless it comes within a specifically exempted category. This is a philosophy underlying freedom of information legislation. However, in Britain the presumption appears to be that information is secret unless the government decides to release it, and officials frequently feel the need to limit information flow:
Only about half a dozen statutes provide for any form of mandatory disclosure (of information of any sort), compared with the hundred or more prohibiting disclosure (in almost every area of government including the environment and public health and safety) (Ponting 1990, 52).
An important consequence is the relative concentration of power and information within the bureaucracy of central government, at the expense of Parliament. ‘Confidentiality’ is the word preferred to secrecy by the British bureaucracy.
An important reason for secrecy is the protection of commercial interests. For instance, the Financial Services Act 1985 appears to have effectively precluded officials from commenting on dam safety in England and Wales because comments might have adversely affected the share prices for water industry privatisation. Ponting (1990, 52–3) provides additional examples: under the Public Health Act 1936 data relating to ‘any manufacturing process’ are to remain confidential; and the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 prevents disclosure of ‘any information obtained by an inspector operating under the Act’.
Many of Michael's examples concern issues directly related to emergency planning. For example, details of near-miss inquiries in aviation is one of the subjects on which members of Parliament are not allowed to table a Parliamentary question. The existence of this list of prohibited topics was itself kept secret until 1972 (Ponting 1990, 45). Spooner criticises industry for allowing information on known hazards to remain ‘buried in corporate files’ and the attempt to make this a punishable offence through a motion signed by more than half of the members of the House of Commons was quashed by government in 1989. This approach to industrial hazards stands in marked contrast to the ‘right to know’ law of the United States.
As well as commercial secrecy needs and legal controls, information flow is inhibited in Britain, and elsewhere, by a mass of constraints including company loyalty, self-interest, pressures to protect the interests of clients, pressures to protect the reputations of colleagues, the financial imphcations of safety problems, the possibility of infringing conditions of employment, fear of negating employment advancement or of dismissal, fear of media attention, and professional nervousness about accepting responsibility for faults.
For example, Adams (1990) points out that in the British Fellowship of Engineering's draft advice to members on warnings of preventable disasters, there is no reminder that the safety of the public should override other considerations. Adams reports that the Institution of Civil Engineers' Rules of Professional Conduct for Chartered Engineers require engineers who discover faults to pay regard to the dangers of risking damage to the client's interests and the reputation of designers, as well as to public safety. Thus, engineers who identify faults and hazards are confronted by conflicting demands and advice to be circumspect in such situations. The legal liability which engineers may carry is no incentive to be less circumspect. Ultimately engineers and others in similar positions face conflicts between their professional responsibilities and their moral ones.
Managing hazards more effectively
The discussion above makes it clear that a whole host of structural or pervasive influences set the conditions which encourage the perpetuation of hazards and the occurrence of accidents, emergencies and disasters. By contrast, forces counter to these prevailing conditions often appear to be limited in their overall positive effect on hazard management. Analysis and understanding of pervasive influences, including ‘unpicking’ the ways in which they reinforce exposure to hazards, can lead towards policies which will reduce risk as long as there is a willingness by politicians, industrial managers, professionals and others to accord safety a high enough priority. Our contention is that, in Britain at least, this willingness is currently in serious doubt.
In the previous chapter, Pidgeon et al begin to define a corporate safety culture although they admit that this is currently underspecified. The further specification and development of this concept within organisations is a promising avenue for the future. Pidgeon et al define safety culture as a set of norms, roles, beliefs, attitudes and social and technical practices within an organisation which is concerned with minimising exposure to risk. Within organisations they accord a high priority to information flow and feedback from incidents, the employment of risk analysts and safety monitors, the setting of rules which are sufficiently flexible to encourage alertness to initially unseen hazards, and the creation of set of beliefs in which everyone is responsible for safety. Some organisations already adopt elements of corporate safety culture but the discussion on information culture reveals that we still have a long way to go.
Developing emergency planning in Britain
Some contributors to this volume are strongly and openly critical of Britain's current approach to emergency planning and management. Whilst some politicians, civil servants and ‘hazard managers’ would argue that Britain has a clear set of policies for emergency planning and management, as well as largely satisfactory legal and organisational arrangements – we, most of our contributors, many within emergency planning and many others would disagree. To some extent the British approach is characterised by a lack of policies, especially explicit national policies providing unambiguous signals; and legal and organisational arrangements which are flawed in a variety of important ways. Yet despite this there is hope that new developments in what is increasingly being termed ‘civil protection’ hold promise for the future. It is possible to identify the principal features required to place British emergency planning on a sound basis (Table 18.1) (Handmer and Parker 1991, Parker 1991).
