© Jiewen Yao and Vincent Zimmer 2020
J. Yao, V. ZimmerBuilding Secure Firmwarehttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-6106-4_9

9. S3 Resume

Jiewen Yao1  and Vincent Zimmer2
(1)
Shanghai, China
(2)
Issaquah, WA, USA
 
The Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) specification defines a set of power states (see Figure 9-1). These power states include the following:

  • G0 (S0) – the working state: The running firmware or OS is in S0 state.

  • G1 – the sleep state

    • S1 – standby: All system context is preserved, except the CPU cache. All CPUs are halted. Other devices are still in a working state. The system resumes from the next instruction when the system is suspended.

    • S2 – similar to S1: Not used today.

    • S3 – suspend to memory: The system context is saved into the platform memory. The devices stop working. Only DRAM is flushed to preserve the content. The system resumes from the firmware reset vector and jumps to the OS waking vector. Afterward, the OS restores the context from memory. When a user chooses the “sleep” option, the system enters S3 state. This can also be initiated by actions such as closing the lid in a laptop.

    • S4 – suspend to disk: The system context is saved into the disk. All devices stop working. The system resumes from the firmware reset vector and boots the OS as normal boot. Afterward, the OS restores the context from disk. When a user chooses the “hibernation” option, the system enters the S4 state.

      • There is one option named S4 BIOS, which means the BIOS saves a copy of memory to disk and then initiates the hardware S4. When the system wakes, the firmware restores memory from disk and wakes the OS by transferring control to the OS waking vector. Today this is not used in most platforms since this is an OS-independent art from early advanced power management (APM) that predates ACPI.

  • G2 (S5) – the soft off state: When a user chooses the “shutdown” option, the system enters S5 state.

  • G3 – the power off state: When a user powers off the machine, the machine is in G3 state.

../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig1_HTML.jpg
Figure 9-1

Global System Power States and Transitions (Source: ACPI Specification)

The system firmware is involved in the Sx suspend and resume. S1 resume is handled inside the OS directly. S4 resume and S5 resume are similar to a normal boot. S3 resume is a special boot path and has significant differences from the normal boot path. These differences create unique security challenges that we will focus on in this chapter.

Threat Model

S3 means “suspend to memory.” The OS context is in memory, and some firmware S3 context is also in memory. If malicious code can access the OS or firmware S3 context used in an S3 resume, it may impact the system’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

The assets of the S3 resume are shown in Table 9-1. The assets include but are not limited to the flash content, memory content, silicon register settings, TPM device state, and storage device configuration. The assets may require integrity, availability, or confidentiality properties.
Table 9-1

S3 Resume Asset

Asset

Integrity

Availability

Confidentiality

Flash

Firmware code

Firmware configuration

Firmware code

Firmware configuration

N/A

Memory

SMRAM

OS waking vector

SMRAM

Silicon

Locked Register

Silicon register

Memory configuration data

N/A

TPM state

TPM2 platform hierarchy

TPM device state

N/A

Storage disk

TCG storage BlockSID

HDD Freeze

N/A

Disk password

The S3 resume attacker could use a software attack (such as writing code to modify the system context) or hardware attack (such as using a flash programmer to access the flash area, using a device to perform DMA attack and trigger power failure). The attack surface could be flash access, memory access, silicon register, or a TPM command. See Table 9-2 for the S3 attack surface.
Table 9-2

S3 Attack Surface

Attack Surface

Software Attack

Hardware Attack

Flash access

Read/write configuration (variable)

Firmware code

Firmware configuration

Memory access

ACPI non-volatile storage (NVS)

ACPI reserved memory

ACPI non-volatile storage (NVS)

ACPI reserved memory

Silicon register

Read/write silicon register (I/O, MMIO, PCI)

N/A

TPM command

TPM device state (shutdown command)

N/A

The attack may be performed during S3 suspend (such as modifying ACPI memory in the OS, sending malicious TPM command, or not sending a specific TPM command), in S3 state (such as updating the firmware code using a flash programmer), or during S3 resume (such as attaching a malicious PCI device for DMA access).

