CHAPTER 2
THE ROAD TO 9/11
Contemporary Terrorism and the Meaning of the September 11 Attacks

Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.

Hart–Rudman U.S. Commission on National Security/Twenty-first Century report, September 15, 1999—two years before 9/11

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Unprecedented in destructiveness, the 9/11 attacks heralded the arrival of a new type of terrorism. The potential of this menace had been foreshadowed by several plots during the previous decade, including the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the millennium bombing scheme against Los Angeles, and Aum Shinrikyo’s gas attack in Tokyo, as well as the cult’s animosity toward the United States. While these attacks failed to achieve their full objectives, and so left American complacency essentially unshaken, they heralded new terrorist strategies with global reach bent on not just influencing political events, but also inflicting death and destruction on a grand scale. On the eve of 9/11, Americans paid scant heed to the warnings of the Hart–Rudman Commission, but that complacency soon changed.

After the 9/11 strikes, analysts recognized several characteristics of this new threat—characteristics that differed dramatically from the state-sponsored terrorism that had concerned the United States during the waning years of the Cold War. America now had to plan for adversaries with well-funded, sophisticated, transnational organizations free from the strictures of a state sponsorship; able to exploit conditions created by globalization and related political, social, cultural, and economic dislocation; and savvy in twenty-first-century technologies that allow terrorists to span the globe and threaten mass destruction.

This chapter describes how international terrorism evolved and the nature of the threat faced by the United States in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Along with the devastation on life and property wrought by the attacks came a new realization of the serious threat posed by contemporary terrorism. The response to the disaster also offers insights into the present-day challenges of preparing for and responding to large-scale disasters. This chapter summarizes those insights as well.

CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter, you should be able to

1. Identify key characteristics of the twenty-first-century terrorist organization as represented by al-Qaida.

2. List major elements of modern technology and commerce used by twenty-first-century terrorists.

3. Describe the human and financial costs of the 9/11 attacks.

4. Discuss the implications of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and mass casualties in twenty-first-century terrorism.

TERRORIST TRENDS ANTICIPATING 9/11

Postwar Japan was one of America’s greatest success stories. A successful occupation after World War II led to the rise of a wealthy, democratic nation and a staunch ally for the United States. Few in the United States paid attention to an obscure Japanese religious cult led by a charismatic 40-year-old mystic named Asahara Shoko, even though he preached hatred of America and the coming end of the world. That changed on March 20, 1995, when members of Shoko’s Aum Shinrikyo cult released enough of the nerve gas sarin into the Tokyo subway system to kill 13 commuters and sicken 5,000. The cult failed to murder larger numbers only because of the poor quality of the chemical agent employed and mistakes in its dispersal.

In the wake of the attack, a crackdown by authorities led to the arrest and conviction of Asahara and other members of the cult’s leadership, as well as the breakup of their extensive financial network and weapons laboratories. The official investigation also revealed details of their activities, including discussion of chemical attacks in the United States, shattering many of the existing preconceptions concerning the nature of modern terrorism. Aum Shinrikyo was not sponsored by a state. The terrorists did not come from the tents of a third-world refugee camp, but from fine, middle-class homes. They did not have specific political aims, but a broad, global vision for the future. They understood how modern technology could serve as the means for achieving their goals. Their ways were not targeted acts of violence, but bold attempts at mass death. They were the harbingers of twenty-first-century terrorism.

THE EMERGENCE OF AL-QAIDA

Among earlier generations of terrorists, many groups pursued national goals by launching tactical operations to achieve specific objectives. For example, Palestinian terrorists of the 1960s and ′70s demanded the elimination of Israel and used hostage exchanges to gain tactical advantages. Communist organizations such as the Baader-Meinhof Group/Red Army Faction, while espousing an international ideology, limited most of their actions geographically. They were focused on “liberating” their individual nations from capitalism and assisting their Palestinian allies in the fight against Israel.

