CHAPTER 6
INTELLIGENCE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
Process, Methods, Structure, and Resources

I wish I could close by giving you a 100 percent guarantee that no terrorist, ever, will try to take down a plane or attack us in some other fashion. I cannot give you such a guarantee; that is not the nature of the world we live in, nor of the threats that we face.

Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, testifying before the Senate after a failed terrorist attack, January 20, 2010

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Secretary Napolitano’s remarks address a common public mis-perception: the notion that “good” intelligence should allow the United States to anticipate and counter each and every threat before it presents itself. In practice, while intelligence can and does provide early warning of some threats and thus helps prevent them, its principle purpose is broader: to help decision makers make better choices by understanding their adversaries and the environment in which they operate. More than just if insights on terrorist “intentions and capabilities,” intelligence supports every aspect of “thinking” about homeland security. This chapter provides an overview of how intelligence activities support the homeland security enterprise. It illustrates how intelligence is collected and created, as well as issues involved in producing “good” intelligence and legal considerations. It goes on to describe organizations and structures that conduct intelligence for homeland security and resources available to them, including counterintelligence assets.

CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter, you should be able to

1. Describe the “intelligence cycle.”

2. Discuss issues involved in collecting and processing intelligence for homeland security.

3. Explain different types of intelligence collection.

4. Describe the fundamentals of intelligence-led policing.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

A misapprehension is that the purpose of intelligence is to tell decision makers what to do. That is flat wrong. The function of intelligence is to help decision makers understand the environment in which they make decisions, including appreciating the intent, capabilities, and actions of adversaries. In this respect, each of the tools, processes, and analytic methods described in Chapter 5 must be rooted in a concrete understanding of current conditions. Intelligence can provide “inputs” for all these decision making activities.

Homeland security intelligence is knowledge produced by an analytic process that collects information involving an adversary, evaluates it, and distributes assessments on it. The analytical content added to the collected raw data is critical to distinguishing an intelligence product from raw information. In short, the simplest definition of intelligence is “information plus analysis.”

The importance of intelligence to homeland security increased dramatically after 9/11 as U.S. strategy shifted from identifying and prosecuting terrorists to preventing their crimes in the first place. This places more emphasis on “early warning,” identifying threats that can be thwarted before attacks occur or identifying threats or vulnerabilities that can be mitigated before terrorists move to exploit them. This increasingly includes national security and criminal threats in the cyber domain as well. To make intelligence more proactive, greater importance has been placed on sharing information and intelligence with stakeholders throughout the homeland security enterprise.

Sources for intelligence may be either covert or open. Covert is a category of information from sources or methods the government has classified. A source is the originating point of the information, such as an informant, witness, or document. The method is the process by which the information was obtained, such as a search, wiretapping, or interrogation. Classification is a system to protect sensitive information and includes various categories (such as secret and top secret) established by law to restrict who is authorized to view the information and/or the sources and methods by which the information was obtained.

Open source information concerns data gained from sources that are publicly available. These include all types of media, publicly distributed government reports and statistics, business records, and scientific studies. While the original material itself may not be classified, the process by which the data is collected and processed may be classified. Intelligence services may classify the products produced by analyzing open source information, even if that raw information can readily be obtained by the general public. This is because the focus and areas of interest revealed by the analysis, or the analytical techniques used, may be sensitive.

Intelligence derived from covert and open sources can take many forms. Some agencies, for example, produce periodic intelligence reports on a variety of issues. Intelligence reports can also take the form of detailed studies on specific topics, such as National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), pronounced “knees,” prepared under the supervision of the director of national intelligence. Products of intelligence activity can be put to a variety of uses, including aiding decision making, analysis, investigations, prosecutions, and operational response. In many cases, NIEs and other intelligence reports focus on the intentions and capabilities of foreign groups or nations, shedding light on what a potential adversary wants to do and its actual abilities to achieve those aims.

Increasingly, intelligence is provided through databases suchas those maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center, which maintains the national consolidated Terrorist Watch List. These are not reports, per se, but repositories of records useful in investigating or thwarting future hostile acts or responding to disaster. One such database is the National Capabilities Analysis Database maintained by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Bombing Prevention. This database provides a portal for state and local law enforcement and other responders to access intelligence regarding improvised explosive devices.

Intelligence may also provide “operational” support to ongoing investigations and activities. For example, under the Container Security Initiative (a program established in 2002), Customs and Border Protection officials (see chapter 4) identify ocean-bound shipping containers headed for the United States that might represent a “highrisk.” These containers are screened at oversees ports before being loaded on ships. Providing information to support this risk assessment process is an example of intelligence support for operational activities. Such intelligence support is particularly important for investigations into ongoing criminal enterprises; conspiracies that are multijurisdictional; or complex threats, such as those involving cyberactivity or money laundering.

Many factors influence how intelligence is exploited in support of any particular activity. These factors include the classification of the intelligence and how it was produced, as well as laws, regulations, and policies regarding distribution and use. For example, intelligence derived in a manner inconsistent with liberties and protections established by Constitution would in most cases be unusable in a judicial prosecution. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is a legal metaphor used to describe evidence collected illegally. It holds that even “new” evidence later developed from information obtained unlawfully (such as illegal search of U.S. persons) would fall under the exclusionary rule (evidence obtained illegally cannot be used against a suspect in a criminal prosecution). For that reason, some intelligence products may not be suitable for criminal prosecutions, even if the intelligence is accurate and provides useful investigative leads.

Rules and standards for collecting, analyzing, and distributing intelligence vary throughout the homeland security enterprise. In addition to federal laws, regulations, and policies, state, local, and tribal governments have their own guidelines that not only affect the collection of intelligence but also govern the retention of records and privacy protections, as well as freedom of information requirements (which dictate public access to intelligence products).

UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLIGENCE CYLCE

While intelligence methods are not uniform, most intelligence processes conform to what is commonly known as the “intelligence cycle.” The word cycle denotes that intelligence activities are not a static exercise. Intelligence products should deliver key insights on hostile forces and their environment. In turn, the consumption of this knowledge in the real world should generate feedback from decision makers, prompting them to request additional information, updates or corrections.

