CHAPTER 20
DOMAIN SECURITY
Border, Maritime, and Aviation Security

The accelerated flow of ideas, goods, and people around the world, while vital to supporting and advancing America’s interests, also creates security challenges that are increasingly borderless and unconventional.

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, February 2010

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

America is connected to the world by networks that ensure the free flow of goods, peoples, services, and ideas. A vital component of the U.S. economy, these networks can also serve as a conduit for pernicious traffic to America’s shores. Conversely, in times of trouble, from natural disasters to pandemics to terrorist attacks, maintaining these networks will be vital to mitigation and recovery. This chapter addresses three of the most important domains through which global networks enter U.S. territory—land, sea, and air—and surveys major homeland security challenges in each of them. The land-domain focuses on the nation’s borders and how related issues of transnational crime and immigration affect their management. The maritime domain includes the seas, coastal and inland waterways, ports, and related maritime infrastructure. Air includes commercial transport, all forms of general aviation, and air defense. Many security analysts call safeguarding these domains “protecting the commons,” ensuring that “common” means of legitimate trade and travel, such as freedom to use the seas, are safe and secure. While discussions on domain security often focus on protecting critical infrastructure, in fact domain security can include the full range of homeland security tasks from early warning to response. It also involves continuous and high stakes balancing of economic and security interests.

CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this chapter, you should be able to

1. Note differences in security on the borders with Mexico and Canada.

2. Describe the role of immigration policies and enforcement in securing the border.

3. Understand components of maritime security.

4. Explain how the principle of layered security is applied to port security.

5. Explain how the principle of layered security is applied to aviation security.

PRINCIPLE OF LAYERED SECURITY

Before World War II, the French military constructed the famed Maginot Line, a series of fortifications and barriers to block traditional invasion routes on the border with Germany. When war broke out, German armies swept through the heavily forested Ardennes, following a route the French did not expect and simply bypassing the Maginot Line. Outflanked, French forces fell back and Paris surrendered. The lesson of the Maginot Line holds great relevance for the challenge of protecting the homeland. When it’s not clear exactly how, when, and where defenses are needed, investing the bulk of resources in one predetermined security effort incurs grave risks. U.S. strategy since 9/11 has viewed the “Maginot Line” approach to homeland security as anathema. Rather, the United States has followed a strategy of “layered security,” relying on a series of programs and initiatives to thwart attacks and mitigate disasters. Securing the perimeter of America is an important layer of the homeland security enterprise.

The perimeter of the United States crosses four physical domains—land, air, sea, and space, each with its own set of layers, from geographical to operational (the fifth domain, the digital and electromagnetic domain of cyberspace, is discussed in Chapter 21. Defense of the space domain falls mostly under the military.). Since no layer of a domain, including the perimeter, is decisive in and of itself, choices must be made concerning how many resources to invest in each—and how to employ them to best effect.

BORDER SECURITY

The federal government has unique and expansive powers regarding both immigration and border security enforcement. A number of laws govern federal authorities here. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, for example, delineates DHS’s responsibilities. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines many legal authorities of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection.

Few issues regarding homeland security are more contentious than border security and immigration. As noted in Chapter 1, concerns over the sovereignty and security of U.S. borders and immigration have waxed and waned over the course of American history. Since 9/11, both issues have received significant attention. Today, three components dominate: terrorism, immigration, and transnational crime.

Terrorism

Concern over terrorist travel is a major homeland security issue. A critical task of the homeland security enterprise is preventing terrorists and weapons of mass destruction from crossing the nation’s borders. The 9/11 Commission studied this problem in great detail and reaffirmed other studies that terrorists and their supporters have usually attempted to infiltrate the United States through legal points of entry. Thus, screening for suspicious individuals before or as they attempt to cross borders has been a primary antiterrorism strategy of the U.S. Furthermore, the government also undertakes significant efforts to screen for WMD materials before or during the shipment of goods through U.S. points of entry. (Detecting radiological and nuclear materials moving through U.S. airports, land crossings and seaports has been a major focus of federal agencies, including DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO. While the government was able to implement screening of most cargo containers coming into U.S. seaports, albeit with sometimes contested accuracy, programs to screen trucks at land crossings ran into repeated problems despite major financial investment.)

Immigration

Immigration relates to homeland and border security in several respects. First, immigration and customs enforcement and border security are missions assigned to DHS. Operational agencies within the department, particularly the CBP, ICE, and Coast Guard, are tasked to support these missions.

Second, many documented cases of terrorist travel involve criminals who used fraudulent or stolen documents and violated other U.S. immigration regulations in order to travel to or remain in the United States. Thus, immigration enforcement and border security are related antiterrorism missions.

Third, illegal border crossing and unlawful presence in the United States are crimes, and the United States dedicates significant resources to battling them and enforcing immigration and workplace laws (though usually involving aliens in the country for economic rather than terrorist or criminal reasons). These crimes exacerbate the challenge of securing borders and divert law enforcement resources that could be used to combat terrorism and transnational crime. The more porous the perimeter, the greater the chance it could be penetrated not only by common criminals but terrorists.

Most border crossing outside legal points of entry occurs across the U.S. land border with Mexico. Another significant source of unlawfully present foreigners comes from “overstays,” individuals who stay in the U.S. after their legal, non-immigrant (such as tourist or student) visas have expired.

