CHAPTER 14
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Understanding Real Threats and Getting Beyond Hype

The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.

Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, December 2008

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

It is dangerous folly to confuse the unprecedented with the impossible. There are terrorist weapons that can cause catastrophic destruction, inflicting tens of thousands of casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars in physical ruin. There are terrorist groups that want these weapons and plot ways to get them. However, Americans are far from powerless in the face of these dangers. Separating hype from reality is the first step to responding effectively to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, often referred to as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). This chapter reviews how each of the CBRNE threats might be obtained and employed, as well as how effective they might be.

CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter, you should be able to

1. Understand how CBRNE weapons can be manufactured, obtained, and employed by terrorists.

2. Describe difficulties of employing chemical weapons in a terrorist attack.

3. Describe steps required to manufacture biological weapons and the challenges a terrorist might face in each step.

4. Understand the nature of casualties and damage that might be produced by a radiological dispersal device and how the effects of a “dirty bomb” might be mitigated.

5. Discuss the difficulties terrorists face in obtaining nuclear weapons and material.

WEAPONS TO WORRY ABOUT

In the late 1990s, a select group of al-Qaida operatives began preparations for a major attack. Toiling away in a secure Afghan facility and reporting to the group’s top leadership, the team reported significant progress by the summer of 2001. But this team was not focused on slamming airliners into office buildings. Instead, it was working on the use of anthrax as a weapon. “The anthrax program had been developed in parallel to 9/11 planning,” CIA Director George Tenet stated later.¹

Key members of al-Qaida’s anthrax project were arrested after the 9/11 attacks, but while counterterrorism successes disrupted this specific plot, U.S. intelligence gathered increasing evidence of al-Qaida’s long interest in obtaining and using a variety of CBRNE weapons, from cyanide to nuclear bombs. Indeed, the group considered obtaining WMD a “religious duty.”

That should have come as little surprise, since al-Qaida was not the first terrorist group to seek, or even use, weapons of mass destruction.

CHEMICAL

Before the Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack on a Tokyo subway station in 1995, chemical munitions were thought of primarily as battlefield weapons (for more about Aum Shinrikyo, see Chapter 2 and Appendix B). The cult’s deadly 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, discussed earlier in this text, failed to murder larger numbers because of the weapon’s poor quality. But the strike did demonstrate that chemical strikes could be an effective terrorist weaponwith the potential to cause mass casualties. Also shown was how even unsuccessful attacks can cause extensive disruption and fear.

Scope of the Chemical Threat

Depending on the type of agent, concentration, and dose, chemical weapons can cause results from discomfort to permanent injuries or death. A light dose of sulfur mustard gas, for example, results in painful skin blistering and eye and lung irritation over in a few hours. On the other hand, a person who inhales 100 milligrams of sarin for one minute has a 50 percent chance of dying within 15 minutes. Chemical weapons are usually employed in aerosol form, either to be inhaled through the lungs (particles in the 1- to 7-micron range) or absorbed through the skin (70 microns or less)—sizes that are a fraction of the size of a human hair.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction), an arms control agreement effective since 1997, prohibits signatories from manufacturing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. By 2010, the convention had been ratified by 188 countries. However, it has not prevented states from developing and even employing chemical arms. The technology and expertise required to produce viable chemical weapons is within reach of many potential enemies. Also of concern are leftover stocks from Cold War chemical arsenals still awaiting destruction. They could be sold, stolen, or sabotaged. The safety and security of the vast Russian stockpiles presents a particular problem.

State-produced chemical weapons are not the only threat. Even terrorist groups with modest means could produce small amounts of such weapons, especially if they are willing to compromise on purity, shelflife, and safety. Two obstacles must be overcome. First, an enemy needs to obtain precursors, component chemicals required to produce a lethal chemical compound. These can be stolen, purchased, or manufactured. Most precursors also have industrial uses and therefore are commercially available. Major obstacles to obtaining these materials in bulk are the Australia Group, a cooperative of countries managing export of precursor chemicals, and associated export controls of individual nations that track their production and use. These controls provide some security, but determined terrorists might overcome them by buying precursors in small amounts, employing substitute chemicals, manufacturing precursors from simpler compounds, or obtaining chemicals from suppliers not covered by controls.

Making Chemical Weapons

Production of large quantities of chemical weapons requires industrial facilities. A facility able to produce tons of sarin gas would cost approximately tens of millions of dollars. It could be built or converted from a commercial chemical plant. Some 100 countries already have capacity for large-scale production.

Manufacturing enough material for a credible threat is within the capabilities of a well-financed terrorist group. Aum Shinrikyo, for example, had a substantial manufacturing capacity. A reasonable expectation is that around 50 pounds of sarin gas could be manufactured for several million dollars. A more modest capability, sufficient to manufacture several pounds of flow-quality chemical weapons, might be assembled for tens of thousands of dollars using readily available commercial laboratory equipment in a facility under 1,000 square feet. (Requirements for preparing poisons, such as the cyanide weapons considered by al-Qaida for use in various attacks, including against the New York subway system, are similarly modest.)