The intelligence cycle commonly consists of six steps. While these steps are discrete, they can be performed by one person, a team, or a single organization, or they can be part of interagency activities at any level of government or among agencies from several layers of government. This cycle might also include participation by other nations and international organizations undertaking joint intelligence activities.

Steps in the Intelligence Cycle

Establishing requirements is the first task of intelligence. This step is usually accomplished by listing priority or critical intelligence requirement—questions that must be answered. These requirements may be extremely specific (such as the location of a specific terrorist) or more general.

The second step in the cycle is planning and tasking intelligence activities. This involves deciding how best to assign responsibility for collecting and analyzing the required information. This step also addresses the allocation of resources, including budget, time, and personnel.

Collecting is the third step in the intelligence cycle. Collecting, or collection, is the process of gathering raw information needed to conduct an assessment. Information can take a variety of forms, from geospatial data to business records. It may also be collected by many methods, from interviews to computer analysis.

The fourth step in the cycle is processing and preparing the data for exploitation. This step may include a variety of tasks, from translating letters in a foreign language to decoding encrypted files.

The fifth step is analyzing and producing intelligence reports. This step, often called analysis, includes assessing the reliability, validity, and relevance of the data collected as well as logically integrating evidence to produce judgments or conclusions, which are provided in finished intelligence reports.

The last step in the intelligence cycle is distributing the intelligence product. The goal is to provide products meet the particular customers’ needs but do not compromise the integrity and security of the intelligence cycle. For example, it is not necessarily important that users of the intelligence know the sources and methods by which it was obtained—for example, a special operations team may only need to know which in house the wanted terrorist is hiding, not how that intelligence was gathered. In such cases, the origin of the information is withheld to limit the potential for exposing or compromising valuable “sources and methods” of intelligence.

Issues in Intelligence Management

While the intelligence cycle depicts the tasks involved in collecting, analyzing, and distributing reports, the process is not always conducted in a linear, close-looped fashion. Though the cycle may suggest a simple process of delivering raw information to analysts and getting a finished report back, in practice an actual “cycle” may not look anything like that. Many factors can influence an analyst’s capacity to deliver intelligence. For example, the raw information discovered may not be adequate for analysis. Other priorities for analysis or new intelligence demands may trump ongoing tasks. Rules and requirements for processing, analyzing, reviewing, and approving assessments may slow or speed the process. Thus, while the analyst is the pivotal point in the cycle, many influences and factors that drive the cycle are beyond his or her control. The intelligence cycle may accurately describe what tasks are part of the process, but it does not fully explain how the process works in specific agencies or activities.

In addition to institutional and organizational factors, there can be many barriers to producing analytically accurate reports. Objectivity can be one barrier if the results of the intelligence cycle are intentionally skewed to favor a particular policy, outcome, or conclusion.

Another barrier or challenge is dealing with ambiguity. In critical intelligence requirements, there can be a paucity of information, which leads to uncertain findings. Or the data may be contradictory. Sometimes, ambiguity results from too much information, an excess of data that makes it difficult to mine the most important or relevant facts. When faced with conflicting or ambiguous answers to vital questions, judgments by analysts can become subject to debate. Even in the best of cases, many intelligence findings are hedged or “caveated.”

One method used to counter analytical concerns is to conduct what is often called a “Team B” exercise. A Team B is a form of red teaming (see Chapter 5). This exercise involves providing the same information to an independent analytical team, Team B, that was given to the original analysts who developed the intelligence product. Team B determines whether analysis of the information can produce reasonable alternative findings and judgments. Team Bs are not a “magic bullet” for intelligence analysis. They can also be subject to concerns over objectivity and ambiguity. Additionally, like the original analysis, Team B’s effort addresses only one step in the intelligence cycle. For example, it cannot fix errors made earlier in the collection of raw information.

Finally, the process of producing intelligence and the use of its products are subjected to turbulence from the same factors that affect other aspects of homeland security, from culture clashes to debates over the balance between security and civil liberties.

METHODS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

There are numerous ways to collect information for homeland security. The rules governing each depend on a number of factors, including federal, state, tribal, or local laws, regulations, and policies. An entirely different set of rules and authorities govern intelligence collected overseas or against individuals (such as most foreign terrorists) who are not classified as U.S. persons under federal laws. The source or method of information collection is crucial. Different sources have varying characteristics; “all-source intelligence” incorporates multiple methods of collection, including those below.

Human Intelligence

Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is information derived from people. Information provided by informants or undercover agents is commonly relied on both overseas and in the United States. Interviews with witnesses and suspects and searches can also be sources of information. In 2004, for example, Mohammad Hossain and Yassin Aref, two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York, were charged with plotting to purchase a shoulder-fired grenade launcher to assassinate a Pakistani diplomat. This case offers an example of how human intelligence can contribute to an operational investigation. With the help of an informant, the FBI set up a sting that lured Hossain into a fake terrorist conspiracy. Hossain brought Aref along. The informant offered details of a made up plot. Both Aref and Hossain agreed to help. Further investigation by the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and local police led to the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of the two men.

The methods of collecting human intelligence can be diverse and go far beyond popular images of spies in back alleys. For insistence, suspicious activity reports filed by local law enforcement can contribute to collection. DHS has promoted a campaign called “If You See Something, Say Something.” The purpose is to encourage individual citizens to report suspicious activity. Originally developed by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the trademarked slogan was later licensed to DHS to promote antiterrorism and anticrime efforts.

The CIA is the national human intelligence manager responsible for coordinating HUMINT operations across the intelligence community, or IC (in accordance with laws, presidential executive orders, and interagency agreements). While the CIA is primarily responsible for collecting human intelligence overseas through covert operations and other activities, additional federal agencies conduct these activities, including the Defense and State departments. Nonfederal entities also support human intelligence collection overseas. For example, the New York City Police Department maintains foreign liaison officers with some overseas police departments and has dispatched teams after major terrorist attacks overseas. In 2008 the department sent a team to Mumbai, India, three days after teams of terrorists coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across the city. Based on information provided by the NYPD team, the department’s Intelligence Division produced an analysis, which it shared with the FBI.