Transnational Crime

Transnational crime is the most serious security challenge on both U.S. borders, though the situation on the border with Mexico is far more grave. Transnational crime is facilitated by criminal cartels and international gangs (discussed in Chapter 11). These activities comprise a vast network of criminal enterprise from kidnapping and car theft to murder. Principal activities of concern are human smuggling, drug smuggling, gun trafficking, and money laundering.

America’s Borders

The United States shares thousands of miles of land borders with Canada and Mexico, although the character of each border and programs used to secure it are very different. On the northern border, the focus is joint security cooperation between the United States and Canada, both because threats are lower and both nations share interest and capacity to address them jointly. The U.S. land border with Mexico is more problematic, both because of overwhelming challenges and the limited capacity of federal, regional, and local Mexican authorities to address them. For example, it is estimated that upwards of 97 percent of illegal border crossings occur on the U.S. southern border. At the same time, Mexican security officials are beset by threats, such as attacks and bribery by drug gangs, on their own side of the border.

Canadian Border

The United States and Canada share one of the longest borders in the world. Including the Canadian border with Alaska, this international boundary spans well over 5,000 miles and incorporates diverse terrain and features, from urban crossings to inland waterways to vast expanses of open, rugged landscapes. Major transportation networks, including bridges, roads, and railroads, bisect the boundary.¹

DHS maintains authorized points of entry on the U.S.-Canadian border manned by both U.S. and Canadian officials. Both Canadian and U.S. citizens enjoy visa-free travel between the two countries, though they must carry passports or other authorized travel documents.

In addition to enforcing immigration and customs laws on the border, joint homeland security and counterterrorism efforts have included keeping foreign terrorists out of both countries and countering domestic extremists. Emphasis on security has at times impeded trade and its facilitation, a serious challenge because Canada and the United States are one another’s largest and most important trading partners, with cross-border activity generating more than $1 billion per day.

Currently, Canada and the United States share information and intelligence, cooperate extensively on law enforcement issues—particularly border-related crime and terrorist travel—and work together to thwart potential air and sea threats. Both countries routinely produce national intelligence assessments published in unclassified form so their citizenry can better appreciate current and emerging national security challenges. At the operational level, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation along the border is through the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) program, a joint U.S.-Canadian initiative that combines intelligence and law enforcement capabilities of five agencies to identify and stop high-risk people and goods.

Both Canada and the United States welcome tens of millions of visitors every year. A common concern is that terrorists, transnational criminals, or other undesirable persons among them will attempt to sneak into one country in order to get into the other. Thus, to reduce confusion and loopholes, the United States and Canada must be cognizant of the differences in one another’s immigration and other policies. The nations use a variety of documents to manage entry into their countries. The United States, for example, relies heavily on the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which allows temporary visitors to enter America. As of 2011, citizens of 36 countries are allowed to come in for up to 90 days with only a passport in hand. Canada has a similar program, also intended to enhance tourism and business while boosting national security. In addition to the 36 countries in the United States’s VWP, Canada extends visitor visa exemptions to 17 other countries, including Botswana and Swaziland. This disparity raises some concerns.

Both countries also have streamlined their policies for refugee claims under the Safe Third Country Agreement. Under this policy, asylum seekers must make a claim in the country where they first arrive, whether it is Canada or the United States. They can then seek asylum in the other country if they qualify under certain predetermined exceptions. Both countries have also launched a pilot program to share information on refugee and asylum claimants based on fingerprint records.

Canada and the United States both maintain Terrorist Watch Lists. In 2007 Canada’s Passenger Protect program created a list of specified persons believed to pose an immediate threat should they attempt to board a flight. Specific guidelines dictate whether an individual should be added to the list.

The United States and Canada both have border cargo-screening programs. As part of the 2001 U.S.-Canada Smart Border Declaration 30-Point Action Plan, CBP and the Canada Border Services Agency launched the In-Transit Container Targeting at Seaports Initiative to target in-transit marine containers at the first point of arrival, be it Canada or the United States. Unarmed U.S. Customs Service analysts are stationed at Canadian marine ports in Vancouver, Halifax, and Montréal to target high-risk, in-transit containers for examination by Canadian customs officers. Likewise, Canadian customs inspectors are stationed in Seattle/Tacoma, Washington, and Newark, New Jersey, to target containers en route to Canada by surface transportation.

While U.S.-Canadian border security activities have been generally cooperative, increasingly both countries are focusing on a “perimeter security” approach, shifting focus away from their joint borders to other external borders. The goal is to maximize use of assets to keep threats out of both countries, rather than simply focus on dangers crossing from one to the other. This strategy should allow for more efficient use of resources, but does require greater harmonization of visa and customs laws between the two countries. Such harmonization raises concerns over differing national regulations and expectations over privacy, due-process, and other issues, along with increasing the reliance of each country on the homeland security capabilities of the other.