Clandestine labs can be hidden anywhere. Illegal methamphetamine production in the United States offers an example. Meth labs, which use highly toxic and explosive chemicals, have been found in farms, garages, apartments, and basements. Los Angeles law enforcement estimated that in 2000, labs dispersed throughout two counties in California had the capacity to manufacture 44.6 metric tons of methamphetamine a year. Federal authorities during that period seized only 3.87 tons. These figures suggest both the potential scope of illegal, small-scale chemical production and the difficulty of finding clandestine facilities, even those with prominent signatures, such as noxious odors and large amounts of obviously contaminated and discolored trash.

Delivering Chemical Weapons

Large-scale chemical attacks require a significant volume both to achieve coverage of the target area and compensate for wind, temperature, and humidity, which diminishes effectiveness. The population density of the attack area is also an important factor. For example, under moderate weather conditions, between six and seven hundred-pounds of sarin gas dispensed by air in an area a bit larger than a tenth of a square mile would kill about 60 to 200 people (assuming an urban population density).²

But making large amounts of chemical weapons is not enough. Dispensing them is a critical challenge. The best method is employing sprayers such as crop dusters. Sprayers force liquids through a special nozzle to create a suspension of fine particles that can drift over a large area. Even with a reliable dispenser there remains the task of transporting and delivering high volumes under the right environmental conditions. In high temperatures the chemicals will evaporate. In the cold they will condense and fall to the ground. High winds will disperse them rapidly. Good conditions for a chemical attack include a temperature inversion where air is trapped over a target area. Complex urban terrain can also significantly alter the dispersal pattern. Some experimentation suggests the shape and array of city buildings may prevent uniform distribution of the agent.

Much easier is deploying small quantities in confined spaces such as buildings or subways, using a simple release mechanism or ventilation system. This could expose thousands of people. Buildings with mechanical ventilation, for example, introduce outdoor air at the rate of about 15 to 20 cubic feet per minute. As a result, there is a constant potential for contaminants to be blown throughout the structure. The chimney effect of air rising through stairwells and elevator shafts can also disperse chemical agents rapidly. (As a result, some experts suggest moving air intakes from ground floors of buildings to their roofs to make it harder to introduce agents into the ventilation system.)

Various reports indicate al-Qaida had developed plans to deliver cyanide and perhaps other agents into U.S. facilities.

Industrial Chemical Threat

Perhaps of greater concern than terrorists producing their own chemical weapons is the threat of them exploiting toxic chemicals used for industrial and commercial purposes. All around the country are tanker trucks, railcars, ships, pipelines, and trucks carrying barrels of poisons or other hazardous materials, as well as chemical manufacturing and storage facilities; manyof these are prospective weapons. In 2001 the Environmental Protection Agency reported that at least 123 U.S. chemical plants contained enough chemicals that, if a major release occurred, each could result in a million or more casualties. In one agency survey of 15,000 chemical facilities, the mean population that potentially could be affected by a toxic chemical release in a worst-case scenario was 40,247.⁴

America already has extensive experience with chemical accidents, fires, and spills, many causing death and significant property damage. Often these incidents occurred near densely populated areas. For instance, a study of chemical releases in New York over a five-year period found that more than half were near residences; seventy-five percent of the events occurred within one-quarter mile of a household. Chemical accidents throughout the United States have resulted in significant damage. For example, from 1986 to 1999 releases from pipelines caused, on average, 23 fatalities, 113 injuries, and $68 million in damage per year.⁵

A deliberate terrorist attack would likely employ either toxic chemicals or flammable substances. Of the two, toxic chemicals may be more dangerous since they tend to represent a greater downwind hazard. Anhydrous ammonia and chlorine are the mostly widely used industrial chemicals that might be the target of a sabotage effort (Iraqi insurgents have detonated tankers and other trucks loaded with chlorine). Both chlorine and ammonia can produce substantial vapor hazards. For instance, most chlorine in the United States is transported in 90-ton railcars. The downwind hazard for a release from a railcar in an urban setting is about 14 miles. The gas plume could kill exposed individuals more than three miles away and inflict permanent lung damage on those farther downwind. Flammable substances present less of a vapor hazard but significant explosive potential. For example, in 1989, a massive release of isobutene, ethylene, hexane, and hydrogen from a Phillips 66 chemical plant in Houston ignited in a fireball with a force of 2.3 kilotons. The disaster killed 23 and injured 130, leaving $750 million in damage at the plant and hurling debris into neighboring communities almost six miles away.

In addition to major strikes against industrial facilities, small-scale attacks could be made with an arsenal of contaminants and toxins freely available to virtually anyone, or stored in areas with little or no security. Fuels, pesticides, and solvents, for example, can all be used as poisons to cause casualties and inflict psychological harm and economic disruption. This includes household chemicals, natural and propane gas, and gasoline. One analyst calls such attacks “toxic warfare” and notes a growing tendency of terrorist groups overseas to conduct strikes using readily available materials. These practices could be adopted for attacks in the United States.