Some federal agencies have authority to collect human intelligence within the United States. The FBI is the lead federal agency for domestic intelligence. But the CIA can, for example, recruit people in the United States to spy on foreign countries. The Department of Defense has some authority to collect information that involves threats to U.S. military installations. Other agencies, including DHS, also have authority to conduct human intelligence–related activities. Additionally, state and local law enforcement agencies conduct activities related to human intelligence.

Within the United States, significant legal strictures govern the use of human intelligence. Under the Constitution, for example, individuals have a right to privacy, protection against unlawful search and seizure, protection against self-incrimination, and safeguards against unlawful arrest and detention. Therefore, a search warrant must be obtained to conduct a legal search of a person or location. Individuals have constitutional rights and protections under interrogation (often called Miranda rights). U.S. persons also have the right of habeas corpus, or the right to petition a judge for release from detention. None of these rights are absolute. For example, the authority of federal officials to conduct a lawful search at a point of entry into the United States is broader than what is acceptable for a law enforcement search in a local community (the courts acknowledge there is a lesser expectation of privacy when crossing an international border, and the government has a legitimate need to search for concealed threats).

Signals Intelligence

Signals intelligence (also known as electronic surveillance), or SIGINT, involves intercepting and interpreting electronic signals from any transmission medium. There are many subsets to the field of signals intelligence, including communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, and certain types of measurement and signature intelligence. Communications intelligence involves intercepting information transmitted on airwaves, fiber cables, across the Internet, or any other means of transmitting messages in electronic form. Less often used for homeland security matters are electronic intelligence, activities that intercept and interpret noncommunications transmissions (such as radar emissions), foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, which intercepts telemetry on the testing of foreign weapons systems, and measurement and signature intelligence, which involves everything from the detection of certain WMD characteristics to sounds produced by mechanical devices.

The most common form of signals intelligence is “wiretapping,” or intercepting voice communications, traditionally done over phone wires or via devices connected to physical wires. However, intercepting and monitoring other forms of electronic communications, particularly those using the Internet, is becoming more prevalent.

The most widely discussed and controversial use of signals intelligence for homeland security concerned the covert Terrorist Surveillance Program, first revealed to the public by a 2005 article in the New York Times. The program authorized monitoring of every electronic networking tool from telephones to the Internet, e-mail, and text messaging. Since the surveillance might have included communications to U.S. persons (a term for U.S. citizens and other persons legally resident in the United States) but did not require a search warrant, the program came under intense criticism. In response, the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006 provided additional legal authority to conduct electronic surveillance and assigned jurisdiction to the special federal court established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), which supports both the military and IC, has primary responsibility for collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence from foreign signals. The NSA was responsible for managing the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies can also conduct electronic surveillance under authority of a warrant.

As with human intelligence, significant legal restrictions govern the collection of signal intelligence within the United States. In particular, the law recognizes that an individual’s right to privacy and protection against unlawful search and seizure extends to his or her personal electronic communications.

Imagery Intelligence

Imagery analysis, or IMINT, involves the collection and study of images. These images primarily come from satellites or airborne reconnaissance, including manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. They are often recorded using cameras, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics.

For activities within the United States and overseas, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) serves as the principal support agency providing satellite imagery intelligence to the DOD and the CIA. The agency also supports other federal activities, including disaster relief and maritime navigation. Other federal agencies collect imagery intelligence in support of homeland security–related activities. DHS, for example, operates unmanned aerial vehicles that conduct surveillance of the U.S. border with Mexico.

State and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies have used geospatial data collection to facilitate their intelligence. Additionally, law enforcement agencies are increasingly using video surveillance systems, which sometimes seem ubiquitous. While these cameras primarily monitor public safety, they also provide a video record of activities in public areas to identify suspicious activity or aid an investigation. The use of automated video analytics, which for example can detect the entry of people into a restricted area or the parking of a car outside a building, dramatically increases the efficiency of surveillance systems by eliminating the need for continuous human monitoring.

There are fewer legal strictures regarding the domestic use of imagery intelligence, particularly in public places. U.S. law holds that public activities are not normally entitled to an expectation of “privacy,” so there is no requirement to obtain a warrant before recording them. There are, however, cases where a warrant is required for imagery surveillance within the United States. For example, the use of infrared imagery to survey a private residence might be considered an invasion of privacy. Such surveillance would require a warrant.

Technical Intelligence

This form of collection includes gathering, evaluating, analyzing, and interpreting scientific and technical information. Technical intelligence is usually associated with analyzing the military equipment of foreign agencies; however, it also has significant application to homeland security.

One important use of technical intelligence involves improvised explosive devices. The Transportation Security Administration, for example, used technical intelligence to determine what prohibitions were necessary to keep materials needed to assemble liquid explosives off commercial passenger flights.

Technical intelligence is also key to evaluating an adversary’s intent, capability, and impact when armed with chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons. One of the most famous and controversial uses of technical intelligence occurred in the wake of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. In September 2001, not long after the 9/11 attack, an unknown attacker mailed several letters containing deadly anthrax spores to media outlets and the offices of U.S. senators. The U.S. government launched a complex investigation to determine the sophistication required to prepare those spores, along with the strain from which they were derived, which helped identify a U.S. government scientist later accused of the attack. However, a 2011 National Academy of Sciences report evaluating the scientific methods used by the FBI disputed some of its findings.

Forensic science is a crucial tool in technical intelligence. Forensic activities can include everything from collecting and evaluating bio-metric data, such as fingerprints and DNA, to reconstructing improvised explosive devices to determine how they function.

Many federal, state, and local governments avail themselves of technical intelligence. Concerns over the use of technical intelligence within the United States often involve the acceptability of information obtained as evidence in a prosecution. The reliability of evidence provided through forensic analysis or other technical means can be challenged in court. Likewise, technical intelligence is bound by the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.

