When a manufacturer or resource development company wants to build a new facility or refurbish an old one, the owner personnel put together the business case for the new project, develop a scope for the project, and assemble the preliminary design. If the facilities require a good deal of exacting engineering, an engineering contractor usually performs the final stage of preparation on the engineering side, while owner personnel put together the execution plan. Few companies in the process industries¹ maintain the people resources needed to engineer the final stage of preparation on their own. After owner authorization, a contractor will be required to execute the detailed engineering, and that contractor will also usually procure all of the major equipment and the engineered materials for the project. The owner will require a construction contractor to build the facility. Contractors may or may not be involved in the commissioning and startup of the facilities depending on the skills and preferences of the owner.

The process of figuring out how the contractors will be selected, how they will be paid, how much work any one contractor will do on the project, and the legal framework under which the work will be done (the contract terms and conditions) is what we call contracting strategy. For reasons that will become obvious, the owner must form the contracting strategy for a project early in project development or the contracting decisions will be entirely tactical and expedient rather than strategic and thoughtful.

For some, contracting strategy is a matter of strongly held beliefs that sometimes resist any appeal to facts. This point was underscored for me recently when I asked a project system director of a large, publicly owned airport if he wanted to join a study of contracting strategies for airport projects we were proposing. His answer “No! I know integrated project delivery² is the best contracting approach, and I don't want anybody trying to prove otherwise!” For many others, the contracting strategy followed on any particular project is more accident than design. By the time contracting strategy is broached as an issue with an owner project team, it is often too late in project development to make any changes: “Well, we are just doing what we always do.” Or my favorite response: “We are just doing what the FEED³ contractor suggested.”

Employing engineering and construction contractors to execute a project may not seem like an inherently difficult task. As individuals, we hire professional service firms all the time—doctors, lawyers, dentists, and so forth. Hiring engineering and construction contractors is much more difficult for a number of reasons. Projects are joint products of an owner and the contractors. It is not a simple matter to parse out who is responsible for what, even in retrospect. As projects get larger and more complex, control of the project and the contractors' performance becomes progressively more difficult. The lack of transparency gives rise to endless variations on the “principal‐agent” problem, which, as we will later discuss fully, is the problem that sits at the heart of contracting. Finally, the contracting entity for projects is not a person but an organization—a corporation—and exactly who makes the decision about the contracting strategy and process within that corporation often materially affects how well the decisions are made. Decision‐making responsibility is often assigned to the wrong entity within owner organizations or is assigned ambiguously.

My first goal for this book is to bring facts to the discussion of which contracting strategies work best and in what circumstances. Contracting strategy is the most difficult problem for most project managers. Contracting for engineering and construction services is always a combination of hoped for collaboration and feared conflict. For that reason, contracting strategy is less about the legalities of contracts and much more about human behavior. Some facts about what works should be the start of any contracting discussion, but owing to lack of reliable data, anecdote and opinion often have had to suffice as poor substitutes.

My second goal is to provide insight into why different contracting strategies produce different outcomes. That goal requires that we discuss the underlying principles that shape the effects of contracting strategy, for example, the principal‐agent problem, the principles of risk pricing and risk assignment, and the principles of sound project preparation by owners. A focus on the principles that underpin contracting is essential because the principles provide the basis against which we must test any particular contracting strategy. When a contracting strategy flouts a core principle, that contracting strategy will lead to grief.

My third and ultimate goal is that an accounting of the facts of what works and what does not in contracting for industrial projects might facilitate reform of the sorry state of owner/contractor relationships. It is an understatement to say things have not been going well. Many contractors are just barely profitable. Many owners are frustrated and unhappy with contractor performance. The problems are deeper than the current state of contractor demographics. My hope is that some focus on the facts will help start positive change.

Point of View: What Constitutes Success?

To have a coherent discussion of contracting, it is necessary to define what successful contracting means. Success, of course, is defined differently depending on who is defining it. Throughout this discussion, I will be considering the various dimensions of success and failure from the viewpoint of those investing in the asset that the project will create. Contractors may object that defining success in this manner leaves their welfare out of the picture. But upon reflection, I believe that contractors would have to agree that if a contracting strategy routinely produces poor‐quality, high‐cost assets in which contractors are the only ones making money, the model is not sustainable. Conversely, if an approach produces good results for owners, that approach is ultimately sustainable only if contractors are successful as well. The problem is mostly one of finding a stable mutually beneficial model.

I find that many owners as well as contractors wonder if the current engineering and construction market is a sustainable business model. I share that concern, which is one of the reasons I felt compelled to write this book. My position, which is supported by data throughout, is that the key weaknesses in the current market start with weaknesses in owner project organizations. Owner project organizations are too weak to create a stable, self‐enforcing business relationship between owners and contractors. Those driving the relationships on the owner side are frequently too transactional in their approach to foster a stable market. It is my hope that this book may help move the discussion toward more sustainable and robust relationships in the future. Just to be clear, however, I do not believe that gimmicky contracting approaches will accomplish that goal. The focus on project fundamentals must remain strong.