In order to mitigate these attacks, the S3 resume implementation should implement defenses. See Table 9-3. Some S3 mitigations are similar to the ones used in normal boot, such as flash image verification in S3 and setting up the IOMMU or another DMA protection to resist DMA attacks in S3. Some S3 mitigations are device specific, such as preserving the TPM device state. These technologies have been discussed in previous chapters. One major category of S3 mitigation is secure storage to save the settings used during S3 resume, including 1) CPU configuration data in memory such as CPU state, SMM environment – page table, and SMBASE, 2) silicon register configuration data such as the register settings of the chipset and PCI express device, and 3) the device configuration data such as TCG storage BlockSID state and the hard disk unlock password. We refer to this type of secure storage as the LockBox.
Table 9-3

S3 Attack Mitigation

Asset

Prevention

Detection

Recovery

Flash

Flash Device Lock.

Variable Lock/Authentication.

Flash image verification in S3.

Variable Check/RPMC.

Switch to normal boot for recovery.

Memory

IOMMU in S3.

Save data to LockBox(*).

Power loss detection.

Switch to normal boot.

Silicon

Save configuration data to the LockBox(*).

Register lock in the code.

N/A

N/A

TPM state

Send TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth().

Check TPM2_Startup().

Cap PCRs.

Storage disk

Save configuration data to LockBox(*).

N/A

N/A

LockBox

The LockBox is an abstraction of secure storage for usage during S3 resume. In a normal boot or during the S3 suspend phase, the authorized firmware component saves the current configuration to the LockBox. In the S3 resume phase, the authorized firmware component retrieves the configuration from the LockBox, configures the system, and boots to the OS waking vector. See Figure 9-2.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig2_HTML.png
Figure 9-2

LockBox Usage in S3 Resume

The LockBox may provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability support. For confidentiality considerations, only an authorized entity can read the LockBox content. For integrity, only an authorized entity can write the LockBox content. For the availability concern, the LockBox should always be present. It is difficult to prevent hardware attacks because the hardware attack may include just removing power to destroy the contents of the memory or using a flash programmer to erase the contents of the flash.

Platforms have many options to implement the LockBox, including but not limited to a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) such as system management mode (SMM), UEFI variables (with Variable Lock for integrity and variable encryption for confidentiality), TPM non-volatile storage, or coprocessor-based mechanisms such as the Intel Converged Security and Management Engine (CSME), AMD Platform Secure Processor (PSP), server Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs), and so on. See Table 9-4 for the summary of LockBox implementation choices.
Table 9-4

S3 LockBox Implementation

Mechanism

Integrity

Availability

Confidentiality

Comment

TEE (SMM)

Yes

Yes, for software attacks. No, for hardware attack.

Yes

Maybe unsupported before memory initialization.

Variable

Requires Variable Lock or authentication.

Yes, for software attacks. No, for hardware attack.

Requires variable encryption.

Flash size limitation.

TPM NV

Requires auth session or lock.

Yes

Requires auth session.

TPM device dependency, NV size limitation.

Coprocessor

Yes

Yes

Yes

Coprocessor device dependency.

Case Study

Now, let’s take a look at some real use cases for the LockBox implementation.

TEE-Based LockBox

The goal of the S3 resume process is to restore the platform to its preboot configuration. The UEFI PI Architecture still needs to restore the platform in a phased fashion just as it does in a normal boot path. Figure 9-3 shows the phases in an S3 resume boot path.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig3_HTML.png
Figure 9-3

PI Architecture S3 Resume Boot Path

In a normal boot, the PEI phase is responsible for initializing enough of the platform’s resources to enable the execution of the DXE phase, which is where the majority of platform configuration is performed by different DXE drivers.

In the S3 resume phase, bringing DXE in and making a DXE driver boot path aware is very risky for the following reasons:

  • The DXE phase hosts numerous services, which makes it rather large.

  • Loading DXE from flash is very time-consuming.

Instead, the PI Architecture provides a boot script that lets the S3 resume boot path avoid the DXE phase altogether, which helps to maximize S3 resume performance. The boot script is a set of entries such as IO_WRITE(Port, Data), MMIO_WRITE(Address, Data), and PCI_WRITE(Segment, Bus, Device, Function, Register, Data). It is a lightweight way to configure the silicon registers. During a normal boot, such as powering on from S5, DXE drivers record the platform’s configuration in the boot script, which is saved in NVS. During the S3 resume boot path, a boot script engine executes the script, thereby restoring the configuration.