The statutory duty issue
With the exception of the duty to prepare off-site emergency plans for certain industrial installations, local authorities do not currently have a statutory duty to produce peacetime emergency plans: this is explained more fully in Chapter 1. There is also no statutory requirement on the emergency services and local authorities to meet regularly to coordinate the execution of peacetime emergency plans. The case for giving local authorities a statutory peacetime emergency planning duty through a new Civil Protection Act is strong and the lack of this duty is currently a major shortcoming.
Given the frequency and scale of peacetime accidents, emergencies and disasters suffered during the past 15 years, local authorities have an important role to play. This role comprises preparing peacetime emergency plans; making strategic plans for cross-boundary emergencies; undertaking rehearsals; supporting the work of the emergency services during the initial stages of a major incident; coordinating and supervising the recovery phase; and providing long-term welfare support to victims.
A number of disasters have emphasised the important role which local authorities play. Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council played an extensive role in responding to the Lockerbie disaster and its aftermath (Mcintosh 1989). Similarly in the 26–27 February 1990 Towyn flood disaster in north Wales when 6,500 people were evacuated from their homes, the local authority played a major role which had to be sustained for many months (Welsh Affairs Committee 1990). Fearns (1978) noted a similarly extensive local authority response following the January 1978 floods in Cambridgeshire.
Given that local authorities have a long-standing statutory duty for war-time planning (civil defence) it makes little sense for them not to have similar duties
in the peacetime emergency planning arena, because an integrated ‘all-hazards’ approach is likely to be the most efficient. The statutory duty for peacetime emergency planning is also necessary in order that adequate financial and human resources are devoted to the role (Table 18.1). Because peacetime emergency planning is not currently a statutory duty it must compete at a distinct disadvantage for scarce council funds and is therefore vulnerable to neglect. Giving local authorities a statutory peacetime emergency planning duty would also help clarify the relevant roles and responsibilities.
The case against giving local authorities a statutory duty is a weak one. It is that many local authorities already fully involve themselves in peacetime emergency planning and have done so for many years – and this is without a mandatory duty to do so. Many councils have been persuaded of the wisdom of extending their civil defence planning to the peacetime case and to provide their own limited resources for this purpose. This approach can be characterised as ad hoc and uncoordinated. Whilst civil defence grant is specifically earmarked for civil defence planning, the Home Office allows some discretion in the use of funds to benefit peacetime planning. Problems arise where councils take a minimalist approach, as some labour-led councils have done in their objection to nuclear war planning. These councils do not engage with any enthusiasm in any civil defence planning thereby effectively undermining the central government's approach.
The case for a local authority peacetime emergency planning statutory duty progressed during 1989 and 1990, and is being pressed by the professional emergency planning bodies. However, during the spring of 1991 wider political, economic and administrative influences surfaced which led to the case being pushed back down the list of government priorities. Once again we see the importance of pervasive influences and context. In the wake of the government's decision to dismantle the community charge (the ‘poll tax’), in April 1991 the government declared its intent to reform local government throughout England and Wales and issued a consultation paper (Department of the Environment 1991). Although the future shape of local government has yet to be determined, the government currently envisages unitary authorities meaning that the current two-tier system of County and District Councils will disappear. Moreover, the government wishes to see continue the transformation of the role of local authorities from ‘providers’ to ‘enablers’. Currently the local authorities are the main providers of services but in the future the government prefers that they have responsibility for securing the provision of services. Within this, central government is committed to local government contracting-out their functions. Local authorities will be responsible for securing for their customers the best services at least cost.
The uncertainties associated with the reform of local government, which are likely to take several years to resolve, will probably further prevent local authorities receiving a statutory peacetime emergency planning duty for several more years at least. With schools ‘opting-out’, local authorities have already been losing control of the resources which they would deploy in disaster response, and this disintegration of control may be taken further reducing the capability of the local authorities to respond to disasters.
