Elevators often interface access control systems to control access to specific floors for each user, but they can also be used to prevent intruders from accessing controlled areas of the building. Years ago I designed security for a very high end residential tower in Los Angeles that housed a large number of celebrities, families of foreign heads of state, a couple of CEOs of major firms, and others who wanted and expected privacy. One of the celebrities had been stalked by a violent person. Another concern was that of civil disorder (protests) against a couple of the CEOs, whose industries were the target of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). Animal Liberation Front (ALF), and Earth First!. All of these are on the FBI's Watch List for radical activist groups. Both have used (to put it mildly) aggressive tactics against individuals who were related to organizations that these activist groups opposed. A typical tactic of these groups was to storm the lobby of the target and swarm all over security overwhelming the one or two people at the security desk and then charge up stairs and elevators to the floor of their target to confront him directly.

These residents wanted security and lots of it. But they also wanted it to be discrete. To counter the anticipated lobby protests I first suggested that stairwell exit doors exit to the outside of the building rather than to the lobby, and that those doors have no hardware on the outside, making it impossible to use the doors normally to gain entrance to the stairwell. I also designed a “Duress Switch” at the Lobby Security Desk that could be activated by the security guard if a group of protestors stormed the lobby. When the Duress Switch was triggered, it automatically put the elevators into “fire recall mode.” This brought all lifts to the ground floor lobby and kept them there, unable to respond to any command from within the lift to go up or respond to calls from upper floors. This effectively isolated the lobby (and thus the protestors) from the rest of the building. An alert was sent to building residents advising them of the protest and each unit was equipped with a video intercom that could see the lobby so they could know what was going on. Triggering the Duress Switch also automatically called the police.

Once triggered, a key from the building engineer was required to reset the alarm and thus the elevator to normal operating mode. The building engineer was not, of course, stationed in the lobby.

All of these functions were triggered by the Alarm/Access Control System, which was interfaced by dry contacts to the Elevator Controller, Phone Dialer, and the Recorded Announcement to individual units and to the Video Intercom System.

In modern high-rise buildings stairwells are the primary means of exit during a fire emergency. It is very important to keep the stairwells free of smoke to aid in the exit. To do this, stairwell doors are operated by automatic closers, and all stairwell doors are equipped with latching locks to make sure that smoke cannot enter the stairwell. Additionally, the Building Automation System supervises the HVAC system to maintain a higher air pressure within the stairwell than exists in adjacent hallways and floor spaces so that smoke cannot enter the stairwell. Obviously, it is important to keep doors closed to maintain the stairwell pressurization.

One building I worked on had a pair of stairwell doors at the ground floor where one entered the stairwell from a corridor off the building lobby and the other was an exit to an employee parking lot. It was common for employees to take smoke breaks just outside this door. Although the door was equipped with an access card reader, lock, alarm, and electrified panic hardware, invariably one person in the group would forget his/her access card, so there was a habit of wedging the door open for re-entry without a card.

This was not only a security violation, but also a fire code violation because it compromised the stairwell pressurization and presented the possibility that if a fire broke out, smoke could fill the stairwell.

The fix was to combine the Alarm/Access Control System with the Building Automation System to create a function that was not (at that time) available on the Alarm/Access Control System. Here is how the function worked:

This is just one example of how BMS and Alarm/Access Control Systems can work together to do more than either could alone.

Most commercial building lighting systems are controlled by BMS. These are used to turn overhead lights on and off on a schedule corresponding to the hours of occupancy.

However, when a computer programmer is called late at night to come fix a software problem, he/she needs a safe lighted path to and from the car to the office and the server room. It would also be nice to have snacks available if one hour turns into ten (as it often does with these things).

Using the BMS and the Alarm/Access Control System one can design an interface that looks at the parking structure entry card reader, and using a Structured Query Language (SQL) database, determines the path from the car to the office and turns on lights between those points. It will also turn on lights for the workspace (including office and server room), light the restrooms and snack areas, and turn on power to the snack machines. These lights will stay on until the card is read exiting the parking structure (if still outside of working hours). If the HVAC system is needed, that will be turned on too.

The Access Control System feeds the SQL database with the data required to calculate the path (user name) and with a command to do so. The SQL database then sends a command to the BMS including turn on the following zones (along with the zones to turn on). This command is reversed if the user exits the parking structure after hours.

Direct Action Interfaces are good for simple commands and logic sequences such as the Local Alarm example regarding Stairwell Pressurization.

A Direct Action Interface is a simple one- or two-way interface that performs a predictable, repeatable function. The function will include basic inputs and outputs and may include counters and timers. These are all controlled by a simple logic cell.

In a Direct Action Interface, the Alarm/Access Control System will typically provide one or more dry contacts to the BMS, which will perform a logical function that may control HVAC, lights, or other devices. Feedback may be given to the Alarm/Access Control System if further action is needed. The function may be controlled by counters, timers, and work on a time schedule.

Proxy Action Interfaces are those that use one system to operate another. The most common form of a Proxy Action Interface is to use an SQL program and database to operate the BMS from the Alarm/Access Control System.

The use of SQL database and functions vastly expands what can be done and the number of variables available to control the functions. All of the examples below use Proxy Action Interfaces.

When systems are integrated one is the “initiating” system and the other(s) are the “commanded” system(s). With simple interfaces the initiating system commands the commanded system to perform a task, and that task is performed by the commanded system. Feedback Interfaces are those that provide information back to the initiating system about the status of or completion of the task commanded by the original interface trigger. Feedback interfaces can be of either the Direct Action type or the Proxy Action Type.