Product or Commodity Tampering

Other forms of chemical attack include product tampering, poisoning of food and water supplies, and disrupting agricultural production. Because of the volume of material required for widespread contamination, large-scale attacks would be extremely difficult. For example, as discussed below, a reservoir would have to be contaminated with major amounts of cyanide to produce any significant chance of a lethal drink of water.³ Many experts discount this sort of attack.

By comparison, product tampering and small-scale, but potentially deadly, attacks are eminently achievable. In 1982, for example, seven people in the Chicago area died as a result of ingesting Tylenol laced with cyanide. In addition to the actual attack, the public was frightened and bewildered by a wave of 270 incidents of suspected product tampering reported to the Food and Drug Administration in the wake of the incident. Many of these were hoaxes. Still, the affair demonstrated the widespread concern and confusion generated by a product-tampering.

BIOLOGICAL

Biological weapons are living organisms and toxins (poisonous materials created by living organisms) that can incapacitate or kill. Far less than an ounce of many biological weapons can inflict high lethality. Weight for weight, they can be hundreds to thousands of times more lethal than the most deadly chemical agents and can, in some cases, be produced at much less cost.

Living microorganisms used for biological weapons, including bacteria, rickettsia, or viruses, cause deadly infections. These are often communicable and can spread easily beyond the initial target. Their value as weapons is affected by their infectivity (ability to infect a person), virulence (severity of the illness caused), transmissibility (likelihood of being spread to other people), and persistence (ability to survive in the environment).

Toxins are poisons produced by bacteria, fungi, plants, or animals. Usually classified as either biological or chemical weapons, they share characteristics of both. Though derived from organic sources, unlike biological weapons they are not living organisms, do not reproduce, and are not communicable. Like chemical weapons, the effects of some toxins can appear in seconds to minutes rather than requiring hours or weeks for symptoms to appear, as is often true for biological infections. They can also be more difficult to detect and diagnose than chemical weapons. For scientific research and nonproliferation issues, it may be useful to group toxins with biological weapons, but medical considerations and casualty response, assessment, and treatment emergency personnel should consider them a separate category.

Scope of Biological Weapons Threat

Many terrorist groups are capable of executing some form of biological or toxin warfare. Individuals with graduate-level science education or medical training could produce bioweapons, though greater skills are required for creating very small and stable agents. In some cases, biological attacks can be mounted without any scientific skills or medical knowledge. (See Figure 14.1.)

FIGURE 14.1
BIOTERRORISM AGENTS AND DISEASES

Developing Biological Weapons

Four essential tasks are involved in producing a biological agent: obtaining seed stocks, production, stabilization, and preparation for distribution. First, the terrorists must get their hands on seed stock of the pathogen or toxin-producing organism. To preclude easily weaponized biological materials from being readily available, there are restrictions on the most dangerous pathogens, based on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The convention, which went into effect in 1975 and has been ratified by almost 150 countries, bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological weapons and certain equipment associated with them. Along with the convention, many countries, principally operating under the cooperation of the Australia Group, have worked to prevent the acquisition of seed stocks by terrorist groups or states attempting to mount weapons programs. Each state is responsible for implementing its own measures, so enforcement is inconsistent.

The challenge of implementing controls for dual-use science and technology—resources useful for both legal commercial and research purposes and weapons production—is one major obstacle to enforcing these regulations.

Another challenge is insufficient security around official biological weapons facilities and programs. This was demonstrated in the case of the 2001 anthrax attacks, which the FBI attributed to a mentally disturbed U.S. Army scientist, Dr. Bruce Ivins, who diverted deadly materials from his workplace. Those attacks prompted the U.S. government to invest many billions of dollars in research involving biological weapons and responses to them. Hundreds of U.S. facilities and thousands of personnel are now cleared to work with these agents. Critics claim this expansion, combined with inadequate safeguards, has actually increased the potential threat of diversion by an insider. Controls in Russia and certain other nations are believed to have been far looser.

Restrictions imposed by the Australia Group can be overcome. Stocks can be purchased under the guise of conducting legitimate scientific research. In 1984 and 1985, for example, the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon set up its own medical corporation and obtained pathogens from the American Type Culture Collection, a nonprofit repository of biological materials for scientific and medical research. The cult later used some of these materials to conduct terrorist attacks. In 1996 and again in 2002, the U.S. government moved to tighten restrictions on pathogen transfers, but the possibility remains that an enemy could obtain seed materials from a source in the United States or other countries.

Seed stocks can also be stolen or extracted from natural sources. In some instances, such as smallpox, this would be very difficult. In others, sources are more readily available. Some toxins, for example, can be extracted from plants or animals, though they are difficult to produce in large quantities. The second task in fielding a bioweapon is to produce the biological or toxin agent in bulk. Protein toxins, for example, are produced from bacteria by batch fermentation. Much of the technology required for this task is employed in both industrial biotechnology and commercial fermentation.