Border with Mexico

The United States shares about 2,000 miles of border with Mexico; most of that, about 1,200 miles, belongs to Texas. New Mexico, Arizona, and California comprise the rest. On the Mexican side, six Mexican states straddle the line. The border offers advantages and challenges to both countries. On the one hand, as with Canada, the border with Mexico is an “economic engine.” Hundreds of millions of people cross each year, the overwhelming majority traveling through legal points of entry and exit, such as land border crossing points, airports, and harbors. Billions of tons of goods, accounting for a third of the U.S. gross domestic product, transit America’s borders as well.

Yet the U.S. border with Mexico also raises significant security concerns. Crime in border communities has mushroomed. Cartels war over control of smuggling corridors that run between the two countries, illicitly moving drugs, money, arms, and people through networks of operatives in cities throughout the United States and Canada.

Human smuggling and illegal border crossing complicate the challenge of responding to violent transnational crime and terrorist infiltration. The single largest group of individuals unlawfully entering the United States comes from Mexico and surrounding states. Serious criminals hide among the hundreds of thousands of individuals who illegally cross each year. Security officials often focus on OTM, or “Other than Mexican,” cases involving border crossers from third countries who may be pursuing more than just employment in the United States. In addition, illegal border crossers contribute to the unlawful population in the United States, historically slightly exceeding the number of illegal aliens who overstayed legal visas.

U.S. customs and immigration laws and policies generally operate the same with Mexico as Canada, with exceptions. For example, by law and under directives from DHS, the CBP is granted “expedited removal” authority along the border with Mexico. This allows rapid return of illegal aliens in the United States to their country of origin.

The security situation on the boundary with Mexico is dramatically different than on America’s northern border. The vast majority of the Border Patrol, for example, serves on the border with Mexico, and Spanish language proficiency is a prerequisite for employment. Along with substantially increasing manpower on the border in recent years, the United States launched a number of other security initiatives.

It is clear that greater law enforcement focus on the border can impact both smuggling and illegal crossing. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies executed a series of interdiction operations along the border and in the interior, using community policing and investigations to identify, target, and disrupt human and drug smuggling operations. As an example, Operation Rio Grande, launched in 2006, reduced all crime by an average of 60 percent in sheriff-patrolled areas of border counties, according to Texas officials.

Among the most controversial tactics is the use of obstacles to inhibit individuals and vehicles from crossing the border. In 2006, President Bush signed legislation to build 700 miles of fence along the border between the United States and Mexico in order to curb illegal crossings.

Border fencing around San Diego, California, substantially reduced illegal crossings. While obstacles work well in some areas, their overall efficacy is poorly understood. The effectiveness of obstacles such as fencing depends on the nature of geography and its impact on smuggling routes. Even the most robust border obstacles can be breached; thus, they can usually only delay, not eliminate, illegal crossing by individuals or vehicles. Border Patrol officers evaluate the effectiveness of obstacles in terms of the “melting point,” the time it takes after an individual illegally crosses the border to disappear into an urban area or major transportation system. When this time is brief, such as where border cities back up on one another, obstacles allow essential time for Border Patrol officers to interdict crossers. In contrast, in remote, lightly trafficked areas where it takes hours to reach a major highway, obstacles are far less cost-effective. In those locations, U.S. security officials already have plenty of time to catch border-crossers before they reach a pick-up spot or city. In these areas, other resources may be more productive than fences.

The federal government has employed increasingly sophisticated technology at the border, including aerostats, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fixed and mobile ground sensors. These technologies have produced mixed results. Smugglers continually experiment with techniques to evade detection, including digging tunnels, using ultralight aircraft to fly across the border, and disguising themselves as Border Patrol agents. The government has also experienced severe management challenges in adapting innovative technologies and tactics. One of DHS’s most high-profile contracting programs, the multi-billion dollar SBInet initiative designed to integrate advanced technology and sophisticated operations along the border, in effect collapsed in 2010 after years of delays caused by mismanagement, technical problems, and red-tape.

An organizational tool increasingly used to deal with border crime is the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST). Similar to the IBET program on the U.S.-Canadian border, BEST involves U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to investigate crimes associated with the border on a regional basis. They also cooperate with Mexican law enforcement.

Several states have undertaken cooperative programs to deal with border-associated crime. Texas, for example, maintains an operations center to organize its activities and conducts integrated statewide operations, often with the CBP, ICE, and other federal agencies. National Guard forces have also been employed to support security-related tasks, serving under Title 32 or state duty status. In 2006, for example, 6,000 National Guard troops deployed to the southern border in Operation Jump Start. Some states, such as Arizona, have criticized the federal government for inadequately enforcing immigration laws and adopted their own measures to combat unlawful presence and enforce workplace laws. These efforts have engendered significant controversy, as have efforts in the opposite policy direction by major jurisdictions that reduced cooperation with federal enforcement, in some cases leaving dangerous illegal immigrants free to commit new crimes.