Open Source Intelligence

The term open source connotes that this form of intelligence analysis relies on materials from sources that are open or, in other words, available to anyone. Open source intelligence may employ various means of collection, including human, signals, imagery and technical intelligence. Like other forms of intelligence analysis, open sources materials are processed through the intelligence cycle to turn information into an intelligence product.

Open source intelligence has a number of uses for homeland security. In some cases, it can supplement, enhance, or even replace intelligence obtained by covert means. Open sources can also be used to protect sources and methods. Judgments can be defended in public using open source intelligence without compromising sensitive information.

Both foreign and domestic information can be collected by all components of the IC. In 2005 the director of national intelligence established the Open Source Center with responsibilities to collect, analyze, research, train, and facilitate government-wide access and use of open source information. Some state and local law enforcement agencies, which provide the primary intelligence support to their governments’ leaders, also conduct open source intelligence collection. For example, both the NYPD and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department maintain units that process open source intelligence. Common sources are the Internet, traditional mass media (including television, radio, and newspapers), specialized journals, conference proceedings and think tank studies, and geospatial information (such as maps).

Since the information is publicly available, in terms of domestic use open source intelligence collection does not face strictures similar to other intelligence collection. Nevertheless, it is bound by federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and policies that direct how government agencies handle public information. Thus open source intelligence that is not classified may be obtainable by the public through public records access requests. Likewise, laws, regulations, or policies may limit the kinds of information that government agencies can maintain, how long they can retain the information, how the information can be used, and the access allowed by the public.

Issues in Intelligence Collection

Some controversies over methods, such as problems of objectivity and protecting secrecy while safeguarding liberties, are enduring and endemic to collecting intelligence for homeland security. Others are unique to the post–9/11 homeland security enterprise.

One of the most significant is dealing efficaciously with the increasingly vast amounts of data available through the Internet and electronic databases. Among controversial aspects of this challenge has been the use of datamining and link analysis tools by law enforcement and intelligence communities. Data mining is technology for analyzing vast amounts of data maintained in electronic form. It involves identifying patterns and anomalies from the processing of vast datasets, including not just traditional “structured” databases but also “unstructured data” such as audio, video, and “free text” found in email, open source media, and social networking sites.

Data mining can be used for both prediction and description. Prediction can involve using historical data to project whether a person will fall into a certain category in the future or take a certain action. For example, the purchase of certain types and amounts of chemicals by the same person in different locations using varying means of payment may foreshadow the preparation of improvised explosives. Or the data may show that when a terrorism suspect gets an e-mail from one party in his network, he typically makes a phone call to a specific second party within a short period. Description concerns increasing knowledge by finding related information (often referred to as link analysis), such as mining travel data to determine which suspects were in the same cities at the same times.

The use of data mining for homeland security has raised many issues. Some critics are particularly concerned when these tools are used to analyze open source information. They fear the use of data mining could violate the privacy of individual citizens or lead to false allegations of criminal or terrorist activities. Others doubt the efficacy of these tools for providing predictive analysis. Additional concerns are raised about ensuring the accuracy and relevance of the data and interoperability among government databases.

An effort undertaken by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which is part of the DOD, proved to be a particular lightning rod for controversy. After 9/11, DARPA brought together several data mining projects to deal with the challenge of terrorism, establishing the Information Awareness Office (IAO) and its Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. Changing the title of the program to the less ominous-sounding Terrorism Information Awareness program did little to dispel the firestorm of controversy that the project attracted. Congress defunded the IAO in 2003, though some components of the project were transferred to other programs.

Defenders of data mining note these technologies are already widely deployed in public and private sectors. Financial institutions, for example, use data-mining methods to determine credit scores and identify potential cases of insurance fraud. Furthermore, supporters argue, issues concerning privacy, false accusations, or abuses can be addressed by establishing appropriate safeguards.

Another issue related to the challenges of data mining is the proliferation of private nonprofit and for-profit organizations that offer “intelligence-like” products. This is often called “competitive” intelligence. These groups usually rely on open source intelligence methods or their own collection methods. Services offered by these groups include everything from periodic reports to support for individual investigations. Some of these groups have outstanding reputations. The Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, for example, offers world-class studies on transnational terrorist threats derived mostly from open source methods. The challenge in using commercial and nonprofit services is evaluating the efficacy of the intelligence cycle used to produce findings and reports.

Vast amounts of publicly available information create opportunities for enemy use of open source intelligence. The terrorist group that organized the 2008 attacks on Mumbai, India, for example, used Google Earth, a Web service that gives free access to a vast repository of commercial satellite and aerial photography, to scout potential targets. It is also well known that foreign intelligence services use FOIA requests to obtain data on U.S. military, intelligence, security, and commercial activities. Security experts are gravely concerned that terrorist groups will use information found in scientific research papers to craft WMD materials.

Business records represent a special case of open source data. Local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies all have authorities and procedures for requesting access to these documents. The courts consider some information contained in business records (including transactions such as banking records and library accounts) as a public activity and thus not entitled to the same privacy protections as individual property. The FBI, CIA, and DOD can all obtain access to these documents through National Security Letters, a form of administrative subpoena. Unlike the process for judicial warrants, agencies requesting these records are not required to demonstrate “probable cause” to justify their requests. Although the practice of National Security Letters predates 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the circumstances in which they could be used. While the letters have been affirmed as valid by the courts, controversies over their use remain. Since 9/11 the Office of the Inspector General of the Justice Department has periodically investigated the use of National Security Letters by the FBI. Its early reports cited the agency for violating statutes governing the issuance of the letters. Later reports acknowledged that corrective measures had been taken. The office also noted the FBI’s increasing use of exigent letters (another form of request without warrant) and other informal means to obtain business records in lieu of National Security Letters.

