230 Just ordinAry robots
party. If there is a suddenly occurring defect in the car, so even with a
failing driver assistance system, force majeure cannot be invoked. e
idea is that those who enjoy the benets of car use should also bear
the burden. e resulting question is whether force majeure would be
able to succeed in the event of the failure of a roadside system or a
lack of data communication with other vehicles because the cause can
be considered as coming from outside and is due to the behavior of a
third party.
e liability of a driver against other motorized road users is
assessed on the basis of tort, which is attributable if this is the driver’s
fault. When a driving assistance system is not adequately function-
ing, the driver alone cannot be blamed if and when particular hazards
are encountered, such as sudden, unforeseeable circumstances that the
driver did not reasonably have to take into consideration. An example
would be sudden—unprovoked—full automatic braking due to a col-
lision avoidance system, which then caused a collision.
e fact that well-functioned driver assistance systems allow driv-
ers to better respond to hazards may aect their liability. If a system
has warned of a slippery surface, the driver cannot claim that this
was an unforeseen circumstance. A case becomes a more dicult one
when a driver has failed to activate the collision avoidance system
and when it is established that the system could have prevented or
limited damage. In that case, the court will probably decide whether
a perfect driver—the standard generally used in law—would have
activated the system.
As we already have seen, drivers may become over-reliant upon
driver assistance and cooperative systems, with the result that drivers
will concentrate less. If an accident occurs, the relevant question for
the court is, again, whether a perfect driver could have prevented the
accident.
In relation to cooperative driving and autonomous cars in particu-
lar, there are unique features that should be considered with respect
to liability. erefore, specic liability regulation will be needed for
cooperative driving and autonomous cars. Hevelke and Nida-melin
(2014) propose a liability regulation based on strict liability. ese
authors argue that it is justiable to hold users of autonomous cars col-
lectively liable for any damage caused by autonomous cars. An owner
of an autonomous car could only be held responsible for taking the
231who drives the CAr?
risk of using the car, which would be a risk taken daily by millions of
people and highly comparable. e owner would, therefore, share this
responsibility with every other person who owns an autonomous car:
“[f]rom this perspective, they did participate in a practice which car-
ries risks and costs for others and it therefore is their responsibility to
shoulder that burden” (Hevelke & Nida-Rümelin, 2014, p. 6).* A tax
or mandatory insurance would be the easiest and most practical way
to achieve collective liability.
5.6.6 Legislation for Limited and Full Self-Driving
e 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Trac, to which the United
States and most European countries are parties, probably does not
prohibit automated driving. e treaty promotes road safety by
establishing uniform rules, including Article 8, which requires that
every vehicle or combination thereof must have a driver who is “at all
times … able to control” it (see also Smith, 2014). e 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Trac, to which the United States is not a
party but most European countries are, contains similar language
in Article 8. In comparison to the Geneva Convention, it requires a
more extensive obligation that “every driver shall possess the neces-
sary physical and mental ability and be in a t physical and men-
tal condition to drive.” A sixth paragraph on distracted driving was
added to this article in 2006:
A driver of a vehicle shall at all times minimize any activity other than
driving. Domestic legislation should lay down rules on the use of phones
by drivers of vehicles. In any case, legislation shall prohibit the use by
a driver of a motor vehicle or moped of a hand-held phone while the
vehicle is in motion.
e idea of an autonomous car with the human-out-of-the-loop is
discouraged by these conventions. e key issue in these conventions
is the concept of control, and, probably, amending these conventions
is needed to ultimately realize the potential of autonomous cars.
*
An exception is when a car does not satisfy the safety regulations, since then the
manufacturer may be liable.
232 Just ordinAry robots
To more accurately capturing this potential, a legal framework for
testing and implementing autonomous car technologies beyond level
2 is needed. ese frameworks are lacking in most countries—which
could impact the rate of adoption of autonomous cars (Mogos, Wang,
& DiClemente, 2014)—with the exception of some states in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and some ad hoc legal permits
passed by regional authorities in some EU countries. e authority
of Gothenburg (in Sweden), for example, has given Volvo permis-
sion to test 100 driverless Volvos on public roads in everyday driving
conditions. is Volvo Car Groups project “Drive Me” started in
2014.* In the United Kingdom, testing of autonomous cars has been
allowed on public roads since 2015.
Tests on public roads, instead of
on private or specialized roads, are necessary to ensure safe testing
and development of autonomous cars and their integration into the
public sphere.