The Context

Contracting for a project must start with the project. How big is it? How many distinct elements of scope does it contain? Where is it going to be geographically? Geography is the single most important element in understanding the contractor market for most projects. How technically difficult is the project? Does the project use routine technology or require something new to the owner or even new to the industry? We will discuss all of these issues later as we explore how the project and the contracting strategy interact.

Next, we need to consider the competence of the owner projects organization to undertake this particular project. Does the owner have the personnel needed to front‐end load—fully define—this project? Does the owner have estimating, planning, and scheduling capability? Can the owner field a strong controls team? Does the owner have the capability to do quality control and inspection of engineering and construction? Has the owner built this sort of facility recently, and are those who remember that project still around? Owners with weak project organizations struggle with all forms of contracting, but some forms are poison for them. Blithely assuming that one can do anything by simply buying consultants, agency personnel, or individual contractors from the market suffers from the defect of not actually being true.

Defining the Elements of Contracting Strategy

Like any other aspect of project management, contracting requires a series of activities and decisions, which need to be supported by work processes that guide how things are done at a given owner company. I see seven major elements of contracting strategy, each of which needs to be navigated successfully. Often discussions of contracting strategy begin and end with the compensation scheme that will be used: fixed price (lump‐sum) or reimbursable. Although compensation scheme is important, it is but a single element in the mix, and compensation scheme is often dictated more by the market than by owner strategy.

• Structure: By phase and activity, how much work should any one contractor do? I consider structure to be considerably more important than the compensation scheme in understanding contracting. In many projects, a single contractor is asked to do all of the work from front‐end engineering right through startup. We dub this structure an “FEPC.”⁴ Alternatively, the owner could, in principle, select different contractors for every phase of the work: a FEED contractor, a detailed engineering contractor, a procurement contractor, a construction contractor, and lastly a commissioning and startup contractor. This is rarely done, but that doesn't mean it hasn't happened. Engineering and procurement of equipment and engineered materials are so intimately integrated that engineering and procurement are almost always structured together. However, separation of FEED, detailed engineering and procurement, and construction is quite common. Structure is important to project outcomes in ways that may be surprising. It is certainly more important than any other single feature of contracting. Structure is the primary topic in Chapters 3 through 6 and is an important consideration as we discuss incentives in Chapter 8.
• Compensation: For any given work, will the contractor be paid a fixed amount, or will the compensation be based on hours expended or “units” of work performed? Compensation scheme is often the feature that owners think about first, but it probably should be down the list of concerns. We come back to compensation in virtually every chapter of the book.
• Supplemental incentives: Closely related to the basic compensation model is the decision to use additional incentives or not. Years of research into the application of incentives in contracts has taught us that incentives rarely work the way owners think they will. We explore the use of supplemental incentives with data in Chapter 8.
• Contractor selection: By what process will contractors be selected? Contractor selection processes vary considerably from owner to owner and project to project. Some owners use rigorous prequalification processes, while others select primarily based on prior experience with the contractor. Some owners have formal competitions for all major projects, while others select with an unstructured process. The selection process should start with an effective prequalification process, which we discuss in Chapter 7.
• Packaging: How will different physical work scopes be bundled? Smaller projects tends to have only a single scope package or possibly two. Very large projects have little choice but to have multiple scope packages, also called the vertical splits of work, because there is too much work for a single contractor to take on or because different parts of the work require very different skill sets. Packaging is discussed in Chapter 11 when we discuss how contracting effectiveness is affected by project scale.
• Risk assignment: How do the terms and conditions in the contract allocate responsibilities between the owner and a contractor? This really comes down to the owner philosophy toward risk and negotiation with the contractor about which risks belong to whom. In risk assignment, the compensation scheme and the terms and conditions are both important contributors.
• Control of the contracting process: The contracting process within owner companies often suffers from the problem of too many cooks in the kitchen, all of whom think they are the chef. A number of owner functions need to be involved, but only one can be in charge. I will argue in Chapter 10 that it is often the wrong one.

The Organization of the Book

When planning the writing of this book, one of the things I learned very quickly is that contracting does not lend itself to a neat chronological narrative. Instead of moving along in a line, the story tends to spread out rather like Bruce Springsteen's “river that don't know where it's goin'.” While hoping to keep the subject within some banks, here is how it is laid out:

Chapter 1 discusses what I see as the 10 key principles of contracting. Contracting strategies that violate a key principle are likely to be unsuccessful. Sometimes owners and contractors are violating a key principle without even being aware of it. When thinking about a contracting strategy, test it against the 10 principles.

Chapter 2 presents the database and methodology. My editor always wants this data stuff in an appendix, but I argue it is too central to relegate to a place no one will go. The data help tell the story of contracting and do so in a way that is unique. The methodology is straightforward enough, and especially so for readers familiar with Independent Project Analysis, Inc. (IPA).⁵ I will do my best to explain for those who are not.

