R. Shyama Nair
The Constitution of India provides for the formation of a Finance Commission (FC) every five years under Article 280, to recommend to the President of India certain measures, relating to the division of the financial resources between the centre and the states. The Thirteenth Finance Commission (13th FC) was constituted in November 2007, under the chairmanship of Dr Vijay Kelkar, to make recommendations on the specified aspects of the centre state fiscal relations for the period 2010–15. The Commission submitted its report to the President on 30th December 2009.
The major constitutionally mandated responsibilities of a FC are the (i) distribution between the union and the states of the net proceeds of shareable central taxes, (ii) determining the grants—in-aid to the states which are in need of assistance and (iii) recommending measures to augment the consolidated fund of a state to supplement the resources of the local bodies. These are mentioned as such in the Presidential Order constituting a FC. In addition to these substantive functions, any other matter can be referred to a FC in the interest of sound finance under Article 280 (3) (d) of the Constitution. It has become customary to mention certain considerations in the Presidential Order, appointing a Commission, which the Commission may consider, among others, while making its recommendations. The Presidential Order listing out the main functions, additional matters and considerations constitutes the Terms of Reference (ToR) of a FC.
It may be noted here that many issues have been raised with regard to the terms of reference of the 13th FC. Some experts are of the view that though many of the guidelines given in the ToR are important, they should not by themselves be the primary objective of the Commission. The focus should be on the fair transfer of resources between the centre and the states as the FC is supposed to be an impartial body (M.G. Rao, 2008). To some others, the terms of reference, reflect a bias in favour of the centre. The demand of the states that the terms of reference be drawn up jointly, by both the centre and the states, through consultation and ratification by the Inter State Council, is relevant in this context since the FC has to maintain the constitutional position of equivalence and neutrality between the central government and the states (Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability).
The 13th FC submitted its report to the President of India in December 2009. The major recommendations of the Commission are discussed in the following sections.
The Commission has recommended that the share of states in the net proceeds of the union taxes may be fixed at 32 per cent. The Commission has also recommended on the inter-se distribution of the states’ share amongst the states. An indicative ceiling of 39.5 per cent of the gross tax revenues of the centre has been fixed for the total transfers to the states on the revenue account. With a view to reducing their share in its gross tax revenue, the centre to review the levy of surcharges and cesses.
The Commission has recommended a model Goods and Service Tax (GST) structure, through the implementation of a Grand Bargain to provide incentives to the states to agree to the model. The structure includes features such as single rate, zero rating of exports, inclusion of various indirect taxes at the centre and state level, major rationalization of the exemption structure, etc. The Commission recommends a grant of Rs 50,000 crore, to meet the compensation claims of the state governments for revenue losses on account of the implementation of the GST between 2010–11 and 2014–15. The unspent balances will be distributed amongst the states in the terminal year of the award period, as per the devolution formula. The amount will not be disbursed, if the states do not reach a consensus on implementing the GST. The main features of the model are:
The National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF) should be merged into the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF), and the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) into the State Disaster Response Funds (SDRFs), of the respective states. The contribution to the SDRFs should be shared between the centre and the states in the ratio of 75:25 for the general category states and 90:10 for special category states
It is well known that the core tasks of a FC relate to sharing of the central taxes with the states, and the central grants to the states. But what is observed over the past few years is that there has been an expansion in the terms of reference of the FCs, to go beyond tax devolution and grants. The present Commission is also no exception to this.
Both the 12th FC and the 13th FC have tried to address the issues of vertical and horizontal distribution of tax revenues of the centre. While the 12th FC recommended the share of the states in the net central taxes at 30.5 per cent, the 13th FC recommended that the states’ share in the central taxes be increased by 1.5 per cent to 32 per cent. There has only been a marginal increase in the share, though the states in a joint memorandum submitted to the 13th FC, had requested to enhance the share of the states to 50 per cent.
Table 33.1 gives the different criteria and the relative weights adopted by the 12th FC and the 13th FC.
It can be seen from the table that the variables adopted by both the Commissions are the same, except that the criterion of tax effort was dropped by the 13th FC. The weights assigned by the two Commissions to some of these variables differ. It is observed that the weights assigned to the population and area are the same with both the Commissions, while that of the fiscal distance and fiscal discipline differ. The fiscal distance was given a weightage of 50 per cent under the 12th FC, but it was brought down to 47.5 per cent under the 13th FC. Similarly fiscal discipline was assigned a weight of 7.5 per cent by the 12th FC, while it is 17.5 per cent under the 13th FC.