In contrast, the al-Qaida organization that evolved over the course of half a decade before 9/11 reflected many of the characteristics of the contemporary terrorist threat—transnational, ambitious, and sophisticated. In 1998 Usama bin Ladin, the product of a wealthy Saudi family and part of the “Afghan Arabs” supporting resistance against the Soviets in occupied Afghanistan, established a network known as al-Qaida (often translated as “the base,” “the root,” or “the foundation”). Seeking to build on the success of international Islamist efforts against the Soviets, he wanted to establish a clearinghouse for the activities of loosely aligned extremist groups. Bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia the following year, but at the same time he dispatched operatives to set up a base of operations in the Sudan. Moving there in 1991, he established a sprawling network of business, criminal, and terrorist enterprises. In 1992 Bin Ladin issued a fatwa (a scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law) that amounted to a declaration of war against the United States.

In 1996 he fled the Sudan, moving his main operations to Afghanistan. Two years later, al-Qaida shifted from primarily funding, training, and supporting terrorist groups to directly supervising the planning, preparation, and execution of attacks. The organization directed strikes including the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya and the 2000 suicide attack against the USS Cole at a Yemeni port.

Al-Qaida portrayed itself as the leader in a worldwide battle, promising to attack “infidel” governments wherever they opposed the development of Islamist theocracies. As will be seen later, the group dedicated itself to establishing a global pan-Islamic caliphate, or Muslim theocracy. Its goals included expelling U.S. influence and friendly governments from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Arab states, along with destroying the state of Israel. As part of this strategy, al-Qaida sought to crush the will and capability of America and its Western allies to resist the emergence of extremist governments. Al-Qaida did not claim to represent one breakaway province, country, region, or even economic class. Instead, the group aimed its appeal at the world’s more than one billion Muslims. While composed primarily of Sunni Muslims, al-Qaida also sought to transcend traditional religious rivalries by gaining the support of Shiite extremists from groups such as Hizballah.

While earlier groups appealed to such broad motivating forces as communism, racism, and pan-Arabism, no traditional terrorist group succeeded in creating the unifying call to arms demonstrated by al-Qaida.

A Sophisticated Worldwide Organization

Unlike many other groups whose international rhetoric far exceeded their actual membership, al-Qaida proved able to motivate a diverse constituency and mold them into an organizationally and technologically advanced force.

International Membership

As part of its broad strategy, al-Qaida formed relationships with a variety of groups, including Egypt’s al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) and al-Jihad; Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group; Pakistan’s Harakatul-Mujahidin; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the Philippine’s Abu Sayyaf; and other groups in nations such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bangladesh. In effect, al-Qaida served as an umbrella group, or “organization of organizations,” with affiliated operations in more than 60 countries.¹

The 9/11 hijackers themselves came from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Lebanon, and Egypt. Plotters connected to the operation included French, German, Kuwaiti, and Yemeni citizens. Other al-Qaida operations were linked to citizens or groups from the United States, the Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Turkey, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Kashmir, Azerbaijan, and Indonesia, among others. At one point, the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, held prisoners associated with al-Qaida from 38 countries.² The movement succeeded in uniting individuals from vastly different backgrounds, including citizens of states hostile to one another.

Large Cadre

Some of the most infamous modern terrorist groups, such as the Red Army Faction and Italian Red Brigades, numbered their hard-core operatives in the dozens and supporters in the hundreds. By some estimates, even the Irish Republican Army fielded fewer than 500 gunmen at its peak. Al-Qaida trained up to 20,000 personnel in its Afghan camps between 1996 and 2001.³ Its hard-core operatives most likely numbered in the hundreds on 9/11, with thousands of trained supporters spread across the globe.

Decentralized Structure

Al-Qaida decision-making structures were highly developed, as was the organization’s tactical execution. The group’s decentralized, “flat” administration gave it the capability of planning and executing complex operations despite resistance and setbacks. This sort of networked organization, composed largely of autonomous cells, made the organization resistant to “decapitation” by targeted strikes on its leadership.

Al-Qaida leadership could prompt terrorist violence through several types of organizational systems, including centrally controlled operations such as 9/11, al-Qaida supported and/or financed operations carried out by affiliate groups, and “spontaneous” action by small groups or individuals inspired by the cause and often trained at al-Qaida facilities. The last two strategies dramatically increased the number and type of potential attackers, posing special difficulties for counterterrorism officials.