Technical procedures for weapons production are available in open-source, scientific literature. Over 100 nation states have the capacity to manufacture biological weapons on a large scale. A facility can be constructed and operated for less than $10 million. Much less expensive is a small-scale program, likely within the reach of any terrorist group with several hundred thousand dollars, a competent team of graduate students and a facility no larger than a few hundred square feet.

The third task is stabilizing the biological or toxin agents for storage and dissemination. Freeze-drying, introducing chemical additives, or microencapsulation (coating droplets of pathogens with a protective material) are all proven methods, and the equipment needed to perform them is not difficult to obtain. Commercial freeze dryers, for example, are widely used in the food and beverage industry. Small-scale dryers, used to produce market samples, can also be used in biotechnology applications.

The fourth task is preparing agents for dispersal. Biological and toxin weapons usually take the form of liquid slurries (a mixture of water and fine particles) or a powder. Liquid slurries are easiest to prepare but less effective and heavier. Powders are created through a milling process, a technically challenging component of weapons production, but again one that mirrors commercial processes. In addition, coatings can be used to prevent clumping and ensure particles remain small.

Making ultrafine particles is central to producing highly lethal agents because many pathogens are most deadly when inhaled. Particles between one to five microns in diameter are ideal. They remain in the air longer and can be inhaled deep into the lungs, where the membranes are thinner, and pass more easily into the body to initiate respiratory infections. Producing ultra-small particles that are both clump-free and highly stable is a trademark of sophisticated programs, requiring tools such as advanced spray dryers, electron microscopes (which alone cost $50,000 to $250,000 or more), and hazard containment facilities.

Delivering Biological Attacks

The means for delivering biological and toxin weapons range from very difficult to easy. The most lethal is an aerosol form of small, unclumped material. Clumping of agents can degrade the effectiveness of an attack. Large particles quickly drop to the ground or, if inhaled, do not easily pass into lung tissue, significantly lessening the potential for infection.

Dispersal can be done effectively by sprayers and, far less efficiently, by explosive devices such as self-dispensing cluster bombs (because they destroy part of the agent when detonated). Cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or aircraft could perform sprayer attacks, but would only be effective if using specialized spraying equipment. Conventional sprayers on crop dusters or air tankers used to fight forest fires, for example, would probably not be very effective at dispensing agents in the one- to five-micron range. Mechanical stresses in the spraying system might also kill or inactivate a large percentage of particles, by some estimates up to 99 percent. However, if a terrorist had a large supply, say over a hundred pounds, of a virulent bioweapon or was not focused on achieving maximum effects, crude dispensers might be adequate.

Any method of delivering biological agents, from dropping a liquid slurry out of helicopters to sprinkling agents on the sidewalk, could achieve some success. But weather conditions and complex urban terrain affect the dispersal and life span of microbes (many are sensitive to ultraviolet light and temperature extremes), and thus high casualties and even widespread contamination are not assured. When Aum Shinriky occultists hurled anthrax off a tall building, the agent was so dispersed or of such poor quality (some investigators report it was a harmless strain) that there were no casualties.⁶

Environmental Considerations

Ensuring high lethality or widespread contamination requires limiting environmental stresses on the agent and vectoring it directly onto the intended target. Ventilation systems and air conditioners may fit the bill. For example, the 1976 outbreak of pneumonia that sickened and killed people attending an American Legion convention in Philadelphia was caused by the bacterium Legionella, which spread through a hotel air-conditioning system. An inventive enemy might adapt such a method for a deliberate attack. Alternatively, agents released on subway platforms would be widely dispersed by the movement of trains, which act like huge pistons forcing air rapidly through the tunnels. More focused delivery could be achieved by portable atomizers employed to contaminate subway cars, airport terminals, or meeting rooms.

Intentional contamination of food and water is another possible form of biological attack. Natural outbreaks of waterborne contamination are already a concern. A 1993 protozoan infestation in the Milwaukee water supply killed 50 and sickened 400,000. Intentionally fouling water supplies, however, is difficult. Though there are over 55,000 community water systems in the United States, the opportunities for an effective attack are less of a risk than generally assumed. Municipal waterworks are already designed to filter out or kill impurities and pathogens. A combination of filtration and disinfection technologies can address most risks, if properly applied. Contaminants, for example, can be removed by inexpensive and widely available carbon filters. Additionally, agents would be disbursed and diluted, requiring huge volumes of contaminant to have any effect. In short, waterborne attacks are feasible but difficult.

Contamination

On the other hand, contamination of food supplies or biological product tampering is an ever-present danger. Contaminated food is already a deadly problem. Food-borne disease causes an average of 76 million illnesses each year, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths, creating an economic cost of up to $32 billion.⁷ Humans can also be exposed to deadly or debilitating toxins by ingesting contaminated plant and animal products or, less frequently, by contact or inhalation. Beans, peppers, carrots, and corn, for example, are ideal vehicles for carrying botulinum. Biological or toxin agents could be introduced effectively through a wide variety of commodities, from cookies to cosmetics. Improper storage, poor sanitation, and cross-contamination during the production, transportation, processing, or storage of medicine, food supplies, or other consumables can further spread toxins or biological agents.

