CHAPTER 10
THE MIND OF THE TERRORIST
Why They Hate

“… I eventually came to the conclusion that jihad (holy war) against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other able Muslim.”

Anwar al-Awlaki, al-Qaida Cleric, Terrorist and Propagandist, March, 2010

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

For many people, terrorism is easier to recognize than define, yet its definition carries crucial policy implications. More important is understanding the groups and individuals who carry out terrorism. Determining what groups choose terrorism and why, as well as the factors that cause individuals to become terrorists, makes it easier to devise and execute strategies to reduce the threat. This chapter reviews the various definitions of terrorism and considers the debate over the origins and goals of transnational terrorist activities.

CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter, you should be able to

1. Define the major elements of terrorism.

2. List significant categories of terrorist groups.

3. Discuss forces that prompt individuals to join terrorist groups.

4. Clarify the factors behind suicide terrorism.

5. Explain factors that have increased the willingness of terrorists to inflict mass casualties.

DEFINING TERRORISM

Debated for decades by diplomats and scholars, there is still no single, accepted definition of terrorism, not even within the U.S. government. International law also offers limited clarity. United Nations treaty negotiations involving the overall definition of terrorism were long stymied by disputes over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The cliché “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” remains accurate in many cases. Yet the attempt to define terrorism is important; the meaning of the term impacts legal and policy issues ranging from extradition treaties to insurance regulations. It also influences the critical war of ideas that will shape the level and role of terrorism in future generations.

Historical Definition

The word terrorism emerged during the French revolution of the late 1700s to describe efforts by the revolutionary government to impose its will through widespread violence; it became defined as a “system or rule of terror.”¹ However, the repression of populations by their own governments is usually not included in the modern definition of terrorism, especially by Western governments.

U.S. Government Definitions

Numerous U.S. government publications, regulations, and laws reference terrorism. America’s National Strategy for Homeland Security defines it as “any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments.”² But even here ambiguity arises, such as in the definitions of unlawful and public welfare. The Department of Defense and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) have their own definitions.

The State Department’s Definition

For many years, as part of its mandate to collect and analyze information on terrorism (an effort later assumed in large part by the NCTC), the State Department used a special definition from the U.S. legal system. According to this law, terrorism means “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” Terrorist group means “any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.” International terrorism is described as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. In a policy that sparks some disagreement, the department counts “noncombatants” as not just civilians, but also unarmed and/or off-duty military personnel, plus armed troops who are attacked outside zones of military hostility.³

The FBI’s Definition

The FBI, in accordance with the Federal Code of Regulations, delineated terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” The bureau traditionally divided terrorism into two categories: domestic, involving groups operating in and targeting the United States without foreign direction; and international, involving groups that operate across international borders and/or have foreign connections.⁴

As might be expected, the FBI’s definition was similar to that used in various U.S. criminal codes it enforced. For example, the U.S. Code described international terrorism as violent acts intended to affect civilian populations or governments and occurring mostly outside the United States or transcending international boundaries.⁵ The more recent USA PATRIOT ACT, discussed in Chapter Three, defines terrorism as: “activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state, that (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.”

Central Elements of Terrorism

These sometimes conflicting definitions raise a number of questions. For example, under U.S. standards, foreign governments can be “state sponsors” of terrorism, but can countries themselves be considered terrorist groups? Do individual “lone wolves”—such as the Unabomber, a deranged recluse who mailed bombs to ideologically selected victims he never met, or Baruch Goldstein, a U.S. citizen who machine-gunned 29 Muslim worshippers to death in Israel—count as terrorists? How about Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, inspired by extremist propaganda to attack fellow Americans on his own? A study by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress addressed some of these issues by defining a terrorist action as “the calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of a subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause.”⁶

When all of these definitions are synthesized, terrorism usually includes most or all of the following central elements:

• Conducted by subnational groups

• Targeted at random noncombatant victims

• Directed at one set of victims in part to create fear among a larger audience

• Aimed at coercing governments or populations

• Planned to get publicity

• Motivated by political, ideological, or religious beliefs

• Based on criminal actions (involving tactics that would also violate the rules of war)

WHY TERRORISM?