Use of Modern Technology and Exploitation of Social Trends

Much as modern multinational corporations dispersed decision making through the use of technology, al-Qaida exploited emerging trends and tools. The end of the Cold War dramatically increased the ease of international communication, commerce, and travel. As the twenty-first century began, more than 140 million people lived outside their countries of origin; millions of people crossed international borders every day.⁴ Among them were numerous al-Qaida supporters, conversant in the languages and cloaked in the citizenships of the very societies they hated.

Moving freely through this ever more open and integrated international structure, al-Qaida operatives maintained communication via new technologies, such as cell and satellite phones, encrypted e-mail, chat rooms, videotape, and CD-ROMs.⁵ This allowed them to disperse their leadership, training, and logistics not just across a region, but around the globe. Operating from safety in Afghanistan, the group’s leaders were able to support operations in dozens of nations.

Funded through Sophisticated and Multiple Channels

Al-Qaida established an international network of businesses, criminal enterprises, and charities to support its operations. From heroin smuggling to leather tanning, al-Qaida ventures generated significant revenue and supported an estimated $30 million annual budget, which was distributed via formal and informal transfer systems.⁶

An example of al-Qaida’s complex and innovative financing system, according to some reports, included a network that trafficked in West African “blood diamonds,” the rough diamonds often illicitly traded in conflict zones by insurgents or mercenaries financing their activities. Such transactions were far more difficult to trace than wire transfers and bank accounts and could be very lucrative. For example, Aziz Nassour, a Lebanese diamond merchant, ran a company called ASA Diam. ASA Diam had suspicious contacts in the Congo, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The company allegedly used these relationships to obtain blood diamonds and then sell them directly to al-Qaida operatives.

Not Reliant on State Sponsors

While al-Qaida prospered in its Sudanese and Afghan sanctuaries, it was not dependent on those states in the same manner as many terrorist groups during the 1970s and ′80s. Indeed, the Taliban government of Afghanistan relied on al-Qaida for capital and military power, discouraging it from cracking down on the group as demanded by the United States. It has been said the Taliban government was in some ways a “terrorist-sponsored state.”

Al-Qaida and other groups also sought out operational bases in other countries in the Americas, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In some cases, these countries could not stop them because of weak central governments or war. In others, such as Europe and even the United States, lax security measures and respect for civil liberties combined to provide the terrorists with operational latitude.

Sophisticated Planning

Whether concocted in Sudanese safe houses, Afghan training camps, European cities, or even American apartment buildings, al-Qaida operations were marked by careful and expert planning and execution. In addition, these terrorists not only understood the culture of their enemies, but were able to employ America’s technology against itself.

Al-Qaida attacks have involved years of planning. The 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa were being plotted as early as 1993.⁷ The 9/11 attacks began taking shape in the mid–1990s. At heart, that plot reflected a disturbing ingenuity, sharply contrasting with the standard terrorist tactics of earlier decades. The ability of the group to envision and plan the details of such an intricate operation, with its extensive recruiting and operational support requirements, demonstrated a new level of terrorist capability.

The growth of al-Qaida’s ambitions and capabilities did not go unnoticed. A congressionally appointed commission chaired by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman released a report in 1999 warning that transnational terrorist groups were contemplating attacks intended to inflict mass casualties. Likewise, the U.S. government was aware of the groups’ activities. The CIA had formed a unit to track the activities of bin Ladin and his organization, and President Clinton authorized both covert operations and missile strikes against al-Qaida operatives and facilities in Afghanistan, though none of these activities deterred the group or lessened its resolve. On August 6, 2001, the CIA provided a briefing to President Bush entitled “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in U.S.”

