Chapter 4
Existential Dimensions of Positive Psychology

ROGER BRETHERTON

This chapter addresses what may seem at first glance to be an unlikely theoretical and practical collaboration, that of existential thought with positive psychology. It argues that there are numerous correspondences and potentially fruitful connections between these two broad intellectual movements and that there is much mutual enrichment to be gained from their cross-fertilization. Indeed, as noted herein, some of the most illuminating concepts in positive psychology bear a distinctly existential inflection. Positive psychology is often at its best when it is most existential. For the sake of argument, some provisional definitions of terms may be useful at the outset.

Positive psychology in this chapter, as in much of the present volume, is taken to mean the movement initiated largely at the turn of the 21st century (though evident prior to that), spearheaded most notably by Martin Seligman during his year as president of the American Psychological Association (see Linley, Joseph, Harrington, & Wood, 2006). As frequently reiterated, positive psychology is concerned most particularly with the psychology of what makes the good, pleasurable, and meaningful life (Seligman, 2003), and is expressed in terms such as thriving, flourishing, and happiness. It is on the whole an empirical approach, seeking to use the research methods of mainstream psychology to investigate the length and breadth of human thriving, and therefore it submits to the received view of scientific knowledge, progressing by peer review and replication.

It could also to some extent be viewed as a protest movement against the tendency in certain forms of mainstream psychology to predominantly address psychological problems, under the assumption that it is these less salutary aspects of being human that are most essential or important for study (Jørgensen & Nafstad 2004; see also Nafstad, Chapter 2, this volume). According to Seligman (2003), “the ‘rotten-to-the-core’ view pervades Western thought, and if there is any doctrine positive psychology seeks to overthrow it is this one” (p. 126). Positive psychology aimed to correct this bias and, judging by the proliferation of attendant teaching, research, and writing, has to a large extent succeeded (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005).

The Internal Diversity of the Existential Approach

The existential approach on the other hand is more problematic to define, but nevertheless, retains definite contours as a movement. Much of this chapter draws on the practitioners who have drawn on existential thinking in the development of therapeutic practice, but it could be argued that there is no single “existential psychotherapy” as such, and hence reviews of the field have taken to referring to the existential therapies (Cooper, 2003). Furthermore, existentially influenced practitioners are increasingly stretching their influence into areas of workplace coaching, supervision, and organizational development (e.g., Langdridge, 2012; Spinelli, 2010; van Deurzen & Hanaway 2012; van Deurzen & Young, 2009). The existential influence in psychology is broader than just psychotherapy; nevertheless, several features unify the spectrum of those who presume to call their therapeutic practice existential.

Primarily existential practitioners are philosophical in orientation (van Deurzen-Smith, 1984). They are interested in the ways in which a person's understanding of life influences and constructs his or her quality of living. In doing so they therefore draw on a rich philosophical background, biased most notably, but not exclusively, toward the mid-20th century “existentialists.” Ironically, very few of them were willing to be called by that name, but the term is widely accepted to include Martin Buber, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, to name but a few of them. According to Warnock (1970), the common interest that unites these philosophers is the interest in human freedom:

For Existentialists the problem of freedom is in a sense a practical problem. They aim above all, to show people that they are free, to open their eyes to something which has always been true, but which for one reason or another may not always have been recognized, namely that men are free to choose, not only what to do on a specific occasion, but what to value and how to live. (Warnock, 1970, pp. 1–2)

This boom in existential thinking in the 1940s and 50s was anticipated by earlier thinkers such as Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). And they in turn reached further back to other philosophers of existential inclination (Plato, Aristotle, Saint Augustine, among others). What these earlier philosophers held in common with their 20th-century counterparts, and contemporary existential psychotherapists, was a thoughtful approach to the matters of everyday life.