Why do groups take up terrorism? Are individual terrorists born or made? These questions have attracted the attention of numerous scholars. Their approaches include political, organizational, physiological, psychological, and multicausal explanations and hypotheses focused on causative issues such as frustration-aggression, negative identity, and narcissistic rage. Yet such academic interpretations suffer from a lack of supporting data (due to the difficulty of interviewing and surveying terrorists), the absence of predictive value, and the difficulty of deriving theories capable of explaining extraordinarily diverse cultural, political, and individual motivations.

Terrorism Works—At Least Terrorists Think So

A more utilitarian explanation for why groups and individuals practice terrorism is that the tactics of terrorism often work, though terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic goals through terrorist acts. To be sure, the actions of some terrorist groups, such as Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo, have been primarily driven by cultism and the twisted psyches of key leaders. But across the globe, groups that harness terror have often been able to obtain publicity, funds and supplies, recruits, and at times social change, political concessions, and even diplomatic clout—along with revenge. Frequently the aim is to prompt an overre-action by authorities or segments of the population, leading to a crackdown or retribution that wins sympathy for the terrorists. In certain circumstances—especially where social and political conditions prevent peaceful change or if military conditions are unfavorable—armed groups may claim terrorism is their only viable strategy.

Emergence of Modern Terrorism

While terrorism has been a recognized form of warfare for centuries, modern terrorism dates from the aftermath of World War II. After that conflict, the world witnessed the rise of guerrilla (Spanish for “little war,” a term originating in the resistance to Napoleon’s occupation of Spain in the nineteenth century) combat, in which small, unconventional insurgent units challenged colonial governments backed by traditional military forces. In following decades, guerrilla armies in different conflicts around the world often portrayed themselves as legitimate military units fighting an enemy army to establish a new political entity. In some cases they may have qualified as such, under norms eventually incorporated into the Geneva Conventions, by carrying their weapons openly, wearing uniforms, maintaining a clear command structure, and following the law of war, along with other practices. But in what is now called “asymmetric warfare,” guerrillas did not try to match their better-equipped opponents in pitched engagements on the open battlefield, where they would be handily defeated. Instead they looked for weaknesses to exploit, for example, using their mobility to ambush colonial convoys and then escaping into jungle or mountains. Eventually terrorism became part of the arsenal for many guerrilla groups, used to diminish the will of colonial armies and their supporters at home. Guerrillas attacked colonial civilians and assassinated sympathizers. This often prompted brutal responses by colonists, such as widespread torture and executions, which helped the guerrillas by creating more supporters.

Inspired by the success of these anticolonial “freedom fighters,” a variety of nationalist and ideological groups took up arms, often with support from the Soviet Union and other sponsors. Their refinement of tactics such as hijackings, bombings, and political sieges—amplified by shrewd use of the growing global media network—would come to define the modern age of terrorism.

Palestinian Terrorism Gets Results—To a Degree

The apparent efficacy of terrorism was dramatically proven to the world by Palestinian groups. In June 1967 Israel inflicted a humiliating defeat on its Arab neighbors during the Six-Day War, occupying the West Bank and Gaza Strip and setting the stage for the era of modern international terrorism. Palestinian guerrillas—losing hope that their Arab allies could be counted on to evict the Israelis and reluctant to take on the powerful Israeli military directly—turned to terrorism. One of the first modern terrorist acts took place on July 22, 1968, when gunmen belonging to a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacked an Israeli passenger flight, winning the release of Palestinian prisoners and receiving worldwide publicity. Many other attacks occurred in following years, perhaps most notably in 1972 when Palestinian “Black September” terrorists seized Israeli hostages at the Munich Olympics. Here the terrorists hijacked not a plane, but an international media event already being covered by an army of international journalists. Images of Palestinian operatives in ski masks guarding their captives, and word of their demands, spread across the globe as the incident ended in a massacre.