TABLE 33.1 Criteria and Relative Weights for Determining inter se Shares of States Under Twelfth and Thirteenth Finance Commissions
Source: Twelfth and Thirteenth Finance Commission Reports.
Therefore, while the distribution neutral factors like population and area were given the same weights as that of the 12 th FC, the redistributive factor like the fiscal capacity distance and the fiscal incentive factor like fiscal discipline were given different weights under the 13th FC awards. These are the major changes brought out by the 13th FC in the tax devolution criteria.
Table 33.2 gives the percentage share of each state under the 12th FC and 13th FC awards. Column 4 shows the difference between the shares assigned by the two Commissions. It is evident from Column 4 that the shares of the ten general category states have declined during the 13 th FC, when compared with that of the 12th FC.
The total grant provided by the 13th FC is Rs 3,18,581 crore against Rs 1,42,640 crore provided by the 12th FC. The 13th FC has not set aside any amount for the health sector, unlike the 12th FC which had earmarked Rs 5,887crores. Similarly, the amount given for education is only for elementary education in the 13th FC, while 12th FC had provided for education as a whole. The Non-plan Revenue Deficit (NPRD) grant is earmarked only to eight of the special category states on the assumption that other states would have a surplus on the revenue account during 2010–11 to 2014–15, which is really doubtful going by the deficit indicators of the states during 2009–10 published in the RBI reports.
A comparison of grants-in-aid of both the commissions is given in Table 33.3. The 13th FC has recommended a performance grant of Rs 1,500 crore for the three special category states (Uttarkhand, Assam and Sikkim), who have graduated from a NPRD situation, as an incentive for them to continue on their path of fiscal prudence. The 13 th FC has earmarked Rs 14,446 crore towards improving the outcomes, which include grants for reduction in the infant mortality rates, improvement in the supply of justice, incentive for issuing the UIDs, the district innovation fund and grants for the employee and pension database. A grant of Rs 50,000 crores is set aside by way of special grants to meet the compensation claims of the states during the implementation of GST. However, the Commission also makes it clear that this amount will not be disbursed in the event of the states deviating from the model GST suggested by the Commission. The Commission rather than giving more autonomy to the states, has ended up giving tied grants to the states, to achieve objectives in the areas that are the functional responsibility of the states (EPW 27 Mar 2010 editorial).
TABLE 33.2 Shares of States as per 12th FC and 13th FC Awards
Source: Worked out from 12th and 13th FC Reports.
TABLE 33.3 Grants-in-Aid Made to States as per the Recommendations of the 12th FC and 13th FC (Rupees in Crore)
Note: *Others include health sector, heritage conservation and maintenance of buildings.
Source: Worked out from the 12th FC and 13th FC Reports.
The 12th FC had recommended a plan for restructuring the public finances, by which the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio of the centre and states is fixed at 3% of the GDP and the revenue deficit relative to the GDP for the centre and the states be brought down to zero by 2008–09. The states had to enact the fiscal responsibility legislation for achieving these targets. The enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility legislation (FRL) was made mandatory to avail the debt relief, and debt write off schemes. All the states, except West Bengal and Sikkim have gone in for the FRL. The enactment of the fiscal responsibility legislation by almost all the states following the recommendation of the 12th FC resulted in the rule-based management of the public finances replacing the discretionary management of the public finances which had resulted in all round deterioration in public finances. This is a major landmark in the history of public finances in the country. (fincomindia.nic.in). The 13th FC has tried to carry these thoughts forward.
For the fiscal responsibility legislation to be more effective, the 13th FC recommends that the central government revises its medium term fiscal policy statement, with a more detailed and elaborate medium term fiscal plan, which incorporates three year forward estimates of the revenue and expenditure, with the detailed break up and an explanation of how these estimates have been generated. The 13th FC expects the government to use such a medium term fiscal plan as an operational policy document, to enhance the credibility of the FRBM legislation. Towards this end, the Commission recommends the proper reporting of plan and non plan grants to states, reporting of contingent liabilities, statements on the compliance costs of tax proposals. The Commission also recommends that all the disinvestment receipts be maintained in the consolidated fund.