Strategic Goals

While obscure to many Westerners, al-Qaida’s strategy was based on a complex historical, cultural, geopolitical, and religious framework. Strongly influenced by the successful battle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, al-Qaida viewed the United States as a weaker adversary than the ruthless Soviet Union. Bin Ladin himself described the desired strategic results of the 9/11 attacks as demoralizing the United States, causing the U.S. government to restrict civil liberties, and—perhaps most importantly—galvanizing Muslims around the world and forcing them to choose sides. “Our goal is for our [world Islamic] nation to unite in the face of the Christian crusade,” bin Ladin said after the attacks.⁸

Tight Operational Security

Contrary to some claims, the infiltration of the 9/11 hijackers into the United States and their operations in America were far from perfect. For example, most of the conspirators made obvious errors in their visa applications, and once in America some of them associated with individuals under scrutiny by the FBI. But in general, the plot reflected strong security and no doubt factored in the U.S. government’s then limited domestic intelligence capabilities.

Most of the hijackers did not have terrorist records, helping them escape the attention of U.S. intelligence.⁹ Fifteen of the men were from Saudi Arabia, whose citizens faced relatively little scrutiny from U.S. visa officials. They got passports and visas under their real names, then entered the United States from different locations at different times. In accordance with the al-Qaida manual, the men shunned the facial hair and garb of traditional Muslims. They were familiar with Western culture and able to navigate American society, including in many cases obtaining driver’s licenses through both fraudulent and legal applications. They attempted to keep a low profile, shopping at Walmart and eating at places such as Pizza Hut. According to the CIA, the hijackers avoided laptops in favor of public Internet connections and used at least 133 different prepaid calling cards on a variety of phones.

Based on statements by bin Ladin and other information, while the hijackers knew they were participating in a “martyrdom”—or suicide—operation, many did not know details of the mission or its targets until it was well under way.¹⁰ In the vocabulary of intelligence, the plot was “tightly compartmented” and difficult to penetrate.

Effective Execution

Al-Qaida also proved skilled at managing operations. When Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar turned out to be terrible flight students, Hani Hanjour arrived back in the United States. Suspected plotters Ramzi Binalshibh and Zakariya Essabar couldn’t get into the United States, but the plot went on. Mohamed Atta, who piloted the first plane into the World Trade Center, had visa problems when trying to reenter the United States in January 2001 and was caught driving without a license, but he managed to avoid drawing the attention of higher authorities. Other hijackers escaped detection during traffic stops. Even when Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested in August 2001 by FBI agents who considered him a possible suicide hijacker, the plan was not derailed. Days after the arrest, the plotters began buying their tickets. And on the morning of 9/11, many of their plotters and their weapons made it through last-minute security screenings. The ability of the terrorists to seize four aircraft and successfully guide three of them into their targets reflected superb planning, significant skill, and superior tactical execution.

A DAY THAT CHANGED THE WORLD

Al-Qaida’s plans to attack the United States itself culminated on the morning of September 11, 2001, when 19 hijackers boarded four commercial air passenger flights. After take-off, the terrorists took control of the cockpits. One plane was flown into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, killing 184 and causing fire and extensive damage to the Department of Defense headquarters. Two flights struck the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. The intense fires ignited by burning aviation fuel compromised the buildings’ superstructures, causing both towers to collapse and claiming 2,753 lives (including some injured victims who died well after the attack). The fourth plane crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after the passengers and crew unsuccessfully attempted to retake control of the flight.

The 2001 attacks certainly qualify as one of the worst crimes in American history. While other uses of force have claimed more lives, few have combined such terrible human losses with the massive economic damage of 9/11, impacts that were magnified by the anthrax attacks that occurred later in 2001.

Human Costs

The human cost of 9/11 can be measured in both physical and psychological terms. By either calculation, the attacks exacted a terrible price on the United States.