Infectious Disease

A traditional means of bioattack is to spread disease through humans, animals, or insects. Infectious diseases are already the third leading cause of death in the United States, and battling them is an ongoing health issue. For example, in recent years an outbreak of mosquito-borne dengue fever in Hawaii, a disease not endemic to the United States, sickened 119 people. Responding to the outbreak cost over $1.5 million. History includes attempts to infect adversaries by offering contaminated goods, firing contaminated arrows, driving infected refugees into hostile cities or even launching infected corpses into the enemy’s camp. A modern enemy might attempt to introduce diseases not common in the United States, such as cholera, dengue, dengue hemorrhagic fever, and dengue shock syndrome. Diseases affecting farm animals could also be spread.

The threat of epidemic varies with type of agent employed, nature of the attack, method of transmission, medical countermeasures required and available to prevent or treat the disease, and size of the target population. (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of pandemics and the public health system.)

RADIOLOGICAL

Radiological weapons rely on radiation, rather than blast, to cause death and casualties. They can also disrupt, damage, and deny access to areas, systems, and facilities. Radiation destroys or damages human cells and in high doses can kill or incapacitate individuals. Lower doses can create both short-term (such as lowering immune response, creating greater susceptibility to illness) and long-term (including causing various forms of cancer) health problems. Some radioactive isotopes, such as cesium 137, bond easily with common materials like concrete and soil, and could pose long-term health and contamination risks in an affected area.

Scope of the Radiological Threat

The threat is determined by the distance from the radioactive source, the manner of dispersal, weather conditions (which affect how far contaminated particles mixed in a debris cloud or aerosol attack will disperse), the degree of protection enjoyed by target populations (for example, buildings and overhead cover), and the type of radiation. Alpha particles, for example, travel a short distance, and most will not penetrate beyond the dead layer of epidermal skin. They are harmful, however, if inhaled or swallowed. Beta particles can penetrate the skin and inflict cellular damage, but can be blocked by common materials such as plastic, concrete, and aluminum. In contrast, gamma rays and neutrons are far more powerful and do not lose energy as quickly when they pass through an absorber like clothing or walls. Heavy lead shielding, great amounts of other absorbent or scattering material (several feet of earth or concrete), or significant distance (perhaps in miles), may be required to avoid high-dose exposure. In an urban attack, buildings might absorb or shield significant amounts of radiation, significantly reducing initial casualties, though cleanup of contaminated buildings would have substantial economic consequences.

Types of Threats

Radiological attacks can take two forms: via dispersal devices, which can spread contamination directly or through attacks on critical infrastructure, such as systems that supply food and other commodities, or by striking nuclear facilities to release radioactivity.

A dirty bomb could take many forms. Relatively large weapons with highly radioactive material would be required to kill or sicken great numbers of people. A truck bomb, for example, with about 500 pounds of explosive and little more than 100 pounds of one-year-old spent fuel rods, would produce a lethal dosage zone with a radius over a half mile. Such a device employed in an urban area against a large, unsheltered population could contaminate thousands or more.⁸

While producing a radiological weapon is far easier than building a nuclear bomb, it’s complicated to fabricate a highly effective radiological dispersal device that can be easily transported to its target.

Among the challenges is that the device’s sizable load of highly radioactive material must be heavily shielded, or the material will melt its containers and contaminate those assembling or transporting it. Shielding can be a significant factor in determining the size and potency of a weapon. For example, one assessment concluded that sufficient radioactive material to contaminate about 140 square miles would require more than three hundred pounds of lead shielding. Other means of distribution can also face technical and material challenges. To distribute radiological material as a fine aerosol (with the ideal size being about one to five microns), the enemy would require a degree of specialized knowledge, as well as special handling and processing equipment to mill the radioactive agent and blend it with inert material to increase the risk of inhalation.

Obtaining Radiological Material

Unlike nuclear weapons, a radiological dispersal device does not require plutonium or enriched uranium. All that is needed is some form of radioactive material, which can come from any nuclear reactor. Worldwide, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) lists hundreds of nuclear power reactors, research reactors, and fuel cycle plants. Highly radioactive material, such as spent fuel rods or other waste material, is subject to export controls, but is far more easily bought or stolen than weapons-grade material. Security worldwide is uneven, and trafficking in these materials is not unprecedented.

Additionally, there are tens of thousands of radiation sources in medical, industrial, agricultural, and research facilities. Illicitly obtaining these materials is well within the realm of possibility. According to the IAEA, over 100 countries have inadequate regulatory systems for controlling radioactive material. Even the United States has significant gaps in export rules covering highly radioactive substances. Current regulations permit virtually unlimited export of high-risk materials.⁹

Weapons Effects

It’s hard to predict the impact of this type of weapon on those who escape an immediately lethal, incapacitating dose of radiation. Latency periods between exposure and the onset of symptoms would be hours to weeks, or even years for some cancers. Thus a radiological weapon—though likely to cause considerable psychological and operational impact—could produce limited immediate casualties. Catastrophic casualty figures, even for the largest radiological dispersal device, are only likely if long-term cancer risks are considered.