Many Americans demand effective border security as the first step in any strategy for controlling illegal immigration and smuggling. While stronger border security is both possible and advisable, under current policy, operational and technological conditions it will never stop all smuggling or illegal crossing for purposes of unlawful residence in the United States. In fact, some security tactics, used without an effective broader strategy, may have unintended consequences. Throughout the 1990s, shoring up the southwestern border was the number one priority in immigration policy. As a result, the U.S. Border Patrol was doubled from about 4,000 agents to about 8,000. However, researcher Douglas Massey found that “[i]ncreased border enforcement has only succeeded in pushing immigration flows into more remote regions.”² Such policies may also increase the number of illegal crossers, including women and children, who die from factors such as dehydration, raising legitimate humanitarian concerns and potentially weakening public support for security. Likewise, another analyst, David Muhlhausen, found that border security arrests might actually increase the unlawful population, reporting “the average apprehended migrant returned to Mexico stays in the country for a shorter period of time, and once inside the United States, the average migrant stays in the United States longer than do those without a previous apprehension.”³ In other words, rather than behaving as migratory labor and taking trips home, arrested individuals might be more likely to stay put in the U.S.

Such research suggests border security is an important aspect of dealing with unlawful migration—but not decisive in and of itself. This same truism holds for combating terrorist travel and transnational crime. Dealing with threats requires an integrated strategy with appropriate investments in each “layer” of defense.

Immigration and Nonimmigration Management Initiatives

Systems used to monitor travel and certify lawful presence in the United States have application to all homeland security-related missions. Passports and visas are travel instruments used in managing nonimmigration-related visits to the United States. A passport is a document issued by a national government that certifies the holder’s nationality and identity. In most cases, both U.S. residents and citizens of other countries must have a passport to enter the United States. Since 9/11 the United States and many other nations have added bio-metric features to passports to authenticate identity. The United States records passport data of persons entering the country under the US-VISIT program. In addition, the United States and other partner countries report and share information on lost and stolen passports.

A visa is a travel authorization issued for a temporary visit. Normally affixed to a passport, visas stipulate the period of stay allowed and conditions, such as whether employment is authorized. Not all foreign nationals need a visa to enter the United States. This includes participants in the Visa Waiver Program, although they must register through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). There are many categories of visas and associated monitoring systems. Students, for example, have their own special visas and their stay is monitored under the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP). Immigrants need a specific visa to come to the United States as a prelude to obtaining lawful residence status or U.S. citizenship.

The Department of State is responsible for issuing visas and visa security measures. Provisions for improving visa security were established after 9/11 in the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, particularly with regard to intelligence sharing and visa issuance and monitoring. In addition, by law the Departments of Homeland Security and State share responsibility for visa policies.

In addition, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, ICE, and CBP are responsible for identifying and combating illegal activities by immigrant and nonimmigrant foreign nationals, especially suspected criminals and terrorists. Verifying lawful presence, workplace authorization and detention and removal are all activities that impact homeland security. For example, individuals detained for removal as “high risk” may be interviewed for national security concerns. The programs are managed by the DHS (see Chapter 4).

MARITIME SECURITY

The many thousands of miles of U.S. coastline are not only a border, but also a domain vital to the security of the nation. Approximately 95 percent (by volume) of U.S. overseas trade transits the maritime domain. In addition, many major population centers and critical infrastructures are close to U.S. ports or accessible by waterways. The future U.S. maritime environment will be characterized by continued growth in seaborne shipment of energy products, rapid expansion of deep seabed mining, further adoption of containerized shipping, and the continued rise of megaports as commercial hubs for trans-shipment and deliveries. Maritime security is a complex strategic problem encompassing the physical domain, land-based critical infrastructure, intermodal transportation, and international supply chains that convey goods, services, and passengers. The task is not only safeguarding America’s borders but also ensuring the safety and security of maritime services and activities, as well as nearby populations.

Risks associated with the maritime domain are also diverse. Terrorism, either aimed at maritime targets or using maritime networks to transport agents or materials, is only one concern. Transnational criminal activities such as piracy, human trafficking, and drug smuggling are also threats. Maritime security addresses health and environmental threats as well. Infectious diseases can be carried by seaborne traffic. Hazardous material spills, as in the 2010 Gulf oil spill, can represent a significant danger. Maritime security assets may also be deployed to address natural disasters.

Federal authorities for maritime security are governed by a veritable ocean’s worth of regulations, including the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the Safe Port Act of 2006, as well as numerous other laws and regulations, plus treaties and conventions to which the United States is a party. States and local governments also have laws and regulations that sometimes apply. Additional complications arise where military, law enforcement, or emergency response personnel are operating. U.S. territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles from the shore. The U.S. exclusive economic zone extends 200 nautical miles from the U.S. coast, and marks where the U.S. government has special rights over marine and seabed resources. In addition, there are inland and coastal waterways. Governance over these waters falls among federal, state, and local authorities.

International Cooperation

No aspect of homeland security relies more on international cooperation than maritime security. Canada cooperates with the United States on maritime security but provides only a modicum of operational capability. Unlike the law enforcement-oriented U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Coast Guard operates under the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans and does not have a constabulary function. Basic maritime security missions, such as search and rescue, interdiction, and exclusive economic zone surveillance and enforcement, have been executed by the Canadian navy, which has traditionally shunned the littoral in favor of more overseas operations. Furthermore, the Canadian naval fleet is not well suited to domestic maritime missions.

