26 Just ordinAry robots
especially in the area of privacy. e vision of aective computing can,
for example, only be realized if the robot is allowed to measure and
store data about our facial expressions.
1.3.2 A Lifelike Appearance
In the previous section, robots were described as having a body and a
brain. Robots with human or animal forms were developed in order
to improve the interaction between humans and robots. is capi-
talizes on the ability of man to anthropomorphize technology: the
ability of people to bridge the gap between humans and technology,
allowing human attributes. Robotics makes explicit use of this option.
Moreover, attempts are being made to develop social robots to engage
with humans on an emotional level. is raises the question of the
limits within which this social psychological phenomenon may be
used. To what level do we want to deploy the emotional bond between
people and machines? And how do we ensure that there is no abuse of
the trust that is articially built between man and machine? Sharkey
and Sharkey (2012) consider the “embodiment” of the robot as an
important approach for further ethical analysis of robot technologies,
and say: “Robots and robotic technology require a new perspective
on many ethical issues, because of their embodiment, and their often
life-like appearance” (p. 37).
1.3.3 Level of Autonomy
e third characteristic concerns the degree of autonomy of the robot
or, in other words, the degree of control that is delegated by the user to
the machine. When man is in control of what the machine does, man
is said to be “in-the-loop.” When the robot acts autonomously, man is
said to be “out-of-the-loop.” When man and machine are both partly
in control, man is said to be “on-the-loop.” Each situation can raise
various social and ethical issues.
When man is in-the-loop, the location of the operator and the
robot may be dierent. e robot makes it possible for people to
act remotely and thus allows social actors to have a presence else-
where. Take, for example, the surgical robot, which provides the sur-
geon with the ability in the United States to perform operations in
27robots everywhere
Australia, or to an operator in Nevada (in the United States) who
controls the drones ying in Afghanistan. ese robots provide a
form of telepresence that is mediated by IT. is shift toward man-
on-the-loop raises the question of to what extent the user still receives
enough information to make well-informed decisions. e delegation
of control to robot systems also raises issues in the eld of safety,
responsibility, and liability.
In extreme cases, one could even give full control or autonomy to
robots. Again, this raises the question of what decisions and actions
we want to leave to a robotic machine. Do we want to have decisions
and actions with a strong emotional or moral dimension, such as kill-
ing people or looking after children, taken solely by computers? A
central question is what decisive position people should take in the
control hierarchy. e European Robotics Technology Platform envi-
sions mainly a supporting role for robots: “Robots should support,
but not replace, human caretakers or teachers and should not imitate
human form or behaviour” (EUROP, 2009, p. 9). But maybe other
countries think otherwise in this area.
1.3.4 Robotization as Rationalization
When human robots are found, mechanical robots cannot be far behind.
Once people are reduced to a few robot-like actions, it is a relatively easy
step to replace them with mechanical robots.
George Ritzer (1983, p. 105)
At the beginning of the twentieth century, German social theo-
rist Max Weber (18641920) created a theory of rationalization.
He reected on industrialization, urbanization, scientism, and
capitalism and found that the modern Western world had become
dominated by a belief in rationality. Weber saw the bureaucracy as
the paradigm for the rationalization process in his day. It is well
known that belief in eciency led to the redesign of the factory and
labor. Engineers not only mechanized separate actions but aimed to
design the factory as one “great ecient machine.” Rationalization,
however, took place in many social practices. Historian Van den
Boogaard (2010) explains that during the 1920s, the kitchen also
28 Just ordinAry robots
became seen “as a factory that converted input (groceries) into out-
put (meals) by means of specic activities, technologies, and spatial
distances” (p. 137). In a similar vein, oces, airports, and cities were
dened in terms of ows that could be designed and mechanized in
an integrated manner. Weber discussed rationalization as a double-
edged phenomenon. On the one hand, it can have many benets,
such as broader access to cheaper products and services with con-
sistent quality. On the other hand, he was worried about the many
irrationalities of rational systems. For example, bureaucracies can
become inecient because of too many regulations. Weber was most
concerned about the so-called iron cage of rationality, the idea that
an emphasis on rationalization can reduce the freedom and choices
people have and lead to dehumanization.
Faith in rationalization implies that eciency, predictability, cal-
culability, and control through substituting technology for human
judgment present dominant cultural values (Ritzer, 1983). Please
note that in our information age, calculability is, most of the time,
about programmability, and control often relies on digital control by
means of algorithms. Rational systems aim for greater control over
the uncertainties of life, in particular over people, who present a major
source of uncertainty in social life. One way to limit the dependence
on people is to replace them with machines. After all, robots and
computers are easier to control than humans. We have witnessed this
rationalization process in the factory. Originally, craftsmen ruled the
production process. en, the work was divided into many simple
partial activities that could be performed by unskilled workers. is
far-reaching simplication and specialization of the work paved the
way for mechanization of various parts of the production process and
nally made it possible during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury to automate and robotize such activities. Robotization thus pres-
ents a way to rationalize social practices and reduce their dependence
on people. As Ritzer (1983) argues: “With the coming of robots we
have reached the ultimate stage in the replacement of humans with
nonhuman technology” (p. 105).