From Socrates to Sartre and ever since, therefore, existential thinkers are concerned with how life is to be lived well. Their writings are therefore overtly psychotherapeutic, a theme developed by van Deurzen (1998) in contending that the etymology of the word psychotherapy leads to a literal translation of care for the soul, “for in ancient Greek the noun psyche means soul or life force and the verb therapeuo means to care for or to serve…to the notion of caring or looking after” (p. 134). Existential thinkers write and speak to challenge their audience, to change and awaken them. They address us directly about our “existence,” that is, the way in which we (you and I) as human beings emerge, stand out, and take responsibility for our living.

This chapter therefore draws from across the range of contemporary existential thought and therapy. While the author is most influenced by the ever-broadening British school of existential therapy (Adams, 2013; Langdridge, 2013; Spinelli, 2007; van Deurzen, 2012), the term existential approach will be used to denote concepts or practices derived from theorists and therapists from the existential tradition in its broadest sense.

The Diffuse Influence of Existential Thinking

There is a further reason, however, beyond its wide-ranging internal diversity, that makes a definition of the existential approach difficult to pin down: the surprisingly large swath of its influence in modern therapeutic psychology. It was once said of Carl Rogers that his impact on the fields of psychology, psychotherapy, education, and human relations could be variously described as “momentous, persuasive, indirect or elusive” (Thorne, 2003, p. 44). The same could be said of existential thinking; its influence is ubiquitous in therapeutic psychology, but often anonymous.

First, there are numerous instances in which existential therapy, rather than standing alone, has been merged with other therapeutic approaches. Perhaps the first example of such occurred in 1929 when Ludwig Binswanger, a psychiatrist and lifelong friend of Sigmund Freud, first met Martin Heidegger and initiated the development of an approach designed to analyze a person's existential position via psychoanalytic methodology (Cohn, 2002). Three decades later, R. D. Laing's (1960) infamous early phenomenology of schizophrenia drew on a creative synthesis of existential concepts and developmental psychology (Laing, 1960; Laing & Esterson, 1964), and subsequently paved the way for contemporary psychological understandings of psychosis (Bentall, 2004). In the United States, the existential approach to psychotherapy achieved prominence largely due to the impressive translation into English, overseen by Rollo May, of various European scholars such as Binswanger (May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1958). The explicitly labeled “existential psychotherapy” of May (1983) and Irvin Yalom (1980) integrated the influence of psychodynamic and humanistic psychotherapy with existential insight. Yalom drew attention to the collaborative potential of the existential approach in referring to it as the “off the record…throw-ins” (Yalom, 1980, p. 4) that made therapy work. His belief was that “the vast majority of experienced therapists, regardless of their adherence to some other ideological school, employ many of the existential insights I shall describe” (Yalom, 1980, p. 5).

Yalom's assertion is further borne out by an examination of the numerous approaches that carry existential assumptions implicitly without necessarily taking an existential title. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the close association of existential psychotherapy with the humanistic perspective (Sanders, 2012), Carl Rogers expressed his indebtedness to existential thought in noting “how accurately the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard pictured the dilemma of the individual more than a century ago, with keen psychological insight” (Rogers, 1961, p. 110), and how in Kierkegaard he found “deep insights and convictions which beautifully express views I have held but never been able to formulate” (p. 199). Aaron Beck, referring to the origination of cognitive therapy, acknowledged that European existential-phenomenological psychiatry had “substantially influenced the development of modern psychology in this group of psychotherapies” (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979, p. 9). In addition, anyone schooled in existential thought would quickly recognize the phenomenology of awareness presented in Fritz Perls's introduction to Gestalt psychotherapy (Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1951). Although these approaches may not be labeled existential as such, they nevertheless bear the mark, and thereby testify to the enormous but subtle influence of existential thinking on therapeutic psychology.

What is perhaps even more pertinent in the present context, however, is a similarly pronounced existential influence evident in positive psychology. Many prominent foci of the positive psychology movement are knowingly influenced by existential thinking. An example is the research conducted by Emmons and his collaborators. It is suffused with existential philosophy and insight. His work on strivings in human personality borrows the term “ultimate concerns” from existential theologian Paul Tillich (1957), and he even goes as far as to state that the central theme of the work can be summed up by this concept (Emmons, 1999). Similarly, his extensive research on gratitude acknowledges Heidegger's equivalence of “thinking” with “thanking” as an indication that gratitude “is not for the intellectually lethargic” (Emmons, 2007, p. 5).