Prompt medical treatment can dramatically improve survivability after radiation injury. In particular, dramatic medical advances have been made in caring for individuals with suppressed immune systems, a common by-product of radiation attack. In addition, the danger of low-dose exposure from a radiological weapon may be far less than commonly assumed. The long-term effect of low-dose radiation is determined by the capacity of irradiated tissue to repair DNA damage within individual cells, which is influenced by a number of exposure, health, and genetic factors. There is some scientific evidence that current models may overestimate risks.¹⁰

Due to public fears of radiation, the psychological effects of an attack might be much greater than the physical threat. Post-traumatic stress and major depression disorders, for example, could be widespread. The economic impact of a radiological strike should not be underestimated. If contamination is extensive, just removing irradiated material could have significant consequences. For comparison, eliminating low-level radioactive waste from biomedical research facilities represents a substantial cost, up to $300 or more per cubic foot for shipping waste to approved facilities. The economic consequences of an attack would also include the cost of evacuating contaminated areas; housing, feeding, and caring for displaced persons; and lost economic productivity.

Radiological Threats from Nuclear Infrastructure

The best chance catastrophic damage through a radiological attack is targeting nuclear power infrastructure or other nuclear facilities. At its worst, a major release of radiation from a reactor or spent fuel storage site caused by sabotage or a direct attack could kill tens of thousands. Many of the more than 100 operational nuclear plants, decommissioned plants that contain spent fuel, and nonpower licensed reactors in the United States are sufficiently close to population centers that an attack would cause major evacuations and severe economic disruption, in addition to threatening lives and property. The cleanup of a major radiological release from a nuclear facility would be substantial, well into the billions of dollars.

The vulnerability of nuclear facilities to ground, sea, and air attack is a subject of some controversy. It is unclear whether the crash of a large, fully fueled, commercial aircraft could create a significant release of nuclear material, or that damaging other facilities such as spent fuel storage facilities or containment cooling systems could cause catastrophic damage. The potential for successful ground- or sea-borne attacks against nuclear material or radioactive waste material in transit is also an issue. Even if an attack were successfully launched, it might not reap catastrophic effects. Consequences of the 2011 nuclear disaster in Japan provide some support to both optimists and pessimists concerning the radiological threat.

NUCLEAR

The effects of a nuclear weapon are blast, heat, and nuclear radiation. Their relative importance varies with the yield of the bomb. With an explosion of about 2.5 kilotons (equivalent to the explosive energy of 2,500 tons of TNT), the three effects are all devastating and about equal in killing power, with immediately fatal injuries at a range of a little over a half mile As yield increases, the volume of blast and heat grow rapidly, outpacing the immediate effects of radiation.

Scope of Nuclear Threat

Several nations possess nuclear weapons (see From the Source: The Nth Country Experiment sidebar). There are also prospects for states such as Iran to field nuclear arsenals. The commercial or research nuclear infrastructure of any country, however, can be used as the foundation for a weapons program. Some technologies and know-how required for production are dual use, well known, and, considering that devices can be built with equipment available in the 1940s, not even state of the art. On the other hand, these tasks, such as refining highly enriched uranium or constructing the explosive lens for a plutonium implosion device, can be technically difficult and expensive to master. In addition, claims that nuclear weapons can be fashioned through simpler means or by employing low-enriched nuclear materials seem questionable.

Producing Nuclear Weapons

The most significant obstacle to fielding a nuclear device is obtaining the nuclear material needed to unleash an atomic explosion. Acquiring highly enriched uranium or plutonium through industrial production consumes considerable technical, industrial, and financial resources and thus is an activity largely limited to states. A weapon using a design no more sophisticated than the U.S. bombs dropped on Japan could produce a kiloton yield with as little as 55 pounds of highly enriched uranium or a little over 17 pounds of plutonium. Some argue, however, that more modern weapon designs can result in a kiloton yield with as little as a couple pounds of nuclear material.

Weapons are easier to produce when developers are willing to accept trade-offs in testing, safety, size, weight, shelf life, and yield predictability. Foreign assistance by nuclear-capable states can greatly speed the progress of nuclear weapons development. These cost assessments, however, assume a program that proceeds smoothly without false starts, accidents, or organizational problems, and in addition avoids security concerns, economic constraints, foreign sabotage, or political decisions that significantly lengthen production times

So far, nuclear weapons have been produced only through indigenous state-run programs. A nuclear shortcut is to purchase or steal weapons or weapons-grade material. This is a credible threat, not only from enemy states, but also from well-financed nonstate groups. There is little reliable data on blackmarket prices for weapons-grade nuclear material, but one study¹¹ suggests nominal prices for these commodities could be $1 million or more for a little over two pounds of material. There are groups capable and willing to make such investments. For example, Aum Shinrikyo had $1 billion in resources at its disposal. Documents seized from the cult reveal an interest in buying nuclear weapons, though its efforts never came to fruition.¹² Nor were the cult’s efforts an aberration.