Life and Limb

In the World Trade Center disaster alone, nearly 3,000 people were killed by the attack, many dying after excruciating physical and psychological ordeals. For those without personal connection to these losses, the scope of the suffering can only be grasped fleetingly, perhaps in the awful images of people choosing to leap hundreds of feet to their deaths from the World Trade Center rather than face the conflagration, or the haunting final phone calls from passengers on the hijacked aircraft. The physical pain of 9/11 will continue for decades among those wounded in the attacks. An untold number of victims, estimated in the thousands, suffered injuries that day and in the ensuing rescue and cleanup operations, some maimed for life. In a reflection of the same trends exploited by the terrorists, many of those harmed on 9/11 were born abroad; the attack killed people from some 80 nations, including a significant number from predominantly Muslim countries.¹¹

Psychological

The 9/11 attacks set a terrible new standard. Up to 10 million U.S. adults knew someone who had been killed or injured in the attacks. Almost every American, and vast numbers of other people around the globe, experienced the attacks through a suffocating flow of media reports. Research indicated that many millions of Americans outside New York City and Washington, DC, experienced negative psychological symptoms such as nightmares, flashbacks, and other anxiety symptoms from September 11.¹² A study showing increased use of cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana by Manhattan residents after 9/11 raised concerns about yet another type of damage to public health from the attack.¹³

The September 11 Fund, a charity, reported providing cash and services to 100,000 victims, including relatives of those killed, people wounded in the attack, and those who lost employment or housing because of 9/11. By one estimate, 6,000 New Yorkers were displaced from their residences in lower Manhattan. While most were able to return home in the weeks after the attacks, their neighborhood had been transformed from a bustling economic center to a devastated graveyard smothered in the acrid dust of crushed concrete and incinerated human remains. During the decade after 9/11, at least 10,000 first responders and citizens who experienced the World Trade Center attack were found to have post-traumatic stress disorder, and in many cases had yet to recover fully, according to health officials.¹⁴

Health and Environmental Consequences

When thousands of responders and volunteers rushed to the World Trade Center in New York, not all probably realized that they too could become victims. The attack created an enormous environmental hazard. Nearly 24,000 gallons of burning jet fuel created an immense toxic cloud. The weight of the collapsing structures vaporized cement, glass, and insulation material, as well as the contents of the buildings, throwing thousands of tons of particulate matter into the air, including glass fibers, asbestos, and lead. In addition to the responders at the site, workers employed to clean the dust thrown off from Ground Zero and nearby residents, including 8,000 children who lived or went to school within a mile of the disaster scene, received significant exposure.

In the months and years after 9/11, some responders and residents exhibited chronic, sometimes debilitating or fatal illness. One follow-up evaluation of more than 10,000 firefighters conducted six months after the attack revealed that 332 had been diagnosed with what was termed the “World Trade Center cough.”

Quantifying the environmental impact of 9/11 proved both difficult and controversial. Scientists grappled with determining the toxicological impact of the materials released by the explosion and fire. Exposure to contaminants, for example, was not uniform.

Shortly after 9/11, Congress established the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which distributed over $7 billion tosurvivors of the 2,880 persons killed in the attacks and to 2,680 individuals who were injured in the attacks or in the rescue efforts; the fund, however, did not address long-term illnesses that resulted from the incident. (That effort largely waited for an additional fund launched in 2011 for others physically injured by the attacks.) Other shortfalls in the response soon became apparent as well. Environmental monitoring in the aftermath of the attack proved inadequate. Responders and civilian volunteers lacked sufficient personnel protective equipment, training, and safety briefings. Accountability of personnel at the disaster site was not well maintained.

Financial

The 9/11 attacks were intended to damage America’s government, military, and economy. They achieved their greatest success with the last. “Those that were there [in the World Trade Center] are men that supported the biggest economic power in the world,” said bin Ladin after the attacks.¹⁵ He later exhorted his followers: “Never be afraid of their [the U.S.] multitudes, for their hearts are empty while their strength has begun to weaken—militarily and economically. This was particularly true after the blessed day of New York, by the grace of Allah, when their losses reached more than one trillion dollars, following the attack and its aftermath …¹⁶ Bin Ladin grossly exaggerated the immediate impact of his work. But while economic damage caused by 9/11 was not enough to cause fundamental harm to the U.S. economy, it did significant financial injury to many locations, sectors, corporations, and individuals.