At the same time the government is progressing with its civil defence review (a review which is separate from the review of arrangements for dealing with civil emergencies discussed in Chapter 2). Given the important changes which have occurred in Eastern Europe in the past two years, and the decline of the Warsaw Pact, the need for civil defence in Britain may well have changed. The government is seeking a ‘peace dividend’ which may mean that the only area of emergency planning which is currently grant-aided from central government (and which currently makes feasible some peacetime emergency planning) – war-time emergency planning – may be reduced.
The role of central government
The recent role of the Home Office in civil emergency planning was examined in Chapter 2, and in the following chapter Gainsford quoted from a letter to The Times in August 1989 in which the Association of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning Officers and others wrote that the Home Office Review (Home Office 1989) gave them little confidence in central government arrangements for peacetime emergency planning.
The Home Office (1989) Review reaffirmed the government's view that arrangements for civil emergencies should continue to be decentralised with the response being primarily local. This is based upon a long-standing principle that response to problems is often best handled locally and it is, for example, the rationale behind organisational arrangements for flood defence in Britain. It also reflects the military view of the primacy of local decisionmaking units, working within set rules of engagement, in combat situations. Within the literature there is much to commend this approach. Kreps (Chapter 11) also argued that the best structure for emergency planning and management will encourage innovation and adaptive behaviour, or the ability to improvise, thus enabling operational units to work independently without central control which might not be immediately available. A somewhat loose structure should also help avoid ‘groupthink’ (the mode of thought people engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive in-group that serious discussion of alternative courses of action is suppressed) (Janis 1971); and the tendency for bureaucracies to exert strong central control thereby constraining the initiative of operational sections (Britton 1989). Organisational theorists (e.g. Perrow 1984) recognise that centralised organisational structures are most appropriate for organisations which have routine tasks, whereas decentralisation is superior where non-routine tasks must be performed. Of course much of the work of emergency planners and the emergency services is routine, but they exist to deal with events of an unexpected and unpredictable nature.
What then should be the role of central government in peacetime emergency planning and management, and how can the organisation of this role be improved? Following the Review (Home Office 1989) the government confirmed that the central government response to peacetime emergencies would be most effectively carried out by nominated ‘lead departments’ supported where necessary by arrangements for collective discussion under Cabinet Office auspices. The ‘lead department’ approach was tightened up following the Chernobyl radiation leakages in 1986 when there was confusion over which British central government department should take the lead in responding to the contamination and in issuing public advice. The ‘lead department’ role is currently limited to coordinating the response of individual central government departments, briefing Ministers and keeping Parliament and the public informed. Currently, the Home Office is the ‘lead department’ for severe weather emergencies, satellites falling to earth and sports ground incidents.
The effectiveness of the revised lead department’ approach remains to be tested but may well be problematic. A range of central government departments will inevitably be involved in most disasters. Whilst the approach attempts to unify central coordination, central government supervisory responsibility will remain fragmented. There may well be too many sources of decisions and this can easily give rise to public information inconsistencies. An alternative model for central government response is potentially present in Scotland and Wales: the Scottish and Welsh Offices. The problem in England is that there is no ‘English Office’: either the Home Office or the Department of the Environment might take over this role in relation to peacetime emergencies.
In addition to its response during emergencies, central government has an important role to play in emergency planning and in ensuring that the entire emergency planning and management system is effective. Although he is an adviser only, the Civil Emergencies Adviser and his recommendations provide the basis for improvements and the further development of the Home Office guidance on emergency planning is a small step forward (Home Office 1985). Furthermore the Home Office could take a much more active role in the ‘feedback’ phase, by collecting and disseminating information about lessons learned from accidents, emergencies and disasters. This could require increasing the size of the Home Office section dealing with civil emergency planning, as well as changing their attitudes to information sharing and critical review. However, as Handmer (Chapter 16) points out a wider, all-embracing guiding conceptual framework or set of principles emanating from central government and which links prevention, preparedness, response and recovery is likely to be most useful. This is because it would give clear signals about overall philosophy and approach where there is currently a void. It could also provide a framework for the development of coordinated planning across the country.
Inspection and corporate ethics
Public confidence in hazard management in Britain has been rocked by the recent spate of disasters and accidents. The bureaucratically closed approach to information sharing with the public does little to inspire confidence amongst those who have cause to seek information on hazards and amongst the many victims’ organisations. To counter these problems and to tighten up emergency planning, the inspection and audit process needs to be developed and applied to peacetime emergency planning agencies including local authorities when given a statutory duty (Table 18.1).