The practice of intelligence-led policing by state and local law enforcement agencies also remains controversial. This concept involves state and local law enforcement creating intelligence units to help allocate law enforcement resources; target specific conspiracies, activities, or organizations; or support operational activities, such as crime prevention programs. While the concept predates 9/11, it received renewed attention when the focus of counterterrorism shifted from just investigating terrorist acts to preventing them. In addition to enduring concerns such as objectivity, ambiguity, and “information overload” that plague every intelligence activity, intelligence-led policing creates unique challenges by influencing relations between local law enforcement and the communities they serve.

Concerns raised include the potential for profiling or persecuting individual members or segments of the community and potential violations of privacy or civil liberties. In particular, local law enforcement must be sensitive to the use and retention of national intelligence products. For example, local law enforcement agencies that hold intelligence collected in questionable ways may be liable for the violation of an individual’s civil rights.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND CLEARANCES

Controlling access to intelligence is often done through security classification and clearances. Classification is the process of determining the level of secrecy. It determines who has access to the information and the security procedures and standards maintained to safeguard it. Clearances denote who has access to the information and standards and procedures for issuing, maintaining, and updating their clearances. The U.S. government issues clearances to both individuals (personnel security clearances) and facilities that hold classified materials (facility security clearances). Security polices for the federal government are established by law and through directives from the president. The director of national intelligence oversees security clearance investigations and related policies on classified information for all federal agencies. Many agencies issue security clearances and have authority to classify documents.

Federal agencies can issue security clearances to state and local officials and persons in the private sector, such as government contractors, as well as federal employees. The requirements for receiving and maintaining a clearance are determined by its level. In order to qualify for clearances, individuals must undergo various levels of background checks, investigations, and polygraph examinations.

The U.S. government maintains three levels of classified information. From lowest to highest, they are confidential, secret, and top secret. In addition, some information is classified secret/sensitive compartmentalized information (SCI) or top secret/SCI. SCI is usually designated by a particular codeword. The SCI designation means that individuals viewing the information require not only an appropriate level of security clearance, but also authorization to view the information in order to perform a specific duty or function. This is often called the “need to know.” An additional classification identifier is special access program, often called “black program.” The very existence of such programs can be classified.

Basic classification levels are supposed to reflect a reasonable expectation of the impact on national security caused by unauthorized disclosure of the information: confidential (damage), secret (serious damage), and top secret (exceptionally grave damage). The agency collecting the information or producing the intelligence is responsible for assigning classification and for determining criteria for declassification. The unauthorized disclosure of classified material carries federal penalties that can be severe.

In homeland security, burgeoning categories of information are designated “sensitive but unclassified.” Federal agencies have established over 100 such categories based on a range of requirements and rationales for secrecy. These include Privacy Act information, sensitive security information, critical infrastructure information, grand jury information, for official use only, law enforcement sensitive, and limited official use. Agencies designate this information after a determination that unauthorized disclosure could harm an individual’s privacy or welfare, adversely impact economic or industrial institutions, or compromise activities essential to the safeguarding of national interests. Many laws, policies, and regulations govern the use of sensitive but unclassified information (though the term sensitive but unclassified itself is not defined in statutory law). For example, the law that established DHS authorized the department to identify and safeguard “sensitive unclassified information,” although it did not specify what this authority included. No security clearance is required to use these materials, but agencies can set policies on who should have access. They can also designate how the information should be marked and maintained. Agencies also assign civil or administrative penalties for the “gross negligence or willful disclosure” of sensitive but unclassified materials.

Robust debate continues over the vast amounts of classified and controlled government information. Critics contend that “overclassification” is used to hide mistakes by government agencies, limits the public’s right to know, and can make inadvertent releases more likely by failing to focus security on fewer but more critical secrets. However, government officials point to the negative consequences of releasing sensitive information.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS SECURITY

Agencies that establish intelligence programs or use intelligence products must also create safeguards to protect them.

Counterintelligence activities are efforts to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage and other intelligence or covert activities undertaken by foreign powers or nonstate entities. A key component of this mission is ferreting out efforts to manipulate, exploit, or obtain classified materials and thwart them. The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under the director of national intelligence (DNI) is responsible for coordinating national counterintelligence strategy and policy. The 2005 National Counterintelligence Strategy for the United States specifically notes the importance of these operations for supporting the “global war on terrorism.” While individual organizations are responsible for their own operations, the FBI is the lead federal agency for domestic counterintelligence. The CIA is the lead federal agency for overseas counterintelligence.

Operations security (OPSEC) is the practice of reducing the vulnerability of classified materials and operational activities to adversaries. OPSEC can include a broad variety of activities, from training and education to inspections, procedures, and physical security measures. Ensuring that personnel appropriately handle and safeguard classified material, for example, is a form of OPSEC.

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS

A plethora of agencies, offices, and activities at all levels of government support the intelligence operations and activities described above. In addition, the private sector plays a significant role in security operations, providing both contractor support and goods and services that support intelligence operations. Key aspects of the evolution of U.S. domestic intelligence and counterintelligence activities as they pertain to protecting the homeland were described in Chapter 1. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 outlined changes to organizations and policies before and in the wake of 9/11. The organization, mission, and structures supporting intelligence for homeland security remain dynamic. As of 2011, they were organized as follows.

Director of National Intelligence

The DNI is appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. The director is the principal adviser to the president and the National Security Council on all intelligence matters. In addition to his or her role as adviser, the DNI has a number of supervisory and operational responsibilities, principally as the head of the IC.

The director’s statutory authorities and responsibilities include establishing objectives and priorities for all national intelligence and overseeing the annual budget for the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The NIP aggregate funding for intelligence activities in several departments and the CIA. To develop the NIP, each organization submits an individual budget request. The specific allocations for each organization are classified. Other duties of the DNI include coordinating and developing policies and guidelines for a spectrum of activities related to producing intelligence, such as personnel, operations, and acquisition. The DNI’s activities directly impacts the practice of intelligence for homeland security through the centers that support the IC. In addition to activities and offices already mentioned, the following are particularly significant.