Several countries in Europe and some states in the United States
have expressed interest in developing legal frameworks for testing and
implementing autonomous vehicles, and some have even started tak-
ing active steps to examine their current laws (Kim, Heled, Asher, &
ompson, 2014).
5.7 Concluding Observations
In this chapter, we have explored the robot car against the background
of developments in the eld of driver assistance systems, trac man-
agement, and cooperative systems. We have shown that the robotiza-
tion of the car is in full swing. ere is clearly a recognizable trend
of driver assistance systems that inform only toward systems that also
warn and even intervene. e next step in this trend is taking over
driving tasks through cooperative systems—in conjunction with trac
management. Ultimately, it is expected that this will lead to autono-
mous vehicles being introduced. In this nal section, we look back on
the social issues that have arisen from driver assistance systems and
cooperative systems in conjunction with trac and autonomous cars.
*
https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/en-gb/media/pressreleases/145619/volvo-
car-groups-rst-self-driving-autopilot-cars-test-on-public-roads-around-gothenburg.
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28551069.
233who drives the CAr?
On this basis, we identify some issues that require attention in the
public and political domains.
5.7.1 Short Term: Driver Assistance Systems (Levels 1 and 2)
5.7.1.1 Expectations ADAS support the driver, but do not yet allow
fully automated driving in trac. e application of driver assistance
systems is rapidly developing and is being fully stimulated by the
car manufacturing industry, research institutions, and government.
ere are high expectations of these systems regarding safety eects.
e available driver assistance systems are probably only harbingers
of a major development that will lead to a progressive “automation
of the driving task. is trend can now be observed. Systems that
in principle only advised or warned, as in alerting the driver about
speeding or unintentionally veering o the roadway, are further
developed into systems that actually intervene, causing the car to
return to the right lane when the driver unintentionally leaves the
roadway. Given technological developments, it is expected that in
the near future more self-correcting driver assistance systems will
be able to intervene in driving behavior instead of only warning or
advising the driver.
5.7.1.2 Social, Ethical, and Regulatory Issues Although the devel-
opment of driver assistance systems is stimulated, much of the
research shows that many consumers have insucient knowledge
about what driver assistance systems can do. is problem has now
been addressed by the European Commission, which has set up
the eSafety Forum, which includes the aim of increasing the public
awareness of driver assistance systems.* In addition, these kinds of
systems require new driving skills. It is important that attention is
paid to this, and a possible solution could be that driving with driver
assistance systems becomes a mandatory part of the requirements
for being granted a driving license. e downside of this develop-
ment is that many drivers come to rely on these systems, making
them less alert.
*
www.esafetysupport.org/.
234 Just ordinAry robots
e greatest benet of these systems, sought by the European
Commission in particular, is in trac safety. e Commission aims
to halve the total number of road deaths in the EU by 2020 as com-
pared to 2010. is is a very ambitious goal, which in our opin-
ion can only be achieved by rigorous measures such as mandating a
number of driver assistance systems. e Commission has already
made the ABS, ESC, and eCall compulsory. e next systems that
could qualify for such an obligation are the ACC system and the
Lane Departure Warning (LDW). Research shows that these sys-
tems have a great eect on road safety. According to a study by
Rijkswaterstaat, part of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and
the Environment, 47% of accidents on highways are caused by
keeping too little distance—respectively, 24% and 18% of accidents
on country roads and urban roads (Rijkswaterstaat, 2007). With
an ACC system, this can be prevented, especially in combination
with a PCS. e European Commission is seeking to achieve the
strategic goal of halving the number of road casualties by stronger
enforcement of trac regulations. Speed is also a basic risk factor
in trac and has a major impact on the number of trac accidents.
According to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents
(2011), the number of fatalities would decrease by between 10% and
26%, and the number of serious injury accidents by between 6%
and 21%, if all drivers adhered to speed limits. is could easily be
addressed by using a far-reaching variant of the Intelligent Speed
Adaption systems: the intelligent speed authority, so that drivers
cannot violate the speed limit. It is not expected that this variant
will be implemented easily, because public acceptance of such an
intrusive system is quite low (Morsink etal., 2007). e car is con-
sidered in our culture as a symbol of freedom (Husak, 2001), and an
intrusive system restricts the freedom of the driver, since the driver
would be forced to have his or her car tted with technology that
keeps them within the speed limit. e question is whether a moral
duty exists to mitigate this freedom in the interest of road safety.
e introduction of the intelligent speed authority will reduce the
yearly toll in trac victims which is a powerful moral reason for
the European Commission to make this intelligent speed authority
compulsory, even though this will be met by a lot of resistance from
both drivers and political parties. Furthermore, the argument that
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