Despite—or perhaps because of—his links to such terrorism, PLO leader Yasir Arafat was invited to speak at the United Nations in 1974, where he addressed the delegates wearing a holster on his belt. This was followed by a series of PLO diplomatic victories facilitated by publicity from the Palestinian terrorist attacks, along with support from oil-rich Arab states. Ultimately, Arafat became an international figure, and the Palestinian issue assumed a central role in the world’s diplomatic agenda—events that might never have happened had the Palestinians focused on conventional military attacks against Israel instead of spectacular terrorist strikes. On the other hand, PLO efforts failed to achieve their erstwhile goal of the destruction of Israel or, as of this writing, the more limited objective of creating an independent Palestinian state.

Iranian-Backed Terror Changes U.S. Policy

During the next decade, terrorism again seemed effective, this time for the Lebanese group Hizballah and its supporters in the Iranian and Syrian governments. U.S. forces were trying to stabilize Lebanon in 1983, and Hizballah, whose members aimed to make Lebanon a Shiite Muslim-dominated state, wanted America out of the way. As detailed in the next chapter, terrorists linked to the group struck the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in two devastating suicide bombings. After limited military response, the United States pulled its troops from Lebanon.

Hizballah then moved to another terrorist tactic, seizing and in some cases killing U.S. and other Western hostages. The ensuing crisis ultimately led the Reagan White House to break its policies and make a deal with Iran, the group’s principal backer, to trade arms for hostages.

U.S. pledges to bring Hizballah leaders such as Imad Mughniyah to justice for these and other terrorist attacks proved hollow; Mughniyah remained free until being killed in 2008 (allegedly by Israeli agents), and Hizballah itself grew even more influential in the region’s affairs.

Bin Ladin Viewed Terrorism as Successful

Reflecting on a decade of terrorist attacks against the United States, Usama bin Ladin mocked U.S. pledges to stand firm in the Middle East: “[I]t shows the fears that have enveloped you all. Where was this courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut took place in 1983? … You were transformed into scattered bits and pieces; 241 soldiers were killed, most of them Marines. And where was this courage of yours when two explosions made you leave Aden [Yemen] in less than twenty-four hours [after a bin Ladin–linked bombing in 1992]! But your most disgraceful case was in Somalia [a U.S.-led humanitarian intervention ended after U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in 1993] … you left the area in disappointment, humiliation, and defeat, carrying your dead with you.”⁷

Such perceptions helped set the stage for 9/11. “It is now undeniable that the terrorists declared war on America—and on the civilized world—many years before September 11th… Yet until September 11th, the terrorists faced no sustained and systematic and global response. They became emboldened—and the result was more terror and more victims,” concluded Condoleezza Rice, the Bush administration’s national security adviser, in 2003.⁸

TYPES OF TERRORIST GROUPS

Such lessons from the 1970s and ′80s continue to influence the broad range of groups now conducting terrorist operations. Just as the very definition of terrorism is hotly debated, so is the issue of how best to categorize organizations that employ the strategy. Their memberships, motivations, and legal status are often murky and fluid. One way to classify them is through their objectives. While some groups have multiple objectives, most can be placed into one of four main types: ideological (motivated by extreme left- or right-wing political goals), nationalist (driven by a desire to achieve autonomy for specific populations) and/or irredentist, religious (inspired to create political or social transformation in the name of religion; Islamist terrorism is discussed in detail in the following chapter), and issue-oriented (focused on achieving specific policy objectives, for example, antiabortion or animal rights laws). In some cases—such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), which opposes the Colombian government, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which fought the government of Sri Lanka on behalf of the Tamil ethnic minority for decades until its defeat in 2009—the groups may operate as guerrilla armies that also use terrorist techniques.

While conditions that spawned these groups vary widely, as do the motives of their personnel, their existence can in part be traced to certain basic dynamics.

Conditions for Terrorism

As discussed, terrorism is by definition a political act carried out by perpetrators with ideological motives. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously declared that “war is the continuation of policy (politics) by other means.” For many radicals, terrorism can be defined similarly. Among guerrilla groups, terrorism may be the continuation of war by other means, a strategy used in addition to conventional military tactics. In these cases, terrorism emerges from the furnace of social, ideological, or religious strife.

Strife Breeds Terrorism

The emergence and survival of terrorist groups are often linked to specific societal conditions. Factors that produce rich soil for the growth of terrorism include political violence, social strife, poverty, dictatorship, and modernization. In many cases, these factors spark guerrilla warfare or violent protest movements that midwife terrorist groups. For example, Palestinian guerrillas switched from guerrilla attacks to hijackings. Extremists involved in the U.S. antiwar and civil rights demonstrations moved from legal dissent to terrorism.

