98 Joint Cognitive Systems
In Figure 5.3, four characteristic artefacts are used to illustrate the
meaning of the dimensions. A decision support system, and in general any
system that provides a high level of complex functionality in an automated
form, illustrates a hermeneutic relation and a high degree of exchangeability
– i.e., a prosthetic relation. While decision support systems (e.g., Hollnagel,
Mancini & Woods, 1986) are supposed to help users with making decisions,
they often carry out so much processing of the incoming data that the user
has little way of knowing what is going on. In practice, the user’s decision
making is exchanged or substituted by that of the DSS, although this may not
have been the intention from the start.
Transparency
Exchangeability
Decision support system
Computer tomography
Artificial limb
Abacus
Prosthesis
ToolTool
Hermeneutic
Embodiment
Figure 5.3: The transparency-exchangeability relation.
An artificial limb, such as a prosthetic arm or leg, represents an artefact,
which on the one hand clearly is a prosthesis (it takes over a function from
the human), but at the same time also is transparent. The user is in control of
what the prosthesis does, even though the functionality need not be simple.
(A counterexample is, of course, the ill-fated Dr. Strangelove.) The issue
becomes critical when we consider a visual prosthesis that allows a blind
person to see, at least in a rudimentary fashion. Such a device certainly
produces a lot of interpretation, yet it does not – or is not supposed to –
provide any distortion. Indeed, it is designed to be transparent to the user,
who should ‘see’ the world and not the artefact.
Computerized tomography (CT), or computerized axial tomography
(CAT), as well as other forms of computer-enhanced sensing, illustrate
Use of Artefacts 99
artefacts with a hermeneutical relation, yet as a tool, i.e., with low
exchangeability. Computer tomography is a good example of extending the
capability of humans, to do things that were hitherto impossible. CAT, as
many other techniques of graphical visualisation – including virtual reality –
are seductive because they provide a seemingly highly realistic or real picture
of something. In the case of CAT there is the comfort that we know from
studies of anatomy that the underlying structure actually looks as seen from
the picture. In the case of research on subatomic particles – such as the hunt
for the Higgs’ boson – or in advanced visualisation of, e.g., simulation results
and finite element analysis, the danger is considerably larger, hence the
hermeneutic relation stronger, because there is no reality that can be
inspected independently of the rendering by the artefact. Indeed, one could
argue that the perceived reality is an artefact of the theories and methods.
The final example is an abacus. The abacus is highly transparent and for
the skilled user enters into an embodiment relation. The human calculator
does not manipulate the abacus, but calculates with it almost as a
sophisticated extension of hand and brain. Similarly, the abacus is clearly a
tool, because it amplifies rather than substitutes what the user can do. The
human calculator is never out of control, and the abacus – beings so simple –
never does anything that the user does not.
Range of Artefacts
As the example of getting up in the morning showed we are immersed in a
world of artefacts, some of which are our own choosing while others are not.
For CSE it is important to understand how artefacts are used and how JCSs
emerge. For this purpose it is useful to consider several ranges of artefacts:
simple, medium, and complex.
The simple artefacts are things such as overhead projectors, household
machines, doors, elevators, watches, telephones, calculators, and games.
They are epistemologically simple in the sense that they usually have only
few parts (considering integrated circuits as single parts in themselves), and
that their functions are quite straightforward to understand, hence to operate.
(Newer types of mobile phones and more advanced household machines may
arguably not belong to this category, but rather to the next.) This means that
they are tools rather than prostheses in the sense that people can use them
without difficulty and without feeling lost or uncertain about what is going to
happen. Indeed, we can use this as a criterion for what should be called a
simple artefact, meaning that it is simple in the way it is used, typically
having only a single mode of operation, rather than simple in its construction
and functionality. (Few of the above mentioned artefacts are simple in the
latter sense.) Indeed, much of the effort in the design of artefacts is aimed at
making them simple to use, as we shall discuss below.
100 Joint Cognitive Systems
Medium level artefacts can still be used by a single person, i.e., they do
not require a co-ordinated effort of several people, but may require several
steps or actions to be operated. Examples are sports bikes (mountain bikes in
contrast to ordinary city bikes), radios, home tools, ATMs – and with them
many machines in the public domain, VCRs, personal computers regardless
of size, high-end household machines, etc. These artefacts are characterised
by having multiple modes of operation rather than a single mode and in some
cases by comprising or harnessing a process or providing access to a process.
They may also comprise simple types of automation in subsystems or the
ability to execute stored programs. In most cases these artefacts are still tools,
but there are cases where they become prostheses as their degree of
exchangeability increases.
Finally, complex artefacts usually harbour one or more processes,
considerable amounts of automation, and quite complex functionality with
substantial demands to control. Examples are cars, industrial tools and
numerically controlled machines, scientific instruments, aeroplanes,
industrial processes, computer support systems, simulations, etc. These
artefacts are complex and more often prostheses than tools, in the sense that
the transparency certainly is low. Most of them are associated with work
rather than personal use, and for that reason simplicity of functioning is less
important than efficacy. Usually one can count on the operator having some
kind of specific training or education to use the artefact, although it may
become a prosthesis nevertheless.