Other areas of positive psychology also liberally draw on sources in the existential canon. From its outset, the posttraumatic growth literature has recognized existential themes in both theory and therapeutic outcome (Tedeschi, Park, & Calhoun, 1998; see also Tedeschi, Calhoun, & Groleau, Chapter 30, this volume), and one state-of-the-art volume on the subject quotes Nietzsche in its title (Joseph, 2011). Even more fundamentally, the continual dialogue in positive psychology circles concerning the relative costs and benefits of hedonic versus eudaimonic well-being (e.g., Biswas-Diener, Kashdan, & King, 2009; Kopperud & Vittersø, 2008; Vittersø & Søholt, 2011; Waterman, 2008; see also Huta, Chapter 10, this volume) mirrors a similarly vibrant discussion within the existential literature (van Deurzen, 2009).

It is therefore not the vagueness of the existential approach that makes it difficult to define, but rather the pervasive subtlety of its influence in psychology. Far from being absent from positive psychology, existential thinking can be found everywhere therein, and that is a good thing. Indeed, this chapter contends that paying greater attention to the existential dimensions of positive psychology enriches, expands, and deepens the field.

The Existential Emphasis on Tragedy

Nevertheless, in spite of the conceptual interpenetration of these respective approaches, we should anticipate some objections to the notion that existential psychotherapy in its fullest sense has much to offer the field of positive psychology, not the least of which would be the dour reputation of existentialism. Whereas positive psychology has addressed itself to the happy, good, and meaningful life, existential therapy has stressed the bleaker side of life, summed up in Yalom's (1980) four ultimate concerns of death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness. It has sometimes been argued that, in addressing the more unpalatable domains of human living, existential thinkers and therapists have in some way magnified, exacerbated, and perhaps even celebrated the suffering involved, leading one commentator to quip that this “is what earns existentialism its reputation for being depressive, despairing, and despondent [It] certainly attracts such personality types and often makes them worse” (Marinoff, 2003, p. 35). It was perhaps for good reason that Tillich (1952) dubbed existentialism “the courage to despair.” But he did not stop there; he called it “the courage to…despair…and to resist the radical threat of nonbeing by the courage to be as oneself” (Tillich, 1952, p. 140)—the courage to affirm oneself in the face of, and in spite of, despair.

It is a caricature to suggest that the existential approach is entirely gloomy. Among existential thinkers there are both optimistic and pessimistic inflections. In the domain of human relationships, for example, Sartre (1943) advocated a radically pessimistic view that arguably makes true human community nigh impossible, but others such as Martin Buber (1937, 1947) and Gabriel Marcel (1950, 1964) advocated more hopeful models of connection and commitment. Similar alternative positions can also be identified among existential thinkers as to whether meaning in life is found or created. In existential psychotherapy, this ambiguity is acknowledged by Yalom (1980) in naming his set of ultimate concerns; they could easily have been named in a more positive light. An existential approach is therefore not unanimously pessimistic, but neither is it avoidant of the tragic dimension of existence. On another occasion, Yalom (1989) phrased it as follows: “So much wanting. So much longing. And so much pain, so close to the surface, only minutes deep. Destiny pain. Existence pain. Pain that is always there, whirring continuously just beneath the membrane of life” (p. 3). It is therefore one of the contentions of existential thinking, and a fundamental tenet of its therapeutic practice, that directly facing the less glittering aspects of life can be a source of passion and courage in living. In writing of the sometimes painful process involved in this confrontation, May (1989) wrote that the client “should ordinarily go out more courageous after the interview, but courageous with the painful realization that his or her personality must be transformed. If the counseling has been more than superficial, he or she will feel shaken and probably unhappy” (p. 124). The existential approach suggests that a positive psychology can be found by exploring the difficulties of human living, not by avoiding them. This is not foreign territory for positive psychology; much of the psychology of hope (Snyder, 2000; see also Magyar-Moe & Lopez, Chapter 29, this volume), gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2004; see also Bono, Krakauer, & Froh, Chapter 33, this volume), and forgiveness (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2001; see also Fincham, Chapter 38, this volume), for example, resonate with similar notions of human magnificence in the face of adverse circumstances. Positive psychology knows a thing or two about dealing with the darker side of life, an insight eminently compatible with an existential perspective.