Canada’s participation in maritime security is further fragmented by its command structures. The Canada Command, created in 2006 to synchronize defense efforts for Canada and greater North America, provides a single chain of command for navy, army, and air force personnel in a domestic operation. The Canadian Coast Guard, however, is not included in this structure; it operates under the Marine Security Operations Centers (MSOCs). These centers are also headed by the Canadian Forces and staffed with personnel from the Canada Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Canadian Coast Guard. To facilitate cooperation, in 2006 the United States and Canada agreed to assign NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), a maritime warning mission, which includes providing shared situational awareness of threats in maritime approaches, maritime areas, and inland waterways shared by the two countries.

Other foreign maritime powers contribute to U.S. homeland security. For example, local navies in the Caribbean participate in the interdiction of drug trafficking through cooperation with Joint Interagency Task Force South. International allies also cooperate in targeting suspected WMD materials at sea through participation in a program called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

More broadly, key instruments of international cooperation for the United States are the International Ship and Port Facility Security (commonly called ISPS) Codes and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Established under the International Maritime Organization, the ISPS, which became effective in 2004, is the first multilateral ship and port security standard. It requires nations to submit port facility and ship security plans, making port security a shared responsibility. SOLAS provides a vehicle to ensure the enactment and implementation of ISPS among signatory countries.

Organization of U.S. Maritime Security

Over 20 federal agencies participate in maritime security activities, though the lion’s share of activities are conducted by the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and State. DHS (with the Coast Guard as executive agent) is the federal lead agency for maritime homeland security. The Defense Department is in charge of efforts to integrate maritime intelligence and improve maritime domain awareness. The State Department promotes maritime security initiatives abroad. The Departments of Commerce, Energy, Justice, and Transportation have missions as well. Many maritime-related activities require interagency coordination. For example, evaluation of security risks in the controversial proposed 2006 sale of port facilities to DP World was conducted under the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States, an interagency activity (see Chapter 16).

Activities are coordinated through a family of plans directed by the president, including orders that govern threat response, domain awareness, maritime commerce security, maritime transportation systems security, international coordination and outreach and intelligence integration, and maritime infrastructure recovery.

The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan provides a framework for coordinating national response to dangers in the maritime domain. It establishes roles and responsibilities and also provides protocols and procedures to evaluate, adjudicate, and task agencies to respond based on the nature of the threat. Under MOTR, for example, DHS (through the Coast Guard) is the lead federal agency responsible for interdicting maritime threats where it operates, and the Justice Department, through the FBI, is assigned as the lead agency responsible for investigating such threats.

The goal of the maritime domain awareness plan is to generate the national maritime common operating picture (often called the COP), information to provide early warning, facilitate intelligence gathering, and support response activities. Implementation of this effort is led by the Defense and Homeland Security departments.

DHS is primarily responsible for implementing recommendations of the maritime commerce and transportation security plans. These include improving risk management, developing interagency information sharing, improving the “credentialing” of commercial and recreational activities, enhancing safety practices, promoting new technologies, and expanding training and exercises. Commerce initiatives facilitate economic activity and enhance supply-chain security.

International cooperation and intelligence integration plans focus on leveraging existing interagency efforts. The State Department serves as the lead federal agency for international maritime cooperation efforts. Intelligence integration draws on the capabilities of the intelligence community (see Chapter 6).

If an incident significantly disrupts maritime infrastructure, the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery plan guides federal efforts in its wake. The plan covers procedures for recovery management and provides mechanisms for national, regional, and local officials to set priorities for restoring the flow of cargo and commerce. This plan is managed by DHS, whose secretary has authority to declare a “transportation security incident” to activate the plan.

Port Security

U.S. ports are unique infrastructures formed of a vast array of enterprises. Ports themselves are owned by states, local authorities, or private entities. They can include various kinds of infrastructure, from passenger terminals to pipelines, refineries, warehouses, railroad terminals, bridges, and tunnels. According to the American Association of Port Authorities, in 2011 there were 185 public ports located on the coasts of the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, Great Lakes within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In addition, the United States has over 170 “inland” ports.

These facilities are diverse in their size and scope, although larger ports dominate. Just 15 ports, for example, account for about 90 percent of passenger cruise industry activity. Fifty ports involve about 90 percent of all cargo tonnage. Most military assets are shipped overseas through only 17 seaports, with just 4 of them designated specifically for shipment of arms, ammunition, and military units through Defense Department-owned facilities.

By law within the United States, public ports are assigned a “captain of the port.” These are U.S. Coast Guard officers, designated by the commandant, who direct Coast Guard law enforcement activities within a designated area of responsibility. The captain of the port’s duties span all homeland security-activities, including enforcing regulations for protection and security of vessels; harbor, waterfront, and anchorage facilities; bridges; and safety and security zones within the ports and adjacent waterways. The captain of the port coordinates with private sector tenants of the facility, as well as federal, state, county, municipal law enforcement, and emergency responders. Each port authority—the manager of the facility—is also required to have a port security director who oversees security, public safety, and emergency response requirements as under the ISPS codes.

Resources available for port security vary greatly. The port may have its own local law enforcement jurisdiction. Some ports are supported in fusion centers (see Chapter 6). A number of federal entities could be represented at the port in addition to the Coast Guard, such as the CBP, ICE, and Defense Department, plus FBI maritime liaison agents.