One avenue here which may fit the government's philosophy is that of self-inspection, inspection by bodies established by industry or by bodies with a close relationship with industry. However, the history of much industrial inspection in Britain does not give much confidence in this approach. It has been one of close relations and cooperation. Major problems with inspectorates are that they are often not independent and are too post-event oriented. Some would assert that even the use of persuasion has been limited, let alone legal action, and that the system has failed to ensure a satisfactory degree of safety. The recent report on the Piper Alpha disaster by Lord Cullen was particularly critical of the lack of independence of the relevant inspectorate. Spooner (Chapter 8) and Cook (1989) document cases where the sense of ethics and corporate responsibility necessary for limited regulation are lacking.
On the other hand a pro-active commission laying down standards and performance criteria, and disseminating information on lessons learned from accidents and disasters would be a positive step.
Trans-boundary coordination
A problem which requires further attention at all scales is the boundary or jurisdictional one (Table 18.1). The importance of this problem was well demonstrated by the Chernobyl disaster and the Sandoz incident in which the River Rhine was contaminated. There are already cooperative arrangements for dealing with civil emergencies between some neighbouring authorities in Britain but cross-boundary coordination requires further attention. For example, in London the statutory powers of the Fire and Civil Defence Authority to coordinate peacetime emergency plans across the London boroughs is strictly limited and relies upon consensus which cannot currently be demonstrated. Similar problems beset other major metropolitan areas. Cooperative and mutual aid agreements are being strengthened in the European Community but arrangements remain relatively fragile.
The European Community role
Developments in the European Community are beginning to set the pace in improving hazard management and emergency planning in Britain. The first meeting of Ministers responsible for hazard management and emergency planning in Member States took place in May 1985. Two years later an agreement on European cooperation was signed. Until then the Community had confined itself to offering funds to areas suffering damage caused by natural hazards, but civil protection in the Community now embraces risk analysis, prevention, preparation, early warning, assistance and long-term recovery (Sourbag 1990): much as Handmer commends from Australian experience in Chapter 16.
The most coherent and systematic civil emergency planning legislation deriving from the Community originated with the Seveso incident of 1976. These are the Seveso/CIMAH regulations (see Chapter 1) which provide a useful general model on which the links between European, national and regional/local level civil protection planning might be progressed. Because of this legislation British local authorities already have statutory duties relating to emergency planning on hazardous installations. The essence of the Seveso Directive is the generation of information processes regarding risks and safety measures. Information must flow from employer to employee, from industry to competent authority, and from government to citizens. There is a strong signal here about the importance of information flow and public access to information. The CIMAH regulations are currently under fundamental review and will evolve further not least through the intensification of information flow and public information access requirements, and the rapid development of legislation to deal with impacts on the environment as well as humans.
During 1990 the Council of the European Communities passed two resolutions on civil protection (Council of the European Communities 1990a, 1990b). These resolutions indicate a growing interest in cooperation between Member States, an initial focus on natural hazards, especially forest fires which particularly affect southern Europe, the development of advanced telecommunication systems and specialised resource data banks.
Promising developments
The further identification of the key elements of corporate safety culture is required. High on this list is a recognition of the need for a refined sense of corporate ethics and responsibility: in some key areas this has been sadly lacking. One key to better hazard management promises to be improved management science and improved management techniques based upon improved information systems. Hazard management should not be separated from other functions, it should be a central part of each function but managers need to improve their capability to deal with the non-routine in this respect.
Questions are now beginning to be addressed about institutional design for effective hazard management (Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1991). At least six contributors to this volume are involved in a seminar series funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and led by the London School of Economics and Political Science which is exploring the possibilities of new institutional designs to deal with hazard management and system failure (Hood 1991). Amongst the first questions being debated in this seminar series is: what constitutes effectiveness in hazard management? This is not an easy question to answer. To the victims of accidents and disasters a system on which they relied for their safety will have failed and been ineffective: emergency management to these people is the failure of hazard management. A risk-free society is unachievable, and even if it was achievable it may not be desirable. What is desirable is that the systems designed to manage hazards and emergencies function, not perfectly, just reasonably well. This is yet to be achieved, but more importantly, the necessary political will has yet to be demonstrated in Britain.
The fixation with civil defence to the detriment of developing adequate arrangements for peacetime emergencies must be abandoned if real progress is to be made. The United Nations has declared the 1990s the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, setting the context for the necessary change.
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