Short-Term Costs

The most obvious financial costs of the attacks were in the people killed and injured and the buildings, infrastructure, airplanes, and other assets destroyed and damaged on 9/11. Those costs have been estimated at $25 billion to $60 billion in life and property losses, with immediate insurance costs in the $36 billion to $54 billion range.¹⁷ These immediate, direct losses combined with short-term lost economic output and other damage in the hours and days after the attack. Economic aftershocks rippled through the economy as buildings were evacuated, flights were canceled, and stock trading halted. Consumers reduced their spending, and investors decreased their tolerance for risk. Companies in the airline, aerospace, travel, tourism, insurance, lodging, restaurant, and recreation sectors reported drops in demand. During 2001 and 2002, more than 145,000 workers in 34 states lost their jobs for reasons directly or indirectly linked to 9/11, according to a report by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Many were from the airline and hotel industries. Because the report counted only certain types of layoffs, the actual number of job losses was almost certainly higher.¹⁸

Long-Term Costs and the “Terrorism Tax”

The long-term costs of the attack include everything from the impact of loans granted to airlines by the U.S. government to the so-called terrorism tax, which describes increased costs for security. These expenditures include government spending on increased national defense, new homeland security programs, corporate security ex-penses, travel delays, higher insurance costs, increased red tape, higher shipping costs, increased expenses from immigration restrictions, slower mail, disaster planning, and backup sites for business and government organizations. In addition to the loss of more than 6,000 American troops, along with many allied servicemen and civilians, the costs of American military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and other battlefields in the decade after 9/11 exceeded $1 trillion by many estimates, with potential total expenditures of over three times that amount when factors from veterans’ care to interest payments are factored in. To be sure, U.S. military action after 9/11 involved a far broader range of geopolitical factors than responding to a single attack by one enemy group. But even a more focused example of the terrorism tax, additional airline security, was measured in the many billions of dollars in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks.¹⁹

Other costs, including what economists call “frictional costs,” are harder to calculate but clearly significant. For example a group of U.S. business organizations estimated that problems with the visa system for foreign business travelers coming to the United States cost more than $30 billion from 2002 to 2004 in lost sales, extra expenses, relocation costs, and other losses.²⁰ The total terrorism tax is certainly many billions of dollars a year on an ongoing basis. By some estimates, domestic homeland security costs, direct and indirect, exceeded one trillion dollars in the decade after 9/11, prompting critics to assert that a lack of cost/benefit analysis resulted in massive overspending for security. Economists assume that such spending diverts investment from more financially productive areas, depressing growth. On the other hand, it can be argued that good counterterrorism measures can promote growth, protecting activities from disruptions, including from more common natural and man-made disasters, and instilling consumer and customer confidence. Additionally, some security measures may have economic benefits, such as improving the efficiency and management of supply chains. In short, while there is a general consensus that security has a significant influence on the economy, the long-term positive and negative impacts of the terrorist tax remain to be seen.

The impact of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. economy are a case in point. While estimates vary widely, in total the economy of New York City alone lost $83 billion due to the attacks, while total damage to the United States easily exceeded $100 billion.²¹ Strictly speaking, and as evaluated by such measures as percentage of GDP, this loss did not produce a fundamental impact on the U.S. economy, which began recovering from a recession not long after the attacks. However, it did create a substantial hardship for many Americans.

An Efficient Attack

In the terrible calculus of combat, opponents must weigh the costs of their campaigns against the damage they will inflict on the enemy. Viewed in this way, al-Qaida proved highly efficient, at least when considered solely in relation to the direct impact of 9/11 on the attackers and victims. Al-Qaida’s direct expenditures on the 9/11 attacks were between $400,000 and $500,000.²² For that amount, plus the loss of 19 trained operatives, the terrorists killed some 3,000 Americans and caused more than $100 billion in economic damages.

LESSONS FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Responses to the disaster scenes in New York and Arlington, Virginia, also brought to the fore concerns over how the nation prepared for and dealt with both terrorist attacks and large-scale catastrophes. In both locations, the federal government actually played only a limited role in the immediate response. Nevertheless, shortfalls in the response highlighted major concerns with the capacity of the nation to deal with terrorist threats and man-made and natural disasters.