Methodological Incompatibility

Perhaps a more fundamental objection to the confluence of positive psychology and existential thought lies in the perceived methodological differences that characterize the two fields. Positive psychology methodologically belongs to mainstream psychology, preferring empirical scientific methodology to establish the credibility of its field (Seligman, 2003). Existential psychotherapy on the other hand has historically preferred to analyze human existence by phenomenological methods and reflective practice, sometimes referred to as discovery-oriented research (Mahrer & Boulet, 2004).

This distinction, however, runs the risk of caricaturing both movements. Positive psychology embraces numerous phenomenological and hermeneutic research ventures (e.g., Krause, Evans, Powers, & Hayward, 2012), and existential research, although continuing to encourage phenomenological approaches, has broadened into a wider range of methodologies in recent years. Existential psychotherapists are prominent in researching therapeutic practice in the United Kingdom (Cooper, 2008), and several introductory texts include reviews of relevant empirical literature from mainstream psychology (Jacobsen, 2008; Langdridge, 2013). Furthermore, there is an increasing range of empirical psychology that addresses issues familiar to the existential tradition, such as death anxiety under the remit of terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg &Arndt, 2011), and several empirically based volumes on the human quest for meaning (Baumeister, 1991; Wong, 2012). The apparent methodological gulf between existentially informed research and positive psychology is therefore not as wide as initially perceived.

Related to this there is also a perceived difficulty in operationalizing what advocates of existential therapy actually do. Positive psychology tends to be attentive to the kind of predictable, replicable results that lend themselves to the design of technical interventions. Positive psychologists are not cautious about adapting their findings into short instructional manuals, a good recent example being the 21-day “emotional prosperity” program developed on the basis of gratitude research (Emmons, 2013). In contradistinction, existential psychotherapy is ambivalent about the notion of objectivized techniques. It is chary of alienating a person from his or her lived experience by the prescription of a set of objectivized skills, and it suspects that a technical approach to therapy may somehow violate the way in which the client chooses to emerge in the session (Cohn, 2002).

Nevertheless, there are several examples of existential therapists working hard to put what they do into words without necessarily naming them techniques as such. From the outset, Yalom (1980) adopted a practical onus in his elaboration of the approach and more recently condensed his profound therapeutic insight into a series of pithy chapters for would-be therapists (Yalom, 2009). Even practitioners in the British school, while acknowledging the inherent ambiguity therein, have creatively framed the practice of existential psychotherapy in terms of the skills involved (van Deurzen & Adams, 2010). It may be difficult to put what existential practitioners do into words, but it is not impossible, and this possibility clears the way for further consideration of the contribution of existential thought to positive psychological practice.

Positive Psychology and Existential Thought in Practical Collaboration

The gap between theory and practice, so it is said, is much greater in practice than it is in theory. Largely due to their investment in figuring out everyday concerns, existential thinkers have abjured any clear-cut division between the theoretical and the practical. Their writings are littered with references to the sheer practicality of good thinking. Sartre rhapsodized that “the truth drags through the streets” (cited in Kearney, 1994, p. 3) and Kierkegaard (1849/1989) insisted that his writing was “like a physician's lecture beside the sick bed” (p. 35), delivered with the aim of assisting the patient. In other words, their philosophy was intended to be lived. This section addresses some specific ways in which an existential approach can collaborate with positive psychology in practice, with special reference to the burgeoning psychology of character strengths and virtues.