Chapter 3 starts by defining the six most common contractual forms for industrial projects. It also introduces what many readers may find a peculiar way of thinking about different forms; I argue that how we structure the amount of work given to a contractor is considerably more important than how we pay the contractor. In Chapter 3 we get to the heart of the matter: how do the most common contracting strategies affect project outcomes? The outcome that most project, C‐suite, and business⁶ professionals care about most is cost, and the story there is really quite interesting. We look at schedule as well and then look at projects with different drivers—schedule‐driven projects and compliance‐driven projects.

Chapter 4 explores why different contract forms behave the way they do. And Chapter 4 addresses what I consider one of the great paradoxes of contracting: why do owners so often choose contracting strategies that contribute materially to poor results?

Chapter 5 is devoted to unusual EPC contracting strategies: functional (duty) specification contracting, design competitions, convert‐to‐EPC‐LS, and Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP). As we will see, some of the strategies are not used often for good reasons, but others are good performers that are overlooked and underappreciated.

Chapter 6 discusses three more unusual strategies for industrial projects: integrated project delivery (IPD)/alliancing, partnering alliances, and repeat supply chain contracting. IPD seeks to use contractual arrangements and language to foster improved collaboration between owners and contractors on a one‐off basis. Partnering alliances use both the contractual arrangements and active relationship management to support collaboration over multiple projects. Repeat supply chain effectiveness is supported, not by additional contract language and agreements, but by careful relationship development and maintenance over time and multiple projects.

In Chapter 7 we take up contractor selection and in particular contractor prequalification. Failures in prequal often start our contracting headaches for a project. If we can fix prequal, then contractor selection will go better and be a bit less perilous.

Chapter 8 is about trying to deal with the core problem in contracting: the principal‐agent conundrum and the silver bullet that some owners believe they have in their guns: the use of various incentive schemes to supplement the incentives of the basic contract. We will discuss such schemes at some length and explore whether and how they work.

Chapter 9 is about risk allocation and risk pricing. Every contract assigns responsibilities to the parties. If the contract is well crafted, those responsibilities are accompanied with downside risks for nonperformance. But projects are intrinsically joint products of owners, contractors, and other vendors and suppliers. The joint product nature of projects often makes the risk assignment messy, imprecise, and downright confusing. Further complicating the problem is that owners often want to shift as much risk as possible onto the contractors and often believe that doing so is smart business. Contractors in turn want to avoid as much risk as possible; they know that is smart business! Further complicating risk allocation is the fact that owners and contractors are usually very different in their abilities to carry financial risk. Industrial owners are highly capitalized firms; contractors are very thinly capitalized.

Chapter 10 addresses one of the thorniest questions within owner organizations—who should control project contracting? My answers will ensure that some readers will hate me; my modest ambition is that everyone won't.

In Chapter 11, we discuss how the effectiveness of various contracting strategies changes with the scale of the project and the role of packaging the scopes of work and the complications that multiple scope packages create. Many of our worst contracting problems are with large projects. Finding strategies that do not degrade seriously with project size is an important consideration.

We conclude in Chapter 12 with a review of what I believe are the most important conclusions. I offer my recommendations to owners on the development and articulation of their contracting strategies. There will be no silver bullet, and the implementation of changes in contracting approach may be quite difficult for some organization as it may require building people infrastructure before changes can take hold. But the potential payoff is huge—over the long term getting project contracting strategies right may be the difference between company success and failure.

I have never met a project manager who thought that the process of hiring the right contractors for a project was fun. One told me, “Contracting is like second marriages: a triumph of hope over experience.” I have found many project professionals and owner purchasing folks who believed passionately in some particular form of contracting but rarely the same form of contracting. And as one PM said wryly, “The worst contractor ever was the one on the last project, and the best contractor ever will be the one on the next project.” He dubbed his position “realistic optimism.”

I don't think the contractors like the process any better. They spend a great deal of time and emotional energy putting together bids or proposals for projects, often knowing that their chances of winning are low. They often feel they must say things that are borderline implausible about the owner's capabilities and shoddy front‐end work and their ability to work around it so they will not be kicked out of the competition. And all that for a “hand‐to‐mouth” existence.

Everybody agrees, it isn't easy! Regrettably, this book cannot promise to make contracting easy, but we can at least bring systematic facts to the discussion and hope to clear away some of the dense fog surrounding the subject. If you, the reader, agree that end is accomplished, I will consider it a success.

The Applicability of This Book

As I will discuss in the next chapter, the data that underpin my discussion are all drawn from industrial projects, that is, projects that produce products to be sold in hope of making an economic profit. I believe, however, that the results of our analysis and the conclusions drawn apply to all projects, but with some caveats.

A good deal of our discussion deals with the cost effectiveness of different contracting strategies. To the extent that cost is not a concern for a class of projects, the conclusions regarding cost effectiveness are simply not relevant. However, adherence to cost budgets is relevant for virtually all projects everywhere, so conclusions about cost predictability of different strategies still apply.

Broadly speaking, I believe the conclusions in this book apply to public‐sector infrastructure projects as fully as to industrial projects. However, public projects tend to have what in the industrial sector we would call weak owners. A weak owner is one in which the owner does not maintain a sufficient number of experienced project staff and lacks the work processes that are characteristic of successful project systems.