The ACPI specification only requires the BIOS to restore chipset and processor configuration. The chipset configuration can be viewed as a series of memory, I/O, and PCI configuration operations which DXE drivers record in the PI Architecture boot script. During an S3 resume, a boot script engine executes the boot script to restore the chipset settings.

In a normal boot, the boot script is saved in the following fashion:
  1. 1)

    In the DXE phase, the silicon/platform driver saves the register configuration to the boot script. This is the boot-time S3 script.

     
  2. 2)

    In SMM, the silicon/platform driver can continue saving the register configuration to the table, even during OS runtime. A typical implementation is that when the OS triggers entry into S3, the system enters SMM. A special SMI handler collects the runtime silicon register settings such as PCI configuration and saves the information to the boot script. This is the runtime S3 script.

     
During S3 resume, the boot script is executed as follows:
  1. 3)

    In PEI, a boot script execution engine gets the boot script and replays the saved boot scripts to restore the system configuration. Both the boot-time S3 scripts and runtime S3 scripts are executed.

     

In practice, the boot script is large because it contains all of the silicon settings from the chipset as well as PCI express devices. Saving the boot script to a UEFI variable or TPM NV is not always practical because of limitations in the storage available in the TPM or in flash. Using the SMM environment is one architectural solution used by the EDK II BIOS to implement the SMM-based LockBox as the default one for boot script.

Besides the boot script usage, we also need to save the hard disk password to the LockBox to unlock the disk automatically. As such, the SMM-based LockBox needs to consider both integrity and confidentiality.

The integrity rules for an SMM-based LockBox are as follows:

  • Before the SmmReadyToLock event, any driver can use the DXE LockBox or SMM LockBox interface to save information into the LockBox. Restoring information from the LockBox is also supported, although it is seldom used.

  • After the SmmReadyToLock event, the DXE code is no longer trusted. Attempts to save information into the LockBox by DXE code are rejected. The SMM code is already available, and the SMM code can use the SMM LockBox to save the runtime boot script.

  • During S3 resume, there is no need to save information to the LockBox. Therefore, the PEI LockBox does not provide the ability to save information into the LockBox.

With these rules, only the platform manufacturer’s code can save information into the LockBox. Third-party code cannot save information into the LockBox.

The confidentiality rules for an SMM-based LockBox are as follows:

  • By default, the LockBox does not provide any confidentiality support. The DXE/PEI/SMM instances can restore the LockBox contents.

  • If a LockBox requires confidentiality, the creator needs to set the LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_S3_ONLY attribute for the LockBox.

  • If the LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_S3_ONLY attribute is set, this LockBox can only be restored

    • Before the SmmReadyToLock event (or)

    • Between the time that the system enters S3 (S3Entry event) and the end of S3 resume (EndOfS3Resume event)

With this rule, secrets can only be restored before the platform exits the platform manufacturer’s authentication phase or during the firmware S3 resume phase. Third-party code cannot restore a secret from the LockBox.

In EDK II, the LockBox provides the following services:
  1. 1)

    SaveLockBox(): Send data to the LockBox. A LockBox can be uniquely identified by a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID).

     
  2. 2)

    UpdateLockBox(): Update data in the LockBox.

     
  3. 3)
    SetLockBoxAttributes(): Set LockBox attributes.
    1. a)

      LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_PLACE means this LockBox can be restored to its original address with RestoreAllLockBoxInPlace().

       
    2. b)

      LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_S3_ONLY means this LockBox can be restored in the S3 resume path only. This is used to provide confidentiality support.

       
     
  4. 4)

    RestoreLockBox(): Get data from the LockBox to a caller-provided buffer address or the original buffer address.

     
  5. 5)

    RestoreAllLockBoxInPlace(): Restore data from all LockBoxes which have the LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_PLACE attribute.

     
Not all LockBox services are available in all BIOS phases. A full summary is shown in Figure 9-4.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig4_HTML.png
Figure 9-4(1)

SMM-Based LockBox Features in Each Phase (Normal Boot)

../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig5_HTML.png
Figure 9-4(2)

SMM-Based LockBox Features in Each Phase (S3)

S means LockBox Save.

R means LockBox Restore.

RS means LockBox Restore for the Secret.

The SMM-based LockBox implementation saves all LockBox contents inside of SMRAM. See Figure 9-5.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig6_HTML.png
Figure 9-5

SMM-Based LockBox: Internal Data Structure

The LockBoxQueue is the head of the SmmLockBox’s linked list. Every LockBox uses the following data structure:
  1. 1)

    GUID: Identifies the LockBox.