The Existential Contribution to Values, Strengths, and Virtues

Given the philosophical nature of existential psychotherapy, one of the most evident areas of mutual interest with positive psychology concerns notions of moral values, strengths, and virtues, and how these can be developed in human lives. From a positive psychology point of view, the emergence of the study of strength and virtue was an important development and was central to the core of the movement. The compilation of Peterson and Seligman's (2004) taxonomy of virtues was an intentional replacement of negative diagnostic criteria of pathology with characteristics of human flourishing, or as the authors phrased it, “a manual of the sanities” (p. 3). Since then, other similar taxonomies of virtue have been developed (Linley, Willars, Biswas-Diener, Garcea, & Stairs, 2010; Post & Neimark, 2007), and a broad psychometric literature has grown up around these salutary qualities (Furnham & Lester, 2012; Linley et al., 2007; Shryack, Steger, Krueger, & Kallie, 2010; VIA Pro, 2004). As a consequence, the focus on strength and virtue, as opposed to pathology and disorder, has become one of the hallmarks of positive psychology, as evidenced in its ubiquitous application in therapeutic (Niemiec, Rashid, & Spinella, 2012) and coaching (Linley & Harrington, 2006) interventions.

Existential psychotherapy in its various guises has likewise been concerned with the strengths and virtues of human living. Similarly to this area of positive psychology, existential psychotherapy, unlike many therapeutic approaches, begins not with a model of pathology to be solved, but with the predicaments of human living to be navigated skillfully, summed up poetically by van Deurzen (1998) as the “paradox and passion” of life. It addresses itself to the question of what makes life worth living. It views living as a skill, and therapy as a tutorial or seminar in the art of living well (van Deurzen, 2012). Like many strengths interventions, it proceeds by clarifying the values by which an individual lives and thereby facilitates his or her commitment to them.

Value and Virtues: Distinct but Linked

The existential vantage point therefore has a lot to offer strengths psychology. From a philosophical point of view, existential therapists would be quick to draw a distinction between the notion of value and that of virtue. In Western philosophical history, it was Nietzsche who first broached the notion of self-made “value” as an explicit repudiation of “virtue”—the “tables of ethics” handed down from previous generations (Nietzsche, 1884/1961). A similar moral vision was formerly, but independently, articulated by Kierkegaard (1843/1985) as the “teleological suspension of the ethical” (p. 83) and was latterly elaborated in the works of Sartre (1948), Camus (1955), and others. Value for the existentialists was, among other things, a challenge to take responsibility for our moral decision making.

Virtue, on the other hand, has a different philosophical genealogy. The modern revival of virtue ethics was explicitly critical of the notion of values espoused by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre, particularly (MacIntyre, 1985). As is well known in both positive psychology and existential therapy, the current conception of virtue emerges from Aristotle. In this tradition, virtues are “goods internal to practices…within an ongoing social tradition” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 273), they are explicitly concerned with emotional regulation: feeling the right thing at the right time and embedded in a community that requires and values such virtues (Woodruff, 2001). “Virtue is the source of the feelings that prompt us to behave well. Virtue ethics takes feelings seriously because feelings affect our lives more deeply than beliefs do” (Woodruff, 2001, p. 6).

Conceptually speaking, therefore, value and virtue are distinct constructs. There is a conceptual tension here, a contradiction alluded to by MacIntyre (1985) when he posed the question, “Nietzsche or Aristotle?…The differences between the two run very deep” (pp. 256–259). But in practice, virtue and value are often linked; this connectedness is reflected in the psychometric literature in which the most prominent instrument for identifying strengths and virtues was originally named the Values in Action scale (VIA Pro, 2004). Virtues, it would seem, are the habits and postures we develop when pursuing that which we and/or our community value.