Nuclear Smuggling

There are great unknowns concerning the nuclear black market. Publicly available information suggests most cases of attempted smuggling involve scam artists or amateur criminals rather than well-organized conspiracies. But these activities do not preclude the existence of a more serious threat hidden from either public scrutiny or Western intelligence. Such efforts might involve state or nonstate groups. Obtaining weapons-grade material and technology from states such as India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan is possible. Revelations concerning the activities of Pakistani scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan, who headed Pakistan’s nuclear program for some 25 years, show the covert trade in materials and technologies relating to nuclear weapons became substantial in recent years. North Korea is alleged to have provided a nuclear reactor to Syria (the facility was destroyed by Israel in 2007). Another likely source would be siphoning material from an established, legitimate program with excess material, although export controls and security measures present significant impediments. There are, however, gaps that can be exploited. Every nuclear country, including the United States, has issues with the security of its materials. Some stockpiles around the world are particularly vulnerable. Of greatest concern is the safekeeping of Russian nuclear weapons and material, which represents 95 percent of the world total outside America.

Overall, enforcement of the international Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, initiated in 1970 and involving most nations around the globe, and the effectiveness of U.S. initiatives have a mixed record of success. To be sure, by 2011 as far as is known no terrorist group had successfully obtained nuclear weapons or developed the capability to build them. This is cold comfort, given continuing demand for these weapons.

Delivering Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons can be delivered by ballistic or cruise missiles, dropped as bombs or smuggled via ships, aircraft, and other means. Britain, China, France, and Russia all have nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles that can reach targets in the United States. For enemies of the United States, the state of their technical skills and resources may determine delivery means. Building nuclear warheads in the thousand pound or smaller range is a significant technical challenge. Terrorists would likely be forced to smuggle a nuclear weapon or its components into the United States.

HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES

Before September 11, 2001, the most notable terrorist attacks on the United States in recent memory were the bombings of Oklahoma City’s Murrah office building in 1995 and the World Trade Center in 1993. (Unremembered by many was the 1920 “horse-drawn wagon bomb” that killed 38 people on Wall Street.) After 2001 the use of large explosive devices, often in vehicles (see Chapter 13) became increasingly common abroad, including massive car bomb attacks in Iraq and the devastating “backpack” attacks against transit systems in Great Britain and Spain. Such attacks will remain a threat to the U.S. homeland for years to come.

Scope of Explosive Threat

Bombs kill by blast effects, flying debris, and ensuing fires, toxic releases, or other damage wrought by the explosion. In a conventional explosive, energy is derived from a sudden, violent chemical reaction. High explosives are materials with a very fast rate of explosive reaction, emitting a detonating wave that can move more than five miles per second. Large, or high-yield, conventional explosive devices can either be manufactured bombs or improvised explosive devices.

Delivery of Weapons

Weapons can be delivered by a wide variety of means, including missiles, UAVs, and bombs covertly transported by air, land, and sea vehicles. The delivery system will largely determine the scale of the attack. Virtually any size group could undertake a large bomb attack employing some form of covert delivery means. For example, the strike on the Murrah office building, undertaken with limited means, consisted of a truck carrying 4,800 pounds of explosives. While a wide range of groups could undertake high-yield explosive attacks, it is unlikely that any single strike could match the catastrophic destruction of other WMD. For example, by one analysis, resources required to respond to the detonation of a very large high-yield explosive weapon would be less than one-third that required after a 10-kiloton nuclear blast. This lower response size gives some indication of how conventional explosives compare with nuclear arms. It should be noted, however, that high-yield explosive devices employed against critical infrastructure, such as dams, nuclear plants, and chemical factories, might have the potential to trigger a near-catastrophic event.

Obtaining High-Yield Explosive Weapons

High-yield explosive devices can be obtained in a number of ways. Military bombs, submunitions (bomblets, grenades, and mines filled with explosives or chemical agents), and explosives can be illicitly bought or stolen. Submunitions, for example, are manufactured by 33 countries. Fifty-six nations stockpile submunitions, and 18 of these are not members of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention), which is designed to limit the spread of some types of military hardware. The Wassenaar Arrangement (formally the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) lists submunitions as a controlled munition, but participation in the arrangement is voluntary and can be circum-vented.¹³

Weapons can also be fashioned from commercial explosives and other chemicals using information from books, magazines, and the Internet. Islamists and other terrorists have published bomb-making instructions online and in books, CD-ROMs, and videos. Advanced bomb-making technologies have spread during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and via state sponsors such as Iran.