National Counterterrorism Center

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is an interagency activity under the direction of the DNI that coordinates global counterterrorism operations. Among its activities are programs that support homeland security intelligence operations. One such initiative is the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), jointly managed by the NCTC, DHS, and FBI to bring state and local perspectives to the national intelligence cycle. Established by law, the ITACG includes an advisory council to recommend policies and the ITACG Detail, which integrates state and local analysts with intelligence analysts at the NCTC.

National Intelligence Coordination Center

Established in 2007, this center is tasked with facilitating coordination of intelligence collection among the members of the IC. Through the center the DNI directs and integrates collection activities both overseas and within the United States. Among its goals is to address the challenges of “information overload,” caused when the amount of information collected exceeds the ability to analyze it, and integrating analysis from all sources, in part by providing a repository for intelligence products.

National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) serves under the DNI. Its principal mission is to provide mid-(several years) and long-term (decades) intelligence assessments. The NIC represents the collective judgment of the intelligence community. Among its most important products are National Intelligence Estimates. These documents provide assessments and forecasts on specific topics. They can be requested by senior government officials or Congress. The assessments are classified, though sometimes unclassified versions are published. These assessments have been conducted for decades and number in the hundreds. Some clearly have application to protecting the homeland. In 1970, for example, one assessment was titled “The Introduction of Clandestine Nuclear Weapons into the U.S.” Since 1997 the council has also periodically produced a long-range forecast titled “Global Trends.”

National Intelligence Management Activity

Among its duties is coordinating emergency preparedness activities across the intelligence community. This planning ensures continuity of intelligence operations during national emergencies.

Department of Homeland Security

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis represents the department in the intelligence community. The department’s intelligence enterprise includes the U.S. Coast Guard (a statutory member of the intelligence community), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Secret Service.

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis conducts all-source intelligence analysis using information collected by the department’s components, foreign and domestic intelligence provided by the intelligence community, and law enforcement information from state, local, and tribal sources, as well as information obtained from the private sector. The office provides a variety of intelligence products to elements within the department, the intelligence community, and other stake-holders including state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector.

In addition to providing intelligence analysis, the department coordinates overall department intelligence strategies, policies, and plans; manages departmental state and local programs; maintains the department’s “common intelligence picture”; and oversees the department’s counterintelligence activities. The office also establishes programs to support specific departmental operations and activities. The Integrated Border Intelligence Program was established to enhance intelligence collection in support of DHS activities on the U.S. Southwest border. The initiative included the establishment of a Homeland Security Intelligence Support Team, analysts deployed to the El Paso Intelligence Center to assist in creating intelligence products for border security operations.

The office also manages the department’s State and Local Fusion Center program. By law the department is required to assist state, local, tribal, and territorial governments with establishing, maintaining, and supporting intelligence “fusion” centers. These centers serve as a focal point for sharing and exchanging information regarding terrorist threats among federal entities and state and local agencies and the private sector. Information sharing includes many participants, such as state and local law enforcement intelligence agencies. Some fusion centers also conduct all-source analysis. As of 2011, DHS had established relationships with over 72 fusion centers in states, territories, and major metropolitan areas. Department intelligence analysts were represented in some of these.

CBP maintains the Office of Intelligence and Coordination, which supports and manages agency-wide intelligence activities. Subordinate elements within CBP provide important intelligence collection assets. The Air and Marine Operations Center, for example, provides both imagery and electronic intelligence support.

ICE’s Office of Intelligence provides intelligence support and products gleaned from the spectrum of activities conducted by the agency. The office oversees a number of specialized teams. One of the agency’s Tactical Intelligence Centers is tasked to work with the NSA. Other units include Counterproliferation Intelligence and Human Smuggling and Public Safety. ICE also maintains 26 Field Intelligence Groups, which provide intelligence support to local ICE offices.

The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services maintains an intelligence unit within its Office of Fraud Detection and National Security. The Intelligence Branch produces all-source intelligence products for the agency and also assists in detecting trends and indicators of fraud. The branch has liaison officers with the department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the NCTC, the Terrorist Screening Center, and Interpol (an international police organization).

The Transportation Security Administration has an Office of Intelligence that coordinates intelligence support for the agency and also conducts analysis. The office provides a variety of intelligence products from daily reports to detailed technical analysis of specific threats. The office also deploys field intelligence officers at major U.S. airports.

The U.S. Secret Service is supported by its Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division. The division is organized into domestic and foreign branches, which use intelligence products provided by other agencies to support the service’s mission. The service’s National Threat Assessment Center provides some analytical intelligence products intended to provide general guidance for the protection of persons. The center’s studies include publicly available reports on topics such as school safety.

U.S. Coast Guard

The U.S. Coast Guard is the only subordinate agency of DHS that is a statutory member of the intelligence community. The Intelligence and Criminal Investigation Program provides overall management of the service’s intelligences support activities. The Coast Guard also maintains a Counterintelligence Service. The service’s Intelligence Coordination Center is the focal point for coordinating with the IC and federal law enforcement. The center also conducts joint activities with the U.S. Navy and CBP, including operations at national Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers. Intelligence support staffs provide assistance to field units.

Central Intelligence Agency

Without question the largest producer of all-source national security intelligence in the IC is the CIA. Much information on transnational and state-sponsored threats provided to domestic intelligence services, law enforcement, and homeland security organizations comes from agency products. The agency focuses on foreign rather than domestic intelligence operations. Activities the agency is authorized to conduct within the United States are those that facilitate its overseas missions, such as recruiting individuals to conduct covert activities in foreign countries. The CIA also serves as the lead federal agency for a number of activities, including human intelligence collection. Subordinate activities that facilitate intelligence collection include the following.

National Clandestine Service

This component of the CIA is responsible for most “nontechnical” means of collection, including human intelligence. The National Clandestine Service is also the primary counterintelligence arm of the agency.

Directorate of Intelligence

The directorate provides analysis for information collected by the agency and other organizations within the IC. The directorate also integrates different collection sources, including open source intelligence, to perform “all-source” intelligence analysis. It has a major role in providing reports and other intelligence products to the IC and senior government officials.