The existential emphasis therefore adds a note of caution to the strengths and virtues literature, a warning against reifying virtues, by treating them as entities or personality traits in their own right. It suggests that virtues are not givens but moral commitments or accomplishments, a perspective shared to some extent by much of the positive psychology literature. Failure to recognize this runs the risk of developing an inverted medical model in which diagnoses of anxiety or depression are supplanted by bestowals of humor or persistence in which virtues sound more akin to disease entities to be caught rather than the dynamic, wise practices they often are.

The existential approach therefore steers true to its philosophical roots in stressing the importance of not losing sight of human freedom in ethics and character development. It recognizes that we each have our biases and may be inclined toward certain virtues rather than others. But it also holds the door open to radical human freedom, whereby we may surprise ourselves through the development of previously unpracticed virtue, even though these breakthroughs may be accompanied by no small degree of anxiety. “The positive aspects of selfhood develop as the individual confronts, moves through, and overcomes anxiety creating experiences” (May, 1977, p. 393).

Traditions of Virtue

Alongside resisting the reification of virtues, existentially informed practice would be equally quick to reemphasize the importance of acknowledging the tradition behind virtues and character strengths. An existential approach would suggest that the history of strengths and virtues is not peripheral or incidental, but an essential part of our understanding and appreciation of them. In many respects, this view of history follows Heidegger's contention that history does not so much tell us of our past as much as demonstrate human possibilities open for us in the present:

History is concerned not with facts but with possibilities, that is to say, not with reconstructing events or chains of events in the past but with exploring the possibilities…that have been opened up in the course of history; and [Heidegger] claims further that history is interested not in the past but essentially in the future. It fetches from the past the authentic repeatable possibilities of existence in order to project them into the future. (Macquarrie, 1972, p. 230)

History inspires our future. The history of virtues, the various traditions in which they arise, is inextricable from our intention to develop them over the course of our lives.

In this regard, it was the existential polymath Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) who first identified the discrete portion of human history in which the first attempts at universal human virtues (ethics intended for the good of all people) arose. He named this period the Axial Age, “the years centering around 500 BC—from 800 to 200,” in which “the spiritual foundations of humanity were laid, simultaneously and independently in China, India, Persia, Palestine, and Greece,” and upon which “humanity still subsists today” (Jaspers, 1951/2003, p. 98). During this window of time there is evidence of the relatively simultaneous emergence of universalizing ethics in these civilizations, sometimes referred to as the Great Transformation (Armstrong, 2006) and studied particularly with regard to the roots of universal compassion (Armstrong, 2011). Jaspers (1949/1953) was bold enough to suggest that humanity as we know it emerged during this era.

But virtues with universal intent arose not in a vacuum, or even in a personal development workshop, but as a response to the existential predicaments of their time. Sociological analysis of the Axial civilizations for which we have evidence suggests that each of these “breakthroughs” occurred in response to some kind of societal “breakdown” (Bellah, 2011). Regarding virtues within the context of their historical tradition allows us to value them much more highly. Knowing that they were hard-won, costly insights for those who first stumbled over them deters us from cheapening them into Scout badges to be accumulated easily. It also underscores the aspect of the strengths literature that endorses self-regulation or willpower as the prime virtue or “moral muscle” (Baumeister & Exline, 1999, 2000). These are not characteristics to be treated lightly, sold cheaply, or earned inevitably.

The existential approach therefore finds much to celebrate in the recent elaboration of ubiquitous strengths and virtues in positive psychology. By stressing human freedom, it ensures that strengths psychology remains vibrant and dynamic and avoids viewing virtues as inert ciphers or tokens. Stressing the majestic tradition in which virtues stand ensures that character psychology retains the profundity of its subject matter and avoids the threat of superficiality. Existentially inclined practitioners, whether working as psychotherapists, coaches, or organizational consultants, view virtues not merely as relatively independent character traits, but located within the context of a person's view of the world, their “basic assumptions” (van Deurzen, 2012, p. 14), the fundamental philosophical presuppositions upon which human beings base their lives.