The type of strife capable of engendering terrorism must involve enough energized participants for a terrorist group to recruit and obtain logistical support. In some cases, especially where external state sponsors exist, the necessary level of support may be quite shallow. In other cases, terrorist groups may have widespread backing. Nationalist groups, such as various Palestinian and Irish extremists, have drawn significant popular support from a broad spectrum of society. In the United States and Europe, ideological groups, such as left-wing extremists, and issue-oriented terrorist groups, such as American animal rights zealots and pro-life radicals, have attracted backing from the fringes of legitimate protest movements.

In many but certainly not all cases, terrorist groups address legitimate grievances, but with illegitimate means in the pursuit of extremist solutions. For example, animal rights extremists seek to reduce the suffering of animals but use bombings and other illegal tactics with the goal of ending all animal testing. Palestinian terrorists demand human rights for their people but are willing to target innocent victims and pursue the destruction of Israel.

Poverty and Ignorance

While poverty is often cited as a precursor to terrorism, history shows that relatively affluent countries have often faced terrorism, while many terrorists are from middle- or upper-class backgrounds. For example, most of the 9/11 hijackers were from the relatively affluent nation of Saudi Arabia and followed the orders of a millionaire leader.

Analysis by Princeton economist Alan B. Krueger failed to detect strong correlations between poverty and the existence of international terrorism groups. The data also suggested no link between lack of education and terrorism. “Instead of viewing terrorism as a response—either direct or indirect—to poverty or ignorance, we suggest that it [terrorism] is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and longstanding feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economic circumstances,” concluded Krueger.⁹

Political Oppression

However, Krueger and others have suggested a link between international terrorism and countries with lower levels of freedom and weak civil societies. In general, nations with high levels of freedom, such as Western democracies, have managed to channel political conflict into nonviolent avenues. In recent years, domestic ideological and separatist terrorism has appeared to ebb in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Large terrorist campaigns have mostly originated with the citizens of oppressive regimes, such as those in the Middle East. Unclear is whether this relationship is one of correlation or causality. Do oppressive conditions cause terrorism, or are they themselves fostered by terrorism? Could underlying social factors that lead a society toward dictatorship also encourage terrorism? Ironically, states with the highest level of political subjugation, such as the former Soviet Union, managed to limit terrorism. Repressive governments may be at their most vulnerable when they are increasing rights; while democracy is often an antidote to widespread terrorism, new freedoms may relax controls that inhibited terrorist activity under dictatorship. Certainly Russia has endured a much greater toll of terrorist violence since the fall of communism.

The disputed relationship between terrorism and poverty may be mediated by the issue of freedom. Oppressive regimes can stunt economic growth and exacerbate social and cultural tensions. For example, poverty in Pakistan left many young people unable to afford any education other than that offered by the madrassas, Islamic academies that often pushed radical teachings. Perhaps the clearest link between global poverty and terrorism is the existence of failed states and uncontrolled regions, such as those in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where terrorist groups were able to operate with limited opposition. On the other hand, North Korea, an extremely poor yet highly authoritarian state, appears to have faced little terrorism. Thus, it appears that countries with weak civil societies and poor security have the greatest prospects for terrorist recruitment.

Modernization, Cultural Conflict, and Religion

In the wake of 9/11, enormous attention was focused on the pains of modernity and cultural change in the Muslim world. For young people facing conflict between traditional values and the allure of Western culture, the response in many cases appeared to be Islamist extremism. This choice, and the further movement to violence, may prove especially attractive to those with specific personality types or other predispositions to join a militant organization.

Terrorists: Born and Made

By definition, terrorists are those who dedicate themselves to the murder of innocent victims. Such behavior is so objectionable to most people, they are tempted to attribute it to individual or group pathology, dismissing the killers as “animals,” “crazy people,” or “psychopaths.”