Port security is often envisioned as a series of concentric rings. The “outer” comprises intelligence and operational assets that identify, provide warnings on and interdict natural or human-made threats before they reach the port. The “perimeter” security ring includes access control, physical barriers, and monitoring to prevent unauthorized access and keep dangerous materials or persons out of the port. The “inner” security ring includes public safety and physical security practices at the facility. Site, asset, and vessel-specific security constitute protective measures for particular infrastructures. Finally, emergency response and recovery resources provide the means to mitigate damage and disruption after an incident occurs.

Small Boats

An aspect of the maritime domain that has gained additional attention since 9/11 is small commercial and recreational boating. Globally, terrorists have shown an increasing interest in using small boats to attack military and commercial shipping and maritime facilities. Using small vessels or swimmers to deliver improvised explosive devices is a proven and exportable terrorist tactic. The definition of “small-boat threat” encompasses a variety of possible weapon-delivery vehicles, tactics, and payloads. Threat vessels could include everything from small freighters, large yachts, fishing trawlers, and commercial tugs to dinghies, Jet Skis, and submarines, including mini-submarines like those used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor or by North Korea in covert operations, or semisubmersible craft now used by international drug cartels.⁴

The best known incident of “small boat” terrorism was the October 2000 attack when two al-Qaida operatives rammed a vessel filled with approximately 500 pounds of shaped explosive charges against the hull of the USS Cole, which was refueling in Yemen’s port of Aden. Besides disabling this Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the attack killed 17 U.S. sailors and wounded 39 others. Al-Qaida had launched a similar attack against the USS The Sullivans when it docked in Yemen in January 2000. (The attack boat sank after the terrorists miscalculated the weight of the explosive charge.) The Cole bombing generated publicity for al-Qaida and was subsequently featured in its recruiting videos and other propaganda. Its lessons have not been forgotten by terrorists or security officials.

Small boats operate across the United States all the time, transiting thousands of miles of coastline, inland waterways, and lakes. On any given day, the number of these craft in U.S. waters is vast. Thousands of boats are bought and sold every year, and many small boats are operated with minimal training or licensing. They are also not closely tracked by government officials, even in some sensitive areas. Frequent undeclared entries by small boats occur between the United States and Canada and between the United States and the Bahamas every day. In many areas, small boats operate in proximity to high-value ships and maritime infrastructure without restriction.

Local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies have limited capability to detect threats, such as boat-borne bombs, and standoff detection is usually restricted to yards at best. Current detection capabilities are a mix of intrusive and nonintrusive systems. Almost all of them are time-consuming and costly, and most present significant “false negatives” and “false positives” in attempting to identify threats.

Law enforcement at all levels also has limited capacity to disable small craft or swimmers and ineffective response times when threats arise. Methods of incapacitation mostly involve the use of potentially lethal force, but rules for the employment of such force are not consistent across government agencies. In addition, methods for disabling small boats using nonlethal technologies are neither widely available nor particularly effective. Emerging technologies include specialized booms and other barriers to block attacking small boats, as well as underwater detection systems to identify terrorist swimmers. Since 2007 the U.S. Coast Guard has undertaken a efforts to address these concerns.

Post–9/11 Maritime Security Initiatives

A number of maritime security programs were initiated after the September 11 attacks, and some are now well established. Others are still being implemented or restructured. The most significant include the following.

The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) was required by the Maritime and Transportation Security Act. By law, DHS is required to develop biometric identification cards for individuals requiring unescorted access to secure areas of seaport facilities or vessels, including Coast Guard-credentialed merchant mariners, port facility employees, longshore workers, and truck drivers. The Transportation Security Administration has overall responsiblility for managing the program. In 2011 DHS declared the initial rollout of the TWIC would involve only a “visual identity check,” rather than requiring use of the biometric capability, raising more questions about the ability of the homeland security enterprise to integrate complex programs and frustrating stakeholders who favored stronger port security. Additionally, the Coast Guard conducts inspections and uses handheld readers during spot checks to ensure credentials are valid, including those held by the crews of high-interest vessels such as tankers carrying liquefied natural gas to U.S. ports (vessels viewed by some experts as potential floating improvised explosive devices).

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) places staff at designated foreign seaports to work with international counterparts to inspect “high-risk containers.” The CBP screens manifests to identify suspicious cargo and then asks overseas ports to inspect questionable shipping containers before they sail to the United States. As of 2011, CSI is in place at 58 non-U.S. ports in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin and Central America, through which about 86 percent of all containerized cargo is shipped to the United States. In addition to prescreening, the CBP can require inspection at U.S. ports of entry from all points of origin. Additional statutory requirements direct that DHS physically scan 100 percent of all (not just high-risk) cargo overseas. By 2011, however, the department had not determined a feasible means to implement this mandate.

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a voluntary program available to manufacturers, shippers, and other entities involved in supply chains that cross U.S. borders. C-TAP is managed by the CBP. Companies agree to improve the security of their supply chains in return for a reduced likelihood that their containers will be inspected.