     
  2. 2)

    Buffer: A pointer to the original data buffer. This is used when a caller requests to restore to the original buffer address.

     
  3. 3)

    Length: The size of data in the LockBox.

     
  4. 4)

    Attribute: The attributes of the LockBox.

     
  5. 5)

    SmramBuffer: The data buffer in SMRAM.

     

The address of the LockBoxQueue is also saved as an SMM configuration table pointed to by the SMST. The reason is that if the SMI is not enabled yet, the PEI phase LockBox library can search the SMRAM region to get the LockBoxQueue and get all of the LockBox content. This makes the PEI LockBox service available before SMM is ready in the S3 resume phase.

The DXE phase LockBox library calls the SMM_COMMUNICATION protocol to communicate with the SMM LockBox service provider. The SmmLockBox driver provides the LockBox software SMI handler to service the request from the DXE instance.

Let’s take the boot script as an example (see Figure 9-6): When an SMM version boot script library requests a LockBox service, the code calls into the LockBoxSmmLib. The SMM instance allocates SMRAM, saves the data, and returns immediately. When the DXE version of the boot script library requests a LockBox service, the code calls SMM_COMMUNICATE.Communicate(). Then a software SMI is triggered. The SmmCore dispatches to the handler registered by the SmmLockBox driver. The LockBox SMM handler calls into the SMM LockBox instance to allocate SMRAM and save the data, and then the handler returns from SMM.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig7_HTML.png
Figure 9-6

SMM-Based LockBox: DXE/SMM Phase Usage

The DXE LockBox library supports five LockBox services before the SmmReadyToLock event. After the signaling of the SmmReadyToLock event, SaveLockBox(), UpdateLockBox(), and SetLockBoxAttribute() are closed and will reject further calls for security reasons. RestoreLockBox() can only restore the LockBoxes that do not have the LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_S3_ONLY attribute. Otherwise, the call is also rejected.

The SMM LockBox library supports five LockBox services as well. It also records the current execution phase. After the SmmReadyToLock event, the firmware exits the platform manufacturer’s auth state. The LockBox save request from the DXE environment will be rejected after SmmReadyToLock. Before the system enters the S3, the platform signals the S3Entry event via the EFI_SMM_SX_DISPATCH2 protocol. Then the system goes into the S3 state. After the system wakes up, the PEI S3 resume drivers restore the environment. Before the firmware calls the OS waking vector, it signals an EndOfS3Resume event. The SMM LockBox only allows the LockBox secret restoration between the S3Entry event and EndOfS3Resume event.

The PEI LockBox library has two ways to communicate with the LockBox in SMRAM:
  1. 1)

    Using the SMM_COMMUNICATION PPI to communicate with the SmmLockBox service provider, similar to the behavior of the DXE LockBox library (see Figure 9-7).

     
  2. 2)

    If the PEI LockBox library is used before SMM is ready, the SMM_COMMUNICATION PPI will return EFI_NOT_STARTED. In this case, the PEI LockBox library can search the SMRAM region directly to find the LockBox content. The LockBox internal data structure is shown in Figure 9-5. The PEI LockBox library can find the ACPI_VARIABLE_HOB to get the SMM_S3_RESUME_STATE location and then retrieve the SMM System Table (SMST) pointer. The address of the LockBoxQueue is saved as the SmmConfigurationTable entry in the SMM System Table (SMST). Care must be taken when PEI is 32 bits while SMM/DXE is 64 bits – all UINTN/VOID * defined in SMST must be parsed as UINT64 even in a 32-bit PEI execution environment.

     
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig8_HTML.png
Figure 9-7

SMM-Based LockBox: PEI Phase Usage

The PEI LockBox library only supports two LockBox services in the S3 phase – RestoreLockBox() and RestoreAllLockBoxInPlace().

Secure Boot Script Implementation

Once we have the LockBox, the boot script implementation should use the lock to protect the silicon configuration data and the boot script execution engine itself. The following content must be saved into the LockBox:
  1. 1)

    Boot script execution engine

     

The boot script engine executes the S3 boot script in S3 the resume phase.

The boot script engine may be in the TEE such as SMM. If so, there is no need to save it to the LockBox. Since SMM is a high-privilege environment, a platform might not want to give this level of privilege to the boot script engine.