Yet research and observation show that most terrorists are not mentally ill. Indeed, terrorist organizations often screen out disturbed recruits, whose suitability for training and effectiveness in the field may be limited. Neither is there a specific personality—a “terrorist type”—common to most terrorists. While there appear to be psychological commonalties among many terrorists, their basic psychological structure is not radically different from certain other groups in society. Their eventual terrorist behavior is also strongly influenced by the ideologies of their groups and common but effective methods of indoctrination, social control, and training.

Terrorist Demographics

Studies show that most terrorists have been young, single, fit men. Such a profile would be expected of people required to conduct quasi-military operations and also matches the demographic cohort most associated with criminal violence. Of course, women have also been active in many terrorist organizations, which are often led by middle-aged men. The socioeconomic and educational backgrounds of terrorists vary widely, both within and between groups, but many observers see a trend of higher educational backgrounds among international terrorists.

Individual Psychology

While terrorists are generally not psychotic, they are also not average. After all, they self-select themselves to conduct activities that are considered morally reprehensible and dangerous by many members of their own societies. In this regard, terrorist recruits may exhibit psychological factors that lead people to join high-risk military units and criminal organizations. They are risk takers attracted to the excitement of conflict. Other psychological predispositions may also encourage them to join a terrorist movement, such as a need to belong, prove themselves, or blame their troubles on an external enemy. In some cases, they may be criminals out for personal gain, such as money, power, and notoriety.

Selection, Indoctrination, and Control

No matter their precise individual motives, those who join terrorist groups are commonly put through extensive selection, indoctrination, and control procedures to produce the capabilities needed by the group. Most human beings are inculcated with an aversion to killing; this is systematically removed by the terrorist group using some of the same techniques employed by legitimate military organizations. Recruits begin with some ideological affinity for the cause; often they have moved from the role of sympathizer to active supporter, perhaps after a triggering event seen in the media or experienced in their own lives. Once in the group, they may take an oath of allegiance and are indoctrinated to think of themselves as members of a noble endeavor. While outsiders may see them as criminals, they view themselves as soldiers. Recruits are encouraged to delegate their moral responsibilities to the group’s leadership and dehumanize the enemy. The intended victims are stripped of their individual humanity by being referred to in terms such as “infidels,” “capitalist pigs,” or “mud people.”

Complex rationales may be built upon the group’s specific ideology. One al-Qaida leader advised the group’s followers that it was proper to attack “infidels” (nonbelievers) even if others might be killed because if the bystanders were “innocent,” they would go to paradise, and if they weren’t, they deserved to die anyway [similar advice, though from a different theological perspective, is reported to have come from a monk during the Crusades]. It is common for leaders to claim the group has “no choice” but to engage in terrorism, thereby shifting blame to the target group. Finally, terrorists and their sympathizers routinely invoke the “greater good” argument, claiming the death of innocent victims is justified by the outcome of the conflict. For example, Timothy McVeigh called the children killed in the Oklahoma City bombing “collateral damage,” using the U.S. military phrase for unintended damage caused during combat. McVeigh was inspired by The Turner Diaries, a novel by William Pierce that depicts the violent overthrow of the U.S. government and was labeled the “bible of the racist right” by the FBI. “We are willing to take the lives of these innocent persons, because a much greater harm will ultimately befall our people if we fail to act now,” declares a terrorist leader in the book, providing a rationale used by many terrorist groups

“Self-Radicalization”

For decades, right-wing domestic terrorist groups advocated the concept of “leaderless resistance.” But in recent years, Islamist extremists adopted the technique in numbers. The FBI called these cases homegrown violent extremism (HVE). Others term it “self-radicalization.” The stereotype became well known in the media—a lone U.S. resident of average background, a Muslim by birth or conversion, is suddenly arrested for planning a major terrorist attack.

The appendix includes numerous summaries of these cases, many involving undercover law enforcement “stings.” As noted above, terrorist “lone wolves” of various ideologies and religions have a long history. A key component of newer Islamist cases is the role of the Internet and its extensive and often sophisticated Muslim extremist propaganda sites, managed by everyone from “wannabes” to terrorist leaders. These sites, and associated digital media and networking applications, provide ideological and religious justification for attacks, along with potentially dis-inhibiting video of terrorist acts and operational tips. For both Islamists and other extremists, the technology enables a new mode of “distributed” terrorism.

Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American radical cleric, emerged as an Islamist propaganda master from his position with al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Skilled in English-language communication and proficient online, he was linked to major attempted attacks such as the Christmas Day airplane bombing plot, as well as several HVE cases. The latter included the Fort Hood shooter, an apparently isolated Islamist extremist who not only consumed terrorist propaganda online, but was able to reach out to al-Awlaki via email. (al-Awlaki was killed by U.S. forces in 2011.) The full scope of the HVE threat remains unclear, but the implications are disturbing, especially given the FBI’s assertion that individuals as young as 14 years old have fallen prey to “Internet radicalization.”

SUICIDE TERRORISM

A suicide attack can be defined as a planned strike in which a willing attacker must kill himself in order for the operation to succeed. This contrasts with an operation in which the attacker has a high likelihood of being killed but could possibly avoid death by escaping or being captured alive. Suicide attacks offer tactical advantages; the bomber can deliver explosives directly into the heart of the target and detonate them without delays caused by timers. There is no need for an escape plan and no risk a captured operative will give up the group’s secrets. In the case of the 9/11 attacks and certain truck bombers, the terrorists were able to create a level of destruction unattainable by conventional tactics.

Perhaps more important than the tactical benefits of the suicide attack is its psychological impact, which reinforces the zealotry of the attacker and the vulnerability of the victim in a more dramatic fashion than traditional bombings.

Groups Using Suicide Tactics

Suicide attacks are neither a new nor purely Islamist manifestation of terrorism. The use of suicide attacks during combat became known to the American people in the early 1900s, when American troops in the Philippines battled Islamist Moro rebels (ideological forebears of the modern Abu Sayyaf, or Bearer of the Sword, terrorist group in that country). The rebels believed that killing Christians was a route to paradise; after ritual preparations they would charge the better-equipped Americans armed only with a sword or knife known as a kris: “[A]ccounts abounded of seemingly peaceful Moros suddenly drawing kris and killing multiple American soldiers or civilians before being killed themselves.”¹⁰ Then came the kamikaze aerial and seaborne attacks of World War II, during which Japanese crewmembers slammed explosives-filled craft into U.S. Navy ships. In modern times, the LTTE, Tamil Tigers, earned the reputation as the most prolific suicide terrorists in the world. Separatists fighting on behalf of the mostly Hindu Tamil minority group in Sri Lanka, the group’s Black Tiger suicide squad, and other members blew up prime ministers of two countries, various celebrities, a battleship, and a host of other targets. LTTE operatives carried cyanide capsules, and dozens killed themselves rather than face questioning by the authorities.

Studies by Robert A. Pape found incidents of suicide terrorism are on average more deadly than other attacks and have increased dramatically over recent years; most involved terrorists trying to force democratic governments to withdraw from disputed territories seen by the terrorists as their homelands.¹¹

Suicide in the Name of Islam

Starting with the bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut during 1983, through the Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel during the 1990s, the 9/11 attacks, and bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan, spectacular suicide attacks have become associated with Islamist radicals.

Islamist history and theology record a special place for war in general and suicide attacks in particular. Istishad is the Arabic religious term for giving one’s life for Allah. In general terms, this form of suicide is acceptable in the Islamic tradition, as opposed to intihar, which describes suicide motivated by personal problems. Vivid descriptions of the pleasurable afterlife supposedly in store for suicide bombers have been used by Islamist recruiters. On a more general level, supporters of Islamist terrorism have often been quoted as reciting a version of the saying “We love death more than you [Americans or other enemies] love life,” a concept said to be centuries old.

As with other terrorists, suicide bombers are generally sane. Those unfamiliar with this tactic may picture suicide bombers as deranged or despondent individuals, perhaps impoverished and uneducated, taking their own lives on the spur of the moment. In reality, they are often willing cogs in a highly organized weapons system manufactured by an organization. Research indicates that Palestinian suicide bombers are no less educated or wealthy than average for their communities. The process of producing a suicide bomber begins with propaganda, carried heavily by local media, praising earlier bombers. Once identified, a potential bomber is often put through a process lasting months that includes recruitment (often with the promise of substantial payments to the bomber’s family), indoctrination, training, propaganda exploitation, equipping, and targeting. The bomber is then provided with a device built for him or her and delivered to the location with instructions on the target and how to reach it. The process has become so efficient that multiple suicide bombers are sometimes sent to the same target by extremist groups.