Irrigation systems are most often controlled by BMS. These can be used to deter and delay Threat Actors who have breached a fence and are moving over terrain. They also help assess the determination of the Threat Actors. Petty Actors will usually run away from sprinklers, determined Threat Actors will not (Figure 22.1).

For any environment such as an outdoor shopping mall, where competing gangs of criminal youths could engage in gunfire, nothing can immediately disperse a crowd quite like 10,000 gallons of water being dispensed in 60 seconds. Afterward, although people are most likely upset and drenched, the gunfire will probably have stopped and the perpetrators will likely have fled, thus dissipating the danger and protecting the innocent public from escalating gunfire between gang members (who after all are so well known for their concern for innocent bystanders).

Coupled with gunshot recognition software, pan/tilt/zoom (PZT) cameras can instantly zoom in on the offender, providing visual verification of the condition requiring action.

Deluge activation systems should only be installed after careful consideration and advice from legal counsel, but they may be appropriate for any venue where there is a potential or history of gunfire in public spaces.

Acoustic Weapons deter inappropriate users by making the environment uncomfortable to the offender (Figure 22.2).

I once successfully addressed gang activity near convenience stores by implementing outdoor speakers playing symphonic pop elevator music on satellite radio. This drives gangbangers totally nuts. The designer is advised to use bullhorn speakers enclosed in a vandal-deterrent cage. Bullhorns are recommended because they sound very bad. The music is not offensive to legitimate customers, who may be very mildly annoyed by the tinny sound quality, but it creates an environment that does not support the business model of intimidators and drug dealers.

A Welsh firm makes a near ultrasonic tone generator, amplifier, and piezo speaker that creates a sound at the very top of the human hearing range that sounds like fingernails on a chalkboard. This also drives young people crazy. Older people cannot hear it due to natural age-related, high-frequency hearing loss. This will not bother most young people who are shopping, but it becomes more obvious and annoying to those who simply loiter outside.

The Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) uses two ultrasonic frequencies separated by an audio signal to propel the audio signal at painful sound pressure levels in a straight line out to incredible distances. LRAD has successfully been used to deter pirate attacks on large sea vessels.

Essentially a Tesla coil on steroids — high-voltage weapons are a Taser™ for protecting buildings. Useful to disperse crowds, they emit an attention-getting amount of high-voltage at very low amperage all around the vicinity of the spike transducers.

Another version of this weapon is the spark-gap transmitter, which can be used in very high security facilities that are under severe risk of intrusion by very high risk Threat Actors. (Don't be too skeptical, these facilities exist all over the world.) Similar to its portable cousin the stun gun, the spark-gap transducer can be mounted on top of a protective perimeter fence at approximately ten foot intervals. When an intruder suspected of carrying satchel chargers or improvised explosive devices is attempting to make entry through the fence, and after detection and a video assessment of the situation and a polite verbal warning through a camera-mounted 30 Wt bullhorn, if this intruder continues to persist, the Console Officer and his/her supervisor can throw a pair of safety switches after selecting the appropriate fence zone, and all the spark gaps along that fence section ignite in a bright array of high-voltage arcs. If the intruder is carrying explosives and electrically activated detonators (the most common type), this display of high-voltage can also be accompanied by an explosion in the vicinity of the intruder, followed afterward by a repair of the fence. This approach is most appropriate in serious threat environments and in countries in which such methods are approved by the government. This approach is much less expensive than a helicopter gunship and requires less maintenance than automated guns.

Except for High-voltage Weaponry and some Deployable Barriers, most of the defeat technologies discussed above are non-lethal. When the asset value is exceptional or the risk of a successful attack to the public is high, and nothing else will get the job done, one can always rely on guns. At least two manufacturers make remotely operated weaponry. From 7.62 mm to twin 50 caliber guns and a range in between, remotely operated weapons are the final answer to intruders that just will not take no for an answer. These are products that couple a PTZ video camera with an appropriate weapon (Figure 22.3). They are available in either temporary or permanent installation versions, and are deployed in the United States at critical installations and also abroad.

It is wholly inappropriate to apply lethal or even less than lethal countermeasures in anything but a serious threat environment in which the asset under protection could cause very great harm (munitions, nuclear reactors, etc.) and in which adequate public safeguards are not possible. The use of any of these systems in an environment in which an innocent could be harmed is completely inappropriate. I have refused to employ them where the government requesting the countermeasure was of questionable moral ethics. They should also be used in close consultation with the manufacturer and under a waiver of liability.

The operation of such barriers and weapons should be limited to cirumstances in which multiple layers of security are in place and the intruder has demonstrated firm determination to proceed toward a goal of harming or destroying a critical asset. Adequate evidence can be achieved by either the amount of force used or the determination with which the intruder continues undeterred by instructions toward the asset. If the attacker has or uses lethal force, it is arguably appropriate to defend with lethal force. If the intruder continues through other deployed barriers and refuses verbal instructions, it is reasonable to assume that he/she will be undeterred by mild measures.

In any case, the system should be configured with adequate operational safeguards to absolutely prevent accidental deployment. This typically requires a deployment action by both an operator and a supervisor or some action by the intruder that is unmistakably hostile and will result in the death of innocents, such as driving a large truck full of explosives toward a Marine barracks compound at 5:00 a.m. at high speed past a guard post.

For any REAPS technology that could cause bodily harm, it is imperative to build in deployment safety systems. These can be affected electronically, mechanically, and procedurally.

For non-lethal systems such as deployable doors, gates, grilles, and so forth, these measures are not necessary, since the deployment of a door is not an unusual or life-threatening event.