AVIATION SECURITY

Like the maritime domain, U.S. airspace is a complex place vital to the national economy but vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists and damage from human-made and natural disasters. Two months after the 9/11 attacks, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created the Transportation Security Administration, initially as part of the Department of Transportation but later folded into DHS. The TSA is responsible for overseeing commercial and recreational aviation, including commercial airline safety, and inspecting boarding passengers. Other DHS elements also have air security missions, including the U.S. Coast Guard and CBP. In addition, the Departments of Defense, State, and Transportation have significant responsibilities related to protecting U.S. airspace.⁵

Nor is air security strictly a federal mission. State and local governments play important roles, particularly in safeguarding airports and other aviation infrastructure. The private sector also has an enormous stake in airspace security, extending well beyond commercial passenger travel and airfreight. General aviation is a significant component of the sector. Finally, air security is an international challenge involving cooperation and support of many nations with a mutual interest in safe skies.

Commercial Passenger Aviation

The largest, highest profile component of TSA’s mission is aviation security. This is not surprising given 9/11 and the terrorists’ subsequent focus on more attacks against commercial passenger aviation. While airline passengers focus on the screening they endure at checkpoints before heading to the gate, aviation security is actually a multi-faceted, layered network of antiterrorism measures.

U.S. aviation security is compliant with standards established under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which governs international civil aviation security. The United States works through this organization to establish global standards. In 2010, at the urging of the United States, the 190 member countries of the ICAO adopted the Declaration on Aviation Security. It raises the bar for best practices to combat terrorist threats. The United States also routinely consults with the International Air Transport Association, a trade group that represents about 230 airlines and more than 90 percent of the world’s air traffic.

While international agreements establish the “baseline” for transnational air transport security, the TSA is responsible for overseeing U.S. programs. As with other aspects of domain security, the United States employs a layered approach. The outer layer is identifying threats and limiting opportunities for terrorists to travel, board planes to conduct an attack, or ship dangerous materials via cargo. These measures include screening passenger manifests to identify individuals on the Terrorist Watch List (see Chapter 4) and identifying “high-risk” passengers who may require additional scrutiny. Manifest screening is conducted for both domestic and international flights using Passenger Name Record (PNR) identifying information, which travelers furnish when they purchase an airline ticket. Meanwhile, the CBP through C-TPAT is improving the surety of supply chains that use commercial air transport.

The second layer of security occurs at airports themselves. The TSA issues regulations that govern access to sensitive areas, as well as policies governing facility security. Airports, carriers, and service providers are routinely inspected by the TSA, which is also expanding TWIC, the secure access credentials discussed above for personnel employed in transportation.

The third layer of security involves keeping “bad” things off the plane. The TSA requires screening of passengers, checked baggage, and cargo on all domestic flights and international flights bound for the United States. This arena combines massive operational and technological challenges. Security officials must deploy screening techniques and technologies capable both of detecting threats and doing so rapidly enough to avoid massive travel delays. Unlike many other areas of homeland security, aviation security personnel must operate on the “retail level,” interacting with huge numbers of air travelers, often in close physical contact (using processes that have provoked substantial public anger at times). At the same time, terrorists are constantly adapting their tactics to take advantage of openings created by the limits of technology or lax procedures. Examples include not just the Christmas underwear bomb discussed above, but the 2006 liquid explosives case and the 2009 “printer bomb” plot, in which commercial shipping services were used to place bombs aboard both passenger and cargo jet aircraft.

The final layer of security involves detecting and responding to hostile acts in flight. This task is assigned to undercover federal air marshals traveling on selected “high-risk” overseas and domestic flights and is supported by the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program, which allows specially trained airline pilots to carry handguns. (In practice, the last line of defense has proven to be air passengers themselves, who disrupted both the Christmas and shoe bomber attacks after government systems failed to keep terrorists and their weapons off commercial aircraft.)

General Aviation

General aviation involves 5,288 community airports in the United States and supports 1.3 million jobs, totaling just over 1 percent of GDP. The approximately 219,000 general aviation aircraft in the United States account for 77 percent of all U.S. air traffic. Safeguarding this dynamic, decentralized, and diversified sector of the U.S. transportation network while not disrupting its economic contribution is no easy task.

The sheer size and diversity of the general aviation sector make it difficult to develop a single security policy. Ninety percent of general aviation aircraft registered in the United States are powered by a single engine, have a short travel range, and weigh and hold about the same amount of cargo as a Honda Civic. Ten percent are medium-size jets that weigh over 12,500 pounds and are usually chartered for business travel, sometimes intercontinental. The over 19,000 landing facilities that service general aviation exhibit similar diversity. Some are grass runways in the wilderness, while others are fully functioning international airports in large cities. In addition, airports are scattered throughout the United States, including Alaska and the Hawaiian islands. Because there is no standard size, shape, or function of a general aviation airport, it is difficult to devise uniform security standards.

The TSA Aviation Security Advisory Committee has published “General Aviation Security Guidelines” that provide municipalities, owners, and operators of general aviation airports a set of recommendations to enhance security. Just as it does for major commercial airports, the TSA issues security advisories to general aviation airports, giving them relevant facts on security that are designed to increase security awareness. In terms of airport infrastructure security, TSA has issued its “Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction.” This document contains guidelines on airport layout, security screening, emergency response, access control, and communications.

Transportation patterns are likewise diverse and fluid. The single characteristic that all general aviation flights share is that, unlike commercial flights, they operate on-demand and are not routinely scheduled. Flights range from pleasure hops to rapid turn charters of business jets. Depending on the size, speed, and destination of the aircraft, pilots might need to file formal flight plans or simply radio the control tower when they reach their final destination, making it virtually impossible to track the majority of in transit aircraft.