As indicated earlier, this book is not about the use of robots in
the clean factory, but about its use in places crowded with “unpre-
dictable” people, such as the home, the city, or the battleeld. e
use of robots in these messy circumstances is only possible when
29robots everywhere
their environments are organized around their simple activities. One
way of doing this is to buy a robot that is embedded in the required
microenvironment: think of a dishwasher. For a long time, this type
of stand-alone application of robots was the only way to exploit their
limited capacities in complex social environments. Floridi (2014)
argues that our world is rapidly becoming well adapted to the lim-
ited capacities of ICTs. He holds, “Nowadays, enveloping the envi-
ronment into an ICT-friendly infosphere has started pervading all
aspects of reality and is visible everywhere, on a daily basis. We have
been enveloping the world around ICTs for decades without fully
realizing it” (p. 144). In addition to technological changes, adapt-
ing the world to the limited capacities of robots requires social and
cultural changes.
In e McDonaldization of Society, Ritzer (1983, 2004) argues that
the processes of rationalization described by Weber have accelerated in
our times and become globalized. He talks about McDonaldization,
because he sees the fast-food restaurant as the paradigm for the ratio-
nalization of contemporary society. e entire food chain—from
farm to fork—is geared toward eciency. Besides production, the
consumption side has also become rationalized. In the United States,
cooking from scratch and family meals have become relatively rare
nowadays. Many U.S. citizens opt for more ecient ways of eating,
such as dining at fast-food restaurants or eating microwavable food in
front of the TV.
Ritzer argues that no aspect of people’s lives is immune to ratio-
nalization any more. Even social relationships and sex have become
McDonaldized. IT is a major driver of this process. Technology is
nestling itself within us and between us, collects a lot of information
about us, and can sometimes even operate like us, that is, mimicking
the facets of our individual behavior. In short, IT has become “inti-
mate technology” (Van Est, 2014). e McDonaldization of sociabil-
ity is evident in “rationalized online systems such as Facebook, where
friendship is reduced to clicking an ‘add’ button and never needing to
interact with that ‘friend’ on an individual basis ever again” (Flusty,
2009, p. 436). Also, sex has undergone substantial rationalization.
Aoyoma, a relationship counselor in Tokyo, believes Japan is experienc-
ing “a ight from human intimacy” (Haworth, 2013). Many Japanese
young people have lost interest in conventional relationships and sex,
30 Just ordinAry robots
because they nd it “too troublesome” (mendokuzai). Dependence on
complicated” humans can be reduced by replacing them with con-
venient technologies, such as virtual-reality girlfriends or sex robots.
Some people even believe that the future of relationships in Japan
and the rest of the world will be largely technology driven (Haworth,
2013). is example shows that information technologies, like ratio-
nal robotic systems, can have a profound eect on how we dene our-
selves and our relationships with other human beings.
1.3.4.1 Irrationality of Rationality Weber and Ritzer are concerned
about the great costs associated with rationalization, which they
group under the heading of the “irrationality of rationality.” is
label comprises all the negative aspects and eects of rationaliza-
tion. More specically, irrationality refers to the opposite of the
dimensions of rationality: ineciency, unpredictability, incalcula-
bility, and loss of control. Most specically, irrationality implies that
rational systems are unreasonable systems. Rationalization thus may
lead to dehumanizing systems that may become antihuman or even
destructive to human beings. For example, the kind of meals served
at fast-food restaurants, and the fast-food culture in general, have
detrimental eects on the health of many people. e rationalization
of food consumption has also caused the loss of the communal meal
for which families got together every day. Moreover, the more face-
to-face and skin-to-skin intimacy is lost to technology; we should
ask ourselves whether the rationalization of social relationships and
sex may cause people to become physically and socially disconnected
from each other. e ultimate irrationality is the possibility that the
system (and/or the elite controlling it) would come to control us or
even replace us.
Related to the latter, the theme “robots taking over society” has,
for a long time, been center stage in the cultural imagination and
public debate around robots. is relates to the hegemony of the
strong AI and robotics vision in the media, which constantly stirs up
the debate, causing anxiety among people. Some robotic technolo-
gists and scientists expect that such robots will soon become smarter
than human beings (Brooks, 2002). Kurzweil (2005) describes a
future in which even the “ordinary” man has no place other than
to function as a kind of pet. e world will belong to people who
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