Therefore, the current implementation lets the boot script be executed in the normal execution environment. During the normal boot, the boot script engine is loaded into the reserved memory. During S3 resume, the boot script engine executes from the reserved memory.

Reserved memory is not a secure place because the OS may modify its contents. Therefore, the boot script engine should save the boot script itself into a LockBox during normal boot and restore it from the LockBox to the reserved memory during S3 resume. The LockBox for the boot script engine needs to use the LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_PLACE. As such, the contents can be restored automatically when the S3 resume module calls RestoreAllLockBoxInPlace().
  1. 2)

    Boot-time S3 script and runtime S3 script

     

Conceptually, a platform may have two boot scripts – a boot-time S3 script and a runtime S3 script. A boot-time S3 script includes the silicon settings recorded during the BIOS boot. The information must be collected before the EndOfDxe event. The runtime S3 script provides additional silicon configuration when the OS triggers the S3 suspend. A special SMI handler traps the S3 suspend action and saves the runtime silicon settings as additional data to the runtime S3 script.

The boot script driver implementation may choose to separate the two tables or combine them into one table. Both the boot-time S3 script and runtime S3 script are in ACPI non-volatile storage (NVS) memory and should be saved into the LockBox.

The LockBox for the S3 script should also have the LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_PLACE attribute. As such, it can be automatically restored in the S3 resume phase. Then the boot script engine just needs to execute the boot script content in the ACPI NVS memory.
  1. 3)

    S3 script metadata

     
The boot script implementation may allocate additional memory to record the metadata of the boot-time S3 script and runtime S3 script, including the table address, the table length, the last boot script entry, and so on. The metadata is in ACPI NVS memory and should also be saved into the LockBox. Figure 9-8 shows the S3 script and metadata in EDK II.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig9_HTML.png
Figure 9-8

Boot Script and Metadata

  1. 4)

    Special handling for DISPATCH OPCODE

     
The boot script defines a set of opcodes for register access such as IO_WRITE, IO_READ_WRITE, IO_POLL, MEM_WRITE, MEM_READ_WRITE, MEM_POLL, PCI_CONFIG_WRITE, PCI_CONFIG_READ_WRITE, PCI_CONFIG_POLL, and so on. The boot script also supports two special opcodes: DISPATCH_OPCODE and DISPATCH_2_OPCODE. These two DISPATCH OPCODEs support the ability to run arbitrary code during boot script execution. These code objects include an EntryPoint and a Context parameter. The EntryPoint is just a pointer to the code to be run, and the Context is the argument to be passed into the EntryPoint. See Figure 9-9.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig10_HTML.png
Figure 9-9

Boot Script: DISPATCH_2_OPCODE

The EntryPoint associated with the DISPATCH_2_OPCODE is an 8-byte address in the boot script. Saving the 8-byte EntryPoint in the LockBox cannot protect all of the code used by the EntryPoint function. Therefore, the driver that produces the 8-byte EntryPoint must use the LockBox services to protect the code used by the EntryPoint. If that function calls other functions, all code of the other functions must also be protected by the LockBox.

The Context associated with the DISPATCH_2_OPCODE is also an 8-byte address in the boot script. For the same reason, the driver that produces the 8-byte EntryPoint must use the LockBox services to protect the data referred to by the Context parameter. If the Context contains another data pointer, all the data referenced must also be protected by the LockBox.

This is described in more detail in the article “Implementing S3 Resume in EDK II” which describes the LockBox and S3 resume design in EDK II.

Variable-Based LockBox

The SMM-based LockBox can be used to protect data in most cases, but not in all cases. It depends on when the LockBox is ready. The SMM-based LockBox can only be consumed after the memory is initialized. If the S3 resume module needs to consume data before the memory is initialized, then we need to devise another solution. UEFI read-only variables are a good candidate because they are available before memory initialization. If the LockBox does not require confidentiality, the read-only variable can be used to store the data.