Bomb-making materials are not difficult to obtain. Commercial explosives are readily available. For example, in 2001, 2.38 million metric tons of explosives, used for a wide variety of industrial and commercial purposes, were manufactured within the United States. Bombs can also be synthesized from a variety of chemical precursors, all with legitimate commercial uses, such as ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, nitromethane, concentrated nitric acid, concentrated hydrogen peroxide sodium chlorate, potassium chlorate, potassium perchlorate, urea, and acetone. For example, the bomb employed in the 1993 World Trade Center attack consisted of about a half ton of a fertilizer-based explosive and three large metal cylinders (about 130 pounds) of compressed hydrogen gas. The 2010 Times Square bomb, which failed to detonate, included a different type of fertilizer, as well as gasoline and propane tanks.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Weapons of mass destruction are often referred to as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive arms. Despite the WMD moniker, not all CBRNE weapons are capable of inflicting catastrophic harm resulting in tens of thousands of casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars in damage. Nuclear arms are the most dangerous, but also the most difficult to obtain or manufacture. Biological or chemical arms can be produced more easily, but delivering them effectively is far from easy. However, the use of biological, chemical, and radiological weapons to inflict limited casualties but great psychological and economic disruption is eminently achievable, even by smaller terrorist groups.

CHAPTER QUIZ

1. Why is the size of chemical, biological, or radiological particles an important factor in determining risk of casualties?

2. What means might be used to reduce casualties from a dirty bomb?

3. What are precursors, and why are they important for determining the potential of terrorists to produce biological and chemical weapons?

4. What is the most likely CBRNE weapon to be employed by a terrorist group?

5. What emergency response measures might be applicable to all CBRNE threats?

NOTES

1. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

2. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (August 1993), 53, www.wws.princeton.edu/cgibin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk1/1993/9341/934101.PDF.

3. For example, to generate a dose of well under an ounce in the first cup or so that a person might drink from a 200,000-gallon clear well would require more than 400 pounds of cyanide. See Donald C. Hickman, “A Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat: USAF Water Systems at Risk” (USAF Counterproliferation Center, U.S. Air War College, September 1999), fn 53, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/hickman.htm.

4. For more on chemical risks see, Environmental Protection Agency, The Chemical Safety Audit Report FY 1997 (October 1998), passim, [http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/pubs/97report.pdf]. See also, Testimony of Paul Orum before the Subcommittee on Superfund, Toxics, Risk, and Waste Management, Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, November 14, 2001; James C. Belke, “Chemical Accident Risks in U.S. Industry—A Preliminary Analysis of Accident Risk Data from U.S. Hazardous Chemical Facilities,” Environmental Protection Agency (September 25, 2000), np. The EPA defines a worst-case scenario as the release of the largest quantity of a regulated substance from a single vessel or process line failure that results in the greatest distance to the endpoint.

5. Paul Rothberg and Hussien D. Hassan, “Pipeline Safety: Federal Program and Reauthorization Issues,” Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2002, p. CRS–2.

6. Statement of W. Seth Carus before a Joint Hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee (March 4, 1998), judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/carus.htm.

7. For an overview of the threat of biological agroterrorism, see Anne Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United States Department of Agriculture,” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000–29, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP–2000–04, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (October 2000). Estimates for the cost of food-borne illness vary considerably based on what criteria are used. See Jean C. Buzby et al., “Bacterial Foodborne Disease: Medical Costs and Productivity Losses,” Agricultural Economics 741(August 1996), www.ers.usda.gov/publications/Aer741/index.htm.

8. In one proposed scenario, it was estimated that a device consisting of about 220 pounds of C–4, a little under two ounces of cesium137, and about four and a half pounds of plutonium detonated in a convention center in San Diego would kill 31 and possibly result in up to 1,969 additional fatalities and sicken 6,569. NBC Scenarios: 2002–2010 Center for Counterproliferation and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation, April 2000), 14, 19.

9. Charles D. Ferguson et al., “Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks,” Monterey Institute of International Studies, Occasional Paper 11 (January 2003), 45, 64.

10. Health Physics Society, “Radiation Risk in Perspective: Position Statement of the Health Physics Society” (March 2001), www.Hps.Org/Documents/Radiationrisk.pdf; National Radiological Protection Board, “Risk of Radiation-Induced Cancer at Low Doses and Low Dose Rates for Radiation Protection Purposes,” Documents of the NRPB, 6/11 (1995), 1–7; “Animal Studies of Residual Hematopoietic and Immune System Injury from Low Dose/Low Dose Rate Radiation and Heavy Metals,” Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute Contract Report 98–3 (1998), 1. See also Medical Management of Radiological Casualties Handbook (Bethesda, MD: Military Medical Operations Office, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, December 1999), 34–39; Electronic Power Research Institute, “Health Risks Associated with Low Doses of Radiation,” EPRI TR–104070 (Palo Alto, CA: Author, 2002), passim.

11. Rensselaer W. Lee III, Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 43.

12. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinriky–Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (October 31, 1995) Staff Statement, Part VI: Overseas Operations.

13. Wassenaar Arrangement, List of Dual-Use Goods, Technologies, & Munitions List, Munitions List, (July 5, 2002) p. 142, [http://www.wassenaar.org/list/wa-list_01_3ml.pdf].