Department of Defense

The Defense Intelligence Agency is the major producer and manager of intelligence products for the DOD and a statutory member of the intelligence community. Overall, the DOD produces more foreign intelligence and manages more intelligence assets than the CIA. Most intelligence activities and assets of the DOD directly support military operations rather than national security intelligence. Nevertheless, military intelligence can impact homeland security activities For example, technical intelligence from the National Center for Medical Intelligence can be an important source of information on biological threats. The Defense Intelligence Agency also manages the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, which conducts all-source intelligence analysis for the DOD, and the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center, responsible for coordinating intelligence activities across the department. The agency also runs the department’s counterintelligence and human intelligence activities. In addition to providing intelligence to the community on foreign threats, the agency reports on security threats related to DOD critical infrastructure within the United States.

In addition to the Defense Intelligence Agency, each military service is represented in the intelligence community. These organizations perform intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and operational security for their services and the infrastructure maintained by them.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Primarily a support agency for the DOD, the NGA also provides intelligence for homeland security–related activities. The agency is the functional manager for the National System for Geospatial Intelligence, a complex form of imagery intelligence. Geospatial analysis involves overlaying geographical information to understand complicated phenomena. In addition to supporting threat-based intelligence collection in coordination with the U.S. Geological Survey, the agency provides map and other geospatial data for emergency preparedness, disaster response, and recovery; modeling, simulation, and analysis of weapons of mass destruction and critical infrastructure vulnerability; and airport and border security (land and maritime) operations. Among tasks the agency has undertaken is an integrated homeland security geospatial infrastructure database.

National Reconnaissance Office

This agency is part of the DOD, but its responsibilities include managing all national space-based intelligence assets. It primarily supports missions of the military and CIA. In 2008 DHS began a joint pilot program with the National Reconnaissance Office to establish satellite-based support for homeland security–related activities. The program generated significant controversies, principally over privacy concerns. In 2009 DHS disbanded the National Applications Office, which managed the program.

National Security Agency

While nominally part of the DOD, this agency provides cryptologic support, as well as signal intelligence intercept and analysis, for the CIA and other agencies. In addition to its role in intelligence collection, the agency is a leader in cyber operations and also plays an important role in operational security by setting standards and certifying government cryptologic systems (means to encrypt information). The agency provides intelligence that supports counterterrorism and homeland security activities and coordinates with DHS on cybersecurity missions.

Department of Justice

The department includes subordinate organizations that are statutory members of the intelligence community.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI was transformed by 9/11 from an organization mostly focused on prosecuting criminals after their acts to an organization developing domestic intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks before they begin. The bureau has authority to investigate all federal crimes not assigned exclusively to other federal agencies. Laws specifically task the bureau to investigate certain federal crimes, including terrorism. To support these activities, as well as other statutory requirements, the FBI is a major contributor to intelligence operations protecting the homeland.

Under the director of the FBI, the Office of Intelligence is responsible for overseeing the bureau’s intelligence analysis workforce, as well as managing the bureau’s intelligence capabilities and functions. The office establishes critical intelligence requirements and maintains an FBI-wide collection plan.

Each FBI field office has a Field Intelligence Group (FIG). These groups include both special agents and intelligence analysts. FIG personnel manage the intelligence cycle within their local offices, including gathering, analyzing, and distributing intelligence products. The FIG is the bureau’s primary contact point for state and local law enforcement agencies and their intelligence activities.

The agency also maintains specialized units. The Communications Analysis Section studies electronic systems (such as telephonic) to identify terrorist suspects and networks. The Document Exploitation Unit analyzes and provides intelligence products from documents and computers. The Special Technologies and Applications Office provides technical intelligence support.

Drug Enforcement Administration

The DEA is also part of the Department of Justice. Its Office of National Security Intelligence is a statutory member of the intelligence community. While the office is responsible for managing global law enforcement drug intelligence assets, it cooperates closely with DHS, particularly with CBP and ICE.

Department of Energy

The department’s Office of Intelligence is a statutory member of the Intelligence Community. In regards to homeland security it provides key technical intelligence support on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation and commercial nuclear infrastructure.

Department of State

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research represents the State Department in the intelligence community. Several organizations within the department contribute intelligence collection, including conducting open source intelligence and providing information for databases such as those supporting the Terrorist Watch List. The bureau provides all-source intelligence analysis of diplomatic reporting. The bureau’s Humanitarian Information Unit collects and disseminates information on humanitarian emergencies worldwide.

Department of the Treasury

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for providing intelligence and counterintelligence support to the department. Among its missions, the office emphasizes operations related to financing terrorists and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

A variety of organizations and activities oversee intelligence activities.

Congressional Oversight

U.S. laws establish reporting requirements on a wide variety of intelligence activities. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act requires periodic reports on the use of investigative and surveillance tools authorized under the legislation. More generally, by law the president is required to ensure the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are kept “fully and currently” informed, including on ongoing and anticipated significant intelligence activities, as well as approved covert action programs.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence consists of members of both Democratic and Republican political parties, with the party holding the majority in the Senate having one more member. These members serve eight-year terms. In addition to providing oversight of intelligence activities, the committee considers certain presidential nominations referred to the Senate for confirmation, including the DNI, the principal deputy director, the director of the CIA, and the CIA inspector general. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is organized in the same fashion as the Senate and has similar oversight responsibilities (although the House does not play a role in the confirmation of presidential appointments). Other congressional committees can also exercise intelligence oversight for matters under their jurisdiction. For example, the judiciary committees are significantly involved in oversight of the USA PATRIOT Act. Congressional committees and members are assisted in their oversight function by the General Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget Office. Inspectors general (IG’s) exist within the Office of the DNI and all members of the intelligence community. IG’s have dual reporting authority to the heads of their respective agencies and Congress and broad investigative authorities to evaluate intelligence activities. They can be tasked by the agency or Congress to undertake investigations or inquiries on their own authority. Many federal agencies also have Offices of Privacy and Civil Liberties, some times required by law. They are often tasked with evaluating the appropriateness of intelligence activities and policies. The intelligence community’s Whistleblower Protection Act establishes procedures for employees and contractors to report complaints to Congress concerning serious problems involving intelligence activities. The Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act (commonly called the No FEAR Act) requiresfederal agencies to be accountable for violations of antidiscrimination and whistleblower protection laws.

STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCES

Intelligence operations at the state, territorial, local, and tribal levels and in the private sector must all comply with protections designated in the Constitution and associated federal laws. In addition, their governing entities establish their own laws, regulations, and policies. The extent of local intelligence operations and the degree of their coordination with federal agencies vary significantly across the nation. Major metropolitan areas, such as New York City and Los Angeles, for example, maintain robust and sophisticated intelligence operations. However, in many smaller communities, intelligence support is assigned as an additional duty if at all.

While state and local law enforcement agencies usually play a principal role in intelligence operations, they are not the only entities that require intelligence products or have the ability to report useful information. Virtually every component of the homeland security enterprise can support intelligence activities, if only by ensuring front-line personnel understand basic intelligence requirements and report items of interest.

Fusion Centers

These centers are “owned and operated” by the states or major metropolitan areas and focus on terrorism as well as other threats and criminal activities. They act as clearinghouses for the flow of information and intelligence from the federal government, the private sector, and other entities. Fusion centers also develop intelligence products. These products result from the process of “fusing” intelligence by analyzing and integrating all sources of intelligence from multiple agencies.

Information-sharing Resources

An enduring challenge for intelligence operations is getting the right data to the right people at the right time.

DHS maintains the Homeland Security Information Network, a web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration that contains both classified and unclassified intelligence products and databases. The network has five major “communities of interest,” including intelligence and analysis. State and local law enforcement, other public and private sector organizations, and fusion centers can all request access to the network. A request for participation must be validated by the community of interest’s “owner” or other government-authorized nominator. Applications and information can be obtained through the network homepage.

Intelink-U is a sensitive but unclassified information-sharing system maintained under the DNI. It includes information related to terrorism. Eligible users include personnel in the intelligence community, as well individuals in the wider U.S. government; personnel in active or reserve military service; contractors and foreign nationals sponsored by a U.S. government agency; state, local, territorial, and tribal employees; and members of the academic community sponsored by a U.S. government agency. Applications can be obtained via e-mail from the Intelink homepage.

OpenSource.gov is also maintained under the DNI. It provides a repository of open source intelligence products. Accounts are available to federal, state, and local government employees and contractors, as well as foreign liaisons with the U.S. government. Application for access is available online at the portal’s homepage.

Law Enforcement Online is maintained by the FBI. The network includes materials produced by the FBI, DHS, NCTC, and nonfederal intelligence products. The material provided is sensitive but unclassified. Access is authorized for federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal government employees whose duties relate to homeland security and law enforcement. Personnel from foreign law enforcement agencies are also allowed to use the network. Applications are available at the website homepage.

The Regional Information Sharing Systems Network is managed by the Department of Justice. Its network is organized around six regional intelligence centers that help collate and share information on multijurisdictional crimes. The network provides access to intelligence databases and connections to other law enforcement and intelligence systems, analytical support tools. The network includes the Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX) system, with homeland security, disaster, and terrorist threat data, including classified information. Law enforcement organizations at all levels of government are allowed access. Application is through the regional intelligence centers.

The National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System is a secure network for information exchange among state and local law enforcement agencies. Nlets, a nonprofit corporation owned and operated by the states, maintains the system. Information is placed and exchanged on the network on a voluntary basis. It primarily includes information such as motor vehicle records, Interpol warrants, and access to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services database. Some intelligence products produced by various sources are also available. Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement can subscribe, as well as international law enforcement and “associate members,” groups that support the criminal justice community. Participation is on a subscriber basis and can be requested through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications homepage.

U.S. government systems that operate at the secret level can also provide access to intelligence products and databases maintained by the FBI, NCTC, Open Source Center, and DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. These networks include the Homeland Secure Data Network maintained by DHS, FBINet (the agency’s intranet), and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), a network for secret information maintained by the DOD.

Training and Education

A number of federal, state, local, and private sector groups offer training and education programs, schools, courses, and materials for homeland security–related intelligence activities. The FBI Academy, for example, has established a Center for Intelligence Training. In addition to facilitating the professional development of federal intelligence personnel, the U.S. government provides some resources to nonfederal entities. This effort includes the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), which is part of DHS and provides tuition-free training to state, local, campus, and tribal law enforcement officers and emergency responders.

Current national training system for homeland security intelligence–related activities is not uniform and lacks common standards. Many private sector contractors offer training to state and local law enforcement authorities, but there is no certification to ensure that information they are providing is credible or accurate. Another issue is that some programs do not adequately reflect the role of intelligence operations in homeland security and counterterrorism. After 9/11, for example, California established a legislative requirement for an Emergency Response Training Advisory Committee. As a result, the state developed an eight-hour training course called Law Enforcement Response to Terrorism. The training was primarily reactive, focused on collecting evidence and investigating terrorism crimes. Little attention was given to prevention and the role of intelligence-led policing.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

It is difficult to imagine how U.S. homeland security efforts could achieve their full potential without fully integrating intelligence operations into the enterprise. Intelligence is not just critical for providing early warning to prevent terrorist attacks. It supports every aspect of “thinking” about, and improving, homeland security. In addition, it includes the important functions of counterintelligence and operational security. There are many challenges and obstacles to collecting, analyzing, sharing, and integrating intelligence. Overcoming them is a priority for the homeland security enterprise.

CHAPTER QUIZ

1. What is the most significant challenge in conducting homeland security intelligence?

2. Explain the greatest concerns regarding protecting constitutional liberties while conducting intelligence operations.

3. Describe how the intelligence community is organized and managed.

4. How does the “broken windows” theory apply to homeland security intelligence?

5. What is the purpose of fusion centers?