Perhaps the place where our character strengths and virtues become most evident is in our closest relationships—our marriages and significant partnerships. Positive psychology has a great deal to teach us in terms of what makes partnerships work (see Gottman, 1999). But there is an equally considerable existential contribution to the notion of a healthy marriage or partnership. Kierkegaard's (1843/1987) first major work, Either/Or, took commitment to marriage as the central motif for the psychological unity achieved through living the ethical life. Similarly, Buber's (1937) notion of the I–thou relationship in many respects expresses the avoidance of objectifying one's partner as necessary for fulfilling human contact. Marcel (1964) particularly has articulated the phenomenology of worthwhile relational commitment, which is translated from the French as “creative fidelity.” According to Marcel (1964), any productive commitment requires two facets: First, that from the moment of commitment, any influence or development that would threaten the commitment “will thus be demoted to the rank of a temptation” (p. 162) to be resisted. But this is only the negative movement of commitment that Marcel labels “constancy…perseverance in a certain goal” (p. 153). But constancy in relationship risks emotional staleness. For a commitment to be truly life-affirming, for it to be “creative fidelity” in Marcel's terms, it requires the second positive movement. It needs hope. The belief that maintaining the commitment in some way leads to a better future for oneself and for the other, or to possibilities that would otherwise die for both if the commitment were broken. Marcel noted that the difference between constancy and fidelity was “presence” to oneself and for the other (Marcel, 1964, p. 153).

The existential literature is therefore rich in analysis and understanding of intimate relationships and has inspired various therapists to write extensively on this subject. Van Deurzen notes the importance of truthfulness:

Couples inevitably pay the high price of fragmentation and alienation when they betray mutual trust…for truth is the essential ingredient of human relating and where it is shared and valued it melds people together into larger units. Where truth is not shared it pushes people apart. (van Deurzen, 1998, p. 76)

Others emphasize the required openness in committing to a person as an ever-changing process, not as an object (Amodeo & Wentworth, 1986). A process commitment is “a more flexible, but equally serious commitment to the well-being of both ourselves and others. It reflects a consistent dedication to embody factors that reliably lead to personal growth, which provides a foundation for love and intimacy” (Amodeo & Wentworth, 1986, p. 144). Again, the existential onus on freedom denotes that partners learn from one another not by merging psychologically (Fromm, 1957) but by taking responsibility for their contributions to the relationship (May, 1969).

Conclusion

The existential approach, therefore, although not being a positive psychology as such, demonstrates a variety of overlapping concerns with the movement of positive psychology. It arguably has a deep awareness of its own roots in human history and can therefore act as one of the many voices that prevent positive psychology from becoming superficial psychology. Its huge stress on human freedom also maintains the notion that living the good life is a choice that cannot be coerced, and therefore stands against any sense of the good life becoming a proscribed oppressive demand. In short, whereas the existential approach is not positive psychology, positive psychology in its most dynamic forms is almost always to some extent existential.

Summary Points

  • Taking an existential perspective can be exceptionally fruitful for both the theory and practice of positive psychology.
  • Contrary to popular opinion, the existential approach is not inherently pessimistic, nor is it methodologically irreconcilable with positive psychology.
  • Positive psychology is already existential; it frequently draws on existential thinkers, themes, and terminology.
  • Recognizing and acknowledging this existential emphasis can add depth and clarity to various aspects of positive psychology.
  • The psychology of strengths and virtues offers a major area of mutual interest for both positive psychology and existential thinking.
  • Although endorsing the study of virtue in psychology, the existential perspective would be critical of separating virtuous traits too far from their original historical and philosophical context.
  • The existential approach is not averse to using philosophical history in a therapeutic manner to inspire the development of similar virtue in people today.
  • An existential approach can therefore make a considerable positive contribution in various therapeutic and workplace contexts, including individual and couple psychotherapy.
  • By emphasizing philosophical rigor, the existential approach acts as one of the many voices that prevent positive psychology from becoming superficial psychology.

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