The main objective of the road map to fiscal consolidation is to take account of the fiscal situation of the centre and the state governments, and to set macro fiscal targets, with reference to the overall position. To achieve this, the macroeconomic parameters identified, are the fiscal deficit and the combined debt—GDP ratio.
The 13th FC expects the states to get back to their fiscal correction path by 2011–12, taking into account 2010–11 as an adjustment year to overcome the global recessionary trends of 2008–09 and 2009–10. But as per the RBI reports (See State Finances, 2009–10), the knock-on effect of the global financial crisis, and the consequent slowdown in the economic activity has impacted the finances of the states. Out of the 28 states, ten states are likely to turn from the revenue surplus to revenue deficit states during 2009–10 (BE), while 22 states have budgeted a gross fiscal deficit/gross state domestic product ratio, of above 3 per cent. This deterioration in the ratio is attributed to the sluggishness in the revenue side, as well as a significant rise in the expenditure, particularly on account of the committed expenditure. These incipient signs of slippage, evident in the state finances on the revenue and expenditure, could halt the process of fiscal consolidation. The RBI thus observes that this slippage needs to be arrested quickly, through a swift designing of a fiscal correction path.
The Commission has set a target of combined debt-GSDP ratio at 68 per cent, with 45 per cent for the centre, and 25 per cent for the states, as against a combined debt-GSDP ratio target of 75 per cent by the 12th FC. The reduction in this ratio as foreseen by the 13th FC, is to be achieved by allowing the central government to take the responsibility of all the borrowings, for any unanticipated shocks in future.
The road map for fiscal consolidation prescribed by the Commission has to be monitored by the fiscal council. But apprehensions are prevalent among the academic scholars, about the capacity of the council in undertaking the independent review and monitoring of the process. The fiscal discipline cannot be ensured without the governments willingness, and legislation on the fiscal discipline will not help unless the government is ready to bite the bullet according to M. G. Rao.
One of the important issues that the 13th FC has been asked to look into, is the impact of the GST. The Task Force on the goods and services tax had submitted a report to the Government of India in which a model GST frame work was given. The recommendations of the 13th FC on the GST have been mainly based on the ‘flawless GST’ as envisaged in the Task Force Report. The grand bargain has been worked out, in which all the states will concurrently tax all the goods and services in a dual mode. But the tax rates suggested by the Commission, 5% for the central GST and 7% for the state GST are too low, which would result in a huge loss of revenue for the states. The conditionalities imposed on the states for claiming the compensation for revenue loss, consequent to the implementation of the GST may not be welcome to the states. It impinges on the autonomy of the states, in matters where they have constitutionally assigned powers of taxation. (D. K. Srivastava) The states have made it clear, that they want a higher combined rate with a low rate for the essential commodities, and a larger exemption list. These differences have to be thrashed out before the components of reforms are brought in. According to M. G. Rao ‘the report of the Thirteenth FC, rather than accelerating, has actually reversed the process, and it will take some time before the threads are picked up again stipulating a corner solution has led the states to adopt a defiant posture’.
The recommendation of the Commission, regarding the revenues arising from fiscal commons like profit petroleum, profit gas and spectrum, is commendable. The Commission is of the view that these non-tax revenues of the centre be made shareable between the centre and the states, by bringing them under the divisible pool through constitutional amendment. Similarly, the Commission has recognized the emergence of rural and urban local bodies as key players in bringing out development transformation. The Commission suggests constitutional changes, for allowing third tier to access the resources directly from the divisible pool. The 13th FC, for the first time, has been asked to take into account the gross budgetary support to the central and state plans as a demand on the resources of the centre.
On the whole, it appears that the 13th FC has tried to fulfill its mandate, by working within the various limitations that the FC are exposed to. The institution of FC will continue to deal with the emerging challenges and the new environment. The FC, especially the recent ones, have played a major role in improving the fiscal situation of the centre and the states, by laying emphasis on the fiscal restructuring. It is expected that the fiscal consolidation will be back on the track after the temporary fall out in the fiscal correction path, witnessed during the recessionary period of 2008–09. Fiscal federalism and the FCs will always be a work in progress.
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