Many of the concerns regarding preparedness and response were highlighted by the congressionally chartered National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, commonly called the 9/11 Commission. In July 2004, the independent bipartisan commission released its voluminous final report, which not only detailed the background and events leading up to 9/11 but also examined the challenges of preventing, preparing for, and responding to the attacks. The findings highlighted significant issues regarding response to all kinds of disasters confronting the United States in the future.

Among the most significant concerns raised was the so-called “connect the dots” challenge. In retrospect, the commission identified a wealth of information that was available to intelligence and law enforcement and might have been used to prevent or prepare for 9/11 and other potential attacks. This finding emphasized the importance of information sharing, not only among intelligence and law enforcement, but also with the broader responder community.

The importance of interoperable communications was also identified as an important concern. The 9/11 Commission concluded, “The inability to communicate was a critical element at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, crash sites, where multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions responded. The occurrence of this problem at three very different sites is strong evidence that compatible and adequate communications among public safety organizations at the local, state, and federal levels remains an important problem.” This lack of ability to communicate was heightened by the lack of common plans and disaster response systems that could help ensure unity in effort in catastrophes.

Finally, concerns were raised about the capacity of the nation’s responders to meet the demands of very large-scale disasters. The federal government did not even have an inventory of resources across the nation that might be applied to disaster response. Furthermore, there were no national standards or baseline requirements for what might be needed in large-scale disasters.

NEW FEARS: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND DISRUPTION

Perhaps the most fundamental lesson of 9/11 was that America’s enemies had both motive and means to cause mass casualties in the United States. While this seems obvious in retrospect, preventing such an attack was never a driving priority of the U.S. government prior to 2001.

While the 9/11 attacks involved the instruments of the everyday world, the interest of terrorists in causing widespread havoc prompted greater concerns over the potential use of WMD. These are nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, and highly explosive weapons capable of inflicting mass casualties and destruction.

Certainly al-Qaida leaders never hid their desire to obtain nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. “Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty,” according to Usama bin Ladin. “If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.”²³

In part, U.S. policy accounted for these threats by focusing on preventing the spread of WMD. But just as global trends had facilitated the 9/11 attack, they also increased the risk that terrorists could acquire WMD. Among other factors were the increased availability of critical technologies and experts, the greater ease of international transportation, and the spread of know-how through the Internet and other media.

Ironically, U.S. assistance to Pakistan and the mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union, may have indirectly facilitated the flow of WMD technology and expertise. Scientists and stockpiles from the former Soviet Union were opened to exploitation. At the same time Pakistan was cooperating with the United States against the Soviets, its experts were developing and proliferating nuclear technology. By 2003 the U.S. government warned: “Presently, al Qa’ida and associated groups possess at least a crude capability to use chemical, biological, and radiological agents and devices in their attacks.”²⁴

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The 9/11 attacks revealed a fundamental truth to America. No longer could reasonable people deny the need to prepare for enemies—whether al-Qaida and other large terrorist organizations, or smaller groups and individuals—capable of devising and executing sophisticated strategies to unleash weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. homeland. As horrendous as 9/11’s destruction proved, it was clear that an even more devastating attack was possible. This finally provided the stimulus to overhaul America’s homeland security policies and prompted far more aggressive measures to protect U.S. citizens and allies. Literally within hours of the attack, American policy makers began planning sweeping reforms, major investments, and global operations. The private sector and citizenry also began to change their behaviors. The results would produce fundamental changes at all levels of American society.

CHAPTER QUIZ

1. What are three characteristics of al-Qaida’s terrorist organization as it existed on 9/11? Why are they significant?

2. Identify two types of modern technology used by twenty-first-century terrorists and why they can be important terrorist tools.

3. Describe the consequences of the 9/11 attack.

4. Identify key issues and lessons for disaster preparedness and response from the September 11 attacks.

5. Might terrorists be more or less likely to employ weapons of mass destruction in the future?

NOTES

1. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Executive Office of the President United States (February 2003), 7.

2. John C. K. Daly, “Revealed Nationalities of Guantanamo,” UPI (February 4, 2004), www.upi.com/print.cfm?StoryID=20040204–051623–5923.

3. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Overview of the Enemy, Staff Statement No. 15,” 10, www.9–11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/staff_statement_15.pdf.

4. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 8.

5. Gabriel Weimann, “WWWTerror.Net: How Terrorists Use the Internet,” Special Report Number 16, U.S. Institute of Peace, www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html.

6. Budget estimated by the CIA as reported in “Overview of the Enemy, Staff Statement No. 15,” 11.

7. Ibid, 8.

8. CNN.com, “Transcript of Bin Laden Interview” (February 5, 2002), www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html.

9. Testimony of George J. Tenet before the Joint Congressional Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks against the United States (June 18, 2002), 9–11congress.netfirms.com/Tenet_June.html.

10. Department of Defense, “UBL Transcript” (December 13, 2001), www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/d20011213ubl.pdf.

11. George Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress” (September 20, 2001), www.white-house.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html.

12. William E. Schlenger et al., “Psychological Reactions to Terrorist Attacks: Findings from the National Study of Americans’ Reactions to September 11,” Journal of the American Medical Association (August 2002): 581–88.

13. David Vlahov et al., “Sustained Increased Consumption of Cigarettes, Alcohol, and Marijuana among Manhattan Residents after September 11, 2001,” American Journal of Public Health, 94/2 (February 2004): 253–54.

14. Anemona Hartocollis, “10 Years and a Diagnosis Later, 9/11 Demons Haunt Thousands,” New York Times, August 10, 2911. A1

15. CNN.com, “Transcript of Bin Laden’s October Interview” (February 5, 2002), www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html.

16. Aljazeera.com, “Message to Iraqis” (October 2003), english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ACB47241-D25F–46CB-B673–56FAB1C2837F.htm.

17. General Accounting Office, “Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center” (May 29, 2002), www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2003/sept/wk2/art03.htm.

18. Department of Labor, “Extended Mass Layoffs and the 9/11 Attacks” (September 10, 2003), www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2003/sept/wk2/art03.htm.

19. Gregg Easterbrook, “Fear Factor in an Age of Terror,” New York Times (June 27, 2004): A1, www.nytimes.com/2004/06/27/weekinreview/27east.html.

20. National Foreign Trade Council, “Visa Backlog Costs U.S. Exporters More Than $30 Billion Since 2002, New Study Finds” (June 6, 2004), www.nftc.org.

21. Estimates of the damages wrought by the 9/11 attack vary depending on the criteria used. The Insurance Information Institute set the initial cost at $40 billion. Insurance Information Institute, Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, Part 1 of 2 (January 9, 2002). A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York put the cost at $33 billion to $36 billion. The Federal Reserve Bank’s estimate included only immediate earning losses, property damage, and cleanup and restoration costs through June 2002 and did not cover long-term productivity and tax revenue losses. Jason Bram et al., “Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York City,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 8/2 (November 2002): 5. The City of New York Comptroller set the total economic impact on the city at between $82.8 billion and $94 billion. Comptroller, City of New York, One Year Later: The Fiscal Impact of 9/11 on New York City (New York: City of New York, September 4, 2002), 1]. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported that it believed the most accurate assessment places the total direct and indirect costs at $83 billion. U.S. General Accounting Office, Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center, GAO–02–7000R (May 29, 2002), 2. In addition, Wilbur Smith Associates estimated the long-term costs of the 9/11 attacks resulting from reduced commercial aviation range from $68.3 billion to $90.2 billion. Wilbur Smith Associates, “The Economic Impact of Civil Aviation on the U.S. Economy—Update 2000” (2002). For the estimate of one trillion dollars in security costs after 9/11, and criticism that much of the money was spent without real cost/benefit analysis, see: John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security (USA: Oxford University Press, 2011).

22. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Outline of the 9/11 Plot, Staff Statement No. 16,” 11, www.9–11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/staff_statement_16.pdf.

23. Declan McCullagh, “Does Osama Have a Nuclear Bomb?” Wired News (September 28, 2001): 1, www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47158,00.html.

24. National Infrastructure Protection Center, “Homeland Security Information Update: Al Qa’ida Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat and Basic Countermeasures” (February 12, 2003), www.nipc.gov/publications/infobulletins/2003/ib03–003.htm.