In most IA platforms, the memory reference code (MRC) is the component that initializes the system memory. The SMM-based LockBox cannot be used in the MRC before memory initialization because SMM is not ready. However, the MRC module in the S3 path depends on the memory configuration data, and the memory configuration data must be saved in a secure place. The solution is to save the configuration to a UEFI variable and lock it by using the EDKII_VARIABLE_LOCK_PROTOCOL. Since this variable is read-only after EndOfDxe, the integrity of the memory configuration data is maintained. See Figure 9-10.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig11_HTML.png
Figure 9-10

Read-Only Variable Usage for Memory Configuration Data

Coprocessor-Based LockBox

Besides a local TEE-based LockBox, a secure coprocessor such as an AMD Platform Secure Processor (PSP) may also help to save and restore the silicon configuration.

The AMD PSP is an ARM-based processor that resides in the same chipset as the AMD64 cores. In the S3 suspend action, after an SMI handler traps the S3 command, the SMI handler notifies the PSP of the S3 entry event. The PSP saves the CPU core context. Then the SMI handler sends the S3 command to the system. During S3 resume, the PSP restores the S3 save state of the CPU core and then transfers control to the BIOS and continues the S3 resume path. Figure 9-11 shows the AMD PSP–assisted S3 resume flow.
../images/488723_1_En_9_Chapter/488723_1_En_9_Fig12_HTML.png
Figure 9-11

AMD PSP–Assisted S3 Resume

Attack and Mitigation

Now, let’s take a look at some real cases for the LockBox attack and mitigation.

Missing LockBox Protection

Some firmware implementations include the register lock in the S3 boot script. If the script is not protected, the attacker may modify the boot script to inject some malicious opcode or remove the lock register access in the S3 resume. The boot script must be saved into the LockBox.

Besides the boot script, if the firmware uses the DISPATCH OPCODE, the firmware should also save the image that produces the DISPATCH EntryPoint to the LockBox and save the context data to the LockBox. Otherwise, the attacker can modify the DISPATCH function to inject malicious code.

Incorrect LockBox Attribute

The LockBox should also be used to save secrets used during S3 resume, such as hard disk storage passwords. For secrets like these, the LockBox must use the LOCK_BOX_ATTRIBUTE_RESTORE_IN_S3_ONLY attribute. Otherwise, the attacker may dump the LockBox content during normal boot.

Missing Register Lock

During normal boot, some silicon registers are locked to maintain the system integrity such as SMRAM lock and flash lock. The same registers must be locked during S3 resume as well. Otherwise, the attacker can trigger a S3 resume to put the system into an unsafe state.

A platform may use the PEI S3 resume code to lock the registers or put the lock action in the boot script. Using the code in the flash to lock the register is highly recommended because it does not depend on boot script protection.

Summary

In this chapter, we discussed the S3 resume path and focused on LockBox design. In the next chapter, we will discuss access control in the firmware.

References

Conference, Journal, and Paper

[P-1] Jiewen Yao, Vincent Zimmer, “A Tour Beyond BIOS Implementing S3 Resume with EDK II,” Intel Whitepaper 2015, https://github.com/tianocore-docs/Docs/raw/master/White_Papers/A_Tour_Beyond_BIOS_Implementing_S3_resume_with_EDKII_V2.pdf

[P-2] Roger Lai, “AMD Secure and Server Innovation,” in UEFI Plugfest 2013, available at www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_PlugFest_AMD_Security_and_Server_innovation_AMD_March_2013.pdf

[P-3] Rafal Wojtczuk, Corey Kallenberg, “Attacks on UEFI Security,” in CanSecWest 2015, available at https://cansecwest.com/slides/2015/AttacksOnUEFI_Rafal.pptx

[P-4] Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, Yuriy Bulygin, Andrew Furtak, Mikhail Gorobets, John Loucaides, Alex Matrosov, Mickey Shkatov, “Attacking and Defending BIOS in 2015,” in RECon 2015, available at www.c7zero.info/stuff/AttackingAndDefendingBIOS-RECon2015.pdf

[P-5] Yuriy Bulygin, Mikhail Gorobets, Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, Andrew Furtak, “FRACTURED BACKBONE: BREAKING MODERN OS DEFENSES WITH FIRMWARE ATTACKS,” in BlackHat US 2017, www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/wednesday/us-17-Bulygin-Fractured-Backbone-Breaking-Modern-OS-Defenses-With-Firmware-Attacks.pdf

Specification and Guideline

[S-1] UEFI Organization, “ACPI Specification,” 2019, available at www.uefi.org/

[S-2] UEFI Organization, “UEFI Platform Initialization Specification,” 2019, available at www.uefi.org/

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