List of Figures and Tables
List of Figures
I.1. ARP4754A engineering processes
1.1. System composition, structure and environment
1.2. Concrete and abstract systems composition
1.3. Concrete and abstract systems environment
1.4. Representation of fictions (Arezzo Chimera and pi number)
1.5. Concrete and abstract objects
1.7. Systems involved in the systems engineering processes
2.2. Structure of technological system design
2.3. Function-behavior-structure framework
2.4. Function-behavior-structure relationships
3.1. Conceptual knowledge classification
4.1. Sign, concept and represented object
4.2. Rosetta stone, signification and meaning
4.3. Page extracted from Voynish manuscript
4.4. Sentence, proposition and fact
4.6. Law statement, nomological proposition and factual law
4.8. Object model and theoretical model
4.9. Fault tree representation
4.10. Reliability block diagram
5.1. ARP4754A engineering processes
5.2. EIA632 system breakdown structure
5.3. EIA632 building block requirement definition subprocess
5.4. EIA632 building block solution definition subprocess
5.5. EIA632 building block design processes
5.6. ARP4754A safety assessment and system development process integration
5.7. EIA 632 design process extended to safety assessment topics
6.1. EIA632 building block requirement definition subprocess
6.2. EIA632 system specification architecture
6.3. Airfoil structural properties and related PBR
6.4. Interpretation: a process from TBR to PBRs
6.5. Some PBRs linking inputs and outputs of an air data computer
6.6. Some PBRs linking inputs and outputs of an aircraft fuel systemE
6.7. Canonical graphical representation of a system
6.8. System specification model
7.1. EIA632 building block solution definition subprocess
7.4. Fuel system behavioral design model
7.6. “Feeding the engines” functional chain
7.7. Basic system model including an equation design model
7.10. Fuel system structural design model
7.11. EIA632 system design process
8.1. ARP4754A validation and verification processes connection
8.2. ARP4754A validation process model
8.3. Specification model tree validation
8.4. System specification model exactification process by simulation
8.5. Subsystem specification model validation process by simulation
8.6. Graphical representation of a specification model
9.1. Implementation verification process regarding specifications
9.2. ARP4754A verification process model
9.4. System model verification bench
9.5. System model integration verification bench
9.6. EIA632-based system verification process
10.1. ARP4754A safety assessment process
10.2. Failure, fault and error
10.3. EIA632 requirement definition process extended to safety aspects
10.4. Interpretation of FAR29.1309(b)(2) and systems FHA
10.5. Baro-altimeter specification model
10.6. Fault-tolerant baro-altimeter specification model
10.7. EIA632 solution definition process extended to safety aspects
10.8. SDM virtual component computing failure rates
10.9. SDM virtual component computing DAL
10.10. Reliability design model b) derived from a baro-altimeter structural design model a)
10.11. Extended EIA 632 design process model
11.1. PMM system development process
11.2. Colossus with feet of clay in Nebuchadnezzar’s dream
11.3. System specification model
11.4. CAS specification model of intended functions
11.5. CAS protected volume and local environment representation
11.6. CAS specification model PBRs
A1.1. PMM workbench conceptual design
A1.2. Front-end main window and views on PMM models
A1.4. Function and PBR graphical editor
A1.5. Equation design model view
A1.6. Behavioral design model view
A1.7. Process graphical editor
A1.8. Structural design model view
A1.9. System model and specification and design tree
A1.10. Component-block binding in system model editor
List of Tables
1.1. Endo and exo-structure for concrete and abstract systems
6.1. Document-centric versus model-centric paradigms
6.2. Tolerances on computed altitude by an ADC required by the SAE-AS8002A
8.1. Validation case for a level of rigor consistent with no safety effect (NSE)
8.2. Validation case for a hardened level of rigor
10.1. Failure rate classification according to AC29.1309.b(1)
10.2. Failure condition severity definitions according to AC29.1309.b(2)
10.3. Safety objectives for installed systems according to AC29.1309.b(3)(ii)
10.4. Top-level function FDAL assignment according to ARP4754A
10.5. Examples of system design patterns considered for safety aspects