Cognitive Artefacts
It has become common in recent years to refer to what is called cognitive
artefacts. According to Norman (1993), cognitive artefacts are physical
objects made by humans for the purpose of aiding, enhancing, or improving
cognition. Examples are sticker-notes or a string around the finger to help us
remember. More elaborate definitions point to artefacts that directly help
cognition by supporting it or substituting for it.
Strictly speaking, the artefacts are usually not cognitive – or cognitive
systems – as such, although that is by no means precluded. (The reason for
the imprecise use of the term is probably due to the widespread habit of
talking about ‘cognitive models’ when what really is meant is ‘models of
cognition’ – where such models can be expressed in a number of different
ways.) There is indeed nothing about an artefact that is unique for its use to
support or amplify cognition. A 5-7000 year old clay tablet with cuneiform
writing is as much an artefact to support cognition as a present day expert
system. Taking up the example from Chapter 3, a pair of scissors may be
used as a reminder (e.g., to buy fabric) if they are placed on the table in the
hall or as a decision aid if they are spun around.
Use of Artefacts 101
Consider, for instance, the string around the finger. Taken by itself the
string is an artefact, which has a number of primary purposes such as to hold
things together, to support objects hanging from a point of suspension, to
measure distances, etc. When a piece of string is tied around the finger it is
not used for any of its primary purposes but for something else, namely a
reminder to remember something. Having a string tied around the finger is
for most people an unusual condition and furthermore not one that can
happen haphazardly. Finding the string around the finger leads to the
question of why it is there, which in turn (hopefully) reminds the person that
there is something to be remembered. In other words, it is a way to extend
control by providing an external cue.
The use of the string around the finger is an example of what we may call
exocognition or the externalisation of cognition. Rather than trying to
remember something directly – by endocognition or good old-fashioned
‘cognition in the mind’ – the process of remembering is externalised. The
string in itself does not remember anything at all, but the fact that we use the
string in a specific, but atypical way – which furthermore only is effective
because it relies on a culturally established practice – makes it possible to see
it as a memory token although not as a type of memory itself.
We may try to achieve the same effect by entering an item, such as an
appointment, into the to-do list of a personal digital assistant (PDA) or into
the agenda. In this case the PDA can generate an alert signal at a predefined
time and even provide written reminder of the appointment. Here the PDA is
more active than the piece of string, because it actually does the
remembering; i.e., it is not just a cue but the function in itself. The PDA is an
amplifier of memory, but it only works if there is someone around when the
alert is generated. Relative to the PDA, the piece of string around the finger
has the advantage of being there under all conditions (until it is removed, that
is). Neither the string nor the PDA is, however, cognitive in itself –
regardless of whether we use the traditional definition or the CSE
interpretation. Speaking more precisely, they are artefacts that amplify the
ability to control or to achieve something or which amplifies the user’s
cognition, rather than cognitive artefacts per se. As such they differ in an
important manner from artefacts that amplify the user’s ability to do physical
work, to move, to reach, etc., in that they only indirectly strengthen the
function in question.
The Substitution Myth
It is a common myth that artefacts can be value neutral in the sense that the
introduction of an artefact into a system only has the intended and no
unintended effects. The basis for this myth is the concept of
interchangeability as used in the production industry, and as it was the basis
102 Joint Cognitive Systems
for mass production – even before Henry Ford. Thus if we have a number of
identical parts, we can replace one part by another without any adverse
effects, i.e., without any side-effects.
While this in practice holds for simple artefacts, on the level of nuts and
bolts, it does not hold for complex artefacts. (Indeed, it may not even hold for
simple artefacts. To replace a worn out part with a new means that the new
part must function in a system that itself is worn out. A new part in an aged
system may induce strains that the aged system can no longer tolerate.) A
complex artefact, which is active rather than passive, i.e., one that requires
some kind of interaction either with other artefacts or subsystems, or with
users, is never value neutral. In other words, introducing such an artefact in a
system will cause changes that may go beyond what was intended and be
unwanted (Hollnagel, 2003).
Consider the following simple example: a new photocopier is introduced
with the purposes of increasing throughput and reducing costs. While some
instruction may be given on how to use it, this is normally something that is
left for the users to take care of themselves. (It may conveniently be assumed
that the photocopier is well-designed from an ergonomic point of view, hence
that it can be used by the general public without specialised instructions. This
assumption is unfortunately not always fulfilled.) The first unforeseen – but
not unforeseeable – effect is that people need to learn how to use the new
machine, both the straightforward functions and the more complicated ones
that are less easy to master (such as removing stuck paper). Another and
more enduring effect is changes to how the photocopier is used in daily work.
For instance, if copying becomes significantly faster and cheaper, people will
copy more. This means that they change their daily routines, perhaps that
more people use the copier, thereby paradoxically increasing delays and
waiting times, etc. Such effects on the organisation of work for individuals,
as well as on the distribution of work among people, are widespread, as the
following quotation shows:
New tools alter the tasks for which they were designed, indeed alter
the situations in which the tasks occur and even the conditions that
cause people to want to engage in the tasks. (Carroll & Campbell,
1988, p. 4)
The substitution myth is valid only in cases where one system element is
replaced by another with identical structure and function. Yet even in such
cases it is necessary that the rest of the system has not changed over time,
hence that the conditions for the functioning of the replaced element are the
original ones. This is probably never the case, except for software, but since
there would be no reason to replace a failed software module with an
identical one, the conclusion remains that the substitution myth is invalid.
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