Popular fears sometimes involve the use of a general aviation plane in a repeat of 9/11. But as a weapon, most general aircraft can only deliver a fraction of the damage of a large commercial airliner. Along with similar cases, the 2006 crash of New York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle into an office building shows that small aircraft may not cause significant damage to buildings or the people inside them. The only people to die in the crash were Lidle and his instructor aboard the aircraft. Even a plane packed with explosives would have modest potential as an air-delivered weapon. Critical infrastructure is often resilient enough to survive such attacks. For example, nuclear power plants are designed to sustain an accidental crash from a commercial airliner. Another overstated threat involving general aviation is that crop dusters could be used to disseminate biological or chemical weapons. Experts, however, doubt the practicality of such a tactic. Conventional sprayers on crop dusters or air tankers used to fight forest fires, for example, probably would not be very effective at dispensing biological or chemical agents (for more detail, see Chapter 14).

To be sure, a commandeered small plane, especially if used against a symbolic target such as a sports event or national leader, could be part of a successful terrorist attack. However, a more serious threat from general aviation may come from using aircraft as a terrorist transportation platform—a means to convey “bad things” or “bad people.” General aviation provides a discreet means to move cargo rapidly over a long distance, and security standards for travelers, particularly passengers, are much more lax than for commercial airliners. While private pilots have their identities and credentials checked on a regular basis, passengers may not be screened, even when they fly internationally. On domestic flights, cargo is almost never inspected.

Drug smuggling demonstrates the potential to exploit the general aviation sector for illicit activity. For years, small private planes have been used to transport narcotics from South America to Mexico and the United States. In addition to illicit material, general aviation can be an effective means to smuggle people. With thousands of landing facilities in the United States, plus innumerable fields, open spaces, and roads that could serve as impromptu runways, there are seemingly endless locations to deliver passengers and cargo covertly.

One security improvement has been the “Airport Watch” program, a joint venture between private and government communities cofounded by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and the TSA. This partnership resulted in an elaborate Neighborhood Watch-like program at thousands of local airports nationwide—a network that includes over 650,000 pilots, as well as airport officials, who serve as eyes and ears for law enforcement. Airport Watch includes warning signs for airports, informational literature, and a training video to teach pilots and airport employees how to enhance security. The program has prevented theft and break-ins at airports in Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, Georgia, Arkansas, and Minnesota.

After 9/11, the private sector worked with the Federal Aviation Administration and the TSA to make flight training more secure and prevent future terrorists from learning to fly at U.S. schools. The first step was advanced screening of pilot databases against TSA threat watch lists. Adopted in January 2003, this regulation means that individuals who show up on TSA watch lists can have their flight certificates suspended or revoked.

Another security measure applies to foreigners training for pilot certificates, who were made subject to a Department of Justice background check before entering training. A more stringent screening process covers foreigners seeking to learn to fly jet aircraft over 12,500 pounds. This rule, dubbed by experts the “Twelve-Five Rule,” became law as part of the FAA reauthorization legislation in 2002. In addition, the Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act requires that flight school instructors be trained in identifying “suspicious circumstances and activities of individuals enrolling or attending a flight school.” On the domestic side, U.S. student pilots must show a government-issued photo ID to verify their identity before enrolling in flight school, and many schools require instructors to be present whenever a student pilot is on the tarmac or near training aircraft.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Domain security represents one of the most complex challenges of the homeland security enterprise, and also one of the most vital. It bisects many homeland security missions and is often politically charged. Activities in domain security cross over federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector. Domain security also carries significant international dimensions and major economic implications. In this area, competition between the demands of homeland security and commerce are often most apparent.

CHAPTER QUIZ

1. What is the purpose of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential?

2. Why is there more security on the border with Mexico than on the border with Canada?

3. What are significant threats associated with general aviation?

4. What is the difference between a visa and a passport?

5. What international organizations are important for domain security? Why?

NOTES

1. This section is adapted from James Jay Carafano, “Northern Exposure: The Right Way to Address U.S.-Canadian Counterterrorism,” Backgrounder No. 2104 (February 1), www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/02/Northern-Exposure-The-Right-Way-to-Address-US-Canadian-Counterterrorism.

2. Douglas Massey, “Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement Without Legislation Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration,” Cato Institution (June 13, 2005), www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa–029.pdf.

3. David Muhlhausen, “Building a Better Border: What the Experts Say,” Heritage Foundation, (July 17, 2006) www.heritage.org/Research/Immigration/upload/bg_1952.pdf.

4. This section is adapted from James Jay Carafano, “Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea,” Backgrounder No. 2041 (June 11, 2007), www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/06/Small-Boats-Big-Worries-Thwarting-Terrorist-Attacks-from-the-Sea.

5. This section is adapted from James Jay Carafano, “America Needs a Security Strategy for Safer Skies,” Executive Memorandum No. 996 (March 21, 2006), s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2006/pdf/em996.pdf; “Keeping the Skies Friendly: Next Steps for General Aviation Security,” Backgrounder No. 2051 (July 13, 2007), www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/07/keeping-the-skies-friendly-next-steps-for-general-aviation-security.