THE DRIVE FOR MASS DESTRUCTION

On a seemingly normal September day, highly trained terrorists unleash a complex plot involving the simultaneous hijacking of four jet airliners filled with passengers headed to U.S. destinations. Members of an internationally feared group, the hardened hijackers display fanatical loyalty to a well-known terrorist leader nicknamed the “Master.” They end up destroying the airliners in fiery explosions carried across the world by the media, achieving their objectives and sparking international debate about the proper response to terrorism.

But the year is 1970, not 2001. The terrorist group is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), not al-Qaida. And before blowing up the jets, the terrorists evacuate all the prisoners. Rather than seeking to kill large numbers of victims, the plot is designed to force the release of imprisoned terrorists and gain publicity, which it succeeds in doing.

The separatist and ideological terrorists of the 1970s and ′80s may have shocked the world with spectacular attacks, but their agenda was in many ways conventional. They focused on specific goals and were open to negotiated political settlements. These terrorists often limited the violence of their attacks in order to appeal to wider constituencies, control the escalation of their conflicts, and prevent reprisals against their state sponsors. In 1970 the terrorists blew up the planes; three decades later, the hijackers blew up not only the aircraft, but all their passengers, victims on the ground, and themselves.

In recent decades, the rise of religious terrorist groups has been followed by an escalation in the level of destruction sought, from the nerve gas attack of Aum Shinrikyo to the 9/11 attacks and devastating suicide bombings against mosques in Iraq.

Increasingly, America’s enemies have the capability and will to inflict mass casualties. As discussed elsewhere in this text, groups such as al-Qaida and Aum Shinrikyo have recruited operatives with high levels of education and technical sophistication. Combined with the increasing spread of both the knowledge and components required to create WMD, along with techniques for advanced conventional explosives techniques, such groups have an increasing capability to launch mass casualty attacks.

No political settlement will satisfy some modern religious terrorist groups. They are motivated by a black-and-white view of humanity and cannot tolerate the existence of the enemy. They do not depend on the support of state sponsors who could be pressured by the West. Because they are not afraid to die, and often have no fixed territories or populations to protect, they are less subject to traditional strategies of deterrence.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Terrorism is politically motivated violence carried out in most cases by sane and intelligent operatives. Even the increase in suicide and mass casualty terrorist attacks can best be understood as tactics that reflect reasoned, if immoral, strategic decisions by organized groups.

To alter the underlying circumstances that create and enable terrorism, the United States must understand the organizing principles and motivation of the specific groups that intend to do the nation harm.

CHAPTER QUIZ

1. Identify three major elements that define 9/11 as a terrorist attack.

2. Name significant categories of terrorist groups and explain their motivation.

3. Are terrorists born or made?

4. What role does mental illness play in suicide bombings?

5. Explain factors that have increased the propensity of terrorists to inflict mass casualties.

NOTES

1. Adam Roberts, “The Changing Faces of Terrorism,” BBCi (August 27, 2002), www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/sept_11/changing_faces_01.shtml.

2. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, (White House) Office of Homeland Security (July 2002), p. 2.

3. 22 U.S.C.ch. 38 § 2656f.

4. Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Policy and Guidelines: FBI Denver Division: Counterterrorism, June 15, 2005, denver.fbi.gov/inteterr.htm.

5. 18 U.S.C.ch.§ 2331.

6. Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” Congressional Research Service (September 1999), 12.

7. PBS NewsHour, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places” (August 1996), www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html.

8. Condoleezza Rice, Remarks to the National Legal Center, New York (October 31, 2003), www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031031–5.html.

9. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Seeking the Roots of Terrorism,” The Chronicle of Higher Education; The Chronicle Review (June 6, 2003), chronicle.com/free/v49/i39/39b01001.htm.

10. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., “Bearers of the Sword: Radical Islam, Philippines Insurgency, and Regional Stability,” Military Review (March–April 2002), fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/FMSOPUBS/ISSUES/sword.htm#end7.

11. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).